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HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE INQUIRY

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being heard before:

SIR ANTHONY HART (Chairman)

MR DAVID LANE

MS GERALDINE DOHERTY

held at

Banbridge Court House

Banbridge

on Thursday, 30th June 2016

commencing at 9.30 am

(Day 218)

MS CHRISTINE SMITH, QC and MR JOSEPH AIKEN appeared as
Counsel to the Inquiry.

1 Thursday, 30th June 2016

2 (9.30 am)

3 (Proceedings delayed)

4 (10.00 am)

5 (By videolink)

6 SIS OFFICER A (called)

7 CHAIRMAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. As always,
8 can I remind everyone if you have a mobile phone, please
9 turn it off or ensure it's on "Silent/"Vibrate", and
10 I remind everyone there is no photography permitted
11 either here in the chamber or anywhere on the Inquiry
12 premises.

13 As will become clear in a few moments, we hope to
14 have a witness giving evidence by way of Livelink.
15 There may be some technical problems associated with
16 that I gather. We will just have to struggle along as
17 best we can, but this morning I have made a restriction
18 order to the following effect:

19 There shall be no video or audio recording of any
20 hearing before the Inquiry save for that conducted by
21 the Inquiry itself.

22 What that means in today's proceedings is that
23 no-one must make a recording of anything that's being
24 said this morning using any mobile phone or other
25 electronic device that has that capacity.

1 What is being said can, of course, be reported and
2 a recording will be made and the transcript will appear,
3 but no-one must make an unauthorised recording of what
4 is being said. The reason for that is that that may be
5 a means by which those who are not entitled to do so may
6 seek to establish the identity of the witness.

7 Yes, Mr Aiken?

8 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY

9 MR AIKEN: Chairman, Members of the Panel, good morning.

10 The first witness today is SIS Officer A. He is in the
11 room in London, because I have spoken to him, and he is
12 aware, Chairman, that you are going to ask him to
13 affirm, and unfortunately I think until he starts
14 speaking his image is not going to appear, but he will
15 repeat after you the words of the affirmation.

16 CHAIRMAN: Good morning, Officer A.

17 **A. Good morning.**

18 **SIS Officer A (affirmed)**

19 CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

20 **A. Thank you.**

21 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY

22 MR AIKEN: Good morning, Officer A. You are aware that we
23 have a technical issue that's arisen that we don't seem
24 to be able to resolve, but rather than delay giving your
25 evidence we are going to work with it as best we can.

1 I have explained to you already that that will involve
2 probably irritating repetition by me checking that you
3 have fully and completely heard what I am -- have asked
4 you so that there can be no doubt that the answer you
5 are giving is connected to the question I've asked as
6 opposed to something you haven't heard, because we are
7 not going to be able to see your visual interaction with
8 us while I am speaking. Hopefully we will see you
9 giving your answer whenever the switching issue, as it
10 seems to be, takes effect. Is that clear?

11 **A. Thank you. I understand. Yes, I understand that.**

12 **Thank you.**

13 CHAIRMAN: Yes. Just so I can make it clear, the Panel and
14 Mr Aiken can see Officer A when he speaks. So although
15 you can only hear his voice, we are seeing his face and
16 his demeanour and so on.

17 MR AIKEN: Officer A, your Chief has publicly explained in
18 paragraph 5 of his Inquiry witness statement, if we can
19 bring up, please, 3501, that because of operational and
20 safety reasons in respect of intelligence officers and
21 their families that is why only the name of the Chief of
22 the Secret Intelligence Service, presently Alex Younger,
23 is publicly disclosed. For that reason your public
24 interaction with the Inquiry involves you being referred
25 to, as you know, having provided witness statements, is

1 as SIS Officer A.

2 Counsel for the Secret Intelligence Service,
3 however, Miss Murnaghan, QC, is going to hand up now to
4 the Chairman of the HIA Inquiry an envelope which
5 contains the confirmation of your actual identity. Just
6 bear with us, please, while that is done. (Pause.)

7 While that is being done, Officer A, that letter
8 will be taken away this morning, but ultimately it will
9 be placed on the Inquiry secret file that I have already
10 referred to publicly during this module. That's a file
11 that will be secured at an appropriate location after
12 this Inquiry completes its work. Just bear with us for
13 a moment, please, while the letter is read. (Pause.)

14 Officer A, can I just ask you to confirm on your
15 affirmation you are the person named in the letter?

16 **A. I am, yes.**

17 Q. I'm going to hand the letter back now to Ms Murnaghan.
18 What I'm going to ask Ms Murnaghan to do -- that letter
19 will be now taken away, but she will return to be beside
20 me, and at the first occasion whenever you are -- at
21 your end the screen reverts to you at an appropriate
22 point of an answer you are giving I will interrupt you
23 and ask her to confirm additionally that the person on
24 the screen is the person that she has worked with as SIS
25 Officer A as well as the Inquiry.

1 **A. I understand. Thank you.**

2 Q. I know you appreciate, SIS Officer A, that these
3 procedures are designed to meet the operational needs of
4 the Secret Intelligence Service and also the needs of
5 this public inquiry, which has set its face to ensure
6 that the matters at issue in respect of Kinchora are
7 publicly examined.

8 **A. Yes, and I'm very grate... -- sorry. I'm very grateful**
9 **for the opportunity to contribute to the work of the**
10 **Inquiry.**

11 Q. Just for the transcript, Ms Murnaghan is confirming that
12 your appearance on the screen, Officer A, is that of
13 Officer A.

14 **A. Thank you.**

15 Q. We have before us in the Inquiry chamber the electronic
16 system displaying documents. You will have the hard
17 copies I trust of the material that I am going to go
18 through with you this morning. If at any stage what
19 I am talking about is not clear, we will resolve that
20 between us until you are looking at the same document
21 that I am looking at and which is visible in the Inquiry
22 chamber.

23 **A. Thank you. Yes, I have those copies here in front of**
24 **me.**

25 Q. The first statement that has been provided by the Secret

1 Intelligence Service is from your Chief, Alex Younger.
2 That's dated 27th May of 2016, and he has explained to
3 the Inquiry, Officer A, that he has delegated to you,
4 one of his deputy directors, responsible in your case
5 for compliance, and has required -- directed and
6 required you to provide the Inquiry with the full
7 cooperation of your service. Can you confirm that that
8 is the position and that is what you have endeavoured to
9 do?

10 **A. Yes, certainly. That is correct. As I said, we're very**
11 **grateful for the opportunity to support the Inquiry in**
12 **this important work. We take issues of child abuse very**
13 **seriously and have done whatever we can to identify the**
14 **material we can find in our files to support the**
15 **Inquiry's investigations.**

16 Q. And he has explained in his statement, and I will
17 summarise them, that he has directed that your -- you
18 and your officers should answer all the questions asked
19 of the Secret Intelligence Service by the Inquiry fully
20 and accurately, that your service should produce
21 material using the search terms provided by the Inquiry
22 and thereafter, as you know, further documents that have
23 developed from the results of those initial searches and
24 to make available for publication, which is, as you
25 know, a difficult and time-consuming task, such of your

1 documents as the Inquiry considered were necessary to
2 allow it to fulfil its terms of reference and in a form
3 that would allow that to happen satisfactorily.

4 **A. Yes. As I say, we have done -- we have discharged that**
5 **duty.**

6 Q. Just to be clear at the outset, Officer A, you yourself
7 had no dealings with Tara, William McGrath or anything
8 to do with Kincora. In fact, you were not in the Secret
9 Intelligence Service at the time of the events in
10 question.

11 **A. That is correct.**

12 Q. And that has been one of the realities but consequently
13 difficulties for your service and other departments and
14 agencies. We are looking at a period of time for which
15 there is no longer corporate memory within your service.
16 So you are relying on in the work you have done to
17 assist the Inquiry the contents of the records that you
18 hold and that they evidence.

19 **A. That is correct, yes.**

20 Q. In paragraph 4 of your Chief's statement he has pointed
21 out that the service has made the Inquiry aware of the
22 capabilities of your systems. I am just going to ask
23 you to explain that a little. Before you begin to
24 answer if I can contextualise it in this way.

25 Like all Government departments and agencies that

1 have existed over a prolonged period of time and which
2 has personnel and systems changes over the course of its
3 existence, no-one can ever give 100% guarantee that
4 every last conceivably relevant document has been
5 traced, and the point I understand the service to be
6 making is it would simply be in being honest impossible
7 to do that, but what you have done is worked with the
8 Inquiry to produce the relevant records that can be
9 identified, and where those records led to possible
10 further records, they were additionally searched for,
11 and that process has kept going until we have got to the
12 end of what records can be found and produced.

13 **A. So, yes, we have taken the original search terms that we**
14 **were asked to search on and we have added to those other**
15 **search terms that we have deemed to be relevant as we**
16 **have come across material in our files. The limitation**
17 **we have on this is that due to the historical nature of**
18 **the issues, large numbers of our files are not**
19 **electronically searchable. They are not held in a form**
20 **that is electronically searchable for that period. So**
21 **we have had to go through in a much more manual way to**
22 **try to find the material. We have used a range of staff**
23 **who are experienced and trained in making such searches.**
24 **We have used our expert data managers to help us make**
25 **those searches, and I am convinced that we have found**

1 **what material there is as much -- as far as we can.**

2 **There may be a small amount of material which we have**
3 **not been able to find due to the nature of the files we**
4 **hold, but as far as I am aware we have -- we have made**
5 **every effort that we can to identify any relevant**
6 **material that we hold and disclosed it to you.**

7 Q. If I can put it that context and layman's terms, Officer
8 A, what you are talking about is a needle in a haystack
9 principle. Not unless every possible file was opened to
10 see had someone misfiled a document could any Government
11 or Department agency ever say that there's not one
12 single other bit of paper out there. That's the point
13 I take you to be making. You have done within the
14 capability of your systems all that can be done to find
15 all the relevant material. Where the Inquiry's
16 examination of that relevant material has led to the
17 search for other material, that has been conducted, and
18 where those records could be found, they have been
19 produced.

20 **A. That is correct, yes.**

21 Q. And just for the record I am going to scroll on to
22 paragraph 6 of your Chief's statement, where he pledges
23 on behalf of your service that your service will do all
24 that it could to ensure that this Inquiry could conduct
25 a full and complete inquiry into the serious issues that

1 we are examining.

2 **A. That is correct, yes.**

3 Q. Now I am going to turn, Officer A, to the first of three
4 statements that you have provided. The first is of 27th
5 March 2016. If we can bring up, please, 3503. What
6 I am going to ask you to do -- I am looking at the first
7 page of your statement on the screen and it begins:

8 "I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence
9 Service ..."

10 The last words on the first page, if we just scroll
11 down, please, in the bottom right corner you have the
12 word:

13 "... Raymond Semple."

14 **A. Yes, I have that.**

15 Q. And you have that document marked with the Inquiry's
16 Bates referencing in front of you?

17 **A. I do.**

18 Q. And you confirm that's the first page of your first
19 witness statement to the Inquiry of 27th May 2016?

20 **A. It is, yes.**

21 Q. I'm just going to have you look at the second page of
22 it, please, which is 3504, and I'm going to ask you to
23 confirm, Officer A, that you have, in fact, signed the
24 statement.

25 **A. I have, yes.**

1 Q. And you want to adopt it as part of your evidence to the
2 Inquiry this morning?

3 **A. I do, yes.**

4 Q. And if we can just scroll down, please, so we can see
5 the signature on the page.

6 So if we go back up, please, to paragraph 1, you
7 explain in paragraph 1, Officer A, that you have been
8 an intelligence officer for some 26 years.

9 **A. That is correct, yes.**

10 Q. And you became a deputy director of the service in 2012,
11 and from 2015 that role has caused you to have
12 responsibility for overseeing The Secret Intelligence
13 Service's compliance and disclosure obligations for
14 various courts and including inquiries.

15 **A. That is right, yes.**

16 Q. What I want to do now is to give you an opportunity,
17 Officer A, to explain perhaps in brief terms the nature
18 and function of the organisation that is the Secret
19 Intelligence Service, because not everyone will -- who
20 is here will have read -- I don't know if you can see me
21 holding it -- the 810 pages of "The History of the
22 Secret Intelligence Service", albeit that ends in 1949.
23 I don't know if you are in a position to tell us if
24 there is another installment coming, but I have a hard
25 back copy, but if I can ask you to explain in your own

1 words what the purpose and nature of the service is and
2 how it goes about its work.

3 **A. Yes, certainly, although I confess I haven't read the**
4 **history myself, but the Secret Intelligence Service was**
5 **established in 1909, and in 1992 it was formally avowed.**
6 **In 1994 the Intelligence Services Act put it on**
7 **a statutory basis.**

8 The role of the service, as set out in that Act, is
9 to provide Her Majesty's Government with intelligence
10 and ability to operate covertly overseas and to provide
11 intelligence on matters relating to national security,
12 economic well-being and serious organised crime. That's
13 the key function for the service today and as is set out
14 in the Act.

15 The role of the Secret Intelligence Service in
16 Northern Ireland is very -- has been very limited
17 traditionally. We currently do not operate in Northern
18 Ireland. It is not part of our remit, but in 1970s,
19 early 1972, we were asked to be involved in the
20 establishment of an Irish Joint Section with MI5 in
21 order to support MI5 and bring our particular expertise
22 in agent crime and in operating in difficult
23 environments in secret to the Joint Section and help
24 this establishment. So that is why we are involved in
25 -- why we hold material that's relevant to this Inquiry

1 I believe, because of that involvement through the Irish
2 Joint Section.

3 The key -- the key role that we have, of course, is
4 to recruit agents. These are human -- human sources.
5 They very often operate for us in overseas environments
6 at risk of their livelihoods and sometimes at risk of
7 their lives. So we take every step we can to protect
8 their identities and protect the information on the
9 operations. So we employ, as I think you are aware, a
10 device called "neither confirm nor deny" where we are
11 very keen not to either confirm the existence of
12 an operation or the identity of an agent or the identity
13 of a member of staff in case that puts them in danger,
14 but equally we also do not want to deny the existence of
15 a particular operation or the identity of an agent or
16 member of staff, because where we deny that, if there is
17 comes an occasion when we don't -- choose not -- when we
18 choose not to deny details, then it immediately gives
19 a lead to somebody to say, "Well, you denied it in one
20 case. You didn't deny it in this case. Therefore there
21 must be some substance in this case to the allegations
22 or facts being put before you". So operating in secret
23 to try and protect our agents and our staff identities
24 puts us in a difficult position sometimes, which we have
25 to negotiate carefully, but it does -- the NCND,

1 **"neither confirm nor deny", principle is an important**
2 **part of how to manage that.**

3 Q. You have pre-empted, because what I am going to do is
4 just bring up on the screen, Officer A, paragraphs 12
5 and 13 of your second statement, your first substantive
6 statement, at 3507, where you explain the "neither
7 confirm nor deny" principle, and you have just done that
8 orally.

9 I was going to ask you just to reflect on this. You
10 will appreciate that its operation can unfortunately be
11 entirely counterproductive for the reputation of
12 a service such as yours in that, because in the way you
13 have explained it because of its existence and the
14 reasons behind it, the service finds itself very often
15 subject to the most serious of allegations, to which it
16 finds itself unable to properly respond even if what is
17 being said has no basis in fact, but because of its
18 greater benefit as far as the service regards it to the
19 effective work of the service and the agents you run,
20 unfortunately sometimes that ends up being the position.
21 Can you understand the point I'm drawing to your
22 attention?

23 **A. Yes, and -- so it is -- it is the case that sometimes we**
24 **have to take criticism even where it is unfounded and**
25 **sometimes we have to not take, you know, credit for work**

1 **that we have done, because it's far more important to us**
2 **to protect the identities and the lives of our agents**
3 **and our staff than it is to try and protect our**
4 **reputation in that way. We hope that by doing so we**
5 **manage to keep our operations secure and maintain our**
6 **ability to operate in the long term rather than**
7 **immediately dealing with a shorter term issue of**
8 **reputation.**

9 Q. The point that your service has made to the Inquiry, if
10 I can explain it and ask you then to comment on it, is
11 that while we are looking at historical events and very
12 detailed, difficult work has been engaged in to allow
13 these issues to be publicly examined and the production
14 of material that otherwise would not ever see the light
15 of day, your focus, and you made this point as your
16 Chief does, is that you are still a service operating
17 today with a serious terrorist threat to manage.

