



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT – SUPPLEMENTARY #6

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. This is SIS's seventh Witness Statement and supplemental to the statement handed to the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) on 27 May 2016. The statement has been made to support a request of the HIA Inquiry to provide information on matters associated with Sir Maurice Oldfield (Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service 1973-78).

OLDFIELD NOTES (2011 & 2014)

4. During a review of sensitive papers relating to Sir Maurice Oldfield the HIA Inquiry identified two notes drafted by an SIS officer (Officer G) in 2011 and 2014. The sensitive papers in which the notes were identified form part of a wider collection of hard copy material on Oldfield, held in four ring binders in a part of the Service inaccessible to the majority of SIS staff. All four binders have been made available to the HIA Inquiry in full, to conduct a review for relevance.

October 2011

5. In 2011, Officer G held a post equivalent in 2016 to Deputy Director with responsibility for matters relating to operational security. In his first note, dated 25 October 2011, Officer G begins by providing summary of the main points covered (Article 1):

The [REDACTED] ^{CODEWORD} papers include full details of the investigation into allegations that he was an homosexual and possibly a KGB agent – the first was true, the second not.

The relationship [REDACTED] ^{CODEWORD} had with the Kincora Boys Home (KBH) in Belfast and subsequent 'rentaboy sex scandal' is, in my view the only remaining potential sensitivity in the papers.

The sensitivity being that [REDACTED] ^{CODEWORD} may have a link to (by association through his friendship of the KBH head) of the alleged crimes at the boys home - given the current climate surrounding similar cases, it may at some point emerge as an issue.

Article 1

6. The investigation referred to by Officer G's in the first paragraph of the summary was conducted by MI5 in 1980 to determine whether Oldfield's homosexuality may have been used to compromise him in a way which damaged national security at any point during his career. The investigation concluded in February 1981 that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that national security had been compromised, and indeed that Oldfield had contributed notably to a number of security and intelligence successes which would not have been achieved had there been a breach of security.
7. Officer G describes the papers as (Article 2):

[REDACTED] paper holding has four ring binders containing the investigation papers and correspondence between the Service and the then Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert ARMSTRONG. There is a separate manila folder containing copies of private correspondence to and from [REDACTED]. It is not clear that the file is complete.

[REDACTED] ^{CODEWORD}

Article 2

8. After providing a description of the papers located in the four ring binders (and the separate manila folder), Officer G confirms that *"I have read all the papers in these files."*
9. In the same note Officer G explains in more detail the references he made in the document summary in relation to Oldfield and the Kincora Boys Home (Article 3).

CODEWORD

More worryingly is the small collection of papers in File 3 which relate to the relationship [REDACTED] had with the head of the Kincora Boys Home (KBH) in Belfast. This institution became the focus of press allegations of an homosexual vice ring – [REDACTED] was never implicated. No action was, or has been since, taken on this aspect of the matter. Given the current climate surrounding the issue of mistreatment, especially sexual, of children in children homes (sometimes a long time ago), it is possibly that KBH might be the subject of a media and subsequent legal enquiry. If so [REDACTED]'s relationship to the KBH might emerge especially as his last job was a security/intelligence co-ordinator in NI which is when his PV certificate was withdrawn.

CODEWORD

Article 3

10. The final version of the note was passed to Officer J who at the time was Director with responsibility for matters relating to security and compliance, and Officer G's senior officer. After reviewing the document, Officer J annotated the note agreeing with Officer G's proposals for the four binders of sensitive material to be retained in the secure area and that the issue should feature on a schedule of possible future risks. Officer G's note was added the sensitive papers and returned to the secure area for storage.

