RECORDED DELIVERY

Sir Anthony Hart
Chairman
The HIA Inquiry
PO Box 2080
Belfast
Northern Ireland
BT1 9QA

9 September 2016

Dear Sir Anthony,

The enclosed submission is self-explanatory. Given the unsatisfactory nature of past Inquiries, I am making this submission to your Inquiry because I want to put on record my very serious concerns about the factual inaccuracies and the questionable use of highly selective information that has permeated Module 15 of the proceedings of the Inquiry, and specifically to matters relating to me.

This submission is an attempt to put on record a selection of the information that I believe is directly relevant to the Inquiry, but, although it is all already in the public domain - and has been for many years - it appears to have been deliberately omitted from the Inquiry's published considerations. The obvious questions raised by my attached submission need to be addressed fully if the ongoing concerns of the public in general, and the victims in particular, are to be met satisfactorily. All of the information contained in my submission is easy to verify and there can be no legitimate reason for not considering it seriously.

I wrote to you on 10 July this year pointing out that, according to the transcripts of the hearings, Counsel to the Inquiry claimed that the Barron and Saville Inquiries both rejected the evidence I gave to them. As you know, I believe that statement to be totally untrue, yet you have refused to disclose any evidence to support Counsel's claim. That is not an acceptable response to such a key issue. I submit that no lawyer involved in an Inquiry should present as a fact any information which he or she does not reasonably believe to be true.

The Barron and Saville Inquiry reports are freely available to everyone and there is no obvious legal or other justification for not providing the evidence for Counsel's claims. Your failure to provide that information can do nothing to dispel the suspicion that your Inquiry is aware that evidence to support Counsel's claim does not exist. If that is true, then it raises very serious questions about the integrity of your Inquiry.
Owing to the serious nature of this matter, I hereby repeat my request made to you on 10 July this year asking you to disclose the precise evidence on which Counsel based his comments that the evidence which I gave to the Barron and Saville Inquiries was rejected by those Inquiries. I find it appalling that apparently the Inquiry was presented with such a statement without any attempt being made to provide supporting evidence. It is also appalling that apparently no member of the Inquiry questioned the absence of evidence to support the claim. Is this really an example of how the Inquiry has operated?

I believe that no reasonable person reading this submission and its appendices could fail to accept that a number inquiries and Government admissions have now shown that the MoD and the Intelligence Services have been involved in a sustained campaign of deception for many years about my role in Northern Ireland, and that the assertion by those agencies that they knew nothing until 1980 about the sexual abuse taking place at Kincora is simply not credible. I can find no reference anywhere in the transcripts of the Inquiry’s proceedings drawing attention to that catalogue of deception by those agencies. This is a highly troubling state of affairs given the widespread public concern about the background to Kincora. All of the information in this submission has been in the public domain for some years and should have been disclosed to you by the MoD and the Intelligence Services. It should, therefore, not be up to me to draw these matters to your attention in an attempt to correct what appears to be a very serious imbalance in the evidence presented to your Inquiry.

Yours sincerely,

Colin Wallace

Encl:

(a) Submission
(b) Supporting documents
RESPONSE TO
THE HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE INQUIRY

BY

COLIN WALLACE

SEPTEMBER 2016

I am making this Response to the HIA because I want to put on record my serious concerns about the factual inaccuracies, misleading information and use of innuendo unsupported by evidence that has permeated Module 15 of the proceedings of the Inquiry, and specifically to matters relating to me.

In particular, this Response is not new evidence, it is an attempt to put on record a selection of the information that I believe to be clearly relevant to the Inquiry, but although it is all already in the public domain – and has been for many years - it appears to have been deliberately omitted from the Inquiry’s published considerations. The obvious questions raised by this information need to be addressed to the satisfaction of the victims and the public.

This submission should not be regarded as the sum total of my concerns about the Inquiry and the ways in which it appears to have used, or misused, information.

[1]
COLIN WALLACE

RESPONSE TO THE HIA INQUIRY

Introduction

It is important to point out that initially I was willing to co-operate with the HIA Inquiry. My solicitor wrote to the Inquiry on 09.12.2014 stating that I was willing to participate in the Inquiry. In April the following year, my solicitor again wrote to the Inquiry saying:

"I write to express my concern that, after more than three months, I have not had a substantive reply to my letter dated 9th December 2014. I would have thought that the Inquiry would wish to encourage Mr Wallace to give evidence. Mr Wallace notes that the inquiry failed to make any contact whatsoever with him prior to my letter in December 2014.

Notwithstanding that some matters can take time to resolve it is difficult for him to understand why he is being ignored by the Inquiry when almost each week brings a new media publication concerning Kincora, "cover ups" and child abuse.

I would be grateful for a substantive reply."

As I have repeatedly made clear, my subsequent decision not to participate in the Inquiry had nothing to do with the Inquiry per se, it simply reflected my strong disapproval of the Government’s inexplicable decision not to afford the Inquiry the same legal powers as the London based Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. I consider the Government’s decision to be grossly unfair to the Northern Ireland victims of such abuse. The Government has never attempted to justify that decision and it has presented a very negative message to the victims. I believed that if I had participated in the Inquiry, I would have beencondoning the Government’s unjust policy. The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from that policy is that the Government has treated the Norther Ireland victims differently from those in England because it has something to hide. This has been a central feature of my experiences since the early 1970s.

The Inquiry and Government agencies have attempted to make mischief from the fact that I did not participate in either the Terry or the Hughes Inquiries. The official claim is deliberately misleading and it is difficult to understand why the facts are being obfuscated. Why is the public being deceived about this?

I did refuse to take part in the Terry Inquiry for the simple reason that on 01.06.1983 the Director of Army Security, Major General HEML Garret, wrote to me saying:

"I must re-affirm the advice I have already given you: that you may communicate classified appropriate information to the two nominated RUC officers; but not to any third party."

That directive is quite clear. My solicitor, quite rightly, was unwilling to accept any restriction that excluded him from being present at meetings I had with the RUC. I totally agreed with his advice and declined to participate.

[2]
When I was approached to give evidence to the Hughes Inquiry, my solicitor asked the Inquiry to provide me with a copy of that Inquiry's terms of reference. Those terms did not make provision for any examination of the activities of the RUC or the Army in connection with the abuse allegations.

A letter dated 03.05.1985 from Mr S Quinn, Secretary to the Hughes Inquiry, states:

"1. I refer to your 25 April letter and enclosure.

2. My reading of your client's 21 April letter in relation to the essential points set out in paragraph 2 of my 18 April letter, is as follows:-

(a) your client has confirmed that he is willing to make relevant information in his possession available to the Committee;

but

(b) he requires some clarification of the Committee's terms of reference to assist him in determining whether he has relevant information.

Mr Quinn goes on to say:

"The Committee is not, therefore, required or empowered to inquire into the performance of the police, military intelligence or any other body or person which had or has no statutory and/or management responsibility for children's homes and hostels."

On 09.09.1985, my solicitor wrote to Mr Quinn saying:

"Further to our recent correspondence and in particular your letter of 29th August 1985, we have now obtained our client's instructions.

We feel we can do no better than to enclose a copy of his letter to us of 6th September last, which sets out admirably all the points at issue and the problem that faces our client.

It is fair to say on behalf of our client that he has throughout taken most of the initiatives in this particular matter, although these seem to have come to no avail by virtue of the limitations that exist so far as his evidence is concerned.

Not unnaturally, our client feels that your staff should not be regarded as his legal advisers. The information that he has is going to be disseminated by those staff and the "relevance" or not of any information is out of the hands of our client.

The matter would be greatly simplified if the papers at present with the Prime Minister were to be made available to you by her so that you could see the content and extent of the information available to our client. This would also, in our view, give him the authority to make the evidence available.

[3]
We must place again on record that our client is not unwilling to assist the Inquiry and, indeed, has never been so. He is, quite understandably, anxious as to the position, particularly in the light of the steps that he has taken to try and make all relevant information available. Indeed, if the Inquiry is to be in terms a full inquiry then the letters that exist should be released and the information that is properly at Downing Street at this time should be made available."

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces in a written reply to Parliament (30.01.1990) admitted that the file which I sent to the Prime Minister for forwarding to the Hughes Inquiry disappeared inside Downing Street.

"Owing to a series of administrative errors, Mr Wallace's file of documents was mishandled. Despite a number of searches to find the originals or to establish what happened to them, no explanation has come to light.

This is clearly a most unfortunate sequence of events; and I can well understand that Mr Wallace must have found the Government's handling of his file of documents very unsatisfactory."

The Sunday Times dated 11.02.1990 reported:

"William Hughes, a retired English judge who headed an official inquiry into Kincora, said that a government file which Downing Street authorized in 1985 to be passed to Hughes, failed to reach the judge and his committee. ‘Although they were sent by Number 10, they were not given to me’, said Hughes."

The Shadow Spokesman on Northern Ireland, Kevin McNamara MP, also made my position clear in a letter dated 16 January 1990, to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in which he said:

"The legal immunity offered to Mr Wallace only extended so far as to cover the matters defined in the terms of reference of the Hughes inquiry. Since the immunity did not cover the role of the security forces, over which Mr Wallace does claim to be in a position to offer detailed evidence, his refusal to testify to the Hughes inquiry can be appreciated."

It is patently misleading in the extreme for anyone in possession of the aforementioned facts simply to claim, without making the full position clear, why I declined to participate in the Terry and Hughes Inquires.

The HIA Inquiry

There is no doubt that the Inquiry has produced some new and significant information about matters surrounding the sexual abuse of children at the Kincora hostel, but I am in no doubt that that information falls far short of being the full story. I would commend the Inquiry on obtaining this new information because it has achieved more than any of the previous inquiries, but this raises the important question: why was this 'new' information apparently not made available to the Terry and Hughes Inquiries? Given the disclosure of this new information, why have successive Governments assured Parliament over the years that previous inquiries were "most thorough"?"
I have now had an opportunity to read the transcripts of Module 15 (Kincora and Bawnmore) of the Inquiry. At this juncture I request that the Inquiry enter this letter into the evidence because, despite the best endeavours of this Inquiry, Government agencies are still not telling the whole truth about Kincora and there is a real danger that the public will continue to be misled about a number of key issues.

The Inquiry is clearly aware of Paul Foot’s book, ‘Who Framed Colin Wallace’ and there is no reason therefore for the Inquiry not to be aware of the issues involved. The book is well referenced and the Inquiry should have been able to check on any matters of interest.

I am writing this Response because I am very concerned about the factual inaccuracies, misleading information and use of innuendo unsupported by evidence that has permeated this stage in the proceedings of the Inquiry and specifically as they relate to me. This submission is, therefore, designed to put on record just a selection of information that I believe to be clearly relevant to the inquiry, but which, although it is already in the public domain, appears to have been omitted from the Inquiry’s published considerations. This submission should not be regarded as the sum total of my concerns about the Inquiry and the ways in which it has used or misused information.

Although the Inquiry clearly has collected quite an amount of information about my story and my allegations, that information has been presented very selectively to avoid dealing with the extent to which the MoD and the Intelligence Services were involved in a range of questionable activities during the 1970s and also to sustain the fantasy put forward by Government agencies that little, if anything, was known prior to 1980 about William McGrath and his activities.

I believe the public in general, and the victims in particular, have a right to be made aware of the information in this submission because it has a clear bearing on the integrity of the Inquiry. The Inquiry cannot, at some future date, say that it was not made aware of this information, nor can it say that it considered all the matters fully and without bias. All of the information to which I refer is clearly referenced and can be easily checked.

My other concern is that the Inquiry has relied heavily on statements - some highly questionable - gathered during previous inquiries and investigations into the Kincora Boys’ Home. Also it appears that a number of important witnesses were not even contacted by the Inquiry. For example, Counsel to the Inquiry (CTI) suggested that former British Army Captain Fred Holroyd of the Special Military Intelligence Unit (SMIU) might have re-typed a memorandum I wrote on Kincora in 1974. This suggestion appears to have been made in the total absence of any evidence.

Not only is that suggestion totally untrue – I briefed my solicitor on the memo in 1982, at least two years before I met Fred Holroyd when he visited me in Lewes Prison - but also the Inquiry is aware that when Captain Holroyd was at the British Army Intelligence School prior to deployment to Northern Ireland, he was told that Tara was a British Intelligence operation. I hope you will agree that the latter statement, if true, would be of great significance to the Inquiry. Despite this, the Inquiry has apparently made no attempt contact Mr Holroyd, either to check the memo typing allegation, or to seek further information about the Tara allegation. In the end, Mr Holroyd contacted the Inquiry. This is a very worrying failure.
I believe that the Inquiry has an obligation to ensure that if it decides to attribute views or information to me then it must do so accurately and without bias. I hope my comments below illustrate that some of the information presented to the Inquiry (or totally ignored by the Inquiry) has been done in a manner that is unfair and requires a rigorous public defence.

I have set out below a brief selection of some of the points in question. All the information I have set out in this submission is in the public domain and there can be no justification for the members of the Inquiry not being provided with this information by CTI. The Inquiry is either not clear about the full nature of my role at British Army HQNI, or, seeks to avoid disclosing what my role at HQNI was and its relevance to matters under investigation in Module 1S. The lack of clarity, deliberate or otherwise, is misleading and fails to demonstrate the significance of what I was doing in terms of William McGrath, TARA and, ultimately, the Kincora Boy's Home.

Deception by the Ministry of Defence

Counsel to the Inquiry (CTI) correctly pointed out that I lied to the police when I was initially questioned by them in 1980. I fully accept that and I can understand why CTI should feel a need to discredit what I have to say about my role with the Army in Northern Ireland during the 1970s.

However, in the interests of fairness, I believe that CTI should also have pointed out to the Inquiry the blunt and somewhat unpalatable fact that the Ministry of Defence and related agencies have repeatedly lied to the public, the press, the Saville Inquiry, Parliament and successive Prime Ministers about the role of Psychological Operations in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and, in particular, about my specific role in those operations. Why, therefore, should the Inquiry accept assurances by the MoD and the Intelligence Services that they knew nothing, prior to 1980, about the sexual abuses at Kincora. The MoD's track record of deliberate deception in these matters is an important one which needs to be fully understood and taken into account by the Inquiry. The MoD's role in deception is not simply my personal view, it is now well established by other official inquiries and records as I highlight below.

In 1975 I was disciplined by the MoD for allegedly passing without authority a restricted document to a journalist. At the time of the alleged offence, I was employed on psychological operations (Psy Ops) at Army HQ, Northern Ireland. As cover for my role in these activities, the MoD had created and published a false, non-existent role for me known as 'Head of Production Services'.

The former Head of the Army Information Services at HQ, Northern Ireland, Peter Broderick, said in a formal statement in 1975 that I initially worked unofficially for 'Information Policy' - the cover title for Psy Ops:

"Colin Wallace, at first, became the pawn in this game. Though on the staff of public relations, he was used by Information Policy as their outlet to the press. He also had knowledge of the Irish situation which was totally unique in the Headquarters and surpassed that even of most of the Intelligence Branch. As time progressed, he was not only the main brief of the press, but also the advisor on Irish matters to the whole Headquarters and because of his personal talents - contributed much creative thought to the Information Policy Unit. In order to do his job he had constant and free access to information of high classification and extreme sensitivity. The attitude of the MOD PR organisation in Whitehall to the activities of Information Policy Unit was one of extreme suspicion. Wallace’s dual role was particularly
resented by Whitehall, while highly valued by the operation commander in Northern Ireland. In re-
organising, one of my first actions was to legitimise the role of Colin Wallace and to allocate him firmly
to Information Policy. By agreement with Intelligence in each case, he was supplied with selected
information about terrorists, their activities, their sources of money and arms at home and overseas, of
the allegiances of so-called innocents and such matters.”

In addition to the false cover role created to conceal my Psy Ops activities, Peter Broderick pointed out
that I was also a serving Captain in the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). In fact, I was the UDR
Information Policy Officer, albeit the UDR has never acknowledged that fact. This was a particularly
sensitive role because of attempts by Loyalist paramilitaries to infiltrate the UDR to obtain access to
Intelligence, weapons and training.

The MoD never disputed the contents of Peter Broderick’s statement to my Appeal Board hearing.

CTI has attempted to restrict the interpretation of my role at HQNI and what access I had to Intelligence
information.

As I have pointed out above, Peter Broderick refers to my access to Intelligence information as follows:

“In order to do his job he had constant and free access to information of high classification and extreme
sensitivity.”

He also stated:

“By agreement with Intelligence in each case, he was supplied with selected information about terrorists,
their activities, their sources of money and arms at home and overseas, of the allegiances of so-called
innocents and such matters.”

With respect to CTI, Peter Broderick was my boss and knew what Intelligence I had access to. CTI has no
direct knowledge of this and can only rely on information from questionable sources. As Peter Broderick
points out, I did have regular access to the Intelligence Branch and the HQNI Ops Room. Access to those
areas was limited to those who at that time had a red HQNI pass i.e. the background to the pass holder’s
photograph was coloured red. I was one of at least six members of the Army Information Services (AIS)
who had such passes.

It is also important to note that on 11.02.1991 the MoD refused to accede to a request by the Defence
Select Committee to see documents relating to my job specification at HQ Northern Ireland saying:

“As regards the particular papers referred to in your third paragraph (my job specification), these are
internal papers and moreover include sensitive material relating to the security and intelligence matters
lying outside the Committee’s inquiry. The provision of such papers, even under the conditions relating
to the Committee’s access to classified information would be inconsistent with conventions.”

A Loose Minute BR/114/1/2/P52 (Army) shows that as early as February 1972 I was not only engaged in
Information Policy activities, but also I was given the role of being in charge of compiling for the British

[7]
Army the ‘Opposition Case’ for the Widgery Tribunal which investigated the events known of Bloody Sunday. This document also shows that I took over that role from Colonel Maurice Tugwell - the then head of Information Policy - on 11.02.1972 of that year and that my involvement was known to the most senior figures in the MoD, including the Secretary of State for Defence, the Minister of State for Defence, the Permanent Secretary of State for Defence, The Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant General and the Director of Military Operations. I submit that I would not have been given that role if the British Army did not have full confidence in me and my work. It is also important to note that the ‘Opposition Case’ was given to ‘Information Policy’ (Psy Ops), whereas responsibility for ‘The Army case’ was given to a normal staff officer, GSO1 Plans. In effect, my role was to investigate the backgrounds of the witnesses who were giving evidence against the British Army and to brief Counsel for the Army accordingly.

Not only did the MoD deliberately discipline me under the terms of the false job description, when I appealed against the MoD’s actions, the MoD and Security Service (M15) had secret contact with the Chairman of the Appeal Board and rigged the outcome of that Appeal. This latter fact was uncovered by Sir David Calcutt QC when he carried out an investigation into the matter in 1990.

In his report, Sir David Calcutt said that the: “Appeal Board on 17 October 1975 was unsatisfactory in two material respects. First, I am satisfied that shortly before the hearing took place representatives of the Ministry of Defence were in private communication with the chairman of the hearing with regard to Mr Wallace’s appeal. Such communications should not have happened; and I believe that what occurred probably affected the outcome of the appeal. Secondly, Mr Wallace’s work, as an information officer, was wide-ranging in its nature. I am satisfied that the full range of Mr Wallace’s work was not made plain to the CSAB. In my view the CSAB needed to know the full range of his work if it was to adjudicate justly on his appeal.” Source: The Calcutt Report August 1990.

In addition, the MoD manipulated my disciplinary hearing by attempting to interfere with key witnesses. The MoD instructed my Psy Ops superior, Lt Colonel Ralton, to avoid attending the hearing to prevent being questioned about my work. He subsequently said that he had missed his plane to London and could not get to the Appeal hearing in time.

In 1990, Peter Broderick told the Observer newspaper (The Observer 04.02.1990) that just before he was due to give evidence on my behalf at my disciplinary hearing in 1975, the Chief Press Officer, John Groves, at the MoD approached him and said:

“You know this Wallace chap is an active member of a militant volunteer force”. He went on to say, “this is the real reason we want him out of the way.” The newspaper quoted Peter Broderick as saying: “He (Groves) told me that the charge of leaking a document to a journalist was just a convenient way of getting rid of him”. The clear implication was that I should bear that in mind when I spoke at the Tribunal.”

If this allegation had really been true, it is clear that MoD and MIS would not have agreed to me taking up a senior appointment at a British Army HQ in England.

In the 16 years following my disciplinary hearing, the MoD repeatedly lied to Ministers, Parliament and the press about my role in Northern Ireland. Then on 30.01.1990 the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher,
told Parliament that Ministers has inadvertently ‘misled’ Parliament over my case. In a written statement to Parliament on 30.01.1990, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Archie Hamilton, said, inter alia:

“The papers which have now come to light indicate that, when the case was made to establish Mr Wallace’s post, it was proposed that its duties should include responsibilities for providing unattributable covert briefings to the press; and it was stated that the incumbent would be required to make on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security during such interviews. It seems that in the event the arguments for including these responsibilities in Mr Wallace’s job description were made orally rather than in writing to those who approved the establishment of the SIO post. But presumably Mr Wallace was told what duties he was expected to carry out; and indeed it would appear that he had already been undertaking unattributable briefing activities of this kind, which may have included disinformation. It has not since the mid-1970s been the policy to disseminate disinformation in Northern Ireland in ways designed to denigrate individuals and/or organisations or for propaganda purposes. That remains the case.”

Note: The Minister’s comments about unattributable briefings are disingenuous because most, if not all, Government press officers give unattributable briefings to the media, but their job descriptions are not classified ‘secret’. The Minister’s reply also indicates that he was well aware of the true nature of my role, but was being ‘economical with the truth’ to cover up what I had really been employed to do.

Source: Hansard

On 01.02.1990, the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Tom King, told Parliament:

“Although the job specification (Wallace’s) is a classified document, Mr Calcutt will have access to it and will be able to show it to Mr Wallace. I have been advised that Mr Wallace will be authorised to give the authorities the facts in the other matters that have been raised, so no offence arises under the Official Secrets Act. In that respect, there is no change from the old Act, which only made unauthorised publication an offence.”

So, given the foregoing, how could the Secretary of State for Defence refer to a “classified document” which the Minister of State for Defence told Parliament did not exist because my job description was only communicated orally to me and to the Establishments Board at HQNI? Source: Hansard

Clearly, the Minister must have been aware of at least some of the contents of my secret job specification when he made this statement. The Minister’s comment is an important one for this Inquiry because it indicates possible reasons why Information Policy took such a close interest in William McGrath and his sexual activities. Although the Minister deliberately avoided mentioning Psy Ops, his statement is a de facto admission that, up to the mid-1970s, it was MoD policy to disseminate disinformation in Northern Ireland in order to denigrate individuals and/or organisations.

Also, the Minister’s statement provides the clearest possible evidence that:

(a) the MoD had deliberately disciplined me knowing full well that I did have authority to make decisions about the release of security classified information and
(b) that the MoD had deliberately misled Parliament and the public (and still does!) for a period of many years about the true nature my role.

During the above debate in Parliament, the former secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, pointed out to the Secretary of State for Defence:

"I say to the Secretary of State, what a position! Here was a high officer of state, an Attorney General, considering whether to prosecute (Wallace), but somebody else had given the man (Wallace) permission to use these documents without telling Ministers of the day. That is the situation that we are investigating.

The question is – I will ask the Secretary of State, who has great advantage of knowing Northern Ireland – who gave this authorisation .... ? I am astonished. How much more does one not know?"

Source: Hansard

I believe that question raised by Merlyn Rees is also a very pertinent one to this Inquiry. How much does it not know?

When my solicitor and I duly met with Sir David Calcutt QC during his investigation into my case, he produced a small document – about half the size of A5 paper – and said that the MoD had told him it was my ‘secret’ job description. Both Sir David and my solicitor were recording the proceedings independently, but Sir David asked that both of the recorders be switched off while we discussed the document. The text on the document was only a very short paragraph and confirmed that I had worked for the Security and Intelligence Services during my time at HQNI. The document was not my job description. The real document was approx. 4-5 pages in length and it was shown to me in draft form by Peter Broderick before it was submitted to the HQ Northern Ireland Establishments Board for approval. Peter Broderick discussed the contents with me and asked for my comments. He again showed the document to me after it had been approved and my promotion had been ratified. The MoD has falsely claimed on a number of occasions that my job description was only given to me verbally. That is clearly untrue because it would be impossible for anyone to participate in the MoD Annual Confidential Report process without a clearly written job specification setting out the exact nature of the work to be done. The fact that the job description was withheld by the MoD at the time of my disciplinary hearing indicates that, from the outset, the Ministry did not want its contents to be seen or put on record.

There were several copies of my ‘secret’ job description in existence in 1974 – at least four at HQNI and at least one at the MoD. Clearly, my false cover job description would not have merited a ‘secret’ security classification and the members of the HQNI Establishments Board would not have accepted the need for such a grading. The Minister’s (Mr Archie Hamilton) statement to Parliament shows, therefore, that he clearly avoided mentioning ‘Psy Ops’ and this indicates that he was well aware of the significance of that activity. By claiming that my job description was only given to me verbally, either he deliberately misled Parliament, or he himself was misled by his own advisers. Bearing in mind that a written copy of my job description which was classified ‘secret’ did exist, the MoD should have a destruction certificate on record if it had been subsequently disposed of. Given that the Inquiry has been given documents which originated at the same time, or earlier, than my job description, is it not very strange that my job description has apparently not been made available to the Inquiry?
Referral to the Metropolitan Police Service of MoD's actions

My solicitor was of the clear opinion that Sir David Calcutt's report provided strong evidence that the MoD had conspired to defraud me. He referred the matter to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). My solicitor and I had a meeting at Scotland Yard with Detective Superintendent Graham Searle of the Organised Crime Branch MPS, who confirmed that Sir David Calcutt's Report did provide prima facie evidence of a conspiracy to defraud and that the case warranted further investigation. However, he said that because of the nature of the work I had been engaged in in Northern Ireland, he would refer the matter to the DPP for direction. The DPP wrote back to the MPS on 22.03.1991 saying that "the evidence is not such as to justify the institution of police enquiries".

Bearing in mind the evidence came from an eminent QC who was carrying out an Inquiry on behalf of the Government, the DPP's decision was as remarkable as it was inexplicable. There is little doubt that individuals within the MoD and the Security Service were either guilty of a conspiracy to defraud or of malfeasance in a public office, but the DPP refused to allow the police even to investigate the matter. I believe this was an abuse of power.

My Annual Confidential Reports for the years 1971-74, which were counter-signed by the most senior officers at HQNI during that period show that the work I was doing at HQ N Ireland was very highly regarded by them. Indeed, one of my former superiors has gone on public record saying that he recommended me on at least two occasions for an MBE. Bearing in mind that I had been engaged in my Information Policy (Psy Ops) role, both unofficially and officially, for a number of years, it is totally inconceivable that my superiors were, therefore, not fully aware of what I was doing.

I believe part of the MoD's reason for lying to Parliament about my role was the sensitivity surrounding psychological operations and it is clear that MoD and other Government witnesses also lied to the Saville Inquiry on this issue.

The MOD and Psychological Operations (Psy Ops)

What are psychological operations and did the Army engage in psychological operations in Northern Ireland? In a report dated 06.04.1973 to the MoD Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Committee Secretary, Air Commodore B. G. T. Stanbridge defined strategic Psy Ops as:

"Undermining the enemy's will to fight, promoting suspicion and distrust and exploiting disagreements among the enemy. It is, however, to be distinguished from public relations (PR) which is concerned solely with the dissemination of factual information, usually through mass media representatives, and normally in answer to questions."

This definition is important because the Army Public Relations (Press Office) did not engage in Psy Ops, nor did it collect intelligence material about individuals. It relied on factual information mainly from the HQNI Ops room or the unit Press Officers. On occasions, it would have received information from Information Policy, but that information would not normally have been classified or have been disinformation. At least one British Army witness claims that the Intelligence Branch at HQNI obtained its information about Tara and William McGrath from the British Army Press Office. That is untrue.

[11]
In a letter ACDS (Ops) 70/1 dated 02.07.1971, from the Director of Defence Operational Plans, Brigadier H. M. G. Bond, to the Commandant of the Joint Warfare Establishment, the Brigadier states:

"You obviously realise, from your caveat on Reference A, that the subject of Psy Ops in Northern Ireland is a matter for UK EYES ONLY. Therefore, it is a subject which cannot be discussed in front of audiences containing non-UK officers. On the subject of security, the answers to your questions at paragraph 2 of the reference would all be classified SECRET or higher and most of the answers would be restricted on a 'need to know' basis.

We would advise that your Psy Ops staff avoid all mention of Northern Ireland and that if questions are asked on the subject that a reply be given as follows:

Northern Ireland is basically an Internal Security operation. As you must all appreciate our methods of operations and tactics employed when involved in IS operations are obviously highly classified and cannot possibly be discussed in an open forum such as this."

On 14.06.1973, Colonel C. R. Huxtable (Col GS MO4) wrote a loose minute to the Deputy Under-Secretary (Army) at the MoD saying:

"There has been some reluctance to admit to the use of psychological operations in Northern Ireland. Partly for this reason the term "information policy" was coined to cover all Army information activities in the Province... Whatever terms we may use to cloak such activities in a more acceptable guise we do in fact use a fairly full range of information techniques in Northern Ireland though, of course, with some limitations imposed by the nearness of the Province, broadcasting policy and the political situation... However, the subject verges on the taboo within the Army and an unwritten policy prevents free discussion even in closed audiences..."

The Inquiry transcripts show that Major General Len Garrett, claimed that Information Policy's (Psy Ops) role was simply to provide a "quick response" to the media. As the MoD internal correspondence on Psy Ops demonstrates, General Garrett's claim is highly misleading. Brigadier (as he was in 1974) Len Garrett was Chief of Staff at HQNI and was part of the Establishments Board that approved my 'secret' job description. As Chief of Staff, he saw my Annual Confidential Reports and he was aware of what my role actually entailed.

The Barron Inquiry into the Dublin-Monaghan Bombings 1974

CTI have claimed that, although I gave evidence to both the Barron and Saville inquiries, both inquiries "rejected" my evidence. CTI produced no evidence to support this claim and it is manifestly wrong.

In a personal assessment of me and my evidence, Judge Barron said:

"In person, Wallace comes across as intelligent, self-assured, and possessed of a quiet yet unwavering moral conviction. Though he has reasons enough to be bitter - the abrupt and unjust ending of a promising career in Northern Ireland, five years spent in prison on a conviction which has since been quashed - he displays no outward signs of resentment towards individuals or institutions. He remains
intensely loyal to his country and to the Army: insofar as he has a quarrel, it is with individuals rather than the institutions concerned. He says he believes that much of the propaganda work undertaken by Information Policy was justifiable in the interests of defeating subversives and promoting a political solution to the Troubles. When speaking of matters directly within his own experience, the inquiry believes him to be a highly knowledgeable witness. His analyses and opinions, though derived partly from personal knowledge and partly from information gleaned since his time in Northern Ireland, should also be treated with seriousness and respect".

Nowhere in his Report, does Judge Barron say that he "rejected" my evidence. On the contrary, he is very positive about my contribution. His comments are apparently being misrepresented by the Inquiry.

The Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday 1972

It is ironic that CTI should refer in the same way to my evidence to the Saville Inquiry. Again, he produces no evidence to support his claim, but it is at odds with submissions made at that Inquiry. In those submissions, lawyers representing the families of those shot by the British Army on Bloody Sunday claimed that "British intelligence officers have obstructed and misled its six-year investigation." This article appears in the 21.03.2004 edition of The Sunday Tribune:

"The Bloody Sunday Inquiry has been told that British intelligence officers have obstructed and misled its six-year investigation into the Derry killings.

In closing submissions to the Tribunal under Lord Saville, solicitors Madden and Finucane (M&F) argue that a pattern of manipulation and misrepresentation, begun at the Widgery Tribunal 32 years ago, has continued into the proceedings of the present inquiry.

The firm, representing a majority of the Bloody Sunday families and wounded, declares that, "It may well be that the...Cabinet fully intended that all relevant official documentation would be available to the Inquiry:" but if so, "this intention has been frustrated."

M&F suggests that "vital documents...have been deliberately destroyed and/or suppressed," and that "Intelligence material has been supplied by the Government in a manner designed to mislead the Tribunal." M&F argues that the apparent disappearance of more than 1,000 British Army photographs of the Bloody Sunday events "gives rise to the inference that they have been deliberately destroyed and/or concealed by the Army or the MoD in order to suppress damaging evidence."

The Tribunal, established in January 1998, adjourned in February after hearing more than 900 witnesses. It will reconvene at Derry Guildhall on June 6th, when legal teams will comment on each other's submissions. Expectations that Saville would deliver his report early next year have been thrown into doubt by a Tribunal request 10 days ago for lawyers to produce documents relating to their clients which had previously been considered confidential. It is not now known when Saville will publish his findings.

M&F bases its allegations on the testimony of serving and former military and intelligence officers, including "psyps" (psychological operations) officer Colin Wallace and the former member of the Force Reaction Unit (FRU) known as Martin Ingram. The firm says the evidence shows that around the time of Bloody Sunday, the intelligence agencies MI5 and MI6 and psy-ops unit, the Information Research Department (IRD), effectively controlled the dissemination of political and military
information in Northern Ireland and dictated what material was released to the Widgery Inquiry. These agencies, it says, "still are engaged in what may euphemistically be described as shaping perceptions of the truth in a manner favourable to the Government and Army."

M&F say that the intelligence services had a wider role and greater influence in the North in 1972 than has generally been acknowledged. "All the information put out by the Army (on Bloody Sunday) was put by psyops personnel," the firm suggests. More broadly, the lawyers say that the UK Government's operation in the North was effectively an intelligence operation. "The UK Representative, Howard Smith, later became head of MI5. His deputy, Frank Steele, was a member of MI6. Clifford Hill (the senior Foreign Office official based in Belfast) and Mr. (Hugh) Mooney (Information Adviser to the General Officer Commanding) were seconded from IRD. The Director of Intelligence at HQNI was also a member of MI5. The claim is that these agencies moved into action immediately after the Bloody Sunday shootings and have been involved in concealing the truth about the incident and their own role in a cover-up ever since.

Wallace was the only witness openly to admit involvement in psyops. Col. Maurice Tugwell claimed not to have been involved - but was identified by Wallace in evidence as head of the psyops unit he served in at Army HQ in Lisburn. A witness code-named INQ 1873 denied playing a role in psyops and said that it was "wrong in principle to practice psyops against one's own people." However, says M&F, "We now know that he was the former Head of Psyops at the Joint Warfare Establishment at Old Sarum and was a member of the psyops staff in N. Ireland."

Hugh Mooney denied that he had played any part in psyops. But, says M&F, "according to the documentation, he was a member of the psyops staff and of the Psyops Committee; and he referred in his own reports to attending psyops meetings."

The fact that these and other witnesses denied involvement in psyops despite evidence to the contrary, M&F argues, "gives rise to the inference that (a) they were involved in such activity, (b) this activity related to Bloody Sunday and (c) it was so discreditable that they had to deny it."

Wallace, a member of the Army's team at the Widgery Inquiry, was the only witness to admit seeing a large number of Army photographs of Bloody Sunday. M&F says that "it is simply not credible" that none of Wallace's colleagues could recall the photographs, and suggests that this implies a concerted effort to conceal evidence from Saville.

The firm quotes Ingram's evidence that he had had access to and saw "hundreds" of documents relating to Bloody Sunday which had not been produced to the Inquiry. According to Ingram, these included documents indicating that Martin McGuinness had been under surveillance throughout Bloody Sunday; intelligence reports prior to Bloody Sunday that neither the Official nor Provisional IRA intended to attack troops on the day; and documents written after Bloody Sunday suggesting that the IRA had not fired first.

M&F say that the failure to produce these documents reveals a continuing determination to conceal facts which might damage the Army's case.

The submission points out that it wasn't until March 2003 that MI5 admitted to Saville - as a result of a series of questions from inquiry lawyers—that much of its information about in Bogside in 1972 had come from an informant code-named Observer C, an agent so reliable, the inquiry was told, that his reports had once been brought directly to the attention of Prime Minister Edward Heath. There was evidence that on the day after Bloody Sunday, Observer C was tasked to find out what the Bogside knew about the shootings. But no account of what he reported can apparently now be
found. M&F comment: "If he had provided information that supported the Army’s account of events, it is likely that this would not only have been retained...but passed on...to agencies including the Army’s legal team at Widgery.... The likely explanation is that Observer C’s report contradicted the Army’s account of events and the relevant source reports have either been excised from Security Service records or have been withheld from the Inquiry."

The M&F submission observes that in one document, “Col. Tugwell...comments that ‘the indigenous Irish, once convinced that their cause is just, possess a breath taking ability to lie with absolute conviction, not just in support of something they believe to be true, but to put across a story they know very well is untrue.”

Extract form the Saville Inquiry Report into Bloody Sunday:

“Psychological operations at the time of Bloody Sunday:

178.18 According to Colonel INQ. 1873, low-level psyops were carried out by the Information Liaison Department until about the end of July 1971. They were found to be unproductive and were halted. Colonel Tugwell did not believe in the efficacy of psyops and, on his appointment in September 1971, reinforced the policy of bringing psyops to an end.

178.19 In an undated report probably written at the end of September or early October 1971 to Mr. Welser of the IRD, Hugh Mooney stated that he attended meetings of the “army psyops working committee in an advisory capacity” 1. In his oral evidence to this Inquiry he said that he could not recall such a committee. He insisted that he was not then involved in psyops.

178.20 The draft document referred to above, dated 30th November 1971 and written by Charles Henn of DS10, suggested that psyops were at that time being carried out in Northern Ireland under the supervision of Colonel Tugwell.

178.21 Colonel Tugwell was asked during his oral evidence about this draft. He said: “... it reflects to me the much greater obsession amongst civilian organisations, Foreign Office and the IRD, very much inclined towards secrecy and psychological this and that. I was just not interested in that. ... [I]t did not affect my policy, which was to back off from Psy Ops”

(a) That extract can be compared with extracts from MoD:

(i) Letter dated 05.08.1971 from Brigadier HMG Bond, Director of Defence Operational Plans at the MoD to Rear Admiral E F Gueritz, The Joint Warfare Establishment, Salisbury.

“Our policy is that we do conduct Military Psy Ops in Northern Ireland. (By definition psy Ops can be employed to influence enemy, friendly or neutral groups, or individuals - all exist in Northern Ireland).”

(ii) Loose Minute (426) A/BR/130/11/MO4 dated 14 January 1973 from Colonel C.R. Huxtable to the Deputy Under-Secretary (Army) and headed ‘Northern Ireland – Psy Ops Policy.’

[15]
“Policy: Whatever terms we may use to cloak such activities in a more acceptable guise, we do in fact use a fairly full range of information techniques in Northern Ireland though, of course, with some limitations imposed by the nearness of the Province, broadcasting policy and the political situation.”

(iii) Ministry of Defence, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Psychological Operations Report by Air Commodore BGT Stanbridge dated 06.04.1973:

“Deception is a specialised form of psyops involving the use of special techniques and can most conveniently be regarded as a separate subject”

(iv) The following officers are currently employed in psyops posts outside NATO

“Northern Ireland: one Colonel and one Lieutenant Colonel at HQ NI and one Major at HQ 8 Infantry Brigade all of whom are employed on information policy matters. Counter propaganda and other aspects of psyops are handled by an organisation representing interested departments.”

(Note: The latter organisation was the Information Research Department (IRD), to which Hugh Mooney belonged. It is important to point out that the IRD, founded in 1946 was a covert anti-communist propaganda unit within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). A restricted memo in February 1948 described the establishment of the IRD as a response to the "developing communist threat to the whole fabric of Western civilization". IRD was closed down in 1977. The Foreign Secretary at the time, David Owen was reported in The Guardian 18.08.1995 as stating that the IRD had become involved in the grey area of manipulating journalism and that clandestine operations were the work of MI6, not that of a "civil department").

The Information Policy press briefing documents on William McGrath and Tara

For a variety of important security reasons, William McGrath and Tara became an Army Psy Ops target in 1973/74.

The name "Kincora" was not used in any of the documents or briefings produced by Information Policy because I was specifically instructed not to for reasons associated with the RUC. In any event, the name 'Kincora' had no significance whatsoever for the press in the mid-1970s. The address of the property was believed to be sufficient to give the press a clear indication of the building and what it was used for. I believe the redacted words on the document were 'Faith House'. McGrath called his previous residences by that name, but I seem to recall that he did not use that name after he moved from Greenwood Avenue to the 188 Newtownards Road, hence the removal of the name from the briefing sheet.

The inquiry appears to be confused over the two press briefing documents used by me. One document was designed to be given to the appropriate press contacts, the other one, for legal and security reasons, was only to be referred to during unattributable briefings. It was not designed to be given to the press. In other words, if a journalist claimed to have been given the names of any of the non-Tara
personalities, such as Thomas Passmore, or William McGrath's address or telephone number, then that information would have come from the second version. We were aware that some journalists had very close relationships with the RUC and that information obtained from us would almost certainly be passed to the police. It had to appear that we were focusing on William McGrath and Tara as paramilitary entities, and not on allegations of sexual abuse at the hostel.

This extract from a story written by David McKittrick in The Irish Times on 12.03.1981 highlights this point particularly well:

"It was clear that he (Wallace) had access to the highest levels of intelligence data. He had an encyclopaedic memory, which he occasionally refreshed with calls made on his personal scrambler telephone to the Headquarters a few floors above his office.

He was astonishingly frank. He would freely give the names, addresses, phone numbers and names of mistresses of paramilitary figures, both Republican and Loyalist. He was also ready to admit mistakes made by the British Army and to acknowledge that the Provisionals or any other group were doing well.

Once, for example, I asked him what he knew about the small Loyalist group, Tara. My notes, which I still have, show that he gave me the name, address and telephone number of its commanding officer [McGrath] and the names of four other prominent members (including two who are now in senior positions in a Unionist political party).

Much of the information was clearly correct and was verified from other sources. But there were also some pieces clearly aimed at blackening the reputation of paramilitary or political figures. For example, a document from Wallace on the Tara group described one of its leaders in the following terms: "he is said to be a homosexual and has conned many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he had initiated. He is also thought to owe more allegiance to the Red flag than to either the Union Jack or the Tricolour."

David McKittrick's article by itself completely undermines the claim by the MoD and the Intelligence Services that they knew very little about McGrath in 1973/74. How could I have known the name, address and telephone of the Tara commanding officer if the Intelligence Services had not known that information?

The information regarding William McGrath's address and telephone number could only have come from the second, unattributable, version of my press briefing document on Tara. Also, bearing in mind that I left Northern Ireland at the beginning February 1975, the briefing I gave David McKittrick must have taken place before Christmas 1974 because I went on leave pending my transfer to HQ North West District in Preston.

It is important for the Inquiry to note that my Tara briefing document also appears to bear the handwriting of Hugh Mooney from IRD, the Information Adviser to the GOC (see the words "he said he resigned" - a reference to Roy Garland's departure from Tara). Also, the fact that there is a reference to Dr Morris Fraser in the handwriting of another officer, Major Harding, at HQNI, indicates that there was a significant level of awareness about the real nature of what was being targeted by the Tara briefings. I should, however, make it clear that I, personally, had no information linking Dr Fraser with Kincora.

[17]
The document bears the words “Clerks IP” written at the top. The handwriting is Peter Broderick's – he confirmed this in an interview with Paul Foot (Daily Mirror 08.02.1990).

“This week, for the first time, Peter Broderick, Wallace’s boss at the time (1974), confirmed to me that he saw the document (The Tara press brief used by Wallace to highlight McGrath’s homosexuality and his role in running a children’s home) and wrote on it. ‘That is certainly my writing’, he told me. ‘I saw the document and approved it’.”

Peter Broderick also confirmed this to the Sunday Times (Sunday Times 11 Feb 1990).

Peter Broderick left Northern Ireland in September 1974, so the memo must pre-date that. Moreover, he has confirmed on the record to The Daily Mirror and The Sunday Times that he signed the document and authorised its release. I believe the Inquiry is missing the key point about this document and its contents. It also bears the handwriting of the GSO1 Information Policy, Lt Colonel Adrian Peck, who was head of psyops at HQNI in 1973 and early 1974. Hugh Mooney, of IRD, left HQ Northern Ireland at the end of 1973, so the document was probably created in October that year when the ‘Clockwork Orange’ project was initiated. This is an example of how the Inquiry’s lack of detailed knowledge about the matter has resulted in significant evidence being overlooked or misunderstood.

A significant amount of additional information was added by me to ‘Clockwork Orange’ in November or December 1974 as a result of General Leng’s memo to Information Policy requesting that steps be taken to ensure that the RUC took action on the allegations.

Given that the documents referred to above contain William McGrath’s name, home address and telephone number, as well as the address and telephone number of his place of work, and that I shared that information with the press in 1973/74, how can the MoD and the Intelligence Services claim that they had little information about him at that time.

Moreover, General Leng makes it clear in his recorded interview with the Sunday Times in February 1990 that he was aware in 1973/74 of McGrath, where he worked and the “homosexual insinuations”. General Leng also recalls writing a memo pointing out that the sexual abuse allegations were a police matter.

An extract from that interview says:

PENROSE: The actual operation, I mean Clockwork Orange, when it was first mooted was in fact Denis Payne - several people have mentioned that - who was at NIO."

LENG: That’s right. There was of course that branch as well. NIO would come in and cross fertilise if they wanted to keep something from the RUC - don't quote me again.

PENROSE: No, No. No."
"PENROSE: No, of course. It's just to see how, if you would forgive me, how the bureaucracy works. So, Clockwork Orange in this case comes from Denis Payne's office, so it's Intelligence to Intelligence, and then you're shown it.

LENG: I'm not always shown it. Only if they need to involve someone at a higher level.

PENROSE: Right.

PENROSE: Clockwork Orange was policy. This sounds like a statement rather than a question, but a statement asking for confirmation.

LENG: And Clockwork Orange was policy.

PENROSE: Yes. And so Denis Payne sends the file over and this is Policy from NIO.

LENG: I wouldn't have thought he would even send a file over if I may say so because the less that was committed to paper the better.

(Note: The latter comment is important because it shows that very sensitive or deniable information was not put on file and it should not come as a surprise to the Inquiry that most of the really key information relating to the matter under investigation is not on record. In essence, it had to be totally deniable. That is exactly what the MoD and the Intelligence Services are doing just now).

Another extract from the interview says:

PENROSE: You said in the memo according to [Mike] Taylor that the RUC and the social services I think ought to be brought in here because the file named men and boys who were obviously part of this abuse which we all know about since.

LENG: Yes, I recall that.

PENROSE: Do you? And you said take action. They waited because obviously there had been other members suggesting this from junior officers, but it was yours that finally convinced Taylor that this was going to happen, but of course it went on for another six or seven years, but again that wasn't your fault. It was just to remind you that there were homosexual abuses taking place, namely by the housefather named McGrath.

LENG: Yes.

PENROSE: who was also the leader of TARA, and of course eventually that was all proven in court some years afterwards, and also a man named McKeague, but I mean this is obviously outside ...

LENG: Yes, I do remember the homosexual insinuations and I do remember saying this is a police business, not ours."

[19]
Is it really credible that General Leng possessed this information about McGrath and the sexual abuse allegations and that neither MoD, nor MI5 nor MI6 knew anything about this? In the end, the public will have to make up their minds on this.

Those who served with General Leng will be well aware that he was a very professional and forthright officer who had great integrity. There is no doubt in my mind that his knowledge of McGrath and Kincora as expressed above would have been communicated very clearly and forcibly to those around him. I am amazed that the Inquiry transcripts indicate that the Inquiry made no determined attempt to challenge senior military and Intelligence witnesses over General Leng’s comments. I am also disgusted that those officers and officials, including the senior Information Policy officers, did not have the courage to speak out and confirm what General Leng had said.

I believe the Inquiry must face up to this issue because General Leng’s comments go to the very heart of the Inquiry’s investigation into Kincora. The Inquiry must decide: do they believe General Leng, who had no reason whatsoever to lie, or do they believe MoD and Intelligence witnesses who had very good reasons to lie. It is sad and very worrying that CTI has attempted to play down the significance of what General Leng said. If it had not been for the stance he took on this issue, I would not have been talking to the press in 1974 about McGrath’s homosexual activities. Although General Leng makes it clear to Barrie Penrose that he could not recall some of the detail relating to ‘Clockwork Orange’, it is very obvious that he was not in any doubt about some of the key facts referred to above. I am sure the tape recordings of General Leng’s interview still exist and the Inquiry should take steps to obtain copies of them because they are pivotal to the understanding of Kincora, and no amount of obfuscation by the MoD or its representatives can avoid that basic fact.

The Sunday Times story based on General Leng’s recorded interview with Barrie Penrose was published in the first edition of the newspaper on 18 February 1990. I was reliably informed that the MoD put pressure on the Sunday Times to withdraw the story. Indeed, the story was withdrawn from subsequent editions. It is not difficult to understand why the MoD reacted so negatively to the story because General Leng’s comments undermined almost everything the Department and its Ministers had been saying about ‘Clockwork Orange’ and Kincora.

Ironically, the story also referred to an incident when an NCO, who was a photographer with the Army Information Services at Army HQ in Lisburn in 1973/74, offered some of the ‘Clockwork Orange’ material to Len Adams, a journalist with the Sunday People. According to the ‘Sunday Times’, Len Adams told the paper: “I was taken to Lisburn by an NCO named Bill Bain”, said Adams. When he later called the unit to ask Bain if the story could be released, an officer told him that he had died. The ‘Sunday Times’ established that Bain was still alive and in the Army.”

Bill Bain was certainly not dead; he continued to serve in the British Army and became a commissioned officer. Clearly, if the MoD was willing to lie blatantly about ‘Clockwork Orange’ related material as it did in this incident, there is no reason to accept at face value anything the Department says, or has said, on this issue.

Bill Bain was not the only former member of the Army Information Services to be falsely described as dead by the MoD. When researching material for his book, ‘Who Framed Colin Wallace’, Paul Foot
attempted to locate a Corporal Neil Fincham who had been a photographer at HQ NI. The MoD told Paul Foot that Neil Fincham had died. Neil Fincham later discovered that Paul Foot had been trying to contact him and was very surprised to hear that the MoD had pronounced him ‘dead’.

Given that the MoD was quite willing to lie to the press by claiming that two soldiers who served with the Army Information Services in Northern Ireland had subsequently died, when, fact the Ministry knew they were alive, is it really likely that the MoD will tell the truth about what the Army knew about child sex abuse in Belfast?

The cover-up was not just at local level, however; it extended right to the top of the MoD. For example, in response to questions from Robert Parker, Channel 4 News, on 24.06.1987, the Director of Army Public Relations at the MoD, Brigadier The Honourable W E (‘Willie’) Rous, replied on 23.07.1987 responding to two specific questions saying:

“I am sorry it has taken me so long to reply, but the research has taken time.”

He then went on to say:

“2. I can confirm that a statement by Mr Broderick and extracts from confidential reports prepared by the Institute of Professional Civil Servants were presented to the Civil Service Appeal Board. I can also confirm that the job description given to the CSAB was the only one covering Mr Wallace’s job and there was therefore no ‘secret’ job description as has been alleged. Mr Wallace’s job as Senior Information Officer in Northern Ireland was to brief the press on military operations and terrorist activities in the Province. It would have been necessary on occasions to give briefings on an unattributable basis, but I am informed that it was not part of his job to spread false information.”

And:

“4. One of your questions referred to a ‘mock raid’ at Belfast Airport which you understood was carried out under my control. I have no recollection of any such exercise.”

I knew Brigadier Rous very well when he served at HQNI in the 1970s. He was then a Major and responsible for the day-to-day running of the Operations Room at HQ NI. In that capacity, I had frequent contact with him and he was familiar with what my true role was. The MoD later admitted that I did have a ‘secret’ job specification and that part of that role was to disseminate disinformation. In other words, Brigadier Rous lied to Channel 4 News.

In terms of the mock raid on Belfast Airport, Brigadier Rous initiated that exercise. The fact that the exercise did take place was confirmed in a letter from the Minister of State for the Armed Forces to Ken Livingstone MP on 30.01.1990 (D/MIN(AF)/AH/9/4/4). In other words Brigadier Rous lied to Channel 4 News on this matter also.

The author (Mr Heyhoe) of a subsequent internal MoD Inquiry in 1990) reported:

“I have also examined the detailed issues which are covered in Mr Hamilton’s letter of 30 January 1990 to Mr Ken Livingstone M.P.:  

[21]
(a) The error over the mock raid at Aldergrove airport was the result of a mistake by officials, who overlooked a minute, available on the file, explaining an individual official's own recollection of the incident.

(b) The information concerning the use of a Sterling 9mm L34A1 sub-machine gun fitted with a suppressor was discovered on the same file as the original reference to "Clockwork Orange" found in July 1989. As already explained, the - earlier - whereabouts of this file have not been established.

(c) Nor has it proved possible at this point to establish the reason for the incorrect date previously given in respect of the Ingram 9mm sub-machine gun M10. The corrected information about its use was found on a closed file dating from the mid-1970s and recalled from archives in the course of the special search of Departmental papers.

Bearing in mind that Brigadier Rous was the Director of Army Public Relations when he wrote to Channel 4, his letter shows that at the very top levels of the MoD there was a deliberate, planned and sustained campaign of deception to cover-up the truth about my case. Given the extent of that cover up, it would be naive in the extreme to believe that the MoD is now prepared to tell the Inquiry the full truth about its knowledge of child sex abuse in Belfast in the 1970s.

When Mr Heyhoe compiled his report in 1990, the MoD claimed that it was a "discontinuity of collective memory", exacerbated by filing issues, that led to Ministers and Parliament being "inadvertently misled" about my case. That is total nonsense. When my disciplinary case arose in February 1975, senior officers at HQ N Ireland and the MoD were well aware of my role - my job specification had been approved only five months earlier - and even the most cursory examination of the facts would have discovered the truth.

'Clockwork Orange, Tara and the Intelligence Services'

I believe it is vitally important that the Inquiry understands something of the climate that existed within the Intelligence community during the 1970s and what the likely impact that climate had on the wider aspects of how McGrath, Tara and Kincora were viewed, used by, and reported on, by the various agencies. Contrary to what the MoD, MI5 and MI6 have attempted to convey to the Inquiry there were serious undercurrents at work with the Intelligence community during the 1970s. The following information is now freely available in the public domain, and highlights why the Government, the MoD and the Intelligence Services went to such great lengths to discredit what I have been saying about Kincora and to deny for years the existence of 'Clockwork Orange' and its references to William McGrath, Tara and related matters.

At page 168 of his book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace', Paul Foot writes:

"On 27 November 1975, he (Wallace) consulted a local solicitor in Blackheath, Graham Dodd. He told Dodd his story and asked if there was any way he could continue to challenge what had happened. Graham Dodd recalls the consultations with Wallace very clearly. Twelve years later he told Channel Four News:
Colin Wallace said he was involved in dirty tricks against politicians in Northern Ireland and he also said this had started to move over onto the mainland against mainland politicians — and in particular he mentioned Harold Wilson.

Eleven years later, a mighty political row blew up over the allegation by a former MI5 officer, Peter Wright, that there had been an Intelligence plot against the elected Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. It is worth recalling that Colin Wallace’s statement, in confidence, to the Blackheath solicitor in November 1975 was the first time ever any such allegation had been put on the record.

It went further. Mr Dodd was impressed with Colin Wallace and made several attempts to help him. First, he suggested a visit to the local MP, Roland Moyle, who was coincidentally a junior minister in the Northern Ireland Office. Colin and his solicitor went to see Moyle in his constituency. They saw him twice and Colin spelt out his complaint at length. Colin felt, he said, that he had been pushed out of his job, at which he excelled, for refusing to rubbish Roland Moyle’s colleagues in the Labour government.

Mr Moyle listened carefully and took a lot of notes. When I spoke to him twelve years later, he could still remember the interviews and the main thrust of what was said there: ‘He was telling me about some dirty tricks operation designed to blacken the names of Northern Ireland politicians.’ (Daily Mirror, 9 April 1987.)

What did Mr Moyle do about these very serious allegations? ‘I can’t remember, I’m afraid,’ he told me. ‘I have destroyed my notes.’

A still more succinct answer to the question can be found in the bill which Graham Dodd eventually submitted to Colin Wallace. It includes an item: ‘Arranging appointment with you and attending with you on interview with your Member of Parliament. Correspondence further on the matter when no satisfaction could be obtained’.

Three years after I briefed solicitor Graham Dodd on ‘Clockwork Orange’, a book was published by two BBC journalists in which they quoted Sir Harold Wilson complaining to them about attempts by MI5 to destabilize his Government.

‘The Pencourt File’ by Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtiour (1978)

During an interview (page 9) on 12.05.1976 at his home in Lord North Street, London, Harold Wilson told Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtiour:

"I am not certain that for the last eight months when I was Prime Minister I knew what was happening, fully, in Security," he said with obvious annoyance. He really could not rule out the possibility that individuals working inside MI5, and even MI6, had contributed to the "smears" which, he complained, had frequently appeared in the Press and elsewhere while he had been at Number 10. He told the reporters that some people in the Security Services were "very right-wing". "They would naturally be brought up to believe," he said, "that Socialist leaders were another form of Communist. They are blinkered; the sort of people who would have spread the stories of Number 10 and the Communist cell."
Harold Wilson emphasised that his basic concern was the fact that British Intelligence had been quoted by reliable witnesses as being the actual source for such unfounded rumours. He said that people had come to hear this particular story in narrow, fashionable circles, invariably in the context that "MI5 knew", and that he had concluded it was part of a wider well-orchestrated campaign against him and his Labour Government.

Without disguising a certain bitterness the former Prime Minister described the steps he had taken to combat such alleged malpractices inside the Secret Service. He had first called in Sir Maurice Oldfield, the head of MI6. Normally, he said, a British Prime Minister does not meet the head of MI6, the service responsible for intelligence and espionage activities outside the United Kingdom. Sir Maurice would usually make his reports to the Prime Minister through the Foreign Office. Only the head of MI5, the body responsible for domestic security, had direct access to Number 10.

Both reporters realised that for the Prime Minister to summon the MI6 chief must be almost without precedent.

"Maurice Oldfield?" Penrose enquired.

"Oldfield," Sir Harold replied, "said that there's a section of MI5 which is unreliable. And there was also a man who had once held high office in the Security Service." He mentioned the name. "And Oldfield confirmed this and he said he was going to bring it out."

"And?" said Courtier...

... Sir Harold explained that by the summer of 1975 the smear campaign against his government was in full swing. Word, he said, was also put about that his Political Secretary had not been positively vetted. She was said to be a security risk. Positive vetting, the reporters had learned, was a rigorous form of security clearance for top civil servants which had to be repeated every five years. Sir Harold was certain he said that the MI5 faction was also responsible for spreading the rumour that Marcia Williams had not been positively vetted. "In fact, she had," said Sir Harold.

Disturbed by the persistent reports which had been reaching him Sir Harold said he had also called in the head of MI5, Sir Michael Hanley. The career Secret Service chief had apparently also confirmed the existence within his Service of a disaffected faction with extreme right-wing views. Such an admission had perturbed the Prime Minister. He went on holiday that summer troubled by what he had learned from his Secret Service chiefs. If he could not trust a section of MI5, how could he ask them to investigate impartially the rumours which were being made about himself and his entourage at Number 10? More particularly, how could he now investigate people whom he suspected might have infiltrated the Cabinet Office for sinister motives?

Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtier later interviewed Sir Michael Hanley, former Director General of MI5 and asked him about Sir Harold Wilson's allegations and, in particularly about allegations that a coup d'état involving members of the Intelligence Services had been plotted on more than one occasion (page 320).
"It's been described to us that on two occasions at least there have been fears of a coup in this country," said the reporter (Barrie Penrose). "Is this something we can discount or not?"

"I am not willing to disclose such information," answered the man.

Later in the interview (page 321), Penrose said to Sir Michael Hanley:

"Your 'no comments' in fact seem to be suggesting that the coup really was a threat at one stage?" enquired Penrose, not expecting a reply.

"I haven't expressed a view on the seriousness of the coup," said the man gruffly.

"You seem to accept there was certainly talk of a coup?" said the reporter quickly.

"I think it is generally accepted," said the official. "Yes."

It may be accepted by some people, thought Courtiour, but not by some fifty-five million people who have had no idea any such plan was ever considered. Whether by "gin-sodden generals" or others who were completely sober.