18 **A. That's right. We face a range of threats and the**
19 **terrorist threat is one of the most serious of those.**
20 **So we are keen to try and maintain our secrecy as far as**
21 **we can.**

22 Q. I want to just go back to your first statement,
23 Officer A, at 3503 and paragraph 4. This is at the
24 bottom of page 3503 and then scrolling on to 3504. You
25 explain in your statement, as you have orally, that

1 a list of search terms were used. What I am doing now,
2 Officer A, is showing publicly the list of search terms
3 that were used across the non-devolved departments and
4 agencies of the UK Government to try and ensure that all
5 relevant material the Inquiry wished to see was
6 captured.

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. And you make the point that in addition in your
9 statement open source research -- for those who don't
10 engage in that type of language, work as to what's
11 publicly available -- was done by your service to see
12 whether there were other terms in and around this story
13 that could be also used to identify material that you
14 might potentially have.

15 **A. Yes. So we took the original search terms that we were**
16 **given, and then as we pursued those searches, where we**
17 **found other open source or other material that was**
18 **relevant, we added those search terms in as well to try**
19 **to make sure we captured the full range of material that**
20 **we held.**

21 Q. What I am going to do now, Officer A, is move to your
22 first substantive statement, which is also dated
23 27th May. It's your second witness statement, but the
24 first statement that deals with substantively with the
25 issues. That runs from 3505. I just want bring that up

1 on the screen and ask you -- you have KIN3505 in front
2 of you. The last word -- if we scroll down, please --
3 in paragraph 5:

4 "... staffed offices in Belfast and London."

5 Can you confirm you can see that page?

6 **A. Yes, I have it in front of me.**

7 Q. And that's the first page of your substantive statement
8 of 27th May?

9 **A. It is.**

10 Q. And then we are going to go in the chamber to 3525,
11 Officer A, which is the last page of your substantive
12 statement, page -- internal page 21, and you have signed
13 that statement as well?

14 **A. I have, yes.**

15 Q. And with that you have provided additional exhibits of
16 material that run from 3526 to 3552 in the Inquiry's
17 evidence bundle. I want to ask you again to confirm
18 that you wish to adopt the contents of this second
19 witness statement as part of your evidence to the
20 Inquiry today?

21 **A. I do, yes.**

22 Q. And just in overview terms I am going to explain,
23 Officer A, as I do with each witness, the Inquiry Panel
24 have already read your statement and the material and,
25 in fact, because of the nature of this subject, much

1 time has been spent on this material in advance of our
2 public hearings, but your statement covers a number of
3 broad issues that I'm just going to highlight.

4 You deal with William McGrath and Tara and you do
5 that between paragraphs 15 to 28 of your first
6 substantive statement, and you have provided within the
7 body of the statement articles 1 to 7, extracts of
8 documents that are relevant to that set of events, and
9 you have also exhibited to the statement five documents
10 that are relevant to the Inquiry's consideration of
11 those issues.

12 Then you deal with the issue relating to Colin
13 Wallace as far as it relates to your service, and you do
14 that between paragraphs 29 to 42 of your statement, and
15 you have in the body of the statement articles 8 and 9,
16 which are extracts of relevant documents, and you have
17 also exhibited documents to your statement which are
18 exhibits 6 and 7 that relate to that issue.

19 Then you deal with James Miller and you talk about
20 him in paragraphs 43 to 47, and you have article 10,
21 an extract of a document, in your statement in relation
22 to him as well as exhibits 8 and 9 which are attached to
23 your statement, which are documents that relate to him.

24 Then you cover the issue of John McKeague, which
25 relates to claims that Captain Brian Gemmell, as he was,

1 made in the media subsequent to his leaving the Army, and you
2 deal with that at paragraphs 48 to 58 of your statement.
3 Within the body of the statement you have articles 11 to 13,
4 which are extracts of relevant documents, and then you have
5 exhibited exhibit 10 to the statement.

6 Finally, this substantive statement deals with your
7 former Chief, Sir Maurice Oldfield, and you deal with
8 that at paragraphs 59 to 65 as well as exhibiting
9 documents at exhibits 11 and 12.

10 Are you content that that is a correct overview of
11 the statement that you have provided?

12 **A. Yes, it is.**

13 Q. Then just at this stage what I want to do, Officer A, is
14 also deal with your third statement, your second
15 substantive statement, to the Inquiry dealing with
16 evidence. That is of 24th June 2016. If we can bring
17 up on the screen, please, 3553, and this statement,
18 Officer A, begins in the same fashion describing your
19 role, but the bottom of the statement on the first page,
20 internal page 18, the last words on the page:

21 "... searches relating to the three outstanding
22 documents ...",

23 can you see that page?

24 **A. I can, yes. Yes, I have that.**

25 Q. That's the first page of your third statement of 24th

1 June 2016?

2 **A. It is.**

3 Q. And I'm going to go then to 3555, which is the last
4 page of the statement itself and ask you to confirm
5 again, Officer A, that you have signed that statement
6 and you wish to adopt it as part of your evidence to the
7 Inquiry along with the exhibited documents that you have
8 provided, which run from 3556 to 3570?

9 **A. Yes, I do.**

10 Q. Now this third statement, or your second substantive
11 statement, Officer A, provides the records that can be
12 found that appear on the William McGrath index card that
13 appears to have been passed to MI5 according to the card
14 itself, and the Inquiry Panel were looking at this card
15 publicly yesterday. Just for the record -- for the
16 record, Members of the Panel, that's the card that can
17 be seen at 105008. The card seems to have passed
18 across, Officer A, on 24th May 1977 to MI5, which was
19 just before they formally opened a file on William
20 McGrath, which was on 31st May 1977, and the formal
21 opening, Members of the Panel, as you saw, is at 105158.

22 What you are doing in this, your third statement,
23 Officer A, is providing -- you found eight of the eleven
24 documents that are referred to on the William McGrath
25 card, which is a summary card that if a piece of

1 information about the individual comes to light and
2 there's not a file on them, the piece of information
3 goes on the card as a ready reference if at some point
4 you need to look at that individual.

5 **A. That's right, yes.**

6 Q. And you've then produced to the Inquiry the records that
7 you can find that relate to the entries on the card.

8 **A. That's right, yes.**

9 Q. And you make the point that it may be the case that MI5
10 can trace the three remaining records that you can't
11 find, but their content is summarised on the card
12 itself.

13 **A. Yes.**

14 Q. Now what I want to do, Officer A, is go back to your
15 second statement and to your section dealing with
16 William McGrath and Tara, which begins at 3507 and runs
17 to 3513. Can you see page 3507?

18 **A. I can, yes.**

19 Q. And I am going to ask you a series of questions,
20 because, as I explained to you, Officer A, the Panel
21 publicly in addition to the work done privately have
22 looked at in public the combination of records available
23 from MI5 and SIS in respect of William McGrath and Tara.

24 You explain in your statement, and I will you ask to
25 confirm this, the service or services in terms of MI5

1 and SIS, because of the nature of the Irish Joint
2 Section that you have explained, had an interest in Tara
3 as a potential paramilitary organisation and
4 consequently anyone involved in it including its said to
5 be Officer Commanding, William McGrath.

6 **A. That's correct, yes.**

7 Q. And you have already explained about the Irish Joint
8 Section. You deal with this in paragraph 5 of your
9 first statement, but do you want to just explain in your
10 own words the focus of the Irish Joint Section as
11 opposed to MI5 intelligence officers, who might have
12 been assisting in The Northern Ireland Office as the
13 Director and Coordinator of Intelligence, with the Army
14 as the ASP or with the RUC as the DCI Rep Knock?

15 The Irish Joint Section was a different entity that
16 was running agents for its own purposes, which was more
17 about strategic political knowledge in respect of
18 paramilitary organisations and matters of that kind. Is
19 that a fair description of its role in the panoply of
20 security arrangements that operated at the time?

21 **A. Yes. As I said, this was a joint section where MI5 and**
22 **MI6 combined to run agent operations to gather**
23 **intelligence specifically required by Her Majesty's**
24 **Government on the -- on the paramilitary organisations**
25 **and the various threats that were seen to exist in**

1 **Northern Ireland at the time.**

2 Q. And the combination of records that the Inquiry has
3 looked at from the two services along with the RUC
4 Special Branch material relating to Tara, which we
5 looked at on Tuesday, would tend to suggest -- and you
6 can tell me whether this is right or not -- that Tara
7 was not a major Protestant extremist organisation
8 compared to the likes of the UVF or the UDA, but where
9 there was information about it that came to the
10 attention of the services, it was recorded and an eye
11 was kept on it no doubt similar to what you would do in
12 respect of lots of groups and organisations that come to
13 your attention.

14 **A. Yes, that's right.**

15 Q. And it appears to be the case that by the mid-'70s or
16 perhaps just before the mid-'70s in the case of SIS, and
17 an earlier date perhaps for MI5 and the RUC, SIS was
18 aware that reporting was saying William McGrath was
19 a homosexual.

20 **A. Yes, that's correct.**

21 Q. And at the time of that information about McGrath being
22 available the practice of homosexuality was still
23 illegal in Northern Ireland, though not in England and
24 Wales. Is the fact he was a homosexual likely to have
25 had any particular significance to The Secret

1 Intelligence Service in terms of its operational remit
2 and what it was interested in and looking for? I am
3 leaving out of that the issue over John McKeague that we
4 will come back to in terms of a potential compromise, but
5 was homosexuality and investigating it or being involved
6 with looking at it something that was of interest to The
7 Secret Intelligence Service?

8 **A. That would have been.**

9 Q. We will, as I say, come back to look at the issue over
10 John McKeague.

11 When we come to mention Sir Maurice Oldfield at the
12 end of your evidence, it was -- homosexuality was a bar
13 to vetting up to much more recent times. Was that
14 because it fell into the category of an issue over which
15 someone could have been susceptible to pressure in the
16 same way as financial problems or infidelity or matters
17 of that kind that might expose someone to pressure from
18 other individuals?

19 **A. Yes. Our concern -- our concern would have been -- the**
20 **concern around that would have been that people who were**
21 **practising homosexuals at the time, at a time when it**
22 **was possibly illegal in some parts, or certainly not as**
23 **socially acceptable in other areas, might come under**
24 **pressure from hostile foreign intelligence services or**
25 **others seeking to undermine our national security.**

1 Q. So it was not an interest in homosexuality per se but
2 its potential availability as a means of pressuring an
3 individual, whether, as we will see in the case of
4 John McKeague, whether for the benefit of recruiting
5 someone potentially, but more so in terms of within
6 the organisations pressure being placed that would
7 cause breaches of national security?

8 **A. Yes, that is correct. I mean, I would say SIS at that**
9 **time and -- would not use blackmail in that way, but our**
10 **concern would have been over other -- others using**
11 **blackmail on people who were homosexual. So that's why**
12 **we would have had concern for that vulnerability.**

13 Q. In this section of your statement in paragraph 19, if
14 you can see it, Officer A -- if we just scroll down,
15 please, on the screen to paragraph 19 -- you explain and
16 are in a position to provide a series of documents to
17 the Inquiry that Brian Gemmell, then Captain Brian
18 Gemmell, gave to two of your officers on 15th
19 October 1976. That's the position?

20 **A. Yes, that is right, yes.**

21 Q. The fact he appears to have done something he should not
22 have done in terms of giving your officers Army
23 documents -- whether the rights and wrongs of doing that
24 -- that has been of considerable assistance to the
25 Inquiry in that the Secret Intelligence Service were in

1 a position to produce these records, one of which we
2 have not been able to obtain from any other source and
3 --

4 **A. Yes. I can't -- I can't comment on the circumstances in**
5 **which he gave them, because I didn't know what they**
6 **were, but, yes, we do have them now.**

7 Q. That is a document that is his note for file of
8 14th October 1976, which was it seems penned the day
9 before the meeting when the series of documents were
10 handed over. Members of the Panel, that document can be
11 found at 3530 to 3532.

12 I think the point of significance that SIS is
13 drawing the Inquiry's attention to from these
14 documents -- so, for instance, in paragraph 4 of Brian
15 Gemmell's note for file, which is at 3530, Officer A, if
16 you can see that document --

17 **A. Yes, I have.**

18 Q. -- if we can just look at 3530, please, and paragraph 4,
19 and the Panel looked at this document yesterday, Officer
20 A, but the point that I take the SIS to be drawing
21 attention to is while they refer to McGrath as being
22 a sexual deviant, which in its context at the time
23 appears to be a reference to him engaging in homosexual
24 as well as heterosexual activity in the context of Tara,
25 because there is a semicolon and then referring to other

1 homosexuals in Tara, the documents do not appear to say
2 anything about William McGrath abusing boys in his care
3 in Kincora.

4 **A. That's correct. It doesn't.**

5 Q. And that the records that you have -- I am not going to
6 spend time looking through them now, because the Panel
7 have looked at them, unless there is something you want
8 to draw attention to -- but the records show -- and I am
9 going to refer, Officer A, if you can look at this, at
10 3512 is a document from February 1977, which indicates
11 consideration being given at that point by I think it is
12 the Irish Joint Section to penetrate Tara.

13 **A. Yes, that's correct.**

14 Q. Obviously the Panel will be able to consider the import
15 of that document in the context of the allegations that
16 are made about William McGrath being run by British
17 intelligence services and Tara being a construct of the
18 intelligence agencies. So that is the document that
19 indicates that in 1977 in February consideration was
20 being given by the Irish Joint Section to trying to have
21 a source within Tara.

22 **A. Yes.**

23 Q. Then you deal in your second substantive statement -- if
24 we can look at 3513 -- you deal then with issues
25 relating to Colin Wallace. Now this is a slightly more

1 complicated issue, Officer A, and the Inquiry will be
2 looking at issues relating to Colin Wallace in the
3 coming days.

4 What I want to do at this stage, because the Panel
5 have had the opportunity to read what you have had to
6 say on behalf of the Secret Intelligence Service, is
7 that you had no major involvement with matters relating
8 to Colin Wallace. That's a line that's in one of the
9 contemporaneous documents that we are going to look on,
10 but that's also the position of the service. You might
11 have lots of open source material that has been
12 gathered, but your actual involvement with him was very
13 limited.

14 **A. That is correct, yes.**

15 Q. And you explain in paragraph 32 of your statement that
16 in 1980 after his arrest on what I think -- the
17 statement says arrest on manslaughter charges -- I think
18 the arrest was at the time a murder charge, and I think
19 you say that later on in the statement -- that SIS were
20 asked at that point in time to review papers that were
21 uplifted from his offices to see whether those papers
22 posed a risk to intelligence staff, agents or operations
23 based on the fact he was someone previously working for
24 the Army in Northern Ireland.

25 **A. Yes, we would be concerned that he might have been -- he**

1 **might have had information that he was prepared to**
2 **divulge to others relating to our operations or our**
3 **agents or staff.**

4 Q. This is one of the difficulties that comes out of when
5 the Inquiry looks at the Brian Gemmell/Ian Cameron
6 episode and the RUC desire to speak to the intelligence
7 officer. It can be perceived as you hiding information,
8 but what -- the concern is that's being expressed in the
9 documents is that material that ought not to be in the
10 public domain should not end up in the public domain.

11 **A. That's precisely it, yes.**

12 Q. And if we can look at the record at 3514, Officer A, and
13 it moves on to 3515, if we just scroll up a little bit
14 so we can see the top of it, please, it refers to:

15 "I can't find evidence in our file ..."

16 This is paragraph 2, Officer A:

17 "... that in his job as information officer at the
18 AIS", which is the Army Information Service at HQNI in
19 Thiepval in Lisburn, "that he had any access to or
20 knowledge of IJS operations."

21 So that's the Irish Joint Section operations. So
22 the concern is, once this man has been arrested, what
23 does he know about Irish Joint Section operations?

24 Then the author is looking at one recorded case it
25 seems to do with psyops where perhaps there was some

1 input from an intelligence officer, but it is drawing
2 attention to the fact that wouldn't necessarily have
3 been known by the time an Army officer might have passed
4 the document to the public relations part where Colin
5 Wallace worked.

6 **A. Yes, that's correct.**

7 Q. And -- but it's observing that's not to say that he
8 wouldn't have known of the existence as distinct from
9 the functions of the intelligence services' operation
10 and we can assume he did.

11 (Videolink disconnected)

12 You then -- Officer A? I think we have had a --
13 that's an insurmountable technical problem unless we can
14 redial in, please. If we can ... (Pause.)

15 Members of the Panel, while we are getting Officer A
16 back, if I can just allow the document to scroll down so
17 you have had the opportunity to read it, because Officer
18 A has read it. You can see what's being said in the
19 third paragraph, and then if we scroll down on to the
20 next page, please. Just scroll down, please, so we can
21 see the rest of the document. This is the rest of the
22 same document. If we just scroll up so we can see
23 paragraph 5. Now if we just allow you to read that
24 while we resolve the technical problem.