August 2014

11. In 2014, the underlying papers and Officer G's 2011 note were reviewed by SIS Officer H who had recently taken over from Officer J as the acting Director with responsibility for security and compliance. Officer H noted the conclusions made by Officer G and that they did not appear to accurately reflect the information contained in the papers themselves. Officer G (now retired) was therefore contacted and invited to conduct a second review of the papers in order to clarify the conclusions he reached in his 2011 note and what they were based on.
12. On 14 August 2014, Officer G visited SIS London to review his 2011 note and the underlying material. He subsequently drafted a second note (Article 4) in which he begins:

CODEWORD

I have this morning (14 August 2014) been given the opportunity by [REDACTED] to examine the 4 volumes of the [REDACTED] case and my review dated 25 October 2011. This collection of papers is the only set of documents I have ever seen on the [REDACTED] case and served as the basis for my original (25 October 2011) review.

CODEWORD

OFFICER I **OFFICER I**

Article 4

13. Officer G goes on to explain that he has been asked in particular to clarify the statement he made in paragraph 5 of his note dated 25 October 2011. After reviewing all the papers Officer G wrote (Article 5):

Having been given full access to the papers, though my focus was on volumes 1-3, I conclude that my original statement was imperfectly drafted. As it stands this particular sentence is at odds with that which immediately follows it: "This institution became the focus of press allegations of an homosexual vice ring – [REDACTED] was never implicated."

CODEWORD

Article 5

14. In concluding his second note, Officer G adds a short explanation as to the reasons why he had recorded his review of the papers.

I do recall vividly reviewing the papers. My overall impression was and is – based on the papers – that there were a lot of unsubstantiated rumours – largely in the Irish press, which hinted at or directly linked [REDACTED] to the Kincora Boys Home.

CODEWORD

Article 6

Interviews with SIS officers

15. At the request of the HIA Inquiry, SIS conducted an interview with Officer G and other officers with knowledge of the notes and the papers relating to Oldfield. Background information on the officers interviewed by SIS is as follows:

- **Officer G** - responsible for drafting the 2011 and 2014 notes. In 2011, Officer G held a post equivalent to the present Deputy Director with responsibility for matters relating to operational security. Officer G's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland. Officer G retired from SIS in March 2013.
- **Officer H** - in 2014 Officer H was acting Director with responsibility for matters relating to security and compliance. Officer H's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland. Officer H retired from SIS in June 2016.
- **Officer I** - in 2011 and 2014 Officer I was managed by Officer G and was responsible for ensuring the secure storage and access to sensitive records, including the collection of papers relating to Oldfield. Officer I's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland. Officer I retired from SIS in September 2015.
- **Officer J** - in 2011 Officer J was Director with responsibility for matters relating to security and compliance. At the time, Officer J was Officer G's line manager. Officer J's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland.

16. On 30 September 2016, Officer I was interviewed in SIS London about her recollection of the Oldfield papers and the circumstances of Officer G's review and his 2011 note. Officer I explained how in October 2011, she was in the process of reviewing and rationalising paper holdings in her office at a time of office moves. Among the paper holdings, she came across four 'sensitive investigative files' associated with Sir Maurice Oldfield in one of their four-

drawer filing cabinets. She recalls drawing the Oldfield files to Officer G's attention and that he decided to review them personally.