"But, of course, there was no coup," volunteered the official. "That perhaps is the most important fact."

Before leaving the former spy chief that afternoon he suggested to the reporters that in the "national interest" they would be better not to publish what they had learned from the ex-Prime Minister. Courtiour replied that others had been equally convinced that what they had learned should be published."

Harold Wilson, he said, was one person who wanted the facts to be brought out into the open. He had told the reporters repeatedly that he was particularly concerned about the recent conduct of the British Security Services. He was convinced that it was in the national interest for any disloyalty to be exposed."

‘Inside Intelligence’ by Anthony Cavendish (December 1987)

Anthony (Tony) Cavendish was one of Sir Maurice Oldfield’s closest friends. They served together in Army Intelligence during World War 2. At the end of war they both joined MI6 and remained very close friends up until Sir Maurice died on 11 March 1981.

In his biography, ‘Inside Intelligence’, Tony Cavendish refers to attempts by MI5 to discredit various political figures including Harold Wilson and Edward Heath.

"In 1978, Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtiour published a book called ‘The Pencourt File’. Two months after the Prime Minister resigned, these two investigative journalists had been summoned to his home by Harold Wilson. He told them, amongst other things, that he suspected the loyalty of certain senior MI5 officers and that he was convinced that his telephone had been bugged by MI5. He had consulted

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both Maurice as Chief of MI6 and Sir Michael Hanley as Head of MI5 and had been told that MI5 contained a 'disaffected' faction.

It was extraordinary that a former Prime Minister should be accusing what had been his own primary security organization of the state of working against him, but after a brief flurry of interest in the media the whole matter was supposedly forgotten.

Even though Penrose was sure there was at least some substance to the accusations, little else happened and everything was damped down until a furore was caused by the Government's clumsily-handled attempts to suppress a book by a former MI5 officer, Peter Wright. Wright stated in Australia that MI5, or a section of MI5 orchestrated by him, had broken the law while actively working to discredit not only Wilson and the Labour Government, but also the preceding Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath.

In the Sunday Times on 22 March 1987 Penrose led the front page with the headline, MI5 'PLOTTED' ULSTER STRIKE. The source of Penrose's story was a former MI5 agent, James Miller. Miller's claims are supported by two former British Army intelligence officers, Colin Wallace and Fred Holroyd; both of whom worked in Northern Ireland, and are now themselves victims of a campaign of disinformation.

I have met both Wallace and Holroyd, and have to confess that the story they tell is frightening and disquieting, but one which ties in with many events to which I have been privy over the past ten years. What has caused me to give credence to these statements is the fact that Wallace asserts that Sir Maurice Oldfield while Security Supremo was also the target for a black propaganda campaign. Details of this campaign match closely details which were told to me privately by Maurice...”

...Maurice did tell me, however, that he had to admit to the Prime Minister that there was 'a section of MI5 which was unreliable'. Whether or not MI5 were tied in to the PM's resignation, weird and disturbing things were undoubtedly happening within MI5 at this time, particularly in Northern Ireland, and there is no doubt that the serious campaign against Oldfield was started there.

A story was 'leaked' in Belfast about Maurice's resignation and was picked up by the Sunday Times of 26 April 1987, alleging that Maurice had travelled alone to a pub in Ulster over one weekend and drank there alone, unrecognized, throughout the afternoon. The allegation went on that while the worse for drink he had followed a man into the gentlemen's lavatory and propositioned him. The resulting complaint from the man was supposed to have initiated the enquiries into Maurice's behaviour.

Subsequent investigations have shown that the pub supposedly involved was one regularly used by the RUC — who would have recognized him — which was about twenty miles from Stormont. As Maurice did not drive, it is difficult to imagine that he hitchhiked undetected to the pub; and certainly when I saw him in Ulster, he always had two car loads of bodyguards with him. Recent enquiries at the pub, which is now closed, have shown that nobody from the manager downwards can remember anything about this incident.
The black propaganda campaign against Maurice started in 1972, increased the year later when he became Chief of MI6 and was reinforced with a vengeance in 1979 when it became known that he was to be the new Security Supremo for Northern Ireland."

Channel 4 News carried out a thorough investigation into how this elaborate smear was manufactured as part of a plan to discredit Sir Maurice. Although there was an identified link between the story and the RUC, it was also clear that the police could not have engineered the story without input from some members of the Intelligence Services.

'Spycatcher' by Peter Wright (1987)

In his memoirs, published in 1987, former MI5 senior officer, Peter Wright, confirms much of what Harold Wilson alleged to Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtiour eleven years earlier.

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As events moved to their political climax in early 1974, with the election of the minority Labour Government, MI5 was sitting on information which, if leaked, would undoubtedly have caused a political scandal of incalculable consequences. The news that the Prime Minister himself was being investigated would at the least have led to his resignation. The point was not lost on some MI5 officers.

One afternoon I was in my office when two colleagues came in. They were with three or four other officers. I closed the file I was working on and asked them how I could help.

"We understand you've reopened the Wilson case," said the senior one.

"You know I can't talk about that," I told him.

I felt a bit lame, but then I did not much enjoy being cornered in my own office.

"Wilson's a bloody menace," said one of the younger officers, "and it's about time the public knew the truth."

It was not the first time I had heard that particular sentiment. Feelings had run high inside MI5 during 1968. There had been an effort to try to stir up trouble for Wilson then, largely because the Daily Mirror tycoon, Cecil King, who was a long-time agent of ours, made it clear that he would publish anything MI5 might care to leak in his direction. It was all part of Cecil King's "coup," which he was convinced would bring down the Labour Government and replace it with a coalition led by Lord Mountbatten.

But the approach in 1974 was altogether more serious. The plan was simple. In the run-up to the election which, given the level of instability in Parliament, must be due within a matter of months, MI5 would arrange for selective details of the intelligence about leading Labour Party figures, but especially Wilson, to be leaked to sympathetic pressmen. Using our contacts in the press and among union officials, word of the material contained in MI5 files and the fact that Wilson was considered a security risk would be passed around.
Soundings in the office had already been taken, and up to thirty officers had given their approval to the scheme. Facsimile copies of some files were to be made and distributed to overseas newspapers, and the matter was to be raised in Parliament for maximum effect. It was a carbon copy of the Zinoviev letter, which had done so much to destroy the first Ramsay MacDonald Government in 1928.

"We'll have him out," said one of them, "this time we'll have him out."

In the summer of 1975 I dined with Maurice Oldfield at Locketts. We regularly met for dinner. He was a lonely man, and liked nothing better than a good gossip at the end of the day. He finally made it to the top of MI6 after two abortive attempts, and I was happy for him. Maurice was a good man, but inclined to meddle. That night I could tell something was on his mind.

He turned the conversation to Wilson. How high had feelings been running in there? he asked. He kept hearing all sorts of rumours.

I was non-committal.

"Most of us don't like him. They think he's wrecking the country." Maurice was clearly preoccupied with the subject, because he returned to it again and again.

"You're not telling me the truth," he said finally.

"I'm not with you, Maurice..."

"I was called in by the Prime Minister yesterday," he said, his tone suddenly changing. "He was talking about a plot. Apparently he's heard that your boys have been going around town stirring things up about him and Marcia Falkender, and Communists at No. 10."

He trailed away as if it were all too distasteful for him.

"It's serious, Peter," he began again, "I need to know everything.

Look what's happening in Washington with Watergate. The same thing will happen here unless we're very careful."

I ordered another brandy and decided to tell him everything I knew. When I had finished describing the plans of the previous summer he asked me if Hanley knew.

"No," I replied, "I thought it best just to forget the whole thing." "I want you to go back to the office tomorrow and tell him everything."

Maurice tottered up to bed.

"Don't worry," he called back over his shoulder.
"I won't," I said, "I've only got a few months to go!"

When I saw Hanley the next morning, he went white as a sheet. He might have suspected that feelings against Wilson ran high in the office, but now he was learning that half of his staff were up to their necks in a plot to get rid of the Prime Minister. It was at times like that I was glad I never climbed the executive ladder.

Ironically, his first reaction was anger with Maurice.

"Bloody Maurice!" he raged. "Poking his nose into our business!"

When he had calmed down he asked me for the names.

I gave them. Having come so far, I could not very well refuse. As I reeled them off, I knew suddenly what Blunt had felt like. It was never easy to put on the mask and point the finger.

"Look after them, won't you?" I asked Hanley.

"There will have to be an inquiry, of course," he replied."

Comment: I think many people will be shocked that despite the Chief of MI6, the Director General of MI5 and a former Prime Minister all being aware that there was a group of some 30 MI5 officers attempting to bring down a democratically elected British Government in the 1970s, it would appear no one was ever disciplined, let alone charged with any offence relating to those (reasonable?) activities. It is particularly ironic that at the time those activities were taking place, MIS was insisting that I be sacked for giving a 'restricted' document to a journalist!

Surely, the fact that the former Chief of MI6, the Director General of MI5, plus a senior officer from MI5, all confirmed that officers from part of the Intelligence Services were conspiring to overthrow, or subvert, a democratically elected British Government required some robust action should have been taken. It is also important to bear in mind that the 'Clockwork Orange' project was in progress while these alleged activities were going on.

'Clockwork Orange' Material – Forensic Analysis

For the avoidance of doubt, I must make it clear that I did not know about MI5's attempt to overthrow Sir Harold Wilson and his Government. However, it is clear that many of the smears listed by Sir Harold Wilson were also contained in my 'Clockwork Orange' notes. Bearing in mind that I did not disseminate any of the material referred to by Sir Harold Wilson, it is significant that The Daily Telegraph, dated 19 May 1976, reported that there was then a concerted campaign in the in US to smear UK MPs from all three major parties. I refer to this in more detail below.

In his book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace', Paul Foot reproduces some of those notes. At page 124 of the 'Clockwork Orange' notes (not the book!) there is a reference to several prominent Westminster
politicians, including a Northern Ireland Office Minister. The reference is accompanied by the comment: "link to homosexual story via Belfast McKeague, McGrath etc."

At page 125 of the notes, there is a reference to "Knox Cunningham, Molyneaux, Paisley, Brown, Smith, Smyth (Rev), [REDACTED] [REDACTED], McGrath, McKeague, van Straubenzee, (REDACTED) [REDACTED]."

The above information is taken from the 'Clockwork Orange' notes, (an appendix to 'Clockwork Orange'). There was significantly more information on McGrath and Tara in the 'Clockwork Orange' material, especially the updated version prepared in November/December 1974 following General Leng's memo about McGrath.

A report by David Leigh and Paul Lashmar in The Observer on 05.07.1987 said:

"MI5-based disinformation schemes in Britain, including the 1974 'Wilson plot,' have been confirmed in a forensic breakthrough by the international documents expert, Dr Julius Grant. Dr Grant, the man who exposed the forged 'Hitler Diaries', has succeeded - in a three-month investigation commissioned by The Observer, - in verifying key documents claimed to be written by the Belfast intelligence officer, Colin Wallace. The Wallace files contain the first independent corroboration of the confession by assistant MI5 director Peter Wright in his banned memoirs that MI5 men and political right-wingers conspired against Labour in 1974.

We asked Dr Grant to show whether the documents were forgeries. He concludes: I consider that the balance of probability favours the authentic origin of the writings attributed to 1974.

As a result, we can now demonstrate the extraordinary tide of smears, leaks and fabrications that were fed into the British Press between 1972 and 1976, many aimed at the incoming Labour government of Harold Wilson.

Wallace's notes are explosive. They contain material known only to MI5 at the time - about the suspicions that Gaitskell had been killed by the KGB; about Wilson's innocent links (via his friend Lord Kagan) with a KGB man called Vaygaukas; about East German links (via businessman Rudy Sternberg) to Wilson's office. They include 'slanted' accounts of Wilson's refusal to act on earlier MI5 claims that Labour minister John Stonehouse was under Czech control.

Some of this material surfaced over the next decade. But it was unknown to the public at the time. This is why Dr Grant's forensic analysis is so important."

Channel 4 News also commissioned Dr Grant to report on the forensic dating validity of my notes and in an interview broadcast on 26 June 1987 he was asked by Channel 4 to state what was the likelihood that the notes could have been forged. Dr Grant replied that the forger would have had to know more about papers and inks than he did.


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My ‘Clockwork Orange’ notes are also important because General Peter Leng confirmed in his recorded interview with the Sunday Times that the project was initiated by Denis Payne’s office (MIS) at the Northern Ireland office. As The Observer article rightly points out, most of the material contained in those notes could not have come from Army Intelligence sources, nor could I have obtained it by myself. So, where did it come from? It is not difficult to understand why the MoD went to such great lengths to cast doubt on ‘Clockwork Orange’ and General Leng’s comments.

On 29.08.2014, the former Leader of the House of Commons, Tam Dalyell MP, wrote to David Cameron saying:

“I can reveal that one of the reasons I was so sure that Wallace was unjustly treated was that I had talked to my friend, the late Sir Maurice Oldfield, Tony Cavendish, another member of the Intelligence Community was equally uncomfortable, as was Field Marshal Sir John Stanier.”

When the former heads of the Secret Intelligence Service and the Army express their discomfort at the way I was treated by the MoD, surely something should have been done about it??

In an email dated 19.04.2001 from a correspondent (Reg Whitaker: regwhit@yorku.ca) to Intelligence Forum, the correspondent says:

“T would like to report that when Foot’s book came out in 1989, I asked Tugwell (then living in Canada) about the book and about Wallace. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, he was not critical of the book and was in fact full of praise for Wallace. He had no knowledge concerning the murder charge against Wallace, since that affair postdated his duties in Northern Ireland, but he certainly told me nothing that would have contradicted Wallace’s account of ‘Psy Ops’ and the unfortunately titled Clockwork Orange project. Most interesting of all, he even expressed some regret that he had not spoken out earlier on behalf of Wallace when the latter had first gotten into trouble for his criticisms of dirty tricks.”

Given the foregoing, the extent of deception by the MoD on these matters is truly remarkable. Also, if MIS and MI6 were really unaware of the information about William McGrath that I was giving openly to the press in 1973/74, they would have been the most inept intelligence services on earth. Of course, that is not the case. They were highly competent and, in general, the quality of Intelligence in 1974 was very good. Also, it must be remembered that virtually all the information I possessed originated from Intelligence sources – Information Policy was not an Intelligence gathering organisation in the normal sense. Information Policy specialised in what we referred to as ‘black Intelligence’ i.e. Intelligence which was of little value operationally, but was of considerable significance for creating dissention and distrust between individuals or within groups.

The 1974 Memorandum

I am satisfied that the version of my November 1974 memo which Fred Holroyd gave to the Essex police and which was subsequently passed on to the RUC is a copy of the document I possessed. A copy of the latter was later given to Fred Holroyd after the Terry Inquiry investigated the Kincora allegations and that copy was, no doubt, subsequently copied on numerous occasions - hence the poor quality of some of the copies. Some copies contain annotations by Fred Holroyd. I briefed my solicitor, James Morgan-Harris, on Kincora and on that memo in March 1982 i.e. two years before I first met Fred Holroyd when
he visited me in HMP Lewes. I did not disclose that document to anyone, other than to my solicitor, until after the conclusion of the Terry Inquiry because there was a possibility that I might give evidence to that Inquiry, subject to agreement on the Officials Secrets Acts.

The HIA Inquiry could establish, via a recognised forensic document examiner, whether or not all the copies in circulation stem from a single source. I believe that it is unacceptable for a non-expert to claim that documents are or are not the same unless there are very obvious differences. The Inquiry should be dealing in facts and not uninformated speculation. The same examination could also show if the claim made by the RUC that two typewriters were allegedly used in the production of the document is correct. If the RUC claim is incorrect then this would indicate that the RUC deliberately attempted to mislead the Hughes Inquiry.

In a response to a letter from the Shadow Spokesman on Northern Ireland, Kevin McNamara, written to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke said:

“In his book, Paul Foot does, as you say, address the question of the authenticity of the memorandum. But whatever the rival positions of the forensic experts on this question the key point at the time was Mr Wallace’s testimony and this he felt unable to provide.”

Mr Brooke was, however, well aware that the Committee’s terms of reference excluded my participation because the role of the Army and the RUC was not part of the Committee’s remit.

On 16.01.1990, Kevin McNamara MP, wrote again to Peter Brooke, saying:

“If you believe that the forensic evidence (on my November 1974 memo) is as irrelevant as your letter suggests, I fail to understand why you raised the issue of the original forensic presented by the RUC to the Hughes Inquiry”.

This was the crucial point and one which the Secretary of State never answered. The Secretary of State’s failure to reply satisfactorily to Mr McNamara indicates that Mr Brooke was well aware that the RUC’s alleged evidence was false and is an indication that the alleged cover-up clearly existed not only at a low level but within the higher echelons of Government. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if the RUC really did have evidence to show that my 1974 memo was forged, they would have been only too willing to produce their forensic expert, have him or her provide the relevant evidence and allow that evidence to be examined by other forensic document examiners. The Secretary of State’s repeated failure to answer Kevin McNamara’s questions on this issues indicates that Mr Brooke was only too well aware that the police claim did not stand up to scrutiny. So, why would the Secretary of State feel it necessary to perpetuate the cover up?

It is interesting to note that the CTI has also been at pains to avoid dealing with the forensic evidence on the document.

Paul Foot submitted the document independently to two leading UK forensic document examiners, Robert Radley and Derek Davis. In particular, he asked Mr Davis to see if he could find any evidence of more than one typewriter being used in the creation of my memo. In a report dated 29.03.1989, Mr Davis said:

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"I cannot find any evidence of more than one typewriter having been used as alleged. It is a poor photocopy, but all four pages are consistent."

I do not know if my original document was re-typed after I submitted it to one of my superiors at HQNI in November 1974 and before it was passed on to other senior officers. I am only aware that General Peter Leng responded to the matter in a memo which instructed Information Policy to take action to ensure that the RUC took a more active part in the matters raised in the memo. I do not know why General Leng found it necessary to use the press as a means of drawing attention to William McGrath and his activities rather than raise the matter with the Chief Constable of the RUC. As a result of General Leng's memo I added a substantial amount of information about William McGrath and his activities to my 'Clockwork Orange' project working draft in December 1974.

I did not retain the various RUC documents referred to in my memo. Neither those documents nor the memo, were designed for release — indeed, I am not convinced that the Army was even meant to see the police documents. In any event, I had no authority to retain them. Also, it is almost certain that I would have re-attached them to the memo when I submitted it to my superiors. The memo by itself would have provided an incomplete picture.

A report published in the Irish Times on 25.06.1985 pointed out that although the RUC had not then been able to validate my memo, there were other similar documents in existence.

"Sources close to the new RUC inquiry say they are sceptical about the document's authenticity and say it will be three or four weeks before their inquiry is complete. But former military/ministry of defence sources contacted by The Irish Times, while unable to authenticate this document, say that at least three other documents containing similar information were in the files of the Information Policy Unit at this time.

These sources, who had knowledge of many top secret intelligence and psychological operations mounted from British Army headquarters, have no current connections with Wallace. They have told The Irish Times that there was an intensive investigation of Tara and McGrath in the early and mid-1970s by military and political intelligence agencies which revealed information about sexual assaults at Kincora.

Another military source, a high-ranking officer based at British Army Headquarters during this period, has also confirmed that the Information Policy Unit was asked by military commanders in 1974 to investigate homosexual offences involving members of Tara. "We were investigating everything at that particular time to see if there were implications for the security side," he said. However, the source, who asked not to be quoted by name, declined to comment further in the light of the new RUC investigation.

The 1974 Information Policy Unit document, four pages long and classified "confidential", refers to and quotes from an RUC background paper on Tara which in turn refers to allegations of assaults on Kincora inmates involving McGrath dating back to 1971. The RUC paper also refers to a claim that key loyalist political figures were "aware" of the Kincora situation.
Other RUC sources have told The Irish Times that an RUC background paper on Tara was indeed prepared by detectives in 1973/74, about a year before the Information Policy Unit document was allegedly written. The sources say that the description of this background paper in the document is generally accurate.

Comment: Given the comment attributed to the "RUC sources", it is reasonable to assume that the document to which I referred in my memo was either a genuine RUC one, or was based on a genuine RUC one.

Question: What became of these 'other documents' referred to in the Irish Times story?

My Job Description

I believe the Inquiry should have had access to my ‘secret’ job description which was submitted to the HQNI Establishments Board in 1974. Copies of that document held at HQNI and the MoD appear to have ‘disappeared’ during 1975.

In 1975, when the MoD failed to disclose the secret job description at my disciplinary hearing, it became clear to me that I was being disciplined under the job specification for my ‘fake’ job, rather than the one I was actually employed to do. I expressed my concerns to the IPCS (Cliff Crook) in a letter dated 29.09.1975:

“I am concerned that we have still not received a reply to my letter of 2 July to John Groves requesting access to the various documents listed. You will recall that when I had a brief interview with him on 11 February * to seek guidance on what information I could give to the RUC about my work on psychological operations, he said that I should confine my comments to justifiable activities directed at the PIRA and not at Loyalists. My concern now is that there may be an attempt by the Ministry to deny that any form of official ‘dirty tricks’ organisation existed within the Security Forces. For example, in the Ministry's summary of my oral representation made to John Groves and Mr Fairbairn on 10 May reference is made in paragraph 3 to "actions" which I was asked to launch during the UWC strike. The word "actions" appears to have been used by the MOD to conceal the fact that I referred to the attempts made by the Security Service to discredit various Loyalist politicians, including the Rev Ian Paisley, by the use of forged documents and by linking the MPs with Loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast. I can fully understand why the Ministry would not want to put such information on record, but I wonder if evidence of that nature will be made available to the Board sub rosa.”

The reference to: “MPs with Loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast” is significant because I also wrote several letters to my former boss, Tony Stoughton at the time of my appeal making similar comments to him. Paul Foot was given copies of my letters by Tony Stoughton when he interviewed him as part of the research he carried out for his book on my story. Copies were given to researchers for an ITV programme about the 1974 Dublin and Monaghan Bombings. Copies of the letters were also given to the Barron Inquiry into those bombings.

The MoD document, 'Summary of oral representations made to Mr J D Groves, CPR, on Friday 30th May by Mr J C Wallace, SIO, in reply to the charges preferred against him.'
Mr Wallace explained that he had elected to make oral representations because of the complex nature of the background to his actions. He began by referring to the Ulster Workers Council strike in May 1974 which had been supported by certain MPs from both Stormont and Westminster and had led eventually to the collapse of the Ulster Executive. He stated that at that time, apart from his normal PR duties which included the production section, he was also acting as "unattributable briefing officer" on behalf of the Information Policy Branch, and in this latter role he had been directed to launch a series of actions to coincide with an Army arrest operation. The Police had not been informed and had subsequently protested about some of the arrests made.

Note: The word "actions" refers to attempts by the Intelligence Services to disrupt the power of the Loyalist paramilitaries to intimidate those people who wished to defy the Strike and go to work. Targets for these "actions" included the Rev Ian Paisley and other Unionist/Loyalist politicians who could be linked to William McGrath and his sexual activities (see story by David Blundy in the Sunday Times on 13 March 1977. Although I told John Groves what those activities were, he deliberately did not record the details in this summary, and simply referred to them as "actions"!

It is also important to bear in mind that the documents used in my disciplinary procedure were copied to Bernard Sheldon who was, at that time, the legal adviser to MIS. The Security Service was, therefore, fully aware of what the "actions" referred to by John Groves entailed.

The following disciplinary charge was dropped - for obvious reasons!

"Charge (c) You falsely stated to the investigating police that you had not so retained and improperly disposed of the aforementioned document.

Mr Wallace explained that when he was questioned on 5 February there were two policemen present: one from the Lancashire Constabulary and one from the RUC. He stated that certain IP operations with which he had been associated had not been released to the RUC and had been denied at a senior level. He could therefore discuss them in the presence of the RUC. On the departure of the Police he had tried to contact HQ NI for advice and eventually on 7 February he had spoken to Colonel Railton and offered to return to N. Ireland. Possibly because of the facts could not be fully explained by telephone Colonel Railton had advised against his return. Mr Wallace had then sought and obtained an interview with CPR on 11 February and later that day made a full statement to the Lancashire Police. About two weeks later he also discussed the matter with the RUC. Mr Wallace explained that in his statement to the police he had not in fact denied leaving the document for Fisk. He had stated to the police only that the last time he had seen the document it had been in his in-tray. He accepted that this was untrue."

Again, this extract shows that I told John Groves (and thus others who were involved in my disciplinary proceedings) about IP operations which had been "denied at a senior level" and which had not been disclosed to the RUC. The fact that John Groves did not state what those "IP operations" entailed i.e. operations directed at Tara and other Loyalist targets during the UWC strike as referred to above, shows that he did not want the details put on record. As a result, the Appeal Board were not provided with the full facts of my role.
Given the foregoing, it is important to note that the Sunday Times 13.03.1977 reported:

"At an army briefing at which a Sunday Times reporter was present attempts were made to link Paisley with the Protestant paramilitary group called Tara, a small obscure and ineffective group as Ulster’s para-military organisations go. The Sunday Times has a copy of an army intelligence summary on Tara which contains accurate details about its organisation. It also contains some startlingly inaccurate information discrediting members of the organisation. One member, which the summary names, is called ‘a homosexual and has conned many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he had initiated. He is thought to owe more allegiance to the Red Flag than to either the Union Jack or the Tricolour.

The purpose of the British Army briefing was clear: to link the Rev Ian Paisley with homosexuals and Communist sympathisers.”

The sensitivity surrounding my work in Psy Ops became clear when the MoD even refused to inform Parliament of what my job entailed. On 12.12.1990, the House of Commons Defence Select Committee wrote to the MoD asking to see my secret job specification. On 11.02.1991 the MoD replied: “As regards the particular papers referred to in your third paragraph, these are internal papers and moreover include sensitive material relating to the security and intelligence matters lying outside the Committee’s inquiry. The provision of such papers, even under the conditions relating to the Committee’s access to classified information would be inconsistent with conventions.”

Two very important points arise from this reply. First, it is clear from the MoD’s reply to the Defence Select Committee that there were in existence in 1990 documents and written information relating to my job description in Northern Ireland. It is important to remember that this was at the time when the Minister of State for the Armed Forces told Parliament that my job description was only given to me orally. Second, the MoD also makes it clear that the information related to “security and intelligence matters” and was so sensitive that even the Committee that had oversight of the MoD could not be shown them. This does not accord with how the CTI presented my role to the HIA Inquiry. However, it also gives us an interesting insight into the relationship between the Intelligence Services and Parliament. In other words, Parliament is only given what the Intelligence Services want the elected government to know. The HIA Inquiry must bear that in mind when it believes that the MoD and Intelligence Services have been totally open with the Inquiry in terms of disclosed documents.

My Posting from Northern Ireland

The Inquiry has deemed it appropriate to report on the Mi5 version of my posting from Northern Ireland without making any reference to the conflicting information provided by the MoD and the Intelligence Services about this matter.

My secret job specification was approved in September 1974 and, having previously been granted acting rank, my substantive grading as Senior Information Office was approved by the MoD to coincide with the approval of my job specification. However, as Peter Broderick pointed out, the approval of the job specification was simply the formal ratification of the Psy Ops work I had been doing since 1971.
Removal Reason 1. On Christmas Eve 1974 I was informed by Mr Tony Chinneck at the Ministry of Defence that I was being moved from Northern Ireland because my life was in danger. It was clear that the MoD statement was untrue and ridiculous because I lived inside what was probably the most protected accommodation in the whole of Northern Ireland.

Removal Reason 2. According to the HIA Inquiry transcripts, Ian Cameron (MIS) said that I was moved from Northern Ireland because I was ‘leaking’ information to the press. Setting aside that fact that my role was to ‘leak’ information to the press, neither MIS nor any of my superiors ever questioned me about such an allegation. Moreover, if I had been guilty of such an activity, it is simply not credible that I would have been permitted to retain my security clearance and to be offered a post at the same rank in another Army HQ in England. Ian Cameron’s role in this is interesting because he was the MIS officer who asked Brian Gemmell to stop investigating the allegations relating to William McGrath’s homosexual activities. It should also be remembered that General Leng said that ‘Clockwork Orange’ was initiated by Denis Payne’s office at the NIO. Denis Payne was Ian Cameron’s boss!

It is correct that I was going to release a sensational story to Robert Fisk. Indeed, I did release it as part of ‘Clockwork Orange’ and with the full agreement of my superiors. It was probably the last piece of Psy Ops work I did before leaving Northern Ireland and involved demonstrating not only how the IRA obtained arms and money from the USA, but also some of business people and organisations in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, who were involved. A story based on that information was published in the Sunday Telegraph on 26 January 1975. Indeed, the reason I had my ‘Clockwork Orange’ material with me when I moved to Preston was that that project was still in progress and my superiors knew that I was going to complete it from my new location. I did not, however, have time to initiate the updated Tara material which stemmed from General Leng’s memo.

In March 1975 Robert Fisk wrote a story saying that:

“The British Government has effectively prevented Army officers in Northern Ireland from continuing a ‘black propaganda’ campaign against suspected extremists and their supporters by taking over control of the department that decides the army and police information policy in the province.

The Government’s decision to coordinate its information policy does not necessarily mean that officials will no longer be empowered to leak information, scurrilous or otherwise, about the lives of extremist suspects, but at least a six-page Army dossier on American businessmen and their contacts, which was handed out to certain journalists, has been withdrawn. Some of the information in that document, together with names, addresses and home telephone numbers, was apparently gathered in the United States (one passage actually refers to an American suspect’s “alleged 40 adulteries during a three-month period”) but a senior official in the State Department last weekend categorically denied any official American involvement in the gathering of the information.

The dossier on Irish businessmen includes the name of a Dublin public house owner who also owns restaurants in Manhattan, Boston, Chicago and San Francisco; and those of the son of a leading United States paper manufacturer who is alleged to have tried to send rifles by air from America to Shannon airport, and of a wealthy estate agent in Dublin.
Other names include those of a businessman who is a leading supporter of the Fianna Fail political party in the Irish Republic (the Army file says that he is "certainly well received in IRA circles"), a man employed by GEC in the Irish Republic; a wealthy Dublin quarry owner; and a farmer in Co Monaghan.

The document suggests their involvement in IRA activities but occasionally adds that there is no evidence to substantiate some of the allegations. Attached to the back of the document is a photocopy of a letter apparently sent by a Belfast businessman to a New York supporter of Sinn Fein, asking for funds which could be deposited in a branch of the Allied Irish Bank in Belfast. No mention is made of whether the letter was legally acquired by the Army (it is dated November 27, 1972) but it was sent to an address in East 45th Street in Manhattan, which is just off Second Avenue. Neither the State Department nor the American Consulate in Belfast could suggest how the letter was acquired.”

That information came from the same 'Clockwork Orange' document as the Sunday Telegraph story. This confirms that, contrary to what the MoD has claimed, 'Clockwork Orange' was still operating at the end of 1974 or the beginning of 1975. It is important to note that Robert Fisk was not the only journalist to be given this information and it is also interesting how very differently the two newspapers treated the story.

Note: It is obvious that I could not possibly have acquired through my own resources the information contained in the above stories. That required very significant Intelligence involvement!

Removal Reason 3. In 1990, Peter Broderick told the Observer newspaper (The Observer 04.02.1990) that in 1975, the Chief Press Officer, John Groves, at the MoD said that I was an active member of a militant volunteer force in Northern Ireland and that the charge of leaking a document to a journalist was just a convenient way of getting rid of me. As in I have pointed out in the previous paragraph, if the allegation made by John Groves had been true, it is simply not credible that I would have been permitted to retain my security clearance and to be offered a post at the same rank in another British Army HQ in England.

Clearly, the MoD and the Security Service have given three totally different reasons for my removal from Northern Ireland – none of which make sense given the situation that existed. So, why did they find it necessary to lie by giving three totally contradicting accounts?

There is no doubt that, given the subsequently admitted sensitive nature of my work, if it had been suspected that I had leaked security classified information to the press without proper authority, I would have been interviewed either by my superiors or by the Security Service and my security clearance would have been immediately withdrawn. In such circumstances, I would have had to resign. The MoD and the Security Service would not have needed to go through the charade that Sir David Calcutt QC later uncovered in his Inquiry.

The Inquiry has felt is acceptable to provide the version put forward by Ian Cameron of MI5, but has failed to give the full picture set out above, despite that information being freely available. As a result, the Inquiry's version is totally unfair because it is highly selective.

Meeting with Robin Bryans
In 1987 I was contacted by a Robin Bryans (aka Robert Harbinson) who had read about me in the press and who claimed that he had information to share with me about Kincora. Fred Holroyd and I subsequently interviewed him at his home and he was also later interviewed by Paul Foot. Bryans was an author who had grown up in Belfast and who was, by his own admission, closely associated with a homosexual and paedophile network in Ireland, London and Brighton. He had also been closely associated with individuals who had been members of the Intelligence Services during World War 2 and afterwards. He told Fred Holroyd, Paul Foot and me that he had warned two Government Ministers in 1973 about the abuse that was taking place at Kincora. He also claimed that he informed the wife of a former Prime Minister about the abuse.

I do not know if what he alleged was true, but several of the people he referred to were also listed in my 'Clockwork Orange' notes. A copy of the notes I made of my meetings and discussions with Bryans is attached to the submission. I am satisfied that there was clearly a link between William McGrath, Sir Knox Cunningham and Peter Montgomery, but I am not in a position to comment on his allegations per se. I believe Paul Foot also tape recorded his interview with Bryans, but he decided that he could not make use of any of the material in his book about my story because the Bryans material was too complex.

I have not redacted from the notes I made of my discussions with Robin Bryans the various names he mentioned. I feel the Inquiry should be aware of these, albeit I believe that most of these are now in the public domain. I assume the Inquiry will, however, handle the information appropriately.

The Murder of Brian McDermott

CTI has claimed that I contradicted myself in terms of what I have said about the murder of Brian McDermott. I disagree. To the best of my knowledge, the British Army possessed no information about the murder of Brian McDermott other than that which we received from the RUC. Initially, we were told that a police suspect was an associate of John McKeague, but that others may also have been involved.

The main suspect was believed to be a member of the Rev. Ian Paisley's church and may also have been involved with McKeague in the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee which was led by the Rev Paisley. He was believed to be a child molester who frequented Ormeau Park where Brian McDermott allegedly disappeared and that he had tenuous links with the Kincora Boys' Home. I cannot now recall the exact nature of his connection with Kincora, but I think he had also been questioned by the police about a sexual assault on a boy just before Brian McDermott was killed. From what we were told, the police were confident that they had identified the guilty person.

We were interested in two aspects of this information. The first was the suspect's alleged association with John McKeague. The second was the RUC's comments possibly linking witchcraft to the murder - McKeague and McGrath both had an interest in the occult. Also, Sir Knox Cunningham had links with both McGrath and McKeague. Later, the police appeared to change their views about their main suspect and apparently took the view that the killing may have been a domestic one. As far as I am aware, all of this information came from police sources and was generally reflected in the document referred to as 'Reference B' in my November 1974 memo. The British Army lost all interest in the matter when the original suspect ceased to be of interest to the police. The RUC records should show
whether or not the information the British Army had been given was an accurate account of what the RUC knew at that time.

I believe that John McKeague’s claim that he would not be prosecuted because “he knew too much”, was not linked to the murder of Brian McDermott, but to his paramilitary activities in general. As far as I can recall McKeague was arrested and was detained in the Maze prison when Brian McDermott was killed.

In 1974 we at British Army HQNI were given information that the RUC believed the original suspect had been protected by influential people and that attempts to prosecute him had been blocked. The Inquiry should ask the RUC for details of their investigations into Brian McDermott’s murder to determine what links, if any, the original suspect had with John McKeague and/or Kincora, and if he was protected by influential people. However, as I pointed out to the police in 2008, I had no direct knowledge of the murder. Indeed, this is accurately reflected in Paul Foot’s book, Who Framed Colin Wallace (London: Pan Books, 1990 (at page 145):

“The section on the murder of Brian McDermott is probably, as the memo (written by CW in November 1974) suggests not strictly relevant to Kincora. McDermott’s murder may well have been a one-off crime by a sexual sadist not necessarily connected with the Kincora gang. Certainly there is no direct evidence to point to Kincora, and the issue is mentioned because of the suspicion of a connection with John McKeague.”

Correspondence between Peter Broderick Chief Information Officer at HQ NI and John Groves at the MoD

I refer to the following extract from the transcript of Day 221 of the Inquiry.

“However, what I want to show you, given the letter we have just looked at of September 1976, is a letter written on 19th July 1976. If we can bring up, please, 102121. This is a letter written in confidence. If we can just scroll down to the bottom so you can see — on to the next page, please, so you can see who it’s from: Peter Broderick. If we go back to the start, please:

“Dear John,

After many months of silence, Colin Wallace and his wife dropped in for a casual social visit yesterday. I thought you ought to know that he is still in my opinion — this is Peter Broderick, a supporter of Colin Wallace — "unable to separate fact from fiction. Far from having accepted the honourable" — Ms. Doherty: Resignation”. Mr Lane: "Resignation". Mr Aiken: — "resignation formula, he is now having a fresh round of lawyers' advice, seeing his MP (Roland Moyle, who is NIO incidentally) and still in touch with IPCS. He is contemplating an appeal to the Industrial Tribunal against the CS Appeal Board on grounds of incorrect" — Mr Lane: "Procedures". Mr Aiken: — "procedures and missing evidence. I tried to get him to clarify what evidence had been missing. He wasn’t very coherent but I get the impression that in a final crunch" - Chairman: "He would not be averse to getting CLF ..." Mr Aiken: "... Commander of Land Forces, then Peter Leng and Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Railton (GI — Information Policy then) to own up for their parts in the various operations which, so he thinks, are now being pinned on him alone
and which have clouded the atmosphere and prejudiced his own case. Needless to say from my own knowledge of the situation that could be embarrassing."

The way this information is presented by CTI is not only highly selective, but also very misleading because of the 'spin' he has put on this item and by his failure to draw the Inquiry's attention to Peter Broderick's later statements to the press. Such a biased presentation of the available information again calls into question the integrity of the Inquiry.

Peter Broderick in his letter of 19.07.1976 was right to say that "the situation could be embarrassing" if I had proceeded to instigate legal action against the MoD. In the end, I decided not to.

It is clear from his letter to John Groves that I was very frank with him at that time about my intentions and, as a matter of courtesy, I informed him that I had consulted a solicitor, my MP and the IPCS. All of this activity was legitimate and done openly with the objective of reaching a solution to the matter. However, I disagreed with Peter Broderick that my enforced resignation was in any way an "honourable" action initiated by the MoD. My view on this was upheld by Sir David Calcutt QC in his report in 1990 when he said: "If this incident had been considered in the overall context of Mr Wallace's work, neither dismissal nor resignations (as an alternative to dismissal) was a reasonable penalty".

The interpretation 'spin' made by CTI of the letter from Peter Broderick to John Groves in of 19.07.1976 is particularly interesting because four years later Peter Broderick told The Observer newspaper (04.02.1990) that just before my disciplinary hearing in 1975, the Chief Press Officer at the MoD approached him - Peter Broderick was due to give evidence on my behalf - and said:

"You know this Wallace chap is an active member of a militant volunteer force". He went on to say, "this is the real reason we want him out of the way."

The newspaper quoted Peter Broderick as saying:

"He (Groves) told me that the charge of leaking a document to a journalist was just a convenient way of getting rid of him. The clear implication was that I should bear that in mind when I spoke at the Tribunal."

On the face of it, this appears to be a fraudulent and slanderous statement by John Groves. Moreover, if his allegation had been true, MoD and MIS would certainly not have agreed to me taking up a senior appointment at a British Army HQ in England.

It is also highly significant that in an interview with the Sunday Times in February 1990, Peter Broderick is reported as saying:

"I blew my top, says Broderick, when he discovered that it was part of a dirty tricks operation. Broderick says he was not told the truth about Clockwork Orange or that Wallace and others on his staff had duties they were instructed by MIS to keep secret from him. This was independent policy by a department, says Broderick. Non-ministerial policy. I would have screamed from the rooftops if I had known what was going on. Broderick says he believes MIS officers supplied forged documents and other dirty tricks material to the secret unit inside his department."

[41]
It is clear from the above information, which CTI did not provide to the Inquiry, that, even 4 years after his letter to John Groves, Peter Broderick was very supportive of me by disclosing that the MoD had attempted to manipulate, almost certainly unlawfully, my Appeal hearing and that MIS had attempted to undermine his role as head of the Army Information services in Northern Ireland.

It is rather surprising - and very worrying - that CTI makes no reference to the two latter items.

It is also important to understand some of the reasons why Peter Broderick was anxious that I should not pursue my wrongful dismissal from the MoD. As mentioned above, he admitted in the press (The Daily Mirror, 08.02.1990) that he had signed my Tara press briefing document in 1974 and instructed me to release it. More significantly, he also told the press that prior to my disciplinary hearing John Groves had tried to influence him in connection with the evidence that he proposed to give on my behalf. He said that John Groves had falsely claimed that I was a member of a paramilitary group in Northern Ireland (see The Observer 4 February 1990). It is clear, therefore, that Peter Broderick was aware of William McGrath and his activities in Tara and Kincora. Bearing in mind that Peter Broderick was the Chief Information for the British Army in Northern Ireland, are the Intelligence Services really saying that Peter Broderick possessed that information, but they did not?

However, the attached document entitled: "I challenge Ted Heath" shows that his knowledge of political psychological operations in Northern Ireland was much greater than that. The document bears Peter Broderick's handwriting on the cover and at page 20 where he writes "This seems to be very different from our first news" with reference to Edward Heath’s likely response to defeat at the 1974 General Election. This was one of a number of documents which I sent to Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher on 23.04.1990.

The Heath document is particularly important because it is consistent with material distributed to the press in the United States in 1975. In their book, The Pencourt File (London: Secker and Warburg, 1978) Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtilot comment (at page 302) on a report which was published in the Daily Telegraph 1976:

"The Daily Telegraph article, dated 19.05.1976, had been written by the newspaper's Washington correspondent Nicholas Comfort. Under the headline ‘Campaign in US to smear MPs’, Comfort had written:

‘Persistent efforts have been made in recent months to discredit leading members of the three major British political parties by planting derogatory stories about them on news agencies in Washington, it was claimed last night. 'Shortly before Mr Heath lost the Conservative leadership last year someone presented us with an article on Mr Heath which was quite derogatory on the lines of Mr Jeremy Thorpe,' said Dr. Edward von Rothkirch, senior editor of Trans-World news agency. 'So far this year his agency and others have been offered similar matter about some eleven MPs, a Conservative, two Liberals and eight Labour.’ When Penrose called Dr. von Rothkirch he confirmed that the Telegraph article was accurate. He also mentioned the names of the political figures who had been the subject of "smear attacks". Among them he included Harold Wilson, Lady Falkender and Jeremy Thorpe. ‘Well, I believe that the really heavy approach was done back in 1975,’ said the American newsman. ‘I had a heart
attack on 16 January 1976 and I know that what we call the 'derogatory British material' was being offered to us well before Christmas.”

The above comments are not intended to be a criticism of Peter Broderick; they simply indicate that he was a victim of malfeasance in a public office just as much as I was. It would also appear that attempts to use 'Clockwork Orange' material to draw attention to William McGrath continued after I left Northern Ireland. On 07.02.1976, the Irish Times reported a speech made by the Rev Ian Paisley at Dungannon in which he claimed that 'the Northern Ireland Office, in alliance with the Ministry of Defence, had established a team for 'psychological warfare against Loyalists' headed by senior officials from the Foreign Office.' The Unit's brief, Mr Paisley added, is to 'break up the UUUC by discrediting its leaders through character assassination and every means that can be employed.' He further alleged that the campaign was already under way, 'digging into the past of UUUC Convention members and prominent party workers. Charges and innuendoes about their morals, home life, families, and personal relationships will be floated.' He added that it was very easy to assassinate a man's character and cited the recent case of the British Liberal leader, Mr. Thorpe. He did not rule out the possibility of information being fed to the media despite the libel laws.”

The reference to Jeremy Thorpe is significant because journalists had heard a rumour that Ian Paisley's speech was apparently the result of information from someone at the Northern Ireland Office who claimed that the Joint Information Co-ordinating Committee had offered a journalist a story linking Ian Paisley to William McGrath using information similar to material that I had included in my 'Clockwork Orange' material in 1974.

On 13.03.1977, The Sunday Times 'The Army's secret war in Northern Ireland', reported:

"On the political front, we have discovered that, towards the end of 1974 a committee consisting of representatives from the Northern Ireland Office, the Army, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary met at Stormont Castle and discussed among other things, ways of discrediting politicians judged hostile to Government policy.

The chairman of the committee was Michael Cudlipp, called in by Harold Wilson to take over the Northern Ireland public relations unit in the wake of the Ulster Workers Council strike in May 1974. Other members included David McDine, the British Army's Chief Information Officer, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jeremy Ralston, at the time head of the Army's Information Policy Unit who was trained in psychological warfare at Fort Bragg, USA.

According to McDine not all the ideas put up were seriously considered. "It was like a newspaper's editorial conference," he said. "Some of the ideas thrown up might be daft and never appear in the paper."

Nevertheless, our sources maintain that, following a series of meetings, which continued into early 1975, the committee issued a report which went to Army, Stormont and police officials.

The Ministry of Defence last week would neither confirm nor deny the existence of the report, and referred inquiries to the Northern Ireland Office. This office in turn directed questions to Merlyn Rees at the Home Office which politely turned them back to the Northern Ireland Office. Its final reply, from a
spokesman, ran: ‘I have searched diligently, but can find no trace of such a report. It is almost certain that it did not exist.”

The Death of Jonathan Lewis

CTI attempted to use selected pieces of information from my trial in 1981 for the manslaughter of Jonathan Lewis, but as on other occasions, his presentation of the material to the Inquiry was biased. Further, CTI omitted to inform the Inquiry about the highly questionable nature of my conviction.

When Home Office pathologist, Dr Ian West, carried out the initial post-mortem on Jonathan Lewis in August 1980, he reported his conclusions to the Sussex Police who issued a statement to the press saying that foul play was not suspected. Shortly afterwards Dr West was invited back by the police and asked to carry out a further post-mortem. Surprisingly, he found a small bruise under Mr Lewis’s nose which he had not seen at the initial post-mortem. Despite this, he recorded the cause of death as “drowning”.

However, in conjunction with the police, (Detective Chief Inspector Harrison who worked on the Terry Inquiry) he later claimed that fracture to the deceased’s skull been caused by a ‘karate-type’ blow to the base of the nose. Dr West presented that opinion (later proved by forensic experts to be totally false) at my trial and the specialist nature of the blow was inevitably linked to my past experience with the British Army i.e. the claim that I had been trained in unarmed combat.

Some years later three leading medical and forensic experts, including Professor Bernard Knight, gave evidence saying that the injury to Jonathan Lewis could not possibly have been caused in the way Dr West described. At my criminal appeal hearing in 1996, Dr West admitted under cross-examination that not only had he never previously seen an injury caused by such a blow, but also that he had been given the information by “an American Secret Service man”. The original evidence had clearly been manipulated to achieve a conviction and Dr West had misled the court: the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed my conviction and sentence. A number of questions occur:

Question 1: Why was a member of the American Secret Service involved in briefing a British pathologist on information for use in a manslaughter trial in the UK?

Question 2: Why did Dr West present the US Secret Service man’s information to the Court as though it was his own specialist knowledge?

Question 3: What was the role of the Sussex Police in introducing the fake evidence presented by Dr West?

Given that the Inquiry has now heard an admission that ‘MI6’ was involved with the Sussex police in the circumstances surrounding my arrest and wrongful conviction, Dr West’s falsification of forensic evidence and his involvement with an American Secret Service source, must surely be regarded as something that merits further serious investigation. Why did MI6 search my home? Why would MI6 search my home? If a breach of security had been suspected, then one would have expected MI5 or the Special Branch to be involved. The role of MI6 is to run agents in foreign territories to gather
intelligence. Bearing in mind that the Kincora story broke in the Irish Independent only a few months earlier, could it be that the Intelligence Services were looking for my ‘Clockwork Orange documents?’

There is little doubt that Dr West should have been subjected to severe sanctions for his conduct, but he was by the time of the appeal terminally ill with cancer. CTI did not think this matter was worth drawing to the attention of the inquiry. This is a further example of how selective information appears to have been used throughout the Inquiry in an apparent attempt to discredit witnesses whose evidence conflicts with the British Government’s stance that the Security and Intelligence Services knew nothing until 1980 about the sexual abuses that took place at Kincora.

It is interesting (see transcript of Day 223) that a representative of the NIO, the MoD, MI5 and MI6 claimed that SIS (in conjunction with the Sussex police) searched my home when I was arrested by the Sussex Police in 1980 and that they “were able to conclude” that I “had no access” to Intelligence information. She went on to say that even my “greater supporter”, Mr Peter Broderick, denied all knowledge of my November 1974 memo.

The latter is a particularly stupid comment because Peter Broderick left Northern Ireland in September 1974, i.e. some three months before the memo was written and should not, therefore, be expected to know about it. This also shows the total lack of knowledge displayed during the Inquiry’s hearings by some of those giving evidence on behalf of the MoD and the Intelligence Services.

The suggestion that ‘SIS’ was involved in a search of my home at the time the Sussex police arrested me is helpful in that it confirms what I have believed for a long time i.e. that the Intelligence Services were somehow involved in the circumstances surrounding my conviction. Why should the ‘SIS’ assume that because I did not have Intelligence information in my possession at my home, that I did not, therefore, have access to Intelligence information when I was working at British Army HQNI? Moreover, the Intelligence Services representative’s claim flies in the face of the evidence provided to the Appeal Board by Peter Broderick and by the MoD when replying to the Defence Select Committee about my job specification. This goes to show that the Intelligence Services are not prepared to tell the truth about even these basic facts.

My suspicion that the Intelligence Services were in some way involved in the circumstances leading up to my arrest and wrongful conviction in 1981 was reinforced by the comments of a former Sussex police officer who wrote to Paul Foot in June 1998. The following is an extract from that letter:

“Dear Mr Foot

I have just finished reading a copy of your 1990 investigation ‘Who Framed Colin Wallace?’ and wish that I had got hold of it years ago. It is bound to be academic after so long, but I had some personal knowledge of the police investigation into the murder of Jonathan Lewis which might just be of some belated historical interest to you. I have always harboured misgivings about who actually controlled the police inquiry, and to find, so many years later, that any book, let alone such a thorough, painstaking, and revealing book as yours, had been written about the event came as a great surprise. My immediate boss was [redacted name of senior police officer], and I recall the arrangements for the it’s a Knockout celebrations, in which many other uniformed officers were involved.

[45]
I also recall the reports of Jon Lewis' death, and how the uniformed investigation, supported by the first autopsy, showed it to be an apparently innocent accidental death - just another of the sadly regular fatal falls into the Arun. I then remember the sense of drama when, having been neatly prepared for the inquest, it suddenly became a murder inquiry because a second autopsy had shown up the nasal bone injury. None of us could understand why a second autopsy had been needed, and how the nasal injury had been missed the first time. Even your book does not clarify how the second autopsy came to be ordered, and I do not remember ever hearing the reason why.

On at least two occasions men in dark suits claiming to be from the Ministry of Defence turned up at the front office with appointments to see the Divisional Detective Superintendent.

I had no doubt that the 'MoD officials' who came to see the Detective Superintendent were from MIS. Knowing nothing about Colin Wallace's background, I did not connect them at the time with him.

When Wallace was released from jail, I remember being told by a former colleague that the police reaction to his release had been largely relief, rather than the annoyance and frustration which was usually felt by the police if a conviction was overturned. I met [redacted name of senior police officer] several years later, after he had retired, and he said in conversation that Wallace should never have been convicted.

I sincerely believe that Colin Wallace was 'fitted up' by corrupt members of an Establishment embarrassed by the events described in the early part of your book.

I would not suggest for a moment that any Sussex Police officer involved in this enquiry was corrupt, because I do not believe they were, but I feel that there was a hidden agenda, and that these senior officers know a lot more about this matter than they would ever care to reveal.”

Detective Inspector Harrison, who was in charge of my manslaughter case, was later appointed to be one of the main investigators in the now largely discredited Terry Inquiry which failed to inform Parliament about various key issues uncovered during the investigation. Had that Inquiry provided Parliament with the full facts, it is likely that a 1921 type Inquiry would have been ordered rather than the very limited one under Judge Hughes, which avoided any examination of the role of the RUC and the Intelligence services.

Loss of Files

Following my Civil Service Appeal hearing in 1975, I realised that the disciplinary action taken against me was not accidental or the result of a misunderstanding. I was concerned about my personal safety and briefed a London-based solicitor on the whole affair. He subsequently arranged for me to meet with Roland Moyle MP, then a Minister at the Northern Ireland Office, so that I could put my case on record with the then Government. A friend also advised me to put all of my case papers and related material into a place of safekeeping. That turned out to be very good advice.

After the Sussex police contacted me in 1982 regarding Kincora and the Terry Inquiry, I briefed my solicitor on the background to the matter and ensured that he was provided with some of the relevant written materials. As Paul Foot pointed out in his book, shortly after I briefed my solicitor on Kincora,
his offices were broken into. Nothing of value was taken and it would appear that those responsible were looking for information. Luckily, my solicitor had also put my material in a place of safekeeping. At about this time, my personnel file went missing from the local authority offices where I worked at the time of my arrest. Later, a copy of the file which Fred Holroyd and I sent to the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, went missing from the Parliamentary offices of Fred Holroyd’s MP, Teddy Taylor. Mr Taylor called in the Metropolitan Police and the file later re-appeared at the MP’s constituency office in Southend. No one was ever caught or charged in connection with these incidents.

If the 'SIS' searched my home, with or without the help of the Sussex Police, in 1980 at the time of my arrest, they would certainly not have found any of my Northern Ireland-related case documents because they were not kept there.

The Inquiry has pointed out that I did not include a copy of my 1974 memo with the documents I sent to Mrs Thatcher in 1984. That is correct. I was then still in prison serving a sentence for a crime I did not commit and I was not going to provide the Government with a reason to extend my stay in prison by turning down my parole opportunities. The Inquiry knows, of course, that my 1974 memo was not the only document I did not send to the Prime Minister. Many of these were in a place of safekeeping and I could not have access to them while I was in prison – all mail had to pass through the prison censors. If the MoD had given me total dispensation from the Official Secrets Acts, the position would have been very different. My solicitor could have brought sensitive documents for me to see, but he would have to have taken them away with him when he left at the end of visit.

The Case of James Miller

On 22.03.1987, The Sunday Times, published a report relating to a James Miller who had been an agent for the Army and M15 in Northern Ireland during the 1970s. The report said:

“Miller, 55, was recruited by army intelligence and M15 in 1970. At the time, Miller, an Englishman married to an Irish Protestant, lived in Monkstown, Co Antrim. His job as a lift engineer enabled him to travel freely all over Ulster and to undertake his intelligence duties. "Miller has revealed that his first task for the intelligence service was to spy on William McGrath, a former housefather at the Kincora home. McGrath, who was jailed for his part in the abuse of 13 children in his care between 1973 and 1979, once headed the Tara Loyalist paramilitary organization. Miller says that McGrath's sexual tendencies were common knowledge inside Tara.”

If McGrath’s sexual tendencies were common knowledge inside Tara in 1971 and Miller knew that McGrath was the OC of Tara, were the Intelligence Services and the RUC suggesting that they did not possess that information at that time? Moreover, in 1971, Tara membership included members of the outlawed UVF and the Ulster Loyalist Volunteers who carried out a bombing campaign in Northern Ireland in the 1960s. On 29.03.1987, the Sunday Times carried a follow-up report story on Miller and quoted him as saying:

"‘My M15 case officer later told me to leave McGrath to them and I understand they used the information to recruit him as an informer.’ ‘Last night McGrath confirmed that he knew Miller but would not comment on any other aspect.”
One of James Miller’s MI5 handlers, known as ‘Julian’, gave evidence to the Saville Inquiry and referred to Miller as ‘Observer B’. He described Miller as: “perfectly reliable and truthful” and ‘an extremely brave fellow’. ‘Julian’ went on to tell the Inquiry: “I can see from the file that a report on him in November 1972 described him as “a reliable agent whose reports are essentially detailed, providing, I would think, valuable op int (operational intelligence) for the security forces. The fact that his reports are described as “essentially detailed” is important as the more detail an agent gives the easier it is to check his reliability.”

On this analysis by ‘Julian’ it is reasonable to assume that his information about Tara and William McGrath is also accurate. The MI5 assessment that Miller was “perfectly truthful and reliable” is also important because, on 22.03.1987, The Sunday Times carried a report based on another interview with him. The report said:

“Miller said his MI5 case officers told him Harold Wilson was a suspect Soviet agent and steps were being taken to force him out of Downing Street. Miller said that in early 1974 his case officers instructed him to promote the idea within the UDA of mounting a general strike which would paralyse Northern Ireland. The result, Miller says, was the Ulster workers’ strike in May 1974 which severely embarrassed Wilson’s Government and helped to torpedo the Sunningdale Power Sharing Executive.”

The information James Miller was allegedly given by his MI5 handlers about Harold Wilson is exactly the same as that which I was given in 1974 for use in the ‘Clockwork Orange’ project, which also featured Tara and William McGrath.

Setting aside whether or not Miller’s claims are accurate, it is an established fact that he did attend Tara meetings in 1971 while he was working for the Intelligence Services and must, therefore, have known McGrath. Indeed, McGrath is on record as saying he remembers Miller. Bearing in mind that this was in 1971 – are we seriously asked to believe that Miller did not tell his intelligence handlers that McGrath was the leader of Tara? It is simply not credible to assert that he didn’t. This information alone, raises serious doubts about the veracity of claims that the Intelligence Services were unsure of McGrath’s identity in the early 1970s.

Missing Material

According to the Sunday Journal on 28.03.1982, “British Army files relating to the Kincora Boys Homes homosexual scandal have been removed from Army headquarters in the North - to prevent a top British policeman examining them.” The report goes on to say that: “the files contained thousands of documents on the work of the Army Information Policy Department - the cover name for the Psychological Warfare section.” The story refers to an “RUC source” and claims that the files were flown to London “for safe keeping.” I am very surprised that none of the various files that I compiled during 1973 and 1974 as part of ‘Clockwork Orange’ project have surfaced as part of the Inquiry – neither, it would appear, has my secret job specification, nor Brian Gemmell’s report on Kincora. It would also appear that, in general, the only files that have surfaced are those deemed by the authorities to be helpful to support their totally absurd assertion that they knew nothing, prior to January 1980, about allegations of sexual abuses linked with Kincora.

Conclusion
I submit that:

all the information presented in this document is already in the public domain and the Inquiry should not, therefore, have had to rely on me to provide it;

it is clear from the material presented in this document that some the information used by the Inquiry about me has been selective and misleading, to the extent that it has undermined the integrity of the Inquiry as a fair and impartial entity;

there can be no justification for the use of selective and misleading information about me by the Inquiry because all the information and documents presented in this submission are already in the public domain and have been for many years;

the way in which the information has been presented to the Inquiry is both damaging to me personally and ultimately to the victims, who really deserve, and are entitled to, much better than this;

the Inquiry has a clear duty to be fair and impartial in the way in which it presents and considers 'evidence' - it has demonstrably failed to do so when dealing with some of the information about me;

irrespective of whether or not the name 'Kincora' was contained in the information I made available to the press in 1973 and 1974, there was sufficient detail in that document to have merited further investigations by the press and/or the RUC, and that even the most cursory investigation would have uncovered what was going on at Kincora;

setting aside any allegations of child sexual abuse at Kincora, it is important to bear in mind that the 1967 Sexual Offences act did not apply to Northern Ireland at that time. My press briefing document, plus the information held by the RUC Special Branch (see HIA Inquiry document 55076, Day 204) provided more than adequate information about McGrath's homosexual activities to have attracted police attention;

had the information which was available to the Army and the RUC about McGrath and his sexual activities been published in the press in 1973/74, the RUC would almost certainly have taken action with the same speed and determination as they did in January 1980, irrespective of the level of terrorism at that time.