25 (Videolink reconnected)

1 Officer A, I think we have you back again.

2 **A. Sorry. The link dropped out then. I am back.**

3 Q. Yes.

4 **A. But your mike is off.**

5 Q. Can you hear me at the moment?

6 **A. I can't hear you, I am afraid.**

7 Q. Right. Bear with us till we see if can --

8 **A. Yes.**

9 Q. Can you hear me now?

10 **A. Yes. Yes, I can hear you now. Thank you.**

11 Q. Excellent. Welcome back.

12 What I have been doing in your absence, Officer A,
13 is having the Panel look at the document that is the SIS
14 record of having perused the two notebooks that were
15 uplifted from the offices of Colin Wallace after his
16 arrest.

17 On 3514 there is a reference, paragraph 8, cutting
18 to it for now, because you were not involved in any of
19 this, but the record indicates:

20 "Subject to the discovery of any further documents
21 in his possession, I do not think this case is likely to
22 cause SIS much difficulty. If he decides to spill the
23 beans, it will be the Army which will attract most, if
24 not all, of the flack."

25 Now the context of that appears to be, if we go back

1 to paragraph 3 of the document, to relate to what this
2 individual would know of Army intelligence activities
3 and whether he as a means of trying to get himself out
4 of the difficulty he was facing he would endeavour to
5 utilise that knowledge in some way.

6 **A. Yes. I think we had two issues. One was whether he had**
7 **knowledge that was or information that was possibly**
8 **damaging or difficult for us and the second on whether**
9 **he would use it. On the first we believed that he**
10 **shouldn't have a lot of access to relevant material and**
11 **that seemed to be confirmed in his notebooks, and,**
12 **secondly, that we believed that he was mindful still of**
13 **the Official Secrets Act and was not -- was not likely**
14 **to divulge any information he had.**

15 Q. I think I have drawn this point out before, Officer A,
16 but I will do it with you. When you say that, you know,
17 he wouldn't release information that was damaging to
18 you, as I understand what you are trying to explain, you
19 are not saying that you had done something wrong that
20 you were afraid of him telling on. It's the actual fact
21 that you were doing things at all, which weren't
22 potentially wrong and were perfectly lawful for your
23 activities that you were doing, that those would not be
24 disclosed into the public domain, because that would
25 risk national security.

1 **A. Yes. As I said, it would be the concern that details of**
2 **our operations, identities of our agents or details of**
3 **our staff would be released that would cause a security**
4 **risk for the service or its agents and staff.**

5 Q. Now the Panel Members have had an opportunity to read
6 this document. I am just going to -- there is nothing
7 in the note that suggests that the author when reading
8 this document, which is in -- I think if we can scroll
9 up -- if we can get the date of the -- if we scroll up
10 just a little further, please. Yes, 30th
11 September 1980. So the Kincora scandal had already
12 erupted in January 1980, and these documents are being
13 looked at by one of your officers in September 1980, and
14 the point that I am going to draw attention to, as far
15 as I can see from the record, Kincora does not seem to
16 have featured anywhere in the consideration, ie it
17 hasn't -- it hasn't been noted as being contained as
18 a reference in these notebooks.

19 **A. That's correct, and there is no reason -- there is no**
20 **Kincora-related reason as to why these notebooks were**
21 **being reviewed.**

22 Q. Yes, but the point I am drawing out for the Inquiry's
23 purposes is that these two notebooks, which appear to
24 contain material from 1972 to 1977 in the hand of Colin
25 Wallace, don't appear to have had any reference to

1 Kincora in them.

2 **A. No, they don't.**

3 Q. Or at least -- that's perhaps going a little far -- the
4 person who is writing this record has not noted any such
5 reference.

6 **A. That's correct, yes.**

7 Q. And then you've also produced at the Inquiry's request
8 the perhaps more, without any disrespect to your officer
9 who did this work, detailed result from a similar
10 exercise undertaken by an Army officer in
11 September 1980. If we can look, please, at 3539, this
12 is a two-page document, Officer A, and it is written by
13 an Army officer. Can you see that document?

14 **A. Yes, I have it in front of me.**

15 Q. And I'm just going to summarise it. The Panel have the
16 opportunity it read it on the screen. If we just scroll
17 down, please, so the two notebooks are being looked at,
18 according to paragraph 2 of the note, and the content of
19 them is then being analysed by the author, and having
20 done that, in paragraph 5 of his minute the author makes
21 the point that the content of these notebooks could have
22 been gleaned from a careful reading of the newspapers
23 and talking to journalists, given this was
24 an information officer, a senior information officer
25 working in the press part of the Army HQNI. The Army

1 author of this document appears to be saying that:

2 "The information there could have been gleaned by
3 a careful reading of newspapers and from having
4 conversations with journalists who came to Belfast in
5 the early '70s. The books seemed to date mainly from
6 1972/'73. They -- they continue at least until 1977."

7 **A. That's correct, yes.**

8 Q. It appears from this record, if we scroll down on to the
9 next page, that there is nothing from this individual's
10 review to suggest any reference to Kincora in the books
11 --

12 **A. That's correct.**

13 Q. -- albeit, as you said, these books are not being looked
14 at for that purpose, because you'd no basis to be
15 looking at them for that purpose, if I have understood
16 the point you are making.

17 **A. Yes, that's right.**

18 Q. Now what I want to turn to, because you also produced
19 a document that's in the Colin Wallace section of your
20 statement at 3516 in paragraphs 41 and 42, Officer A,
21 you deal with a document of 12th October 1989. The
22 document itself, if we scroll down, please, on to 3517,
23 the document is entitled "Colin Wallace", and you
24 explain the context of this document from 12th
25 October 1989, that SIS, the Secret Intelligence Service,

1 has been asked to contribute to the work the Cabinet
2 Office appears to have been coordinating and asking of
3 MI5 as to provide answers to a series of questions that
4 relate to broader issues about Colin Wallace that were
5 being looked at as part of the Rucker -- what would end
6 up being the Rucker report.

7 **A. Yes, that's correct.**

8 Q. And a series of questions are asked of the Security
9 Service in the context of the investigation into the
10 allegations of Colin Wallace. I am just going to give
11 the Panel the reference, Officer A. I am not going to
12 turn to the questions now. They are at 105142 and
13 105143.

14 What seems to happen, according to this note, is the
15 Security Service appears to have also engaged SIS,
16 presumably because of, as you have explained, the nature
17 of the Irish Joint Section, to consider the issues and
18 that resulted in this minute of 12th October 1989 being
19 produced.

20 It is at paragraph 5, as you are aware, Officer A,
21 that I want to draw your attention to. One of your
22 officers is saying:

23 "There is one area ..."

24 If we just scroll down, please, so the Panel can see
25 the full part of paragraph 5:

1 "There is one area which needs further research in
2 ..."

3 I am not sure if "HO" is "head office". It may be
4 head office.

5 "This concerns the various allegations surrounding
6 the Kincora Boys' Home. We certainly ran at least one
7 agent who was aware of sexual malpractice at the home
8 and who may have mentioned this to his SIS or Security
9 Service case officer."

10 Now you have explained -- and if we can just -- in
11 paragraphs 41 and 42 of your statement, Officer A, you
12 have explained that The Secret Intelligence Service
13 can't find any record that justified the assertion
14 that's made in this paragraph 5.

15 **A. That's correct. We could find -- we looked at the**
16 **documents around this document and there was nothing**
17 **else to support this -- this comment and the extensive**
18 **searches which we conducted at the request of the**
19 **Inquiry went back over those files and can still find no**
20 **documents in our files that supported that statement.**

21 Q. Now I am not going to look at it with you now, Officer
22 A, but the response that ultimately went from The
23 Security Service to the Cabinet Office on 10th
24 November 1989 was quite equivocal in nature and did not
25 suggest that the IJS had received any reporting of that

1 kind from one of your agents. I am just going to give
2 the Panel Members the reference for that. We will be
3 looking at it in the coming days. It is 105134 and
4 105135.

5 Officer A, obviously that's a very relevant issue
6 for the Panel. I don't want to appear critical of the
7 author of the sentence in paragraph 5, but in fairness
8 to your service if you can look at the sentence that is
9 there, and, Members of the Panel, you may wish to
10 consider the particular sentence that's on the screen,
11 you may consider it's a little difficult to see how the
12 first half of the sentence can actually sit with the
13 second half.

14 I hope what I am trying to say, Officer A, is clear.
15 I am going to try to describe it this way. I pose the
16 question: how could the author of the note be in
17 a position to assert that the agent did know of sexual
18 malpractice at the home unless they were first aware
19 that the agent had, in fact, told this to his handlers,
20 who then recorded it so that the author of this note
21 would be in a position to read that? Do you understand
22 what I'm getting at?

23 **A. Yes. As I said, we found no evidence, no document on**
24 **our files that says that any SIS officer was aware of**
25 **any such malpractice. So we can't say where he got that**

1 **line of thought from.**

2 Q. The sequence of events, looking at the sentence, would
3 be necessary first in order for there to be a record
4 that said or recorded him or her telling your officer,
5 the handler, that he was or she was so aware in order
6 for the author to read it. Do you see the point I am
7 getting at?

8 **A. Yes. I understand. I understand.**

9 Q. There appears on the face of it to be language that
10 doesn't -- I don't want to be critical of the author --
11 but it doesn't make sense written in the way that it is.
12 Is that fair?

13 **A. I think that's fair, yes.**

14 Q. But your position in any event is you have not found any
15 record that would substantiate that, and that is the
16 position of the Secret Intelligence Service?

17 **A. That's right, yes.**

18 Q. You go on then in your statement to deal with James
19 Miller. Paragraphs 43 to 47 relate to him. You explain
20 in your statement, Officer A, that you are drawing
21 attention to claims that were carried in newspapers
22 relating to him. The claim was recarried in 2014, but
23 it was originally carried, if we scroll down, please, in
24 1987 in the Sunday Times.

25 Now the Panel looked yesterday, as we were going

1 through the sequence up to 1980 of what is in the
2 intelligence records, they looked at a letter from 1972.

3 Officer A, if you have the MI5 statement to hand and
4 can look at KIN4073, which is internal page 30 of 75 of
5 the MI5 statement and paragraph 90 -- can you see that?

6 **A. Yes.**

7 Q. You'll see on the page a little extract of the letter
8 and I am just going to show that to the Panel. We
9 looked at it yesterday, but just so you know what we are
10 talking about. It is at 105005. If we can just look at
11 that for a moment, please. This is the reference in
12 James Miller's letter to -- he's been told that the Tara
13 OC McGrath -- and at that point, as the Inquiry saw
14 yesterday, no-one had yet worked out this is William
15 McGrath -- that he had been accused of assaulting small
16 boys, and MI5 have explained what they want to say about
17 that record, but it's that record from 1972 that's
18 available to the Inquiry, and then you make available
19 and deal with this in paragraphs 43 to 47 of your
20 statement. If we go back to 3517, please --

21 **A. Yes.**

22 Q. -- if we scroll down, please, you explain the sequence
23 of events, but what I want to do is just to look at 3546
24 with you, Officer A, which is the Sunday Times article
25 of 29th March 1987. If we can bring that up on the

1 screen for the Panel, please, at 3546. I am going to
2 draw attention, Officer A, to the bottom of column 1 and
3 then on to the top of column 2. So you can see:

4 "Rumours that Kincora was a sex 'honey trap' used by
5 MI5 to compromise intelligence targets, including
6 Loyalist politicians and paramilitary figures, have
7 appeared since the early 1980s. The stories have always
8 been dismissed by the authorities.

9 However, Miller claims that the intelligence
10 services had known about the activities" -- scroll up,
11 please -- "at Kincora for a number of years and believes
12 the boys' home was used to entrap men who would be
13 blackmailed into providing information.

14 Miller has revealed that his first task for the
15 intelligence services was to spy on William McGrath,
16 a former housefather at the Kincora Home."

17 So that is the story that was being carried, and you
18 can see then the passage in -- two paragraphs down:

19 "Miller said, 'My MI5 case officer later told me to
20 leave McGrath to them and I understand they used the
21 information to recruit him as an informer'."

22 That was what was being carried as James Miller's
23 allegations, and obviously extremely serious allegations
24 having been made, and then credibility being given to
25 them by this individual saying, according to the

1 journalists, what he is alleged to have said, which they
2 report in the Sunday Times article of 29th March 1987.

3 **A. Indeed, yes.**

4 Q. Now, as I explained yesterday, for the first time, you
5 have produced for the assistance of the Inquiry the
6 record of a subsequent interview that was conducted with
7 James Miller on 2nd April 1987. I want to go back,
8 please, to 3518. So this is, to put it in context, in
9 the aftermath of the article and the record records
10 that:

11 "Miller, who was in contrite mood, gave a full
12 account of his dealings with Barry Penrose and Liam
13 Clarke of the Sunday Times."

14 So that's the two journalists.

15 There is two articles, just so we are clear. There
16 is an article of 22nd March 1987 which doesn't relate to
17 Kincora and then the one that we have just been looking
18 at of 29th that does. Then:

19 "In brief, in February of this year Miller became
20 concerned about the degree of publicity Colin Wallace
21 was receiving. He was particularly incensed at
22 a Penrose story in the Sunday Times which he felt
23 supported Wallace's allegations that the Security
24 Service had 'framed him'. Miller contacted Penrose by
25 telephone early in February and during that month they

1 had a number of telephone conversations. Miller, who is
2 a talkative and gullible individual ..."

3 So the author is expressing that view about him:

4 "... thought that he was refuting Wallace's
5 statements, but it is clear now that Penrose was simply
6 drawing him out on other subjects, namely ..."

7 Then the lists the five issues, the fifth of which
8 is relevant to the Inquiry, which is:

9 "Allegations regarding the Kincora Boys' Home."

10 Then paragraph 3 records:

11 "Penrose contacted Miller on Friday, 20th March to
12 say that he proposed to publish a piece on Sunday, 22nd
13 March about Wallace and wanted to include a small amount
14 of what Miller had to say on the subject. He also
15 wanted Miller to speak to Liam Clarke, the Sunday Times
16 'Irish expert', which he did later that day. Miller
17 became concerned that he might have said too much and
18 asked for the article to be read out to him over the
19 telephone before publication. This was not done, and
20 after several calls on Saturday, 21st March, having
21 received the assurances that his comments would be
22 a very small part of a larger article, he agreed to its
23 publication."

24 Then it says:

25 "Miller was genuinely shocked when he read the story

1 produced by the Sunday Times and phoned Penrose on
2 Sunday, 22nd March ..."

3 So we are talking about the first story that deals
4 with these other issues not related to Kincora:

5 "... and he phoned Penrose on Sunday, 22nd March to
6 remonstrate. This cut little ice with Penrose. Miller
7 has not spoken to Penrose or Clarke since, but" --
8 scroll down, please -- "his family ..."

9 We are going to move on to the next page and finish
10 the article, Officer A:

11 "... his family have received a number of further
12 calls from Clarke attempting to elicit further details.
13 Clarke has also implied that unless the family cooperate
14 there would be 'a number of journalists on their
15 doorstep'. On 3rd April Miller received a letter from
16 Penrose, the text of which is attached. Miller has
17 firmly stated to us his intentions not to speak to the
18 press again, but would like to take some action to
19 counter what has been reported. He has talked of asking
20 his solicitor to take the matter up with the Sunday
21 Times and it is possible he could sue for libel. We
22 have, however, instructed him to do nothing until we
23 have considered this matter further.

24 According to Miller, he did not make the two
25 principal allegations in the Sunday Times article of

1 22nd March."

2 So that's the other article not related to Kincora:

3 "His comments were taken out of context and twisted
4 to suit the theories being postulated by Penrose and his
5 associates. He maintains that the article published on
6 29th March", which is the one we have looked at, "in the
7 Sunday Times is untrue and he did not speak again to
8 Penrose as was stated. Miller has never met Penrose or
9 Clarke and has received no payment whatsoever."

10 Then he says this in paragraph 6, the record of
11 the meeting that was held with him on 2nd April 1987:

12 "Miller said that although he admitted to Penrose
13 that he had had a brief acquaintance with McGrath from
14 days in the Tara Brigade and had heard rumours that the
15 man was homosexual, he had no knowledge whatsoever of
16 the Kincora Home and the entrapment story, which he
17 learned about after his departure from Ulster. These
18 remarks he said were the sum total of what he told
19 Penrose about McGrath and the home."

20 Now I have read that document out because of its
21 importance to the Inquiry. We have looked at the
22 document that's available from James Miller in 1972 that
23 does speak of McGrath, and you have made this document
24 available for the Inquiry to make public, which is the
25 first time that it will be known that this is what James

1 Miller was saying in the aftermath of the interview.

2 **A. Yes.**

3 Q. The Inquiry, as with all of your documents, has seen the
4 full documents around this and involving this in
5 entirely unredacted form.