17. On the same day (30 September 2016), Officer G was also interviewed by SIS London, during which he explained the circumstances which led to his decision to review the Oldfield papers in 2011 and to draft the notes in 2011 and 2014. Officer G began by explaining that in 2011 he was aware that there were numerous sensitive paper holdings which had accumulated over a period of decades that were held variously by himself, Officer I and Officer J.
18. His recollection is that he wished to understand the scope of materials held, and to determine what, if any, action should be taken in relation to those holdings. He was not asked to carry out a review of the sensitive paper holdings, nor to start with the Oldfield file. Rather, he decided on this course of action as the senior officer most directly responsible for sensitive security issues (and thus one of the very few officers who would be authorised to review such sensitive Service files).
19. In reviewing the Oldfield files, Officer G explained that he had access only to the four files in the group, and to no other SIS documentation on Oldfield. He added that there was nothing on the files to explain when and why they were compiled or the nature of any Service investigative activities in relation to Oldfield at the time. His views, as recorded in the two notes, therefore drew solely on the content (including media pieces) of those four files.
20. Officer G's recollection is that he was struck by some documents in the files that related to MIS's investigation into Oldfield in 1980, at least in part due to allegations appearing in the media in 2011 concerning the activities of Jimmy Saville.
21. Having reviewed the four files, Officer G typed up his first note, which was produced on a stand-alone computer used exclusively for sensitive security related issues. Officer G went on to explain that the note was the only copy produced, and this and other files produced on the stand-alone by Officer G were properly deleted on his departure from the post (and the Service). Officer G then handed a hard copy version of the note to his superior officer (Officer J) who added a brief comment. No further action was taken and the note was appended to the collection of papers.
22. On 3 October 2016, Officer H was interviewed on his involvement in this matter. Officer H explained that in 2014 he had taken over, on a temporary basis, the role of Director for security and compliance issues. His previous post had been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters.
23. Officer H went on to say that on taking over the role of Director he received a briefing by Officer I which included details on the Oldfield papers and the production of Officer G's 2011 note. Officer H explained that on reviewing the note, it did not seem to him that Officer G's conclusions accurately reflected the underlying material in the files themselves. He therefore asked that Officer G be invited back to SIS to review the papers and his original note in order to clarify his earlier conclusions and to explain on what they were based on. Officer G did on 14 August 2014 when he drafted a second note entitled "*Supplementary Comment*".

MIS emails

24. Searches conducted by MIS at the request of the HIA Inquiry in relation to Sir Maurice Oldfield identified a chain of internal emails dated 11 August 2014 that refer to the papers held by SIS and the 2011 note written by SIS Officer G. The final email, initiated at 13:37, (Article 7) indicates that MIS had been in contact with SIS Officer I with regard to the SIS papers on Oldfield. The author of the MIS email commented:

It sounds like the [Oldfield] file is similar to ours, but less complete. Our conclusions were the same, except that on the [SIS Designator] file there's reference in a recent file summary to OLDFIELD knowing the head of Kincora Boys Home at the time. [Officer I] is not sure where this has come from as she can't find a source for this. She has arranged to speak to the person who wrote the summary on Thursday to find out."

25. The full MIS email chain is set out below:



Article 7 (Page 1)

MIS DESIGNATORS **SECURITY MARKING**

From: [REDACTED]
 Sent: 11 August 2014 12:37
 To: [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED] **CODEWORD**
 Subject: RE: Child Abuse Enquiries - [REDACTED] Review
 Importance: Low

Thanks [REDACTED] **NAMES OF MIS OFFICERS**

A very good comprehensive review. As discussed, I'll talk to [REDACTED] on Wednesday morning and clarify whether she is completely clear on what the [REDACTED] task was. I'm working on the basis she is, but I'll also need to clarify whether the other participants are aware. And finally what, if anything, we need to communicate externally, particularly bearing in mind there is no clear link between OLDFIELD and Kincora. Given the historic media allegations, I don't know whether the intended recipients of the [REDACTED] product (something I will need to understand from [REDACTED]) are expecting something to be said about OLDFIELD. I'll let you know what I learn from [REDACTED] before the meeting. **NAME OF MIS OFFICER**

MIS DESIGNATORS

Just one other thing, when I was seeing [REDACTED] last week with [REDACTED] at SIS she was looking at some OLDFIELD-related files. Has she fed the results of that into your work? Is this something we would normally share in the [REDACTED]s?
 I wasn't sure whether [REDACTED] would be seeing additional stuff to us.