Anyone who knows me well will confirm that, despite my criticisms of parts of the security apparatus, I remain as committed to the work carried out by the Army, the police and the Intelligence Services as I have ever been and as my Army Annual Confidential Reports show – despite the efforts made by Government to portray me otherwise. The vast majority of the members of the Security Forces with whom I worked in Northern Ireland were thoroughly professional and totally dedicated to protecting the community from terrorism – often at great cost to themselves. However, as with any organisation that is made up of human beings, it is unfortunate that some individuals will act in ways that are unprofessional and even unlawful, as we have seen from the numerous cases of clergy sexually abusing

[49]
children. The problem is that 'the system' will often feel it necessary to close ranks to protect such individuals for what is regarded as 'the greater good'. As a result, the authorities get onto a conveyor belt of deceit and cover-up from which they appear to find it impossible to get off and admit the truth.

From a personal point of view, I repeat below Judge Barron’s assessment of me because it sums up exactly how I still feel about this issue and why I have spent almost 40 years drawing attention to it.

“Though he (Wallace) has reasons enough to be bitter - the abrupt and unjust ending of a promising career in Northern Ireland, five years spent in prison on a conviction which has since been quashed - he displays no outward signs of resentment towards individuals or institutions. He remains intensely loyal to his country and to the Army: insofar as he has a quarrel, it is with individuals rather than the institutions concerned.”

Request to the HIA Inquiry

At this juncture I request that this submission and its attachments be placed on the record of the Inquiry. I have made clear my concerns regarding this aspect of the Inquiry’s investigation specifically regarding myself as a witness. I further take note of the following statement from the Robert Hamill Inquiry:

“The Robert Hamill Inquiry is concerned to ensure that it acts fairly towards witnesses and others who may be affected by it. It is an important principal of fairness that, if any criticism is to be made publicly in the course of an inquiry, the individual subject of that criticism has a fair chance of dealing with it.

Throughout the course of this inquiry procedures have been adopted with the aim of ensuring that potential criticisms are identified and notified to the individual concerned so that he or she could respond to them. In particular such procedures operated when witnesses were interviewed, when evidence was led, when written submissions were made, and when oral submissions were made.

The Chairman recognises the possibility that, notwithstanding those precautions, the Inquiry’s report may contain criticisms against individuals to which those individuals have not previously had a fair opportunity to respond. In those circumstances he has decided that, to the extent that the Panel is minded to make criticism in its report, and the individual being criticised has not previously had a fair chance to deal with that criticism, a letter will be sent to him or her. Such letters will set out the gist of the criticism that the Panel is minded to make and will give the individual an opportunity to make representations about it.

For the avoidance of any doubt, such letters will not be sent to any individuals who are likely to be criticised in the report who have already had a fair chance to deal with the criticism.”

See: http://www.roberthamillinquiry.org/content/maxwell/

Section 14 of The Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse Rules (Northern Ireland) 2013 states:

Warning letters

14.—(1) The chairperson may send a warning letter to any person—

[50]
(a) he considers may be, or who has been, subject to criticism in the inquiry proceedings; or
(b) about whom criticism may be inferred from evidence that has been given during the inquiry proceedings; or
(c) who may be subject to criticism in any report of the inquiry.

(2) The recipient of a warning letter may disclose it to his recognised legal representative.

(3) The inquiry panel must not include any explicit or significant criticism of a person in any report of the inquiry, unless—
(a) the chairperson has sent that person a warning letter; and
(b) the person has been given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the warning letter.

Given the concerns I have identified in this letter regarding the conduct of the Inquiry in matters relating to myself I require a reassurance from the Inquiry that should I be subject to criticism I be issued with a warning letter and given my rights under section 14(1)(c).
Dirty tricks case officer wins appeal

Richard Norton-Taylor

Colin Wallace, a former army officer who blew the whistle on a covert black propaganda campaign in Northern Ireland, demanded a full inquiry into his prosecution for manslaughter after his conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal yesterday.

Mr Wallace, who has fought for 15 years to clear his name, said evidence at his trial was “manufactured and manipulated”. He believed his friend, Jonathan Lewis, was killed by criminal members of the antiques trade in Brighton. He said: “The police have evidence of this but have suppressed it.”

He said his lawyers had been passed police reports not disclosed at the appeal hearings — indicating a link with the antiques trade. He also called for a government investigation into how his case was handled.

His solicitor, Jim Nichol, told the Guardian there was “strong evidence” to suggest the security services were “helping the prosecution along”. His suspicions were first aroused when he learnt that the security services had privately approached the Civil Service Appeal Board in 1975 when Mr Wallace was dismissed from his secret role in Northern Ireland.

He pointed to a passage in the judgment — described as significant by Lord Bridgeham, the Lord Chief Justice — that Mr Justice Owen had referred to in his judgment. Mr Justice Owen, the judge in the case, had not mentioned any involvement of the security services in the antiques trade.

The court noted that the agreement was “frustrated” by the publication in a number of newspapers at a crucial point in the trial of a photograph of Mr Wallace posing in full SAS uniform. The defence had argued that the pictures “could well have led the jury to disbelieve him when he denied any training in unarmed combat.”

The judge also pointed out that Iain West, a senior Home Office pathologist, said evidence he gave about Mr Lewis was struck unconvincing was obtained “from a conversation with an American secret service agent”.

Mr West described the blow to Mr Lewis as “like a police officer” as “most unusual”. That said, the judge, was “something of an understatement”. Neither Mr West nor Professor Ralph Manzi, who said Mr Lewis had been “hit by a fatality-type chop”, had even seen Mr Lewis’ body, or read of a fracture caused that way.

But the court’s key finding was that new evidence — now supported by Dr West — showed Mr Lewis was struck shortly before he drowned. Though the prosecution conceded this on appeal, a central plank of its case was that Mr Wallace had knocked out Mr Lewis earlier and had hidden the body for several hours.

The appeal court said the trial judge had therefore misdirected the court and the jury had probably discounted evidence from a crucial witness, Mr Wallace’s friend, who said the man Mr Lewis knew after the prosecution claimed he had been knocked out.

Mr Wallace had initially lied to the police about when he last saw Mr Lewis. But the appeal court could not rule out a reasonable possibility of an innocent explanation, including Mr Wallace’s “suspicious but not adulterous” relationship with Mr Lewis’s wife, a colleague at work.

Ann Curno, QC, for the prosecution, asked for a retrial. The Crown Prosecution Service said it could not comment because the case remained sub judice.

Mr Wallace, 53, said he would be seeking compensation. He was jailed for 10 years in 1999 and was released on parole in 1999.

Why was an American Secret Service officer involved in Colin Wallace’s case and why did he provide information that was later shown to be totally false? Why did Dr Ian West not make it clear at Colin Wallace’s trial that the the ‘expert’ evidence he gave to the court was not based on his own professional experience and knowledge and that it came from a member of the US Secret Service?
Mr. Paul Foot

d/b Macmillan General Books
25 Eccleston Place
London
SW1W 9NF

PLEASE FORWARD

4 June, 1998

Dear Mr. Foot

I have just finished reading a copy of your 1990 investigation *Who Framed Colin Wallace?* and wish that I had got hold it years ago. It is bound to be academic after so long, but I had some personal knowledge of the police investigation into the murder of Jonathan Lewis, which might just be of some belated historical interest to you. I have always harboured misgivings about who actually controlled the police inquiry, and to find, so many years later, that any book, let alone such a thorough, painstaking, and revealing book as yours, had been written about the event came as a great surprise. It was shock enough to see it lying among cheap novels at a car boot sale, but the actual reading of it provoked in me a strong sense of déjà vu, and I must confess to having thought about little else since finishing it.

I then remember the sense of drama around the station when, having been neatly prepared for the inquest, it suddenly became a murder inquiry because a second autopsy had shown up the nasal bone injury. None of us could understand why a second autopsy had been needed, and how the nasal injury had been missed the first time. People even joked, as policemen do, that somebody had gone to the mortuary and broken the nose of the dead body - in the light of later events, perhaps not such a silly idea. Even your book does not clarify how the second autopsy came to be ordered, and I do not remember ever hearing the reason why.
On at least two occasions men in dark suits claiming to be from the Ministry of Defence turned up at the front office at Chichester with appointments to see the Divisional Detective Superintendent, whose name escapes me now - it may have been Finley or Curd. Nobody knew why they were there, and none of the usual police station rumours ever suggested they were connected to the Lewis murder inquiry.

Having seen them at the front counter of the police station, I had no doubt that the 'MOD officials' who came to see the Detective Superintendent were from MIS, they stood out a mile as such to me. Knowing nothing about Colin Wallace's background, I did not connect them at the time with him.

The whole impression given was of the police being "led by the nose" step by step through the investigation by a higher authority, and pointed in directions which they would not normally have taken - as if to say: "we put a clue there for you and you've missed it - go back and do it again" or "there's a loophole there which might help Wallace - go and plug it."

When Wallace was released from jail, I had left the police, but I remember being told by a former colleague that the police reaction to his release had been largely relief, rather than the annoyance and frustration which was usually felt by the police if a conviction was overturned. I met [redacted] several years later, after he had retired, and he said in conversation that Wallace should never have been convicted.

I sincerely believe that Colin Wallace was 'fitted up' by corrupt members of an Establishment embarrassed by the events described in the early part of your book. This being the case, the question which you could obviously not answer in your book is who actually killed Jonathan Lewis? Knowing what I do about the
You have moved on to greater things, and Colin Wallace may now be history, so forgive me for going on at such length about something which is now irrelevant, but your book brought it all back to me so vividly that I just couldn't resist.

Yours sincerely
Dear Sirs

RE: COLIN WALLACE

I refer to your letter of 21 September 1990, with which you enclosed a copy of a letter and enclosures that you sent on the same day to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. I am sorry that you have not had a substantive reply before now.

Having considered carefully the matters raised in your letter to the Commissioner, the Director has decided that the evidence is not such as to justify the institution of police enquiries.

I have informed the Metropolitan Police accordingly.

Yours faithfully

C W P NEWELL
Director of Headquarters Casework
Yard told not to pursue Wallace case

HOME NEWS 5

S

COTLAND Yard has been told by the Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Allan Green, QC, not to investigate allegations that the Ministry of Defence and MI5 conspired to cover up a dirty tricks campaign in Northern Ireland.

The decision, announced yesterday, follows a complaint six months ago that officials perverted the course of justice by secretly approaching the Civil Service Appeal Board in 1978 about Colin Wallace, a former Army information officer who says he was forced to resign.

Mr Wallace says the MoD wanted him out after he complained about a black propaganda operation against leading politicians and an MI5 cover-up of child abuse at Rincor, an east Belfast boys' home.

James Nichol, Mr Wallace's lawyer, drew up the claim in the light of a report by David Calcutt, QC, Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, into the handling of Mr Wallace's appeal. Mr Calcutt said that, shortly before the hearing, MoD officials were "in private communication" with the chairman of the appeal board, Sir Leslie Williams, and "the full range of Mr Wallace's work" was not disclosed to the board.

Detective Superintendent Graham Searle of the Yard's organised crime branch, said that although the case warranted further investigation, he was reluctant to go ahead without the DPP's approval. He did not want to embark on a lengthy inquiry if the Crown Prosecution Service had no intention of bringing charges.

A CPS spokesman said yesterday that Sir Allan had decided the evidence did not justify a police inquiry.

Mr Wallace, who may now bring a private prosecution, said despite all the Government's assurances, the rule of law still did not appear to apply to the Security Service.

The MoD admitted last year that it had misled Parliament by denying there was any truth in Mr Wallace's allegations.

Following the report by Mr Calcutt—who has not been seen by the police—the MoD gave Mr Wallace £20,000 in compensation.
Hi Paul,

As promised, I have tried to summarise below some of the salient points arising from my meetings with Robin Bryans, Humphrey Berkeley and Lady Laura Grimson. Sorry this has taken longer than I originally envisaged, but I have been trying to de-cypher my notes and RB's contribution is of marathon proportions. My main difficulty is that I do not know enough about the various personalities involved to understand their relevant significance. All three have, however, confirmed that they are very happy to talk to you and I have listed their telephone contact numbers below. I have also listed some of the contact details for a few of those who may be able to shed more light on the 'plot' against Wilshin and Heath.

I also apologise for writing these notes by hand. I shall get them typed at the earliest opportunity and send to you, but I thought it would be good if you had a 'diary' or what was said. I am sorry if some of the information is a bit disjointed, but Robin Bryans' narrative was so fragmented that I am still in all confidence that I have clearly understood what he was saying. I have tried to include as many as possible of the names he mentioned, to help you to check what he is claiming. I did check with him the correct spelling of the various names and I am reasonably confident that most are correct. His memory for details is phenomenal!

I have now had two meetings with RB, plus several very lengthy phone calls. Some of the information provided by Bryans and Berkeley is highly contentious and I would ask you to treat it with great caution, as I am sure you will, until it can be fully substantiated and/or until we decide what to do with it. I feel we have to be careful that we are not being used by either Bryans or Berkeley to settle 'old scores' with the former 'friends'!

However, even if only parts of his claims are true, it is easy to see why the authorities did not want to investigate homosexual paedophile activities in Northern Ireland because that would have opened up a very large can of worms! Also, I am not sure that we can show that any of this material is relevant to my case.

Robin Bryans. (Do you know him - he sometimes writes under the name 'Robert Harbison'
and claims that he has provided information in the past to 'Private Eye' - via Peter McKay - particularly about Blunt being a Soviet agent.

RB contacted me as a result of the press coverage of my story and told me that he had information that could be of assistance to me. Initially, Fred and I visited him at his home (58 *redacted*) to find out what he had to say. He is originally from East Belfast and is a cousin of John 'Jack' Bryans who was Grand Master of the Orange Order in the early 1970s and who was succeeded by the Rev Martin Smyth MP.

However, at worst, I feel some of his claims may be coloured, but there is a strong element of truth in what he says. As you will see, what he is alleging is sensational. I did talk this over with Tony Caudish and he also believes that most of what RB says is probably correct, albeit overstated in places.

RB showed me a number of books that he has written, mainly on travel and his childhood in Ireland. He made it clear from the outset of our meeting that he is gay, but not a paedophile. Indeed, I get the feeling that he is strongly opposed to the sexual exploitation of minors. He says that it is important for us - in terms of what happened at Kincora - to understand something of the network of prominent people in Ireland and in London, during the pre and post-WW2 period, who were homosexuals and paedophiles. He also says that we need to understand the membership of that network because some of those more recently involved in child abuse both in England and Ireland have links to members of that old group.

RB believes that the authorities 'turned a blind eye' to the sexual activities of that network over the years because of the very prominent personalities involved. He also says that McDaid and Maine were involved with children's homes in the Irish Republic. This supports information I recorded on my "Clockwork Orange" notes.

Perhaps the most significant information RB provided was that he briefed Lord John 'Jack' Donaldson (NIO Minister) - who apparently knew Peter Montgomery well - about Kincora in 1979. He claims that, at about the same time, he also told Lord Edward Shackleton about Kincora (Lord Shackleton also knows Peter Montgomery - as a result of his activities at the BBC!). It became very clear from our conversation that RB does not like Lord Shackleton!

Finally, he says that he wrote to Anthony Eden's widow, Lady Avon, about the abuse at the home.
In the mid to late 1970s RB became involved in an acrimonious dispute with his publishers (Fabers) and with some of his former gay associates and began circulating rather defamatory information about them.

I think his main reason for asking to meet with me was to find out what I knew about Kinora and abuses at other homes in the Province. When I gave him an outline of what I knew, it became evident that he had very little detailed knowledge about the abuse allegations at Kinora (albeit he clearly knew that it had been taking place).
allegations into my story because there are no obvious strong links with my case. Having said that, I have a gut feeling that a lot of what he says is probably true, but it is a potential legal minefield and, on balance, we should probably stay away from it. It does, however, raise serious questions about the failure to prosecute any of the key figures named by Bryans to the police and to others for homosexual activities in both England and Northern Ireland at a time when such activities were criminal offences, and it illustrates how politically corrupt ‘the law enforcement system’ is. My overall feeling is that he hopes you will refer in your book some of the activities he has been trying to draw public attention to by other means.

Humphry Berkeley: I serious doubt about him in that I think his sole interest in me was to see what I know that could be of value to him politically. He hinted about his knowledge of the paedophile underworld in Parliament and Whitehall, but he supplied no hard facts to back this up. I could be doing him an injustice and you may have different views if and when you talk to him. In particular, I feel there may be merit in looking at his allegations relating to the Monday Club.

Laura Grimmond: I was very impressed by her. She comes across as highly intelligent and sincere. I felt she was genuinely angry about what happened to me and that she will do her best to raise the issue with appropriate people. The main problem is that he is party has very little clout in either Parliament or Whitehall and, in any event, very few MPs will want to get involved. Unfortunately, courage is not a common commodity in politics.

Do let me know if you have any queries on the above. I am sure you will. I shall have these notes typed up as soon as possible to make them easier to read.
REFERENCE: 2075/1

Thos Eggar and Son
East Pallant
Chichester
West Sussex

J C WALLACE

Reference:

A. Your 19 of 30 Oct 80.

1. The above named resigned from the Ulster Defence Regiment with effect 14 Nov 75. He held the rank of Captain.

2. We do not hold any further information, however you should make further enquiries as to his service record to:
   Officer in Charge
   MOD (SCR) 2b
   Army Search
   Bourne Avenue
   Hayes
   Middlesex

3. Any request for information should be accompanied by your client's signed release certificate.

S DE KOPKINS
Captain
for Commander
LOOSE MINUTE
BR/114/1/2/PS2(Army)

AG...
DUS(Army)
MOD
ALS2
Head of C2(AD)
Treasury Solicitor (Mr Bailey)

Copies to: PS/S of S
PS/Minister of State
PS/US of S(Army)
MA/GCS
PS/PUS
DMO
AUS(GS)
Head of DS 1C
DFR(A)

THE LONDONDERRY ENQUIRY

1. At 1600 hours Wednesday 2 February I attended the opening meeting of the Northern Ireland Tribunal Team at Headquarters Northern Ireland Command. This Team consists of:-

COS
Col AQ

Col GS (IF)

Mr Wallace

GSO 1 Plans

IC

Deputy

Liaison with MOD

Administration

The opposition case

Asst. Takes over on 11 Feb

The Army case

Liaison with 6 Bde and units

Provision of evidence

Full-time Asst

Lt Col Overbury

Maj Hugh Smith

GSO 3 Plans

Legal Adviser

Secretary

Asst Secretary (when required)

Also in attendance at this meeting were:-

CIVAD

Brigade Major 8 Infantry Brigade

ZIC 1 Para

Police Adviser

2. I was invited to open the proceedings by addressing the team. I said that my aim in coming was first and foremost to show that not only had they the solid support of the Ministry of Defence, which they already knew, but that we were determined to do everything we could to help them in connection with the Tribunal.
IN CONFIDENCE

THE APPEALS BOARD

Statement (Transcript)

I am Peter Broderick, employed in the Civil Service for 16 years and now a Chief Information Officer (A).

From July '73 until September '74 I was Head of Army Information Services, Headquarters, Northern Ireland, in the rank of Chief Information Officer (B). Colin Wallace was on my staff as an Information Officer and later as Senior Information Officer.

My statement concerns the work and character of Colin Wallace, but to do this I must set the scene. It is an important factor in this case and I believe that it has been much misunderstood and resented by some in Whitehall.

At the start of the present troubles in Northern Ireland, Army Public Relations there consisted of two civilians - one senior and one Assistant Information Officer (Colin Wallace). It was geared for peacetime tasks largely slanted towards recruiting. At that time, the Army did not have a clear appreciation of the operational necessity of press and public relations because they had never operated against insurgents within the borders of the United Kingdom before under the close scrutiny of over 200 resident press-men. The two civilians found themselves operating a 24 hour press service, 365 days a year. This situation continued for three years. When the lessons had been learned the hard way, mixed military and civilian public relations reinforcements were drafted in - over 30 of them to do the work that the two incumbents had managed. Even so, the Army recognised that the personal strain was such that military personnel usually did 6 month tours in Northern Ireland, and no one did more than 2 years without relief. Civilian Management made no alteration to their peace-time procedures whereby staff were expected to remain indefinitely. (They now have - but only since this case arose.)

Under the strain, the Senior Information Officer became ill and largely ineffective. The Army by this time had become keen converts to the need for active public relations as an integral part of their operational capability, and became impatient with the Senior Information Officer who was neither well enough nor personally trained for an operational role. Consequently, and with the full agreement of the Army in Whitehall, a separate military staffed unit was set up in Northern Ireland, literally on the other side of the corridor from Public Relations. Under the title of Information Policy, its brief was to use psychological means to assist operations strategically and tactically. It is a skill that requires sensitivity, political finesse, and a thorough knowledge of the situation.

The military approach - with officers who had a minimum of theoretical training and no practical experience - would have been doomed to embarrassing failure. They had even forgotten the one basic essential - a channel of communication to enable them to transfer their thoughts and ideas into effective coverage by the press.
Colin Wallace, at first, became the pawn in this game. Though on the staff of public relations, he was used by Information Policy as their outlet to the press. He also had knowledge of the Irish situation which was totally unique in the Headquarters and surpassed that even of most of the Intelligence Branch. As time progressed, he was not only the main briefer of the press, but also the advisor on Irish matters to the whole Headquarters and because of his personal talents - contributed much creative thought to the Information Policy Unit. In order to do his job he had constant and free access to information of high classification and extreme sensitivity.

The attitude of the MODPR organisation in Whitehall to the activities of Information Policy Unit was one of extreme suspicion. Wallace's dual role was particularly resented by Whitehall, while highly valued by the operation commander in Northern Ireland. The Senior Information Officer had by now become very ill and was retired.

I was posted to Northern Ireland in a high rank deliberately to take over both Public Relations and Information Policy and mould them into one unit. This I did - but I confess that it took only few weeks on the ground to realise that the Whitehall defensive' approach to Army information work was totally inappropriate to the Northern Ireland situation. I was instructed by my Generals there to use public relations and information policy techniques in direct support of their military objectives, and this I willingly did in direct liaison with the Northern Ireland Office and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

In re-organising, one of my first actions was to legitimise the role of Colin Wallace and to allocate him firmly to Information Policy. As it involved an upgrading, we were put in the difficult position of having to trawl the post publicly to comply with civil service rules and we could scarcely mention psychological warfare. A device was therefore agreed for a cover title as Head of Production Services - but the trawl did not mention briefing of the press as an important function.

Wallace's primary job was to win friends among the press and to gain their total confidence as a reliable source of information. By agreement with Intelligence in each case, he was supplied with selected information about terrorists, their activities, their sources of money and arms at home and overseas, of the allegiances if so-called innocents and such matters. This together with his long-term and intimate knowledge of the Irish scene - made him an invaluable contact for the press - that I cannot recall a single occasion when any reporter, even from the hostile papers, disclosed the source of the briefings.

To my knowledge, he worked at least 80 hours a week - coming to his desk every day. He lived in the Officers' Mess and regarded himself as always on duty. He has never claimed long hours gratuity nor overtime as a matter of principle. During my 15 months duty, I doubt whether he even left the camp area (except on accompanied duty) more than a dozen times - until the last few weeks when he found himself a girlfriend who is now his wife. Upon my arrival I found that he had taken virtually no leave for 6 years except to attend his Territorial Army Camp. For about two nights each week, he served with the Ulster Defence Regiment which meant going on armed patrol from 8pm until dawn and getting no sleep.

Colin Wallace - though very sociable - is basically a self contained and private individual with, I understand, a strong religious upbringing. He has very little in the way of human safety-valves. Upon my arrival, it was obvious that not only he, but the rest of the civilian
staff, had been under strain for some time - and in Wallace's case for six years.

Though inevitably much of the strain is imaginary and anticipatory, there is a very real physical threat: Not only from random bombs and shootings, but particular threats to members of the Army Information Service's staff who are - in all senses - targets for the terrorists. Wallace was licensed by the Chief Constable to carry a personal protection firearm: Such licences were not issued lightly.

He was not always the easiest person to manage: His enthusiasm and dedication sometimes outran his judgement: His personal pride made it difficult for him always to acknowledge mistakes. His self-contained personality meant that I personally could never guess just how deep the communication between us really was. But these are all human factors which, once a manager has recognised them, can be taken into account; and they pale into insignificance compared to the plus points.

I do not hesitate to say that Colin Wallace is the best thing that ever happened to Army Public Relations in Northern Ireland; that if it had not been for his talents, knowledge and efforts the Army could well have lost the propaganda war; and I could not wish to meet anyone more dedicated to the Army than he was and, so obviously, still is. He acted resolutely and to effect against anyone - republican or loyalist - who was destroying his country: His name is well known in Ulster in terrorist circles. Under no circumstances could he ever return. His successes there for the Army means that he is now banished for ever.

The particular incident which this Board is now considering happened after my departure from the scene. Some facts have been made available to me. Knowing Wallace and how deeply he feels about his work, knowing Robert Fisk and his particular style, knowing my successor, and above all knowing the atmosphere and pressures of Northern Ireland, I venture to say that Colin Wallace is capable of an error of judgement; particularly against the background of six years under constant strain and pressure; but I just cannot conceive of any situation in which he would act maliciously against the interests of the Crown and the Army.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS FOR 1971-1974
JOHN COLIN WALLACE, SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICER, ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, N. IRELAND

Supplied as evidence to the Appeal Board in October 1975 from information released by the MoD to the IPCS

1971

Reporting Officer: 'This is an officer of high calibre. Totally dedicated to the Army, demonstrates this by a devotion to duty that is truly remarkable'.

Countersigning Officer: 'I heartily agree'.

1972

'Continues to demonstrate that his talents are of the very highest standard'.

1973

Reporting Officer: 'Undoubtedly fit for promotion, loyal, conscientious and hardworking'.
Countersigning Officer: 'In every way an outstanding IO, merits promotion'.

1974

On percentage of time spent on duty:

Reporting Officer: 'The pencilled-in percentages above add up to 200. This is the only reasonable solution for an officer who consistently works double the conditional hours'.

Assessment of performance: 'Outstanding'

Special factors: 'His dedication and sheer professionalism'.

Management and staff: 'he gets things done by somewhat unorthodox management techniques - but they get done'.

Self organisation: 'To prove he is human, he has the most untidy office I have ever seen'.

Next job: 'He wishes to stay in Northern Ireland - he is irreplaceable'.

Opinion: 'One of the most effective personal contributions of any to the standing and reputation of the Army in these troubles'.

'For knowledge, loyalty, professionalism, Wallace is in a class of his own.'
LOOSE MINUTE
BR/114/1/2/PS2(ARMY)

AG
DUS(ARMY)
MO4
ALS2
Head of C2(AD)
Treasury Solicitor (Mr Bailey)

Copies to: PS/S of S
PS/Minister of State
PS/US of S(ARMY)
MA/GCS
PS/PUS
DMO
AUS(GS)
Head of DS 1C
DFR(A)

THE LONDONDERRY ENQUIRY

1. At 1600 hours Wednesday 2 February I attended the opening meeting of the Northern Ireland Tribunal Team at Headquarters Northern Ireland Command. This Team consists of:

- GCS
- Col AQ
- Col GS (IP) Mr Wallace
- GSO 1 Plans
- AFM
- DAFM (Complaints) Maj J A Smith
- Lt Col Overbury
- Maj Hugh Smith
- GSO 3 Plans
- The opposition case
- Asst. Takes over on 11 Feb
- The Army case
- Provision of evidence
- Full-time Asst
- Legal Adviser
- Secretary
- Asst Secretary (when required)

Also in attendance at this meeting were:

CIVAD
- Brigade Major 8 Infantry Brigade
- 2IC 1 Para
- Police Adviser

2. I was invited to open the proceedings by addressing the team. I said that my aim in coming was first and foremost to show that not only had they the solid support of the Ministry of Defence, which they already knew, but that we were determined to do everything we could to help them in connection with the Tribunal.
TARA

TARA first came to notice in the late sixties when the group issued a statement to the press claiming to be "the hard core of Protestant resistance", and it is thought that the organisation was set up as a counter to the civil disturbances associated with the NICRA marches.

The name TARA is derived from the place where the ancient high kings of Ireland were crowned and it, therefore, an unusual choice of title for a Loyalist paramilitary group.

Operating from its HQ at Clifton Street Orange Hall, Belfast, as 'The Orange Discussion Group', TARA was organised initially into platoons of 20 or so men and run on military lines not unlike the old Ulster Special Constabulary ('B Specials'). Membership is drawn almost exclusively from the Orange Order and each platoon has a Sgt/OM (Quartermaster) and IO (Intelligence Officer). Contributions: 50p per month - half to a central fund - half at pin level. Pins are able to draw on the central fund if the opportunity to buy stores arises. Training includes radio, weapons and guerrilla tactics.

The CC is William McGrath. He is a known homosexual who has conned many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he himself initiated. He is a prominent figure in Unionist Party politics and in the Orange Order.

McGrath uses a non-existent evangelical mission as a front for his homosexual activities and also runs a home for children on Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast (Tel: B'fast 657836). Also at Newtownards Road (B'fast).

The TARA 2/3/c is Roy Garland, a close personal friend of McGrath and his former employer.

McGrath's 'ADC' is Frank Miller who comes from the Shore Road area of Belfast and who is also an active member of the Unionist Party. He is the author of a number of political pamphlets including one called 'Dangers and Sinister Realities'.

TARA's 'Intelligence Officer' is Clifford Smith who lives with McGrath, and the group's 'Admin Officer' is David Brown from Bangor Co Down. Brown is Deputy Editor of Rev Paisley's 'Protestant Telegraph'.

Other people closely associated with McGrath and aware of his activities are Thomas Passmore, Rev Paisley, Rev Martin Smith, James Molyneaux and Sir Knox Cunningham QC MP.
Crisis meant politicalников across Britain's dispersed
in British engineered was conducted by Soviet
forces through Labour Party activists and leg
groups. Many were expelled. Health NPs, CDU
and v1

Soviet plan to bask Britain's economy, ended by
Labour Government

With this, to bring down Health Care funded by
W.H.

USRA means to turn Britain out of NATO, as long
about the removal of US troops in UK.

Control over NPs—homicide and the Umncrool
Health

Maj. Steiner

Unacknowledged

Chevassu

Witney — the senior relationship with

Marcus Bellagio

Lion in 1975—Bennett and Ziulshvili

W. Suhl says:

David, keeping Bennett in N. Scotland

1. Dance of Independence

2. Trade with Belgium

3. Contact with Defence


U.K. Strick
19 May 1934 — Begin

Jan 1978 — Ahluwala election

Dec 1975 — Supplementary conference

Jan 1979 — N.J. Congress—Tamil civil

26 Feb 1994 — Hindu comes to power
Visit to Labour officials by I.V. Kapitonov, Secretary to the Soviet Central Committee. Also:-
V. M Tsybulko
B. I. Gostev
Z. M. Kruglov
N. V. Matkovskiy (expert on Irish affairs)

Note: visits by HW and Marcia Williams to Soviet Union and Marcia Williams refusal to be subjected to Positive Vetting.

Purpose of visit by Soviet delegation - to establish links with trade unions - see industrial unrest in 1973/74.

It is reliably reported that the Russians congratulated Jimmy Reid on forcing the Conservative Govt to spend millions of pounds on a project on the Clyde where the water is too shallow to take large tankers. "Clearly Mr Gollam owes Mr Reid a reward much greater than that of having him on the national executive committee or having won the affection and approval of Mr Wedgwood Benn.

Communists strong in AUEW, T & GWU, NUM and TASS (formerly DATA) - see Lord Shawcross.

£5,000 sent from KGB to Irish Congress of Trade Unions.

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Civil unrest, political violence and Industrial disputes in Britain engineered and controlled by Soviet Union through Labour Party activists and Left Wing organisation. Role of Labour MPs in CDU and TOM.

Soviet plans to ruin Britain's economy aided by Labour Government

NUM strike to bring down Heath Govt funded by USSR.

USSR anxious to take Britain out of NATO and bring about the removal of US bases in UK.

Control over MPs - homosexual and other blackmail Heath
St John Stevas
Van Straubenzee
Gilmour
Wilson - extra marital relationship and Marcia Williams.

Link to homosexual story via Belfast McKeague, McGrath etc.

See also Driberg and Barclay
Floud (died 1967)
Heavy meeting got off Jan. 12th. to keep hospital.

Police Station.

Ballymena
Connor's
North 1st Street

Turn for every patient at 4 or 1,200 meals.

from 4th to 10th.

Another order of 50 or 80 people

Vesuvius
Inc.

James Smith
South (W.)."
Factors helping terrorism in N. Ireland:
1. Release of Intenees
2. Talks with Sinn Fein and UDA etc
3. Cutbacks in Defence Budget
4. Meetings between Wilson and IRA

Lord Salisbury
Joseph Josten
John Wilkinson
John Slessor
Leonard Schapiro

UWC Strike
14 May 1974 - Begins
June 1973 - Assembly elections
Dec 1973 - Sunningdale conference
Jan 1974 - NI Executive takes over
28 Feb 1974 - H Wilson comes to power

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Heavy industry cut off from grid to keep hospitals, public services etc working

Power Stations:-
Ballylumford
Coolkeragh??
Belfast East and West
These four can produce a total of 1,300 megawatts - well over half the total power comes from Ballylumford.

Normal electricity demand in Ulster = 400 megawatts

Knox Cunningham, Molyneaux, Paisley, Brown, Smith, Smyth TARA, RHC, UVF etc
(Rev), Baird, Craig → McGrath, McKeague, Van Straubenzee,
Cecil Harvey, Peter Robinson

Meetings between PIRA and Wilson/Rees of great help to terrorists. Wilson's meeting was organised by Heath - see also Whitelaw
Note: The words "Wallace" and "MS" are in Paul Foot's handwriting

TARA

[see statement issued in August 1971]

The use of the title 'Tara' is rather interesting in the context of Loyalist philosophy. Tara was the seat of the southern Hy-Niall (High King) - the Northern Hy-Niall had his residence at Griannan-Aileach [Aileach = of stone, Griannan = place of sun]. Aileach was destroyed in 1088. MacLoughlin Prince of Aileach invaded Thomond and destroyed the palace at Kincora. Mortogh O'Brien, King of Thomond rebuilt Kincora three years later and then marched on Aileach and burned it down. According to legend he asked every man in his army to carry away a stone of the destroyed fortress (Aileach is half-way between Londonderry and Lough Swilly).

The place of O'Brien was at Kincora near Killaloe but nothing of it remains today. The O'Briens were the Chieftains of the Dalussian tribe [House of Brian Boru - Battle of Clontarf].

The connections between McGrath's paramilitary group 'Tara' and the home called 'Kincora' is rather symbolic. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the Orange Lodge which he founded 4 years ago in June 1970 is called "Ireland's Own Heritage" (L.O.L 1303)


McGrath claims that the Irish are one of the "lost tribes of Israel" and, therefore, pre-date the arrival of the Roman Catholic faith.

Note in margin: Silent Valley etc [P/O] see links with UCDC/LDV and WPV. *Campbell, McKeage 50" Anniversary of the Easter Rebellion etc.

Tara was active during the 1969 protest marches and rioting when it met in Clifton Street, Orange Hall (opp Victoria Bks) under the cover title of 'The Orange Discussion Group'. It was mainly a propaganda group although McGrath had plans to develop it into a full scale militia similar to the old UVF and using the Orange Order as a conduit.
'TARA' - REPORTS REGARDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOMOSEXUAL COMMUNITY IN BELFAST

Reference A: Attached RUC background paper on 'TARA'.
Reference B: Attached RUC report on the death of BRIAN MCDERMOTT.
Reference C: Tour request for a press investigation into the matters referred to above.

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to 'TARA'. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2. If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success, I also feel that it is difficult to justify our involvement in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, 'TARA' is no longer of any security interest.

3. In theory, 'TARA' was basically a credible concept from a Loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body, had it been established, would have made good use of the Orange Order's normal selection and 'vetting' system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had ready made facilities for clandestine training by making use of the Orange Halls throughout the Province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, mainly because of WILLIAM McGRATH's rather strange political views which are more akin to Irish Nationalism or Republicanism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the Loyalist community at that time, sprang up during the period.

4. Reference A deals with McGRATH's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kinora hostel in Newtownards Road where he worked was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of Belfast Corporation Welfare Department. He does not, as the paper claims, "run the hostel" - he is employed as a 'housefather'. The Warden of Kinora is JOSEPH MAINS and the Deputy Warden is RAYMOND SEMPLE. MAINS was appointed in 1959 and SEMPLE in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals. Indeed, various allegations of homosexual assaults on inmates of the hostel were investigated by senior Welfare Department staff in 1967 but no action was taken against anyone (see notes of a report by Dr H. JASON at flag 'W').

Continued/.....
5. It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kincora "began shortly after his appointment". As I have pointed out in para 4 above, allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after MAINS was appointed.

6. Reference A claims that McGRAFI TH "is a known homosexual" but it avoids any mention of his links with various other key figures in the local homosexual community, other than to insinuate that a number of well known political personalities with whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of Reference A, it is claimed that McGRAFTH left his previous employment "as a result of a lovers' quarrel" with his employer, whereas our information would tend to indicate that he left following a row over an outstanding debt. His former employer, ROY GARNLON, is well known in Unionist Party circles (see also CLIFORD SMITH) and was for sometime 2i/c of 'PRA'. Admittedly, some of the personal correspondence between the two men during this period cannot be regarded as normal between employer and employee (see Flag 'H'). Whatever the real reason for the row between GARNLON and McGRAFTH, there is certainly considerable animosity between them at present, and GARNLON has been actively engaged in trying to have McGRAFTH removed from his post at Kincora. GARNLON's own version of events (see Flag 'O') is, of course, very enlightening, but I would suggest that it should be treated with caution until it can be substantiated because of the antagonism between them. It would also appear that many of the RUC source reports on this matter after 1971 originated from GARNLON.

7. McGRAFTH was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation Welfare Department in 1972/73, following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints have been received about his behaviour and that, although the complaints had been passed to senior welfare staff and to the RUC, no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be confirmed, to some extent, by Mr ORR (see Flag 'B') in 1973. There were, of course, similar allegations relating to other hostels during this period (see Bawnmore, Westwind, Bannside etc.) and this conflicts with reference A's assertion that the allegations were confined to Kincora.

8. It should be remembered that the 1967 Sexual Offences Act does NOT apply to Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors is a criminal offence. The apparent lack of interest, therefore, by the Welfare Authorities and the RUC is quite remarkable. Furthermore, the claim made by Reference A that key individuals in the Welfare Department were homosexuals and thus, not only appointed homosexuals to such posts but also covered up the offences that took place and protected the offenders, requires very serious examination. In particular, I view her allegations about with great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.

Reference H which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of BRIAN McDERMOTT last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between the murder and the homosexual community is via JOHN McKEAUS. McKEAUS's own statements (see Flag 'S') raise more questions than they answer. Certainly,
9. continued...

his boast that he will not be prosecuted because "he knows too much about some people" merits serious investigation, but I suspect that he will no be prepared to talk until he is released. It is also rather remarkable that no charges have been preferred against him, at least during the past 3 or 4 years. Our own investigations of instances of alleged witchcraft or other satanic rites in the Province would tend to dismiss the RUC's theory that BRIAN McDermott's murder could be part of these activities. In the past, Black Magic practices appear to have been mainly confined to groups operating from Republican areas, with the possible exception of three cases in Co Antrim. I think, however, that from a press point of view, we would be very foolish to give any credence to such claims without the most convincing evidence. The formular reports on the McDermott murder (see flag #1) would tend to indicate that someone tried to dispose of the body by cutting it into pieces and burning them. It would also appear that when this failed, the pieces were dumped in the river. The indiscretion made in the document regarding the boy's disappearance and the proximity of the Rev PAISLEY's church is dangerous nonsense.

10. Reference A claims that a number of key personalities in the political arena "are aware of the Kinoree situation and, in particular, of McGRAH's background. It does not, however, explain the extent of their awareness nor of each individual's involvement with McGRAH. In summary, it would appear that the document is claiming that:-

(a) Senior members of the Grand Orange Lodge are aware of the situation because of the discussions and correspondence relating to McGRAH within the Orange Order (sea flag #5). It is further alleged that THOMAS PASSMORE and the Rev MARTIN SMITH have blocked any action against McGRAH.

(b) The Rev PAISLEY is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because of possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with McGRAH, DAVID BROWN and JOHN McKENNA. On the face of it, the statements made by VALERIE SHAW and TOM MCWILLI (see flag #3) would tend to support the only part of such a claim. There are also a number of inconsistencies: McGRAH would appear to be strongly anti-communist and anti-U.V.F. and this conflicts with the document's views on links with TOMMY HERRON, ERNE 'DUKE' ELLIOTT, 'The Ulster Citizens Army' etc.

(c) Various public and political figures who hold positions of power and who are also homosexual protect each other from prosecution. The claims of a prostitution ring involving juveniles and centered on Bangor is not really substantiated, other than by CARLAD's own personal account. It would be interesting to check, however, the number of charges brought against people involved in homosexual activities in the greater Belfast area in the last 5 years. I also think that the RUC report on drug abuse in this connection merits
10 (c) continued.

... close examination because this is a natural area of fund raising for terrorists. There is, of course, the obvious problem of security with the possible blackmailing of civil servants, politicians etc.

Conclusions and recommendations.

I am so far from happy with the quality of the information available on this matter, and I am even more unhappy because of the, as yet unexplained, failure of the RUC or the HIO to take on this task.

I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless they had specifically received some form of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level. If that is the case then we should be even more wary about getting involved.

On the other hand, if the allegations are true then we should do everything possible to ensure that the situation is not allowed to continue. The youngsters in these hostels almost certainly came from problem families, and it is clear that no one will fight their case unless we do. Those responsible for the murder of BRIAN ODERMOTT must be brought to trial before another child is killed, and if it can be proved that there is a connection with this homosexual group, then the RUC must be forced to take action irrespective of who is involved.

I would recommend therefore that:

(a) We make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter or at least discuss the matter with HUCLO.

(b) We obtain very clear and unambiguous authority from London to proceed with a press disclosure.

(c) We approach a responsible journalist whom we are confident will make a thorough investigation of the matter and not simply write a sensational type story purely on the information he is given.

(d) We continue to look for additional information on this matter to ensure that we are not just being used as part of some political disinformation scheme.

J.C. Wallace
Senior Information Officer
his straightforward Public Relations duties and that there was also a further job specification classified SECRET. MOD did not contest the evidence given on Mr Wallace’s behalf, but it did not acknowledge the existence of a supplementary job specification; nor did it make a copy available, as Mr Wallace had requested. More recently, the existence of any supplementary job specification has been denied; and indeed no evidence has been found in the documentation still available that Mr Wallace was given any formal supplementary directive or job specification.

However, the papers which have now come to light indicate that when the case was made to establish Mr Wallace’s post, it was proposed that its duties should include responsibilities for providing unattributable covert briefings to the press; and it was stated that the incumbent would be required to make on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security during such interviews. It seems that in the event the arguments for including these responsibilities in Mr Wallace’s job description were made orally rather than in writing to those who approved the establishment of the SIO post. But presumably Mr Wallace was told what duties he was expected to carry out; and indeed it would appear that he had already been undertaking unattributable briefing activities of this kind, which may have included disinformation. It has not since the mid 1970s been the policy to disseminate disinformation in Northern Ireland in ways designed to denigrate individuals and/or organisations or for propaganda purposes. That remains the case.

The fact remains that the disciplinary offence with which Mr
1. At its meeting today the Committee considered in detail your letter of 30 November answering the Committee’s 31 October requests for information relating to the case of Mr Colin Wallace.

2. In response to the paragraph headed "Clockwork Orange", which was in response to Question 2 of the Committee’s 30 October questions, and Question 1 on the attachment to the letter of 14 February, the Committee would wish to make a further attempt to clarify the phrase in the Secretary of State’s letter of 2 February to Mr Livingstone (MO 19/3/19L) deposited in the Library of the House which reads:

"The initial examination of this material began in the early part of 1989..."

The Committee now understands that the material referred to included the General Staff Secretariat file on which the reference to Clockwork Orange was first found. But it is still not clear how the reference to initial examination "in the early part of 1989" relates to Mr Heyhoe’s reference to work being undertaken in response to points raised by Mr Dalyell on 8 June.

3. In response to the paragraph headed "General Requests", the Committee would wish to be provided with a copy of the two following documents, with the principal references to them in Mr Heyhoe’s Report shown in brackets:

A. The original paper identified in July 1989, containing a reference to Clockwork Orange, and described by the Secretary of State on 1 February, HC Deb, col 467, as "a background paper seeking to justify expenditure on a further information officer in Northern Ireland Headquarters": [Heyhoe 1, 9 &c].

/cont...
B. The "source document" in 2 PUS folders, of which A was an extract, containing information on Mr Wallace's job description and a reference to Clockwork Orange, stating that the project was not cleared [Heyhoe 1, 3, 9].

As I mentioned in my letter of 14 February and as referred to in Question 1 as forwarded on 31 October, the Committee remains happy that the papers should be provided if necessary under the usual conditions governing the Committee's access to classified papers.

4. The Committee would like to be able to consider the response to this letter at its meeting on 6 February, so that I would be grateful to have it by noon on 4 February.

David Natzler
Clerk of the Committee

Miss S J Ambler-Edwards
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State
Room 6164
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall SW1
Dear David,

Thank you for your further letter of 12th December last seeking clarification on several points arising from ours of 30th November about Mr Colin Wallace.

As regards your first question, the examination of papers beginning in the early part of 1989 reflected the need both to deal with inquiries about Mr Wallace's case and to familiarise new staff with it. It was a continuing process, and the reference to "Clockwork Orange" was found in July 1989.

As regards the particular papers referred to in your third paragraph, these are internal papers and moreover include sensitive material relating to security and intelligence matters lying outside the Committee's inquiry. The provision of such papers, even under the conditions relating to the Committee's access to classified information, would be inconsistent with the conventions. The Parliamentary reply of 30th January by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces included all the information which, in the Government's view, is necessary for a proper understanding of the issues. If, however, the Select Committee would provide a fuller statement of what information they are seeking through access to this material, the Government would be glad to consider further whether they can provide the Committee with such information.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

(W C CLARK)
Private Secretary

David Natzler Esq
Clerk to the Defence Committee
From: Reg Whitaker <regwhit@yorku.ca>
To: intelforum@his.com
Subject: Re: Maurice Tugwell, Northern Ireland & Canada
Date: Thu, Apr 19, 2001, 1:57 pm

The name of Maurice Tugwell has been raised in relation to Colin Wallace, whose case was discussed in the 1989 book by Paul Foot, Who Framed Colin Wallace?. Col. Tugwell was head of the Information Policy Unit of British forces in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, but later came to Canada, where until his retirement he headed the conservative MacKenzie Institute.

I would like to report that when Foot's book came out in 1989, I asked Tugwell about the book and about Wallace. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, he was not critical of the book and was in fact full of praise for Wallace. He had no knowledge concerning the murder charge against Wallace, since that affair postdated his duties in Northern Ireland, but he certainly told me nothing that would have contradicted Wallace's account of 'PsyOps' and the unfortunately titled Clockwork Orange project. Most interesting of all, he even expressed some regret that he had not spoken out earlier on behalf of Wallace when the latter had first gotten into trouble for his criticisms of dirty tricks.

Other than the accidental circumstance of Tugwell having moved to Canada, I too am doubtful about any alleged role that Canadian intelligence might have played in Northern Ireland. Our people up here have enough trouble covering their own waterfront with limited resources. The Brits did not require any help with their mess in Ulster.

Reg Whitaker

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Room 0355
Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB
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(Switchboard) 01-218 9000

From: Brigadier The Honourable W E Rous OBE
Director of Public Relations (Army)

23 July 1987

Robert Parker Esq
Channel Four News
Independent Television News Limited
ITN House
48 Wells Street
London
W1P 4DE

Dear Robert

COLIN WALLACE

1. Thank you for your letter of 24 June seeking confirmation on a number of points concerning Mr Wallace's time with the Ministry of Defence. I am sorry it has taken me so long to reply, but the research has taken time. You ask for a reply 'on the record' which I take to mean attributable. The information which follows can be regarded as attributable to 'the Ministry of Defence' or to 'an Army spokesman' but not, please, to me by either name or appointment.

2. I can confirm that a statement by Mr Broderick and extracts from confidential reports prepared by the Institute of Professional Civil Servants were presented to the Civil Service Appeal Board. I can also confirm that the job description given to the CSAB was the only one covering Mr Wallace's job and there was therefore no 'secret' job description as has been alleged. Mr Wallace's job as Senior Information Officer in Northern Ireland was to brief the press on military operations and terrorist activities in the Province. It would have been necessary on occasions to give briefings on an unattributable basis, but I am informed that it was not part of his job to spread false information.

3. As to Mr Wallace's visits in the period between 1971 and 1973, I am afraid that we have been unable to trace any record of the visits to which you refer. This does not mean that Mr Wallace did not make these visits, either for pleasure or as part of his duties, but rather that after a gap of some fourteen years such records are simply not available to enable a check to be run.

4. One of your questions referred to a 'mock raid' at Belfast Airport which you understood was carried out under my control. I have no recollection of any such exercise.
16 January 1990

The Rt Hon Peter Brooke MP
Northern Ireland Office
London
SW1A 2AZ

Dear Secretary of State,

Thank you for your letter of 27 November 1989 concerning the Kincora affair and the evidence of Mr Colin Wallace.

I am sorry that you feel that I was unfair to you in my letter of 10 November 1989 but I feel that you had not faced up to the questions which I had raised. Unfortunately, having read your letter, I must say that I am more convinced than ever of the continuing need for a satisfactory response from you.

I must stress the necessity to deal with the substance of the issue, that is whether or not Mr Wallace, and his Army superiors, were aware in 1974 of the crimes being committed in Kincora.

I say this with a great deal of regret because I had hoped for some progress on this issue on your part. Unfortunately, the second paragraph of your letter of 27 November glosses over the reasons for the failure of Mr Wallace to testify to the Hughes enquiry.

First, the terms of reference of the enquiry, limited to the responsibility of the social services agencies in the Kincora affair, were such that Mr Wallace felt he had little detailed information to offer. I understand that Mr Wallace freely admits that he has no detailed knowledge of the position of the social services over Kincora.

Second, the legal immunity offered to Mr Wallace only extended so far as to cover the matters defined in the terms of reference of the Hughes enquiry. Since the immunity did not cover the role of the security forces, over which Mr Wallace does claim to be in a position to offer detailed evidence, his refusal to testify to the Hughes enquiry can be appreciated.

For both of these reasons, I believe that it is essential for the credibility of the rule of law and of the security forces that proper steps are taken to re-examine Mr Wallace's allegations. Furthermore, I am also surprised that you should attempt to cast doubt on the relevance of the forensic evidence per se. If you believe that the forensic evidence is as irrelevant as your letter suggests, I fail to understand why you raised the issue of the original forensic evidence presented by the RUC to the Hughes enquiry. I would again urge you to re-examine the forensic evidence about the validity of Mr Wallace's memorandum of 8 November 1974.

I am sure that you are aware that I am not alone in my concern over the issue. I firmly believe that the interests of justice and of the security forces will be best served by establishing the truth over the Kincora affair in an open and convincing manner. Unfortunately, the previous
enquiries have not succeeded in allaying public fears because of this limited terms of reference. I would therefore urge you to establish a full judicial enquiry into all aspects of the Kincora affair as soon as possible.

Yours faithfully

K McNamara MP
Shadow Northern Ireland Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL

(Privy Council Office) 30 May 1977

To: Mr. John Groves
From: Mr. J.C. Wallace

Subject: Inquiry into Allegations Made Against Him

(Agreed with Mr. Wallace and incorporating his amendments)

SUMMARY

Mr. Groves advised Mr. Wallace that the Police enquiry has resulted in a decision not to prosecute, the Department has now to consider what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken in respect of the matter with which he had been charged. The fact that the appropriate authorities had decided not to prosecute did not dispose of the question of discipline, nor did it imply that nothing serious was involved. The Department took a serious view of the matter and the way it had been handled. Hence the reference in the charges to "serious misconduct".

2.

Mr. Wallace, having confirmed that he understood these points, was invited to present his answer. He was told that a note would be taken and that where necessary he might be asked to elucidate points or to resolve any apparent inconsistencies.

STELMENT BY MR. WALLACE

Background

3.

Mr. Wallace explained that he had elected to make oral representations because of the complex nature of the background to his actions. He began by referring to the Workers Council notice in May 1974 which had been supported by certain MPs from the Labour Movement and Westminster and had precipitated the collapse of the Workers Executive. He stated that at that time, apart from his normal PC duties which included the production section of the Police, he was also acting as "magnificent working officer" on behalf of the Information Policy Branch. In this latter role he had been directed to launch a series of seminars to coincide with any arrest operation. The Police had not been informed and had subsequently protested about some of the arrests made.

The word "actions" refers to attempts by the Intelligence Services to discredit Mr. Paisley by linking him to William McGrath and his activities (see story by David Blundy in the Sunday Times on 13 March 1977. Although I told John Groves what those activities were, he deliberately did not record the details in this summary and just described them as "actions"!!

Note: The following charge was dropped for obvious reasons!

CHARGE (c) You falsely stated to the investigating Police that you had not so retained and improperly disposed of the aforementioned document.

13.

Mr. Wallace explained that when he was questioned on 5 February there were two Police officers present, one from the Lancashire Constabulary and one from the H.C. He stated that certain allegations had been made relating to the H.C. and had been denied at senior level. He could not therefore discuss them in the presence of a member of the Police. On the departure of the Police he had tried to contact Mr. Wallace to advise and eventually on 7 February he had spoken to Colonel Walton and was told to return to Mr. Wallace, whereby he was unable to fully explain his role. Colonel Walton had advised the matter to be put to Mr. Wallace. Mr. Wallace had then sought and obtained an interview with the Police on 11 February and later the same day had made a full statement to the Lancashire Police. About two weeks later he had also discussed the matter with the H.C. Mr. Wallace explained that in his statement to the police he had not in fact denied leaving the document for Mr. C. He had stated to the Police that the last time he had seen the document it had been in his in-tray. He accepted that this was untrue.
The Institution of Professional Civil Servants

NORTHUMBERLAND STREET · LONDON · WC2N 5BS · Telephone: 01-930 9755

26 September 1975

CC/HJG

J C Wallace Esq
Headquarters
North West District
Gordon Hall
Braunber Bridge
Preston
PR5 6AY

Dear Colin,

You will have been informed that the hearing has been set for Monday 6 October and I hope you will now have confirmed your desire to attend.

I shall not be in the office on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday of next week, but I can be reached at home, for most of that time.

I suggest we meet in my office at 12.30 on 6 October and assure you I shall be well prepared by then.

Please let me know if these arrangements are convenient.

[Signature]

[Handwritten Note]

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
THE ARMY MEDAL OFFICE
Government Office Buildings
DROITWICH, Worcestershire WR9 8AU
Telephone: Droitwich 2322

1971

[Handwritten Note]

Sir, I am directed to forward the General Service Medal 1962 with CLASP "NORTHERN IRELAND" the receipt of which should be acknowledged on the enclosed form.

[Handwritten Note]

For Lieutenant-General
Military Secretary

[Handwritten Note]

[Handwritten Note]

[Handwritten Note]
Dear Cliff,

Thank you very much for your letter of 26 September regarding the Appeal hearing on 6 October.

I am concerned that we have still not received a reply to my letter of 2 July to John Graves requesting access to the various documents listed. You will recall that when I had a brief interview with him on 11 February to seek guidance on what information I could give to the RUC about my work on psychological operations, he said that I should confine my comments to justifiable activities directed at the IRA and not at loyalists. My concern now is that there may be an attempt by the Ministry to deny any form of official 'dirty tricks' organisation existed within the Security Forces. For example, in the Ministry's summary of my oral representations made to John Graves and Mr. Peaderson on 10 May reference is made in paragraph 3 to "actions" which I was asked to launch during the MRC strike. The word "actions" appears to have been used by MRC to conceal the fact that I referred to the attempts made by the Security Service to discredit various Loyalist politicians, including the Rev. Ian Paisley, by the use of forged documents and by linking the MRC with loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast. I can fully understand why the Ministry would not want to put such information on record, but I wonder if evidence of that nature will be made available to the Board sub rosa. For example, will the Board have access to the statement I gave to Inspector Cairns RUC?

The letter which I received from the Civil Service Board dated 10 July says: "Until we have seen the Department's case it is not possible for the Appeal Board to ask the Department to produce evidence that may or may not be relevant to your case". I assume the Appeal Board has now seen the Department's case and should therefore be in a position to ask for the relevant documents.

Other points for consideration:

1. The Security Service officer who typed the anti-dilon draft is She can be contacted on the Lisburn Military number

CONFIDENTIAL
The enclosed document "supporting" the allegations "revolutionary leadership" is another forgery and purports to come from the 'official sources.' I do not think who did the actual forgery, but it was supplied to me with the other material from a different source.

Do you know if the NCID plan to call any other witnesses other than Col Wallis? I think it is very odd that David McEne is not being called. I think it is important that he is called because he told me in November that Brigadier Garrett had tipped him off that I was going to be moved.

Also, he was present at the meeting I had with Eric Garrett in January when I referred to the use of forged documents for political warfare. Moreover, if NCID is going to claim that the account of the handover received from ES NJ is different from mine, I think we should be allowed to challenge the author (s) of such a claim.

3. Bearing in mind the warning I received that my telephone at Lisburn had been bugged by the Security Service (E1/134 5665), could we ask for the transcripts of all calls intercepted during January? Such transcripts would demonstrate that I was acting in the best interests of the Service.

If you feel it would be helpful to you if I came down again to London before 6 October, I am quite happy to do so.

Many thanks once again for all your help.

Yours sincerely,

Colin Wallace

CONFIDENTIAL
INSIDE INTELLIGENCE

ANTHONY CAVENDISH

PALÜ PUBLISHING Ltd.
Typed copy of original handwritten letter to The Prime Minister, The Rt Hon David Cameron

House of Binns
Linlithgow
West Lothian
EH49 7NA

Telephone: 01506 83 4255

29 August 2014

Dear David,

In the 1980's and 1990's, I was immersed in the case of Colin Wallace, a cause célèbre at the time.

After all these years, I can reveal that one of the reasons I was so sure that Wallace had been unjustly treated was that I had talked to my friend, the late Sir Maurice Oldfield, Tony Cavendish, another senior member of the Intelligence Community was equally uncomfortable, as was Field Marshal Sir John Stanier. I knew them well, and wrote both their obituaries for the Independent.

I heard you say on TV "I will get to the bottom of this." Actually, I am very sympathetic to you on these matters, as disentangling events of 30 years ago is exceedingly difficult. I happen to think that Ministers such as Archie Hamilton and Tom King acted in good faith.

I enclose Wallace's dossier. It might be helpful if you asked a civil servant involved in "getting to the bottom" to see Wallace. He is not unreasonable, and not after money - simply an acknowledgement that he acted honourably in the interests of our country. He went to the Press at the behest of General Sir Peter Leng. If Leng and Wallace's allegations had been acted upon, many children would have been spared abuse.

Yours sincerely,

Tam Dalyell

MP West Lothian 1962-2005
Dear David,

In the 1950's and 1960's, I was immersed in a case of Colin Wallace, a cause célèbre at the time.

After all these years, I can reveal that one of the reasons I am so sure that Wallace had been unjustly treated was that I had talked to my friend, the late Sir Maurice Oldfield, Tony Cawdish, another senior member of the Intelligence Community was equally uncomfortable, as was Field Marshal Sir John Stainer. (I knew them both and wrote both their obituaries for the Independent).

I heard you say on TV "I will quit to be bottom of this."

Actually, I'm very sympathetic to you on these matters, as disentangling events 50 years ago is exceedingly difficult.

I imagine that Ministers such as Archie Hamilton and Tom King acted in good faith.

I endorse Wallace's denial. It might be helpful if you asked a civil servant involved in "getting to the bottom" to see Wallace.

He is not unremorseful, and not after money - simply an acknowledgement that he acted honourably in the interests of our country. He went to the Army at the behest of Sir Alan and Sir Peter Legh. If Legh and Wallace's allegations had been acted upon, many children might have been spared abuse.

Yours,
Tom Cawdell
Convicted for the killing of Dr Martin Luther King. According to the newspapers, the lawyer now headed the Committee to Investigate Assassinations. The Committee was a group of private citizens investigating the slayings of President John F. Kennedy and others. Courtbour was reminded of "Dave". He said he had helped to form the Committee. Tony Eaton too had become involved.