6 **A. Yes.**

7 Q. You then in your statement go on, Officer A, to deal with
8 John McKeague. John McKeague was murdered in January 1982
9 and was involved in paramilitary activity in Belfast.

10 **A. Yes.**

11 Q. You cover this in paragraphs 48 to 58, which run from
12 3519 to 3524. Now as part of that you have produced
13 a record of 13th February 1980, if we scroll down to
14 3520, and just to contextualise this record, this will
15 have been -- this is I think within a month -- less than
16 a month -- three weeks of the Kincora story being first
17 carried in the Irish Independent. The record you held in
18 relation to John McKeague, but you produced it to the
19 Inquiry because it relates to William McGrath, and is
20 recording, if I have understand what you have said
21 clearly -- you can correct me if I am wrong about this,
22 Officer A -- this is an intelligence officer in Belfast
23 communicating with the Secret Intelligence Service and MI5
24 in London --

25 **A. That's correct, yes.**

1 Q. -- and it's recording what's known and indicating:

2 "The above report named first name unknown McGrath
3 as leader of Tara and alleged to be involved in the
4 alleged scandal of homosexual activity in a Belfast
5 boys' home. A number of demands are being made for
6 a public enquiry ..."

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. We are 36 years on and doing this.

9 "... and you may be interested in the following
10 details."

11 So he is reporting back to his colleagues in London
12 or her colleagues in London explaining what is on the
13 records that is available to the author --

14 **A. Yes.**

15 Q. -- and saying:

16 "McGrath is William McGrath."

17 It gives his date of birth:

18 "In 1976 he was reported to be the warden of Kincora
19 Boys' Hostel, 188 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast, where
20 he still lives."

21 Well, we were observing yesterday that that's not
22 quite right. 188 was where he lived. 236 Upper
23 Newtownards Road was where Kincora was, but in any event
24 he is or was, according to the author, leader of Tara:

25 "Our records suggest he is or may have been known to

1 an agency based here or in London."

2 Now one could read that phrase in a number of ways.
3 I just want to give you an opportunity to explain in the
4 context of the card and the file that the Panel have
5 already looked at being opened in May 1977 what the
6 Secret Intelligence Service's view is of what the author
7 is trying to explain.

8 **A. Yes. So my understanding of that phrase would be that**
9 **the author believes there may be some information on our**
10 **files either in Belfast or in London relating to William**
11 **McGrath. "May have been known" to us or MI5 doesn't**
12 **I think necessarily imply any sort of direct**
13 **relationship or connection with, contact with McGrath.**
14 **It could equally just apply to the fact that we hold --**
15 **hold information on him, we have some background file on**
16 **him because of his role with Tara and because Tara has**
17 **been a group that is of interest to the intelligence**
18 **security services.**

19 **Q.** And I think in fairness to you, Officer A, the point you
20 have made, you have produced what records you have and
21 those don't disclose a direct communication with
22 McGrath.

23 **A. Precisely. The only records we have are of the sort of**
24 **background information, as it were, that we held that we**
25 **found and disclosed to the Inquiry.**

1 Q. And this record, while it relates to John McKeague, if
2 we scroll further down, it is being suggested in the
3 record as well as pointing out that McGrath was reported
4 to be a very active homosexual, that he had some contact
5 with John McKeague and was responsible for posters being
6 written about him which appeared all over Belfast, and,
7 of course, the document goes on to identify other
8 associates of McGrath who were potentially involved in
9 Tara.

10 Then the last sentence, which is:

11 "[For] London only."

12 I am not sure what that means or whether you can
13 assist with what it means, but it says:

14 "In view of the possibility of a public enquiry
15 possibly lifting the curtain on this fascinating scene,
16 you may like to consider whether any of this needs to be
17 passed to ..."

18 another particular section within the organisation.

19 **A. Yes. I think saying it's "London only", it is just**
20 **identifying that it's -- they're expecting London to be**
21 **the ones to take any action on that as opposed to any**
22 **other local addressees in Belfast that this might have**
23 **been copied to.**

24 Q. Well, here you and I are 36 years later doing just that.

25 So you also deal, Officer A, in this section of your

1 statement with the Public Eye programme of 1st
2 June 1990. That runs from 3547 to 3550 in your exhibits.
3 I want just to take you to a particular page, because the
4 Panel will be considering this issue in detail around
5 Brian Gemmell. If we look at 3548 and what he is saying
6 in the programme in the section -- if we look at
7 paragraph 5 I think, if we scroll down, the programme is
8 talking about Kincora, but then it goes on to quote him,
9 who is James, as you explain in your statement, a
10 meeting he says he had in London with MI5 about John
11 McKeague:

12 "This encounter made his even more sceptical, he
13 says, about the moral outrage he claims was expressed by
14 a senior MI5 officer."

15 That's Ian Cameron. So he is referring back to his
16 exchange with Ian Cameron in 1975.

17 "John McKeague was an alleged homosexual, who was said
18 to have founded a Loyalist assassinations gang, and James
19 says he met two MI5 officers in London. They wanted to
20 explore with him as an expert on Loyalist intelligence
21 the chances of turning John McKeague into an informant
22 using his suspected homosexuality as a lever."

23 **A. Yes.**

24 Q. You see the exchange about compromising film being
25 available and whether that was going to be capable of

1 being used to make John McKeague cooperative as an informant,
2 and then he is asked various questions about that.

3 Now you have produced for the assistance of the
4 Inquiry an SIS record of 16th October 1990. If we can
5 go back, please, to 3521 I think --

6 **A. Yes, ...21.**

7 Q. -- 3521, and we have a record of -- there's obviously
8 been meetings or discussion has taken place between
9 I think it is an SIS officer and an MI5 officer:

10 "Some time ago you helped me to track down papers
11 which might corroborate Brian Gemmell's claim in
12 a television programme that MI5 were planning the
13 recruitment of a Loyalist agent using threats of
14 exposure as a homosexual. It has taken me too long to
15 put all this finally on paper, but I now enclose a copy
16 of a verbatim transcript which I have made."

17 So that's the transcript we have looked at just now
18 recorded of the programme, and then details are given
19 about Brian Gemmell from the records that you have. If
20 you scroll down, please, and then you've got:

21 "The potential target of 1976 was ..."

22 named in the programme itself. If we scroll
23 further down, please. Just go a little further down,
24 please. We see then what's being done then in the note
25 we are looking at, which is of 16th October 1990, is

1 analysis has then been done by the author going back to
2 the records from the time of these events and then
3 setting out in paragraph 3 onwards the sequence of
4 events as disclosed in the documents.

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. You can see:

7 "Although it has not been possible to discover all
8 the papers hoped for, the sequence and tenor of events
9 seem to my mind clear enough as follows, the references
10 being to John McKeague's ..."

11 Then you have:

12 "28th January '76: Consideration being given to the
13 recruitment of John McKeague."

14 If we scroll further down, please, then:

15 "March 1976: Various approaches considered." Those
16 don't contain reference to homosexuality. Then in May
17 1976:

18 "Full traces of John McKeague for interested parties,
19 including one brief mention suggesting homosexuality
20 (not in any event unusual in John McKeague's circles",
21 it is said, "and not singled out for attention by the
22 SIS officer)."

23 If we scroll down, please, we then have:

24 "10 May '76: Gemmell seen."

25 So that's denoting a meeting that takes place

1 between Gemmell and SIS officers, albeit you can see in
2 the programme he is -- by that point whether he has
3 misremembered or did not understand them to be SIS
4 officers, he is describing them as MI5 officers, but in
5 any event he is having a meeting with them it seems on
6 10th May. Then the record is disclosing:

7 "11-13 June 1976: John McKeague was under
8 surveillance during a visit to London and observed in
9 unmistakably making homosexual contacts. Photographs were
10 taken. It later emerged John McKeague suspected that he
11 had been under surveillance, but nothing came of this."

12 Then the next in the sequence of events it seems is
13 there is a lunch that takes place on 7th September 1976
14 between Brian Gemmell and the SIS officer. I think
15 subsequently, as MI5 have explained, he was applying
16 again for admission to the service during this sequence
17 of events, but then on 23rd November:

18 "Suggested recruitment of John McKeague be
19 considered using the photos and the threat of exposure
20 of his homosexual activities in London as a lever."

21 You can see:

22 "Marked lack of enthusiasm for this ploy was
23 reported in the telegram.

24 Various objections to the proposal were voiced,
25 including quotations of [an individual] whose doubts

1 were whether management would accept it."

2 Then you can see the author is saying:

3 "There is no further mention of this particular
4 recruitment proposal and doubtless it was dropped.
5 Gemmell is therefore presumed correct in saying that MI5
6 was considering a homosexual compromise approach to John
7 McKeague, but of course he was not to know that it was not
8 pursued. Since he mentions hearing from MI5 about
9 'compromising film of a homosexual nature', this must
10 have been at a time after the surveillance in June and
11 also after the occasion on 10th May 1976 when he met two
12 MI5 officers. It leaves the projected lunch with the SIS
13 officer on 7th September 1976 as the probable occasion on
14 which the subject was discussed. The actual proposal for
15 a homosexual recruitment was not made formally until 23rd
16 November 1976, and it seems likely that the lunch meeting
17 on 7th September consisted partly of preliminary informal
18 discussion, as between two intelligence officer
19 colleagues, of the practicalities of agent recruitment.
20 It presumably included asking Gemmell for his opinion of
21 John McKeague, about whom Gemmell would have been assumed
22 to know at least something.

23 Gemmell's statements during the television interview
24 were clearly about matters which were classified at
25 least secret when they were current in 1974-'76 and

1 which he must have known as such. A note on file
2 written in 1982 guesses that Gemmell would be loyal to
3 the Official Secrets Act unless his Christian principles
4 were involved."

5 Now other documents the Inquiry has received
6 indicates that the actual pictures taken were not of
7 sexual activity. They were indicating by reason of
8 where they were taken and who was being met that they
9 indicated homosexual connections, but the point -- you
10 have produced this record to the Inquiry to indicate in
11 keeping with what we were discussing earlier that just
12 because allegations are made in the media, you don't,
13 because of how you operate, respond to them, even when
14 you could demonstrate that the facts were not as they
15 were believed to be, but you have made this record
16 available to the Inquiry, who can see the sequence of
17 events.

18 **A. Yes, that's correct. I think we would -- we would say**
19 **that the discussion of John McKeague's homosexuality was**
20 **part of the discussion around who he was and how he -- how**
21 **he would react to a recruitment approach rather than any**
22 **-- any thought that it was a blackmail or a method of**
23 **blackmail for him. As I said earlier, it is not a**
24 **technique which we would employ I think at that time or**
25 **even now.**

1 Q. I think MI5 have said to the Inquiry, and we will look
2 at this, that the issue that would have been relevant
3 for the intelligence officers was more the lack of trade
4 craft that saw him caught in this way, ie, the fact he
5 was capable of being photographed in this way would have
6 assisted with the compromise, if that had been pursued.

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. And you -- having produced -- in fairness to Brian
9 Gemmell, the -- he is right to the extent that he was
10 told something of that ilk was being complicated --
11 sorry -- was being contemplated, and the point you are
12 making is he was not to know that that did not actually
13 occur in terms of what this record discloses.

14 **A. That's true.**

15 Q. It would be in November 1976 -- so this lunch is
16 September -- it would be November 1976 that he would
17 then pass the material across which we have discussed
18 earlier and which the Panel have looked at, after -- and
19 after this he was turned down for the second time in his
20 application for the Security Service, as they have
21 explained it to the Inquiry.

22 The last matter that you cover in your second
23 substantive -- your second statement, which is your
24 first substantive statement, Officer A, relates to
25 Maurice -- Sir Maurice Oldfield, GMCB (sic), CBE. If we

1 look at paragraph 59, please, at 3524 --

2 **A. Yes.**

3 CHAIRMAN: GMCG.

4 MR AIKEN: GMCG. I apologise, Chairman. You explain in
5 paragraphs 59 to 65 -- and I am going to summarise this,
6 Officer A -- Sir Maurice Oldfield joined the Secret
7 Intelligence Service in the 1940s. He was Chief of the
8 Secret Intelligence Service between 1973 and his
9 retirement from the service on 31st January 1978. The
10 Inquiry has seen material to indicate the view was he
11 certainly wouldn't have been in Northern Ireland at any
12 stage during that time, but from 2nd October 1979 he
13 came out of retirement at the request of the then Prime
14 Minister to take on the role of Security Coordinator in
15 Northern Ireland, which was to have a more cohesive
16 relationship between the various people engaged in
17 intelligence work and to oversee it.

18 Then in March 1980, so about six months into that
19 role, his security clearance was withdrawn after it came
20 to light that he was a practising homosexual.

21 **A. Yes.**

22 Q. MI5 thereafter conducted a major investigation into
23 whether there had been any compromise to national
24 security by that fact, because, as you have explained in
25 your statement, his role was not only Chief of the

1 Secret Intelligence Service, but he had been across the
2 world as part of his work.

3 He then died on 11th March 1981. It was not until
4 about nine months after his death that the Sunday
5 Telegraph then published an article by a journalist
6 linking him with the Kinchora scandal. You have produced
7 that article and a subsequent article to the Inquiry.
8 You are aware -- if we just scroll down, please, so the
9 rest of the paragraphs are available -- you are aware
10 from the work the Inquiry has done to date, Officer A,
11 that there appears to be no resident or ex-resident of
12 Kinchora who makes an allegation that they engaged in
13 sexual activity with Sir Maurice Oldfield, whether in
14 Kinchora or anywhere else. I think there's one
15 individual who says he saw Sir Maurice Oldfield in
16 Kinchora, but no-one makes an allegation of sexual
17 activity involving him.

18 But in paragraph 63 of your statement, if we scroll
19 down on to the next page, please, 3525, you explain
20 that:

21 "The Secret Intelligence Service has reviewed all
22 the material that it holds on [your] former Chief and
23 has identified no material to indicate that Sir Maurice
24 Oldfield had visited Northern Ireland during his Secret
25 Intelligence Service career or to associate him with the

1 Kincora Boys' Home other than the articles that were
2 published in the media."

3 **A. That's correct, yes.**

4 Q. And it is the case you explain, if we scroll down to
5 paragraph 65, please, that in 1983 it appears as part of
6 the MI5 extensive investigation into whether what had
7 then been discovered of Sir Maurice Oldfield being
8 a practising homosexual throughout his career had
9 compromised national security in various parts of the
10 world -- as part of that it appears that a by then
11 retired SIS officer had alleged to MI5 in 1983 that
12 Sir Maurice Oldfield's removal from Northern Ireland
13 related to Kincora in some way.

14 You then express in paragraph 65 the views of the
15 Service about that allegation:

16 "Further searches conducted by SIS into the
17 officer's allegation or the circumstances in which it
18 was made found no material on the SIS record ..."

19 that substantiates that. You express your
20 understanding that MI5 concluded that it was a senseless
21 allegation. They address the allegation in MI5's
22 statement.

23 You explain that the officer concerned died in
24 March 1985. So the Inquiry obviously can't speak to
25 him, but obviously the Inquiry was concerned to look at

1 the information around this, and obviously an incredibly
2 embarrassing scenario for the Secret Intelligence
3 Service at the time, and I will come back to that in
4 a moment.

5 I don't know if you have this record, but I am going
6 to show the Panel a record, and I will explain to you
7 what it is, Officer A, if you don't have access to it,
8 but MI5 have made available to the Inquiry a record of
9 its interview with Sir Maurice Oldfield on 28th
10 March 1980, so right in the eye of the storm, as it
11 were, and this is a document that begins at 105274.

12 **A. Yes, I have it.**

13 Q. Excellent. 105274, please, if we can bring that up, we
14 can see it is a "Report of interview by MI5 officer with
15 Maurice Oldfield on 28th March 1980". Now the Inquiry
16 has seen and considered the full document and it is
17 obviously fascinating in and of itself, but the material
18 that relates to places other than Northern Ireland is of
19 no interest to the Inquiry.

20 What I want to take you to -- the document runs
21 through to 105281. So it's a long record, report of the
22 many interviews that were undertaken with Sir Maurice as
23 he's setting out in considerable detail the activity
24 that he did engage in that was the cause for the
25 concern.

1 If we can look at 105277, so, as I explained, it's
2 a document containing details of homosexual activity
3 over many years that Sir Maurice revealed during his
4 interview with MI5, but I want to show you the only
5 section the Inquiry has an interest in. It is being
6 said here -- the interviewer is recording:

7 "He had no homosexual relations at the time ... It
8 was quite impossible for him to have any such relations
9 from the time he took up the Irish appointment and was
10 placed under guard."