[REDACTED] **SIS OFFICER I** **SIS OFFICER G** **MIS DESIGNATOR**

-----Original Message-----
 From: [REDACTED] **MIS DESIGNATORS**
 Sent: 11 August 2014 11:13
 To: [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: Child Abuse Enquiries - [REDACTED] Review
 Importance: Low

Hi [REDACTED] **MIS NAME & DESIGNATOR** **CODEWORD**

My write-up of possibly relevant material on the OLDFIELD [REDACTED] file is attached (in some detail in the interests of full disclosure and so hopefully we won't have to review the file again at a later date).

As discussed, we need to decide how much of this needs to be passed to [REDACTED] at this stage.

Thanks,
 [REDACTED] **MIS DESIGNATOR**

Article 7 (Page 2)

26. SIS has made available to the HIA Inquiry all Service records associated with Sir Maurice Oldfield including the 4 ring binders of sensitive papers. Searches carried out by SIS at the request of the HIA Inquiry has identified no material to show that Oldfield visited Northern Ireland during his employment in SIS, or to indicate any visits to the Kincora Boys Home or contact with William McGrath.

OLDFIELD PRIVATE PAPERS (1981)

27. In the course of the HIA Inquiry's review of SIS records relating to Oldfield the Inquiry team identified a note entitled "Contents of suitcase received on 12 March 1981" (Article 8). There is no information to indicate who in SIS drafted the note (or when) but it provides a list of the material belonging to Oldfield that was received by SIS following his death on 11 March 1981. The list includes including personal diaries, address books and private papers The note indicates that action was taken in SIS to sort papers into particular categories of information.

28. One of the categories listed on the note is a set of papers referred to as "*Private papers with positive or possible [Codeword] implications*". The HIA Inquiry has been able to account for all of the categories listed on the note with the exception of this set of private papers. SIS was asked by the HIA Inquiry to conduct searches for the purpose of identifying any information relating to the papers and their present whereabouts (if still held by SIS).

CONTENTS OF SUITCASE RECEIVED ON 12 MARCH 1981		NAME OF LOCATION
	5 plain folders -	
HANDWRITTEN ANNOTATIONS	1 containing copies (in some cases the 'originals') of detailed minuting, briefing by desk officers, lists of questions senior officers wished to raise, etc etc, for the Senior Officers' Seminar [REDACTED] 30 Sept - 2 Oct 1966.	
	[REDACTED] containing personal correspondence March 1964-July 1966.	
	" " " Oct 1974-Dec 1975.	
	" " " Jan 1976-Oct 1976.	
	" " " Jan 1977-Jan 1978.	
	Office diaries for 1977, 1978 and 1980.	
	Private diaries for [1963, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968(2)] [1969, 1970, 1971] [1972, 1973, 1974] [1975, 1976, 1977] [1978, 1979]	
	3 Address books. (one 12/3/78)	
	Red folder containing an exchange of correspondence with [REDACTED] on literary matters.	
	Bundle of copies of "Foreign Report" published by The Economist Newspaper Ltd, dating from early 1978.	
	"Life" membership card and correspondence connected with the Intelligence Corps Association.	
	Bundle of miscellaneous papers.	
	HANDWRITTEN ANNOTATIONS	CODEWORD
	The papers have been sorted, as follows:-	
	SIS papers;	
	Private papers with positive or possible [REDACTED] implications;	
	Correspondence from persons connected with publicity (Press, books);	
	Correspondence dating from the "Stormont" period;	
	Overt material relating to intelligence/security matters;	
	The material connected with the Intelligence Corps Association;	
	Miscellaneous.	
PROTECTION OF IDENTITY		

Article 8

29. The note provides no additional information to describe what the papers consist of (i.e. letters, press cuttings) or the quantity of papers referred to. Searches conducted by SIS have failed to identify any further documents in relation to the contents of the suitcase or information on Sir Maurice Oldfield that has not already made available to the HIA Inquiry

team. SIS has made enquiries with both MI5 and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on the possibility that SIS may have passed papers relating to Oldfield to these organisations on or after the 12 March 1981. Searches conducted by both organisations failed to identify anything on their corporate record to indicate that material had being received from SIS in relation to this matter.