One of the points put to Pensterwald by the Star was: "The Committee to Investigate Assassinations has long been suspected by some people of being somehow connected with the CIA and you yourself being labeled possibly a CIA agent or CIA plant. Are you in fact a CIA agent of any sort?" The blunt question had been answered with a flat denial: "No, I'm a full-time lawyer... I have no idea where the rumour started."

If the Committee with the unfortunate initials CIA really was CIA, Courtbour argued, was the American who kept visiting them really working for? But Penrose said it was probably just another coincidence. The lawyer had adamantly denied he had any connection whatsoever with the Intelligence Agency.

Tony Eaton had told the reporters that he was also involved with the Committee to Investigate Assassinations. Again the Englishman seemed to be involved in matters which might possibly involve the Intelligence world.

More disturbing was a news clipping which somehow the reporters had not noticed before. The Daily Telegraph article, dated 19 May 1976, had been written by the newspaper's Washington correspondent Nicholas Comfort. Under the headline "Campaign in US to smear MPs", Comfort had written: "Persistent efforts have been made in recent months to discredit leading members of the three major British political parties by planting derogatory stories about them on news agencies in Washington, it was claimed last night."

"Shortly before Mr Heath lost the Conservative leadership last year someone presented us with an article on Mr Heath which was quite derogatory on the lines of Mr Jeremy Thorpe," said Dr Edward von Rothkirch, senior editor of Trans-World news agency.

"So far this year his agency and others have been offered similar matter about some eleven MPs, a Conservative, two Liberals and eight Labour."
KAREN COOPER

I Challenge Ted Heath

After my trial in Brussels, the police attempted to keep away the mass of reporters, photographers and camera-men outside the court room.

Every effort was made to prevent me from speaking out the truth.
"You damned homosexual:
This is only the beginning!"

It is these words and not any others
that I called out to Ted Heath in Brussels
in the presence of Sir Alec Douglas-
Home, Geoffrey Rippon and others as
they approached the great marble stair-
case in the Egmont Palace for the signing
of the Common Market Treaty on Sat-
urdays, 22nd January 1972.

I had chosen these words carefully and
for a specific purpose. I wanted the world
Press to report them and the British pub-
lic to take it seriously. Heath’s charac-
ter and his suitability as Prime Minister

A Blatant Lie
The harsh words which I called out loud-
ly to Heath had far more frightening ef-
fect upon him than the ink-throw which
followed the words.

I had the opportunity of observing him
‘closely as we were led away afterwards
by mistake to the same corner of the hall by
the Belgian stewards. Heath looked a
frightened man. I had spoken the truth in
his face in the presence of others includ-
ing two of his Cabinet colleagues.

However, when Heath was asked by
members of the Press to confirm the
words which I had shouted at him, he
told them that I had said: ‘This is your
face, pig!’

This was a blatant lie and this means Heath was able to save his politi-
cal career. The reporters failed to record
the truth in their notebooks and they ac-
cepted Heath’s lie instead. Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, Geoffrey Rippon and others present politely agreed that they
too had heard the same words as their
Prime Minister.

The truth was thus successfully smother-
ed by the politicians. On the following
morning, the national newspapers quoted
me as saying: ‘This is your face, pig!’

This lie was translated into many dif-
ferent languages and perpetrated in al-
much every country throughout the
world. As I had been put immediately
under arrest, I was unable to make any
comment or to correct the untrue.

From that moment onwards, the Bri-
tish Press and the other communications
media have followed strict instructions
from the Government not to print any-
thing to engage in any public dis-
cussion about Heath’s personal secret.

No Denial, No Legal Action
I have made every attempt possible to
break through this ban on the subject of
Heath’s homosexuality. I have now pub-
licly accused him on the following occa-
sions:

1 The Brussels ink-throw
22nd January 1972
2 The Trial, Brussels
29th February 1972
3 The Appeal, Brussels
28th March 1972
4 My plane journey with the Press
from Brussels to Copenhagen
25th April 1972
5 My 1st Copenhagen Press Conference
27th April 1972
6 Heath’s Official Visit, Copenhagen
8th June 1972
7 My 2nd Copenhagen Press Conference
10th June 1972
8 My Stockholm Press Conference
10th June 1972
9 My London Press Conference
22nd June 1972
10 Summit Meeting, Paris
18th October 1972

Heath has neither denied my accusa-
tions, nor has he taken any legal action
against me. His only recourse has been to
ban me from Britain in self-defence. He is
hoping that if I am prevented from enter-
ing the United Kingdom, the truth might
never reach the ears and the minds of the
British public.

I have now been kept out of Britain for
2 years and 8 months or possibly 987
days even though I have paid in full my
duty to authority by having served a pris-
on sentence of 94 days in solitary confi-
nement in Brussels.

Also, my colleagues have been con-
tinually subjected to their telephones be-
ing wire-tapped, pestered unnecessarily
by immigration and other authorities and
followed by secret service agents. A great
deal of harm and financial damage has
been done to our work in a direct result of
this kind of interference and harass-
ment by agents.

Arguments in the Home Office
An operation of an unusually con-
spicuous nature was mounted by the Heath
Government through the Immigration
Department against me with identity
photographs and detailed instructions to
officials at various entry points.

Can anyone believe that an operation
of such extraordinary magnitude and
duration is to protect Heath from another
harmless ink-throw or is it more likely
aimed at covering up the truth about him?
As a known pacifist, can I really be so
dangerous to his physical safety?

Even the Labour Government has
been unable to grant me entry into Bri-
tain in recent months in spite of the efforts
made by my colleagues as well as my
local Labour Party branch in Chelsea.

I have been a member of the Labour
Party since 1961. Yet neither Roy Jen-
skins, the Minister in the Home Office
nor his junior colleagues in that Ministry
could override the insistence and the
denials put forward by Conservative
Whitehall officials to keep me out. Such
is the loyalty to Heath of the top civil
servants including their chief, Sir William
Armstrong, before his retirement from
the civil service to join the Board of
Directors of the Midland Bank Limited.

These civil servants are engaged in
politics behind the scenes at this time in
an unprecedented historical struggle
against the Labour Party and the trade
unions. They are determined to keep me
out of the country in order to safeguard
This story is about what must become the greatest property struggle of all time for the redevelopment of a central area in one of the great capitals of the world.

A fruit and vegetable market has been in existence in Covent Garden for over three hundred years, and, at fourteen years since the original decision was taken by Parliament to move the market from central London, on 14th/15th October of this year (1974), the market will move out to a new site.

Yet, after all these years and the very large sums of money spent by the Government and the GLC, there are no plans ready for the redevelopment of the land to be vacated by the market.

There is a good deal of hot air in politics in London but no real drive, no real action. In these circumstances, is it any wonder that the economic situation in Britain is deteriorating rapidly as one month succeeds another?

The working class led by the militant shop stewards on the factory floor rightly believe that they could do a great deal better given the opportunity to take more vigorous action in their work and to devote more for themselves upon the issues that govern their lives.

A Reversal of Roles
The French gross national product is now more than 25 per cent ahead of the British. In 1958 the position was in reverse.

The French have looked to the future and have already built their Centre. The brochure of the Centre International de Paris states clearly: “Experts in the convention business have predicted that there will be something like 20,000 international congresses taking place yearly by 1985, involving some 10 million people. That’s about four times the figure in the early ’70s.”

Thus, while their new Centre is adding to the prosperity of the French economy, the British Government and the GLC are still spending taxpayers’ money without having achieved any kind of results. Is it any wonder that there is a reversal in the position of the two economies?

Take another example. During the last 13 years, Germany has made great strides forward in raising the living standards of its people. The buying power of the average person has raced ahead by 92 per cent while the British worker has seen only a 30 per cent rise.

Public facilities and amenities for the working people in the two countries can
A Possible Crisis

The latest developments in European politics suggest that the situation may escalate into a crisis. The current political instability and the ongoing negotiations between the various political factions could lead to a breakdown in the existing order. It is crucial that the international community takes prompt action to prevent a full-scale conflict.

Preparation for Military Action

Heath's government has taken measures to prepare for military action. The deployment of troops to the border areas and the increase in defense spending indicate the government's readiness to defend the nation's interests. The public has been informed about the measures taken, and the media has been active in reporting on the situation.

The German KSA has responded to this stance by increasing its military presence in the region. The situation is tense, and the possibility of military action is rising. The international community must continue to monitor the situation closely and encourage diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.

Luxury at the Royal Opera House

Derelict housing in Covent Garden

These photographs highlight the economic disparities and social issues affecting the nation. The luxury of the Royal Opera House contrasts sharply with the derelict housing in Covent Garden, reflecting the wealth gap and social inequality.

Health will then be given the chance to take military action. From that moment onwards, Heath will turn all the military forces against the working class and the trade union movement. He will have subjugated a proud people where others have failed. It must not be allowed to happen in Europe.

The German KSA tried to defeat the people of Britain in the First World War. He fell. Hitler tried to do the same in the Second World War. He, too, failed. But it was Heath, the man from within, who very nearly succeeded - but for the workers and the Left-wing trade unionists - in defeating the British nation with his repressive policies and the three-day working week.

It was during that unnecessary period of crisis intentionally instigated by Heath that Britain suffered the greatest defeat of all time in her long economic history. A homosexual Prime Minister was setting out his personal problems in his confrontation with the workers from the bunker of No. 10 Downing Street.

Derelict housing in Covent Garden

These photographs highlight the economic disparities and social issues affecting the nation. The luxury of the Royal Opera House contrasts sharply with the derelict housing in Covent Garden, reflecting the wealth gap and social inequality.

These photographs highlight the economic disparities and social issues affecting the nation. The luxury of the Royal Opera House contrasts sharply with the derelict housing in Covent Garden, reflecting the wealth gap and social inequality.

Health's most secretive man by nature, all that anyone knows, he may be in this moment laying detailed plans to counteract events which has already occurred. His leadership of a military coup would give him every excuse to remain Leader of the Opposition and so he would attain power in his own right and his military operations prove to be successful.

Such a military coup would immediately become justified should a victorious Labour Party be in alliance with the trade unionists introduce radical social policies which the majority of the workers desire but which would permanently deprive the middle and upper classes of their superior, comfortable and oppressive role in the capitalist society of Britain.

The second alternative of Heath resulting in military action would place Heath in a similar position as if Heath were returned legitimately to power again. A Tory victory with Heath as Prime Minister will only succeed in dividing the nation to such an extent that it will bring about a veritable class struggle.

Such is the nature of the man - his stubbournness, his intransigence, his abnormality - that he will precipitate a confrontation between the working class on the one hand and the middle and upper classes on the other hand by of an unparalleled scale in a Western industrial state.

The anarchy, the chaos and the political struggle of Northern Ireland could spread and be unleashed in England, Scotland and Wales. This has already started on a still comparatively small scale.

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Anti-Loyalist squad claim by Paisley

Irish Times Reporter

THE REV. Ian Paisley, the DUP leader, told the latest Loyalist rally in Dungannon, Co. Tyrone, last night that a special Ministry of Defence/Northern Ireland Office "psychological team" has been set up to spread black propaganda about Loyalist Convention members.

Dr. Paisley, who said he hoped to "try bare this scheme" even though it might imperil his life, claimed that no Northern Ireland civil servants were allowed to know anything about the team.

It was led by high-ranking officers from the Foreign Office specially seconded to the NIO, he claimed, and its orders were to break up the UUUC by discrediting its leaders, by character assassination, and every other possible means.

"Money is no object to them," added Dr. Paisley, claiming that the cash had been provided for in the Intelligence Estimates.

The campaign was already under way, with a probe into the past of all UUUC Convention members.

"Charges and innuendoes about the morals, home life, and personal relationships of members will be floated and backed by lavish expenditure." There would be those prepared to make such charges.

When the Army had started its campaign against the IRA, Dr. Paisley said, the Ministry of Defence had set up, in association with the NIO, a special interrogation team to conduct psychological warfare against the IRA. "Now the Ministry of Defence has set up this new team for similar action against Loyalists," he said.
Rees rejects Paisley claim

From Niall Kiely

ALLEGATIONS by the Rev. Ian Paisley that a black propaganda unit had been set up to discredit members of the UUUC were tersely denied yesterday by the Northern Secretary of State, Mr. Rees. Displaying an acerbity rare in Northern Ireland Office statements, he said: "Dr. Paisley needs no help from the Secretary of State or anyone else on this account."

The statement added that the matter could be raised in the House of Commons if the Democratic Unionist Party leader so wished.

Mr. Paisley first publicised his claims on Thursday night at the UUUC rally in Moygashel, Dunagoun, Co. Tyrone, one of a series intended to organise support for the UUUC-sponsored Convention Report. He claimed that the Northern Ireland Office, in alliance with the Ministry of Defence, had established a team "for psychological warfare against the Loyalists" headed by senior officials from the Foreign Office.

The unit's brief, Mr. Paisley added, is to: "break up the UUUC by discrediting its leaders through character assassination and every other means that can be employed." He further alleged that the campaign was already under way, "digging into the past of UUUC Convention members and prominent party workers. Charges and innuendoes about their morals, home life, families, personal relationships; will be floated."

Engaging in a little propaganda work of his own, he also claimed that the Government, as part of its campaign, had paid for a full-page advertisement in last Wednesday's News Letter in which the SDLP attempted to explain its policies to Loyalist readers.

A swift reaction followed yesterday from the SDLP deputy leader, Mr. John Hume. "Mr. Paisley's statement that the Northern Ireland Office paid for the recent SDLP advertisement is a lie. The ad was paid for out of the SDLP overdraft," he said. "I challenge Mr. Paisley to raise the matter in Parliament."

Mr. Paisley, who is also deputy leader of the UUUC, said last night that he would not have made his statement if he had not got evidence to support it. "I do not wish to go any farther because the Official Secrets Act was in operation and he did not want to put anyone in jeopardy."

He felt that the first action would be taken against "second-line leadership" in the Loyalist coalition. This would constitute an attempt to destroy its unity and to bring into Government in Northern Ireland in which the SDLP would be members, which would suit the policy of "the present British Establishment."

Although it was thought that the UUUC had nothing of which to be afraid, Mr. Paisley said that he felt it best "to pull the veil from off this thing and let Mr. Rees know that we know what's going on."

He added that it was very easy to assassinate a man's character and cited the recent case of the British Liberal leader, Mr. Thorpe. He did not rule out the possibility of information being fed to the media despite the libel laws. "There are places where you can make an allegation which is privileged like a court of law," he said.

Sources in the UUUC believe that Mr. Paisley's allegation may be a devious attempt to anticipate a situation of potential embarrassment to his party, rather than simply an exposure of behind-the-scenes activities by the authorities. As a result of his reference to court privilege, it is likely that the media will be keeping a particular watch on the Northern legal scene in the immediate future.
Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee Meetings 1974/75

IPCC Meeting, 22 October 1974

A meeting on 22 October 1974 produced a redrafted version of 'Information Policy: Its Use in Northern Ireland' for submission to the Northern Ireland Secretary. In the new draft, reference to 'at the extreme - front organisations, peace festivals, rumour, etc,' was replaced with 'The creation of independent organisations which will support moderate policies, peace festivals and other uncommitted groupings.'

The new draft envisaged the following membership of the IPCC: Brigadier HEML Garrett, HQNI | D McDine HQNI | Dept CC K Newman, RUC HQ | Mr W McGookin RUC HQ | Mr R J Seaman NIO London | Mr J Allan Laneside | Mr D Gilliland NIO | Mr T M Roberts (Central Sec) | Mr R Ramsay | Mr B M Webster NIO D/D House | Mr W Adler NIO D/D House | Mr D Wyatt Liaison Staff | Mr M Cudlipp (Chairman).

IPCC Meeting, 25 November 1974

This meeting included a lengthy discussion of the paper on 'The Undermining of the IRA's Will to Fight'.

Cudlipp's report on Meeting the Northern Ireland Secretary, 13 December 1974

Michael Cudlipp reported in a draft minute of 13 December 1974 on two meetings with the Northern Ireland Secretary, who was said to have approved the IPCC paper on a coordinated information campaign, and to have agreed with point 3a of an earlier minute by Cudlipp which called for 'an attacking and expanded information policy campaign'.

he agrees with point 3a but emphasises there must be no attempts at "black propaganda" without Ministerial authority. He is extremely concerned at the blowback effect of such methods. He emphasised however that this did not mean he was not greatly in favour of a vigorous and attacking information policy and indeed he is anxious that we should be far more on the attack than on the defence.

IPCC Meeting, 27 January 1975

An IPCC meeting held on 27 January 1975 decided to submit the paper on undermining the IRA's will to fight to the Northern Ireland Secretary, emphasizing that it was a contingency measure in event of the breakdown of the ceasefire. It was also suggested that in this uncertain situation, the committee should focus on IRA propaganda in America.

IPCC Meeting, 3 February 1975
At a meeting on 3 February 1975, it was reported that the paper on 'Undermining the IRA' had gone to the the Permanent Under Secretary of the NIO. The main subject of discussion was a paper on 'Propaganda Overseas' by Mr Roberts, and it was agreed that a meeting would be sought with FCO officials.

Cudlipp-Cooper letter, 24 March 1975

In a letter to Sir Frank Cooper reviewing the activities of the Committee, Michael Cudlipp stated:

The point of the Committee was partly co-ordination of public relations effort and partly cosmetic, particularly in relation to the Army who had rather wild ideas of IP, insufficiently thought through in professional and political term.

He went on to add:

I understand the Army has again begun to get itchy feet about their version of IP and this is reflected in the latest manual you sent me...

Cudlipp suggested a regular meeting between himself P.T.E. England and John Boum 'while the current Army situation lasts'. An annotation of the file by England suggested that he agreed with Cudlipp's assessment.

IPCC Meeting, 2 April 1975, Stormont Castle

present: Mr Cudlipp NIO | Mr Roberts (NIO) | Mr Gilliland (NIO) | Mr Webster (NIO)| Mr Montgomery (Central Secretariat) | Mr Newman (RUC) | Bigadier Campbell HQNI | Mr McDine HQNI | Mr Hill (NIO).[25]

The Committee discussed the problem of information policy during the ceasefire: Brigadier Campbell commented that the reports made every day by COs in Northern Ireland contained useful factual information of which more use could be made. Was it Government policy at present to lie low.

Mr Cudlipp replied that this was the case.[26]

It was also recorded that "Brigadier Campbell thought that some use could be made of material from intelligence sources as dirty propaganda."[27] it was agreed that the NIO would write down their ideas on ceasefire strategy for the next meeting.

Cudlipp meeting with the GOC, 1 April 1975

On 1 April 1975, Cudlipp met with the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland. In a report on the meeting to Sir Frank Cooper, Cudlipp stated:

IP: The GOC admits frankly his concern here arises from the fact that we now have
effective control of his PR Department. All sensitive issues are referred to Stormont Castle.

He went on to report that the GOC believed the approach to propaganda was too cautious:

He believes strongly that we do not retaliate sufficiently against the Provisional's propaganda and suggests more use should be made of Army intelligence reports (community relations reports?) that come into Mr Payne's Department [M15] to provide regular briefing material. Is this a sound idea? Should an intelligence brief be produced for NIO information officers?

**Foreign Office Meeting, 3 April 1975**


Members of the IPCC were among the NIO officials who took part in a meeting at the Foreign Office on 3 April 1975. Among the conclusions reached it was agreed that:

The FCO (Information Research Department) would keep under review the production of unattributable material and briefing on "fund-raising".

**IPCC Meeting, 7 April 1975, Stormont Castle**

Present: Mr M Cudlipp NIO | Mr D Wyatt NIO | Mr J Allan NIO | Mr T Roberts NIO | Mr E Montgomery Central Secretariat | Mr R Ramsay Central Secretariat | Brigadier P Campbell HQNI | Mr D McDine HQNI | Mr K Newman RUC | Mr W McGookin RUC | Mr D Hill NIO

Brigadier Campbell said that the previous minutes were inaccurate and should read:

"Brigadier Campbell thought that account should be taken of information from terrorist sources which indicate what para-military groups intend to do in the propaganda field.

Campbell sought a paper outlining what action would be taken in the event of a return to violence. It was agreed that a subcommittee of Cudlipp, Wyatt, Campbell and McDine would draft a new paper.[35]

**IPPC Subcommitteee meeting, 15 April 1975**

Present Mr Cudlipp NIO | Mr Newman RUC | Brigadier Campbell HQNI | Mr Gilliland NIO | Mr McDine HQNI | Mr Webster NIO | Mr McGookin RUC | Lt Col Ralton | Mr Oyler

Messrs Webster Cudlipp and Gilliland met the Army and Police on 15 April 1975 to discuss a draft information policy paper. It was favourably received with the proviso that the RUC sought to emphasise their sovereignty vis-a-vis the NIO.[37]
Paragraph 4 of the draft paper stated:

There is also the question of an aggressive information policy attacking and denigrating extremist organisations. This can only be effective in the right political climate; a climate which is always difficult to discern (see Para 6 below) and which certainly does not exist now.

Army Comment on Draft Information Policy Paper, 2 May 1975

Brigadier Campbell wrote to Cudlipp on 2 May 1975 with the Army's comments on the draft paper. This included the following paragraph:

b. The Denigration of Extremist Organisations. I am afraid we find your para 4 rather confusing. Until extremist organisations can be divorced from their grassroots support, we will never achieve the sort of political climate you seem to describe. Your suggestion, therefore, takes us round in a circle. Obviously, in the present climate, any aggressive information policy would need to be very carefully handled but I do not see that it needs to be ruled out. There is no reason at all why a skilful policy could not be effective even in the present climate. Obviously a general information attack on extremist organisations would be unlikely to succeed but in those areas where it can be shown that fringe elements (their connection with an established para-military organisation would not be claimed) are acting outside the law and against the interests of the community, it would seem possible to direct some most useful publicity. The Mafia/Chicago style extortion and protection rackets at present being operated in the Shankill and Andersonstown are examples.
COPY

(daytime number: 01-589 1629)

17th July 1987

The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath MBE MP
House of Commons
London SW1A 0AA

Dear Ted [handwritten]

It was very good of you to spend so much of your time seeing me on Wednesday afternoon. Laura Grimons [sic], to whom I gave an account of our conversation, asked me to tell you how sorry she was that she was unable to stay to see you since she had another appointment.

As I told you, I have probably read more about Messrs. Wallace and Holroyd than any other person in this country - about half a million words. Everything which I have read convinces me that serious malpractices were committed by MI5 in Northern Ireland in 1974 and 1975. Every allegation which I have doubted has been independently corroborated by at least one person and, in some cases, by many.

It is unfortunate that Ken Livingstone should have made his maiden speech on this subject. It would seem, from the material which I have seen, that the charge against Captain Nairac is almost certainly true. It was also a pity that Livingstone mentioned Airey Neave since it gave the Prime Minister a chance to say that any demand for an inquiry is tantamount to slandering the memory of a brave and honourable man. I have seen five letters written by Airey Neave to Colin Wallace which makes it clear that Wallace was briefing him about Northern Ireland after he had been dismissed and disgraced by MI5 in 1975 and 1976.

The attempt by Teddy Taylor to buy the silence of Fred Holroyd by secu...[end of word missing] a payment to him of £150,000 through Rank Xerox, the wife of whose cha[...].man, Mrs Annie Orr-Ewing was formerly special assistant to Peter Wright[,] in MI5, is also disturbing, particularly since Holroyd lives in Southend West and is not, therefore, one of Taylor’s constituents.

The most extraordinary episode which I recounted to you was the approa[...] made by the Agent to Anthony Nelson, the MP for Chichester, to Mr. Ja[mes] Morgan Harris to stop him acting as solicitor to Colin Wallace “because Margaret has enough on her plate already”. Not only was this a very clumsy approach, but it can only have originated from 10 Downing Street[,] I was shown by Mr. Morgan Harris an angry letter written to Anthony Nelson to which he received no reply. Mr. Morgan Harris is a Conserv[ative] who lives in Chichester.

You kindly said that you would talk to Merlyn Rees and Roy Jenkins about these matters. Both Laura Grimond and I have come to the conc[clusion] that the Prime Minister has personal reasons for wishing a cover up.

Yrs ever
Humphry [handwritten]

cc The Rt. Hon. Merlyn Rees MP
The Rt. Hon. Roy Jenkins
Killers of kiosk man missed £105,000

Two men were jailed at the Central Criminal Court yesterday for the killing of Mr Abraham Cohen, aged 69, owner of an East End tobacco kiosk known as The Hole in the Wall.

David McLean, aged 25, and a poster, of Denmark Street, Whitechapel, London, left September. The strokes took £150 and £100, 000, Mr Cohen's life savings, and £105,000, Mr Cohen's life savings, which was stolen in the kiosk.

Mr McLean was given a concurrent sentence of six years, and Mr Barbour a concurrent sentence of four years for the robbery. Both men denied all the charges.

Kenneth Richard Britton, aged 33, a painter, of no fixed address, was convicted of robbery of £4 000, a woman stolen from Mr Cohen. He pleaded guilty to the theft of a woman's book, receiving a stolid passport, forging a cheque and obtaining an address in East End.

The men were sentenced to 12 years, concurrently, on each charge.

Britain ends 'black propaganda' campaign by Army in Ulster

From Robert Fisk

In the British government has effectively prevented army officers in Northern Ireland from continuing a "black propaganda" campaign against suspected terrorists and sympathisers by taking over control of the department that runs the propaganda apparatus.

The British government's campaign has included the dissemination of photographs of suspected terrorists and sympathisers by taking over control of the department that runs the propaganda apparatus.

The department has been shut down and the army has taken over control of the department that runs the propaganda apparatus.

Other names include those of a businessman who is a trading competitor of the Finance Minister in the Irish Republic (the army file says that he is "well known in some IRA circles") a man employed by an American newspaper until he became a wealthy Dublin newspaper owner; and a farmer in Co Louth.

The government's decision to coordinate its information policy does not automatically mean that officials will no longer be empowered to leak information, scurrilous or otherwise, about the lives of extremist suspects, but at least a six-page army dossier on American businesses and their contacts, was handed out to certain journalists, has been withdrawn. Some of the information in that document, together with names and addresses and telephone numbers of people apparently arrested in the United States (one passage actually refers to an American suspect's "alleged 40 adultery during a three month period" but a senior official in the State Department last weekend categorically denied any official American involvement in the gathering of the information.

The file on journalists contained names of staff on London and Dublin daily newspapers. They contain information, some of it almost certainly obtained from tapped phone calls, on Mr Kevin Myers, for another correspondent in Belfast, for The Observer, The Times, and The Independent, and a reporter on The Daily Telegraph.

The file on cutlass contains a report submitted last year to the military Special Investigation Branch by a former member of the Special Air Service, the Army's counter-terrorist unit, naming every possible contact and friend one may have made in the previous 12 months. The information, virtually all of which is false or misleading, is given to the suspects, including journalists, of the Army's suspicions of the officer concerned, was presented during a dinner at the neue restaurant and even includes the description of a picture in the court where I live.

The dossier on Irish business contains information on the names of a Dublin public house owner who also owns restaurants in Manhattan, Boston, Chicago and San Francisco; and those of the son of a leading United States paper manufacturer who is alleged to have tried to send rifles by air from America to Shannon airport, and of a wealthy estate agent in Dublin.

Other names include those of a businessman who is a trading competitor of the Finance Minister in the Irish Republic (the army file says that he is "well known in some IRA circles") a man employed by an American newspaper until he became a wealthy Dublin newspaper owner; and a farmer in Co Louth.

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Ex-British Army PRO jailed for manslaughter

(Continued from page 1)

throughout 1974 and 1975 for official misconduct, it was still enough that he had access to the highest levels of intelligence data. He was an experienced member of the British Army and was already on the list of suspects when he was arrested.

Once, for example, he asked me what he knew about the small unit of the British Army that was involved in counter-intelligence. He was able to provide detailed information about the unit's activities and personnel.

Wallace then said that some of the information he was giving was sensitive and should only be shared with other members of the unit. He also mentioned that he had been involved in the planning of some operations.

The next day I telephoned the journalist in the south of England. He asked if he could interview me and I agreed. I told him that I had been involved in the planning of some operations and that I had been involved in some illegal activities.

The journalist asked me if I had ever met any of the British Army officers involved in counter-intelligence and I said yes. He asked me if I had ever heard of any of the British Army officers involved in counter-intelligence and I said yes.

He then asked me if I had ever heard of any of the British Army officers involved in counter-intelligence and I said yes. He asked me if I had ever heard of any of the British Army officers involved in counter-intelligence and I said yes.

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Kincora scandal - files go missing

BRITISH ARMY FILES relating to the Kincora Boys Home homosexual scandal have been removed from Army headquarters in the North - to prevent a top British policeman examining them.

As the Chief Constable of Sussex, Sir George Terry, was arriving in the North last week to conduct his investigation into the Kincora scandal and subsequent cover-up, the top secret files were being removed from British Army command headquarters at Thiepval barracks, Lisburn, Co. Antrim.

British Army files which detail military knowledge about the Kincora sex scandal have gone missing from Northern Ireland Command HQ in Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn, Co. Antrim.

A British police chief, Sir George Terry, Chief Constable of Sussex, was expected to examine them as part of his probe into the RUC cover-up of the scandal, last week.

The files contained thousands of documents on the work of the Army Information Department.

"DON'T FORGET"

SUMMERTIME officially begins at 3.00 a.m. this morning for all of you who keep your clocks forward one hour.

"The English language has had its God-given gift", Mr. John Ruskin wrote. "It may be given to the world that the 80s are a golden age."
Document claims RUC, army knew about Kincora in 1974

THE RUC has reopened its investigation of the Kincora boys' home scandal following the recent appearance of an alleged internal British Army document which claims that the RUC, the military authorities and the Northern Ireland Office were aware of the sexual assaults on Kincora boys six years before the scandal came to light in 1980. ED MOLONEY and ANDY POLLAK report.

THE DOCUMENT referred to, a copy of which is in the possession of The Irish Times, sharply contradicts every British Government assurance that there was no cover-up of the affair nor any knowledge of it in British military circles.

The document is dated November 8th, 1974, and carries the initialled signature of Colin Wallace, a senior British Army information officer at the time. It was apparently written in response to a request from a high-ranking officer for a press inquiry into homosexual offences associated with the Loyalist paramilitary group, Tara, in order to stop "further assaults on youngsters in these hostels".

The leader and founder of Tara, William McGrath, was housefather at Kincora and in December, 1981, after a two-year RUC investigation, he and two other Kincora employees, Raymond Semple and Joseph Mains, were convicted of sexual assaults against Kincora boys dating back 20 years. Their conviction, and subsequent media disclosures, led to two further police inquiries and two British Government inquiries into Kincora.
Wallace, who is now serving a 10-year prison sentence for the manslaughter of an antiques dealer in Arundel, Sussex, in 1980, also distributed two British Army intelligence briefs on McGrath dealing with his homosexuality and links with Tara to Belfast-based journalists in the mid-1970s.

He did this while serving with the British Army's Information Policy Unit, a black propaganda and psychological warfare agency attached to the press desk at Army Headquarters, Lisburn, Co Antrim. The document which has reopened RUC inquiries was allegedly an internal Information Policy Unit document.

A copy of the document was handed over to the RUC by the Desx police in March this year. They had obtained it from a former British military intelligence officer who had served in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. The RUC in turn passed the document on to the inquiry into Kincora headed by Judge William Hughes, which was appointed by the former Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr James Prior, in 1984.

The inquiry has written to Wallace, asking to interview him about the document, but has limited its questions to him — nine in all — to social welfare aspects of Kincora allegedly revealed in the document. Wallace has refused to co-operate with the inquiry, or with the RUC, who have also tried to question him, until he receives assurances that he will not be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act.

Sources close to the new RUC inquiry say they are sceptical about the document's authenticity and say it will be three or four weeks before their inquiry is complete. But former military/ministry of defence sources contacted by The Irish Times, while unable to authenticate this document, say that at least three other documents
containing similar information were in the files of the Information Policy Unit at this time.

These sources, who had knowledge of many top secret intelligence and psychological operations mounted from British Army headquarters, have no current connections with Wallace. They have told The Irish Times that there was an intensive investigation of Tara and McGrath in the early and mid-1970s by military and political intelligence agencies which revealed information about sexual assaults at Kincora.

Another military source, a high-ranking officer based at British Army Headquarters during this period, has also confirmed that the Information Policy Unit was asked by military commanders in 1974 to investigate homosexual offences involving members of Tara. "We were investigating everything at that particular time to see if there were implications for the security side," he said. However, the source, who asked not to be quoted by name, declined to comment further in the light of the new RUC investigation.

The 1974 Information Policy Unit document, four pages long and classified "confidential," refers to and quotes from an RUC background paper on Tara which in turn refers to allegations of assaults on Kincora inmates involving McGrath dating back to 1971. The RUC paper also refers to a claim that key loyalist political figures were "aware" of the Kincora situation.

Other RUC sources have told The Irish Times that an RUC background paper on Tara was indeed prepared by detectives in 1973/74, about a year before the Information Policy Unit document was allegedly written. The sources say that the description of this background paper in the document is generally accurate.
The Irish Times has submitted the Information Policy Unit document for a forensic report together with recent photocopied examples of typewritten material originating from Wallace and with material emanating from British Army headquarters and the Information Policy Unit in 1974 to see if there were any similarities. The test proved "inconclusive" because the documents were photocopies not originals.

The document complains of police inactivity over Kincora and speculates that this might have been due to a policy direction from "a very high political or police level". The document also complains about the unexplained failure of the Northern Ireland Office to take on the task of exposing Kincora.

The document also refers to an RUC report on the murder of Brian McDermott, an 11-year-old boy whose dismembered and partially burned body was discovered in the River Lagan in September, 1973. The document says that the only link between this and Tara was the Loyalist paramilitary leader, John McKeague, a known paedophile, who was shot dead by the INLA in 1982.

The document concludes by making four recommendations, including "one final attempt" to get the RUC to investigate Kincora or discuss it with the British Army's police liaison officer, a senior figure in military intelligence. It also suggests that the army brief a responsible journalist on the matter or get clear authority from London to disclose it to the media.

Following allegations of a cover-up of Kincora in 1982, the British Government ordered the Sussex police to investigate and their report, prepared by the Chief Constable, Sir George Terry, cleared the authorities and said there was no evidence of knowledge on the part of the military authorities. Wallace, who was prosecuted by the Sussex police, is due out of Lewes Prison in two years time and still denies the charge of manslaughter.

(More tomorrow)

The Kincora boys' home in east Belfast
MI5 'plotted' Ulster strike

A former MI5 undercover agent is at the centre of a new security controversy after claiming that the service conducted a secret operation to undermine the Ulster government. Part of MI5's campaign included a plot to help promote the Ulster workers' strike in 1974 which led to the collapse of the Northern Ireland government.

The agent, James Miller, worked for MI5 in Northern Ireland during the 1970s but was forced to flee the province when the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association threatened him with death. Miller, who was on behalf of MI5 infiltrated the UDA and became one of its military commanders for almost five years, says his MI5 case officers instructed him to use his position within the UDA to promote the Ulster workers' strike.

Miller, 53, was recruited by army intelligence and MI5 in 1970. At the time, Miller, an Englishman married to an Irish Protestant, lived in Monaghan, Co Armagh. His job as a lift engineer enabled him to travel freely all over Ulster and to undertake his intelligence duties.

"I did a dangerous job over there for nearly five years and many UDA and IRA men went to prison as a result," Miller said last night. "But I could never understand why my case officers, Col Brian X and George Y, wanted the UDA to start a strike in the first place. But they specifically said I should get UDA men at grass-roots level to start pushing for a strike. So I did."

Yesterday, Home Office officials working with MI5's legal adviser confirmed that Miller had worked for the security forces in Northern Ireland. Later, Admiral William Higginson, secretary to the Defence Committee, reassured The Sunday Times for security reasons not to identify Miller's present whereabouts or his case officers.

Miller says his work for MI5 backs up claims by other former intelligence agents that the security service used them to undermine the Labour government. Last night Miller said he planned to give his evidence to Martin Rees, the former home secretary, and other former Labour cabinet ministers, who are pressing for an inquiry into "unlawful" MI5 activities in the mid-1970s.

Miller told his MI5 case officers told him Harold Wilson was a suspected Soviet agent and steps were being taken to force him out of Downing Street. Miller said that in early 1974 his case officers instructed him to promote the idea within the UDA of mounting a general strike which would paralyse Northern Ireland.

The result, says Miller, was the Ulster workers' strike in May 1974 which severely embarrassed Wilson's government and helped to topple the Sunningdale power sharing executive of Catholics and Protestants, which had included an "Irish dimension" by allowing the Irish government a consultative role in Ulster. The strike was also successful in bringing down the Northern Ireland government of Brian Faulkner and Gerry Fitt. Miller's claims are also supported by Colin Wallace and Fred Haldrey, two former British Army intelligence officers who left the army in 1976 after protesters against them.
M15 'spy' infiltrated Ulster strike

MI5 policy in Northern Ireland is to bring in MI5 officers to report directly to ministers in the British government. A Senior MI5 officer in Belfast has been given a desk in the Northern Ireland office of the defence ministry and will be reporting to Tony Benn and Denis Healey and not to the MI5 minister. This will be the first time this has been done. The MI5 officer will be working on security and intelligence issues, which have been given to David Owen in the past. MI5 claims to have been given a desk in the Northern Ireland Office because MI5 is not keen to have an MI5 officer in the Department of Northern Ireland. MI5 is also keen to have a desk in the Defence Ministry because MI5 is the only security and intelligence agency with MI5 as its only security and intelligence agency.
Rees calls for inquiry into 'dirty tricks' - MI5

Barrie Penrose

29 March 1987

The Sunday Times

Merlyn Rees, the former home secretary, called last night for a royal commission or similar judicial inquiry into allegations that MI5 attempted to destabilise the Wilson government in the mid-1970s.

Last week James Callaghan, the former prime minister, and Rees increased pressure on Mrs Thatcher to investigate alleged 'dirty tricks' operations. Callaghan's surprise intervention followed a Sunday Times report about James Miller, a former MI5 agent who claimed that the security service helped to promote the Ulster workers' strike in 1974 in a plot to discredit and undermine the Wilson government.

Callaghan said the Sunday Times report broke new ground, outside the scope of the limited inquiry into MI5 activities he had instituted in 1977. Rees told The Sunday Times: 'In view of the allegations that are being made there is a need now for an urgent royal commission-style inquiry.'

New claims by Miller this week are likely to add further weight to demands for an inquiry. Miller, an Englishman recruited by the security service in Northern Ireland in 1970, casts doubt on the conclusions of an official inquiry into the sexual abuse of inmates at the Kincora boys' home in Belfast.

The inquiry, chaired by Sir George Terry in 1983, who at the time was chief constable of Sussex, concluded 'there is no evidence that army intelligence had knowledge of homosexual abuse at Kincora'.

Rumours that Kincora was a sex 'honeytrap' used by MI5 to compromise intelligence targets, including Loyalist politicians and paramilitary figures, have appeared since the early 1980s. The stories have always been dismissed by the authorities.

However, Miller claims that the intelligence services had known about the activities at Kincora for a number of years, and believes the boys' home was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information.

Miller has revealed that his first task for the intelligence service was to spy on William McGrath, a former housefather at the Kincora home.

McGrath, who was jailed for his part in the abuse of 13 children in his care between 1973 and 1979, once headed the Tara Loyalist paramilitary organization. Miller says that McGrath's sexual tendencies were common knowledge inside Tara.

Miller said: 'My MI5 case officer later told me to leave McGrath to them and I understand they used the information to recruit him as an informer.' Last night McGrath confirmed that
the knew Miller but would not comment on any other aspect.

Miller's claims are borne out by an official army briefing paper signed by Colin Wallace, a former army intelligence officer who was attached to M15 operations in Ulster during the 1970s. The document is dated November 8, 1974, a period when McGarth was employed as housefather in Kincora.

The paper makes clear that army intelligence had inside knowledge of young boys being sexually exploited at the home seven years before the Kincora scandal broke publicly. Wallace's detailed four-page report was seen by several senior officers at army headquarters.

Headed 'Tara - Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated with the Homosexual Community in Belfast', the report was requested by Lieutenant-Colonel Brain Dixon, then chief of army intelligence who worked closely with M15 at the Royal Ulster Constabulary headquarters at Knock in west Belfast.

According to the document, 'allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959'. It concludes: 'I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC has consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless they had specifically received some from of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level.'

Despite Miller's and Wallace's specific warnings, McGarth was still employed as a housefather at Kincora between 1971 and 1979. And it was not until 1981 that he was jailed for four years on 18 counts of abusing boys.

In Ireland, Wallace has claimed he was eventually instructed to use the Kincora information as part of a black propaganda operation against prominent Loyalist politicians under the codename 'Clockwork Orange 2'. It was his operation, says Wallace, which was widened to include smear tactics against national politicians in all three political parties.

Last night, Rees, who was the Northern Ireland secretary in the mid-1970s, said he had no first-hand knowledge had no first-hand knowledge of Kincora. 'But it does tie in with conversations I heard at the time. This whole affair must be investigated.'

Note: This is incorrect. Miller said he worked for Colonel Dixon. The 1974 memo was not requested by Colonel Dixon, nor sent to him as far as I am aware!
Riddle of the ‘Wilson file’

EVERYONE is getting excited about the secret services burgling politicians ten years ago—but is the burgling still going on today?

Consider, for instance, the strange mystery of the top secret file which vanished from a Tory MP’s office in the House of Commons.

Teddy Taylor is Tory MP for Southend West. He was approached last year by Fred Holroyd, who lives in Southend.

Mr Holroyd, a former army intelligence officer, had teamed up with Colin Wallace, a former “psychological operations” Army officer. They wrote a file on the strange behaviour of the security services in the 1970s. The file included allegations that some MI6 officers were spreading lies about Harold Wilson and other Ministers in the Labour government.

In November 1984, the two men sent the huge file to Mrs Thatcher. Three weeks later, a photocopy of the file was returned to them—w ith pencil marks in the margin.

The two men tried to get their original file back from 10 Downing Street—but without success.

Eventually, Fred Holroyd took the copy to Teddy Taylor to see if he could help.

Teddy Taylor locked it up in his office in the Norman Shaw building of the House of Commons.

Some time in March last year he found to his horror that the file was missing.

“I searched everywhere for it,” he tells me. “I was most embarrassed because this was the first time I’d ever had a file to do with the security services.”

“My research assistant searched for it, so did my secretary and my wife. We couldn’t find it, so I called in the police and told them it might have been stolen.”

“A fortnight later, the file turned up in my office. In Nelson Street.”

Colin Wallace

“It was stolen.”

Teddy Taylor

“I searched everywhere, but as far as I know it was never found. I say, is also possible, will never know.”

Colin Wallace tells me: “I think it’s pretty clear the file was stolen. The file was most embarrassing to MI6. It had their pencil marks on it.”

“I wrote to the Commissioner of Police on February 8, but have as yet had no reply.”

Scotland Yard confirmed that Mr Taylor reported his file lost on April 19 last year.

They will be replying to Mr Wallace and apologising for the delay.”
Irish firm in bid to publish Wright book

AN IRISH publishing company intends to embarrass Mrs. Thatcher and go ahead with the publication of the controversial memoirs of former MI6 officer Peter Wright.

Brandon Books, which is based in Co Kerry, said last week that it planned to publish the 657-page manuscript which the British government is trying to block through the Australian courts.

Early this year, Brandon successfully joined Whitley's efforts in the Dublin courts to stop One Giant Leap, the memoirs of Joan Miller, another former MI6 officer. While Whitley's book is now freely available in Irish bookshops, it is banned in mainland Britain and Northern Ireland. Thatcher will also decide this week whether to take the fight to stop Spycatcher to the United States.

The prime minister is heading a small group of senior ministers and is the one who will decide, rather than Sir Michael Havers, the attorney-general, what action to take after an American publishing house announced on Thursday that it has scheduled the former MI6 officer's memoirs for publication in New York next month.

On Friday, John Bailey, the treasury solicitor, in co-operation with MI6's legal advisors, invited New York lawyers to assess the American government's chances of stopping Viking Penguin Books, a subsidiary of the British Pearson conglomerate, publishing Wright's book.

If the American lawyers recommend fighting the case, Thatcher will instruct government law officers to seek an immediate ban in the New York courts. Wright alleges that MI6 officers attempted to topple Harold Wilson's government in the mid-1970s.

In a separate development, Clive Ponting, the former Ministry of Defence official, has said he took part in meetings with MI6 officials in mid-1983 called to discuss how to prevent two former army intelligence officers making public allegations of a "shoot to kill" policy in Northern Ireland and a "dirty tricks" campaign against MI6.

Major Fred Holroyd and Captain Colin Wallace left the army in 1976 after protesting at MI6 policies in Ireland which they believed were unlawful.

Ponting said that he had gone to the Northern Ireland Office's permanent secretary, Stephens, and said he did not dispute such meetings taking place.

Ponting's letters, saying the ministry meetings were chaired by Tony Stephens, who is now deputy to the Northern Ireland Office's permanent secretary, Stephens, were published yesterday.

Ponting said: "Our concern about Holroyd centered on the various allegations about illegal activities by the security forces in Northern Ireland."

He said his colleagues discussed the ministry's Holroyd files which, he said, contained claims that Robert Nairac, an SAS-trained officer who was assassinated by the IRA in 1972, had killed a suspected terrorist in cold blood.

Holroyd said that in 1975 Nairac gave him a photograph of John Fraser Green, taken minutes after Green was assassinated, apparently confirmed by the fact that blood on Green's body had not yet coagulated.

"They were absolutely AI sensitive about Nairac," said Ponting. "They were all paranoid of one of the victims. The two MI6 officers said: 'Of course a lot of what Fred Holroyd said is true. Certainly these illegal actions did take place.'"

Holroyd, who last week gave evidence in Dublin to the Irish government's formal inquiry into alleged British intelligence "dirty tricks", said that Nairac had told him he would leave his cartridge on a dead terrorist as part of his personal hallmark.

"The Panther which Holroyd kept, and which in 1982 was handed to the RUC with a demand to investigate such cases, shows cartridges in the same manner." "That was also concerned about the case of Colin Wallace," Ponting added. "They were genuinely surprised when the book appeared in New York last month.

In Australia, the British government has already appealed against a court decision to allow publication of Spycatcher. Last night, one Whitley official said that the book dies appear in the United States it does not mean the end of the Australian case.

The official added that the government only learnt on Thursday that the book was scheduled to appear in New York next month.

Yesterday, senior Whitehall sources admitted they were by no means confident they would win a case in New York. According to Martin Carbon, Viking's lawyer, the British government has only chance of stopping the book now would be to seek "preliminary restraint" for "reasons of US national security."

That is because Wright reveals in his book his close relationship with James Angleton, the former CIA deputy director who died last week.

The government had hoped Lord Blakenham, chairman of the British company which owns Viking Penguin, would agree to delay the decision to publish until the outcome of the appeal in the Australian courts.

Yesterday, Lord Blakenham was not available to comment although a company spokesman in New York said the book could be in the bookshops before the British general election.
Private Eye 10 June 1988

SOMEONE should introduce Mr Tom King, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, to Mr Roger Birch, Chief Constable of Sussex, and set them talking on a matter of joint interest: the Kincaid Boys Home scandal in Northern Ireland (Eyes pasten).

Ken Livingstone, Labour MP for Brent East, has been lying since the beginning of the year to find out from the Sussex police whether they had carried out any inquiries into allegations made by Mr Robin Bryans (otherwise known as Harbenson) over homosexual prostitution in Northern Ireland by very important people in the 1970s. Bryans/Harbenson says he first contacted the Sussex police in the early 1970s with a long string of allegations about his former boyfriend Anthony Blunt. The allegations suggested blackmail, extortion and male prostitution in Northern Ireland.

Mr Livingstone was interested because in 1982 the Chief Constable of the Sussex police, Sir George Terry, was put in charge of the Independent Inquiry into the Kincaid Boys home scandal (his full report has not been published).

Did the Government hint to the Sussex police because of their previous involvement in the Bryans/Blunt allegations?

Mr Livingstone first wrote to Mr Birch in January with a polite inquiry. He got a frosty reply telling him, in effect, to mind his own business. He wrote again in February enclosing documents from Mr Bryans which plainly proved his involvement in the 1970s with the Sussex police.

On 11 March, Mr Birch replied, agreeing that the documents did prove the involvement of the Sussex police. He explained that in 1974 and 1978 complaints had been made about "scurrilous and defamatory" letters written to important people by Mr Bryans, and that the Sussex police had made inquiries which resulted in 1974 in Mr Bryans being bound over to keep the peace. In 1978, no action had been taken after the Sussex police made their report. Since the "scurrilous and defamatory" letters all concerned Blunt (who had not then been exposed as a spy and was better known as the keeper of the Royal Pictures), it is a fair guess that at least some inquiry might have been made by the Sussex police into the substance of the Bryans allegations.

In fact, as Mr Birch's letter makes clear, the Sussex police under George Terry were involved (at whatever distance) in allegations about homosexual behaviour in Northern Ireland on at least two occasions before the Kincaid Inquiry under Sir George Terry was set up.

What has all this to do with Mr Tom King, OBE, that this question and answer is reported in Private Eye for 16 May?

Mr Ken Livingstone: "What information was available to the department concerning allegations made by the late Robin Bryans (Harbenson) of homosexual activities in the Kincaid Boys Home in Northern Ireland?"
Typed transcript of a story in Private Eye magazine dated 10 June 1988

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What has all of this got to do with Mr Tom King? Only that this question and answer is reported in Hansard.

Mr Ken Livingstone: "What information was available to his department concerning investigations undertaken by the Sussex police relating to allegations of homosexuality prior Sir
George Terry's appointment to investigate the events at Kincora Boys Home?"

**Mr Tom King:** "I am not aware of any such investigations."

**Note:** It is important to note that Bryans has stated publicly that he reported the abuses at Kincora to two Government Ministers in 1973, and to the wife of a former Prime Minister, Anthony Eden (lord Avon) at around the same time.
Kincora scandal cover-up alleged

by Barrie Penrose

THREE former Ministry of Defence officials have provided new evidence of a British intelligence cover-up of a homosexual scandal used to entrap Loyalist politicians in Ulster.

The men support one of the key allegations made by Colin Wallace, the former MoD information officer who claims he is the victim of "dirty tricks" by MI5 because he tried to expose the use of "black propaganda" against British politicians.

They said that classified MoD files about homosexual abuses at the Kincora boys' home in Belfast were withheld from government and police inquiries into the scandal.

The two inquiries, by Sir George Terry, former chief constable of Sussex, and Judge William Hughes, examined allegations that the intelligence services used their knowledge of criminal activities at the boys' home to blackmail and control prominent Loyalists.

Tom King, the defence secretary, told the Commons 11 days ago that no information had been found to substantiate Wallace's allegations of a cover-up relating to Kincora.

King also said there was nothing to call into question "the thoroughness of the major inquiries already made into that affair, including those of Sir George Terry and Judge Hughes."

Yesterday, Michael Taylor, the former British army information officer who insists he has seen evidence of a plot in the 1970s to discredit Ulster political leaders like Ian Paisley, said: "MI5 wanted to break the power base which the Loyalist paramilitaries and Paisley had got after the Ulster workers' strike in 1974."

In 1983, Sir George Terry concluded there was no evidence of homosexual mispractice or involvement by British intelligence officials in the Kincora scandal.

Yesterday Terry said: "I'm sure that in the light of all that is now being said, any inquiry that can look at everything would be a very wise step."

William Hughes, a retired English judge who also headed an official inquiry into Kincora, said that a government file which Downing Street authorised in 1985 to be passed to Hughes, failed to reach the judge and his committee.

"Although they were sent by Number 10, they were not taken by me," said Hughes.

Taylor's backing of Wallace's claims is confirmed by James Miller, a former MI5 agent in Northern Ireland in the 1970s.

He also says Kincora was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information.

"The last task for the intelligence services was to spy on McGrath," said Miller.

Four other senior army officers also added their initials to the papers. Wallace says that while senior army officers wanted the Kincora scandal to be stopped, MI5 wanted the intelligence gathering operation to continue.

"The army were telling me to release details about Kincora to the press and MI5 were telling me to use Kincora to discredit Ulster political leaders like Ian Paisley," he said.

"MI5 wanted to break the power base which the Loyalist paramilitaries and Paisley had got after the Ulster workers' strike in 1974."

"They detailed homosexual abuses organised by William McGrath, a Protestant paramilitary who was then house father at Kincora."

McGrath ran a paramilitary group called Tara and was blackmailed into reporting to British intelligence. He and other paramilitary figures named in the files in 1973 were not prosecuted for sex offences until eight years later, when he was jailed for his role in the abuse of 13 children in his care between 1973-9.

"The information was detailed enough in 1973 to name the boys and name the people who were committing the offences," said Taylor.

"Taylor said that in 1973-4 four senior army officers urged that action be taken over Kincora."

"I saw a memo attached to the file where General Sir Peter Leng, commander land forces, suggested action be taken by the police based on our information," he said.

"I was pleased because having read the background made me feel bloody sick to be perfectly honest," he said.

Taylor added that the need for police involvement was even greater after Brian McDermott, 10, was found murdered in 1973.

Army intelligence established a tenuous link between the boy and John McKeague, another homosexual and paramilitary leader who abused Kincora inmates while supplying British intelligence with information.

A former army officer, who was McKeague's intelligence "handler", says he saw the Kincora files but was "warned off" from involving the police or social services.

Taylor claims MI5 officers ensured the police and social services department took no action because they were using Kincora for intelligence gathering.

Taylor, who worked alongside Colin Wallace, says he also remembers seeing detailed documents that Wallace wrote urging RUC action over Kincora.

"Taylor's backing of Wallace's claims is confirmed by James Miller, a former MI5 agent in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. He also says Kincora was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information," said Miller.
Wallace claims

by Barrie Penrose

A FORMER army general has challenged government statements about "Clockwork Orange", the clandestine operation which allegedly targeted prominent British politicians.

General Sir Peter Leng, who was commander of forces in Northern Ireland from 1973 to 1978, told yesterday that, contrary to government claims, the operation was never authorized to proceed, and it had official sanction to run.

This month Tom King, the defence secretary, told MPs that documents relating to the project "make it absolutely clear that the project was not actually cleared". Leng, who retired in 1983, said the project was sanctioned by the Northern Ireland Office, which asked him to release army intelligence material with the aim of discrediting IRA and Loyalist activists.

The operation was masterminded by Denis Payne, a senior civil servant at the Northern Ireland Office and an MI5 officer, and carried out by the army's information policy unit at Lisburn barracks.

"Orders were done verbally, and minutes would be kept and then destroyed after a certain time," Leng said. He said other senior officers were also aware of Clockwork Orange, including Brigadier (now General) Len Gurnett, who was chief of staff.

The army's involvement was authorized, Leng said, by General Sir Frank King, his personal officer and then GOC for the province. King said yesterday he had no quibble with Leng's account.

Leng also contradicted government statements about G.H.Q., the Belfast boys' home allegedly used by the intelligence services to black.

Wallace

mail and control prominent Loyalists

On February 1, King told the Commons that there was no new evidence to disprove the findings of two inquiries that army intelligence services and MI5 were aware of homosexual abuses at the home before 1980. However, Leng said he ordered his intelligence staff to alert the police as early as 1974, after they showed him a dossier naming the men and boys involved.

The Commons row over Clockwork Orange began after disclosures by Colin Wallace, an army information officer who was forced to resign from the Ministry of Defence in 1975. His existence was kept under wraps by the MoD.
Further evidence casting doubt on government claims that British intelligence officials never carried out a systematic disinformation campaign in the 1970s, code-named Clockwork Orange, emerged yesterday.

General Sir Peter Leng, who was commander land forces in Northern Ireland from 1973 to 1975, said yesterday that the Northern Ireland Office introduced Clockwork Orange as part of official policy in early 1974. "I knew it as an operation about terrorists and intelligence gathering," says Leng. Because such work took so much time it lasted for up to a year, he added.

This latest development is likely to cause embarrassment to the government. On January 30, Archie Hamilton, the minister for the armed forces, told the Commons that only two MoD documents mentioning Clockwork Orange had been found and they stated "that the project was not cleared". Two days later Tom King, the defence secretary, told MPs that "the documents make it absolutely clear that the project was not actually cleared".

Leng says Clockwork Orange was launched after discussions at Stormont by Dennis Payne, a senior MI5 official, and army intelligence officers on his staff. "Orders were done verbally and minutes would be kept and then destroyed after a certain time," he says. "In such a sensitive matter the less that was committed to paper the better."

Colonel M

Asked how many people would have been involved in Clockwork Orange Leng said: "The senior intelligence officer (Brigadier, now General) Len Garrett would have been more involved as the chief of staff."

Leng stressed that he, fellow senior army officers, had no knowledge that British politicians were to be investigated or smeared in a "black propaganda" campaign. "My job was running the land army day-to-day, not intelligence."

Colin Wallace, he added, whose allegations about a dirty tricks campaign against politicians are at the centre of a House of Commons row, was also involved in the operation.

Because Clockwork Orange "was policy" Leng said it had to be authorised by General Sir Frank King, then army GOC in Northern Ireland. Last night Sir Frank said he "took for granted" what Leng says but cannot specifically remember Clockwork Orange.

Leng, who retired in 1983, says he authorised intelligence material to be released to the Clockwork Orange project which was being handled at Lisburn barracks by the army's information policy unit of which Wallace was a member. "I said go ahead," he said, stressing that if he had known the project was investigating politicians he would have protested.

Leng also contradicts what the government has said about Kincora, the Belfast boys' home which is alleged to have been used by the intelligence services to blackmail and control prominent Loyalists in Ulster.

On February 1, Tom King told the Commons that there was nothing (in Wallace's allegations of a cover-up relating to Kincora) to call into question the two government inquiries which found no evidence that the intelligence services used their knowledge of homosexual abuses to compromise prominent Loyalists.

Leng says he urged police action as early as 1974. He recalls writing a memo saying "this is police business, not ours". However, although serious criminal offences were taking place at the boys' home nothing was done until eight years later when prominent Loyalist para-military figures were jailed for

Len's recollection is confirmed by Michael Taylor, the former British army
information officer, who told The Sunday Times last week that Kincora files at
Lisburn "was detailed enough (in 1973-4) to name the boys and name the people
who were committing the offences."

Taylor, whose duties included safeguarding the Clockwork Orange files, claims
the files contained evidence of a plot to smear leading British politicians
using classified material.

Last night in a separate development Peter Broderick, who took over as head of
Northern Ireland army information in 1973, said he stumbled across one of the
first Clockwork Orange operations. A fake letter, purporting to be from an
anonymous IRA leader who wanted to "defect" to mainland Britain and sell his
story, was sent to Gerald Bartlett at the Daily Telegraph in early 1974.

"The letter said we should place a small add in the paper's personal column,
confirming our interest in the story," says Bartlett, who arranged for the ad
to appear. The reporter mentioned the "IRA" story to Broderick.

"I blew my top," says Broderick, when he discovered it was part of a dirty
tricks operation." Broderick says he was not told the truth about Clockwork
Orange or that Wallace and others on his staff had duties they were instructed
by M15 officers to keep secret from him.

"This was independent policy by a department," says Broderick. "Non-
ministerial policy. I wld have screamed from the rooftops if I had known what
was going on." Broderick says he believes M15 officers supplied forged
documents and other dirty tricks material to the secret unit inside his
department.

Broderick was unaware the letter sent to the Telegraph was part of an anti-IRA
operation which was also designed to blame Harold Wilson, the Labour prime
minister, for a bombing in Belfast.

According to former MoD officials, including Michael Taylor, the IRA man's
1000-page typewritten "story" was typed by an M15 officer at Lisburn. In it
Wilson was reported as having told Irish tv the Provisionals were "a well
disciplined tightly knit force". As a result of the "interview" the "IRA
leader" said: "this was just the boost that our morale needed"... We called
off our truce" and bombed the Abercorn bar in Belfast "killing eight people
and injuring approximately 150 others".

The "story" was also offered to Sunday People reporter Len Adams. "I was
taken to Lisburn by an NCO named Bill Bain who introduced me to senior top
brass officers," says Adams. "I was then handed a file marked 'Secret' and
allowed to skim through a few pages. Then it was taken back and said 'Look
that's just a taster, we've got to get clearance. When the time comes you've
got the greatest story in Fleet Street'."