11 Now this is not a record that you hold, because MI5
12 conducted the investigation into Sir Maurice when his
13 security clearance was withdrawn. The significance of
14 this, Members of the Panel, that I am going to draw your
15 attention to is that this interview is being conducted
16 before there is ever an allegation about Sir Maurice
17 Oldfield in Northern Ireland connected to Kincora. So
18 the document, which details, as I said, the homosexual
19 activity in many places over many years, neither the
20 person asking the questions nor the person answering
21 them is imbued with the knowledge that there is
22 an allegation made against Sir Maurice Oldfield of
23 anything to do with Kincora or Northern Ireland. So he
24 is explaining in the context of the homosexual relations
25 that he is describing in various parts of the world in

1 various forms that the one place where he couldn't
2 engage in this type of activity was as a result of his
3 Irish appointment, which is the Coordinator of
4 Intelligence.

5 So you have seen that record, Officer A, albeit it
6 is not a record that Secret Intelligence Service hold?

7 **A. That's correct, yes.**

8 Q. Now I suppose the one point that this does reveal,
9 Officer A, which is relevant to the matters being
10 considered by the Inquiry, given that there were three
11 homosexual paedophiles engaging in the abuse of boys
12 under 18 in their care in a boys' home, and it's perhaps
13 analogous to a degree in that what we are dealing with
14 here is you have a -- to call a spade a spade, you have
15 a spy, who ended up the chief spy, living among spies
16 and he is able to carry on a homosexual lifestyle
17 throughout the period when to do so would have caused
18 what eventually did happen in 1980, which was his
19 security clearance to be withdrawn, because it's not
20 until a later date that a different approach is taken to
21 homosexuality in terms of security clearance. So he was
22 able to carry on this lifestyle, and it came as a very
23 dramatic shock to your organisation in 1980 and to the
24 Prime Minister, because we have seen lots of documents
25 around that that resulted in her ultimately having to

1 make a public statement about the matter in Parliament.

2 **A. Yes.**

3 Q. Now there's a number of points that you have made me
4 aware of that you wanted to cover as I come towards the
5 end of the questions that I want to ask you, Officer A.

6 You make the point in your statement that you wanted
7 to put it formally on record that there is no record of
8 SIS, the Secret Intelligence Service, being aware of
9 child abuse at Kincora prior to the subject coming to
10 light. I say it that way, because in your statement you
11 mention it was not until the convictions in 1981. That
12 is not quite right, because the document of
13 13th February 1980 that we talked about, the one that
14 talks about the fascinating scene, indicates that the
15 author is aware of the allegation, but the point you are
16 making is there is nothing on the SIS records to suggest
17 that any SIS officer knew about sexual abuse taking
18 place in Kincora before it broke, as it were, in the
19 Irish Independent on -- in January 1980.

20 **A. That's true, and we have conducted very extensive**
21 **searches of the files that we hold. We have used the**
22 **search terms that have been provided to us by the**
23 **Inquiry and enhanced those with our own search terms,**
24 **and have still found no -- no documents on our files**
25 **that give any indication that any SIS officer was aware**

1 **of this abuse.**

2 Q. And you explained to me -- you also said this in your
3 statement, but I will just draw attention to it -- you
4 have no record whatsoever that indicates any evidence
5 that your Service were involved in paedophile rings and
6 operating them for intelligence purposes, whether
7 focused on a children's home or otherwise?

8 **A. Absolutely not, and I want to really emphasise that SIS**
9 **does not exploit children or vulnerable adults, and we**
10 **won't tolerate that sort of exploitation where we find**
11 **it amongst our agents -- if we were to find it amongst**
12 **our agents or if we were to find it amongst our staff,**
13 **who would be dealt with very seriously indeed. It's**
14 **just not part of what we do, and we -- we adopt**
15 **essentially the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child**
16 **now in relation to these sorts of instances, putting the**
17 **best interests of the children first. So that's, you**
18 **know, a fundamental overriding principle of how we**
19 **operate.**

20 Q. You have explained there is no evidence of your Service
21 being aware of sexual abuse taking place in a children's
22 home and turning a blind eye to it.

23 **A. There is no evidence of that at all, no.**

24 Q. And I think you have covered the point. If we look at
25 3525, paragraph 67, you have mentioned the approach of

1 the Service to matters relating to children.

2 SIS Officer A, I am not going to ask you any more
3 questions, but are there any other points that you want
4 to make that I haven't in the summary that I have tried
5 to take you through drawn out? If there are, I will
6 give you an opportunity to make them now before I hand
7 over to the Panel. It may be they want to ask you
8 something, but is there anything else you want to draw
9 attention to that perhaps I have not covered or covered
10 in the way that you would have liked?

11 **A. No. I think that has been very thorough. Thank you.**

12 Q. I am not going to ask you anything further, Officer A.
13 If you just bear with us for a short while, the Inquiry
14 may want to ask you something.

15 **A. Certainly.**

16 **Questions from THE PANEL**

17 CHAIRMAN: Officer A, can I just, first of all, recap what
18 you have been saying about the approach which your
19 Service has adopted to the requests for information and
20 access to documents made by the Inquiry, because in
21 a sense what you have said about that represents what
22 the Inquiry understands to be the position not just of
23 your Service but of your sister Service, The Security
24 Service, the records held by The Police Service of
25 Northern Ireland in relation to its predecessor, The

1 Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch, the Ministry
2 of Defence, the Cabinet Office and the Northern Ireland
3 Office and it is, as I understand what you say, that
4 your Service has made available to the Inquiry all files
5 that appear to contain material relevant to the
6 Inquiry's work and not only --

7 **A. That is --**

8 Q. Yes, and not only that you have provided the Inquiry
9 with such material, but you have also provided further
10 material which the Inquiry's examination of the initial
11 material identified as being relevant, and all of that
12 material, both initially identified by your Service and
13 which the Inquiry, having looked at it, then asked for
14 more, that that has all been made available to the
15 Inquiry in unredacted form?

16 **A. That is correct. We have been keen from the outset to**
17 **support the Inquiry as fully as we possibly can. So we**
18 **have made as wide a set of searches as we possibly can**
19 **imagine and gone into the files in as much depth as we**
20 **can to provide you, sir, with the material which you**
21 **require.**

22 Q. And you, I am sure, will be aware that the Inquiry,
23 therefore, has not just looked at the documents that we
24 have seen on the screen, but has had the opportunity to
25 examine and has examined a very large number of pages of

1 documents comprised in a large number, indeed many
2 files, files which contained other material that doesn't
3 relate to what the Inquiry is looking at.

4 **A. Yes. I understand.**

5 Q. And the documents which have been produced today
6 publicly in redacted form therefore really only
7 represent those parts of a much greater body of material
8 that the Inquiry considers relevant to its work.

9 **A. Yes.**

10 Q. This no doubt has been a complex process not just for
11 the Inquiry but for your Service, but I would like to
12 make it clear that the documents that have been examined
13 today, which we have seen in redacted form, represent
14 the evidence that the Inquiry regards as necessary for
15 its public examination of all relevant material held by
16 your Service that is relevant to the issues relating to
17 Kinora, all the issues relating to Kinora, that the
18 Inquiry has been examining, and, as I understand your
19 evidence, you are saying on behalf of your Service that
20 your Service accepts that is the position?

21 **A. That is the position, sir, yes.**

22 Q. May I then ask for 3517 to be brought up on the screen,
23 and I think, Officer A, you have that to hand?

24 **A. I do, yes.**

25 Q. Now if we just scroll down, please, we come to

1 paragraph 5, which Mr Aiken has asked you about, and if
2 I can just look again at this sentence with you, it
3 reads:

4 "We certainly ran at least one agent who was aware
5 of sexual malpractice at the home ..."

6 Now pausing at that point in the sentence, because
7 it does continue:

8 "... and who may have mentioned this to his SIS or
9 Security Service case officer",

10 but the first half of the sentence, as Mr Aiken has
11 explored with you, looked at in isolation, is
12 an assertion that your Service had an agent who not
13 merely might have been but who was aware of sexual
14 malpractice in Kincora. I take it you accept, looking
15 at it as it stands, that is the inference that one would
16 draw?

17 **A. One would draw that inference, yes.**

18 Q. Now you have explained, as I understand it, that your
19 Service has not been able to find any evidence that
20 would justify that assertion.

21 **A. We did find nothing that was written at the same time as
22 this document that justifies that assertion, and we have
23 been able to find nothing subsequently in our searches
24 for the Inquiry that backs up that assertion.**

25 Q. So that would appear to suggest that either the author

1 must have had personal knowledge, which he has not
2 recorded in any way in any surviving document, or that
3 for some reason he's got the wrong end of the stick.

4 **A. All I can say is we have no evidence for why he made**
5 **that assertion. I can't -- I can't speculate on what --**
6 **on what he was thinking when he wrote it.**

7 Q. Yes. Thank you very much, Officer A. Well, that is the
8 last question we have for you. Thank you very much for
9 giving evidence to us today.

10 **A. Thanks very much.**

11 MR AIKEN: We are going to terminate the connection now,
12 Officer A.

13 (videolink terminated)

14 MR AIKEN: Perhaps if we take --

15 CHAIRMAN: Yes. We have tried our stenographer rather hard
16 by going on longer than usual. I take it we will in any
17 event be turning to other matters now. Well, we will
18 rise now for a short break and we will see what the
19 programme holds for the rest of the morning.

20 (1.50 am)

21 (Short break)

22 (12.20 pm)

23 Material relating to Detective Superintendent Ronald Mack
24 (retired) dealt with by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY

25 CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Aiken?

1 MR AIKEN: Chairman, Members of the Panel, just before we
2 have lunch and then the next witness today I am going to
3 just deal with a short, discrete issue that I am in
4 a position to open to you. What we are going to look at
5 is a witness statement that has been provided by retired
6 RUC Detective Superintendent Ronald Mack, who was at the
7 time of the Kincora Inquiry or the Phase Two part that
8 he was involved in a detective inspector working with
9 Detective Superintendent Caskey.

10 Just to explain and set the scene for this, I want
11 us to look at 1782, please, which is an exhibit to
12 Ronald Mack's witness statement. It is an article
13 written by the now late journalist Liam Clarke published
14 in the Belfast Telegraph on 23rd January of 2015. You
15 can see the headline is:

16 "Sex assault Tory MP visited Kincora Boys' Home,
17 claim retired detectives."

18 Now you then have in the body of the article
19 a picture of the former boys' home and then:

20 "At least one Tory MP visited Kincora during the
21 1970s when it was riven with sexual abuse by staff of
22 boys in their care, it has been claimed."

23 So it is not saying that necessarily the Tory MP
24 engaged in the sexual activity, but simply that he
25 visited, but you can see the impression that the article

1 creates. You can see:

2 "The allegations are said to have been made by two
3 retired detectives who were part of a team which
4 investigated the East Belfast boys' home in the 1980s
5 and prosecuted three members for abuse. The names of
6 the police officers are being withheld for security
7 reasons. They are instead referred to as officers ..."

8 CHAIRMAN: Scroll down.

9 MR AIKEN: Scroll down -- sorry -- please. Thank you.

10 "They are being instead referred to as Officers
11 Smith and Jones."

12 You can see:

13 "Both are known to the Belfast Telegraph and we have
14 established that they conducted the inquiry. Both are
15 willing to help any inquiry into Kincora. They revealed
16 that the MP died before they could arrange to interview
17 him."

18 You can see:

19 "Officer Jones was the more senior of the two and
20 did most of the interviews, while Officer Smith prepared
21 files and conducted some interviews. They said that
22 none of the former Kincora residents they interviewed
23 were taken out of the home for sex parties, as has
24 sometimes been claimed."

25 If we scroll down, please:

1 "Officer Jones revealed that he had also interviewed
2 Joshua 'Joss' Cardwell, a Unionist politician, who was
3 chairman of the committee responsible for children's
4 homes.

5 The former detective said, 'Mr Carswell answered the
6 door -- Cardwell answered the door a happy man. "Well,
7 Inspector, how can I help you?", he said, and I told him
8 I was here about Kincora investigation because he had
9 visited the home. He said it was something to do with
10 his work and he was entitled to inspect it. He turned
11 from a happy man to an absolute nervous wreck and I was
12 arranging for him to come to the station'.

13 Mr Cardwell took his own life before this could take
14 place",

15 according to the journalist:

16 "The officer added, 'A conservative MP was coming
17 over to the Northern Ireland Office quite regularly and
18 has since died. We were told by Criminal Records in
19 Scotland Yard, London that he had a conviction many
20 years ago for indecent behaviour or something in
21 a gents' loo against another boy, but his death meant we
22 never got a chance to question him'."

23 They go on to say then:

24 "Both men also interviewed Colin Wallace. The RUC
25 officer said he had been unwilling to tell them

1 anything."

2 You can see:

3 "Mr Wallace produced papers to show that he had been
4 threatened with prosecution if he said too much."

5 So that article posed for the Inquiry the same type
6 of difficulty as you heard Detective Superintendent --
7 retired now -- Chief Superintendent Caskey explaining,
8 that you have these articles, and their sources are not
9 being identified, and obviously the impression being
10 conveyed of a number of different things from the
11 article.

12 There the matter may well have remained. However,
13 the Inquiry, if we look, please, at 1785, there is
14 a journalist, an academic journalist in the Republic of
15 Ireland who has written a report. Now the report was to
16 do with Morris Fraser, but I just want to just take you
17 down to the footnote at the bottom of the page, please,
18 and footnote 26. You can see reference is made to the
19 article that we have just looked at. In the footnote it
20 is said by the author that one of the anonymous officers
21 in the report was Officer Mack, and he is described in
22 the text above being involved in Morris Fraser's
23 proceedings in England in 1972.

24 So the -- you have this article. Then you have
25 another document which purports to identify the or one

1 of the sources of that, and as a result -- and I want to
2 put on record the assistance that The Police Service of
3 Northern Ireland gave the Inquiry then in tracing the
4 retired officer Ronald Mack -- if we can look, please,
5 at 1776 -- and he was prepared to and has assisted the
6 Inquiry in providing a witness statement.

7 What he explains in the witness statement is:

8 "I retired from the RUC in '93, by which time I had
9 attained the rank of Detective Superintendent and
10 Department Head of Greater Belfast Regional CID."

11 So he was an officer of considerable rank. He
12 explains during '82 and '83 he was part of the Phase Two
13 Inquiry that Detective Superintendent Caskey, as he then
14 was, was undertaking.

15 He explains in paragraph 3 he wanted to put on
16 record that the then Chief Constable Sir John Hermon's
17 direction was that "no stone was to be left unturned".

18 So you heard that from Detective Chief
19 Superintendent Caskey yesterday.

20 "... and that is how what was an extensive
21 investigation was conducted."

22 You are aware that the Phase Two investigation was
23 into the much wider very serious allegations that were
24 made about paedophile rings and establishment figures
25 and so on.

1 Then he -- if we look at paragraph 4, he explains
2 that the Inquiry has shown him the article that we have
3 just looked at published in the Belfast Telegraph and
4 written by the now deceased journalist Liam Clarke. We
5 also showed him the relevant page of Dr Meehan's article
6 which identified him.

7 Then you can see at paragraph 6, if we can bring
8 that up, please, 1777, he then confirms that he was one
9 of the RUC investigating officers who was involved in
10 what led to the prosecution and conviction of Dr Fraser
11 in England in 1972, and that he did give evidence to the
12 GMC about Dr Fraser in 1973.

13 He acknowledges what the Inquiry's position was has
14 been explained to him, which was that the Inquiry is not
15 investigating matters relating to Dr Fraser save to the
16 extent that in any way involved matters connected to
17 Kincora. Then he says:

18 "I can say that at no time during my involvement in
19 the RUC investigation into him", as in into Dr Fraser,
20 "nor my subsequent involvement with the RUC
21 investigation into Kincora, was there any basis to
22 connect Dr Fraser to Kincora."

23 He then draws attention to the footnote from
24 Dr Meehan's article referring to him as being one of the
25 two retired detectives that spoke to Liam Clarke, and he

1 in paragraph 9 then says:

2 "I confirm that I did speak to Liam Clarke and that
3 I am the "Officer Jones" he was referring to",

4 the more senior colleague of the two. He also
5 confirmed that his colleague, Samuel Edward Cooke, was
6 the Officer Smith that he was referring to.

7 Then at paragraph 10 of his statement he says this:

8 "I confirm that I did not tell Liam Clarke that
9 a Tory MP was a visitor to Kincora. There is no basis
10 for such a statement.