30. The codeword used to describe the Private papers is that used for the investigation conducted by MI5 in 1980 to determine to whether Oldfield's homosexuality may have been used to compromise him in a way which damaged national security at any point during his career.

OLDFIELD SIS PAPERS

31. Whilst reviewing sensitive papers relating to Sir Maurice Oldfield the HIA Inquiry identified a note originated by an SIS officer on 2 May 2001 in relation to papers on Colin Wallace, Oldfield and Northern Ireland (Article 9). The author of the note, at that time, was in a role that handled personal and staff related matters.

1. I attach the papers relating to Maurice OLDFIELD. They seem to fall into two categories.

a) Tracing on [REDACTED]: the papers appear to have been taken from OLDFIELD's file on a loan slip in 1984. **PROTECTION OF IDENTITY**

b) Papers relating to Colin WALLACE, OLDFIELD and Northern Ireland. I do not know the background to this. The [REDACTED] papers mentioned in the pink memo is a reference to a large collection of papers found in [REDACTED] waste bag after he left the service (all torn in half - hence the sellotape). I assume that they are not the originals, but have no idea where the originals might be filed. **PROTECTION OF IDENTITY**

2. Sorry to dump these horrors on you.

SIS DESIGNATOR
[REDACTED]
2 May 2001

1. [REDACTED] These originated by [REDACTED] So possibly derived from an [REDACTED] interview - Maurice Oldfield's PV top-up? Manchester University 1935-37 might have made him a contemporary of M.O.

2. [REDACTED] Colin WALLACE the army officer engaged in Pops in N. Ireland in the '70s. He went to prison on a ^{manslaughter} conviction. On release he attempted to clear his name. It had a cause celebre.

3. M.O. was in N. Ireland at the time.

4. All on M.O.'s file I guess.

INFORMATION KNOWN TO THE HIA INQUIRY AND CONSIDERED NOT RELEVANT

Article 9

32. The note contains annotated comments made by an unknown SIS officer, in which the individual writes in paragraph 3 "MO. was in N. Ireland at the time". SIS has been asked by the HIA Inquiry to conduct research in order to identify any material in SIS records that could assist the Inquiry to understand the meaning of the unknown SIS officer's comment in paragraph 3 or what it refers to.
33. The author of the note left the Service in July 2001 and SIS has been unable to find any information to help ascertain the identity of the unknown SIS officer who made the annotated comments. Efforts to date, to contact the author of the note has proved unsuccessful.
34. Research conducted by SIS for information associated with the note that could help ascertain what the annotated comment is in reference to, has identified no relevant

material. Searches have also identified no information in SIS records to indicate that Oldfield made any visits or operational deployments to Northern Ireland during his service with SIS. His appointment in 1979 as Security Co-ordinator appears to be the first occasion that Oldfield visited Northern Ireland.

SIS SEARCHES

35. With regard to searches carried out by SIS at the request of the HIA Inquiry for material relating to Sir Maurice Oldfield. SIS has identified no information to support any of the allegations published in the media, or the suggestions found in Officer G's 2011 note, associating Oldfield with the Kincora Boys Home or William McGrath. Of particular note is that SIS records give no indication that Oldfield ever served in or visited Northern Ireland whilst a member of the Secret Intelligence Service (1947-1978). His appointment in 1979 as Security Co-ordinate appears to be the first occasion that he visited the Province.
36. All material relating to Oldfield has been made available to HIA Inquiry, in full, to enable the Inquiry team to conduct a comprehensive review of information held on the SIS corporate record. SIS has also ensured that all requests received from the HIA Inquiry for access to additional records or answers to questions that have arisen during the review process are handled to the full satisfaction of the Inquiry team.

Signed

SIS Officer A

SIS Officer A

Date

8 DECEMBER 2016