Lisburn's black propaganda unit realised the story could not be released in
case Broderick spotted it. When Adams called the unit to ask Bain if the story
could be released an officer told him he had died. "They said it was a car
crash," said Adams. On Friday The Sunday Times established that Bain was still
in the army and about to be promoted.

(END)
PM's aides pondered stance on Wallace

Richard Norton-Taylor

Mrs Thatcher's closest advisers, including senior intelligence officials, were privately debating how much to disclose about the Colin Wallace case months before the Government finally acknowledged a dirty tricks campaign in Northern Ireland.

The discussions included Sir Robin Butler, the Cabinet Secretary, his deputy, Mr Len Appleyard, Sir Michael Quinlan, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, and Sir Christopher Curwen, the Government's Co-ordinator of Intelligence and Security.

Sir Michael believed it was time to come clean. The admission of the campaign - in a carefully-worded written parliamentary answer by the armed forces minister, Mr Archie Hamilton - was a victory for those who wanted to restrict disclosures.

The statement omitted details about the covert links Mr Wallace, a former army press officer, had with MI5, and the extent of the security services' knowledge of homosexual abuse at the Kincora boys' home in Belfast.

The discussions among senior Whitehall officials raise the question of what information was withheld from ministers.

Tory and Labour members of the Commons Defence Committee will today argue that their investigation into the Wallace case should be as wide as possible.

Mr Michael Mates, the committee's Conservative chairman, wants the inquiry limited to the admissions of 'maladministration' in the Ministry of Defence. But Mr John McFall, a Labour member, said yesterday: 'Our inquiry should not rule anything out.'

Regular meetings were held in the Cabinet Office between September last year and January this year, when Mr Hamilton acknowledged there was a limited black propaganda campaign and apologised for giving inaccurate information to MPs.

Labour MPs, notably Mr Ken Livingstone, Mr Tam Dalyell and Mr Kevin McNamara, the shadow Northern Ireland Secretary, ensured that the issue would not go away. Sir Michael Quinlan is understood to have wanted more than the limited and private inquiry the Government has agreed to set up, under David Calcutt, QC, to look into the circumstances surrounding Mr Wallace's dismissal in 1975.

He pressed unsuccessfully for a new investigation into allegations of homosexual abuse at Kincora. Mr Michael Taylor, a former army security officer in Northern Ireland, disclosed at the weekend that the army wanted an investigation as far back as 1973, but it was blocked by MI5 officers.

It is understood that intelligence officials, including Sir Christopher Curwen, did not want Mr Wallace's connections with the security services to be revealed.

Sir Robin Butler was reluctant for these connections to come out but wanted a common, agreed, position among officials before discussing the whole matter with ministers.

The original, 200-page file sent by Mr Wallace to 10 Downing Street in 1984, disappeared. Mr Hamilton told Mr Michael Marshall, Tory MP for Arundel and Mr Wallace's MP, that it has not been traced despite a number of searches.
THESE ARE THE VICTIMS OF 'BLACK PROPAGANDA' IN ULSTER, BUT THEN THE SMEARER WAS SMEARED...

On the list of victims in Ulster are David Owen, Jeremy Thorpe, Edward Heath, Ted Heath, Denis Healey, Sir Denis Green, Mervyn Rose and Harold Wilson. "Our names have been betrayed," says Mervyn Rose.

‘He’s a UVF terrorist, you know’

“He’s a UVF terrorist, you know” is a quote from a newspaper article. The article is discussing allegations of black propaganda and smear campaigns in Ulster. The article mentions several prominent figures who have been targeted, including David Owen, Jeremy Thorpe, Edward Heath, Ted Heath, Denis Healey, Sir Denis Green, Mervyn Rose, and Harold Wilson. The quote is attributed to Mervyn Rose, who says, "Our names have been betrayed."
Paul Foot reporting

King of the cover-up

The Minister joins closed ranks over scandal at boys home

Listen to Defence Secretary Tom King telling the House of Commons about his Department's "re-examination" of the Colin Wallace affair...

"No information has been found to substantiate Mr Wallace's allegations of cover-up relating to the Rhondda boys home in the late 1970s." He said in question time. His remarks were made into that affair, including those of Sir George "Terry and Judge Holyoke." No details were given of this Department's inquiry into Wallace's allegations.

The minister had met several times with colleagues and the Department. He had received a copy of Wallace's book and had discussed it with his colleagues. He had also had discussions with the Government's legal advisers. The minister had been aware of Wallace's allegations for some time and had been considering them.

Sky falls in on Maggie 'air force'

Down the steps comes Margaret Thatcher, jubilant about her 1983 election success and the absence of clouds in the sky. The British prime minister took her time in descending the steps, but everyone was watching her every move. The people who bought Daily Express with their money along with all the other readers. There are some reports suggesting British Telecom and its monopoly on phone services are being considered.

British Airways

Down the steps comes Margaret Thatcher, jubilant about her 1983 election success and the absence of clouds in the sky. The British prime minister took her time in descending the steps, but everyone was watching her every move. The people who bought Daily Express with their money along with all the other readers. There are some reports suggesting British Telecom and its monopoly on phone services are being considered.

MIKE GATTING has come under fire from the National Farmers Union for his report on the country and has been accused of 

Dr Al Socks, managing director, is quoted in the Guardian, April 2, 1983.

"The air force has been described as the best in the world and is certainly the most cost-effective. We plan to expand it in the future," Mr Socks tells a reporter. The Guardian, April 2, 1983.

Presence of 'allies' is a sign of strength, says Defence Secretary: The army is being modernised and is still a flexible force, Mr Socks tells the House of Commons. He says the government is committed to spending on defence. The Guardian, April 2, 1983.

A classic success story of Thatcher's Britain, is to be all there - an ambitious business plan, leading to an ambitious idea, to a successful outcome. The prime minister is known for her confidence and ability to face up to criticism and adversity. She has been described as a "real" leader, The Guardian, April 2, 1983.

SADLY, Maggie Thatcher's dream of a new Britain is ending. The Prime Minister's government is facing growing criticism over its handling of the economy and its approach to the EU. The Guardian, April 2, 1983.

IF YOU have something you think I ought to investigate, write to me at the Mirror or phone 01-822-2385.
KING is pressed to name civil servants in Wallace affair

By Anthony Bevins
Political Editor

pointed Director of Security (Army) at the Whitelaw Ministry. Now 66, he retired from that post last June.

Mr Wallace said yesterday that General Garrett was dealing with elements of his case for the Ministry during the early 1990s, in correspondence which was sent to Margaret Thatcher.

Those letters dealt with Mr Wallace’s allegations that officials had acted on complaints about abuse of boys at the Kinross boys’ home, in east Belfast, and that homosexual activities there could be used for blackmail purposes.

But it was not until 1984 that Mr Wallace’s allegations about a black propaganda exercise, called Clockwork Orange, began to break in the national media.

Yet again, there was one senior civil servant who, it is alleged, would have needed to know all about the Wallace-Clockwork Orange connection. If he did know, he apparently did not warn the Prime Minister that ministers were misinforming Parliament. He was legal officer to the Security Service, MI5.

When Mr Wallace was initially suspended without pay in July 1975, he mistakenly received a letter from a Whitlehall circulatiom list on it.

Apart from Sir Michael Cary, the Permanent Secretary at the MoD, it Included General Sir Peter Hunt, the Chief of General Staff, Ronald Kent, deputy Under-Secretary (Army); Major-General John Woods, director of security (Army); John Groves, Chief of Public Relations, MoD; John Waterfield, an Under-Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office; and “B” Sheldon.

Bernard Sheldon, 65, who came to public notice at MI5’s legal adviser during the Spockhouse affair, retired in 1987.

As for others on the circulation list: Mr Kent, now 76, retired in 1973; Mr Waterfield, now 68, retired in 1990; Mr Groves, now 67, retired in 1982; General Sir Peter Hunt and General Woodrow died in 1980.

Sir Michael Cary died in 1976 and was replaced by Sir Frank Cooper, who had been then been Permanent Under-Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office. Sir Frank, now 67, retired in 1981.

Other senior figures included: Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, now second Permanent Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office, who was Permanent Secretary in charge of the Belfast Central Secretariat in 1974-75; Denis Payne, who was listed as an Under-Secretary, Liaison Staff, in Belfast, and Counsel Jeremy Railton, who succeeded the Wal- lace’s superior as Head of Information Policy.

This week’s Ministry of Defence report said that the junior officials who had dealt with the Wallace files in recent years had not known of other, security-related files which had been kept in folders belonging to the office of the Permanent Secretary and the Under-Secretary (Civilian Management) DUS (CM). The DUS (CM) who initially dealt with Mr Wallace’s case in 1975 was William Geraghty, but he was promoted to Second Permanent Secretary (Administrative) and knighted, later that year, when Sir John Wilson retired from that defence post to become deputy chairman of the Civil Service Appeal Board.


Ministers’ denials of the Wallace allegations were eroded by the Commons admission, on 20 January, of two points: that there had been a Clockwork Orange project, although it had not been approved; and that Mr Wallace’s job included “providing unattributable covert briefings to the Press... which may have included disinformation”, and which re- quired him “to make on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security”.

David Calcutt QC, is now inquiring into whether the Ministry’s “personalization” of the Civil Service Appeal Board may have resulted in any injunctions to Mr Wallace, and if so whether compensation should be paid”. But Mr Calcutt is not empowered to compel witnesses to testify.

Vincent Van Gogh's Melba Anthony Fortune Of De Oocher at Newark, is an auction record for a painting at £81,550 ($106,500) in a falling market at Christie's in New York.

The event, on Tuesday night, was exceptional on several levels. Christie's was allowing paintings to sell below the market levels of last autumn and Japanese buyers were back in strength, snapping up prettily by Claude Monet, Modigliani and Manet.

Auctions are normally speculative affairs. Bidders hardly allow their heads to turn when prices soar. But they lost all restraint as the bidding climbed on the Van Gogh, one of the great paintings of all time. The bidding started at $3,000 ($12,000) on, there were only two bidders in the running. Hiberto
S

cien

Senior officials had 'full knowledge' of Colin Wallace case

By Anthony Bevis, Political Editor

The case is currently being investigated by David Caleott QC.

In a further written reply last night, Mr King said he had placed the Commons a letter which had revealed an inaccurate statement made by the "full knowledge" of senior officials.

The official who had dealt with the disciplinary action over recent years had an "incomprehensible" history, said, because the papers had been split up over the "special security" of the case, whether any of them were still in government service, and whether any of them had been questioned.

Mr Dalyell, while it was clear that the case had been handled in a transparent manner, said: "I am livid at

Oxford learns the value of robust Sunspoke

By Mary Brald, Education Reporter

Worcester College, but a boot of fish removed from star billing, leaving two unranked officials from the New College, Andrew Knight and Richard Searby, to field some tricky questions.

Mr Murdoch, who had been one of the key figures in the Sun's management, was passing over to a new role — in the publisher of The Sun, as the editor of the English language edition, the press call at which Murdoch's letter to London became a rather uncomfortable affair.

Mr Murdoch is a 1950s graduate of

the way that Parliament has been handled. Either the Ministry of Defence could not be bothered to off its proverbial backside when asked a host of questions over three-year period, or worse, a suspect, there was something of this sort of thing going on.

The ministry report, into H Papers Were Overlooked in Case of Mr Colin Wallace, said it was not possible to determine what had happened to the file on the 1979 discovery of a file on an article to which Bowes had been attached.

The report said that there was "a matter of perception" of the Ministry of Defence's personal file had been received by the earlier discovery of the main papers that had now been found.

The Ministry of Defence report, published last night, said that officials responsible for drafting the report had not yet been named in a statement which had been made in an "incomprehensible" manner.

The Ministry of Defence report, published last night, said that officials responsible for drafting the report had not yet been named in a statement which had been made in an "incomprehensible" manner.
From: Major-General H.E.M.L. Garrett CBE

Director of Security (Army)
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Metropole Building, Northumberland Avenue, London WC2N 5BL
Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-318 2637
(Switchboard) 01-318 9000
Pt II Sy 1a(A)

Mr. J.C. Wallace

1 June 1983.

Dear Mr. Wallace,

Thank you for your letter dated 29 April 1983.

You mention the possibility that you may be provided with legal advice and assistance, and you draw my attention to the security implications of this. I am grateful to you for bringing this to my attention, and note what you say.

I must re-affirm the advice I have already given you: that you may communicate classified appropriate information to the two nominated RUC officers; but not to any third party.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
2. Dealing with point (d), I fear the committee’s views of reference may differ from mine. It is the view of the committee that it is not within their remit to make recommendations on the protection of volunteers, and I doubt whether they would wish to second guess the decisions of the Department of Health and Social Services. If the committee are convinced of the wisdom of the present arrangement, they may consider it is better to allow the present position to continue. If, however, they wish to make recommendations on the protection of volunteers, I believe they should do so in the course of their present annual reports on the arrangements for the protection of volunteers. The committee’s views of reference may differ from mine, and I believe it is necessary that the committee should have the opportunity to express their views in writing.

(b) It is a requirement of the committee’s terms of reference...

For the attention of Mr. Morgan Harris

Post 115
West Sussex

Date: 20th July 1999

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter of 20th July 1999 in which you requested my comments on the arrangements for the protection of volunteers. I agree with the committee’s view that it is not within their remit to make recommendations on this matter, and I do not wish to second guess the decisions of the Department of Health and Social Services.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Chairman, The House of Commons

and

In Childcare Homes

Committee of Inquiry

[Stamp]
For your further advice:

B. I trust you will not believe the position I have taken, and I would be grateful

that you will take the trouble to consider the matter further on

the point.

I have several reasons for not wanting to consider the position of the country with regard to the matter at the moment.

1. The position of the country is too sensitive to any information or statement.

2. I am worried about the implications for our economy.

3. I am not convinced that the position is in line with our foreign policy.

I appreciate your interest in the matter, but I believe it is best to consult with the appropriate authorities before taking any action.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

May 1985

[Name]
Following these:

4. In the past we have dealt with questions pertaining to PPs or permissions to proceed, which concerned the security aspect. However, we are now worried that we may have to consider situations where the original plan we were previously consulted on now has to be revisited. We consider these cases to be crucial, and we recognize that we have to be careful not to lose any

On the other hand, you will appreciate that we have officers on course who have been in

duty to ensure that the impression that we are now to re-
possibilities with our current resources. This is because it cannot be emphasised in the way that the work involved is a difficult one. While our capacity to handle such a complex situation is limited, it is important to appreciate the complexity of the issue and to understand the

Reference:

PSYOPS NORTHERN IRELAND.

LONDON SW1

Whitehall

Ministry of Defence

Line Officer

Buckingham Palace

London SW1

Old War Office

From: Rear Admiral E. Curtis DBE DSO
PSYOPS NORTHERN IRELAND

References:
B. AGDS(Ops) 70/1 dated 2 July 1971.

1. I was very pleased to see from your letter of 30th June 1971 the increasing emphasis now being given in MOD to Psyops. As you know, I continue to be concerned about the effectiveness of our overall approach and I am writing to VCDS separately on that subject.

2. I must, however, return to you directly on the specific point of how we are to deal with the difficult topic of Psyops in Northern Ireland, which was raised with you in Reference A. Predictably, the discussion period after the Psyops presentation for both the NATO Senior Officers' Study Period and the Combined Staff Colleges at Camberley opened with searching questions on Northern Ireland. Whilst I appreciate the security reasons behind your advice in Reference B, I feel that the answer which it is suggested should be given implies a cloak and dagger approach to the subject, coupled with the implication of a larger Psyops effort than is possible with our present resources. Thus it seems to me that by answering in the way laid down we create precisely the impressions that we are anxious to avoid.
3. On the other hand you will appreciate that we have officers on Course who have been in Northern Ireland or who will be going there. We therefore have to be careful not to give any answer which may reflect on our (JJE) integrity in dealing honestly with our audiences. It therefore seems right to follow our own precepts and use the truth so far as is consistent with security.

4. In the past we have dealt with questions relating to Psyops in Northern Ireland on the following lines:

   a. "N Ireland is almost by definition a Psyops problem, being more a matter of attitudes than of real material differences between the different sectors of the population."

   b. As a matter of policy we do not conduct offensive military Psyops against our own population; however, Psyops opportunities obviously exist for Government agencies and we can perhaps expect to see an increasing Government information effort.

   c. The military in Northern Ireland are deployed in Aid of the Civil Power and are available to give support to the Government in whatever form is appropriate. This could, for example, include the provision of printing facilities not otherwise conveniently available.

   d. The IRA and other target groups based outside Northern Ireland could be considered legitimate targets for military Psyops, but even so any military effort that we do make in this area is bound to be controlled by the civil and political authorities and will be small and "classified" as part of current IS operations.

   e. Of course, the large community relations effort that is made in Northern Ireland and the image created by the soldier as he goes about his business are both forms of Psyops and both make a significant contribution to stabilising the situation."

5. You may agree that an answer on these lines as appropriate to the question, gives little away, is sufficiently full to frustrate further discussion, and is not likely to antagonise the audience.
Your letter of 2nd July.

I take the liberty of suggesting the instructions contained in the letter to me officially modifying the instructions contained in the July issue of your letter. I am informed that you will participate in a remarkable and acceptable way as the line of the matter developed through the committee that we cannot reached, but to a very large extent, these suggestions may be ignored. I would suggest that you contact the Secretary of the board of directors to the problem I have referred.

The matter remains of concern to me since it is likely to be referred to each major director and reports therein and I have referred.
SECRET PENTIETER

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The IRD Officer should be of Counsellor/top-grade First Secretary rank and/or equivalent to an army brigadier.

2. He should retain his present title of Information Adviser to the GOC and continue to work from HQ quarters Northern Ireland, remain responsible to UHREP.

3. He should continue to advise and help the Army in improving its image and should therefore sit on the top army information policy and working committees, and on any other official information committees that may be set up.

4. It is necessary for him to have an office of his own, preferably behind the security grille (in view of Recommendations 5 and 6). His title should be on the door and in all directories and on army correspondence, just like any other member of HQNI, in order to maintain his cover.

5. He should continue to work closely with the Director of Intelligence and BUC Special Branch and should liaise with the Embassy in Dublin.

6. He should be the channel, directly below the present one, for the consideration of all BPA projects, informing IRD, UHREP and the GOC.

7. Additional staff should be appointed to handle files and correspondence. Someone with book-keeping experience should be available to administer an operational fund for the financing of small projects.

8. The IRD Officer should have the cooperation of all information agencies in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, which can also call on him for help with special projects.

VM6 117
...
could not even be read. In any case, I have to consider another a course of action.

[Handwritten note:]

"This reads on to say that I am sure that my happiness and in

[Handwritten note:]

"... could not even be read."

[Handwritten note:]

"... in any case, I have to consider another course of action."

[Handwritten note:]

"This reads on to say that I am sure that my happiness and in..."
Finally if in the event there is no alternative to having Ma
in Northern Ireland with his present title, the accommodation
will have to be provided by either the GO or the Home Office.
Of course we will fully bear the cost of this accommodation but you can appreciate that the problem of the appointment of a new person against either GO or Home Office
is on the backburner. I am going to forward this letter to Jack Broom. He will be the best people to discuss the matter with.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

[Handwritten notes]
KIN-124796

BYLINE: Emam M.”

Terrorist cells throughout the country have engaged in con-

April 2003

Sunday Times
The Bleden Central Citizens Defense Committee (Done given a clot of

crime in action)

and which now lies in disarray, the configuration of probable action here.

P. The question arises (which have spread beyond the thin politician and

contrasts the campaign with existing beliefs while the information

is obtained).

A. The association for legal justice (which was seen as the group's goal to

spread to the world. These organizations lacked the

supporters' view, finding themselves often in the foreground, the will to

The committee is joined by numerous other organizations and democrats

a part of their larger organization in national and international forums.

Chapter 5: The Role of the Bleden Central Citizen's Defense Committee

7. RA. The preparation is made in the USA to which books and other

materials are produced by CEI.

produced by CEI.

The same apparent lack of understanding was evident in an appeal of RA. Exposed

"The police strike at the outset of the Troubles in 1969,

the Official IRA appealed because the Irish was first. The protest was a result

This an example of an阐明 Item. That only two years earlier, the protest was a result

of the IRA's involvement, which was not an organization.

Corkbridge forces in the situation of the Irish. The" in the situation of the Irish,

section of the situation, the information originated, was included in the

The section of the situation, the information originated, had been inserted in the

the aspect of the situation, the information originated, is the section of the

But this was insufficient. The USA was to the Irish. The Irish and the IRA

exceeded the flight and the USA was included. The section of the situation,

considered the situation of the Irish. The information originated, had been inserted in the

In a 2002 submission to the Dublin South constituency, the Dublin climate of the

The issue involved was for the GAA players and the GAA intervention in the

Central Sinn Féin Committee.

Over the next week, the committee worked on one matter, down to the floor, in one

one of the problems, for economic work, down to the floor, in one

KIN-124799
Perhaps it is not surprising that this example confused itself in today’s circumstances.

politic manipulation by unacknowledged others.

Above all, it would mean the exploitation of national security concerns to justify domestic personal communication of all opposition as the direct cause of a mundane external conspiracy. It would mean the sooner hind in the way into the nation-state and the domestic media. It would mean the sooner hind in the way into the nation-state and the domestic media. It would mean the sooner hind in the way into the nation-state and the domestic media. It would mean the sooner hind in the way into the nation-state and the domestic media. It would mean the sooner hind in the way into the nation-state and the domestic media. It would mean the sooner hind in the way into the nation-state and the domestic media. It would mean the sooner hind in the way into the nation-state and the domestic media.
The army's secret war in Northern Ireland

The exploding tree • the dead dogs that never lived • the figures that misled the Minister • the political smear

Special report by David Blundy

The habit of internees

In early 1974, Godfrey P. Butcher, an Army intelligence officer, claimed to have been influenced by the military intelligence service of the Provisional IRA to carry out a series of operations against the army. Butcher was later convicted of sedition and sentenced to 14 years in prison.

The police

At an army briefing at which a bomb threat was announced, it was said that the police were aware of the threat and were taking precautions. However, the police were later found to have been asleep at the switch.
American ‘relief funds’ used to buy arms • Taxpayers’ money aids Provo bombers

How I.R.A. gets guns and cash

CHRISTOPHER DOBSON reports from New York,
Dublin and Belfast on the paymasters of terror

Security.
It’s good to know there’s still somewhere you can find it.

With a growing family you can’t take risks with your money and the so-called experts haven’t been doing well anyway.

We’ve got the Abbey Habit.
Real security.
Good interest of 7.5% p.a. (that’s worth over 11% because we pay basic-rate tax). And the money’s always there when you need it.

That’s for you.

Get the Abbey Habit.

Abbey National
for the security you need today.

[Image of balloons and text promoting the Abbey National]

89 years and only a hole in the roof to show for it

It’s four Fridays down and four Fridays up for Mary. Just to drive her a little bit crazy and sick. At night there are no lights, you have to use the light of the moon. Her children are missing and she can’t find them. What a way to spend a life, in the dark, in the moonlight, missing her children.

Mary is one of the many women who work in the Abbey National building in Dublin. She has been there for 49 years, since 1925, when the building was completed. The Abbey National is the oldest bank in Europe, and it has been in operation since 1894.

Mary’s husband, John, also works at the bank, as a security guard. They have been married for 27 years and have three children: two boys and a girl.

Mary says she never thought she would work there for so long, but she enjoys the job and the people she works with. She says the bank is like a big family, and everyone looks out for each other.

The Abbey National is known for its good customer service and its security, which is why Mary and John have been there for so long. They say the bank is like a second home to them.

[Image of the Abbey National building]

INFORMATION FROM *CLOCKSTICK COANCE*
RECORDED DELIVERY

Sir Anthony Hart
Chairman
The HIA Inquiry
PO Box 2080
Belfast
Northern Ireland
BT1 9QA

26 September 2016

Dear Sir Anthony,

I have not yet had the courtesy of a response to the submission I sent to you on 9 September and I would be most grateful if someone from the Inquiry would acknowledge receipt of that material. I do not expect an immediate reply to the points I have raised with you, but a simple acknowledgement would be very welcome.

I also attach two further documents for your consideration. These clearly indicate that some of the information presented to your Inquiry by Government witnesses was false or deliberately misleading.

A story in the Guardian on 30 May 1990 refers to an interview between one of its reporters and a Mr Cliff Crook of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants. The Guardian report says:

“A letter sent by Mr Wallace to Cliff Crook, an official of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, in 1975, refers specifically to the homosexual allegations and smears against leading Labour politicians.

Mr Crook said yesterday that General Garrett [Director of Army Security] did not appear at Mr Wallace’s appeal. If he had, Mr Crook said the Civil Service Appeal Board could have discussed the ‘extra work’ assigned to Mr Wallace, a reference to his covert work.”

This clearly refers to my letter dated 29 September 1975 to Mr Crook in which I said:

“I am concerned that we have still not received a reply to my letter of 2 July to John Groves requesting access to the various documents listed. You will recall that when I had a brief interview with him on 11 February to seek guidance on what information I could give to the RUC about my work on psychological operations, he said that I should confine my comments to justifiable activities directed at the PIRA and not at Loyalists. My concern now is that there may be an attempt by the Ministry to deny any form of official ‘dirty tricks’ organisation existed within the Security Forces. For example, in the Ministry’s summary of my oral representations made to John Groves and Mr Fairbairn on 10 May reference is made in paragraph 3 to “actions” which I was asked to launch during the UWC strike. The word
"actions" appears to have been used by MOD to conceal the fact that I referred to the attempts made by the Security Service to discredit various Loyalist politicians, including the Rev Ian Paisley, by the use of forged documents and by linking the MPs with Loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast. I can fully understand why the Ministry would not want to put such information on record, but I wonder if evidence of that nature will be made available to the Board sub rosa."

It is clear from the above, therefore, that, within six months of leaving Northern Ireland and some 5 years before the Kincora story surfaced in the Irish Independent, I had been referring to "homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast". I also sent a copy of the above letter to my former boss at HQ Northern Ireland, Tony Staughton. Moreover, it is clear that the MoD and the Intelligence Services were well aware of the allegations I was making at that time. This is totally at odds with comments made by Government witnesses and by Counsel to the Inquiry during the Inquiry's hearings. My point is that quite a number of people in Government service were aware of the allegations I was making in 1975 and there is no valid reason why your Inquiry should not have been made aware of this. The selective disclosure of information favourable to the Authorities is indicative of a co-ordinated cover-up.

The attached letter dated 24 February 1982 shows that, just 5 days after the Terry Inquiry was announced, I wrote to my solicitor to make arrangements to brief him fully about my knowledge of Tara and Kincora. The letter also refers to a report published in the ‘News of the World’ about Kincora. Bearing in mind that I was in Wormwood Scrubs prison at that time, I had no access to the press. Shortly after I wrote to my solicitor, he visited me at the prison and I briefed him in some detail on the background to Tara and Kincora. I also arranged for him to receive various documents relating to the matter. Soon after my solicitor’s visit to me, his offices were broken into and searched, but nothing was taken. Fortunately, he had put my papers into a place of safekeeping! I am sure my solicitor would be very willing to confirm this to your Inquiry should you consider it important.

Finally, the HIA website contains the following comment:

"In due course we will place on our website all those documents we consider are relevant and which do not contain private information, such as medical or social services records, which might cause distress to applicants or others such as family members and others who were not applicants to the Inquiry, or information which need not be published."

This is rather selective in terms of who the Inquiry's comments are potentially causing distress to. What about those of us who have been subjected to the publication of totally false or deliberately misleading information about us in the transcripts of your Inquiry's hearings? I can see no evidence of anyone from your Inquiry challenging the obviously highly questionable claims being promulgated by the Authorities.

Yours sincerely.

Colin Wallace
Richard Norton-Taylor

COLIN Wallace yesterday named three former senior Ministry of Defence staff who, he says, have long been aware of his allegations of a dirty tricks campaign in Northern Ireland in the mid-1970s.

In a letter to Sir Michael Quinlan, permanent secretary at the ministry, he challenged the MoD to say whether advice was sought from the three over the past few years, when ministers were being questioned by MPs about his allegations.

In January this year, the Government acknowledged that answers given to the Commons were inaccurate.

The three named by Mr Wallace are General Willie Rous, who served in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and was later appointed director of army public relations in Whitehall; General Len Garrett, chief of staff in Northern Ireland and later director of army security; and Chris Whitehead, who served with Mr Wallace at the Army's Northern Ireland HQ in Lisburn and went on to become the ministry's deputy chief press officer.

Neither General Rous nor General Garrett was available for comment yesterday. Mr Whitehead, a press officer at the Home Office responsible for the prison service, has refused to comment.

Mr Wallace makes detailed comments about the three in his letter to Sir Michael. Mr Wallace made it plain yesterday he wants them to give evidence to the forthcoming inquiry by David Calcutt, QC, into the circumstances surrounding his dismissal in 1976.

He also challenges the statement in the report drawn up earlier this month by David Heyhoe, a senior MoD official, into why ministers had not been told the full facts surrounding the affair.

"The report said that neither the inquiries into allegations of homosexual abuse at the Kinora boys' home in east Belfast, nor the black propaganda campaign, code-named Clockwork Orange, "appeared to play any part in Mr Wallace's disciplinary proceedings."

A letter sent by Mr Wallace to Cliff Crook, an official of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, in 1976, refers specifically to the homosexual allegations and smears against leading Labour politicians.

Mr Crook said yesterday that General Garrett did not appear at Mr Wallace's appeal. If he had, Mr Crook said, the Civil Service Appeal Board could have discussed the "extra work" assigned to Mr Wallace, a reference to his covert activities.
Letter dated 24 February from Colin Wallace at HMP Wormwood Scrubs to James Morgan Harris, Thomas Eggar & Sons (Solicitors) at Chichester

Dear James,

Hope you have recovered from the trauma of the Appeal hearing (or lack of it, depending on your point of view!!). Needless to say, I am not at all happy about the outcome any more than you are. I have read Eileen’s transcript of the summing up and, overall, it appears that the three judges made a greater mess of it than did JKB.

I get the very distinct impression that they spent most of their time justifying the trial judge’s summing-up and, even more ridiculous, blaming Mr Kennedy for not taking a stronger line in respect of certain matters. Some points they did not answer at all!! I really do despair of the judicial system.

Having got that off my chest, I will now lumber you with my latest problem before you cool off. I enclose a cutting from the News of the World which refers to the looming drama of Kincora Boys’ Home. This is potentially the greatest political scandal of recent years and raises a number of serious problems for me. Can you find out if you can get any legal aid cover to do some work for me on this matter. I think you should have the fullest possible information from me at an early date because it will require a considerable amount of time spent on it before I would agree to give evidence.

For obvious reasons, I do not wish to put anything into writing at this end in case it should ‘go astray’. There are the implications of the Official Secrets Acts as well as my own situation in the not too distant future.

I do not want you to give up any of your own time on this - you have given up more than enough of that already. In the meantime I shall adopt a policy of refusing to see anyone: police, government officials, etc, unless you are present and have had the chance to discuss matters first.

Sorry this note is rather hurried and illegible, but I want you to be aware of the problem as soon as possible.

Please pass my best wishes to Michael Kennedy, Simon Coltart and Brian for all they did at the Appeal. I realise you all did your very best.

Hope to see you soon.

Best wishes,

Colin
In replying to this letter, please write on the envelope:
Number 21925 Name WALLACQ

DEAR JAMES,

Hope you have recovered from the terrific shock of the recent
school. (Our loss if you don't, and your point of view!!) I
mean less if you don't. I have read Mr. Miller's latest
book. It's a pity he didn't write more of it, and get
the very human emotions that the story
ought to have. If you have any
interest in these topics, you may
find them more interesting, hearing
Mr. Kinsey's talk on a larger scale in prospect of certain
results. Some parts they did not cover at
all!! I believe do disappear if the material system
works out. I hope that all my letters will
reach you with my latest problem before you write off.
I enclose a cutting from the News of the World
which refers to the Kinsey cleave. & Kinsey boy?

Love. This is possibly the greatest problem
seen in the last dozen years or two.
I enclose you a number of letters written for me. Can you find out if
you can get any letters and stuff to do some
work for me on the subject? If you could
have the fullest possible information from me at
an early date, because it will require a
considerable amount of this sort, & before I
would agree to fill evidence.

For other reasons I do not want to put
any letters in the end in case it should
be

No. 244 3-563 7-47-68 XMS

24 FEB 1932

A. MILL
MIL. PRISON
WORRWOOD SCRUIN
14 CAFI ROAD
LONDON, W.12

RECEIVED
26 FEB 1932

KIN-124809
RECORDED DELIVERY

Sir Anthony Hart  
Chairman  
The HIA Inquiry  
PO Box 2080  
Belfast  
Northern Ireland  
BT1 9QA

17 October 2016

Dear Sir Anthony,

In my previous letter to you dated 26 September 2016 I referred to a report in ‘The News of the World’ on 21 February 1982. I have now obtained a copy of that report (attached). It states:

“He (Wallace) warned of the male prostitution ring - and the British Intelligence knowledge of it - in 1975, five years before Independent MP Gerry Fitt raised the issue in the Commons in 1980.”

Given that the reporter did not spell my name correctly, it is unlikely that he knew me personally, and I assume that he was probably given the information verbally by someone who had access to my disciplinary hearing procedure. I was in Wormwood Scrubs prison in February 1982 and had no contact with the press.

‘The News of the World’ report clearly corroborates my assertion that I highlighted, at the time of my disciplinary hearing in September 1975, the existence of what we believed to be “a male prostitution ring” in Belfast during the 1970s.

As I pointed out to you in my previous letter, my allegations about “homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast” were made to the MoD, the IPCS and to my former boss at Army HQ NI, at the time of my disciplinary hearing. Copies of the information relating to my disciplinary hearing were sent by the MoD to Bernard Sheldon, then Legal Adviser to MI5 and to J P Waterfield (MI5 officer at the Northern Ireland Office). It was also copied in part to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief of the General Staff and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for the Army. I accept the latter addressees were probably only provided with a heavily MoD ‘sanitised’ version of the case. Indeed, as you know from my previous submissions, it is significant that Tam Dalyell, the Former Leader of the House of Commons) wrote to David Cameron on 29 August 2014 pointing out that Field Marshal Sir John Stanier (Head of the Army) and Sir Maurice Oldfield (Chief of MI6) had both approached him separately expressing his concerns about the way my case had been handled. There is, therefore, no doubt whatsoever that the relevant authorities, including the Intelligence
Services, were well aware of the allegations I was making at that time. However, ‘The News of the World’ report referred to above also put that information into the public domain for the first time, and that was before the Terry Inquiry commenced its investigations.

It is clear that, as a result of ‘The News of the World’ story, the authorities, including the Intelligence Services, would once again have been made aware of what I had alleged in 1975. To claim, as they now do, that they only became aware of such allegations following the publication of a report in the ‘Irish Independent’ in 1980 and that I only began to make such allegations during the Terry Inquiry is grossly dishonest and shows that they are still totally unwilling to tell the truth about how much they really knew about McGrath and his activities. I do, however, accept that current Intelligence officers are probably, to a significant extent, relying on what is recorded on file, rather than on personal experience. However, as General Leng made clear in his recorded interview with the ‘The Sunday Times’ really sensitive information would often not be put in writing, or on file.

Information Policy documents

There have been a number of comments made during the Inquiry’s public hearings to the effect that there was no mention of child sex abuse at Kinora in any of the Information Policy documents. That is correct because General Leng made it very clear to Information Policy that we should take whatever steps were necessary to get the press to investigate McGrath and his activities, but we must not be seen by the RUC to be disseminating allegations of child sexual activities. I do not know the full reasons why this was a very sensitive issue in terms of Army/RUC relationships, but it clearly was. Obviously, the matter must have been extremely sensitive otherwise General Leng, who was a very tough-minded but very fair individual, would have raised that matter directly and forcefully with the Chief Constable. When General Leng was perturbed about something, he made his feelings very plain and people were left in no doubt about his displeasure!

The Information Policy strategy for getting around the RUC sensitivity problem was that if the press discovered the sexual abuse ‘by accident’ while investigating McGrath as a result of our unattributable briefings about his homosexuality and paramilitary activities, we could not be accused of interfering in the RUC’s territory. It is clear from the wording of my press briefing document on Tara that I was making very pointed comments to draw the attention of the press to McGrath’s sexual preferences and his track record of blackmailing people about those activities, yet he was allowed to work in a children’s home! It is true that we did not give all journalists the same amount of information, how much we disclosed was determined by the journalist’s background some had ‘close connections with the RUC’. I am not attempting to justify that strategy, my job was simply to implement it.

It must be said that although ‘Clockwork Orange’ targeted McGrath for sound operational reasons, General Leng’s response was, I believe, based entirely on the allegations he had heard about boys absconding from homes in Belfast because they were being abused and because they were likely to become prey to the paramilitaries. The reason I raised with John Groves at the MoD matters relating to Ian Paisley and ‘homosexual prostitution’ involving a children’s home in Belfast at the time of my disciplinary hearings was simply that I required clearance from the MoD on the extent of the information I could reveal to the RUC about IP activities.

The Tara press briefing document

There has been considerable discussion in your Inquiry about the various documents that I did, or did not, possess and which related to McGrath and/or Tara. Much of the discussion appears to be ill-informed and based on opinions rather than facts. This is particularly true with regards to which ‘official’ documents I possessed after I left Northern Ireland. There is no mystery about this and the relevant background information is also in the public domain. For the avoidance of doubt, I shall restate the position.

When I was informed of my transfer from Northern Ireland in December 1974, I was actively engaged in several ongoing ‘Clockwork Orange’ activities - particularly the revision of material that took place in November and December 1974. These activities included one related to how the IRA...
financed its weapons procurement activities in the USA, and one on the role of William McGrath and Tara which focussed on his attempts to undermine various peace initiatives involving dialogue between Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries. I agreed with Colonel Railton that I would complete these outstanding activities as quickly as possible after I took over my new post in England. As a result, I took with me various documents which contained the relevant declassified information for those activities. Although the information had been declassified and cleared for use in ‘Clockwork Orange’, it was still highly sensitive and designed for unattributable or deniable use only. The documents also included the Tara press briefing paper to which your Inquiry has referred. This is the version annotated by Peter Broderick and other officers at HQ NI. I did make reference to these outstanding activities in my oral submission to the MoD. In the MoD’s ‘Summary of oral representations made to Mr J D Groves, CPR, on Friday, 30th May (1975) by Mr J C Wallace’ (para 10) it states:

“He (Wallace) did not consider that he had completed his duties in Northern Ireland since he still had briefings for six feature articles about N Ireland (‘Clockwork Orange’) to complete for the Press and it had been agreed that he would return at weekends to discuss outstanding IP (Information Policy) matters with Colonel Railton.”

The MoD did not deny my assertion that I was still engaged in some work that was outstanding from my time in Northern Ireland, or the fact that those activities related to IP work. See the attached press cutting from the ‘Sunday Telegraph’ about the funding of IRA weapons, which was based on ‘Clockwork Orange’ material. Had I not been engaged on that work, I would not have retained the relevant documents. Significantly, however, Colonel Railton failed to attend my disciplinary hearing (he claimed that he missed his flight from Belfast) and, therefore, avoided being questioned by the disciplinary board on what had been agreed with me!

The record of my oral submissions to the MoD also shows that I handed over “three filing cabinets” of briefing material to Colonel Railton prior to leaving HQ NI. Bearing in mind that those cabinets contained a significant amount of my ‘Clockwork Orange’ material, what became of them and their contents?

General Leng’s comments about ‘Clockwork Orange’ are accurate. It was an open-ended project which started in the late summer or early autumn of 1973 and was updated and revised on regular basis over the following year to reflect changes in operational requirements. The MoD lied when they claimed the project was not cleared. Cleared by whom? Much the material was unattributable or deniable, but that does not mean that the project was not authorised. Information I received was specifically earmarked for the project. Although Psy Ops did include the use of disinformation, the vast majority of my work entailed the use of accurate ‘black Intelligence’ i.e. with a good reliability rating. Disinformation is of limited value in Psy Ops.

My work on the outstanding Psy Ops activities stopped when my disciplinary proceedings were instigated, and I put all the various documents into a place of safekeeping pending the outcome of those proceedings. As a result, the full material on McGrath was never used by me.

The various press reports clearly show that the information I provided to journalists from 1973 onwards included McGrath’s name, home address and home telephone number, plus the address and telephone number of Kincora (even though ‘Kincora’ was not specifically mentioned by name!). It is also clear that the press briefing document referred to above was annotated by Colonel Adrian Peck (Information Policy) and Peter Broderick (Chief Information Officer), as well as bearing the handwriting of Hugh Mooney (an IRD officer and Information Adviser to the GOC), plus a Major in the Army Information Services. In other words, all these individuals read and annotated my press briefing document no later than September 1974, but almost certainly before the end of 1973 when Hugh Mooney left Northern Ireland. [Note: Colonel Peck was Colonel Railton’s predecessor]

The above information demonstrates in the clearest possible terms that, at the very least, these senior officers and individuals all possessed the information about McGrath and Tara that I gave to the press unattributably in 1973 and 1974 from that document.
It is also abundantly clear from the above that I gave the press more information about McGrath and Tara than the Intelligence Services are now prepared to admit to your Inquiry that they possessed at that time. This denial by the Intelligence Services cannot possibly be correct and this fact must be faced up to by your Inquiry because the authorities are still not providing the true facts!

I must stress that my press briefing document contained only minimal information about McGrath and his activities. The ‘Clockwork Orange’ files contained considerably more material and those files should have been disclosed to your Inquiry. Had the press reported on McGrath’s activities, we would have released substantially more information unattributably to support such press coverage.

Despite the subsequent so-called ‘investigations’ by various officials into my claims, not one of those officials, including those named in your Inquiry’s transcripts, ever made contact with me to ask me any questions about my allegations. The investigators also did not make contact with other key people involved in my case. Those investigations were, therefore, totally one-sided. Despite this, the reports that they produced are now being advanced as accurate accounts of what actually occurred. To make matters worse, it is clear that your Inquiry is also relying to some extent on such reports! That is grossly unfair.

‘Private Eye’ and ‘The Sunday Times’

Understandably, the authorities have gone to great lengths to play down the tape recorded interview given by General Peter Leng to ‘The Sunday Times’ because his comments totally demolish the pronouncements made by the Government over the years about ‘Clockwork Orange’ and Kincora. The attached article by ‘Private Eye’ shows that the MoD put pressure on the editor of ‘The Sunday Times’ to withdraw the General Leng story. What is even more important is that the ‘Private Eye’ report shows that an internal inquiry carried out by ‘The Sunday Times’ into the matter concluded that the publication of the story was justified. If true, this is something that the editor of ‘The Sunday Times’ failed to tell Tam Dalyell MP when he raised the matter in Parliament. Why?

Knowing General Leng, as I did, I have no doubts whatsoever that what he told ‘The Sunday Times’ was a truthful account of the extent of his recollections of ‘Clockwork Orange’ and the allegations relating to Kincora in 1973/74. I also have no doubt that he was the driving force behind the attempts by Information Policy to encourage the press to investigate William McGrath’s activities during those years. General Leng was a officer of high integrity, and attempts by the MoD and others to minimise the significance of what he told ‘The Sunday Times’ are disgraceful. Your Inquiry should also ask why, bearing in mind General Leng’s very strongly held feelings about McGrath and his activities, none on the senior officers who worked closely with him appear to have been aware of his concerns?

How the MoD misled the Calcutt Inquiry

The attached note which I sent to Mr Tam Dalyell MP illustrates the remarkable lengths to which the MoD has been prepared to go to perpetuate the cover-up associated with my role in Northern Ireland and my related allegations.

On 1 February 1990, the Defence Secretary, Mr Tom King, promised Parliament that Sir David Calcutt QC would undertake an Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the disciplinary proceedings taken against me by the MoD in 1975.

On that occasion, Mr Martin O’Neill MP asked Mr King, the following question

(Hansard section 467-468):

“Will the Secretary of State confirm that Mr Calcutt will have the powers to obtain and make use of the job description (Wallace’s)? Will he also confirm that section 1 (9) of the Official Secrets Acts 1989 makes it clear that not only those in the security services but those who work in support of them can obtain immunity and the like?

Will he guarantee that immunity from prosecution will be provided under that Act?”

In reply, Defence Secretary, Tom King said:

“Although the job specification is a classified document, Mr Calcutt will have access to it
and he will be able to show it to Mr Wallace. I have also been advised that Mr Wallace will be authorised to give the authorities the facts in the other matters that have been raised, so no offence arises under the Official Secrets Act.”

Bearing in mind that my false or cover job description was not classified, it is clear that Tom King was referring to my psychological operations role. It is also clear that the Defence Secretary was in no doubt that a written version of my ‘Secret’ job specification did exist at that date. You may think it significant that the Defence Secretary specifically asked Mr Calcutt not to write a report on his investigation, but to submit only his conclusions to Parliament. This indicates that Mr King was well aware of the likely outcome of the Inquiry and was keen to ensure that Parliament was given only the minimum information about the background to my case.

The MoD did not challenge the fact that Defence Secretary promised to provide Mr Calcutt with a copy of my job specification. However, the MoD was well aware that there would be very severe political repercussions if full details of what I had been employed to do were put on record by the Inquiry. To avoid this happening, the MoD provided Mr Calcutt with a false job specification for me. In other words, the MoD deliberately sabotaged the Inquiry set up by the Government. Since then, the MoD have adopted a new approach to this issue and claim that my ‘Secret’ job specification never existed in writing and that it was only given to me orally.

Given that the MoD deliberately attempted to sabotage the Calcutt Inquiry set up by the Thatcher Government, it is not unreasonable to assume that the Ministry would be equally willing to behave in a similar fashion with any other Inquiry that might be embarrassing to it. Indeed, as you know from my previous submissions, Government witnesses also misled the Saville Inquiry over the existence of ‘psychological operations’ in January 1972. To make matters worse, Parliament appears to be totally impotent when faced with such instances of malfeasance in a public office. The implications of the above incidents for your Inquiry must be obvious to you.

‘The Phoenix’ Magazine

On 16 September 1983, the Dublin-based magazine ‘The Phoenix’ published a lengthy article on Kincora. Although that report contains a number of obvious errors, it refers to the RUC ‘leaking’ selected parts of the Terry Report prior to publication and it raises a number of questions that still need to be satisfactorily addressed.

For example, it states:

"1973: Drugs offence by one of the boys leads to a police inquiry by D Sgt George Caskey of Strandtown RUC and D Insp George McBride of Donegall PASS Drugs Squad. Details about the homosexual offences at the home were logged and the file passed to D Supt Bill Meiharg, head of the Special Branch (sic). The file has gone missing."

Bearing in mind that the article was based on information allegedly ‘leaked’ by the RUC, it is reasonable to assume that the intention was to present the police in the best possible light. Setting aside the obvious inaccuracies in the above paragraph, the overall allegation is significant in that it claims that Detective Superintendent Caskey, who led the RUC Inquiry into Kincora in 1982, had been involved in an investigation in 1973 in which a Kincora inmate alleged that homosexual offences were being committed at Kincora.

There does not appear to be any reference to this incident in the Inquiry’s transcripts. Did a Kincora inmate make such allegations about abuse at Kincora to the two named police officers? If the report is false, the police should say so.

The Phoenix article also refers to a NIO official named ‘Peter England’ and claims that a document found in Kincora had on the margins of "pages 5, 7, 11 and 13, several phone numbers" written in his handwriting.

As you know, Peter England’s name also appears in Chris Moore’s book, ‘The Kincora Scandal’ (page 89) which states:

"Another frequent visitor to (Anthony) Blunt’s home was Sir Knox (Cunningham), described
by Harbinson as a 'Muscle queen' who liked to be 'screwed by young boys'. Given Knox Cunningham's knowledge of Tara and McGrath, and given that McGrath made visits to London for meetings of the 'Belfast-London' committee, it is just possible that Knox Cunningham was able to introduce his acquaintance McGrath to his London friends, such as Montgomery, Blunt and others, including a man who held a senior post in the Northern Ireland office in Belfast in the mid seventies, P.T. E. England, Peter to his friends.

Harbinson knew Peter England and his family in Surrey very well indeed and he was aware that England was under suspicion during his two years in Northern Ireland (1974-76) because of his sexuality."

In a written question to the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, on 8 March 1988, Ken Livingstone MP asked:

"Will the Prime Minister take time in her busy day to reconsider the statement that she made to the House last year about Sir Maurice Oldfield? Will she consider the inconsistency of the withdrawal of his positive vetting while no action was taken against Mr. Peter England, a deputy secretary in the Northern Ireland Office, and Mr. J. L. Imrie, an assistant secretary at the Northern Ireland Office, following investigations into the buggery of young children at the Kincora boys' home? Is she not disturbed that Mr. Imrie has taken no action against the newspaper that named him and his activities four weeks ago, although he continues to work for the Government in the Ministry of Defence? Can she assure the House that she is convinced of Mr. Imrie's innocence?"

If not, will she now finally concede a genuinely independent inquiry into what went on in the homes in Kincora, irrespective of the damage that may do to Ml5 when its role is exposed?

Mrs Thatcher replied:

'I have nothing further to add to the statement that I made on Sir Maurice Oldfield in the House. I note that the hon. Gentleman uses the privileges of the House to name people who are unable to answer back.'

The Prime Minister's reply was, of course, deliberately evasive. She did make a very good point, but that did not stop her Government from using the privileges of the House in an attempt to discredit Sir Maurice Oldfield.

It has been reported that both England and Imrie were later convicted of sexual offences in separate incidents in London. For example, it has been claimed that Imrie was charged with gross indecency at Victoria Station (August 1979). It is said that he appeared at Horseferry Magistrates Court and was given a conditional discharge and required to pay costs. Bearing in mind the publicity given to these two men and their alleged links with homosexual activities in Northern Ireland where such activities were, at that time, criminal offences, it is very strange that no mention appears to have been made of them during your Inquiry.

Ken Livingstone put down another question:

**Hansard 03 May 1988**

"To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if Mr. Peter Bell, currently working at the Northern Ireland Office, was interviewed in respect of any of the investigations into the Kincora boys home."

Mr. Tom King [holding answer 26 April 1988]:

"I have nothing to add to the answer I gave to the hon. Member on 25 February 1988 at column 322"

On 06 April 1989, Ken Livingstone put down the following question:

"To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will call for a report from the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as to the stage which investigations
have reached into the bombing of the home of Mr. Peter Bell, a civil servant working for his Department."

Mr. Ian Stewart [holding answer 4 April 1989]:

"A bomb explosion occurred on 12 March 1976 between the homes of Mr. Bell and another civil servant. Although there was extensive damage to both houses no one was injured in the explosion. I understand that the police file in this case remains open."

As you are no doubt aware, it has been claimed at various times that at least four senior NIO UK officials were investigated by the Terry Inquiry about their sexual activities and possible links with child abuse. There have also been similar allegations made about a former Northern Ireland Office Minister who was named several times in my ‘Clockwork Orange’ notes in conjunction with William McGrath and Joseph mains. Given the related publicity, it is remarkable that the anonymous individuals who reassured your Inquiry that the Intelligence Services knew nothing about the abuses at Kincora until 1980 did not refer to the allegations made against England, Imrie et al, nor did your Inquiry appear to question them about those allegations.

Peter England held a very senior position at the NIO in 1975 when my disciplinary proceedings were taking place. If the allegations about him are correct, then it is unlikely that he would have looked favourably on my attempts to expose McGrath and his activities as part of the ‘Clockwork Orange’ project. England would also have worked closely with Ian Cameron.

I strongly believe that the victims and the public have a right to know if the Terry Inquiry was aware of the allegations surrounding these NIO individuals. Did that Inquiry investigate those allegations and, if so, what was the outcome of those investigations?

The issues referred to in ‘The Phoenix’ article are just some of those that do not appear to be referred to or dealt with by your Inquiry. For example, Captain Brain Gemmell is on record as saying that his Army driver transported a senior civilian Intelligence officer from Army HQ in Lisburn to Kincora on a number of occasions. Clearly, it is important to establish if this allegation is true and, if so, to identify both the driver and/or his civilian passenger.

Brian Gemmell has also said that he had a meeting with MI5 officers in London and was asked if he could use some compromising film they had of John McKeague, the paedophile leader of the Loyalist group, Red Hand Commando, to blackmail him into becoming an informant. This use of blackmail totally contradicts the evidence given by MI5 and MI6 witnesses who assured your Inquiry that homosexuality was of no concern to them at that time.

Report by Ian Cameron (MI5)

Your Inquiry has dealt at considerable length with the so-called leak inquiry by Ian Cameron MI5 into information that I allegedly gave to Robert Fisk, but much of Ian Cameron’s report is totally incorrect and deliberately misleading. There is no doubt that I gave Robert Fisk a number of items of information including material on Tara and McGrath. However, I must place on record that a number of the so-called leaks referred to in Ian Cameron’s report had nothing whatsoever to do with me, or, to the best of my knowledge, with Information Policy. Indeed such ‘leaks’ continued long after I left Northern Ireland. Some of those leaks were almost certainly as a result of the antagonism felt within parts of the Security Forces to the policies of Harold Wilson’s Government in Northern Ireland. Robert Fisk was a particularly tenacious and professional journalist and had excellent sources within the NIO and the Security Forces. He did not have to rely on me for his information and I had no special relationship with him.

Setting aside the incident which led to the disciplinary action being taken against me, I can only recall two controversial items that involved me; the SAS plain clothes patrols story and
the community policing story, both of which were planted at the behest of my superiors. The SAS story was for operational reasons in that it was designed to put psychological pressure on the IRA. The community policing story was designed highlight the very serious concerns within the Security Forces that the proposal would have on the morale of the RUC. It was not uncommon for Information Policy to be asked to plant information with the press - not just with Robert Fisk - on a totally deniable basis. Senior officers would ask for some action to be taken, but also ask not to be told what action had been taken so that they could deny all knowledge of that action. This was particularly true of activities that had strong political implications.

These so-called 'leaks' were not really leaks in the normal sense of that term. For example, in the case of the SAS plain clothes patrols story, the Army prepared a written 'defensive brief' on the subject. This amounted to a series of questions and answers that were to be used by the Army Press Desk to respond promptly to any press enquiries related to that. My task was simply to get Robert Fisk to initiate such an enquiry from the Army Press Desk. Part of the problem was that there were often serious differences between the views of the Government and the views of the Security Forces. Instead of the two sides resolving those differences to the satisfaction of both sides, they engaged in an information war via the media.

Ian Cameron’s reference to the so-called 'Blue Card' leak is a nonsense. Blue Cards (instructions for arresting people) and Yellow Cards (instructions for opening fire) were restricted documents issued to all soldiers. It is probably no exaggeration to say that most journalists in Belfast has copies of these. The security aspect of these cards was nil. Ian Cameron could easily have questioned me about these leaks if he had really wanted to discover the truth.

MI5’s allegations about the various leaks are what is referred to as ‘smoke and mirrors’. It was later made clear to me by a totally reliable source that the ‘leaks’ allegations were just a means of having me removed from the Province because the NIO - particularly MI5 - wanted to take full control of the so-called information war. In effect this is what happened!

The attached extracts from the Minutes of the Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee show that in April 1975, just after I was removed from Northern Ireland, the GOC, General Sir Frank King, had a meeting with Michael Cudlipp at the NIO and complained that the NIO “had taken control of his PR Department”.

My removal from Northern Ireland and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings were, therefore, nothing less than a dishonest charade in what was in reality a battle between the Security Forces and the Northern Ireland Office for control over information.

As in my previous correspondence, nothing in this submission is ‘new’. All the information I have provided here is already in the public domain and should have been made available to you by the various Government agencies. I am sending this to you simply to challenge false and misleading information that has been made public in the official transcripts of your Inquiry’s hearings. Whether or not you act on the information I have provided is, of course, entirely a matter for you.

I would again stress to you in the strongest possible terms that I have no quarrel whatsoever with the Army, the RUC or the Intelligence Services per se. My quarrel is purely with a relatively small number of individuals who manipulated the situation in Northern Ireland for their own ends and then spent the last 41 years covering up what was going on. For example, it is simply not credible for anyone to suggest that I knew more about William McGrath, Tara and Kincora than MI5 and MI6 did, because virtually all of my information about McGrath and Kincora came from the Intelligence Services. Indeed, it is obvious that much of the political information contained in my ‘Clockwork Orange’ notes could not possibly have come from the Army.
In my submissions to you, I have frequently referred to the MoD’s deliberate policy of covering up the nature of my role in Northern Ireland. I believe that understanding the true nature of my work is important because that was inextricably linked with how and why I gained my knowledge of McGrath and Tara, and why McGrath was as of greater significance to us than the Intelligence Services have admitted so far.

I fully understand and accept why the Intelligence Services will do their best to present themselves in the best possible light, but there is also another side to what they do, and it is important that your Inquiry fully understands that.

Lord Stevens, former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, presided over an external police inquiry into of collusion between the Army, the Intelligence Services, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and loyalist terrorists in the murders of Irish nationalists. In May 2011, he gave evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary Extension) Bills and said:

"When you talk about Intelligence, of the 210 people we arrested, only three were not (Intelligence) agents. Some of them were agents for all four of those particular organisations (Army, MI5, MI6 and Special Branch), fighting against each other, doing things and making a large sum of money, which was all against the public interest and creating mayhem in Northern Ireland. Any system that is created in relation to this country and Northern Ireland has to have a proper controlling mechanism. It has to have a mechanism where someone is accountable for what the actions are and that has to be transparent."

Given the extent of the penetration of the paramilitary organisations by the Intelligence Services, as referred to by Lord Stevens, is it really credible that they knew so little about William McGrath and Tara before 1980?

I would strongly urge that your Inquiry keep Lord Stevens comments in mind when considering the MoD’s reluctance to be totally honest over the past 41 years about my role and that of psychological operations in Northern Ireland during the 1970s. The Intelligence world in Northern Ireland was not as benign as the picture painted by the MI5 and MI6 witnesses who gave evidence to your Inquiry.

Your Inquiry may well be the last opportunity that the victims have of getting some form of closure. It is essential, therefore, that it is seen to deal comprehensively with some of the issues that have been adeptly avoided to date. From the transcripts of the hearings that I have read, and from the choreographed denials by the Intelligence Services and the MoD, I have no confidence whatsoever that the true facts will emerge.

Yours sincerely

Colin Wallace

Enclosures:
(a) Note from Colin Wallace to Tam Dalyell MP reference the Calcutt Inquiry
(b) News of the World report dated 21 February 1982 - 'British agents in vice ring probe'
(c) Private Eye article 6 July 1990 - reference General Leng and The Sunday Times
(d) Sunday Telegraph article dated 26 January 1975 - 'How the IRA gets guns and cash'
(e) Oral submissions to the MoD by Colin Wallace on 30 May 1975
(f) The Guardian 15 September 1990 - 'A stench of 15 years'
(g) Minutes of the Information Policy Co-ordination Committee 1974-75
THE CALCUTT INQUIRY

Note for Mr Tam Dalyell MP

My solicitor, Mr Jim Nichol and I attended an interview with David Calcutt QC on 24 July 1990 at his chambers in Lamb Building, Temple. The meeting was scheduled to start at 2.00 pm, but we were asked to wait for a short time until Mr Calcutt was ready to see us. Eventually, we were ushered into Mr Calcutt's office where he had a tape recorder and microphone on a table. He said something to the effect that he was having technical difficulties with the machine and asked us if we were familiar with tape recorders. I thought that was amusing and ironic, bearing in mind that we had been discussing M15 and the bugging of Harold Wilson's office!

Jim Nichol also had a mini tape recorder with him and he, too, recorded the meeting.

During the interview, Mr Calcutt asked me a number of questions about my role in Northern Ireland. Then, at one point, he asked us to switch off our tape recorder and then turned his off also. He told us that the MOD had supplied him with a copy of the security classified job description for my post in Northern Ireland - the post that the Government had hitherto denied knowledge of. He said, however, that we could only discuss its contents when the tape recorders were switched off and he asked us not to make notes about the document's contents.

The document relating to the job description was a single paragraph in length and confirmed that I had been employed by the "Intelligence and Security Services" in Northern Ireland during the 1970s, but it did not go into specific details about the nature of my work on psychological operations. I told Mr Calcutt that the document was not a copy of the job description that had been agreed by the Establishments Board at Army HQ in Northern Ireland in 1974. That document had been several sheets of A4 paper in length and had listed a number of specific disinformation functions and targets. I also told him that the job specification had been approved both by the Board and by the MOD. Indeed, my promotion to the substantive rank of senior information officer would not otherwise have been approved with effect from 27 September that year.