11 The RUC Phase Two investigation", he explains, "did
12 look at claims relating to four individuals in The
13 Northern Ireland Office. None of them were Tory MPs."

14 He refers to the fact the Inquiry showed him the
15 relevant pages from the Phase Two investigation report
16 and you have those exhibited to the statement. They are
17 at 1787 and 1791. These are -- were press allegations
18 about officials in the NIO engaged in homosexual
19 activity being linked to Kincora. Superintendent
20 Caskey's investigation looked at those matters and
21 ultimately concluded, if we look at 1791 just for
22 a moment, please, having engaged in the analysis, he was
23 satisfied that there was:

24 "... no evidence found that British officials in the
25 Northern Ireland Office, policemen, Justices of the

1 Peace, or businessmen and boys in care were involved in
2 a homosexual prostitution or vice ring."

3 But he did speak to -- if we go back to the -- his
4 -- Ronald Mack's statement, please, at 1778, the RUC
5 investigation did speak to or endeavour to speak to the
6 four individuals who had been identified by a journalist
7 speaking to or passing information to the police.

8 "One of the individuals who worked in the NIO was
9 a man called Peter England. He had been the subject of
10 an allegation that he had sexually assaulted a colleague
11 called Stephen Hewitt",

12 who also worked at the time in the Northern Ireland
13 Office. Now Peter England had died before he could be
14 interviewed, and during the Phase Two investigation the
15 police officer who investigated and satisfied himself
16 that he had died sets out in statements at 1794 -- we
17 don't need to look at it -- that Peter England was
18 deceased. So he couldn't be spoken to.

19 You can see the resonance with that in the Liam
20 Clarke article, although there seems to be conflation.
21 Peter England was never a Tory MP and he was not someone
22 who was convicted of any form of indecency. We will see
23 that's a conflation with a different individual, but
24 before we do that, what the RUC were able to do was to
25 speak to Stephen Hewitt, who was the person in the NIO

1 said to have been victim of this assault from Peter
2 England.

3 In his statement -- I want to look at it for two
4 different reasons, please. If we look at 1792, he
5 explains in his statement that he was in the NIO and
6 that no such incident involving Peter England ever took
7 place. So this is the alleged victim saying there was
8 no such incident.

9 But for a different reason -- and you will recall
10 when we were talking to the SIS Officer A, I was drawing
11 your attention to matters related to Sir Maurice
12 Oldfield, and just when we are here, if we can scroll on
13 to the next page, please, he explains:

14 "I have read certain allegations about Sir Maurice's
15 private life in the magazine Private Eye. From my
16 knowledge of the man I totally repudiate these
17 allegations. I know of nobody, including British civil
18 servants, who might have been involved in homosexual
19 activity in Northern Ireland. It has been suggested to
20 me that there may have been somebody involved in such
21 activity who drove a flashy Mini car. I can think of
22 nobody who might fit this description."

23 Now the reason he raises Maurice Oldfield and says
24 that, you can see:

25 "I believe Mr England died about twelve months after

1 leaving the NIO in 1979. I acted as Private Secretary
2 to Sir Maurice Oldfield during the time he was Security
3 Coordinator in Northern Ireland. For security reasons
4 Sir Maurice always travelled in Northern Ireland with
5 a police escort and was accompanied by police officers
6 whenever he left the Stormont Estate."

7 So that was Stephen Hewitt, who himself was dealing
8 with an allegation that he had been the subject of
9 a sexual assault by a different individual, Peter
10 England, but is here addressing a media article he is
11 aware of linking Sir Maurice Oldfield with being
12 involved in some sort of homosexual activity in Northern
13 Ireland and that's what he had to say about it.

14 The point, if we go to 1778, please, that Ronald
15 Mack makes is that none of this to do with Peter England
16 -- if we scroll down a little further, please -- and
17 Stephen Hewitt had anything to do with Kinchora.

18 He goes on to explain that they also did interview
19 John Imrie -- you will find his statement -- I am not
20 going to open it -- it's at 1795 to 1800 -- who worked
21 in the NIO between 1972 and 1973. He denied any
22 homosexual activity in relation to his time in Northern
23 Ireland. He did disclose, however, having been
24 convicted in England in 1979 for masturbating in
25 a public place, and he explained the circumstances of

1 that in his witness statement, but he was convicted of
2 it, but again in spite of the tenor of the newspaper
3 article, which seems to conflate Peter England, although
4 saying he is a Tory MP and then linking him to what is,
5 in fact, Mr Imrie's activity post his time in Northern
6 Ireland, again that had, says Ronald Mack, nothing
7 whatever to do with Kincora.

8 Then you will recall the article also had comment to
9 make about Joss Cardwell. You can see Inspector Mack,
10 as he was then, says:

11 "I was involved in interviewing Joss Cardwell along
12 with Detective Superintendent Caskey. I have again been
13 shown the relevant documents relating to that part of
14 the investigation."

15 They can be found, Members of the Panel, at 1802 to
16 1805. That's Detective Superintendent Caskey's summary
17 in his report.

18 Also of significance, given what is said in the
19 newspaper article, is the witness statement from Joss
20 Cardwell of 23rd March 1982, which is at 1806 and 1807,
21 because you will recall the article said that he had
22 taken his life in effect after the visit and there had
23 been no opportunity for him to come to the station and
24 make a statement. Well, he made a statement on
25 23rd March 1982. He died on 15th April 1982. Ronald

1 Mack makes the point in paragraph 19:

2 "No individual ever made an allegation against Joss
3 Cardwell during the police inquiry."

4 It was explained to him by the Inquiry when we met
5 with him that the Inquiry was not aware of any
6 subsequent allegation being made against the man either,
7 and he confirmed what is -- what is in Detective
8 Superintendent Caskey's report, that it was the
9 journalist Chris Moore who brought up the name during
10 the RUC Kincora Phase Two Inquiry.

11 He then explains in paragraph 20 of his witness
12 statement that he agreed with the conclusions reached by
13 Detective Superintendent Caskey on behalf of the RUC as
14 expressed in the Phase Two report. He says:

15 "There was absolutely no evidence of a paedophile
16 ring involving establishment or prominent individuals
17 operating at Kincora or anywhere elsewhere within the
18 purview of the police inquiry. The allegation was also
19 entirely inconsistent with what the victims of Mains,
20 Semple and McGrath and the other former residents of
21 Kincora had to say."

22 "A great many allegations", he then says in
23 paragraph 21, "have been made through the media about
24 the involvement of establishment or prominent figures at
25 Kincora that consequently had to be examined in or

1 investigated in Phase Two of the inquiry. Where they
2 could be investigated, they were found to have no basis
3 in fact."

4 You can see then he has signed his statement to be
5 true on 14th June 2016. It is not the Inquiry's
6 intention in view of what he has to say, and because it
7 is a discrete issue I can deal with in this way, to ask
8 Ronald Mack to attend to give oral evidence. That is
9 the evidence he has provided to the Inquiry and
10 indicates that, "Where we have been in a position to
11 identify an unidentified source and get to the bottom of
12 what they have had to say, well, you can see the
13 consequences of doing that".

14 That's all I intend to say. Perhaps -- I think we
15 are going to have some evidence after lunch, all being
16 well, that Ms Smith is going to deal with.

17 CHAIRMAN: Yes. We will rise now and we will aim to sit
18 again at 2 o'clock.

19 (12.55 pm)

20 (Lunch break)

21 (2.00 pm)

22 MR BOB BUNTING (recalled)

23 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY

24 MS SMITH: Good afternoon, Chairman, Panel Members. Our
25 witness this afternoon is Mr Bob Bunting. He has

1 difficulty with hearing, Chairman, and he's also
2 recovering from an infection. So he may have difficulty
3 speaking at some point as well, but you have given
4 evidence before, Bob.

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. So there's no need to have you re-sworn.

7 **A. No.**

8 Q. Bob has provided two statements for the benefit of the
9 Inquiry in this module. That's KIN197 to 434, which
10 includes an earlier statement that he provided during
11 the second module -- third module of evidence to the
12 Inquiry during the Rubane module on 10th November 2014,
13 and then a supplemental statement of 28th June 2016 at
14 435 to 437.

15 Now your first statement, if I can call it that, the
16 one from 23rd June, is on the screen, Bob. Can I just
17 ask you to confirm that that is the statement that you
18 have provided to the Inquiry?

19 **A. Yes, it is.**

20 Q. And we can look at the other one in due course, but the
21 one that's on the screen here, I am not going to go
22 through your career path. We know that you were
23 certainly in the relevant time period for part of that
24 period of time you were Children's Officer in the
25 Belfast Welfare Committee, or Welfare Authority I should

1 say. You then subsequently on reorganisation you moved
2 to become a more managerial role -- isn't that right --
3 in the new ...?

4 **A. I moved to the post of Assistant Director of Social**
5 **Services --**

6 Q. Yes.

7 **A. -- which was not a managerial post.**

8 Q. It was still very much on the ground in the office?

9 **A. Yes, but it was dealing with the family and child care**
10 **services, and my responsibilities really were for**
11 **assessment of need, planning, development of services**
12 **and --**

13 Q. But it didn't involve at that stage visiting the homes
14 in the way you had done as Children's Officer.

15 **A. No, it didn't.**

16 Q. Isn't that right?

17 **A. No. In fact, it was a complete change for me, because**
18 **prior to that as Children's Officer I had been the**
19 **overall manager for all of the children's services in**
20 **Belfast.**

21 Q. I'm going come back to talk about reorganisation in due
22 course, but just before I move on to talk about what's
23 in your statement, where were headquarters during your
24 time period? We have heard of College Street. We have
25 heard of premises in University Street. What was the

1 position with regard to where headquarters was
2 effectively?

3 **A. In Belfast Welfare?**

4 Q. Yes.

5 **A. It was College Street, 16 College Street.**

6 Q. Then we've heard about Purdysburn. That's when the
7 Board was set up.

8 **A. Yes.**

9 Q. Its headquarters was at Purdysburn. Is that right?

10 **A. That's right. That would have been a district office
11 for East Belfast and Castlereagh.**

12 Q. And were there premises in University Street at any
13 stage that you recall?

14 **A. Oh, yes. That initially started off as the Eastern
15 Health & Social Service Board headquarters and
16 subsequently moved to Linenhall Street to new premises.**

17 Q. Where I think they still are effectively?

18 **A. Yes. That's where the Health & Social Care Board is at
19 present.**

20 Q. So if I've understood you correctly, College Street was
21 the Belfast Welfare Authority headquarters?

22 **A. Yes.**

23 Q. Purdysburn was the East & Castlereagh District
24 headquarters?

25 **A. That's right.**

1 Q. And University Street was the Board headquarters?

2 **A. That's right.**

3 Q. Okay. Well, in paragraph 2 of your statement here you
4 are just talking about Kincora being established by
5 the Belfast Welfare Authority in accordance with
6 section 96 of the Children & Young Persons Act (Northern
7 Ireland) 1950.

8 **A. Yes.**

9 Q. And it opened on 6th May 1958. There are initial
10 proposals which you refer to for Kincora at KIN118
11 (sic).

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. You say that it was clear from that -- I think it was
14 a letter addressed to Belfast Welfare Authority --

15 **A. Yes.**

16 Q. -- setting out how Kincora would operate. Isn't that
17 correct?

18 **A. Yes. I think this was the proposal put forward by the
19 then Chief Welfare Officer to establish a hostel.**

20 Q. And it was essentially set up in accordance with his
21 proposal. Isn't that so?

22 **A. It was.**

23 Q. Because, as you -- we were talking earlier, you say, you
24 know, instead of being -- talking about houseparents or
25 that, there was a warden --

1 **A. Yes.**

2 Q. -- was the terminology being used for the hostel.

3 **A. I thought that was, you know, a rather -- more like**
4 **a youth hostel term, because one would have expected it**
5 **to be "officer in charge".**

6 Q. The term was "warden", and we know that Mr Mains became
7 that warden?

8 **A. Yes, yes.**

9 Q. You talk also there in paragraph 50 -- sorry --
10 paragraph 4 about that in 1950 the upper limit for
11 compulsory school age was 14.

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. That changed to 15 in '57. So when Kincora opened in
14 1958, the school leaving age was 15.

15 **A. That's right.**

16 Q. And that continued until April 1973, when it went
17 upwards to 16.

18 You also talk in paragraph 5 as -- you say:

19 "As far as the Welfare Authorities and Boards were
20 concerned, hostel provision was for young persons of
21 working age and this the basic criterion for admission."

22 **A. Yes.**

23 Q. "The children's officers were managerially responsible
24 for all admissions to care and would have been aware
25 that younger children had to be accommodated in the

1 hostels, usually in an emergency and on a short stay
2 basis because of the inadequacy of the residential
3 provision, particularly for Protestant children, during
4 the 1950s and into the 1960s."

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. You then go on to say:

7 "Also relevant was the increased demand for
8 residential care which in the case of the Eastern Health
9 & Social Services Board continued into the 1980s."

10 You talk about that in your earlier statement.

11 **A. Yes.**

12 Q. Now can I just ask -- you go on -- I am not going to
13 call it up, but in paragraphs 26 and 27 of this
14 statement you go on to discuss the procedure for
15 admission.

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. When we were talking about it, you say there was
18 a multi-disciplinary approach, that there was
19 a psychiatrist involved certainly in 1972, a John
20 Barcroft, that you recall.

21 **A. Yes. Maybe I could clarify that. We had**
22 **a multi-disciplinary approach to the provision of**
23 **residential care in relation to meeting the boys' needs**
24 **effectively. Some of them had problems, as you are**
25 **aware, and it included child psychiatrist. It also**

1 included education, similar to the assessment team at
2 Palmerston Assessment Centre.

3 Q. Well, I just -- what I was --

4 A. So we had -- we had implemented that from probably
5 I would say '70 -- 1970 on possibly.

6 Q. Just -- so certainly in the 1970s that was the position?

7 A. Yes, it was.

8 Q. But I was -- when we were talking earlier, I was
9 wondering whether a psychiatrist would ever have had
10 a say in placing a child in a specific --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- home?

13 A. Yes. Not I think unless it was considered necessary
14 that he needed that particular accommodation, but the
15 decisions about appropriateness were taken by the staff,
16 the Personal Social Services staff, and it would
17 obviously have to have been agreed with the Principal
18 Social Worker who was -- it was Mrs Wilson.

19 Q. So if I have understood you correctly, while a child
20 psychiatrist, who may have been treating a child in
21 a children's home --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- could have said, "Well, you know, I think this child
24 would benefit from moving to a different sort of
25 environment" --

1 **A. Yes.**

2 Q. -- such as that afforded by a particular hostel or
3 whatever --

4 **A. Yes.**

5 Q. -- and then the Social Services would have looked at
6 that --

7 **A. That's right.**

8 Q. -- and presumably would have put a great deal of store
9 on what a psychiatrist might have said in those
10 circumstances?

11 **A. Yes, they would -- they would have done I'm sure, yes.**

12 Q. Well, could -- but nonetheless that psychiatrist could
13 not have directed that it be done?

14 **A. Oh, absolutely not.**

15 Q. And Mr Mains equally as warden of Kincora couldn't have
16 said, "I want that boy out of Williamson House moved
17 into my hostel"?

18 **A. Absolutely not.**

19 Q. Could he -- is it possible, though, that if a child was
20 moving from, say, Williamson House to Kincora, that
21 Mr Mains might have gone and brought him over to
22 Kincora?

23 **A. Highly unlikely, because the social worker would have
24 taken him to the hostel --**

25 Q. I was wondering --

1 **A.** -- and that would have been part of the introduction,
2 and ideally what would have happened was the boy would
3 have been prepared for the admission, so he had an idea
4 of where he was going and why, given the reasons, and
5 the social worker would have visited him fairly soon
6 after that to see had he settled in all right.

7 **Q.** Well, I mean, is it possible maybe the social worker and
8 Mr Mains might have transferred the child over together?

9 **A.** **It's possible, but ...**

10 **Q.** You think it's unlikely?

11 **A.** **I think it's unlikely. It wouldn't be necessary,**
12 **because he would be receiving the boy.**

13 **Q.** You go on to talk here about the Inquiry being aware, as
14 we are, that the welfare authorities began to develop
15 homes and hostels during the 1950s --

16 **A.** **Yes.**

17 **Q.** -- and the deficiencies in the system particularly with
18 regard to age and gender, which you have addressed in
19 the first report that you gave to us. As you say, it
20 was your first priority as Children's Officer.

21 **A.** **Yes.**

22 **Q.** And you developed the first small group homes in
23 Northern Ireland?

