



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT – SUPPLEMENTARY #2

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. This is a second supplementary statement to the SIS Witness Statement handed to the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) on 27 May 2016. It is provided to support a request from the HIA Inquiry on 2 July 2016 for additional material in relation to an assertion made by an SIS officer in paragraph 5 of a Minute dated 12 October 1989: that *"We ran at least one agent who was aware of sexual malpractice at the Home, and who may have mentioned this to his SIS or Security Service case officer."* The Minute is referred to in paragraphs 41-42 and Article 9 of the SIS witness statement dated 27 May 2016.
4. The author of the Minute was a former SIS officer who, in October 1989, had direct responsibility for managing matters relating to SIS external communications and disclosure. This role is analogous to similar posts that currently sit within the area for which I now have responsibility. The SIS record shows that the officer never served in Northern Ireland or in a role which had responsibility for matters connected to Northern Ireland. The officer retired in March 1991, and died in 2007.
5. The SIS record shows that the Minute was initiated in SIS London to record details of a meeting held at Gower Street (MI5's London base from 1976-95) on 11 October 1989 involving the author of the Minute, a second SIS officer (deceased April 1992) and an officer

from MI5. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a list of questions recorded by MI5 that had been formulated at a recent Cabinet Office meeting in relation to a review being conducted by senior MoD official, A G Rucker, into Colin Wallace. Some of the questions concerned allegations made by Wallace related to the Kincora Boys' Home. The meeting on 11 October was to discuss a response to the Cabinet Office questions that incorporated the results of consulting SIS and MI5 records, given that the two agencies had worked jointly in Northern Ireland during the key period in question.

6. As I made clear in my evidence of 30 June, in preparing material for the current Inquiry, SIS conducted extensive searches to identify any further material that may have led the author of this Minute to reach his conclusion. No such records have been identified, either from the period in the mid-1970s, or from 1989 when this minute was produced, beyond those already made available to the Inquiry. SIS records relating to Colin Wallace, which would have been reviewed by this officer in 1989 (and that were primarily focused on the national security implications of the material which he disclosed to the media), have already been made available to the Inquiry. The officer is likely to have had broad access to relevant Service files when conducting their work, subject to the limitations on our file management systems for that period, of which the Inquiry has already been made aware. On this basis, it is unclear why the officer reached this conclusion, which does not appear to be supported by other material identified in searches conducted by SIS, all of which has been disclosed to the HIA Inquiry.
7. I am aware that MI5 possess a corresponding Note for File, documenting their officer's account of the meeting on 11 October 1989, which they intend to disclose to the Inquiry. I understand that the document reveals the identity of the agent and that SIS officers were made aware of MI5 records that indicate that, in the mid-1970s, a handler had informed a particular agent of an allegation relating to McGrath's homosexuality. The allegation had originated from Roy Garland.
8. No reference is made in the MI5 document to "sexual malpractice at the Home [Kincora]" though I note that the MI5 officer expressed the view that some information on the agent's record could be "incorrectly interpreted". Given the apparently conflicting contemporaneous records from the 11 October meeting, and in the absence of any corroborating material for the SIS officer's account, I believe it is quite possible the SIS officer misinterpreted what was discussed at the meeting.
9. Research into the distribution of the SIS Minute shows that it was signed off without comment by two other London-based SIS officers. These officers had separate responsibilities for engagement with Whitehall Departments and regional affairs. Wider searches conducted by SIS for the HIA Inquiry has failed to identify any material on the SIS corporate record that could help to corroborate or dispute the assertion made by the author in paragraph 5 of the SIS Minute.

SIS Officer A

Signed

SIS Officer A

Date

14/7/16