Mr Calcutt considered what I had said for a few moments and then said something to the effect that he had taken on board the points that I had made. He got the very distinct feeling that he felt that the MOD had not been entirely open with him about the matter and said something to the effect that "what you have said has not been lost on me".

It is also significant that someone leaked the conclusions of his report to the Sunday Times before it was submitted to the Secretary of State for Defence, Tom King. I subsequently wrote to the Prime Minister about that matter on 5 August (1990).

18.10.90
BRITISH AGENTS IN VICE RING PROBE

STARTLING allegations that British Intelligence agents blackmailed men involved in the Kincora boys' home vice-ring scandal are to be investigated by a judge.

The agents are said to have kept silent over the Belfast ring in return for information about Loyalist terrorism.

A public inquiry ordered by Ulster Secretary Jim Prior will take the lid off the part played in the scandal by fanatical Protestant para-military groups like Tara.

And it will explain why top people, including politicians, civil servants and Royal Ulster Constabulary officers, kept quiet about the vice ring for more than 20 years.

Yesterday, one of the former boys at Kincora said he and others may sue for damages.

Hugh Quinn, 33, who now lives in West London, said: "They ruined our lives and now they must be prepared to pay for the consequences."

The evidence of Mr Colin Walls, a former British Army press officer, now in jail for manslaughter, is regarded as vital to the judge's investigation.

 Warned

He warned of the main prostitution ring — and the British Intelligence knowledge of it — in 1975, five years before his independent Belfast MP Gerry Fitt raised the issue in the Commons in 1980.

The inquiry will probe allegations that a police file on Kincora vanished in 1988.

And it will ask why Belfast City Council officials took no action when welfare officials expressed concerns about the home.

Senior members of Unionist groups are alleged to have been afraid to expose the vice ring because details of Loyalist terrorism would have emerged.

Top Unionist politicians are also alleged to have known about the Kincora affair through local party officials connected with the para-military organisation.

It was revealed yesterday that the Kincora scandal was hushed up because one of the key people involved, William McGrath, 41, a housefather at the home, was a member of Tara.

He is now in jail on vice charges.

Security service chiefs and top civil servants were said to have turned a blind eye to the vice ring because McGrath was informing about what was happening in para-military groups.

A former lay preacher, cover-up.

News of the World
21 February 1982
PRIVATE EYE 6 JULY 1990

THE WALLACE AFFAIR

A huge but silent upheaval has occurred at the offices of the Sunday Times following some rather unpredictable behaviour by editor, Andrew Neill. The row dates back to an interview some weeks back between Sunday Times reporter Barrie Penrose and retired General Sir Peter Leng. The subject of the conversation was the Colin Wallace affair, in particular Collin Wallace’s assertion that senior army and intelligence officers knew perfectly well in 1974 that boys in the care of Belfast Corporation were being abused and raped by the leader of the Protestant paramilitary organisation TARA, William McGrath.

This allegation, denied by the Terry Report into the Kincora Boys Home, where (see two Eyes ago) McGrath was “housefather” and bugger in chief from 1971 until his overdue arrest in 1980 and by the British Government ever since, was put by Penrose to Leng. Leng was certainly in a position to know something about it. He was Commander Land Forces Northern Ireland from 1973 to 1975.

An army information officer at the time, Mike Taylor, had announced a week before the Penrose/Leng conversation that Leng had referred to Kincora in a high-level secret memorandum.

This point was pressed by Penrose in his conversation, which was tape-recorded, as follows:

PENROSE: “You said in the memo according to Mike Taylor that the RUC and the social services I think ought to be brought in here, because the file named men and boys who were obviously part of this abuse which we all know about since.”

LENG: “Yes, I recall that.”

Later in the conversation, Penrose says:

“It [the memo] was just to remind you that there were homosexual abuses taking place, namely by the housefather named McGrath.”

LENG: “Yes.”

PENROSE: “Who was also a leader of TARA, and of course eventually that was all proven in court some years afterwards, and also a man named McKeague, but I mean this is obviously outside…”

LENG: “Yes, I do remember the homosexual insinuations and I do remember saying this is a police business, not ours.”

The whole conversation, when transcribed, covered 27 pages. But these excerpts alone were enough to make Barrie Penrose very excited. Here, beyond doubt, was clear proof that the man in charge of the land forces in Northern Ireland remembered abuse of children in care in the Kincora Boys Home. He had, he said, done nothing about it because it was “police business”, not an army one. Leng’s statements, clearly spoken on tape, completely contradicted the denials of government Ministers and two official reports.

Penrose excitedly prepared his story and submitted it for the publication. He was wary. A recent article on the same subject which he had submitted to the editor had been published only in the Irish editions before being holked out by editor Neill. This time though, after the article was printed in the first edition, Penrose felt confident.

Imagine his horror then when he was told that the Ministry of Defence were complaining about the article. How, he wondered, did the Ministry know it existed? He never got an answer to that question. He was further perplexed when a Ministry spokesman, speaking to the Sunday Times Defence Correspondent, James Adams, vehemently denied that General Leng had said anything like what he had in fact said — on tape. Anxiously, Penrose submitted his tape to the editor who proclaimed that the story was not justified by what had been said on tape, and took it out of the paper.

This unusual approach to press freedom was questioned in Parliament by Tam Dalyell. The Observer published an article critical of Neill’s behaviour.

Neill duly set up an inquiry under Sunday Times executive Peter Roberts to see whether his action had been justified. After a long and careful investigation, Roberts concluded that Penrose had been right to submit the article; that the article was justified by the Leng interview and that it was therefore editorially wrong to exclude it. Neill was livid.

There have been three interesting developments since.

1. Peter Roberts has changed jobs. He is now an executive of The Times.
2. Barrie Penrose is no longer at the Sunday Times. He works occasionally for the Sunday Express.
3. James Adams has been promoted to Personnel Director.
He also agreed that he had handed over his duties to Mr Winterford and Colonel Railton but he did not consider that he had completed his duties in N. Ireland since he still had briefings for six feature articles about N. Ireland to complete for the Press and it had been agreed that he would return at weekends to discuss outstanding IP matters with Colonel Railton. Replying to Mr Groves he said that he could not say for certain that it was understood by Mr McDine that he would continue to deal with the Press on those feature articles. He said, however, that Colonel Railton had been present when he had had discussions with a member of the Press.

Mr Winterford had not known as he was not taking over IP duties.

Notes:

1. Prior to my transfer to Army HQ North West District at Preston, Lancashire, I handed over my HQ NI duties in two parts: the Information Policy activities (Psy Ops) to Colonel Jeremy Railton and the non Psy Ops activities to Squadron Leader Don Winterford. Squadron Leader Winterford was not going to be undertaking any Psy Ops work. Later in my representations, I refer to three filing cabinets of briefing documents (including the ‘Clockwork Orange’ material) being handed over to Colonel Railton - what became of them?

2. David McDine was Peter Broderick’s successor. I reported direct to both David McDine and Colonel Railton, but owing to the strict ‘need to know’ principle governing Psy Ops activities, Colonel Railton determined how much information about those activities was disclosed to David McDine.

3. The meeting referred to between Colonel Railton, a journalist and myself was to make arrangements for ongoing availability to provide that journalist with information from ‘Clockwork Orange’ after I moved to England.
American ‘relief funds’ used to buy arms • Taxpayers’ money aids Provo bombers
How I.R.A. gets guns and cash

CHRISTOPHER DOBSON reports from New York,
Dublin and Belfast on the paymasters of terror

Security. It’s good to know there’s still somewhere you can find it.

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It’s not always as easy as it looks, but every year our staff work hard to make sure the Abbey National is the best place to save and invest your money. And we’re always looking for ways to improve.

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Every day matters in all people we need. Please send a gift or a message to people we love.

A stench over fifteen years

Even Miss Marples would find it difficult to untangle the Colin Wallace affair. An army press officer in Northern Ireland, from a staunch Tory family, is sacked by the Government for leaking a document to a journalist. The press officer objects, claiming black propaganda as an essential part of his job. He says the real reason for dismissal lies in his threat to expose a homosexual ring at Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast, where a well-known Loyalist, among others, has been abusing and raping youths. Wallace is also concerned by Clockwork Orange, a covert intelligence operation out of control and moving from discrediting Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups to spreading Ulster and British (Labour) ministers.

Mr Wallace is sacked. He appeals to the independent Civil Service Appeal Board; but, just before the hearing, MI5 contacts his chairman. When the hearing is held, Whitehall withholds from the hearing important aspects of Mr Wallace's work. Shortly afterwards Mr Wallace is convicted of the manslaughter of an Arundel antiques dealer, the husband of his assistant, Jane, with whom he had become involved. He says he was framed by MI5 and a television documentary later casts doubt on the forensic evidence. Then the Defence Ministry, which has for 15 years denied any knowledge of Clockwork Orange, suddenly admits it was wrong and has misled the Prime Minister. The Government appoints David Calcutt QC, who is given strict instructions to concentrate only on Mr Wallace's dismissal and not to provide a report. But sensibly Mr Calcutt this week does indeed issue a report to ensure that his conclusions are not misinterpreted. In a sentence, he concludes that the appeal tribunal was "nobbled" and Colin Wallace unfairly dismissed.

So that's all right then? Mr Wallace gets £30,000 compensation for his wrongful dismissal. Shouldn't he be grateful for this belated justice? There are no doubts about Whitehall's urgent wish to close the file; but the Opposition parties are right to insist that the Calcutt report, a mere three pages, can be only the start.

Layer upon layer of this murky, mysterious story need to be coolly and impartially examined by a senior judge. The inquiry should start with Kincora, move on to the serious allegations about the MI5 operation to destabilise the Wilson Government (allegations which have also been made by the former MI5 officer, Peter Wright, in his book Spycatcher), take in Mr Wallace's manslaughter conviction, and finally insist on the Government both identifying the civil servant who nobbled the Civil Service Appeal Board, and disclosing what was said.

Nothing less will be satisfactory. Colin Wallace was right to declare that the Defence Secretary's instruction to Mr Calcutt not to write a report was "not the action of a minister trying to establish the truth". Already several of Mr Wallace's claims have been upheld: the existence of a counter-intelligence operation in Northern Ireland, his own wrongful dismissal, and the biased evidence submitted by civil servants at his appeal hearing. The time is long overdue for his still more serious allegations to be examined by a judicial inquiry. Nothing could be more serious than the suggestion of a security service trying to subvert a democratically elected government. Those allegations will not go away; they must be laid to rest.
Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee Meetings 1974/75

IPCC Meeting, 22 October 1974

A meeting on 22 October 1974 produced a redrafted version of 'Information Policy: Its Use in Northern Ireland' for submission to the Northern Ireland Secretary. In the new draft, reference to 'at the extreme - front organisations, peace festivals, rumour, etc,' was replaced with 'The creation of independent organisations which will support moderate policies, peace festivals and other uncommitted groupings.'

The new draft envisaged the following membership of the IPCC: Brigadier HEML Garrett, HQNI | D McDine HQNI | Dept CC K Newman, RUC HQ | Mr W McGookin RUC HQ | Mr R J Seaman NIO London | Mr J Allan Laneside | Mr D Gilliland NIO | Mr T M Roberts (Central Sec) | Mr R Ramsay | Mr B M Webster NIO D/D House | Mr W Adler NIO D/D House | Mr D Wyatt Liaison Staff | Mr M Cudlipp (Chairman).

IPCC Meeting, 25 November 1974

This meeting included a lengthy discussion of the paper on 'The Undermining of the IRA's Will to Fight'.

Cudlipp's report on Meeting the Northern Ireland Secretary, 13 December 1974

Michael Cudlipp reported in a draft minute of 13 December 1974 on two meetings with the Northern Ireland Secretary, who was said to have approved the IPCC paper on a coordinated information campaign, and to have agreed with point 3a of an earlier minute by Cudlipp which called for 'an attacking and expanded information policy campaign'.

he agrees with point 3a but emphasises there must be no attempts at "black propaganda" without Ministerial authority. He is extremely concerned at the blowback effect of such methods. He emphasised however that this did not mean he was not greatly in favour of a vigorous and attacking information policy and indeed he is anxious that we should be far more on the attack than on the defence.

IPCC Meeting, 27 January 1975

An IPCC meeting held on 27 January 1975 decided to submit the paper on undermining the IRA's will to fight to the Northern Ireland Secretary, emphasizing that it was a contingency measure in event of the breakdown of the ceasefire. It was also suggested that in this uncertain situation, the committee should focus on IRA propaganda in America.

IPCC Meeting, 3 February 1975
At a meeting on 3 February 1975, it was reported that the paper on 'Undermining the IRA' had gone to the the Permanent Under Secretary of the NIO. The main subject of discussion was a paper on 'Propaganda Overseas' by Mr Roberts, and it was agreed that a meeting would be sought with FCO officials.

**Cudlipp-Cooper letter, 24 March 1975**

In a letter to Sir Frank Cooper reviewing the activities of the Committee, Michael Cudlipp stated:

> The point of the Committee was partly co-ordination of public relations effort and partly cosmetic, particularly in relation to the Army who had rather wild ideas of IP, insufficiently thought through in professional and political term.

He went on to add:

> I understand the Army has again begun to get itchy feet about their version of IP and this is reflected in the latest manual you sent me...

Cudlipp suggested a regular meeting between himself and John Bourn 'while the current Army situation lasts'. An annotation of the file by England suggested that he agreed with Cudlipp's assessment.

**IPCC Meeting, 2 April 1975, Stormont Castle**

present: Mr Cudlipp NIO | Mr Roberts (NIO) | Mr Gilliland (NIO) | Mr Webster (NIO) | Mr Montgomery (Central Secretariat) | Mr Newman (RUC) | Bigadier Campbell HQNI | Mr McDine HQNI | Mr Hill (NIO).[25]

The Committee discussed the problem of information policy during the ceasefire:

Brigadier Campbell commented that the reports made every day by COs in Northern Ireland contained useful factual information of which more use could be made. Was it Government policy at present to lie low.

Mr Cudlipp replied that this was the case.[26]

It was also recorded that "Brigadier Campbell thought that some use could be made of material from intelligence sources as dirty propaganda."[27] it was agreed that the NIO would write down their ideas on ceasefire strategy for the next meeting.

**Cudlipp meeting with the GOC, 1 April 1975**

On 1 April 1975, Cudlipp met with the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland. In a report on the meeting to Sir Frank Cooper, Cudlipp stated:

> IP: The GOC admits frankly his concern here arises from the fact that we now have
effective control of his PR Department. All sensitive issues are referred to Stormont Castle.

He went on to report that the GOC believed the approach to propaganda was too cautious:

He believes strongly that we do not retaliate sufficiently against the Provisional's propaganda and suggests more use should be made of Army intelligence reports (community relations reports?) that come into Mr Payne's Department [M15] to provide regular briefing material. Is this a sound idea? Should an intelligence brief be produced for NIO information officers?

Foreign Office Meeting, 3 April 1975


Members of the IPCC were among the NIO officials who took part in a meeting at the Foreign Office on 3 April 1975. Among the conclusions reached it was agreed that:

The FCO (Information Research Department) would keep under review the production of unattributable material and briefing on "fund-raising".

IPCC Meeting, 7 April 1975, Stormont Castle

Present: Mr M Cudlipp NIO | Mr D Wyatt NIO | Mr J Allan NIO | Mr T Roberts NIO | Mr E Montgomery Central Secretariat | Mr R Ramsay Central Secretariat | Brigadier P Campbell HQNI | Mr D McDine HQNI | Mr K Newman RUC | Mr W McGookin RUC | Mr D Hill NIO

Brigadier Campbell said that the previous minutes were inaccurate and should read:

"Brigadier Campbell thought that account should be taken of information from terrorist sources which indicate what para-military groups intend to do in the propaganda field.

Campbell sought a paper outlining what action would be taken in the event of a return to violence. It was agreed that a subcommittee of Cudlipp, Wyatt, Campbell and McDine would draft a new paper.[35]

IPPC Subcommittee meeting, 15 April 1975

Present Mr Cudlipp NIO | Mr Newman RUC | Brigadier Campbell HQNI | Mr Gilliland NIO | Mr McDine HQNI | Mr Webster NIO | Mr McGookin RUC | Lt Col Ralton | Mr Oyler

Messrs Webster Cudlipp and Gilliland met the Army and Police on 15 April 1975 to discuss a draft information policy paper. It was favourably received with the proviso that the RUC sought to emphasise their sovereignty vis-a-vis the NIO.[37]
Paragraph 4 of the draft paper stated:

There is also the question of an aggressive information policy attacking and denigrating extremist organisations. This can only be effective in the right political climate; a climate which is always difficult to discern (see Para 6 below) and which certainly does not exist now.

Army Comment on Draft Information Policy Paper, 2 May 1975

Brigadier Campbell wrote to Cudlipp on 2 May 1975 with the Army's comments on the draft paper. This included the following paragraph:

b. The Denigration of Extremist Organisations. I am afraid we find your para 4 rather confusing. Until extremist organisations can be divorced from their grassroots support, we will never achieve the sort of political climate you seem to describe. Your suggestion, therefore, takes us round in a circle. Obviously, in the present climate, any aggressive information policy would need to be very carefully handled but I do not see that it needs to be ruled out. There is no reason at all why a skilful policy could not be effective even in the present climate. Obviously a general information attack on extremist organisations would be unlikely to succeed but in those areas where it can be shown that fringe elements (their connection with an established para-military organisation would not be claimed) are acting outside the law and against the interests of the community, it would seem possible to direct some most useful publicity. The Mafia/Chicago style extortion and protection rackets at present being operated in the Shankill and Andersonstown are examples.
BRITISH SPY LINK WITH KINCORA

PUBLICATION of the findings of an "independent" inquiry into a vice ring at Kincora Boys Home in Belfast has been delayed for almost a year because RUC Commissioner Sir John Harman (known without affection among his men as "Honest Jack") has been "too busy" with the controversy over his War Office appointment.

Last week, the RUC started taking parts of the report signed by Sir George Terry, former Chief Constable of Sussex, appointed to lead the inquiry by H.M. Inspector of Constabulary in London. First look went to the Belfast Newsletter, later picked up by the Press Association and used by RTE and Dublin papers. It claimed that the report dismissed allegations of British intelligence involvement in the saga and gave a gentle rap to the RUC for not knowing sooner about the homosexual abuse of boys at Kincora.

The Phoenix has discovered that an "independent" report into Kincora by Professor Paul D. Lyttle of the Queen's University of Belfast has been "too busy" with his War Office appointment to sort out the "independent" report on Kincora.

Harman and Flumley were appointed by Terry in March, 1982, to conduct investigations for him. They were both well chosen.

The late Sir Robert Brodrick, Whitehall's "spy master" when Harman was a young man,

The late Sir Robert Brodrick, Whitehall's "spy master" when Harman was a young man, had a solid background in the secret services.

Mr. William Bradford has sentence of 8 years for mugging man under the influence of drugs.

BRITISH PROBLEM

Although the Kincora saga is a lengthy one – going back to at least 1958 when the first homosexual offences were mentioned in court – the problem presented as the British investigation is a simple one. Do they admit that some of their top secret agents for almost a decade used socially and mentally retarded boys as sexual playthings, or do they keep it quiet?

The answer is obvious. Even if they attempted to confess themselves to exposure of Peter England, who is now dead, they would be in deep trouble. They were agents of a war ministry, the parents of which would be outraged. They would be dragged before "the court" with the result that they would be hanged. As a result, "there was no important interest in British intelligence - Belfast. He disappears from boat. No body ever found. An RUC inquiry into details given by Loyalist police reports that "It was not established, and no evidence was produced or tendered, that directly connected his death with mischief at Kincora."

October 1979: The North and West Belfast District Health and Social Services Committee receives the "Campbell Report" – after an inquiry into abuses. Kincora is not mentioned.

1973: RUC Regional Crime Squad, a special section of the Special Branch set up to probe sectarian murders in East Belfast under the command of D. Sept B1, Moonsay, trains history of Kincora homosexual vice ring and its links with British intelligence. File is passed to the RUC Assistant Chief Constable, codenamed HSB (Head of Special Branch). The file is passed to the RUC Assistant Chief Constable, codenamed HSB (Head of Special Branch).

1973: "Deep Throat" phones Irish Independent Belfast reporter Peter McKeehan, 8am, Ardsley, who writes story on the basis of the report. Other papers ignore it, "Deep Throat" rings McKeehan again even more detailed story...
THE PHOENIX 12/4/83

KIN-124830

BIZARRE CONNECTIONS

TWO bizarre happenings, probed by Harrison and Pleney and which do not get a mention in the Terry Report, are a homosexual assault made on the back of a young man by the security guard of Sir Maurice's Mole Oldfield and the Karate Chop killings.

At least one statement was made to the detectives about the occurrences which occurred in Maurice the Mole's private apartment on the top floor of Stormont Gate. A senior employee of Maurice had found the attractions of Maurice's assistant too much and attempted to molest him. A scuffle resulted between the two, but the guard intervened. No report was made. As a result of which the assistant returned to London.

The Karate Chop killing seems more like fiction than fact. Colin Wallace was a key figure in the British intelligence Pres One investigation. Wallace's warrant unit was responsible for much of the blackmail and was noted to be very well-informed in the 1970s. Among those who have admitted that he was a source for their material were: former Russian Ambassador to Ireland, Soviet Intelligence officer in England, the Irish Times editor, and the Irish Times editor. Following this Wallace told both that a homosexual assault was going on and threats to link them up with the Orange Order and the Unionist Party. When the final piece of information was not supplied, Wallace told him his job in Line was lost. He moved to England.

During the March, 1981, Wallace's job was a 10 year sentence to the Duke of Norfolk, for which he was named by a special task force headed by a special agent. In the event, Wallace was named by a special agent. In the event, Wallace was named by his superiors as having supplied information to the police on the adjacent. This information was used against him by the police. This information was used against him by the police.

February 1983: Michael Alison, Stormont Health Minister, tells Commons that, since the police had received no allegations of homosexual practices at an earlier date, their investigations had begun on January 24, 1980. Rejects calls for a public inquiry.

December 1981: RUC Chief Sir John Littler sets up internal inquiry to discover what happened to missing files and why Kincora boys were not prosecuted earlier. Mix in charges by alleged Assistant Chief Commissioner John Whiteside, a former head of the Special Branch, that the RUC's most wanted missing file in white collar crime was gone. He is former RUC member of the Security Liaison Committee set up by Sir Maurice. (See above).

November 1982: The Belfast News Letter, quoting RUC sources, said the Terry Report had been completed and had been sent to Sir Barry Shap, the Secretary of the Government Secret Act. Neither of these points are mentioned in the Terry Report.

Jim Prior sets up an independent tribunal of inquiry. Jitters are: Dr Stanley Worral, head of the Security Liaison Committee, RUC. August 1982: As claims of "whitewash" grow and prove incorrect on Northern Secretary Jim Prior to have public inquiry into allegations that British intelligence was heavily involved, German announcement he has asked the Inspectorate of Constabulary in London to nominate an "independent" police officer to inquire. He says "the way that the probe (the RUC) were 'conducted their inquiries' (into Kincora) for Sir George Terry, Chief Constable, Surrey, is inadequate.

February 1982: Following a spate of press stories linking Kincora and British intelligence, a team of detectives (Harrison and Pleney) run down. When the report is released it was October 1980. By the time the three were brought to trial in December 1980, the RUC had interviewed over 180 former inmates. 31 of whom made complaints to investigating detectives. One of the former inmates to be publicly identified was Hugh Quinn, aged 37, who now lives in England. As an orphan he had no-one to turn to except Mains in his homosexsual advances against him.

"Mains knew everyone from the Lord Mayor downward," Quinn told The Guardian. "What could I do? I had no one to turn to. Mains knew that, and he threatened I would be sent to borstal if I complained, or he'd beat me."

Another inmate alleged that at the age of 16 he was released from Kincora into the care of an uncle who, he says, customarily abused him. A second inmate alleged that his late father had been homosexsual with businessmen, civil servants, and other prominent men. The compliance to the police in 1973. The police authorities concluded he had evaded his evasive, uncontrollable.

SHOCKING CRIMES

At the start of the Kincora trial, it was alleged that McGrath, Smale, and Mains were guilty of a joint total of 14 separate charges of burglary, obtaining by false pretenses, and indecent assaults which dated back to 1961. These allegations are distasteful and abhorrent. Thus this systematic corruption continued in P4.

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of young persons in care and control of these men," said the prosecution.

The court heard that the incidents took place while the youths were in bed watching TV, in the toilets, in the office and in warden's flat adjoining the building. "In some cases the evidence will be that the accused compelled or threatened the persons. In other cases, the offences were consensual."

All three pleaded guilty. Main was jailed for six years, Semple for five and McGrath got four. Also sentenced were three other men — including an Anglican monk and a former Scout Commissioner — for sex offences committed in other children's homes.

But it is beyond doubt that Main, Semple and McGrath are merely the small-fry. McGrath's links with British intelligence have never been properly explained, nor have any of the British spies actively involved in the scandal ever been brought to justice.

**BLACKMAIL**

When British intelligence moved into Ireland in a big way in 1970, they found this ready-made blackmail situation. A network of Unionist politicians and leaders in the Orange Order who were practising pedophiles, and a key figure in Loyalist paramilitary circles, John McKeague, then leader of the Shankill Defence Association (later to become the UDA) were members of the Kincora vice club.

McGrath was used as an intelligence recruiter in Orange and Unionist circles. McKeague was set up as an agent provocateur, running the pseudo-gang which he called "Red Hand Commandos" as an instrument of British intelligence.

By the mid-Seventies, a lot of things had changed. British intelligence had developed an information-gathering system which had much less use for figures like McGrath, while McKeague's agents provocateurs were of diminishing importance.

Kincora was pushed into the background. The vice ring which had existed for so long to entertain top Unionists and Orange men continued under British intelligence protection, despite a widening circle of knowledge about its activities. D. Set Caskey and other CID men in East Belfast knew of it; the RUC Special Branch knew about it; and even Orange leader Martin Smyth and Ian Paisley knew about it, according to Valerie Sharp, a disingenuous Free Presbyterian official who later resigned because of the lack of action.

**AFTER-HOURS FUN**

But the most startling part of the saga was yet to happen. Peter England, arriving to take over intelligence affairs at Stormont, saw his chance for some after-hours fun.

Joe Main, the Kincora warden, who had not been used until then by British intelligence, was recruited as a procuring of young boys. Several of the boys were taken from the home to Newtownards by an uncle of one of them, Billy Baird, a friend of Main's, where they were picked up and taken to the British intelligence house on Old Hollywood Road, One of the boys, John Louis Baird (shown in silhouette on a BBC TV report about Kincora) has made a statement about how signals were exchanged with car headlights before he was transferred to the "Englishman's" car.

The "Englishman" was Stormont Intelligence Chief Peter England. Investigators Harrison and Penley were whisked last June several pages from a British intelligence briefing document on personal security which was found in Kincora. On the margins of pages 5, 7, 11 and 13, several phone numbers had been written. The handwriting, as Harrison and Penley discovered when they compared it with other papers in their secret inquiry headquarters at Carnegive RUC Training Centre in Belfast, was that of Peter England.

None of this information is contained in the Terry report which is due to be published in its sanitised form next week, after selected "leaks" have minimised its impact.
RECORDED DELIVERY

Sir Anthony Hart
Chairman
The HIA Inquiry
PO Box 2080
Belfast
Northern Ireland
BT1 9QA

27 October 2016

Dear Sir Anthony,

In my previous submission dated 26 September 2016 I attached notes which I supplied to Paul Foot following a meeting that Fred Holroyd and I had with the author Robin Bryans. In those notes I said:

"RB says that John Bryans [his cousin] is gay and that the Orange Order may have discussed that fact and forced him to relinquish his role in the 1970s. He [RB] also claims that Thomas Passmore - another senior figure listed in my 1974 notes - is a suspected child sex offender."

Thomas Passmore was, as you know, one of those listed in my Tara press briefing document in 1973 as someone who had knowledge of William McGrath’s activities. The attached story from ‘The Examiner’ on 13 July 2013 claims that Thomas Passmore sexually abused a boy from the Bethany House children’s home in Dublin. I have no idea if the allegation is accurate, but the victim is apparently still alive and it should be easy for your Inquiry to check the veracity of the story - especially when the victim is quoted as saying that he is considering making a complaint to the PSNI. I am also very surprised that there was no mention of this during your Inquiry’s hearings, bearing in mind that it is in the public domain.

My reason for pointing this out to your Inquiry is that, if senior members of the Orange Order were themselves engaged in homosexual activities at a time when such activities were criminal offences, that might account for their failure to pursue the allegations made about William McGrath. This is also important because Robin Bryans is on record as saying that ‘Jack’ Bryans was close to McGrath and visited McGrath’s home. He also is on record as saying that Anthony Blunt knew “Jack Bryans”- Blunt, of course, had a long-term homosexual relationship with Peter Montgomery, whose estate in Co Tyrone was allegedly used by Tara for training purposes. Given that Blunt was then living under immunity from prosecution, having confessed his role in spying for Russia, it is simply not credible
that the Intelligence Services did not know about his activities in Ireland - especially when Peter Montgomery had also been under suspicion at one time of spying for the Russians.

The Sunday Times 30 May 1976

On 30 May 1976, The Sunday Times published a story claiming that the RUC carried out a series of raids on the Belfast homosexual community and questioned a number of individuals about their involvement with English civil servants at the Northern Ireland Office. The newspaper went on to claim that a spokesman for the Belfast gay community protested to Merlyn Rees about police harassment.

When Paul Foot published his book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace', in 1989, he and I had a meeting at Parliament with Merlyn Rees, Roy Jenkins (Lord Jenkins of Hillhead) and Lord Stockton. In response to a question from Paul Foot, Merlyn Rees confirmed that Peter England (a senior official at the NIO) had been removed from his post in Belfast in 1976. Mr Rees would not elaborate on the reason for Peter England’s removal. However, he did say that he was very surprised to hear later that Peter England had not only been allowed to keep his security clearance, but also had subsequently been given an even more senior post at the MoD. Finally, Mr Rees confirmed the Sunday Times claim that he had received a complaint from the Belfast gay community about alleged RUC harassment.

Apparenty the RUC had proposed charging a number of individuals with sexual offences, but Mr Sam Silkin MP, the Attorney General, had stopped the prosecutions. Mr Rees would not say what reasons, if any, the Attorney General gave for his decision to prevent the prosecutions going ahead, or, indeed, why the Attorney General was involved in the matter.

It seems very strange that the RUC were apparently actively investigating links between the Belfast gay community and civil servants at the NIO at the time when Sir George Terry and senior RUC officers later claimed the police were so busy dealing with terrorist activities that they did not have the time or the resources to investigate allegations relating to McGrath and Kincora. I also find it incredible that although the RUC had significant knowledge of the Belfast gay community to launch the arrest operation, they appear to have been totally unaware of McGrath, Mains and Semple, or at least they did not include them in that arrest operation.

I do not know if the arrest operation was linked with civil servants at the NIO, but the claim that NIO staff may have been involved in unlawful sexual activities appears to have been ignored by your Inquiry - at least in the public hearings.

To demonstrate the extent to which MI5 misled Merlyn Rees, he informed us that the Security Service told him that I was a "filing clerk" at Army HQ when the Fisk incident occurred. Why did MI5 find it necessary to lie to the Secretary of State about my role at HQ NI? Mr Rees also told us that he was totally unaware that an Army Psy Ops unit existed, or that there were IRD officers based at Stormont Castle. In addition, he claimed that he was not aware that the Army knew the alleged identities of the Dublin bombers. I have no reason to doubt what Mr Rees said, and it is clear that the Intelligence Services were being less than honest with him. So much for democratic parliamentary accountability!

As I pointed out to you previously, when I decided not to give evidence to your Inquiry, it was not because I had any doubts about the willingness of your panel to do their best to discover the truth about child sex abuse allegations, it was because the Intelligence Services and the MoD have a long and demonstrable track record of lying about my case. They lied about my job specification and my disciplinary proceedings, and they rigged the outcome of those proceedings. They lied to Parliament, to Ministers, including Prime Ministers, about my allegations. They lied to the Calcutt Inquiry and they lied to the Saville Inquiry. Any reasonable person who has followed my case closely would come to the inevitable conclusion that they had something to hide. Eventually, the MoD was forced grudgingly to make some admissions that my allegations were correct. When the Government decided to treat this Inquiry differently from the Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (ICCSA) in London - and refused to justify their actions - I came to the conclusion that nothing would change. Sadly, I
now believe that I have been proved right in that respect.

The Folio Document

One of my main concerns about your Inquiry is what appears to be a significant lack of direct knowledge about what was going on during the 1970s. To some extent that is inevitable with the passage of time. However, the net result is that topics appear to have been raised and then left hanging in mid air because of that lack of knowledge. Worse still, there has often been a information vacuum left which the Inquiry has attempted to fill by pure speculation rather than facts. This is unfair to all those involved. A good example of this are the references in Inquiry transcripts to “The Folio Document”.

To the best of my knowledge, ‘The Folio Document’ first appeared in late 1973 or early 1974. The Army, or at least those engaged in Intelligence and Psy Ops, suspected that the document was produced by a prominent member of Tara with a view to undermining Peter Robinson. However, there appears to have been a belief within the DUP that the document was the work of another Tara member who was also in the DUP. It was believed that although individual withdrew from the Party in 1974, the wrong person had been blamed. Clearly, the document author was someone who had access to very specific information about the DUP leadership.

I have no doubt whatsoever that the Army had nothing to do with the creation of ‘The Folio Document’. Indeed, the document’s contents were counter-productive to what we were trying to achieve at that time. It is, however, highly likely that we did encourage some members of the press to investigate who was responsible for writing the document and the reasons for its production. I may have sent a copy to Jim Campbell, but I cannot recall if I did. The Army’s interest in the document was a result of the DUP’s opposition to the Power Sharing Executive and the potential impact that might have on the security situation. I do not believe the Army used The Folio Document in connection with Tara, McGrath or the Rev Ian Paisley - at least not while I was at Army HQ in Lisburn.

In 1976, a year after I left the MoD, a reporter told me that he had recently i.e. in 1976, been given a copy of ‘The Folio Document’ by an official at the NIO who claimed that it had been produced by the UDA. This incident may have been linked in some way with claims by the Rev Ian Paisley in February that year that attempts were being made by “a black propaganda unit” headed by “senior officials from the Foreign Office” at the NIO to discredit members of the UlUUC by circulating allegations about their morals. I still do not know the true identity of The Folio Document author.

Yours sincerely,

Colin Wallace

Encl:

Paul Graham
Thomas Passmore allegation
Thomas Passmore
Bethany to hell ... and back

Paul Graham found out he was adopted. Years later he found out more. Today he's an angry man, writes Danielle McGrane

At 31, Paul Graham found out he was adopted. Years later he found out more. Today he's an angry man, writes Danielle McGrane.

Paul Graham, 31, was adopted after being sexually abused as a child. His mother was 30 years younger than him.

Paul's journey of discovery began when he joined Alcoholics Anonymous. He drank to escape reality. He now feels he was always frightened. His adopted mother was a terrible woman. She ran a flower shop and had a car — a big deal in those days — but spent her time drinking. She used to get drunk all the time and would beat me. At about 12 years old, she would wake me up at last to go out and get her whisky. My father was bedridden, but my mother was about 30 years younger than him.

Paul was sexually abused after he was adopted, by his acquaintance of his mother's. He

was always there. But I just thought: what do you do with these people? I haven't spoken about it with my wife and kids. I think it would be hard for them, too, he says.

At the age of 14, Paul joined the navy. His wife, Hilary, was a cigarette packer and they began as penpals. When Paul was 17, marrying when he was 21. She was the only person who ever loved me, he says. They lived together in weekdays and Paul was home in the children, but struggled. Drink had taken hold of his life.

"By the time we came out to Australia, our three kids, 1 was 31."

Paul worked in a sawmill factory, but spent his free time drinking to shut out the horrors of his childhood.

"I kept getting picked up by the police and I spent a lot of time in jail," he says.

Paul sobered up, got a well-paid job in a chemical factory and focused on his community.

He was elected to the local council in Mascot, a suburb of Sydney. "I got elected as deputy mayor here — and I was the first non-Australian elected to the local council," he says.

While it seemed on the outside that things were going well for Paul, his feelings of emptiness hadn't subsided. "I just kept crying if I saw children being abused on TV. So I went to my doctor and he told me to see a psychologist. The psychologist said to me I'm going to tell you now, you were abused as a baby, whether sexually or physically, I don't know."

His doctor backed this up, saying his leaking heart valve was probably a sign he had malnutrition or consumption as a child.

In 1986, Paul hired a lawyer in Sydney who began delving into an organisation called PAC. He found out about his family. "My mother was 34 and employed in domestic service when she was sent down south to Bethany House to have me. I seemed, at the time, Bethany House was the kind of place where you could just pick up any baby if you wanted to adopt one," he says.

PACT said Paul's birth mother was dead, and that his aunt wanted to meet him. "I travelled to the offices of PACT in Dublin, and they told me I could pick up the phone to my aunt straight away. It was great."

I reckon I spent four years there now, because I can remember ... long rooms with rows of beds."

Paul began to find out who he was, and where he came from. "I knew I was born in a place called Bethany House, so when I was researching it on the internet, I came across Derek Leaman, the chairman of the Bethany Survivors Group, who had also been born there, around the same time as me."

The Examiner 31 July 2013
CHILD ABUSE ALLEGATION - THOMAS PASSMORE

A former resident of a Dublin children’s home [Bethany Home] has claimed he was sexually abused by, Thomas Passmore, a Orange Order figure after being adopted by a Belfast-based Protestant couple.

Maurice Johnson - his real name - claims that when he was 11 he was targeted by his abuser when the man worked in the flower shop run by his adoptive mother. The Sydney-based pensioner, who fled Belfast after a decade in the care of Edith and William Graham, revealed that he was shocked to discover that the man who assaulted him was an influential member of the Orange Order. The now-dead man’s name has been featured on an Orange banner.

The father of three said he remained angry that he had been placed in the care of a couple incapable of ensuring his safety.

"My sister and I were adopted like you’d buy a handbag. There was no vetting to discover if the Grahams were suitable to care for children," he said.

Mr Johnson’s unmarried birth mother, who was from Castlederg in Co Tyrone, had her son in the Bethany Home in Dublin on May 9 1939. The boy remained in the care of the Protestant-run institution until February 1944 when he was adopted by the Grahams. His early years with the Grahams were happy despite his adoptive father’s frailty due to tuberculosis. However, by the time he reached the age of nine it became apparent that Mrs Graham was an alcoholic.

Mr Johnson said that as a 14 year old he convinced his inebriated mother to sign a document giving him permission to join the Royal Marine Bands. He later transferred to the Royal Navy as a boy seaman.

Mr Johnson, who emigrated to Australia with his wife Hillary in 1970, battled alcoholism until kicking the habit 30 years ago. His birth mother passed away in 1983 without meeting her son but he maintains contact with her sister. He is now considering making an official complaint to the PSNI about the sexual abuse he suffered.
Paul Graham

President of Mascot RSL Sub – Branch Club

Paul Graham, a life member, former Chairman and Director of Windgap was appointed as an Ambassador in 2015.

Paul was Chairman of the Board of Windgap from 1986 to 1987 and he was reappointed to the Board in June 2007. He served as a Director and acted in an advisory capacity relating to Windgap properties. He has been involved with the foundation for over 30 years. Paul worked in the event logistics industry for over 25 years which included working on four Olympic Games. He is a British war veteran with over 15 years of service in the Royal Navy and he was appointed as the President of the Royal Naval Association (NSW). He is currently the president of Mascot RSL Sub – Branch Club and served as a Deputy Mayor of Botany Council.

Paul continues to support Windgap in a great capacity by engaging with the community to bring awareness and with his involvement in initiatives, events and celebrations such as: Windgap Warriors Soccer Team, St Patrick’s Day and Remembrance Day.

“"I have great belief of ensuring that clients and supported employees of Windgap have a great chance of succeeding in life” – Paul Graham
RECORDED DELIVERY

Sir Anthony Hart
Chairman
The HIA Inquiry
PO Box 2080
Belfast
Northern Ireland
BT1 9QA

7 November 2016

Dear Sir Anthony,

I refer to my letter to you dated 27 October 2016 and to the subsequent reply dated 2 November from the Secretary to the Inquiry, Mr Andrew Browne.

I assume from Mr Browne’s response that either I did not make myself very clear, or your Inquiry did not read my letter very carefully. Mr Browne says:

“You will appreciate that allegations in respect of the Bethany Home, which was in Dublin, fall outside our Terms of Reference and therefore cannot be considered by this Inquiry.”

I fully understand that, but I did not refer to any allegations involving the Bethany Home. My letter referred to a former resident of that Home, Paul Graham (born in the Home in 1934), who claims that he was sexually abused by Thomas Passmore after he left the Home and had been adopted by Edith and William Graham who lived in Belfast. It is further claimed in the press that at the time of the alleged offences, Thomas Passmore worked in a “flower shop” run by Paul Graham’s adopted mother. It should be clear from the foregoing that I was referring to sexual offences that (a) occurred after Paul Graham left Bethany House and (b) that the offences took place in Belfast.

What I attempted to highlight in my previous letter was that in my earlier submissions to you there exists credible evidence that, in the 1970s when Roy Garland was attempting to get the Orange Order to take action on his allegations relating to William McGrath’s activities, at least two of the most senior figures in the Orange Order had themselves, it is claimed, a track
record of unlawful sexual activity. Clearly, if those allegations are true, there could have been a serious conflict of interest within the Orange Order leadership, and that could account for (but not justify) why the Orange Order appeared to be less than enthusiastic about dealing with Roy Garland's allegations. Had Roy Garland's allegations been acted upon at that time, it is likely that years of sexual abuse of children could have been avoided. The thrust of my previous letter was, therefore, to highlight just one of a number of possible reasons why no action was taken against William McGrath until 1980.

You will, of course, recall that Thomas Passmore was one of the individuals named in my 1973 press briefing document on McGrath and Tara as being "aware of" McGrath's activities.

As a separate issue, I feel the PSNI should investigate Paul Graham's allegations, if only to bring some form of closure to the issue. I accept, of course, that this is not part of your Inquiry's remit.

Finally, I attach a copy of a letter, which I have recently discovered and which I sent to Lord Trefgarne at the Ministry of Defence. You may already have a copy of this document.

The letter shows that I repeatedly made it clear to the most senior people at the MoD (including Government Ministers) that it was agreed with Colonel Railton that I would continue to work on "various outstanding projects" ('Clockwork Orange') for a period of time after I took up my new post at Army HQ North West District. Given that MI5 claimed that I had been removed from Northern Ireland for allegedly 'leaking' information to the press, is it really credible that I would have been allowed to work on highly sensitive material such as that used in 'Clockwork Orange' and maintain contact with Colonel Railton after I left Northern Ireland? The MoD did not deny that such an agreement existed. MI5 is also well aware that if I had really wanted to damage the MoD, I could have leaked full details of the 'Clockwork Orange' project to the press. I did not do that and I still have not done that. Even Paul Foot was not aware of the full details of what I had been engaged in.

This is also important because, in the light of General Leng's memo in late 1974 about McGrath and Kincora, some of the outstanding work that I was engaged in at the time I was removed from Northern Ireland related to William McGrath and Tara, including his sexual and political activities. The 'Clockwork Orange' material demonstrates this very clearly.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Colin Wallace
PERSONAL FOR:

The Rt Hon the Lord Trefgarne
Minister of State for Defence
The Ministry of Defence
Main Building
LONDON
SW1A 2HB

21st May 1986

Dear Lord Trefgarne,

Since drafting my letter dated 20 May I have received a reply from Mr R P Hatfield at your Ministry regarding my correspondence with you of 23 April.

I can only assume from Mr Hatfield's letter that you are either being totally misled by your advisers over the issues in question or that you have deliberately chosen to ignore the facts. It is absurd to claim, as Mr Hatfield does, that the disciplinary case against me in 1975 "did not depend in any way" on the nature of my duties in Northern Ireland. That is a grossly dishonest statement to make because the correct facts are as follows.

I was appointed to the post of Assistant Command Public Relations Officer at Army Headquarters Northern Ireland in May 1968 to replace Colonel Jack Gracie. My terms of employment related to press and public relations work only and I had no involvement whatsoever with psychological warfare. As a result of the terrorist activity in the Province, the Ministry of Defence decided that I should be re-employed on psychological operations which operated under the cover title of Information Policy. The Ministry publicly trawled a totally fictitious job description for my new post to conceal the true nature of my employment. Indeed, Mr Broderick, former Chief Information Officer, Army HQ Northern Ireland, referred in a statement to the hostility that existed prior to 1974 within parts of Whitehall over my "dual role". When the events which led to disciplinary action being taken against me arose in 1974/75 the authorities, caught by their own deception, claimed that my duties were those which had been advertised publicly and that my conduct should be judged in that light. This was done to avoid political embarrassment and
prevent legal or other action being taken against those responsible for my clandestine activities. To reinforce their case, the authorities also embarked on a campaign of character assassination to ensure that my account of events would not be believed, and they blocked all possible attempts by me and my representatives to obtain official information, records or witnesses to corroborate my case. In other words the Ministry of Defence as my employer changed my conditions of employment by clandestine means from those under which I was originally recruited to those which were totally contrary to the normal Civil Service code of conduct. Despite this, they later dishonestly led the Civil Service Appeal Board and others to believe that my actions should be judged in the light of a totally spurious job description and abdicated all responsibility for my difficulties. It is clear from the above that if the Ministry of Defence had not changed the nature of my duties in Northern Ireland to those breaching the Civil Service code then my difficulties would never have arisen, I would almost certainly still be employed by the Government and would not have spent the last six years of my life in prison for an offence which I did not commit. I hope you will admit that my annual confidential reports show that my work and behaviour in Northern Ireland were otherwise excellent and that there was no reason to indicate that my conduct would change in the future.

It is also most important to point out that a very large percentage of my work in Ulster related to the planting of sensitive, classified information in the press on a 'non-attributable' basis because the authorities did not want the information traced back to them. It was common practice for 'restricted' information, including certain classified documents, to be given by the press by those engaged in 'disinformation' activities and it is absolutely dishonest for the authorities to pretend that such practices were not used. Also, in many instances I had to work on the basis of delegated authority when it was impracticable to do otherwise. Indeed, I was sometimes requested to 'manufacture' classified documents containing false information for some operations to add credibility to specific stories. It is significant that disciplinary action was ever taken against anyone else for such actions - particularly those directing or instigating the projects. Furthermore, the document which I deposited at the reporter's home was in itself nothing more than a cover for the more contentious Information Policy activities - hence the very low classification of 'restricted' - and you know very well that I could have deposited numerous really damaging documents with the press if I had been simply trying to 'cause trouble'. I would again challenge you to deny that the job description which the Ministry of Defence supplied to the CSAB was false and that the Ministry did so not only to strengthen their case but also to prevent discovery of other disinformation practices.

It is equally untrue to say that the document was handed over after I "had relinquished" my duties in Northern Ireland. The document was deposited at an address on the day I handed over my post - it was not the only activity that I carried out during that day but no disciplinary action was taken against me for anything else I did on that occasion - and was part of a cover-up
operation in which I had been engaged for some weeks before my departure. Not all my duties were handed over before my departure and, as you well know, I had made arrangements with Lt Colonel Railton to return to the Province on a number of occasions to deal with various outstanding projects. The reason for this was that my 'successor', Squadron Leader Winterford, was not taking on ANY of my Information Policy work and, in any event, owing to the 'non-attributable' and politically sensitive nature of some of the matters in which I was engaged, was not being briefed on the full details of my activities. As you know, Colonel Railton was prevented from attending the CSAB and my representatives and I could not, therefore, question him as to the true nature of events leading up to my departure. As a result the CSAB had no idea of the true nature of my normal working practices nor had my representatives any means of corroborating my evidence. In short the hearing was a carefully engineered charade. If Colonel Railton had attended the Appeal and had denied my version of events, then I would certainly have taken the case to an Industrial Tribunal or the courts. Instead, I was repeatedly assured that the case was being handled in a low-key manner to protect the Security Forces from embarrassment and that, if I went along with this, the whole affair would be resolved satisfactorily. Of course, the authorities never had the slightest intention of telling the truth because it was not in their interests to do so, nor had they any intention of dealing with my case in a just manner once they had acquired the CSAB verdict.

I have never heard of any request from the Board that the IPCS representative be given access "to documents - including some classified information" - which they thought would aid my appeal, and commonsense dictates that such a claim cannot possibly be true. How on earth could such a request have been made by the Board? The hearing lasted about one hour only and there were NO subsequent hearings - at least if there were then I was neither informed nor present. The only classified document which the IPCS representative had access to was a copy of the document which I deposited at the journalist's home and access to that was gained only after strong representations to your Ministry from IPCS. Furthermore, the IPCS representative, the former Deputy Director of Army Public Relations (who wrote my classified job description) and myself were REFUSED access to my classified job description and to the 'Information Policy Directive' issued by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in January 1975. If what you claim is true, perhaps you would be so kind as to tell me which documents the Board asked that the IPCS representative be given access to and when these were made available to my representatives and myself?

Referring to the matter of legal representation, I was informed during an interview at the Ministry of Defence in FEBRUARY 1975 that I could only engage a solicitor 'cleared by the Ministry' to act on my behalf. You will note that this advice was given during the initial police investigations and long before either the DPP decided to take no legal proceedings or the Ministry decided to take disciplinary action. Clearly, it would have been pointless of me to brief a solicitor who was not sanctioned by
the authorities if he would not be given access to the relevant classified documents, and, in any event, I was assured privately that such legal representation was unnecessary because the matter was the result of a "misunderstanding or breakdown in communication" and would be resolved satisfactorily.

Turning to the authority which you claim I was given to send my file to the Kincora Inquiry, Mr Hatfield tries to avoid the issue by saying that the authority was contained in Major General Garrett's letter of 16 July 1985. This is absolute nonsense: General Garrett stated in his letter:

"The purpose of this letter is to confirm that you may disclose to members of the Committee any information which is DIRECTLY RELEVANT to the investigation - including, where necessary, information which you gained in the course of your employment with the Ministry of Defence and which may be security classified. You will, of course, appreciate that your responsibilities for safeguarding information not related to the Inquiry remain unchanged and you must therefore only divulge information which falls within the scope of the Committee's terms of reference, a copy of which is attached."

You will note that General Garrett's letter was written almost ONE YEAR after I submitted my file to the Prime Minister and nowhere in that letter does he refer to the file nor its contents, despite the fact that the Ministry of Defence had a copy in their possession. Secondly, General Garrett particularly points out that I "must therefore only divulge information which falls within the Committee's terms of reference, a copy of which is attached." You are well aware that the Committee decided that the information in my file WAS NOT within their terms of reference - a fact which your Ministry must have been fully aware of when the General wrote to me - so could you please explain to me how that letter could possibly be regarded by your office as authority to release the file to the Inquiry? Legal opinion which I have received is in no doubt whatsoever that General Garrett's letter and the attached copy of the Committee's terms of reference not only gave me no authority to submit the file to the Inquiry but also effectively precluded me from doing so without breaking the Official Secrets Acts.

Incidentally, I have now been told that the copy of my file which mysteriously disappeared from Mr Teddy Taylor's office at the House of Commons, the loss of which was reported to the police - has now been returned to him. Would please explain how it went missing, who had took it? Given the official reaction to that episode alone, it is easy to see why the authorities are so very reluctant to order a proper investigation into my case and I find it remarkable that the Government can persist in such blatant dishonesty.

Yours sincerely,

Colin Wallace
RECORDED DELIVERY

Mr Patrick Butler
The HIA Inquiry
PO Box 2080
Belfast
Northern Ireland
BT1 9QA

18 December 2016

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter dated 8 December 2016 and I attach herewith a response to that letter. Despite what your Chairman has said, my response is severely limited for the following reasons.

I received a large boxful of documents from the HIA Inquiry on Saturday, 11 December 2016. I sent an email to the Inquiry pointing out that because I would be away from home until 16 December (two days ago) I would not be able to read and respond appropriately by the Inquiry’s deadline of 22 December 2016. Moreover, my solicitor is abroad for much of the relevant period.

To expand on this: the Inquiry is already aware from my previous submissions that in 1982, in preparation for a meeting with the Terry Inquiry investigators I briefed my solicitor on the background as to how I gained my knowledge of Kincora. After that briefing, my solicitor’s offices were broken into and searched, but nothing stolen. No one was ever arrested or charged with an offence linked to that break-in. It is not unreasonable to believe that whoever was responsible for the break-in might well have been searching for information about what I had given my solicitor about Kincora. Fortunately, my solicitor had hidden the material I gave him. However, in the light of that experience, I have subsequently had to store all my case papers in a place of safety. As a result, I do not have quick and easy access to them.

The Chairman pointed out to me that, despite the foregoing, it was up to me “to manage my own affairs”. I fully accept that, but I have been informed that other individuals who have been given “warning letters” have also been granted one or more time-extensions by the
Inquiry to complete their submissions. Not unnaturally, I regard the Inquiry’s policy of treating respondents differently in this respect as being very unfair.

The net effect of the Chairman’s decision is that my solicitor has been unable to read all the relevant papers, or to advise me properly. As a result, I have had to limit my response to some selected items, some of which I have partially commented on in my previous submissions to your Inquiry. This is most unsatisfactory, both to me and to the needs of the victims, but I have been left with no other alternative.

Also, as I have previously pointed out to the Inquiry, I go abroad on Wednesday and I shall not be back in the UK until about 7 January 2017 at the earliest.

It is true that I have made five previous submissions to the Inquiry. As I have pointed out in those submissions, I wanted to draw the Inquiry’s attention to incorrect or misleading information that was disseminated to the public via the Inquiry’s website. I also pointed out that my submissions did not contain new information or evidence, only material that the Inquiry should have been aware of and thus should not have created those inaccuracies. I believe that most inquiries would have welcomed such information, but if that was not the case in this instance then I apologise. If my previous submissions were unwelcome, then the HIA Inquiry will be the first Inquiry I experienced that has adopted such a position.

Yours faithfully.

Colin Wallace
RESPONSE BY COLIN WALLACE TO THE HIA INQUIRY DRAFT REPORT

18 December 2016

Background

I received a large boxful of documents from the HIA Inquiry on Saturday, 11 December 2016. I sent an email to the Inquiry pointing out that because I would be away from home until 16 December I would not be able to read and respond appropriately by the Inquiry’s deadline of 22 December. Moreover, my solicitor was abroad for much of the relevant period.

To expand on this problem: in 1982, in preparation for a meeting with the Terry Inquiry investigators I briefed my solicitor on the background as to how I gained my knowledge of Kincora. After that briefing, my solicitor’s offices were broken into and searched, but nothing stolen. No one was ever arrested or charged with an offence linked to that break-in. It is not unreasonable to believe that whoever was responsible for the break-in might well have been searching for information about what I had told my solicitor about Kincora. Fortunately, my solicitor had hidden the material. However, in the light of that experience, I have subsequently had to store all my case papers in a place of safety. As a result, I do not have quick and easy access to them.

The Chairman pointed out to me that, despite the foregoing, it was up to me "to manage my own affairs". I fully accept that, but I have been informed that other individuals who have been given “warning letters” have also been granted one or more time-extensions by the Inquiry to complete their submissions. Not unnaturally, I regard the Inquiry’s policy of treating respondents differently in this respect as being very unfair.

The net effect of the Chairman’s decision is that my solicitor has been unable to read all the relevant papers, or to advise me properly. As a result, I have had to limit my response to just a few items. This is most unsatisfactory, both to me and to the needs of the victims, but I have been left with no other alternative. I believe, however, that I ought to have been given sufficient time to respond properly.

Introduction

I worked as part of the Army’s team on the Inquiry chaired by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery, and which was the first examination of the events known as ‘Bloody Sunday’. I also gave evidence to the Inquiry by Mr Justice Barron into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in May 1974, and to the Inquiry chaired by Lord Saville into ‘Bloody Sunday’.

In the light of my previous experiences with those Inquiries, the HIA Inquiry has been a major disappointment on a number of grounds:
Unlike the Saville Inquiry where all witnesses were required to provide signed, formal
statements, the HIA Inquiry appears to have relied heavily on unsigned statements compiled during the now largely discredited Terry Inquiry. Such a process is wide open to abuse and such 'evidence' should not have been relied on. Moreover, because of the historical background to the Terry Inquiry, some witnesses may not have regarded the police as an entirely impartial entity and may, therefore, have been unwilling to be fully open about what happened.

Unlike the Saville Inquiry, lawyers representing the victims did not have an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and it is clear from the transcripts of the public hearings that cross examination by the HIA Inquiry’s lawyers was largely ineffectual, with many obviously important issues totally ignored.

Unlike the Saville Inquiry, for more than a year before I eventually gave evidence, I was supplied with copies of all documents which were deemed by the lawyers for that Inquiry to be relevant to my evidence. My solicitor asked the HIA Inquiry to provide him with a list of documents released by the Government to the Inquiry. This was to help me to identify if I was aware of any documents that were clearly missing and which should be requested by the HIA Inquiry from the relevant Government departments. My solicitor’s request was refused. This is an important factor because of the official records show, when I was transferred out of Northern Ireland in February 1975, I handed over three filing cabinets of documents to Lt Colonel Railton. Included in those cabinets was much of my ‘Clockwork Orange’ material, including my files on Tara and William McGrath. What became of those documents? Did the MoD supply them to the HIA Inquiry?

Introduction

It is clear from reading the on-line-published transcripts that the Inquiry has adopted two very different approaches when dealing with the information provided to it. Evidence provided by the Intelligence Services has been treated almost with awe and subjected only to the most perfunctory, if any, questioning, while information supplied by those who take a different view from that provided the Intelligence Services is almost dismissed out of hand, or attempts have been made to discredit it.

The problem is that the account supplied by Government agencies, including the Intelligence Services, is one that is more in keeping with a work of fiction than the harsh realities of what was taking place within the Intelligence communities in Northern Ireland during the 1970s.

Lord Stevens, former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, presided over an external police inquiry into allegations in Northern Ireland of collusion between the British Army, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and loyalist terrorists in the murders of Irish nationalists. In May 2011, he gave evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary Extension) Bills and said:

"When you talk about Intelligence, of the 210 people we arrested, only three were not (Intelligence) agents. Some of them were agents for all four of those particular organisations (Army, MI5, MI6 and Special Branch), fighting against each other, doing things and making a large sum of money, which was all against the public
interest and creating mayhem in Northern Ireland. Any system that is created in relation to this country and Northern Ireland has to have a proper controlling mechanism. It has to have a mechanism where someone is accountable for what the actions are and that has to be transparent." [Minutes of The Joint Committee on the Draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary Extension) Bills, 3 May 2011.

Bearing in mind that Lord Stevens is a highly experienced and respected former senior police officer, his comments should serve as a stark reminder to the Inquiry of a complex world of which they have no personal experience. For example, for the Inquiry to accept that, in the world described by Lord Stevens, the Intelligence Services, the Special Branch and others, would not have used coercion or blackmail on members of the homosexual community to obtain information, or to do what those agencies wanted, is to live in a world devoid of reality. If the Inquiry does not face up to this unpalatable fact then it will do a great disservice to all of those who were abused. I can see no real evidence that the Inquiry has been willing to meet this challenge head-on.

Despite what I have said, as I shall illustrate below, I have always been - and still remain - a very strong supporter of the work done by the Security Forces in Northern Ireland. Indeed, I believe that the role played by the Intelligence Services contributed greatly to the relative peace that Northern Ireland enjoys today. The vast majority of the people with whom I worked, including the RUC and the UDR, did a thoroughly professional job, but there were some individuals who acted in a thoroughly unprofessional manner and whose actions undermined the good work of the Security Forces as a whole. I have no reservations whatsoever in criticising those individuals because their actions may well have prolonged the violence in the Province, with all that that entails.

I have already provided detailed evidence to the Inquiry about how Government witnesses repeatedly lied to the Saville Inquiry about the existence of Psychological Operations in 1972, and how the MoD and other Government agencies repeatedly lied (and are still doing so!) to Parliament and successive Prime Ministers for some 20 years about my activities. Despite the Government’s track record of deception, the Inquiry appears to have totally accepted the evidence given by Government representatives without demur.