24 **A.** **Yes.**

25 **Q.** And that was because of your experience in the UK and

1 what you saw happening there, that you felt that that
2 was a better approach to take.

3 **A. Uh-huh.**

4 Q. You got considerable assistance from the Ministry of
5 Home Affairs in going along that route --

6 **A. Yes.**

7 Q. -- particularly Mr Stirling and Ms Forrest. If you can
8 just scroll on down, please, there were resource issues
9 in relation to the provision of family and child care
10 services affecting both the Belfast Welfare Authority
11 and the Eastern Health & Social Services Board.

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. If I might just pause there, we do come back to this,
14 but whenever there was the reorganisation, you were
15 explaining to me that Belfast Welfare Authority had
16 responsibility for the homes that were within the
17 Belfast county -- city and county boroughs effectively,
18 but the Eastern Health & Social Services Board was
19 a much bigger beast, if I can put it that way --

20 **A. Uh-huh.**

21 Q. -- and had responsibility not just for those homes and
22 for the children within that area who needed to be taken
23 into care, but also I think you said you took in parts
24 of County Antrim --

25 **A. Yes.**

1 Q. -- Lisburn, parts of North & West Belfast where there
2 were big housing areas and on out?

3 **A. Yes.**

4 Q. And so the geographical area --

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. -- became bigger, but you also made the point that
7 certainly within the Antrim area that you now had
8 responsibility for there were no statutory children's
9 homes in that area.

10 **A. That's correct, yes.**

11 Q. So all of those children who might -- it is hard to know
12 how they would otherwise have been accommodated --

13 **A. Uh-huh.**

14 Q. -- suddenly had to be accommodated by what was formerly
15 Belfast Welfare Authority. Is that right?

16 **A. Yes, that's correct.**

17 Q. Just talking about staffing ratios, in her overview
18 report Ms McAndrew on behalf of the Health & Social Care
19 Board -- and we don't need to call this up -- but at
20 KIN1094 she talks about the fact that the Castle Priory
21 recommendations were the basis for working out staffing
22 ratios for any children's home or hostel.

23 **A. Yes.**

24 Q. In paragraph 10 in your statement here, if we can scroll
25 down, please, you say that:

1 "From '69 care staffing levels were based on the
2 Castle Priory recommendations."

3 **A. Yes.**

4 Q. "That related to the group the home was in. The
5 grouping system took account of the care needs and
6 behaviour of the children."

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. "The Welfare Authority homes were in group 3, the lowest
9 grouping, apart from the residential nurseries, which
10 were in a higher group. That did not reflect", you say,
11 "the troubled children staff were having to deal with
12 and the nurturing that they needed."

13 **A. Yes.**

14 Q. "Consequently with the approval of the Ministry of Home
15 Affairs you moved the homes and hostels into group 2
16 some time around '73 or '74 --

17 **A. Yes.**

18 Q. "-- which you believe increased the staffing levels and
19 salaries of the officers in charge and deputies, but for
20 reasons you go on to talk about that didn't, in fact,
21 happen in respect of Kincora. It only happened in
22 respect of children's homes.

23 **A. Yes.**

24 Q. "I will come back to that.

25 **A. Yes.**

1 Q. Certainly when you were speaking about Kincora in your
2 statement, you were under the understanding it was
3 a hostel for nine boys?

4 **A. Yes.**

5 Q. We know at that time certainly in the '60s, in 1969 when
6 Castle Priory reported, there were twelve boys in
7 Kincora?

8 **A. Yes.**

9 Q. I am not going to call it up, but, I mean, for the
10 benefit of the Panel you can see an example of that at
11 KIN1276.

12 Now the Castle Priory report gave an example of
13 a twelve-bedded hostel for working boys and girls and
14 they recommended an officer in charge, a deputy, 5.4
15 full-time employees as care staff. The auxilliary
16 staff, cooks and cleaners, were separate. Then when the
17 introduction of the forty-hour week came in in the
18 1970s, that increased to 6.2 full-time employed staff --

19 **A. Yes.**

20 Q. -- care staff.

21 **A. Uh-huh.**

22 Q. I just wondered in the case of Kincora boys weren't --
23 they weren't expected to do chores in the home or to do
24 the laundry or to do the cooking or anything like that.
25 Isn't that right?

1 **A. I think initially that might have been the case, but**
2 **I don't recall them actually when I was Children's**
3 **Officer having -- having to do that, and I think they**
4 **must have -- that they appointed a new domestic member**
5 **of staff possibly to undertake that.**

6 Q. To do the laundry and things?

7 **A. Yes, I think so.**

8 Q. Yes. I mean, certainly the evidence --

9 **A. Again I can't be absolutely certain.**

10 Q. Certainly the evidence the Inquiry has heard --

11 **A. Yes.**

12 Q. -- is that there was a Mrs McCullough, who was the cook.

13 **A. Yes. She was originally -- she was there from the very**
14 **beginning until the end, until it was closed.**

15 Q. There was another lady, whose name escapes me --

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. -- who came and did laundry and cleaning.

18 **A. Yes. That was what I was aware of, yes.**

19 Q. Well, in paragraph 13 here you suggest that the staff --
20 staffing guidelines in April 1974 --

21 **A. Yes.**

22 Q. -- was one member of staff to 3.5 young people in
23 respect of hostels.

24 **A. Yes.**

25 Q. I just -- I was asking about these guidelines and you

1 are saying that they were issued by the Department in
2 1974?

3 **A. Yes, they were, yes.**

4 Q. Now you said that they said they didn't issue
5 guidelines, but you are quite clear that they did.
6 I think you may have annexed them --

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. -- to your original statement.

9 **A. Yes. I have it in my appendix 5 of my first statement.**

10 Q. Now it is clear that certainly from evidence that the
11 Inquiry has seen for a considerable period of time
12 Mr Mains only had part-time domestic help. That can't
13 have been satisfactory. He seems to have been expected
14 to work maybe 167 hours a week.

15 **A. Absolutely not, I mean. and I think that ended up with
16 other staff having to actually take charge of the hostel
17 to give him some respite.**

18 Q. You mean other staff from other facilities --

19 **A. Yes.**

20 Q. -- other -- from other homes?

21 **A. Yes, and also -- well, particularly at weekends to give
22 him a break, and I think Mike May... -- Mr Maybin
23 actually spent some time at the home.**

24 Q. Yes. I think that's certainly -- he spent a summer
25 there --

1 **A. Yes.**

2 Q. -- it would appear in or about 1966 maybe.

3 **A. Yes.**

4 Q. You certainly refer and the Inquiry has heard about the
5 difficulties there were in recruiting staff. We can see
6 that in Kincora --

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. -- that Mr Mains was on his own for quite a while.

9 **A. Yes.**

10 Q. Eventually Mr Semple was brought back in after a period
11 of no deputy being successfully recruited.

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. But it would seem that the maximum staffing in Kincora
14 ultimately was three members of staff --

15 **A. Yes.**

16 Q. -- a cook and a cleaner?

17 **A. Yes.**

18 Q. Paragraph 18 you talk about the plans that there were
19 for Kincora, if we can just scroll down to that. You
20 say that:

21 "As part of the reorganisation in 1972 or the
22 planning for reorganisation approval had been obtained
23 to use either Kincora or Ettaville as a hostel for both
24 genders and it was decided that that would be used for
25 the most troubled adolescents, as the small group homes

1 could accommodate adolescents up to the age of 18."

2 So, in other words, there was not going to be
3 a movement anymore from children's home to home for
4 older children?

5 **A. Absolutely.**

6 Q. It would have just been a specialist unit for the very
7 troubled adolescents?

8 **A. Yes. The small group home system was to accommodate
9 family groups. That is why, in fact, we were proposing
10 that the hostel could -- would deal with more troubled
11 adolescents.**

12 Q. But you go on to say the development was due to commence
13 in 1974 and therefore there wasn't an increase in the
14 staffing because of these changes that were afoot, as it
15 were.

16 **A. That's right.**

17 Q. And that had perhaps an adverse effect then in respect
18 of Kincora?

19 **A. Yes. Undoubtedly it must have had.**

20 Q. But unfortunately in 1973, when the Eastern Health &
21 Social Services Board, as you say, inherited the most
22 needy areas of County Antrim, the new estates down in
23 West Belfast and Lisburn, there was no statutory
24 residential care provision in those areas and no
25 statutory residential care provision for the Downpatrick

1 area --

2 **A. No.**

3 Q. -- apart from one family group home.

4 **A. Yes.**

5 Q. You gave me some statistics.

6 **A. Uh-huh.**

7 Q. If I have got these right --

8 **A. Uh-huh.**

9 Q. -- you were saying that there were 465 children taken
10 into residential care in Belfast in 1967. In 1971 that
11 had risen to 586 children in care, and that was
12 an increase of 121, and 117 of those came into care in
13 the one year between 31st March '68 and 31st March '69.
14 So we know that in Northern Ireland that's when the
15 Troubles, as we call them, started in '68 --

16 **A. Absolutely.**

17 Q. -- '69. So ...

18 **A. Uh-huh.**

19 Q. And children -- families were being burnt out of their
20 homes and things like that.

21 **A. Yes, yes.**

22 Q. So that caused that influx in that year?

23 **A. That's quite right, and I think because of that it was**
24 **a regular occurrence to put up additional beds both in**
25 **the statutory and voluntary homes. I can remember**

1 **phoning Nazareth Lodge for** SR63 **to**
2 **accommodation some children, a bit of extra beds.**

3 Q. Yes, and certainly -- I think certainly some of the
4 documents that the Inquiry has seen in respect of
5 Nazareth Lodge show that at the time of this very
6 difficult period of Belfast's history the convent was
7 opening its doors to families as well.

8 **A. Yes, yes.**

9 Q. The -- you also made the point to me that there was
10 a huge imbalance between the Eastern Health & Social
11 Services Board and the other -- and the six districts
12 within that Board --

13 **A. Yes.**

14 Q. -- and the other Boards --

15 **A. Yes.**

16 Q. -- in that you say that the child care work load --

17 **A. Uh-huh.**

18 Q. -- in North & West Belfast was equivalent to all of the
19 other Boards?

20 **A. No. Equivalent to one Board.**

21 Q. To one Board?

22 **A. Yes.**

23 Q. So --

24 **A. My work load was equivalent to that of my three**
25 **colleagues in the other Boards, the Northern and**

1 **Southern --**

2 Q. The other districts?

3 **A. No, the other Boards.**

4 Q. Right.

5 **A. The other Assistant Directors of Family and Childcare in**
6 **the three other Boards, the Northern, Southern and**
7 **Western.**

8 Q. So there was a concentration of need in the Belfast area
9 --

10 **A. Yes, indeed.**

11 Q. -- and the Eastern Health & Social Services Board area?

12 **A. Yes, but also our Board was by far the largest. It**
13 **covered over 40% of the population of Northern Ireland**
14 **and it also included the very large hospitals, the**
15 **regional hospitals.**

16 Q. Yes. Well, paragraphs 23 and 24 of this statement, Bob,
17 you say that if it had not been for reorganisation, it
18 is unlikely that -- sorry -- I've just realised
19 I neglected to talk to you about this --

20 **A. Yes.**

21 Q. -- but you said it is unlikely that Mains, Semple and
22 McGrath would have continued to work in Kincora, because
23 the plan was for more specialist hostels.

24 **A. Yes.**

25 Q. And unqualified staff were unlikely to have been

1 successful in getting those jobs.

2 **A. Yes.**

3 Q. But I wondered might those men, because of their
4 experience in Kincora, have obtained jobs in other
5 children's homes?

6 **A. Well, I -- I would doubt it. I would actually doubt it,**
7 **because they were -- the only experience they had was**
8 **dealing with older adolescent boys, and if they were**
9 **going to move into a group home, I mean, it would be**
10 **quite an adjustment for them.**

11 Q. But, I mean, we have heard that there was sort of
12 a small pool of staff who worked in the statutory
13 children's homes in Northern Ireland, and Belfast in
14 particular. I mean, staff moved from -- for example,
15 from Bawnmore to Palmerston.

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. And I'm just wondering would that have -- is it
18 a possibility maybe that Mains, Semple and McGrath might
19 have got employment in one of those other homes?

20 **A. Well, it would be a possibility, but I wouldn't have**
21 **thought it would be likely.**

22 Q. In paragraph 25 you go on to say that you felt that
23 essentially younger children going into Kincora, you
24 were saying that really Kincora was being used as
25 a stopgap for younger children when you were Children's

1 Officer, and you describe, as I say, the procedure for
2 admissions and the level of planning that went on into
3 that.

4 But paragraph 7 of Fionnuala McAndrew's statement
5 shows -- and we don't again need to call it up, but it
6 is at KIN1085 -- the ages of the boys admitted between
7 February '74 and October '77, and it is clear that
8 within that period at least, and I think, in fact, the
9 registers for Kincora would support also, that there
10 were more boys of school age being admitted to Kincora
11 than actually of working age.

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. And you suggest that they were there for short periods.

14 **A. Uh-huh.**

15 Q. When we were discussing this, you were saying that was
16 certainly -- you know, if there were vacancies somewhere
17 else, you weren't putting a child of school age in
18 there.

19 **A. Absolutely. The only reason for that -- in fact, for**
20 **any younger people going into Kincora -- was if there**
21 **were no vacancies in either -- any of the statutory or**
22 **voluntary homes.**

23 Q. Well, we know that certainly there are at least two boys
24 who went in for a longer period of time. I am going to
25 use names: Richard Kerr and Hugh Quinn.

1 **A. Yes.**

2 Q. Both went to Kincora at the age of 14.

3 **A. Uh-huh.**

4 Q. Richard Kerr went from Williamson House and Hugh Quinn
5 I think came from Bawnmore.

6 **A. Yes.**

7 Q. Hugh Quinn in the 1960s and Richard Kerr from '75 to '77.

8 **A. Yes.**

9 Q. Now the suggestion was that they were moved to Kincora
10 because their behaviour was such in the children's home
11 --

12 **A. Uh-huh.**

13 Q. -- that they couldn't be accommodated any longer in
14 a children's home.

15 **A. Yes.**

16 Q. I mean, was Kincora ever designed for that purpose?

17 **A. No, it wasn't. No, it wasn't.**

18 Q. And again is it a case of there not being somewhere else
19 for them to go?

20 **A. Yes. It wasn't, but inevitably it had to accommodate
21 troubled young people who would have been committed to
22 our care by the Juvenile Court.**

23 Q. Well, I don't believe --

24 **A. It certainly wasn't -- you know, it was just a general
25 hostel for boys.**

1 Q. You also go on to talk about Elizabeth McCullough who --
2 at paragraph 30 you say that you remember being told she
3 was a very motherly person.

4 **A. Yes.**

5 Q. I mean, the reason I'm saying this is that there was --
6 apart from her and the cleaner, there was no female
7 influence in the -- in Kincora.

8 **A. That's right.**

9 Q. And you said that you believed she was likely to have
10 paid attention to these younger boys coming in. That
11 may well have been true --

12 **A. Uh-huh.**

13 Q. -- but there was no housemother.

14 **A. Yes.**

15 Q. There was nobody there to cater for the needs of younger
16 children.

17 **A. That's right.**

18 Q. The men who were -- for a long period of time it was
19 just Mr Mains.

20 **A. Yes.**

21 Q. The men who were there were there to look after working
22 age boys.

23 **A. Absolutely.**

24 Q. And that was their role.

25 **A. That's right.**

1 Q. And if -- well, if it was operating as intended and it
2 was only for boys who were out at work all day --

3 **A. Uh-huh.**

4 Q. -- then one member of staff may well have been adequate.

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. But not where school boys were resident.

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. You would accept that?

9 **A. Oh, yes, yes.**

10 Q. We also --

11 **A. The Castle Priory recommendations in relation to hostels**
12 **was based on one member of staff to a group of six boys**
13 **during duty hours, which meant that in a twelve-bed**
14 **hostel there would always have been two staff on duty.**

15 Q. And that was not the case at Kincora.

16 **A. In the case of Kincora if you translated that into what**
17 **it was originally intended, a nine-bed home, it would**
18 **have been one and a half staff, one and a part-time**
19 **member of staff --**

20 Q. Well --

21 **A. -- for Kincora --**

22 Q. Well, again --

23 **A. -- on duty. On duty.**

24 Q. That may well have been acceptable if it had operated
25 purely as a hostel, but it was operating -- it had

1 a dual purpose. It was operating as a hostel, but it
2 was also a children's home.