I have already made five, what the Inquiry refers to as “unsolicited” submissions, supported by documentary evidence, to the Inquiry since September this year, drawing attention to a selection of false or misleading information contained in the public hearing transcripts regarding my past allegations and activities. My submissions were designed to highlight information which was already in the public domain and which the Inquiry either did not report or reported inaccurately. The purpose of my submissions was to enable the Inquiry to correct those inaccuracies, if it so wished. However, from what I have read in those transcripts, I have no doubt that the Inquiry has long ago decided on its conclusions and there is nothing that I can say that will alter that. From the overall tenor of the responses from the various Government agencies, no one in the Army, RUC or the Intelligence Services was aware of the abuses at Kincora and other homes until 1980. That position is simply not tenable.

Despite the Inquiry’s approach, I feel it is important for people to be aware of some of the
disinformation that has been deliberately promulgated by those authorities who have a vested interest in avoiding responsibility for what occurred in Kincora and other homes. Also, simply because the Inquiry says that it has been unable to discover evidence of what the security services knew, that does not mean that such evidence does not, or did not, exist.

My 1974 Memorandum regarding Kincora

A good example of this point is the repeated attempts to discredit the memo which I wrote in November 1974 about alleged abuses at Kincora, i.e. six years before the abuse was finally exposed in the Irish Independent. It is clear that that memo is a major obstacle to the claim by the authorities that they had no knowledge of that abuse prior to 1980.

For example, the Hughes Inquiry report (page 124, paragraph 4.85) states:

"A Forensic Report (produced by the RUC) raised the possibilities that the first page had been tampered with and that two typewriters had been used, but was inconclusive as to its authenticity."

It is important to note the use of the word “possibilities” - the author of the document indicates that he or she was unprepared to go further than that. That claim was, of course, totally false. There is no credible reason for more than one typewriter being used and I believe the claim was designed to ‘muddy the waters’ and manipulate the Hughes Inquiry into not relying on the document’s contents.

Documents tend to be “tampered with” for specific reasons, but in this instance the RUC and the Inquiry appear to have gone to great lengths to avoid identifying what the alleged “tampering” in this instance was designed to achieve. Setting my personal views aside, this matter raises some very important questions that the HIA Inquiry should explain to the public and the victims if it is to retain any integrity on this issue:

Which specific parts of the document were allegedly “tampered with” and what significance, if any, did that ‘tampering’ have to the overall content and meaning of the document?

If the so-called ‘tampered’ parts of the document were to be discounted, would the content of the document have been significantly different?

Even if the “first page” - which, by sheer coincidence, refers to the RUC’s knowledge of Kincora - was totally discounted, would the rest of the document still raise the same very serious challenges for those who are keen to convince the public that the abuses at Kincora were unknown to the Security Forces and Intelligence Services prior to 1980?

There is no evidence whatsoever to show that the Inquiry has considered this aspect of the matter, yet it still appears to be very willing to cast doubt on the authenticity of document.

The Inquiry is, of course, also well aware that Paul Foot submitted the document to Mr Derek
Davis, a leading UK forensic document examiner, and asked him to see if he could find any evidence of more than one typewriter being used in its creation. In a report dated 29 March 1989, Mr Davis said:

"I cannot find any evidence of more than one typewriter having been used as alleged. It is a poor photocopy, but all four pages are consistent."

The second expert, Mr Radley, concluded:

"I have been unable to find any significant differences in design or spacing characteristics nor have I found any significant differences in typographical layout features which would suggest more than one typewriter or more than one typist has been involved in its production."

In a response to a letter from the Shadow Spokesman on Northern Ireland Kevin McNamara MP to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke MP said:

"In his book, Paul Foot does, as you say, address the question of the authenticity of the memorandum. But whatever the rival positions of the forensic experts on this question the key point at the time was Mr Wallace's testimony and this he felt unable to provide."

Mr Brooke clearly accepted the evidence provided by the UK expert, but he attempted to 'move the goal posts' by falling back on the well worn smokescreen that I failed to provide testimony to the Hughes Inquiry. His response was disingenuous in that he was well aware that, despite what Mr James Prior MP had promised Parliament, the Hughes Inquiry's terms of reference were 'amended', without the knowledge of Parliament, specifically to exclude any investigation of the role of the RUC or Army.

On 16 January 1990, Kevin McNamara MP wrote again to Peter Brooke, saying:

"If you believe that the forensic evidence (on my November 1974 memo) is as irrelevant as your letter suggests, I fail to understand why you raised the issue of the original forensic presented by the RUC to the Hughes Inquiry".

This was a very astute question by Mr McNamara and one which the Secretary of State never answered.

The inescapable fact, which the Secretary of State inevitably accepted, is that the memo was created using only one typewriter.

Despite this, attempts to manipulate public opinion on this matter have even continued during this Inquiry. On Day 223 of the Inquiry, Counsel representing the Intelligence Services claimed that my former boss, Peter Broderick, denied all knowledge of my November 1974 memo. That is a particularly stupid and deliberately misleading comment because, as Counsel would have known, Peter Broderick left Northern Ireland in September 1974, i.e. some three months before the memo was written and could not, therefore, be expected to
know anything about it. Either her comment was deliberately misleading, or it demonstrated an appalling lack of knowledge of this matter which the Authorities have been so keen focus on.

Setting aside the forensic issue, it is beyond dispute that I gave my solicitor a copy of the memo in March 1982 when I briefed him, prior to a meeting with the Terry Inquiry investigators, on the background to my knowledge of Kincorn. It is clear that the memo contained information that, at that time, was not available anywhere in the public domain.

Moreover, a report published in the Irish Times on 25 June 1985 said that the newspaper had received confirmation from the RUC “that an RUC background paper on Tara - similar to the one referred to in my memo - was indeed prepared by detectives in 1973/74, about a year before the Information Policy Unit document was allegedly written. The sources say that the description of this background paper in the document is generally accurate.”

The Inquiry has been at great pains to avoid explaining how I could possibly have written a so-called ‘fake’ document prior to March 1982 which contained information about a police document (or documents, plural) that was not publicly known about at that time, but turned out to be, in the views of the RUC, “generally accurate”! Clearly, I could only have written that memo if I had been in possession of the relevant RUC information, and such information would not have been available to me between 1975 and 1982 because I was no longer working for the Government.

Bearing in mind what is now known about the various RUC investigations into Kincorn prior to November 1974, it is very likely that the RUC material which the Army received - and which I referred to in my memo - came from the reports made by DCs Cullen and Scully, albeit not the actual reports themselves.

Moreover, as the Inquiry is aware, my ‘Clockwork Orange’ notes compiled in late 1974 clearly state:

“McGrath currently works at a hostel for boys at 236 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast which was, until recently, run by Belfast Corporation, but is now part of a new Social Services organisation. The hostel has been the source of allegations about sexual assaults by staff since the 1960s before McGrath started to work there. According to an RUC report there were also complaints in 1971. Further complaints were made in 1972 and 1973. One inmate made a statement to the RUC at Donegall Pass Police Station. Although McGrath appears to have featured in some of the complaints, some relate to the manager of the hostel, Joseph Mains. The RUC say that it is likely that McGrath was probably using the residential accommodation at his evangelical mission to engage in homosexual activities with vulnerable residents for many years, but that some of those involved were too embarrassed or frightened to complain. McGrath also uses a pseudo-religious form of sexual counselling to mask his activities.”

The handwritten version of my name above the departmental stamp on the front page of the ‘Clockwork Orange’ document is almost certainly Colonel Railton’s. I realise the Inquiry
will point out, yet again, that the above extract does not refer specifically to Kincora by name, but there is a limit to how long the Inquiry can continue to hide behind this increasingly obvious subterfuge. The document however provides some insight in why McGrath and Tara were being targeted by the Army Psy Ops unit in 1974.

Also, as the Inquiry must be aware, my November 1974 memo should not be read in isolation from other available information that I (and the Security Forces) possessed. In addition to the press briefing document which I used during 1973 and 1974 and which contained McGrath’s home address and telephone number, plus the address and telephone number of Kincora, there are the letters which in September 1975 I sent to my former boss at HQ Northern Ireland, Tony Staughton, and to the IPCS referring to “homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast”. I provided the information to Tony Staughton and to Cliff Crook at the IPCS because they were both potential witnesses at my disciplinary hearing in October 1975. My, disciplinary hearing, was, as the Inquiry knows, based on totally false information and was almost certainly fraudulent in the view of the Metropolitan Police at that time.

The inquiry has attempted to claim that, because I did not say that the “children’s home in Belfast” was Kincora, my evidence is not relevant. So, if the home referred to in my letters was not Kincora, can the Inquiry say which home it was?

Given the foregoing, I believe the way in which the Inquiry has handled this specific matter is wholly unacceptable and highly questionable.

It is clear from correspondence sent to me by the MoD in 1975 that copies of the information relating to my disciplinary hearing were also sent by the MoD to Bernard Sheldon, then Legal Adviser to M15 and to J P Waterfield (M15 officer at the Northern Ireland Office). It was also copied in part to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief of the General Staff and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for the Army. I accept the latter addressees were probably only provided with a MoD ‘sanitised’ version of the case but why should it be of significance to people in such senior positions?

On 21 February 1982, before the Terry Inquiry commenced work ‘The News of the World’ published a report stating:

“He (Wallace) warned of the male prostitution ring - and the British Intelligence knowledge of it - in 1975, five years before Independent MP Gerry Fitt raised the issue in the Commons in 1980.”

What is clear however is that while my superiors at Army HQ Northern Ireland were instructing me to attract the attention of the press to William McGrath and his paramilitary and sexual activities, the Security Service (M15) were less than enthusiastic about what I was doing.

The following is a bizarre example of this conflict between how the Army and M15 viewed McGrath and Tara and demonstrates graphically my deep concerns about the impartiality and investigative capability of the HIA Inquiry overall.
On Day 220 (Page 34) Mr Aiken told the Inquiry:

I want to just show you this is written by Ian
10 Cameron. It is written in April 1976, so following on
11 from a point the Chairman made, this is after Colin
12 Wallace has already left Northern Ireland:
13 "In an article in The New Statesman on 19th March
14 1976 about the extreme Loyalist organization Tara,
copy
15 attached marked A."
16 Just so we ground that, please, if we move through
17 to 105026, you can see what he is attaching at B, which
18 we are about to see is the document we have already
19 looked at, so the summary document on Tara. If we
20 scroll back up, please. So:
21 "In this article Robert Fisk refers to the Army's
22 account of their activities collated by an
intelligence
23 officer at Lisburn.
24 The reference is almost certainly to a summary on
25 Tara (copy attached marked B) held in the Army

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1 Information Service records at HQNI. The information in
2 the summary was no doubt drawn from G INT" -- so the
3 intelligence section's -- "files at a time when the IP
4 information policy element."
5 Where Colin Wallace and others worked "within the
6 AIS was working closely -- too closely -- with G Int,
7 The Intelligence Section. So that may be a hint to the
8 black propaganda type events. You can see, and know,
9 Members of the Panel, from having looked at the
10 material, April 1976 Ian Cameron has already conducted
11 the leak inquiry and contributed his report. The
12 decisions would then be made by The Northern Ireland
13 Office and the Army. That would see Colin Wallace exit
14 Northern Ireland in the early part of 1975. So Ian
15 Cameron is writing, having been involved in that
process
16 to the limited degree that he was, but he is then
17 drawing attention to the fact, "This article was
written
18 by Fisk". As you know, the allegation was Wallace and
19 Fisk were together, Wallace passing documents to Fisk:
20 "Wallace would have had access to the Army
21 Information Service file, and I do not think there is
22 much doubt that also in this instance he was Fisk's
23 source.
24 The passages which have been underlined had been
25 published in one form or another previously."

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Now we will come back to look at that at the point
2 in time. I can't now show you. I will have to come
3 back to the article itself, but of particular
4 significance you will wish to consider is if Fisk's
5 article is based on the document that we are -- if we
6 scroll down, please -- that we are looking at here, and
7 Ian Cameron has carried out and set out in his memo the
8 detective work he has done to express the view that
9 this
10 is it, what did Fisk not have and that's a matter you
11 will want to consider. He is receiving documents from
12 Colin Wallace and he is being given this document, or
13 the gist of this document, which is said to be
14 available
15 as a result of the Intelligence Section working too
16 closely with the information press section, why would we
17 get this document and not 8th November '74 document?
18 Now if I can ask you just to look very closely at
19 what this document says:
20 "Tara. One word -- individual letters have no
21 significance.
22 William McGrath. ."
23 So we vasscillate between 3 and 5, neither of which
24 is right. It was :
25 " Belfast.
26 Admin office: David Browne, Bangor, Deputy Editor --
27 Protestant Telegraph. Then assistant."

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1 Then:
2 "Details -- CO uses non-existent evangelical mission
3 as a front. Homosexual. Said to have attended
4 a meeting in Dublin prior to troubles where three
5 representatives of the Eastern Block countries were
6 present. Thought to owe more allegiance to the Red Flag
7 than the Union flag or tricolour and has conned many
8 genuine people into membership keeping them ensnared by
9 threatening to reveal homosexual activity which he had
10 initiated."
11 Then, and this is important for what I am going to
12 show you:
13 "Details -- Tara, organised initially in platoons of
14 20, now probably in companies and drawn almost
15 exclusively from members of the Orange Order. Each
16 platoon has a sergeant, quarter master, " and I think
17 that's "IO", "contributions -- 50p per man per month,
18 half to a central fund, half kept to platoon level.
19 Platoons were able to draw on a central fund if
20 opportunity to buy", I think that's "stores possibly"
21 "arose. Meetings held in Clifton Street Orange Hall
22 about every two weeks under name of Orange Discussion
23 Group. Training in radio, weapons and lectures in
24 guerilla tactics."
25 Then:

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1 "Ian Paisley, Molyneaux (MP), Reverend Martin Smyth
2 and Sir Knox Cunningham all said to know McGrath and to
3 have been told of his activities. So far is known -- so
4 far as is known no action ..."
5 MR LANE: "Action".
6 MR AIXEN: "No action has been taken by any of them."
7 Now that last phrase in particular when you go back
8 to look at and what he says he did in terms
9 of who was informed, that will be something you will
10 want to consider.
11 Now having looked at that document, which you have
12 Ian Cameron saying in 1976 is a G INT or an
13 intelligence
14 document summary that is available to the Army
15 Information Service, if we then look at 80249, please,
16 this is a document that Colin Wallace was able to
17 produce to Paul Foot when he was writing the book "Who
18 Framed Colin Wallace?" in 1989 and also to the likes,
19 for instance, of Peter Brooke in a letter of 12th
20 May 1990.

What the above extract is clearly saying is that I allegedly briefed Robert Fisk of The Times
from a document which is headed "Some off the cuff" information on TARA for the press". I
probably did brief Robert Fisk - and also a number of other journalists - from that document
(albeit not in 1976). After all, that is what I was employed to do: i.e. to provide
unattributable, sensitive information to the press! Apparently, Robert Fisk subsequently
wrote an article about Tara, which was published in the New Statesman on the 19th March
1976. According to Mr Aiken, Ian Cameron, a senior Intelligence officer with MI5 who was
attached to Army HQ Northern Ireland at Lisburn, did some “detective work” and concluded that I had ‘leaked’ the relevant information to Robert Fisk! The term ‘leak’ is normally associated with releasing information without permission, or without having the authority to do so. My boss at HQ NI is on record as saying that he instructed me to release that information but, in any event, as I shall show below, the Armed Forces Minister, Archie Hamilton, told Parliament in January 1990 that a key part of my role was to make on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security in terms of what information I should, or should not, give to the press.

The obvious problem with Mr Cameron’s so-called ‘leak inquiry’ allegation about the ‘New Statesman’ story on Tara is that the so-called ‘leaked’ document makes it very clear at the top of the paper that the information was given to me with the express purpose that the contents should be given to the press. And, indeed, my superiors were encouraging me to circulate its contents to the media to initiate an investigation and expose McGrath’s activities.

Why should Ian Cameron have believed that I had ‘leaked’ the information, without authority, when the document was clearly marked for the press? Moreover, as the Inquiry is well aware, that document bears the handwriting of the Army’s Chief Information Officer, The Information Adviser to the Director of Operations, and the Head of Information Policy (Psy Ops), all of whom were aware of what I was doing! Peter Broderick, the Army’s Chief Information Officer, subsequently confirmed in the media that he initialled the document and agreed its release.

It is important to bear in mind that it was Ian Cameron’s so-called overall leak inquiry that had me removed from Northern Ireland and it was Ian Cameron who ordered Brian Gemmell to stop investigating William McGrath and Kincora. Finally, it was also Ian Cameron who refused to be interviewed by the Terry Inquiry. I can well understand why Mr Cameron was very concerned by my attempts to draw the attention of the press to McGrath and Tara and I would be very surprised if the HIA Inquiry has not also worked that out!

This was the ‘leak’ that never was! Are we seriously being asked to believe that in 1976 - one year after I left Northern Ireland - Ian Cameron did not know what I had been employed to do? Did Ian Cameron not know that I had given the same information to other journalists as I did to Robert Fisk? If he did, why did he not regard those instances also as ‘leaks’?

This episode was a complete charade. On the one hand, MI5 were accusing me of ‘leaking’ official information, yet on the other hand, it is beyond doubt that my Army superiors were instructing me to give that very same information to the press. What ‘game’ was Ian Cameron playing? This nonsense appears to have gone totally unnoticed by the Inquiry!

I have deliberately highlighted the above two instances (the handling of my 1974 memo information and the so-called MI5 ‘leak’ inquiry) because, in a Judgement by the Court of Appeal relating to a Kincora victim of sexual abuse, (Gary Hoy - 27 May 2016 paragraph 41) the Judge (The Lord Chief Justice Sir Declan Morgan) commented:

“This society has been rocked to its core by the shocking disclosure of the abuse of children in this community over many years. Just as shocking has been the manner in
which the institutions to which some of the abusers belonged sought to protect the institution rather than the children. There is a suggestion in this case that children in Kincora were abused and prostituted in order to satisfy the interests of national security. If that is true it must be exposed. As a society we must not repeat the errors of the institutions and should remember our obligations to the children. If the suggestion is not true the rumour and suspicion surrounding this should be allayed. We have decided that the HIA is entitled to proceed along the route mapped out by it. That does not in any way detract from the need to ensure that our obligations to these children are satisfied.”

Given the inadequacies of previous Inquiries into the sexual abuse of children at Homes in Northern Ireland, the Lord Chief Justice rightly highlighted the impact that the disclosure of such abuse has had on the community as a whole over many years, and the need “for the truth to be exposed”. In the light of the very clear direction given by the Lord Chief Justice, I believe it is not unreasonable to expect that the HIA Inquiry should demonstrate their obligations to the victims by ensuring that the information they provide to the public and the victims is fair, factually correct and free from bias.

The House of Lords in Porter v. Magill (2001) stated the test for bias to be “whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased”. The basis for the rule against bias is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal system.

It is my submission that some of the information provided by the Inquiry to the public to date has been inaccurate and/or misleading, and has shown an unacceptable degree of bias.

Brigadier W E Rous

During 1973/74 I was the Acting Senior Information Officer and later Senior Information Officer for the Army as a whole in Northern Ireland working during that time on Psychological Operations which operated under the cover title Information Policy. In addition, I was serving as an officer with the Ulster Defence Regiment also engaged on Psychological Operations. To conceal my Psychological Operations role, the MoD deliberately created a false cover job for me with the title ‘Head of Production Services’ and which was a civilian role.

On 23 July 1987, the Director of Army Public Relations at the MoD, Brigadier The Honourable W E (‘Willie’) Rous, wrote to Robert Parker at Channel 4 News responding to two specific questions saying:

“...I can confirm that a statement by Mr Broderick and extracts from confidential reports prepared by the Institute of Professional Civil Servants were presented to the Civil Service Appeal Board. I can also confirm that the job description given to the CSAB was the only one covering Mr Wallace's job and there was therefore no 'secret' job description as has been alleged. Mr Wallace's job as Senior Information Officer in Northern Ireland was to brief the press on military operations and terrorist activities in the Province. It would have been necessary on occasions to give briefings..."
on an unattributable basis, but I am informed that it was not part of his job to spread false information."

As the Inquiry is now well aware, in January 1990, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Mr Archie Hamilton MP, made a statement to Parliament which showed that Brigadier Rous’s response to Channel 4 News was untrue because I did have a ‘secret’ role and part of that was to use disinformation. The MoD knew that the role Brigadier Rous was being asked to refer to was a false, ‘cover’ role.

I believe it was a despicable act by the MoD to require Brigadier Rous to write the above false reply to Channel 4 News in a bid to cover-up my role in Northern Ireland - I am sure Brigadier Rous was deeply unhappy about what he was told to write because he knew it was untrue. This is yet another example of the Ministry’s behaviour being devoid of integrity. As the attached letter shows, I knew Brigadier Rous very well and worked closely with him on an almost daily basis when he was the GSO 2 Ops at HQ NI. Indeed, it was Brigadier Rous (then a Major) who requested the operation which my team and I (acting as terrorists) carried out on Belfast (Aldergrove) Airport in 1974 to test its security. By compelling Brigadier Rous to provide such a knowingly false answer to Channel 4 News, the MoD has demonstrated in the clearest possible terms the lengths to which the Department has been willing to go to mislead the press about my role. In the light of the above, is it really wise for the Inquiry to rely unquestioningly on anything that the MoD has had to say about Kincora?

James Miller

The attempts by a witness representing the Intelligence Services to detract from the significance of information provided by James Miller to the Sunday Times is significant in terms of how Government agencies have been dealing with those who attempted to ‘blow the whistle’ on possible wrongdoing.

In March 1987, the Sunday Times published two reports about James Miller, a former MI5 agent who claimed that the Security Service helped to promote the Ulster workers’ strike in 1974 in a plot to discredit and undermine the Wilson government.

Miller revealed that his first task for the Intelligence Service was to spy on William McGrath, a former housefather at Kincora. He also claimed that the intelligence services had known about the activities at Kincora for a number of years, and believes the boys’ home was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information.

According to the Sunday Times, Miller said:

"My MI5 case officer later told me to leave McGrath to them and I understand they used the information to recruit him as an informer. Last night McGrath confirmed that he knew Miller but would not comment on any other aspect."

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There is no doubt that Miller was a very valuable agent and it is sad that the Intelligence authorities are now attempting to discredit him because of what he told the Sunday Times.

The facts are that Miller did infiltrate Tara in 1971, but was asked to leave a Tara meeting run by McGrath at Clifton Street Orange Hall in Belfast when UVF members present became suspicious of him. He was escorted from the meeting by Roy Garland. It is clear that if Miller was attending Tara meetings run by McGrath, then he clearly knew the identity of the Tara leader. This is totally at odds with what the Intelligence Services witnesses have told the IHA Inquiry.

In 1987, journalist Liam Clarke was working for the Sunday Times and rang Miller after the first two stories about him were published. Miller told him his Intelligence handlers were furious about the publicity and they had pressurised him into retracting what he had said to the Sunday Times. He also told Liam Clarke that he was strictly forbidden from talking to the press from then on. According to Liam Clarke, Miller told him that he was then in severe financial difficulties and could not afford to upset the Intelligence authorities.

His handlers’ previous glowing tributes to him stopped when he talked to the Sunday Times about Tara and Kincora, and about being asked to encourage the UWC strike to undermine Harold Wilson! According to Barrie Penrose and Liam Clarke of the Sunday Times, the MoD then accused him of being “unreliable and unstable”.

Miller’s decision to talk to the Sunday Times in the first instance was to highlight that the Army and the Intelligence Services did know about Tara, McGrath and Kincora in the early 1970s. Ironically, the thought he was being helpful by doing that!

My Role

I’d understand my role, it is important to understand the core of what Psy Ops was about. In a report dated 6 April 1973 to the MOD Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Committee Secretary, Air Commodore B. G. T. Stanbridge defined strategic Psy Ops as:

"Undermining the enemy's will to fight, promoting suspicion and distrust and exploiting disagreements among the enemy.

It is also important to note that on 11 February 1991 the MoD refused to accede to a request by the Parliamentary Defence Select Committee to see documents relating to my job
specification at HQ Northern Ireland saying:

"As regards the particular papers referred to in your third paragraph [my job specification], these are internal papers and moreover include sensitive material relating to the security and intelligence matters lying outside the Committee’s inquiry. The provision of such papers, even under the conditions relating to the Committee’s access to classified information would be inconsistent with conventions."

This exchange shows that documents relating to my job specification did exist within the MoD as recently as 1991, but that the Ministry was quite prepared to defy the Select Committee’s request to see them. This demonstrates in the clearest possible way the ineffectiveness of the Parliamentary democratic system of oversight when it comes to investigating alleged abuses by the Intelligence Services.

When dealing with the various allegations I have made relating to Tara and William McGrath, the presentation of information by Mr Aiken, Counsel to the Inquiry, has at times been highly selective and apparently aimed more at character assassination than presenting facts that are directly relevant to the Inquiry’s terms of reference. As I point out below, the smears and disinformation circulated about me by the MoD and the Intelligence Services only commenced when I was moved from Northern Ireland. Some of those smears are now being regurgitated by the Inquiry to undermine what I have said in the past and what I might say in the future.

For example, on Day 221 he states:

you may consider that the flow of
3 the material that you have looked at may suggest that
4 Colin Wallace was prone to and has continued to
5 overstate his role and importance within the Army.

It is certainly not for me to say whether or not I did a good job while I was working for the Army in Northern Ireland. However, Mr Aiken’s comment is clearly at odds with what my superiors at HQ Northern Ireland during the 1970s actually said about me and my work while I was working with them.

EXTRACTS FROM MY ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS FOR 1971-1974

1971
Reporting Officer: ‘This is an officer of high calibre. Totally dedicated to the Army, demonstrates this by a devotion to duty that is truly remarkable’.
Countersigning Officer: ‘I heartily agree’.

1972
‘Continues to demonstrate that his talents are of the very highest standard’.

1973
Reporting Officer: ‘Undoubtedly fit for promotion, loyal, conscientious and hardworking’.

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Countersigning Officer: 'In every way an outstanding IO, merits promotion'.

1974
On percentage of time spent on duty
Reporting Officer: 'The pencilled-in percentages above add up to 200. This is the only reasonable solution for an officer who consistently works double the conditional hours'.
Assessment of performance: 'Outstanding'
Special factors: 'His dedication and sheer professionalism'.
Management and staff: 'He gets things done by somewhat unorthodox management techniques - but they get done'.
Self organisation: 'To prove he is human, he has the most untidy office I have ever seen'.
Next job: 'He wishes to stay in Northern Ireland - he is irreplaceable'.
Opinion: 'One of the most effective personal contributions of any to the standing and reputation of the Army in these troubles'. 'For knowledge, loyalty, professionalism, Wallace is in a class of his own'.

In a formal statement to my disciplinary hearing Appeal Board in 1975, Peter Broderick said:

"Colin Wallace, at first, became the pawn in this game (Psy Ops). Though on the staff of public relations, he was used by Information Policy as their outlet to the press. He also had knowledge of the Irish situation which was totally unique in the Headquarters and surpassed that even of most of the Intelligence Branch. As time progressed, he was not only the main briefer of the press, but also the advisor on Irish matters to the whole Headquarters and because of his personal talents - contributed much creative thought to the Information Policy Unit. In order to do his job he had constant and free access to information of high classification and extreme sensitivity. The attitude of the MODPR organisation in Whitehall to the activities of Information Policy Unit was one of extreme suspicion. Wallace's dual role was particularly resented by Whitehall, while highly valued by the operation commander in Northern Ireland.

I was posted to Northern Ireland in a high rank deliberately to take over both Public Relations and Information Policy and mould them into one unit. In re-organising, one of my first actions was to legitimise the role of Colin Wallace and to allocate him firmly to Information Policy.

Wallace's primary job was to win friends among the press and to gain their total confidence as a reliable source of information. By agreement with Intelligence in each case, he was supplied with selected information about terrorists, their activities, their sources of money and arms at home and overseas, of the allegiances of so-called innocents and such matters. This - together with his long-term and intimate knowledge of the Irish scene - made him an invaluable contact for the press - that I cannot recall a single occasion when any reporter, even from the hostile papers, disclosed the source of the briefings.

To my knowledge, he worked at least 80 hours a week - coming to his desk every day. He lived in the Officers' Mess and regarded himself as always on duty. He has never
claimed long hours gratuity nor overtime as a matter of principle. During my 15 months duty, I doubt whether he even left the camp area (except on accompanied duty) more than a dozen times - until the last few weeks when he found himself a girlfriend who is now his wife. Upon my arrival I found that he had taken virtually no leave for 6 years except to attend his Territorial Army Camp. For about two nights each week, he served with the Ulster Defence Regiment which meant going on armed patrol from 8pm until dawn and getting no sleep.

I do not hesitate to say that Colin Wallace is the best thing that ever happened to Army Public Relations in Northern Ireland; that if it had not been for his talents, knowledge and efforts the Army could well have lost the propaganda war; and I could not wish to meet anyone more dedicated to the Army than he was and, so obviously, still is. He acted resolutely and to effect against anyone - republican or loyalist - who was destroying his country.

I just cannot conceive of any situation in which he would act maliciously against the interests of the Crown and the Army.

It is important to note that, although Mr Aiken referred to an employment reference that Peter Broderick wrote for me after I left the MOD, he did not during the same public hearing refer to the contents of the above statement which Mr Broderick wrote in 1975. This failure is inexplicable in that the above statement explains the nature of the work that I did in Northern Ireland - information that is more highly relevant to the Inquiry than the information contained in the job reference.

In his book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace', Paul Foot records an interview he had with Tony Staughton my former boss at HQ Northern Ireland.

"Before he finally left his post after his stroke in the spring of 1973, Tony Staughton twice recommended Colin Wallace, who was not yet 30 years old, for the MBE, and to this day cannot understand how and why the recommendations were turned down. 'I've never known such a deserving case' he says, 'I had the champagne on ice'. He concludes that an MBE for a 29-year old is so exceptional that even in this exceptional case the authorities could not stomach it'."

In an interview with Paul Foot in January 1988 Lt Colonel Tony Yarnold said:

"Let's face it, Colin was the lynchpin of the whole operation. He was terrific - way ahead of us all in his knowledge, his skill with the press and his readiness for work. Everyone wanted him all the time, and somehow he was always available."

These are not my own views, they are the views of my superiors with whom I worked and who knew me well. Mr Aiken is not one of those. His opinions are purely subjective and, I believe, highly questionable. Given the above comments, most reasonable people would have the good grace to admit that, on the face of it, I did a good job in Northern Ireland, even if they do not necessarily agree with the work I was required to do.
The Barron Report

Mr Aiken then continues with the smear strategy:

**Day 221 - page 18**

In addition, you have Colin Wallace's evidence to 1 Barron Inquiry in 2004 and his contribution, what Barron 2 Inquiry had to say about it, and I make it clear this is 3 what they said:
4 "When speaking about matters directly within his own 5 experience, the inquiry believes Wallace to be a highly 6 knowledgeable witness. His analysis and opinions, 7 though derived partly from personal knowledge and partly 8 from information gleaned since his time in Northern 9 Ireland, should also be treated with seriousness and 10 respect."
11 But, as you know, and you have the Barron Inquiry 12 report they, having said that, went on to reject all 13 of 14 the claims that he was making."

That claim by Mr Aiken is at best highly misleading and - at worst deliberately false - and is, regrettably, the subject of a complaint to the Bar Council of Northern Ireland. The complaint only arose because my requests to the HIA Inquiry to correct that false information were ignored. Nowhere in his report does Mr Justice Barron even criticise, let alone say that he rejected, any of the evidence I gave to him.

I did not claim that I had any evidence of direct collusion between members of the Security Forces and the bombings in Dublin and Monaghan in May 1974.

Mr Aiken must have been well aware that it would have been illogical, misleading and, indeed, unprofessional for him to claim that Judge Barron’s failure to establish conclusively that collusion between the British Security Forces and the Loyalist paramilitaries occurred in the bombings in Dublin and Monaghan meant that the Judge, therefore, rejected all of the evidence I provided to him.

If one were to apply such flawed logic to the other former military and police witnesses who gave evidence, it would naturally follow that Judge Barron also rejected all their evidence. Such an approach is obviously absurd. Like me, none of those witnesses claimed that they possessed any direct evidence that collusion took place in those incidents. That does not, of course, mean that collusion did not take place. As the proceedings in the Irish Parliament show, there remains a very strong suspicion that it did.

It is also important to note that Judge Barron was severely critical of the failures of the Garda Siochana to follow-up the information that I and other witnesses provided. Mr Aiken made
no reference to that.

The Barron Report pages 123-4

"There doesn't appear to have been any real attempt to follow up elsewhere the substance of either Holroyd or Wallace's claims. Indeed one might wonder what 'evidence' the Garda authorities expected either of these men to be in a position to furnish. It cannot be the practice of any effective police force simply to ignore or discontinue a line of enquiry because the person making the allegation is not in a position to offer concrete evidence of the matter alleged. Rather there exists a free standing obligation on the police force to investigate an allegation fully and to seek to identify all potential evidence in support of or contrary to the allegation. In the case of Holroyd and Wallace, it is necessary to ask whether the principal purpose of D/Supt Murphy's enquiries was to properly investigate their claims or simply to allow the Gardai to say that the claims had been investigated and found to be unsubstantiated."

In other words, not only did Judge Barron not reject my evidence, or the evidence provided by other former members of the Security Forces, but also he criticised the Irish police for not following up my evidence properly.

My meeting with the 'social worker'

On Day 221 (page 154) Mr Aiken said:

15 The welfare worker told him of a boy who had alleged
16 he had been sexually assaulted at Kincora by housemaster
17 William McGrath, already on Mr Wallace's radar due to
18 the paramilitary group Tara.

This is demonstrably untrue and it highlights the problem created by the Inquiry using third party information instead of what I actually recorded in writing. As Mr Aiken is well aware, I wrote a background briefing document [Political and Security Implications regarding the Disclosure of Security Classified Information to assist in the Investigation of the Allegations relating to the Kincora Hostel, Belfast] dated 20 March 1982 for my solicitor in preparation for a meeting with members of the Terry Inquiry. An extract from that document says:

"I believe it was in early 1972 that I was first told of the situation at the Hostel. I had just returned to HQ Northern Ireland from Londonderry where I had been attached to the 'Bloody Sunday' Tribunal. At this time I was running an Army Free Fall Parachute Team as an Information Policy/Community Relations project. The Team was very popular and appeared at numerous events and locations where the Security Forces would have otherwise been unwelcome. Shortly after one such display, I was telephoned by a woman who claimed to be a social worker and who said that she had been given my name by a clergyman at whose charity fete the parachute team had given a display. The caller said that she had some information which she would like to give to me in confidence and I agreed to meet her in Belfast. When I met her she
told me that she had a young boy in her charge who had claimed that he had been sexually assaulted in the Kincora Boys’ Hostel. She went on to say that there had been other similar claims involving other inmates and that, although the matter had been reported to the police, no action had been taken. She asked if I could, through Army channels, get the police to investigate. She appeared to be very distressed about the situation and asked that her identity should not be disclosed. I was given to believe that she was particularly worried because key members of the welfare department which ran the Home were also homosexuals and that they might take reprisals against her. She also explained that one of the members of the staff at the time was a known homosexual and was a prominent figure in Ulster politics. This man she identified as William McGrath.

William McGrath was known to me through the ‘personality and organisation’ files which I kept as part of my job, but I was not then aware that he was employed in a hostel for boys. According to my records, McGrath was employed by a prominent member of the Unionist Party who owned a business in East Belfast. It was alleged that McGrath had a homosexual relationship with this man and that he was also a prominent figure in the Rev Paisley’s church. My main interest in McGrath, however, was centred around his attempts to use the Orange Order to form a paramilitary organisation called ‘TARA’. This organisation never developed into anything beyond a pipe dream, but it did have the potential to be a major security problem if it had worked. Fortunately the Orange Order ignored McGrath’s rather peculiar political philosophies and the scheme came to nothing. ‘TARA’ and McGrath were, however, important in Information Policy terms because they jointly provided a platform of anti-communist propaganda and could be used as a divisive factor within the Loyalist paramilitary groups that sprang up around that time. Tara also took a strong anti-Ulster Volunteer Force line in its pronouncements and this was very helpful at a time when the UVF was seen by the Security Forces as a prime source of violence on the Loyalist side.

I reported my conversation to one of the Intelligence staff when I returned to Lisburn and asked if the matter could be raised with the RUC through our liaison channels. Some days later the officer to whom I had given the information came to my office and said that I leave the matter alone because it was already the subject of consideration by ‘other people’. I did not regard this as unusual because similar situations arose quite frequently when interest by one intelligence group could quite easily damage an operation which was already in progress. Also, at that time the information was of more significance to the police than it was to the Army. I had no further information about Kincora for almost two years and I do not know if the information which I received from the social worker was ever passed to the police.”

The Thatcher file and the Hughes Inquiry

It is important to note that a copy of the foregoing document was sent by me to Mrs Thatcher in 1984 as part of a file of material for investigation. That file went missing inside 10 Downing Street and in a written statement to Parliament on 30 January 1990, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Archie Hamilton, said, inter alia:
"I have today answered a Parliamentary Question from you about the case of Mr Colin Wallace.

One point which I did not cover in my Answer concerns a file of documents belonging to Mr Wallace which Mr Fred Holroyd sent to the Prime Minister on 1 November 1984. You will, I am sure, remember the earlier correspondence about this file; and I believe that it would now be right for me to set out what we believe happened - although I have to say that the story appears to have been a most confusing one. Owing to a series of administrative errors, Mr Wallace’s file of documents was mishandled. Mr Holroyd has said that the documents returned to him on 21 November 1984 by the Prime Minister’s office were not the originals but copies. I have no reason to doubt what he says, in which case the documents must have been copied while they were held by the Government. Despite a number of searches to find the originals or to establish what happened to them, no explanation has come to light. So far as we can now establish, the only documents retained by MOD in November 1984 were the first pages only of two papers now known to have been on the file: the first was entitled "The Kincora Inquiry - Summary of Events relating to requests for information from John Colin Wallace ..."; the second was a 16 page document without its cover-note, which was dated March 1982 and headed "Political and security implications regarding the disclosure of security classified information to assist in the investigation of the allegations relating to the Kincora Boys Hostel, Belfast". Subsequently some of the documents on the file came into the Government’s hands once again, through being attached to later correspondence from Mr Wallace. In particular, the “Political and security implications ...” document was attached to a letter from Mr Wallace to Lord Trefgarne’s Private Secretary dated 26 September 1985. This seems to explain the confusion in subsequent correspondence, which led to both you and Mr Wallace being told that no copies were made of papers which were not considered to be of long term significance; whereas the fact seems to have been that no complete copies were retained of any documents at all.

On 8 October 1985 the Hughes Committee Secretary and Solicitor were shown certain documents which had been enclosed with subsequent correspondence, but not the “Political and security implications ...” document, which had only recently been received (for the second time) and which was still being considered. On 30 October 1985 the MOD authorised the NIO to show this document to the Hughes Committee: in the event, however, this was not done, as the Committee had already seen a document of this title in the papers which Mr Holroyd had given to the Essex Police and which had reached them via the RUC. It is now known that, although these two documents had the same title, their pagination was different and there were minor variations in the texts. I understand that the Hughes Committee representatives referred to selected aspects of both the document which they held and of others attributed to Mr Wallace, when seeking a statement from Mr Wallace.

This is clearly a most unfortunate sequence of events; and I can well understand that Mr Wallace must have found the Government’s handling of his file of documents very unsatisfactory."
It is important that the HIA Inquiry take particular note that, contrary to what Mr Aiken has alleged, nowhere in my recorded personal account of my meeting with the ‘social worker’ in 1972 did I claim that she said that the boy “had been sexually assaulted at Kincora by housemaster William McGrath”. This is crucially important because I did not suggest in my brief to my solicitor that McGrath assault the boy. I submit that Mr Aiken’s failure to draw the Inquiry’s attention to the correct information is a very serious matter because the HIA Inquiry had access to my document and, therefore, should have known what I had actually written about the matter in March 1982. Why did Mr Aiken not give the Inquiry an accurate account of what I wrote?

It is, of course, clear from what Mr Hamilton told Parliament that there were sustained attempts by Downing Street and the MoD to keep my document away from the Hughes Inquiry. Indeed, Judge Hughes was quoted in the ‘Sunday Times’ (11 February 1990) as saying that although Downing Street sent some of my papers to him, “they were not given to me.” Bearing in mind that both Downing Street and the MoD had copies of my document, is it not very odd that neither of these sources were able to ensure that Judge Hughes received a copy? Indeed, the Hughes Inquiry apparently only received a copy because Fred Holroyd gave one to the Essex Police, who passed it to the RUC!

I submit that the Inquiry’s attention should have been drawn by Mr Aiken to this document [Political and Security Implications regarding the Disclosure of Security Classified Information to assist in the Investigation of the Allegations relating to the Kincora Hostel, Belfast] because it records that (BEFORE the Terry Inquiry even got fully under way) the ‘social worker’ claimed: “key members of the welfare department which ran the Home were also homosexuals”. It is important to note that she referred to “key members of the welfare department” and not the Kincora Home. To the best of my knowledge, that was the first time that such an allegation was made.

I reported that she told me that “there had been other similar claims [about sexual assaults] involving other inmates”. It is important to note that the ‘social worker’ did not refer to McGrath’s membership of TARA and one might reasonably conclude, therefore, that she did not know about his role in that organisation. Her concern appears to have been that, because McGrath was “a prominent figure in Ulster politics”, she might be the target for some form of disciplinary action if her conversation with me became known.

Finally, the document states that the ‘social worker’ said that McGrath was a “homosexual”. I believe that up to that occasion, I did not know that McGrath worked at Kincora. The Inquiry needs to explain why it did not refer to my document and why it relied instead on Mr Aiken’s incorrect information. Was this yet another attempt simply to damage my credibility or was there a wider motive?

It is important to note that the Hughes Report (page 122 paragraph 4.79) states:

“Mr Wallace maintained that the papers returned to Captain Holroyd were not those submitted to the Prime Minister’s office but photocopies of them. The NIO contend that this was not the case.”
As the Inquiry knows from the admission by Armed Forces Minister, Archie Hamilton, in Parliament on 30 January 1990 (quoted above), the NIO lied to the Hughes Committee on this matter. The original documents did disappear and were never found.

It is clear from the above, that both Mr Aiken and MI5 have made great play with the fact that I ‘leaked’ information to the Press, but Mr Aiken has failed to make it clear to the public and to the Inquiry that that was what I was officially employed by the MoD to do. Indeed, as the records show, it took almost 20 years of intensive campaigning by me to force the MoD to admit, grudgingly, that a key part of my role was to make on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security in terms of what information I should, or should not, give to the press, and that, on occasions, some of that information was disinformation. This is absolutely crucial to the Inquiry’s understanding of how and why I was making information about Tara and McGrath - and indirectly ultimately about Kincora - available to the press.

"The papers which have now come to light indicate that, when the case was made to establish Mr Wallace’s post, it was proposed that its duties should include responsibilities for providing unattributable covert briefings to the press; and it was stated that the incumbent would be required to make on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security during such interviews. It seems that in the event the arguments for including these responsibilities in Mr Wallace’s job description were made orally rather than in writing to those who approved the establishment of the SIO post. But presumably Mr Wallace was told what duties he was expected to carry out; and indeed it would appear that he had already been undertaking unattributable briefing activities of this kind, which may have included disinformation. It has not since the mid-1970s been the policy to disseminate disinformation in Northern Ireland in ways designed to denigrate individuals and/or organisations or for propaganda purposes. That remains the case."

In other words, Mr Hamilton’s admission to Parliament shows that the disciplinary action against me in 1975 by the MoD and based on MI5 ‘evidence’ was fraudulent. Despite this, the DPP prevented the Metropolitan Police from even investigating the matter with a view to prosecuting those involved. Mr Hamilton’s statement also says, de facto, that it was policy to disseminate disinformation in Northern Ireland prior to the mid 1970s to denigrate individuals and/or organisations.

The MoD and the Intelligence Services denied for years the existence of my role because, to do otherwise, would have opened up a very large jar of ‘political worms’. Clearly, if I did not have the Psy Ops role which involved me making on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security in terms of what information I should, or should not, give to the press, and that, on occasions, some of that information included disinformation, then, by definition, that enabled the MoD and MI5 to claim that I was ‘leaking’ classified information in the normal sense of that term. In simple terms, the MoD and MI5, ‘threw me to the wolves’ to protect themselves from potentially very severe political sanctions. To achieve this, the MoD and MI5 even deliberately rigged my disciplinary hearing - a fact uncovered by Sir David Calcutt QC and regarded by the Metropolitan Police as potentially fraudulent.
The Tara ‘leak’ inquiry by MI5

My concern is that the Inquiry is, therefore, not only relying on false or misleading information, it is also not grasping some of the key, fundamental concepts surrounding this issue. For example on Day 220 page 36, Mr Aiken tells the Inquiry:

1. Now we will come back to look at that at the point in time. I can't now show you. I will have to come back to the article itself, but of particular significance you will wish to consider is if Fisk's article is based on the document that we are -- if we scroll down, please -- that we are looking at here, and Ian Cameron has carried out and set out in his memo the detective work he has done to express the view that this is it, what did Fisk not have and that's a matter you will want to consider. He is receiving documents from Colin Wallace and he is being given this document, or the gist of this document, which is said to be available as a result of the Intelligence Section working too closely with the information press section, why would we get this document and not 8th November '74 document?

This is highly misleading because Mr Aiken knows very well that a number of journalists received documents from me regarding Tara and McGrath and that they also did not receive a copy my November 1974 memo.

The reason for this is very simple, contrary to what Ian Cameron of MI5 claimed, and as my boss at the time has confirmed, I was officially ‘leaking’ information to the press about Tara and McGrath. Ian Cameron clearly did not like what I was doing, but there was absolutely no doubt that he knew that one of my roles in Psy Ops was to ‘leak’ sensitive information to the press. However, it is important to stress that I did not ‘leak’ to anyone information that was not advantageous tactically or strategically to the Army. Indeed, in his statement, referred to above, the former Chief Information Officer, Peter Broderick, said: “I just cannot conceive of any situation in which he would act maliciously against the interests of the Crown and the Army”.

The November 1974 memo was, at the time it was written, a highly sensitive internal document created to highlight a number of serious issues that required careful handling and had clear direction from General Peter Leng. Leaking my memo at that time would most certainly not have been in the Army’s interests and would have had very serious repercussions for the Army’s relationships with the RUC. Had I really wanted to stir up trouble, I could, of course, have leaked that memo and other even more damaging information, but I did not.

In 1974 General Leng obtained information that boys were absconding from homes in Belfast for a variety of reasons, but some of those related to sexual abuse. He also had information that some hotels in East Belfast close to Kincora which were used by the leadership of Loyalist paramilitaries were also used as ‘brothels’ by a homosexual (paedophile) group of
which Joseph Mains was a member. General Leng was concerned that boys from the hostels could become prey to the paramilitaries. Indeed, a young male employee at one of the hotels had been assassinated by Loyalist paramilitaries, albeit that assassination was almost certainly sectarian.

The Psy Ops unit was not permitted to target Mains because he was not a paramilitary member. Moreover, we had information that a member of his family held senior rank in the RUC. We believed, however, that by encouraging the press to investigate McGrath properly we would indirectly open up the whole matter to the extent that the RUC would have to act.

As the HIA Inquiry is aware, I wrote to the IPCS and to my former boss, Tony Stoughton, in September 1975 referring to “homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast”. I must make it clear that I had NO evidence that boys from Kincora were being used in those hotels, albeit we suspected it. I was also not aware that McGrath was personally involved with this group. I do not know what exchanges there were between the top levels of the Army and the RUC at that time, but I was made aware that a very senior RUC officer had told General Leng that any action taken against McGrath would not only have a very serious impact on Unionist politics as a whole and but also would give the IRA a major propaganda weapon. I do not know if the comment referred to McGrath’s homosexuality in general, or to Kincora in particular, but the issue was clearly highly sensitive. Hence the complex, convoluted way in which we in Psy Ops were required to deal with it.

I am not surprised that my November 1974 memo was not put on file. Like much of the deniable material we handled, information of that nature was either communicated verbally, or, if in printed form, destroyed immediately after use. General Leng made this clear in his interview with the Sunday Times.

Ian Cameron probably disliked Psy Ops because his predecessor was from MI6 and the Army had a really good working relationship with him. There was a lot of rivalry between different parts of the security community at that time. This is illustrated by Mr Aiken’s presentation of Ian Cameron’s views (Day 220 page 125):

1 The information in
2 the summary was no doubt drawn from G INT” -- so the
3 intelligence section's -- "files at a time when the IP
4 information policy element."
5 Where Colin Wallace and others worked "within the
6 AIS was working closely -- too closely -- with G Int,
7 The Intelligence Section.

Ian Cameron’s view that Information Policy (Psy Ops) worked “too closely” with “G Int” is his personal opinion - an opinion certainly not held by either General Sir Frank King or General Peter Leng. Indeed, in his Operational Directive when he assumed the role of Commander Land Forces, Northern Ireland, General Leng stressed the need for Army Intelligence and Information Policy (Psy Ops) to work closely together. It is also important understand that the Information Policy unit was entirely separate from the Army Press Desk. The Psy Ops unit was accommodated adjacent to the Press Office to give it provide it with cover and to facilitate access to the press. However, much of the work done by the Psy Ops
unit had nothing to do with the press. MI5 were well aware of this and, perhaps significantly, the HIA Inquiry avoids using the terms ‘Psychological Operations’!

Also on Day 220 at Page 125 Mr Aiken says:

It is a very difficult analysis to
draw to your attention is that the sequence of events
seem to be the document that we have just looked at, if
the document that Colin Wallace was able to produce to
Peter Brooke and others was a summary of this document
to then be communicated to the press, and Colin Wallace
then prepared his own version of that which was
circulated to journalists, how would Robert Fisk have
the first of the three documents rather than just the
third?

Again, as Mr Aiken knows, the press briefing document with the various handwritten annotations was NOT designed to be GIVEN to the press. There were obviously very sound legal reasons for this. We did, however, give out unattributable briefing documents that contained less personal information about named individuals. Mr Aiken is creating a mystery where no mystery exists. I am certain that neither I nor my colleagues gave any journalist, including Robert Fisk, copies of the so-called ‘third’ document while I was in Northern Ireland.

A good example are the notes made by David McKittrick during a briefing I gave to him in 1974. The text of his article covers information for the basic Tara handout which did not contain addresses and telephone numbers. However, it is clear from Mr McKittrick’s notes which he supplied to the Press Council in 1987 that he also was given details of William McGrath’s then current address and telephone number, plus his previous home address. Although the notes say "McGrath said to have attended meeting in Dublin with 3 reps of eastern bloc countries present - before troubles". It also refers to the ‘Rev William McCrea’, a name not listed on any of the three versions referred to by the Inquiry!!

Dr Morris Fraser

On Day 221, Mr Aiken told the Inquiry Day 221 6 July

In the PSNI second statement to the Inquiry at 14 paragraphs 73 to 106, Detective Chief Superintendent
15 Clarke addresses Wallace's attempts to link Dr Morris
16 Fraser to Kincora and his engagement with Dr Meehan,
17 whose report you saw we used to identify Inspector
18 as the person said to have spoken to Liam Clarke about
19 a Tory MP being in Kincora. As you know, Inspector
20 now retired, has made it clear to you he did not
21 make that allegation and it was not correct.

This statement is highly misleading. First of all, I have never claimed that I had evidence that
links Dr Fraser to Kincora. A study by Dr Niall Meehan, Griffith College, Dublin, in 2016
into the activities of Dr Morris Fraser says:

"Between 1971 and 1973 police shielded a child-psychiatrist, Dr Roderick Morrison
Fraser, from exposure. The secretly convicted predatory paedophile was left in
charge of vulnerable children. Between 1973 and 1975, the General Medical
Council's Disciplinary Committee colluded with police in preventing the full extent of
Fraser's abusive activity from becoming public knowledge. The GMC then allowed
Fraser to continue to practice medicine without any stated restriction. Until
December 1995 Fraser used his professional status to gain access to children and to
facilitate access by fellow paedophiles.

Journalists failed to detect clear anomalies in reports of Fraser's abusive activities in
1973 and in 1974. The media failed also to address adequately the extent of Fraser's
crimes. Had they done so, the role of police in shielding Fraser's behaviour from
health authorities and from the public would have been exposed. Abused children
might have been protected earlier.

It can be revealed here that an official 'certificate' of conviction was sent to the
'Northern Ireland Hospitals Authority'. However, the certificate was dispatched
one year late, on 11 May 1973, according to a handwritten note on the Bow Street
Magistrates Court record. That was one week after reporting of Fraser's US arrest,
when Fraser was already suspended. The note appeared beside the verdict of Fraser
being bound over not to re-offend for three years. Aside from the very important
matter of the secrecy of Fraser's 1972 conviction, journalists might therefore have
investigated:

a) why was the Northern Ireland Hospitals Authority not informed by the RUC in
   May 1972 of Fraser's conviction;
   b) why was the authority not notified after police began inquiries into Fraser's
      August 1971 abuse;
   c) who decided to inform the authority in May 1973 and why then;
   d) how could a 'single sordid sexual episode' have occurred when two men were
      accused of abusing two boys simultaneously;
   e) how was that finding credible when Fraser engaged in similar activity in the
      US;
   f) why was the US case ignored by the GMC;
   g) why was Fraser's UK conviction ignored in the US;
h) why was Fraser not brought back before a UK court after his February 1974 US guilty plea;

Had they investigated the GMC meetings journalists might have discovered that RUC officer Reginald (Ronnie) Mack gave evidence at the July 1973 GMC hearing on Fraser’s conviction for indecent assault. What was Mack’s role and that of the RUC in failing to tell Fraser’s employers about Fraser’s abuse and conviction? What task, if any, was Fraser expected to perform in return? Mack served later as part of a 1983 investigation under Sir George Terry, former Chief Constable of Sussex, into child sex abuse in the Kincora Boys’ Home. It was widely regarded as a whitewash.

The attached letter from the solicitors representing the GMC claims that the RUC failed to co-operate with the GMC in its investigations into Fraser.

“The position is that sometime ago we instructed Agents in Belfast to assist us with the enquiries but these have been held up due to the lack of co-operation they have received from the Royal Ulster Constabulary there. We ourselves have spoken with the Chief Superintendent in Belfast but regrettably this has had no effect and it has therefore not been possible for our Agents to see either the Police Officers involved or the boy’s mother [redacted]. Indeed we do not even know the address of this woman and all efforts so far to establish it have proved unsuccessful.”

This is important because Fraser’s convictions in the UK and the USA took place prior to the Terry Inquiry into the RUC’s apparent failings to investigate the abuses at Kincora. Bearing in mind that a member of the RUC (Det Con Mack) attended the GMC hearings, it is clear that the RUC were well aware of Fraser’s paedophile activities in the UK and the USA. As Fraser was a child psychiatrist in Belfast and had dealings with children who were sent to homes such as Kincora, it would be reasonable to expect that he would have been the subject of some investigation by the Terry and Hughes Inquiries. Instead, he was able to have access to vulnerable children and continue his paedophile activities until the 1990s.

I make the above points because, as the Inquiry is well aware, Dr Fraser’s name is recorded on my Tara press briefing document. It is recorded in the handwriting of an officer who was serving at Army HQ N Ireland in 1974 and who clearly had identified a link between Fraser and the allegations relating to Tara and to McGrath’s sexual interests. Fraser did visit the Army HQ on one occasion accompanied with a Scandinavian man. He and his colleague were accompanied by a staff officer from the HQ, but I cannot recall the reason for the visit or the date of the visit - I would guess that it was in 1974. It was only sometime after the handwritten note was added to my briefing sheet that I discovered that Fraser had been convicted for paedophile activities. I was also told by one of my superiors that if Fraser requested any facilities from the Army we were to decline.

The reference in the above transcript extract to the Liam Clarke story in the Belfast Telegraph poses an interesting dilemma for the Inquiry.

‘Sex assault Tory MP visited Kincora boys' home, claim retired detectives’
Belfast Telegraph 23 January 2015 [Liam Clarke]

"At least one Tory MP visited Kincora during the 1970s when it was riven with sexual abuse by staff of boys in their care, it has been claimed.

The allegation was made by two retired detectives who were part of a team which investigated the east Belfast boys’ home in the 1980s and successfully prosecuted three members of staff for sexual abuse.

The names of the police officers are being withheld for security reasons. They are instead referred to as officers Smith and Jones.

Both are known to the Belfast Telegraph and we have established that they conducted the inquiry. Both are also willing to help any inquiry into Kincora either here or in England. They revealed that the MP died before they could arrange to interview him. Officer Jones was the more senior of the two and did most of the interviews, while Officer Smith prepared files and conducted some interviews. They both said that none of the former Kincora residents they interviewed were taken out of the home for sex parties as has sometimes been claimed."

Officer Jones revealed that he had also interviewed Joshua “Joss” Cardwell, a unionist politician who was chairman of the committee responsible for children’s homes. The former detective said: “Mr Cardwell answered the door a happy man. ‘Well Inspector, how can I help you?’ he asked and I told him I was here about the Kincora investigation because he had visited the home. He said it was something to do with his work and he was entitled to inspect it. He turned from a happy man to an absolute nervous wreck and I was arranging for him to come to the station.”

Mr Cardwell took his own life before this could take place.

The officer added: “A Conservative MP was coming over to the Northern Ireland Office quite regularly and has since died. We were told by criminal records in Scotland Yard London that he had a conviction many years ago for indecent behaviour or something in a gents’ loo against another boy but his death meant we never got a chance to question him.”

Liam Clarke told me about this interview and identified the two officers allegedly involved as “Cooke” and “Mack”. I do not know if that is correct, but the Inquiry has been told by Counsel that one of the officers had been identified and that he denied making the allegation and that it was incorrect.

Clearly the allegation that a former Conservative MP was involved in the Kincora abuse scandal is an important one and needs to be cleared up by the Inquiry. Did Liam Clarke make the whole story up, or did the former RUC officer lie to the Inquiry? If, as alleged, an Conservative MP was suspected by the police during the Terry Inquiry, then it is not unreasonable to assume that there should be a reference to that in the Terry Inquiry files and the Inquiry should be aware of that fact. If Scotland Yard had been able to tell the RUC that
the MP had been convicted of a sexual offence, then that offence must also be on record. These are simple matters to check. Has the Inquiry taken steps to find the answers to this allegation? Were the two officers in question invited to give evidence to the Inquiry? If the MP did exist, is his name included in my 'Clockwork Orange' material? Liam Clarke had very good contacts in the RUC and I do not accept that he was making up this story. Despite that, the Inquiry appears to be satisfied by the former RUC officer's response. Most fair-minded people will think that such an attitude is unacceptable, especially when Prime Minister, David Cameron, promised Parliament that "no stone would be left unturned" when investigating historical child sexual abuse. The story is also significant because the Army was aware of rumours that a Conservative MP, had been active with a homosexual group in Belfast while he was a Minister at the Northern Ireland Office. His name was recorded in my 'Clockwork Orange' notes.

On Day 217 (29 June) Mr Aiken Counsel to the Inquiry (page 157):

11 Now what will be immediately apparent, Members of the Panel, is that this document written on 14th October 1976 is said to be a summary of what is 14 known about Tara and its principal members, and if we go back up, please, to the first page, paragraph 4, you can see what is said about William McGrath, that: 17 "... [he] is almost certainly bisexual and there are 18 homosexuals in his immediate circle of Tara associates."
19 There is no reference to Kincora. There is no reference to allegations of abuse taking place in Kincora on anyone in his care. The allegation is he is bisexual and there are others around him in Tara who are homosexual.
21 Now the Army wasn't in a position or is not yet in a position to produce this document to the Inquiry.

1 That is because it has not yet been possible to find the Army HQNI Tara file, which definitely did exist, or the 39 Brigade Tara file, which may be the one that Brian Gemmell had and which this document may well have been found on. Those files, according to Mr Rucker, who you are aware did the report examining much wider issues, but including looking at matters relating to Kincora and the Army, according to Mr Rucker, they appear to have last been with The Security Service in that he sent them to The Security Service for them to reconsider matters in them that he was looking at, but The Security Service hasn't as yet been able to trace them in order to know do they still have them, did they send them back to the Army or have they been destroyed."

The loss by MI5 of both the Army HQNI Tara file and the 39 Brigade Tara file must be a cause for serious concern, bearing in mind that one of MI5's responsibilities is the oversight of security measures to protect classification information. Bearing in mind that the Tara/Kincora story has been a long-running saga and the subject of various Inquiries, it is difficult to see why the Army would have destroyed those files. Indeed, Mr Aiken's comment indicates that the files only went missing after they were handed over by the Army to MI5. It
is even more worrying that the report created by former Captain Brian Gemmell on Tara, McGrath and Kincora has also apparently gone missing.

Captain Brian Gemmell

Although, like me, Brian Gemmell, the former Intelligence Officer with 39 Brigade in Lisburn, decided not to give evidence to the Inquiry, some of his reported comments are particularly important and merit thorough investigation. For example:

BBC News N Ireland - 1 August 2014

The former intelligence officer, Brian Gemmell, said that he learned details of what was happening inside the home while gathering information about loyalists. He said he was running two agents who had close links to Kincora.

However, after presenting his report to a senior MI5 officer (Ian Cameron), Mr Gemmell said, he was told to cease his investigation.

He said: "I was summoned to go and see him. I went up thinking he was going to be pleased with me. "He bawled me out. He was rude and offensive and hostile. "He told me not just to stop any investigation into Kincora, but to drop 'Royal Flush' [an agent Brian Gemmell was running]."

The Belfast Telegraph - 24 January 2015

A former intelligence officer has revealed that a senior civilian was driven by the Army to Kincora Boys' Home on visits at the height of the child sex abuse scandal there in the 1970s.

Brian Gemmell left Belfast as a captain in Military Intelligence in 1976. Last August he volunteered, through an article in the Belfast Telegraph, to help the Hart Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse (HIA) or any other body investigating the Kincora scandal.

Speaking last week, Mr Gemmell told us he had not yet heard from the HIA.

He said: "One soldier who worked for me told me after I left that he drove a civilian, who he now thinks was MI5 but never identified himself, from HQNI to a meeting in Kincora. He did it a couple of times."

He went on: "My intelligence NCO (non-commissioned officer) drove him to Kincora and he was inside for half-an-hour and then he drove him back. I am prepared to give the inquiry the name of the driver." He added: "It didn't really impact him that significantly at the time sitting outside in the car."

A key question obviously is: "Why would anyone from HQ N Ireland be visiting Kincora in 1975/76?" According to what Intelligence witnesses have told the Inquiry, neither the Army nor the Intelligence Services knew anything about Kincora at that time. One possibility is that the "senior civilian" was Ian Cameron. There was normally only one "senior" civilian Intelligence officer at HQ N Ireland and in 1975/76 that was Mr Cameron. Most Intelligence officers were members of the Army. The civilian ones were relatively younger and more
junior in rank. According to the transcripts of the Inquiry’s public hearings, in 1976 Ian Cameron asked the Army Information Services for copies of any information they held on Tara and William McGrath. The so-called ‘leak’ inquiry by Ian Cameron into my own case had been completed some two years earlier and it is unclear why he had taken a renewed interest in the matter—especially when he had allegedly told Brian Gemmell to stop investigating William McGrath.

On reason may be linked to matters associated with a speech made by the Rev Ian Paisley at Dungannon (see Irish Times dated 07 Feb 1976) in which he claimed that the Northern Ireland Office, in alliance with the Ministry of Defence, had established a team for ‘psychological warfare against Loyalists’ headed by senior officials from the Foreign Office’. The Unit’s brief, Mr Paisley added, is to ‘break up the UUUC by discrediting its leaders through character assassination and every means that can be employed.’ He further alleged that the campaign was already under way, ‘digging into the past of UUUC Convention members and prominent party workers. Charges and innuendoes about their morals, home life, families, and personal relationships will be floated’. He added that it was very easy to assassinate a man’s character and cited the recent case of the British Liberal leader, Mr. Thorpe. He did not rule out the possibility of information being fed to the media despite the libel laws.”

The reference to Jeremy Thorpe is significant because journalists had heard a rumour that Ian Paisley’s speech was apparently the result of information from someone at the Northern Ireland Office who claimed that the Joint Information Co-ordinating Committee had offered a journalist a story linking Ian Paisley to William McGrath and using information similar to material that I had been given for my ‘Clockwork Orange’ material in 1974.

Another reason why Mr Cameron took a renewed interest in my press briefing document in 1976 is that on 30 May that year The Sunday Times published a story claiming that the RUC carried out a series of raids on members of the Belfast homosexual community:

“Ulster’s hard-pressed police force with 132 murders on its books so far this year has still found time to clamp down on one of the Province’s less vital problems: homosexuality.

Leaders of homosexual associations have complained to Merlyn Rees, the Secretary for Northern Ireland, about police raids, arrests and hostile interrogations of their members. Eighteen homosexuals have been arrested and questioned over the past few weeks, but none has yet been charged.”

The reports also said that “Diaries, letters and address books have been taken from their homes”.

“Last month, the committee wrote to the Province’s chief constable complaining that in some cases police had threatened to tell parents and employers that a person was being questioned about homosexuality. The police deny that homosexuals are being harassed, but admit that ‘investigations into homosexuals are being carried out’.

The author of the story, David Blundy, told me personally that some of those arrested had been asked about their links with UK civil servants based at the NIO.
On 16 September 1983, the Dublin-based magazine, The Phoenix, refers to a NIO official named 'Peter England' and claims that a document found in Kincora had on the margins of "pages 5, 7, 11 and 13, several phone numbers" written in his handwriting.

As the Inquiry is aware, Peter England’s name also appears in Chris Moore’s book, ‘The Kincora Scandal’ (page 89) which states:

"Another frequent visitor to (Anthony) Blunt’s home was Sir Knox (Cunningham), described by Harbinson as a 'Muscle queen' who liked to be 'screwed by young boys'. Given Knox Cunningham's knowledge of Tara and McGrath, and given that McGrath made visits to London for meetings of the 'Belfast-London' committee, it is just possible that Knox Cunningham was able to introduce his acquaintance McGrath to his London friends, such as [Peter] Montgomery, Blunt and others, including a man who held a senior post in the Northern Ireland office in Belfast in the mid seventies, P.T. E. England, Peter to his friends. Harbinson knew Peter England and his family in Surrey very well indeed and he was aware that England was under suspicion during his two years in Northern Ireland (1974-76) because of his sexuality."

In a Parliamentary question to the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on 8 March 1988 Ken Livingstone MP asked [Hansard HC [129/184-88]:

"Will the Prime Minister take time in her busy day to reconsider the statement that she made to the House last year about Sir Maurice Oldfield? Will she consider the inconsistency of the withdrawal of his positive vetting while no action was taken against Mr. Peter England, a deputy secretary in the Northern Ireland Office, and Mr. J. L. Imrie, an assistant secretary at the Northern Ireland Office, following investigations into the buggery of young children at the Kincora boys' home? Is she not disturbed that Mr. Imrie has taken no action against the newspaper that named him and his activities four weeks ago, although he continues to work for the Government in the Ministry of Defence? Can she assure the House that she is convinced of Mr. Imrie's innocence?"

Mrs Thatcher replied that she had nothing further to add to the statement that she made on Sir Maurice Oldfield in the House, but failed to answer Ken Livingstone’s question.

As the Inquiry is, no doubt, aware there have been persistent allegations that four senior NIO civil servants were suspected of involvement in various homosexual/paedophile activities. Three of them were named in Parliament by Ken Livingstone. Ian Cameron is almost certain to have known all four, but he would certainly have known Peter England. Despite the serious nature of the allegations, neither this Inquiry nor the Terry Inquiry, have dealt with the matter.

When Paul Foot published his book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace', in 1989, he and I had a meeting at Parliament with Merlyn Rees, Roy Jenkins (Lord Jenkins of Hillhead) and Lord Stockton. In response to a question from Paul Foot, Merlyn Rees confirmed that Peter England (a senior official at the NIO) had been removed from his post in Belfast in 1976. Mr Rees would not elaborate on the reason for Peter England’s removal. However, he did say that he was very surprised to hear later that Peter England had not only been allowed to keep
his security clearance, but also had subsequently been given an even more senior post at the MoD. Finally, Mr Rees confirmed the Sunday Times claim that he had received a complaint from the Belfast gay community about alleged RUC harassment. Apparently the RUC had proposed charging a number of individuals with sexual offences, but Mr Sam Silkin MP, the Attorney General, had stopped the prosecutions. Mr Rees would not say what reasons, if any, the Attorney General gave for his decision to prevent the prosecutions going ahead, or, indeed, why the Attorney General was involved in the matter.

Mr Rees also told us that when he was first made aware of my case in early 1975, he was totally unaware that an Army Psy Ops unit existed in Northern Ireland. He also said that MI5 told him that I was a “filing clerk”. Why did MI5 find it necessary deliberately to mislead the then Secretary of State? Why could MI5 not tell Mr Rees the truth about what I was actually employed to do?

From the Sunday Times story it seems very strange that the RUC were apparently actively investigating links between the Belfast gay community and civil servants at the NIO at the time when Sir George Terry and senior RUC officers later claimed the police were so busy dealing with terrorist activities that they did not have the time or the resources to investigate allegations relating to McGrath and Kincora. I also find it incredible that, although the RUC had sufficiently detailed knowledge of the Belfast homosexual community to launch the arrest operation, they appear to have been totally unaware of McGrath, Mains and Semple, or, at least, they certainly did not appear to have included any of them in that arrest operation. It is clear from the information possessed by the Inquiry that the RUC at that time were aware of the allegations regarding McGrath’s homosexual behaviours.

I do not know if the arrest operation was linked with civil servants at the NIO, but the claim that NIO staff may have been involved in unlawful sexual activities appears to have been ignored by the HIA Inquiry - at least in the public hearings. This may be that Sir George Terry dismissed allegations of “any homosexual practices by British officials in the Northern Ireland Office”.

It is also significant that former Detective Superintendent Caskey told the Inquiry that when he was working with the Terry Inquiry he was not allowed to interview Ian Cameron. Bearing in mind that the Terry Inquiry was set up by the Government to investigate allegations that the police and Intelligence Services had covered up the sexual abuses at Kincora, it is remarkable that a senior MI5 officer allegedly involved in that cover up did not give evidence to the police. He could only have got away with failing to talk to the police if the top management of MI5 had supported his decision not to participate.

It is safe to assume that if the Director General of MI5 had instructed Ian Cameron to co-operate fully with the RUC/Terry Inquiry, he would have done so. In other words, Ian Cameron’s failure to co-operate with the Terry Inquiry must have been condoned by the very top of MI5 - why? Why criticise me for not taking part in previous Inquiries, when a senior MI5 officer who also failed to participate has escaped any criticism? To make matters worse, the Inquiry does not appear to have pursued this particular matter, or Mr Gemmell’s comments in general, very rigorously.

This a very important matter because it is obvious that the Terry Inquiry clearly was aware that Brian Gemmell had written a report about McGrath, Tara and Kincora (a report which
has mysteriously disappeared). It is also clear that he gave that report to Ian Cameron: Brian Gemmell is quoted as saying:

"I was summoned to go and see him. I went up thinking he was going to be pleased with me. He bawled me out. He was rude and offensive and hostile. He told me not just to stop any investigation into Kincora, but to drop 'Royal Flush' [one of the agents Brain Gemmell was running inside Tara]."

The Terry Inquiry also was aware that Det Superintendent Caskey was refused access to Ian Cameron to question him. Not one word about these serious issues is contained in the Terry Report to Parliament. Indeed, Sir George Terry said in his report (page 23):

"The Military sources have been very frank with me and perfectly open during the ongoing enquiry by your own team under D/Superintendent Caskey."

I assume this is the same D/Superintendent Caskey who was refused permission to interview Ian Cameron of M15 who was based at Army HQ Northern Ireland and who told Brian Gemmell to stop investigating William McGrath? If so, then Sir George Terry's use of the words "frank" and "perfectly open" are perhaps overstated.

I believe that Sir George Terry's failure to include in his report to Parliament the fact that Brian Gemmell had written a report about McGrath and his activities and that, on reading that report, Ian Cameron had instructed instruct him to stop investigating McGrath would have caused serious questions to be asked by MPs. However, if Parliament had also been made aware that the D/Superintendent had been refused permission by M15 to interview Ian Cameron, I feel that a Judicial Inquiry would probably have been set up to look into the matter. In other words, the deliberate exclusion of those facts misled Parliament. What we do not know is if D/Superintendent Caskey protested about Parliament being misled? Surely as an experienced detective he must have been concerned that Parliament had not been given all the relevant facts - especially that his own attempts to interview Ian Cameron had been blocked? It is also reasonable to assume that the then Chief Constable of the RUC must have been annoyed by the fact that Sir George Terry did not refer to the RUC being prevented from interviewing Ian Cameron. Is there any official record of the Chief Constable making representations to anyone in authority e.g. the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, about this blatant attempt by M15 to obstruct his officers when doing their duty?

Also, given all the hype about how many files have been declassified and released to the HIA Inquiry, why did not the Government take the same action when the Terry Inquiry was set up?

In the event, the Northern Ireland Secretary, James Prior, used the false assurances provided by the Terry Report to get away with setting up an 'administrative inquiry' which, despite Mr Prior’s assurances to Parliament, had its terms of reference watered down deliberately to exclude consideration of the activities of the Army and the RUC.

The 16 September 1983, edition of the 'The Phoenix' magazine referred to above also states:

"1973: Drugs offence by one of the boys leads to a police inquiry by D Sgt George Caskey of Strandtown RUC and D Insp George McBride of Donegall Pass Drugs Squad. Details about the homosexual offences at the home were logged and the file
passed to D Supt Bill Meharg, head of the Special Branch (sic). The file has gone missing."

Bearing in mind that the article was based on information allegedly ‘leaked’ by the RUC, it is not unreasonable to assume that the intention was to present the police in the best possible light. Setting aside the obvious inaccuracies in the above paragraph, the overall allegation is significant in that it claims that Detective Superintendent Caskey, who led the RUC Inquiry into Kincora in 1982, had been involved in an investigation in 1973 in which a Kincora inmate alleged that homosexual offences were being committed at Kincora.

I do not know if the allegation is correct, but bearing in mind that the information is already in the public domain, I feel the Inquiry should deal with it properly, either by denying it or by confirming it. Did a Kincora inmate make such allegations about abuse at Kincora to the two named police officers in 1973? If the report is false, the police should say so. I believe it is important that the Inquiry deal effectively with as many of these outstanding allegations as possible.

The references by Chris Moore in his book, ‘The Kincora Scandal’, to Sir Knox Cunningham and Peter Montgomery are significant because both Cunningham and Montgomery are referred to in my ‘Clockwork Orange’ material. Sir Knox Cunningham, the former Conservative MP and Parliamentary Private Secretary to Harold Macmillan knew McGrath and was a contributor to the Rev Paisley’s ‘Protestant Telegraph’ newspaper and had links with John McKeague. The Army had information that he also provided funds to Tara. Cunningham also knew Peter Montgomery, who was a key figure at the BBC and Deputy Lieutenant for Co Tyrone. The Army was aware that he had been an officer in the Intelligence Corps and was related to Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein. We also had information which indicated that he had given McGrath permission to use his estate near Fivemiletown for military training activities by Tara. There were also rumours that Montgomery was an active member of a homosexual group in Belfast associated with the Arts and which included some well known ‘show business’ personalities.

In later 1974 I was asked to redact all references to Peter Montgomery from my ‘Clockwork Orange’ draft material, albeit the references to Knox Cunningham were allowed to remain.

It was not until after I left the MoD that I discovered that one of Peter Montgomery’s long term homosexual partners was Anthony Blunt and that Blunt frequently visited Northern Ireland and stayed with Montgomery at his estate in County Tyrone. Bearing in mind that Anthony Blunt was by then, living under immunity from prosecution, having confessed to MI5 that he had been a Soviet agent while he was also serving with MI5, it is simply not credible that MI5 did not know about his trips to Ireland and his homosexual activities, both in London and Ireland.

In her memoirs, ‘Secrets and Lies’, Christine Keeler, who with Dr Stephen Ward was involved in the infamous ‘Profumo Affair’, writes:

“Great discretion was necessary over any homosexual goings-on for these were illegal, even between consenting adults, until 1967 and Stephen [Ward] knew all about the Lords and prominent clergy who were ‘fruity’, as he said, with one another. Stephen often had dinner with Godfrey Winn, who was a Fleet Street star writer and a
dreadful old pool and poseur. He was a user, not a friend. But Stephen made use of him for gossip from the homosexual world, about men like Anthony Blunt. Blunt's long-time lover was Peter Montgomery, the brother of Hugh Montgomery who was the Very Reverend Monsignor Montgomery.

But there was nothing spiritual about the gay set. There were what we now call rent boys on the circuit. Lord Boothby, who was mixed up with the Kray twins, was known to be a habitual user of these young lads. His penchant was for rubbing himself, while naked, up against their private parts. He was a close associate of the Krays, who procured young men for his sexual amusement and then blackmailed him."

John Profumo was the Secretary of State for War in the Macmillan Government and Sir Knox Cunningham was Macmillan's Parliamentary Private Secretary. The repercussions of the affair severely damaged Macmillan and he resigned as Prime Minister on 'health grounds' in October 1963. The Conservative Party was severely damaged by the scandal, which may have contributed to its defeat by Labour in the 1964 general election.

In 1987, I was contacted by a Belfast-born author, Robin Bryans (aka 'Robert Harbinson'), who claimed that he had information to share with me about Kincora. Fred Holroyd and I, accompanied by a Parliamentary researcher, interviewed Bryans at his home in London. During the interview, Bryans claimed that he had informed two Government Ministers in 1973 about the abuses at Kincora. As the Inquiry is aware, I have already supplied it with a comprehensive summary of what else Bryans told us. Although I did not disclose to Bryans the identities of the various people referred to in my 'Clockwork Orange' material, there was clearly a significant overlap between the two lists. Paul Foot also later interviewed Bryans.

What is particularly interesting is that there is no reference to Anthony Blunt in any of my 'Clockwork Orange' material and I assume that his name must have been deliberately removed from the data I was being given.

Private Eye magazine dated 10 June 1988 published the following story:

"Someone should introduce Mr Tom King, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to Mr Roger Birch, Chief Constable of Sussex. and set them talking on a matter of joint interest: the Kincora Boys Home scandal in Northern Ireland (Eyes passim).

Ken Livingstone, Labour MP for Brent East, has been trying since the beginning of the year to find out from the Sussex police whether they had carried out any inquiries into allegations made by Mr Robin Bryans (otherwise known as Robert Harbinson) over homosexual prostitution in Northern Ireland by very important people in the 1970s. Bryans/Harbinson says he next contacted the Sussex police in the early 1970s with long string of allegations about his former boyfriend Anthony Blunt. The allegations suggested blackmail, extortion, and male prostitution in Northern Ireland.

Mr Livingstone was interested because in 1982 the Chief Constable of the Sussex Police, Sir George Terry, was put in charge of the independent inquiry into the Kincora Boys Home scandal (this full report has never been published).

Did the Government turn to the Sussex police because of their previous involvement in the Bryans/Blunt allegations?
Mr Livingstone first wrote to Mr Birch in January with a polite inquiry. He got a frosty reply telling him, in effect, to mind his own business. He wrote again in February enclosing documents from Mr Bryant which plainly proved his involvement in the 1970s with the Sussex police.

On 11 March, Mr Birch replied, agreeing that the documents did prove the involvement of the Sussex police. He explained that in 1974 and 1978 complaints had been made about “scurrilous and defamatory” letters written to important people by Mr Bryans and that the Sussex Police had made inquiries which resulted in 1974 in Mr Bryans being bound over to keep the peace. In 1978, no action had been taken after the Sussex police made their report. Since the “scurrilous and defamatory” letters all concerned Blunt (who had not then been exposed as a spy and was better known as the Keeper of the Queen’s pictures), it is a fair guess that at least some inquiry might have been made by the Sussex police into the substance of the Bryans’ allegations.

What has all of this got to do with Mr Tom King? Only that this question and answer is reported in Hansard.

Mr Ken Livingstone: “What information was available to his department concerning investigations undertaken by the Sussex police relating to allegations of homosexuality prior Sir George Terry’s appointment to investigate the events at Kincora Boys Home?”

Mr Tom King: “I am not aware of any such investigations.”

In fact, as Chief Constable Birch’s letter makes clear, the Sussex police under George Terry were involved (at whatever distance) in allegations about homosexual behaviour in Northern Ireland on at least two occasions before the Kincora inquiry under Sir George Terry was set up in 1982. The Terry Inquiry was not, therefore, totally “independent” as the Northern Ireland Secretary, James Prior, claimed in Parliament.

As the Inquiry is aware, some of the allegations made by Bryans, and which the Sussex Police were presumably aware of from the documents Bryans circulated, involved some of the most prominent people in the country at that time.
In his book, "Let The Petals Fall" (Published in July 1993) says:

The Army heard rumours that McGrath may have abused children in the Republic of Ireland and that he and Mains may have taken boys from Kincora to the Irish Republic. I do not know if those allegations were true.

Given that the Sussex Police had investigated in the mid 1970s the allegations being widely circulated by Bryans, it is strange that no arrests or convictions arose from those investigations. Robin Bryans was more than willing to talk to anyone in great detail about his allegations. It is also significant that some of those named by Bryans at that time were convicted years later of sexual abuse.

I am not suggesting that these allegations were, by themselves, proof that they confirm links to Kincora, but it is truly remarkable that the Sussex Police investigation during the 1970s did not lead to any arrests for homosexuality and were not referred to when Sir George Terry undertook his so-called 'independent' Inquiry in 1982. Bryans openly admitted that he, himself, was a homosexual, but that he was not a paedophile. Indeed he claimed that he had warned two Government Ministers in 1973 about the abuses at Kincora.

**Political and Intelligence background**

I believe that if the HIA Inquiry is to understand why the authorities were reacting to Tara, McGrath and Kincora in the way that they obviously were, it must examine and understand the political and Intelligence background that prevailed in 1973/74 when I was briefing the Press on the activities of William McGrath and Kincora.

In December 1987, Anthony (Tony) Cavendish who was one of Sir Maurice Oldfield's closest friends and who served with him in Army Intelligence during World War 2 and also in
MI6, published his memoirs, ‘Inside Intelligence’. In his book, Tony Cavendish refers to attempts by MI5 to discredit various political figures including Harold Wilson and Edward Heath.

"In 1978, Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtier (BBC) published a book called 'The Pencourt File'. Two months after the Prime Minister resigned, these two investigative journalists had been summoned to his home by Harold Wilson. He told them, amongst other things, that he suspected the loyalty of certain senior MI5 officers and that he was convinced that his telephone had been bugged by MI5. He had consulted both Maurice as Chief of MI6 and Sir Michael Hanley as Head of MI5 and had been told that MI5 contained a 'disaffected' faction.

It was extraordinary that a former Prime Minister should be accusing what had been his own primary security organization of the state of working against him, but after a brief flurry of interest in the media the whole matter was supposedly forgotten.

Even though Penrose was sure there was at least some substance to the accusations, little else happened and everything was damped down until a furore was caused by the Government’s clumsily-handled attempts to suppress a book by a former MI5 officer, Peter Wright. Wright stated in Australia that MI5, or a section of MI5 orchestrated by him, had broken the law while actively working to discredit not only Wilson and the Labour Government, but also the preceding Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath.

In his memoirs, 'Spycatcher', published in 1987, former MI5 senior officer, Peter Wright, confirms much of what Harold Wilson alleged to Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtier eleven years earlier. He states:

"As events moved to their political climax in early 1974, with the election of the minority Labour Government, MI5 was sitting on information which, if leaked, would undoubtedly have caused a political scandal of incalculable consequences. The news that the Prime Minister himself was being investigated would at the least have led to his resignation. The point was not lost on some MI5 officers.

One afternoon I was in my office when two colleagues came in. They were with three or four other officers. I closed the file I was working on and asked them how I could help.

"We understand you've reopened the Wilson case," said the senior one.

"You know I can't talk about that," I told him.

I felt a bit lame, but then I did not much enjoy being cornered in my own office.

"Wilson's a bloody menace," said one of the younger officers, "and it's about time the public knew the truth."

It was not the first time I had heard that particular sentiment. Feelings had run high inside MI5 during 1968. There had been an effort to try to stir up trouble for Wilson then, largely because the Daily Mirror tycoon, Cecil King, who was a long-time agent
of ours, made it clear that he would publish anything MI5 might care to leak in his direction. It was all part of Cecil King's "coup," which he was convinced would bring down the Labour Government and replace it with a coalition led by Lord Mountbatten.

But the approach in 1974 was altogether more serious. The plan was simple. In the run-up to the election which, given the level of instability in Parliament, must be due within a matter of months, MI5 would arrange for selective details of the intelligence about leading Labour Party figures, but especially Wilson, to be leaked to sympathetic pressmen. Using our contacts in the press and among union officials, word of the material contained in MI5 files and the fact that Wilson was considered a security risk would be passed around.

Soundings in the office had already been taken, and up to thirty officers had given their approval to the scheme. Facsimile copies of some files were to be made and distributed to overseas newspapers, and the matter was to be raised in Parliament for maximum effect. It was a carbon copy of the Zinoviev letter, which had done so much to destroy the first Ramsay MacDonald Government in 1928."

The 'Daily Telegraph' on 19 May 1976, published a report by the newspaper's then Washington correspondent Nicholas Comfort. Under the headline 'Campaign in US to smear MPs', Mr Comfort had written:

"Persistent efforts have been made in recent months to discredit leading members of the three major British political parties by planting derogatory stories about them on news agencies in Washington, it was claimed last night. 'Shortly before Mr Heath lost the Conservative leadership last year someone presented us with an article on Mr Heath which was quite derogatory on the lines of Mr Jeremy Thorpe,' said Dr. Edward von Rothkirch, senior editor of Trans-World news agency. 'So far this year his agency and others have been offered similar matter about some eleven MPs, a Conservative, two Liberals and eight Labour.' When Penrose called Dr. von Rothkirch he confirmed that the Telegraph article was accurate. He also mentioned the names of the political figures who had been the subject of "smear attacks". Among them he included Harold Wilson, Lady Falkender and Jeremy Thorpe. 'Well, I believe that the really heavy approach was done back in 1975,' said the American newspaper. 'I had a heart attack on 16 January 1976 and I know that what we call the 'derogatory British material' was being offered to us well before Christmas."

I believe there is now little doubt that the political information I was given in early 1974, and which originated mainly from the NIO, almost certainly came from the same sources as the USA material. The Army simply did not have access to such information. I also believe it did not originate from MI6 because the thrust of the information was counter-productive to what MI6 was attempting to do at that time.

A report by David Leigh and Paul Lashmar in The Observer on 5 July 1987 said:

"MI5-based disinformation schemes in Britain, including the 1974 'Wilson plot', have been confirmed in a forensic breakthrough by the international documents expert, Dr Julius Grant. Dr Grant, the man who exposed the forged 'Hitler Diaries', has succeeded - in a three-month investigation commissioned by The Observer - in
verifying key documents claimed to be written by the Belfast intelligence officer, Colin Wallace. The Wallace files contain the first independent corroboration of the confession by assistant MI5 director Peter Wright in his banned memoirs that MI5 men and political right-wingers conspired against Labour in 1974.

We asked Dr Grant to show whether the documents were forgeries. He concludes: ‘I consider that the balance of probability favours the authentic origin of the writings attributed to 1974’.

As a result, we can now demonstrate the extraordinary tide of smears, leaks and fabrications that were fed into the British Press between 1972 and 1976, many aimed at the incoming Labour government of Harold Wilson.

Wallace’s notes are explosive. They contain material known only to MI5 at the time - about the suspicions that Gaitskell had been killed by the KGB; about Wilson’s innocent links (via his friend Lord Kagan) with a KGB man called Vaygauskas; about East German links (via businessman Rudy Sternberg) to Wilson’s office. They include ‘slanted’ accounts of Wilson’s refusal to act on earlier MI5 claims that Labour minister John Stonehouse was under Czech control.

Some of this material surfaced over the next decade. But it was unknown to the public at the time. This is why Dr Grant’s forensic analysis is so important.’

Channel 4 News also commissioned Dr Grant to report on the forensic dating validity of my notes and in an interview broadcast on 26 June 1987 he was asked by Channel 4 to state what was the likelihood that the notes could have been forged. Dr Grant replied that the forger would have had to know more about papers and inks than he did.

(Source: Channel 4 News)

A former Conservative MP, Humphry Berkeley, wrote to Edward Heath on 17 July 1987 - copy to Merlyn Rees and Roy Jenkins - saying, inter alia:

"It was very good of you to spend so much of your time seeing me on Wednesday afternoon.

As I told you, I have probably read more about Messrs. Wallace and Holroyd than any other person in this country - about half a million words. Everything which I have read convinces me that serious malpractices were committed by MI5 in Northern Ireland in 1974 and 1975. Every allegation which I have doubted has been independently corroborated by at least one person and, in some cases, by many."

I do not know if MI5 was engaged in a plot against Wilson, but, given that the above allegations were made by a former Prime Minister, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, the Director General of MI5, plus a former senior officer in MI5, it is obvious that what they said should have been taken very seriously and the matter should probably have been very thoroughly investigated, possibly by a Royal Commission. Attempting to subvert the 1974 General Election was not just a misdemeanour, it was a threat to our whole democratic process and should be not have been dismissed lightly. Were any of the MI5 officers involved in the smear campaign disciplined, let alone prosecuted, for their actions? I would imagine not!

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Will there ever be a proper investigation into the so-called plot against Harold Wilson? I imagine not!

It is not just in the matter of the Kincora sexual abuse that MI5’s activities are highly questionable, there were similar occurrences in England during the 1970s. For example, on 14 November 2012, The Daily Telegraph published a report under the headline “Sir Cyril Smith sex abuse dossier seized by MI5”.

The report stated:

“Tony Robinson, a special branch officer with Lancashire Police in the 1970s, said he saw a police dossier which was “thick” with allegations from boys claiming they had been abused by Sir Cyril.

He said that after taking the file out of the safe at special branch headquarters in Hutton, Preston, he was contacted by an officer from MI5 who told him it needed to be sent to London.

Mr Robinson also disclosed that the then Director of Public Prosecutions had examined the allegations but decided they were “not in the public interest”.

He said: “The police now say the file is lost. It seems like there was a complete cover up to me.”

According to Mr Robinson a copy of the report from Lancashire Police was passed to Special Branch, which dealt with national security and intelligence.

Mr Robinson, who had a previous interest in the case, said he read Sir Cyril’s file. He said: “I looked through Sir Cyril’s file which was kept in a safe in our office.

“It was thick full of statements from young boys alleging abuse. It had been prepared for prosecution.

“Written across the top of it were the words: ‘No further action, not in the public interest. DPP [Director of Public Prosecutions].’

“Shortly after taking it out I was called by an MI5 officer. They asked if I had the file on Mr Cyril Smith, and said: ‘Please have this sent down to London.’

A Channel 4 ‘Dispatches’ programme broadcast on 12 September 2013, ‘How Cyril Smith got away with child abuse’, said that And the Metropolitan police have confirmed to the programme that during the 1980s Smith was a visitor to the Elm guest house in south west London, where a paedophile ring was reported to have been active.

It is also important to note that the DPP apparently ruled that it was “not in the public interest” to prosecute Cyril Smith for the sexual abuse of children and it was also the DPP also ruled it is was not in the public interest to allow the Metropolitan Police to investigate Sir David Calcutt’s report which concluded that the MoD and MI5 had rigged my disciplinary hearing in a way that the Metropolitan Police regarded as almost certainly fraudulent.
As the HIA Inquiry is aware, Cyril Smith was one of the politicians named in my 'Clockwork Orange' notes.

**M15 and the murder of Pat Finucane**

Commenting on the investigation by Sir Bernard De Silva into the murder by Loyalist paramilitaries of Belfast solicitor, Pat Finucane, the BBC website on 13 December 2012 says that very senior army officers and MoD officials provided "highly misleading and in parts factually inaccurate advice" to the then Defence Secretary Tom King about their agent Brian Nelson who had helped target Finucane. When it came to Military Intelligence, says de Silva, the system "appears to have facilitated political deniability - rather than creating mechanisms for an appropriate level of political oversight".

The BBC website goes on to say:

"That's pretty damning isn't it? For it means there was a complete breakdown between officials and ministers over the army's role in the so called "dirty war" being waged to counter an insurgency within the United Kingdom."

The De Silva Inquiry found that M15 received intelligence two months before the killing that Mr Finucane was under threat but that no steps were taken to protect him. It also found that M15 helped spread propaganda against Mr Finucane in the years before he was killed.

Despite what I have said in this submission, and the damming indictments by Sir Bernard de Silva, Lord Stevens and others, the HIA Inquiry appears to have accepted at face value the evidence provided by the various security and intelligence agencies as accurate and reliable when those agencies claimed total ignorance of what was happening at Kincora.

**Summary**

For the purpose of this limited response I have relied, with two exceptions, on information that is in the public domain and, therefore, available to the Inquiry. Those exceptions are the copy of the letter from the solicitors representing the General Medical Council, to the General Medical Council regarding Dr Fraser, and the letter sent to me by Brigadier Willie Rous.

It is clear from the information I have supplied to the Inquiry that there was a sufficient level of awareness within the Army and the RUC by 1974 at the latest (so well before 1980 as was claimed) to have merited a serious investigation into William McGrath and his sexual activities. This is particularly true when one realises that homosexual practices, even between consenting adults, were then criminal offences in Northern Ireland. The fact that the RUC was actively engaged in arresting substantial numbers of the homosexual community in Belfast in 1976 shows, contrary to what Sir George Terry claimed, that the police did have the manpower and the direction to investigate potential homosexual offences and carry out such arrests.

The comments made by Lord Stevens and by Sir Bernard De Silva about excesses carried by elements the Intelligence services in Northern Ireland are shocking and must give serious cause for concern. However, nothing that I have said in this submission should be regarded as a criticism of the Security Forces as a whole. My criticism is aimed at excesses by some individuals who actions have taken other parts of the Security Forces 'hostage' by creating a conflict of loyalty in the minds of even those who disagree with their activities. To some
extent that mind-set has helped to perpetuate a cover-up of those excesses. On the other hand, I must point out that General Peter Leng and some of my colleagues did do their best they could in the prevailing circumstances at that time to draw attention to William McGrath and his activities. Had that been successful, then a lot of the abuse that subsequently took place could have been prevented.

It is also clear from the information I have provided that there were important factors at work within the political and Intelligence worlds at that time which were likely to have had a significant bearing on the way the security authorities dealt with this issue. As I have pointed out above, the failure of successive governments to admit that such a situation even existed has not been conducive to achieving justice for those who were sexually abused.

In this submission and in the previous ones I have sent to the HIA Inquiry, I have clearly documented and referenced all the material I have referred to. The Inquiry should, therefore, have no difficulty whatsoever in establishing the accuracy of what I have said.

My concern is that the manner in which this Inquiry has been conducted is contrary to the very clear direction from the Lord Chief Justice to which I referred at the beginning of this submission. In particular, I believe a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that because of the way in which the Inquiry operated there was a real possibility that the process was biased - even if that bias was believed to be well-intentioned.

There is little doubt that the Government will use the outcome of this Inquiry to refuse any further calls for an Inquiry into the child abuse that clearly took place during the period in question. As the years pass there are ever fewer people available to give evidence. Many of the potential military witnesses and victims have now died, and in the days ahead it will become ever more difficult to get at the truth. The need for the HIA Inquiry to be really meaningful - as the Prime Minister, David Cameron, promised Parliament - was never greater, yet I believe it has singularly failed in that respect. Indeed, it has raised more questions and concerns than it has answered. I believe that this will probably be the very last occasion when the victims will have an opportunity to achieve justice, even if “justice” means nothing more than the authorities simply admitting that they were wrong and that they could have done more to stop the abuse before 1980. I have no confidence that this will happen.

Signed: Colin Wallace

18 December 2016
Background

Attempts are being made by the Government, in particular in Northern Ireland, to implement the recommendations of the Departmental Committee on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and to strengthen the rule of law. The Government has taken steps to ensure that the law is enforced effectively and that those who commit terrorist acts are brought to justice. The Northern Ireland Assembly has been established to provide a forum for the resolution of political differences and to promote reconciliation. The Assembly has been in operation since May 1998, and it has been involved in significant legislative and policy-making activities. It has been an important step towards harnessing the political will to end the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Current Situation

Despite the progress of the peace process, there have been setbacks. There have been incidents of violence and intimidation, and some leaders of the Ulster Unionist Party have been accused of supporting paramilitary groups. However, the Ulster Unionist Party has also made efforts to support the process of reconciliation and to engage with the political community. The party has been involved in negotiations with the Irish Government, the British Government, and the Northern Ireland Executive to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Ulster Unionist Party has also been involved in efforts to promote respect for human rights and to ensure the rule of law in Northern Ireland.

In conclusion, the Ulster Unionist Party is committed to the process of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. The party is working towards a peaceful solution to the conflict, and it is committed to supporting the efforts of the Irish and British Governments, the Northern Ireland Executive, and the political community to achieve a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.
a scheme to stop the intimidation of those who wished to ignore the regime. As a result, the Security Forces have been known as perpetrators of human rights abuses. Furthermore, the increased number of incidents where people have been killed and killed due to allegations of theft and murder have continued to be reported. This has undermined both public and private confidence in the capacity of the regime to ensure the safety of its citizens. Consequently, this is creating serious problems for those charged with maintaining order in the country.

This update recognizes the overall need to be proactive rather than reactive. Therefore, the Prevention of Living Quarters 5 must be developed in a proactive manner, taking into account the need for effective monitoring and enforcement. This is also taken into account by the National Operation of the Prevention of Living Quarters 5. The Operation started on 13th July 1973, at dawn of the loth of the month of the 2nd anniversary of 1st December. Many dependents were lost the full support of the Operation.

Objectives

The overall objective is to deter individuals from committing crimes and to ensure the security of the regime. Therefore, the Operation is designed to deter and undermine the activities of local and foreign perpetrators, particularly those engaged in internal aggression.

1. Convincing defections by the group and the creation of distinct leadership networks.
2. Exploiting any perceived weaknesses and conflicts that already exist within the group.
3. Discouraging the growth and their numbers in the regime of the internal opposition.
4. Debating the situation and group from the group.
5. Discouraging the group's direct and indirect actions taken in opposition to the regime. This should also include denouncing, either publicly or privately, the group's support for the objectives of the regime.
6. Encouraging people to participate in the Security Forces with interest and enthusiasm.
7. Breaking the group's confidence in the current political system.
8. Encouraging community leaders, clergy, and officials to speak out against the regime's killings.

Because of the current political situation, the project will specifically target:

- The IRA's networks - particularly in the USA - of terrorists, weapons, and explosives are political support, plus the re-armed in the UK.
The current policy of the UK  has been particularly successful in Britain since it was successfully complemented by the DIY's initiative. Most of the former sites now have the second order involved, and some are now being transformed into natural surrounding. The sites still remain attractive, and several areas such as South Derry, Tyrone and South Armagh are already known as centers of illegal activity. It is likely that the organizations will continue to operate on a large scale, and the hilly areas would make it difficult to maintain a high profile for the organizations.

A major concern is the Government's relatively weak enforcement of laws and the lack of law enforcement officers in the region. The police's presence in the region is negligible, and it is likely that the paramilitary groups in the region would take advantage of the situation. The security forces are frequently absent from the region, and the paramilitary groups have gained significant control.

**KIN-124904**

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**Strategy**

- South Derry, Tyrone and South Armagh
- Layout: Belfast, South and East Antrim, Mid Ulster and Armagh

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Proposed

Clearly, the success of this project relies heavily on good intelligence information, but it can also be ineffective if it is managed in a strict 'locally sensitive' basis. The overall strategic planning of this project, even within the Security Forces, would be highly counter-productive.
KIN-124905

The IRA's Founding Year

By Peter Emery on 7 April 1972

The Sunday Times

The IRA's early days were marked by a period of significant events that shaped its identity and strategy. The organization was founded in 1969, in response to the perceived failure of the Northern Ireland Agreement to address the grievances of the Catholic community. The IRA's objectives were to implement a united Ireland by any means necessary, and its early years were characterized by a combination of armed struggle and political activism.

In the context of its formation, the IRA was described as "a small but powerful" organization. Its members were drawn from a diverse group of individuals, including former soldiers, trade unionists, and students. The IRA's strategy was based on an understanding of the power dynamics in Northern Ireland, and it sought to create a sense of solidarity among the Catholic community.

The IRA's early successes included the 1972 Hunger striker's death, which galvanized public opinion and increased its support. The organization's leadership was also adept at maintaining a degree of secrecy, which helped to keep its activities hidden from the authorities.

1. Informers: The role of informers and the significance of information were crucial to the IRA's success. The organization relied heavily on informants to provide critical intelligence about the police and other government agencies. This information was used to plan and execute attacks, and it was a key factor in the IRA's ability to operate effectively.

2. Leadership: The leadership of the IRA was crucial to its success. The organization was led by a small group of dedicated individuals who were committed to the cause of a united Ireland. The leadership was also adept at maintaining discipline and unity among its members.

3. Political situation: The political situation in Northern Ireland was complex and volatile. The IRA's support was strongest among the Catholic community, but it also had a significant presence among the Protestant community. The organization was able to maintain a degree of support among certain sections of the community, which gave it a significant advantage in the struggle for power.

The IRA's early years were characterized by a combination of armed struggle and political activism. Its success was due in large part to the leadership's ability to maintain a degree of secrecy, as well as its ability to organize effectively and maintain discipline among its members. The IRA's activities were a significant factor in shaping the political landscape of Northern Ireland, and its legacy continues to be felt in the region today.
4. Sexual and other forms of misconduct: This includes incidents where the offender, illegal and after sexual activities being perpetrated by persons removable under the law. There are also other issues involving personnel. For instance, in the case of persons who were charged under the IRA, it was considered that an incident similar to this could have been avoided if, at the time, the writer or any other person involved in the case had been informed.

5. Misappropriation of funds and materials: As the January 1973 article, referred to above, highlights, the problem is of great importance. It can be said that it is likely to have a significant impact on the future of the organization and its support. Time is running out for the organization and it is now more likely to become a victim of its problems. The need for the necessary resources has been highlighted. Moreover, the project will pay particular attention to business organisations and their contributions, particularly those in the United States of America, who contribute to the PR&A supply of weapons.

It is important to note that a number of so-called independent peacekeeping organisations such as MIFC and UNIC or similar organisations such as those in the United States of America, which are not formally independent and which are not operated on behalf of the government, have peacekeeping roles that are being carried out on behalf of the government itself in order to avoid being perceived.

Release of report.

To be continued.
CURRENT SITUATION

Republican

There has been little change since the overview presented in the previous
issue and we should be satisfied that the high rate of attention on
the Shankill Rd, in particular to account of
has continued.

In addition to the paramilitary's operations, it is also essential that the army
will have to maintain a high level of vigilance through units in Londonderry, South Down
and South Armagh. It is also necessary that the Army Council will
attempt to deflect attention away from crucial British to
support by mounting fresh attacks on the UK mainland.

Parties: It is believed that


Loyalist

The success of the Shankill plaintiffs in May last year had two important
consequences:

1. It has provided the Loyalist paramilitary groups with a degree
of confidence and a feeling of unity too unseen for some time.

2. It has encouraged the Nationalist Community to view that
the security forces are unable and for unable to
fight the Loyalist paramilitaries.

2. It is believed that there has been little real or profound
impact on the nature and extent of paramilitary activities in
the country as a whole. Partly, it would encourage the growing
members of the Nationalist Community to believe paramilitaries
are likely to be concerned in the election.
The IRA is a 'necessary evil' to protect the community from attack by Loyalist paramilitaries. Second, there is a very real danger that numbers of the IRA and the IRA will become alienated from current security strategy and perceive — especially to the support of the British government. Finally, it is not important that we support the idea of a 'noise abatement' but rather that, in the interest of the population, we are genuinely willing to explore political options for bringing this violence to an end.

**INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR RELEASE**

US SUPPLIERS OF FIREARMS TO THE IRA

1. KIN 390 [redacted], New York
2. KIN 391 [redacted], New York

Secret numbers required for firearms provided by the above and been captured in Northern Ireland. [redacted]
TRANSCRIPT OF THE
HANDWRITTEN 'CLOCKWORK ORANGE' UPDATED DRAFT
COMPiled BY COLIN WALLACE IN NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1974

Note:

On the photocopy of the original handwritten draft:

My name, just above the Army Information Services stamp, appears to be in the handwriting of Col. Colin
Jeremy Rafton, GSO1 Information Policy

The names "McKeague" and "McGrath" are in solicitor's handwriting.
Background

Clearance is requested for the use of the information set out below in note form and which is intended to supplement the material approved in May this year (IP/SIO/CO date 3 May 1974 refers) and should be read in conjunction with that material.

This project outline follows the original brief approved in October 1973 regarding the impact of the security situation on the Northern Ireland Assembly which first met on 31 July last year, and the Power Sharing Executive which was established on 1 January this year.

This version has been updated to take into account changes in the operational landscape since June this year, with particular reference to the collapse of the Power Sharing Executive on 28 May.

Current Situation

Despite the success of the UWC strike, attempts to encourage both Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries to participate in political dialogue have had some limited success, and in April this year the Secretary of State removed proscription from both Sinn Fein and the Ulster Volunteer Force to allow both organisations to take part in the political process. However, the ‘success’ of the Ulster Workers Council strike has given the Loyalist paramilitaries new confidence in their military muscle. Ironically, this has also increased rivalries within and between those organisations, especially between those who favour a political solution and those who believe that an overall military victory can be achieved. The success of the UWC strike has also made it appear to sections of the community that the Security Forces were either unwilling - or failed to - take appropriate action to stop the intimidation of those who wanted to ignore the strike. As a result, the Security Forces have been seen as partisan in the dispute. Moreover, the increased number of random sectarian killings has led to tit-for-tat assassinations which have created fear in both communities and undermined belief that the Security Forces can provide those communities with adequate protection. Finally, the sectarian violence is justifying the existence of the paramilitaries who are being seen as protectors of their respective communities. Inevitably, this is creating serious problems for those charged with making ongoing dialogue work.
This update recognises the overall need to reintroduce normal policing throughout the Province if Army force levels are to be reduced in the relatively near future. I also take into account CLF’s Operational Directive dated 13 July 1973 in terms of the joint role of the Intelligence and Information Policy departments and has the full support of Col GS Int.

Objectives

To plan and deliver a series of initiatives designed to disrupt and undermine the activities of Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries, particularly those engaged in sectarian assassination, by:

1. Creating dissension within the groups and thus creating distrust between members.
2. Exploiting any personal vulnerabilities and conflicts that already exist within those groups.
3. Discrediting those groups and their members in the eyes of the moderates in their respective communities.
4. Isolating the assassination groups from their grass roots support.
5. Discrediting those who support, directly or indirectly, those involved with the assassination groups. This should also include, where appropriate, individuals and organisations outside Northern Ireland who support the objectives of the paramilitaries.
6. Encouraging people to provide the Security Forces with information about those engaged in sectarian assassinations.
7. Building public confidence in the current political process.
8. Encouraging community leaders, clergy and agents of influence to speak out against sectarian killings.

Bearing in mind the current operational situation, the project will specifically target:

- the PIRA’s sources - particularly in the USA - of finance, weapons, explosives and political support, plus the re-involvement of detainees in terrorism;

- the level of extortion and racketeering within the Loyalist paramilitary groups - particularly in Belfast - and the possible takeover of those groups by hardline militants.

Note: the project will also target paramilitary group members who are currently detained or convicted, but who actively are engaged in supporting or directing those at large.

Strategy

The current policy of targeting the PIRA leadership has been particularly effective in Belfast where the attrition rate has severely depleted the PIRA’s ‘strategists’ - most of whom are now in detention. Much of this success has been the result of improved Intelligence from informants and enhanced surveillance. The PIRA still remain effective in rural areas such as South Derry, Tyrone and South Armagh and it is likely that the organisation will concentrate on carrying out attacks in those areas and in the UK mainland to maintain a high propaganda profile.
A major concern is the Government's avowed policy of releasing detainees, many of whom are hard-core terrorists who have no general desire to follow the political process. Such releases are likely to have an adverse impact on the morale of the Security Forces - especially the RUC and the UDR.

It is proposed, therefore, that this project should focus attention on those organisations and geographical areas that currently pose the greatest threat to the Government's political initiative. However, it is anticipated that the spin-off from the project will affect paramilitary groups in general. The main geographical target areas are:

- Republican - South Derry, Tyrone and South Armagh
- Loyalist - Belfast, South and East Antrim, Mid-Ulster and Armagh

**Proposal**

Clearly, the success of this project relies heavily on good Intelligence information, but it can only be effective if it is managed on a strict 'locally sensitive' basis. The unauthorised disclosing of the project, even within the Security Forces, would be highly counter-productive and have major political ramifications. In particular, all raw material should be treated strictly on a 'need to know' basis and not filed or stored in the normal system.

The 'IRA Embezzlement' story provided for Paul EDDY and Chris RYDER of the Sunday Times by INFOAD and COL GS IP (published on 8 April 1973) is a good example of how effective accurate Intelligence can be in the context of this project if it is targeted properly.

Based on the Working Party meeting last October, it is suggested that the objectives highlighted above can be supported by focusing attention on a number of central themes to put pressure on existing fault lines within the various paramilitary groups with a view to undermining their effectiveness. In particular, public attention will be drawn to a variety of vulnerabilities with these groups. The following list is not definitive, but provides examples of what could be included.

1. **Informers:** Reinforcing the fact that paramilitary group members are prepared to inform the Security Forces about what is going on inside their organisation. For example, it is interesting that the disclosure of information about the MRF has increased paranoia within the IRA about potential informers in their ranks. Ironically, the increase in the activity of internal security teams within the PIRA - and the brutality of their methods - is likely to be counter-productive in the longer term.

2. **Racketeering:** Local people in both Loyalist and Republican areas resent the growing levels of racketeering and other criminal activity that is being carried out in the name of 'the cause' - see UDA internal feud. Local communities, especially in Belfast, are well aware of this issue, but it is important to demonstrate that some paramilitaries are more concerned with lining their own pockets than they are with defending their communities.

3. **Political subversion:** There is a growing belief that Communist or extreme Left Wing influences (both internal and external) are undermining traditional values and religious beliefs. This issue needs to be handled with care to avoid undermining those
paramilitary leaders who are willing to follow the political process. It could also put in jeopardy the personal contacts being developed between Loyalist and Republican groups both inside and outside the Maze Prison. The TARA organisation, particularly its leader, William McGrath is playing a significant part in promulgating the ‘Communist’ allegation against those Loyalist paramilitaries who favour dialogue.

4. Sexual and other moral misconduct: This includes [sic details of] extra-marital affairs, deviant and other sexual activities being perpetrated by paramilitary members and leaders. There are also other issues involving morality (see INFOAD’s paper on RC clergy and the IRA). This is a particularly sensitive matter and material would be submitted for clearance on a case-by-case basis. For example, it is likely that the bombing of Claudy by the PIRA on 31 July 1972 could have been avoided if one of the ring-leaders, an RC parish priest, did not have de facto immunity from arrest.

5. Misappropriation of funds and materials: As the ‘Sunday Times’ article reference the above highlighted, the publication of such information, if accurate, is likely to have a significant impact on the relevant organisation and its supporters. This is similar to the racketeering there, but is more likely to be seen in an adverse light by the relevant organisations. On a related theme, this project will pay particular attention to business organisations and personalities - particularly those in the United States of America - who contribute to the PIRA’s supply of finance and weapons.

It is important that we stress the fact that a number of so-called ‘independent’ paramilitary organisations such as the UFF are not truly independent and could not operate without the connivance of those parent organisations who are hiding behind these ‘flags of convenience’ titles to avoid being proscribed.

Release of material:

[TO BE AGREED]

CURRENT SITUATION

Republican

There has been little change since the overview provided in the previous version, but it should be re-stated that the high rate of attrition on the Belfast PIRA, in particular the arrest of has continued to reduce the organisation’s operational effectiveness, and there is now a serious morale problem within Belfast units. It remains to be seen what impact the release of will have on the Belfast PIRA, but the Army Council will probably attempt to maintain a high level of violence through units in Londonderry, South Derry and South Armagh. It is also likely that the Army Council will attempt to deflect attention away from recent setbacks in Belfast by mounting bomb attacks on the UK Mainland. In particular, it is believed that favour this course of action. It is also anticipated that there will be an increase in PIRA activity in Co Derry following the release of Martin McGuinness. A key objective of this project is to target the PIRA’s supply of finance, arms
and explosives, with particular emphasis on activities in the USA and racketeering in Ireland.

**Loyalist**

The 'success' of the UWC strike in May this year has had two important outcomes:

1. It has provided the Loyalist paramilitary groups with a degree of confidence and a feeling of unity not seen for some time. It is believed that this sense of unity will be short-lived and there are already signs of internal conflicts developing.

2. It has reinforced the Nationalist Community's view that the Security Forces are unwilling and/or unable to confront the Loyalist paramilitaries.

It is believed that these two factors could have a profound impact on the nature and extent of paramilitary activities in the coming months. First, it could encourage the wavering members of the Nationalist Community that the political progress is unlikely to be achieved in the relative short-term and that the PIRA is a 'necessary evil' to protect the community from attack by Loyalist paramilitaries. Second, there is a very real danger that members of the RUC and the UDR will become alienated from current security strategy and processes - especially, the release of detainees. Finally, it is most important that support is given to those paramilitaries, both Republican and Loyalist, who are genuinely willing to explore political options for bringing the violence to an end.

**INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR RELEASE**

**US SUPPLIERS OF FIREARMS TO THE PIRA**

1. Leslie Edelman, 75 Sherwood Avenue, Farmingdale New York 11735
2. Ed Agramonte Inc, 201 Warburton Avenue, Yonkers, New York 10701

Serial numbers required for firearms provided by the above and later captured in Northern Ireland. [Insert]
D/MIN(AF)/AH/9/4/4

30 January 1990

Dear [Name],

I have today answered a Parliamentary Question from you about the case of Mr Colin Wallace.

One point which I did not cover in my Answer concerns a file of documents belonging to Mr Wallace which Mr Fred Holroyd sent to the Prime Minister on 1 November 1984. You will, I am sure, remember the earlier correspondence about this file; and I believe that it would now be right for me to set out what we believe happened – although I have to say that the story appears to have been a most confusing one.

Owing to a series of administrative errors, Mr Wallace’s file of documents was mishandled. Mr Holroyd has said that the documents returned to him on 21 November 1984 by the Prime Minister’s office were not the originals but copies. I have no reason to doubt what he says, in which case the documents must have been copied while they were held by the Government. Despite a number of searches to find the originals or to establish what happened to them, no explanation has come to light.

So far as we can now establish, the only documents retained by MOD in November 1984 were the first pages only of two papers now known to have been on the file: the first was entitled "The Kincora Inquiry - Summary of Events relating to requests for information from John Colin Wallace ...."; the second was a 16 page document without its cover-note, which was dated March 1982 and headed "Political and security implications regarding the disclosure of security classified information to assist in the investigation of the allegations relating to the Kincora Boys Hostel, Belfast". Subsequently some of the documents on the file came into the Government’s hands once again, through being attached to later correspondence from Mr Wallace. In particular, the "Political and security implications ...." document was attached to a letter from Mr Wallace to Lord Trefgarne’s Private Secretary dated 26 September 1985. This seems to explain the confusion in subsequent correspondence, which led to both you and Mr Wallace being told that no copies were made of papers which were not considered to be of long term significance; whereas the fact seems to have been that no complete copies were retained of any documents at all.
On 8 October 1985 the Hughes Committee Secretary and Solicitor were shown certain documents which had been enclosed with subsequent correspondence, but not the "Political and security implications ..." document, which had only recently been received (for the second time) and which was still being considered. On 30 October 1985 the MOD authorised the NIO to show this document to the Hughes Committee: in the event, however, this was not done, as the Committee had already seen a document of this title in the papers which Mr Holroyd had given to the Essex Police and which had reached them via the RUC. It is now known that, although these two documents had the same title, their pagination was different and there were minor variations in the texts. I understand that the Hughes Committee representatives referred to selected aspects of both the document which they held and of others attributed to Mr Wallace, when seeking a statement from Mr Wallace.

This is clearly a most unfortunate sequence of events; and I can well understand that Mr Wallace must have found the Government's handling of his file of documents very unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, I am bound to say that I find it hard to understand why the difficulties over this file should have prevented Mr Wallace from giving evidence about the Kincora Boys Hostel either to the RUC or to Judge Hughes' Inquiry, in response to the approaches made to him.

I am placing a copy of this letter in the Library of the House and my Department is sending a copy to Mr Wallace.

Yours ever,

ARCHIE HAMILTON

Note: The Terms of Reference for the Hughes Inquiry ruled out any examination of the role of the RUC, the Army or the Intelligence Services. Mr Hamilton's comments are, therefore disingenuous because he was well aware of the reason why Colin Wallace was prevented from giving evidence to the Inquiry.

Michael Marshall Esq MP
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Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB
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(Switchboard) 01-218 9000
Brigadier The Honourable W E Rous OBE
Director of Public Relations (Army)

Colin Wallace Esq
C/o Mr J H Morgan-Harris
Thomas Eggar & Son
Solicitors
5 East Pallant
Chichester
West Sussex

30 August 1985

Dear Colin,

Thank you for your letter and for your good wishes. I am thoroughly enjoying myself as DPR(A), but who wouldn't? Your remarks about my appointment are far too kind!

I was sorry to hear of the predicament in which you now find yourself, but I note what you say in the second paragraph of your letter.

Thank you for writing.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

RECEIVED
- 4 SEP 1985
T. E. & SON
4, St. Paul's Churchyard,
London.
EC4M 8BA.

2nd April, 1973

Dear Gray,

Re: Dr. R. M. Fraser.

I refer to our conversation on the telephone recently when you enquired as to the position concerning our investigations into the conduct of this practitioner.

The position is that some time ago we instructed Agents in Belfast to assist us with the enquiries but these have been held up due to the lack of co-operation they have received from the Royal Ulster Constabulary there. We ourselves have spoken with the Chief Superintendent in Belfast but regrettably this has had no effect and it has therefore not been possible for our Agents to see either the Police Officers involved or the boy's mother [REDACTED] Indeed we do not even know the address of this woman and all efforts so far to establish it have proved unsuccessful.

We have also been in communication with Detective Inspector Rich at Rochester Row Police Station and asked him to ascertain the address of this woman but unfortunately to date it has not been supplied. I have therefore written again to Rochester Row and I hope the desired result is obtained.

The main difficulty in London is that the Police have long since filed their papers and they have been sent off to a storage warehouse out of London and inevitably it takes some time for the papers to be traced and forwarded on to Rochester Row.

In the circumstances it might now prove to be impossible to complete this enquiry to enable you to write this practitioner asking for an explanation in time for the next Penal Cases Committee meeting.

Yours sincerely,

R.C.B. Gray, Esq.,
General Medical Council,
44 Hallam Street,
London,
W1.
his straightforward Public Relations duties and that there was also a further job specification classified SECRET. MOD did not contest the evidence given on Mr Wallace's behalf, but it did not acknowledge the existence of a supplementary job specification; nor did it make a copy available, as Mr Wallace had requested. More recently, the existence of any supplementary job specification has been denied; and indeed no evidence has been found in the documentation still available that Mr Wallace was given any formal supplementary directive or job specification.

However, the papers which have now come to light indicate that, when the case was made to establish Mr Wallace's post, it was proposed that its duties should include responsibilities for providing unattributable covert briefings to the press; and it was stated that the incumbent would be required to make on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security during such interviews. It seems that in the event the arguments for including these responsibilities in Mr Wallace's job description were made orally rather than in writing to those who approved the establishment of the SIO post. But presumably Mr Wallace was told what duties he was expected to carry out; and indeed it would appear that he had already been undertaking unattributable briefing activities of this kind, which may have included disinformation. It has not since the mid 1970s been the policy to disseminate disinformation in Northern Ireland in ways designed to denigrate individuals and/or organisations or for propaganda purposes. That remains the case.

The fact remains that the disciplinary offence with which Mr