3 **A. Yes. That was -- that's certain... -- that certainly**
4 **was not acceptable for, you know, a lot of school**
5 **children, you know, coming in.**

6 Q. Yes. The Castle Priory would have recommended a much
7 higher ratio of staff?

8 **A. Oh, they would, yes. In fact, I think I have that in my**
9 **statement, that the Castle Priory recommendations for**
10 **twelve-bed children's home comes out at one -- a member**
11 **of staff to two children.**

12 Q. Yes. Well, we also know that apart from the staffing
13 inadequacy in terms of school children being
14 accommodated in Kincora, there were no facilities there
15 for younger children.

16 **A. No, there weren't. I think initially the two attic**
17 **rooms were to be used for recreational purposes as far**
18 **as I am aware, billiard table or something like that or**
19 **whatever.**

20 Q. Well, certainly --

21 **A. But there was nothing.**

22 Q. -- that didn't happen.

23 **A. In fact, there weren't any suitable grounds outside for**
24 **outdoor play, though there was I think football pitches**
25 **or a park at the back of --**

1 Q. I think there was a school certainly adjacent to it.

2 **A. Yes. At the back there there were --**

3 Q. Yes, but certainly not --

4 **A. Maybe -- maybe those were playing fields. I don't know,**
5 **but I know --**

6 Q. But not within the curtilage of Kincora?

7 **A. Not within -- absolutely not, no.**

8 Q. There was no play area.

9 **A. No.**

10 Q. There was no games for children.

11 **A. No.**

12 Q. The only recreational activity seems to have been
13 watching TV.

14 **A. Yes. Uh-huh.**

15 Q. I wondered about holidays. We have heard the boys went
16 to Portrush and the north coast and camping and things
17 like that.

18 **A. Yes.**

19 Q. Were you ever aware of anybody going to London? Was
20 there ever a trip to London you were aware of?

21 **A. I was never aware of that, but I think, as I've said to**
22 **you --**

23 Q. Yes.

24 **A. -- my period as Children's Officer before reorganisation**
25 **was from October '71 until September '73. So I was only**

1 **involved in these matters for two years.**

2 Q. You also said that Miss -- Mrs Wilson, who reported to
3 you --

4 **A. Yes.**

5 Q. -- she was the one who was actually visiting Kincora
6 after '71 --

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. -- on behalf of the Board and certainly after --

9 **A. Even prior to me becoming Children's Officer she had**
10 **been appointed as Assistant Children's Officer**
11 **specifically for residential care to manage that I think**
12 **with effect from 1st January 1968.**

13 Q. Well, she -- you were saying to me that she would come
14 back and she would chat to you about the various
15 children's homes that she visited.

16 **A. Oh, yes.**

17 Q. That's how --

18 **A. She actually -- when I took up Children's Officer post,**
19 **she would have been visiting Kincora every -- every**
20 **week.**

21 Q. Well --

22 **A. And every visit that she made, she would have told me --**
23 **discussed it with me. She would have come in and**
24 **discussed it with me.**

25 Q. I mean, for example, the kind of things she would have

1 said was about Elizabeth McCullough being a lovely woman
2 and very motherly.

3 **A. Absolutely, yes. That's where -- that's where I get --**

4 Q. Where you got that information.

5 **A. -- my view from.**

6 Q. But did she ever at any stage say to you she had any
7 concerns about Mr Mains or any other staff or about the
8 boys being unhappy there in any way?

9 **A. Never.**

10 Q. Paragraph 34 of your -- I mean, in fact, it is more than
11 paragraph 34, but you talk about the fact that post the
12 Kincora scandal, if I can put it that way, there was
13 a working group set up --

14 **A. Uh-huh.**

15 Q. -- in 1981 and you were chairing that right through to
16 1983 --

17 **A. Uh-huh.**

18 Q. -- when recommendations were made in respect of
19 monitoring, inspections, a complaints procedure, and you
20 make the point that if that had been in place prior --
21 much earlier -- you know, shortly after reorganisation
22 --

23 **A. Yes, yes.**

24 Q. -- then issues with Kincora would have been identified
25 much sooner.

1 **A. Yes, indeed. I think that's the case, because in**
2 **relation to our monitoring recommendations there would**
3 **have been a detailed annual audit of every home and**
4 **hostel and that would have been undertaken by the**
5 **principal officer in the district and would have been**
6 **forwarded to me at headquarters.**

7 **Q. Well, I mean, at the risk of sounding trite, hindsight**
8 **is a wonderful thing.**

9 **A. It is. It is.**

10 **Q. Obviously that was a reaction to --**

11 **A. Yes.**

12 **Q. -- what was discovered about what was going on in**
13 **Kincora.**

14 **A. Yes, it was of course.**

15 **Q. Had there been anything in train prior to that or had**
16 **there been plans prior to that?**

17 **A. Well, the only -- the only information that we got in**
18 **relation to monitoring was that it was included in my**
19 **job description and in all the Assistant Directors' job**
20 **description, but it was linked with programmes of care,**
21 **because the services were to be delivered on**
22 **a multi-disciplinary programme of care basis. This was**
23 **the new corporate management system. Programme planning**
24 **teams were to be established to deliver the service --**
25 **to plan the services, and ensure whatever**

1 **recommendations they made for improving, we monitored**
2 **them to ensure they had been implemented properly, and**
3 **the Eastern Board I think set up the first programme**
4 **planning team for children and young people in 1975 and**
5 **I chaired that group.**

6 Q. But that was not --

7 **A. But it wasn't a monitoring as such of any services.**

8 Q. It was just --

9 **A. It was actually a monitoring of the --**

10 Q. Of future development really?

11 **A. -- of mostly future development, and it would have been**
12 **as well how that was going, you know.**

13 Q. Yes. Well, I mean, I was asking you about what you saw
14 as the real problem with reorganisation --

15 **A. Uh-huh.**

16 Q. -- and I think you said the fact that they cut out the
17 specialist managers was a problem.

18 **A. Absolutely, yes. I think that was crucial, because**
19 **the -- the DSSOs were now the managers for all of the**
20 **Personal Social Services and reported directly to the**
21 **Director of Social Services, and, in fact, prior to**
22 **reorganisation the then Chief Social Work Adviser met**
23 **with the newly appointed DSSOs to inform them that, in**
24 **fact, there would be no specialist managers between them**
25 **and the Director, and as a consequence of that we had to**

1 **have a meeting in the Eastern Board with all the**
2 **Assistant Directors and DSSOs and the Director to try**
3 **and sort out what our role was, and the DSSOs did not**
4 **want us to be involved in operational management in any**
5 **form. We would -- we were there as professional**
6 **advisers and that's ...**

7 Q. And that was how your role was defined?

8 **A. That was how our role was defined.**

9 Q. I am going to move on, Bob, to the issue that the
10 Inquiry has been looking at. That's one I know you gave
11 evidence to the Hughes Inquiry about, the Mason file.
12 I am not going to revisit that in any depth --

13 **A. Yes.**

14 Q. -- but you were certainly aware in 1971 that a complaint
15 had been made by way of a letter to the Falls Road --

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. -- Social Services office. Isn't that right?

18 **A. No. To --**

19 Q. To Townsend Street. Sorry.

20 **A. -- Townsend Street, yes.**

21 Q. That was the North -- sorry -- West Belfast office --

22 **A. West Belfast.**

23 Q. -- in Townsend Street?

24 **A. Yes.**

25 Q. And you -- when we were speaking earlier, you said you

1 came back after having been on holiday and you were told
2 that this letter had been received --

3 **A. Yes.**

4 Q. -- by the social worker who was for the boys concerned
5 and --

6 **A. Yes, that's right, and the team leader.**

7 Q. And their team leader.

8 **A. Yes.**

9 Q. You actually saw the letter?

10 **A. I saw the letter, yes.**

11 Q. But not the envelope?

12 **A. No, I didn't see the envelope, no.**

13 Q. As far as you were concerned the social worker or her
14 team leader had spoken to Harry Mason in the
15 headquarters.

16 **A. No, she wasn't -- I don't think she spoke to Mr Mason.**
17 **She wasn't sure who she spoke to. It might have been**
18 **I think she said Stanley Herron or Tony McCaffrey.**
19 **I'm not sure at this --**

20 Q. But it was someone in headquarters of Belfast Welfare?

21 **A. Someone in headquarters, who assured her that they had**
22 **received a similar letter and that it was being dealt**
23 **with by Mr Mason and there was no need for her to do**
24 **anything further.**

25 Q. And she --

1 **A. And she also told me that the police were involved.**

2 Q. But you certainly knew the nature of the complaint?

3 **A. Oh, I did. Yes, yes, I did.**

4 Q. That was a complaint about Mr Mains.

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. And you then when you went -- in November '71 you were
7 saying you then went to College Street -- isn't that
8 right -- as Children's Officer?

9 **A. Yes. I was appointed with effect from 1st October, but**
10 **I wasn't able to go to College Street at that time,**
11 **because they hadn't a replacement for me, and Stanley**
12 **Herron arranged for Tony McCaffrey, the other Assistant**
13 **Children's Officer, to take charge of the district with**
14 **the proviso that if he wanted to remain in that post --**

15 Q. He could stay on.

16 **A. -- he could do so.**

17 Q. But you eventually end up in College Street in November
18 '71.

19 **A. I was at College Street permanently from 1st November**
20 **I think.**

21 Q. At that stage you were saying that you had a discussion
22 with Minn Wilson.

23 **A. Yes.**

24 Q. She briefed you on all of the homes generally.

25 **A. She did, yes.**

1 Q. But in respect of this complaint about Kincora --

2 **A. Yes.**

3 Q. -- she said that it hadn't been substantiated.

4 **A. Yes.**

5 Q. And that's -- as far as you were aware that was the end
6 of it, but she did say there was to be greater
7 supervision in the evenings.

8 **A. Yes. She told me that it hadn't been possible to**
9 **substantiate it, but that it had been decided that they**
10 **should increase the visits and supervision of the home,**
11 **and that this increase would be in relation to evening**
12 **visits when the boys were there, because -- that's the**
13 **reason why it was an increase in the evening visits.**

14 Q. If I have understood something that I saw in the bundle,
15 she was unable to travel across town, given the civil
16 unrest that there was, and Mr Mason himself carried out
17 some of those visits. Is that right?

18 **A. Yes. I wasn't -- I wasn't aware of that. She didn't**
19 **mention that to me.**

20 Q. She didn't tell you that?

21 **A. No. She said she -- she said she --**

22 Q. But that was some arrangement she came to?

23 **A. -- she was visiting more frequently in the evenings**
24 **because the boys would be there.**

25 Q. Whenever reorganisation took place and whenever Harry

1 Mason was retiring, he handed you what has been become
2 known as the Mason file.

3 **A. Yes.**

4 Q. You were saying you first thought it was two files,
5 because it was in two sections, was it, or why did you
6 think there was two files that he was handing you?

7 **A. I thought he had given me a file as well in relation to
8 the girls' hostel.**

9 Q. So you thought -- you thought it wasn't just this one
10 file he handed; there was another one?

11 **A. Yes, yes, but ...**

12 Q. Maybe if you just want to relate the circumstances of
13 him handing over the file to you and what was said.

14 **A. Yes, yes, yes. My recollection is that he gave me the
15 file on the morning of the day he was retiring. He said
16 he was clearing his desk and that he had been holding
17 this file, and the only thing in relation to the
18 conversation was he said -- he advised me to retain it
19 in case anything further came up about Kincora.**

20 Q. Well, before going on to that, in 1971 had you any
21 conversation with Mr Mason about what was done about the
22 complaint then?

23 **A. No, no.**

24 Q. Were you ever aware from '71 that there had been
25 an earlier complaint about Mr Mains in '67?

1 **A. No.**

2 Q. Any communication at all other than the handing over of
3 this file about complaints about Kincora by Harry Mason?

4 **A. No. That was it, and I think this was dealt with by**
5 **Hughes. He did not brief me on this. He did not give**
6 **me the file at that time, and I think this was allegedly**
7 **out of a sense of loyalty to his -- to the Town Clerk**
8 **and Deputy Town Clerk.**

9 Q. But you certainly as Children's Officer were not made
10 aware of these issues at that -- in 1971 or --

11 **A. No, I was not.**

12 Q. You had that file and, not to put it too thinly, you
13 stuck it in a drawer and forget about it for three years
14 until Detective Constable Cullen came talking.

15 **A. Well, if I hadn't known about the '71 complaint, it**
16 **would have been entirely different, but I knew that**
17 **Mrs Wilson knew about this and she would be taking on**
18 **the super... -- continuing the supervision of Kincora as**
19 **Principal Social Worker for Residential and Day Care,**
20 **and I was up to my eyes in preparing for reorganisation.**
21 **We needed procedures and all the rest of it in place,**
22 **and I -- it was not of any particular significance to me**
23 **at that time. It only became significant when**
24 **Mrs Wilson said she had never seen the file or known**
25 **about it.**

1 Q. No. Sorry. Just if I can take you back, that's what
2 she said to the Hughes Inquiry.

3 **A. Yes, to the Hughes Inquiry.**

4 Q. But I am talking about 1976 now.

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. I mean, you had forgotten about it. It had been stuck
7 in a drawer for three years.

8 **A. Oh, sorry. You are on to the police now?**

9 Q. And then a police officer came -- yes, yes.

10 **A. Sorry. Yes, yes.**

11 Q. Detective Constable Cullen came and mentioned to you --

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. -- and you said "Well, I know nothing about Mr McGrath,
14 but I have this file here. There's something about
15 Mr Mains".

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. That sort of prompted your memory about that file's
18 existence. So --

19 **A. Well, he asked -- he asked me if there were any
20 complaints --**

21 Q. Complaints?

22 **A. -- against Mr Mains and I think Mr Semple. I don't
23 think he knew -- I don't think he knew Mr Semple, but
24 Mr Mains and other staff.**

25 Q. And that's when your memory was jogged that you had this

1 file?

2 **A. Yes. Uh-huh.**

3 Q. Would it not have been -- when Harry Mason handed it on
4 to you, given what you were saying about not having any
5 supervisory role, as it were --

6 **A. Uh-huh.**

7 Q. -- in respect of children's services --

8 **A. Uh-huh.**

9 Q. -- would it not have been appropriate for you just
10 immediately to hand it on to the person who did have
11 that role?

12 **A. Yes, yes, it would and, as I say, I overlooked that.**
13 **You know, there's no question of that.**

14 Q. Did you read the file?

15 **A. I -- I scanned it. I did not read it in detail, again**
16 **because I knew about the '71.**

17 Q. When you scanned it, did you even come to any
18 appreciation of the fact, look, there's been another
19 complaint about this man in '67?

20 **A. Well, I'm -- I don't recollect it. I'm not -- I'm not**
21 **sure whether I did or not, because --**

22 Q. But certainly --

23 **A. -- I have to say I didn't really go into it in detail**
24 **and what have you because of the '71 complaint.**

25 Q. You had other things on your plate at the time.

1 **A. I had an awful lot on my plate I can tell you.**

2 Q. And I think you told Hughes, you know, when it was
3 handed to you, you considered it to be a closed file
4 really.

5 **A. Yes, yes, because it had been closed for two -- was it**
6 **two years -- and Mr Mason had had this file for --**
7 **since, what, '67.**

8 Q. Well, I'm going to move on to just another point, if
9 I may, Bob, one final point that I wanted to ask you
10 about, and that is that the Inquiry has seen a record of
11 a military official speaking to the press and saying
12 that absconding from Kincora was a big issue.

13 **A. Yes.**

14 Q. Were you ever aware of absconding as an issue in
15 Kincora?

16 **A. No, I wasn't, I must say. I have no recollection of**
17 **that whatever.**

18 Q. What about other --

19 **A. And if they were, I would have expected all this to be**
20 **in the monthly reports, which Mr Scoular submitted to**
21 **the Director, and I always saw those reports, because**
22 **the Director then passed them to me if there's anything**
23 **he wanted to discuss.**

24 Q. You made the point that none of the complaints that
25 Clive Scoular was aware of were ever reported in his

1 monthly report.

2 **A. As I am aware, that was the case, otherwise I would have**
3 **picked them up immediately.**

4 Q. Was Kincora -- was absconding an issue in other
5 children's homes? Were, you know, boys -- residents
6 being -- we have heard certainly in the St. Pat's
7 Training School module of this Inquiry that it certainly
8 was an issue there.

9 **A. Well, children sometimes went -- went missing from**
10 **children's homes. I don't know whether you would**
11 **categorise that as absconding or not, but because that**
12 **it had escalated a bit in 1977 and -- because of that**
13 **I was concerned that even though they were only gone for**
14 **short periods usually and the police picked them up**
15 **fairly quickly, I was concerned that they were at risk**
16 **when they were out on their own, and I drafted I think**
17 **the first procedures in Northern Ireland to deal with**
18 **that, and it's included in my first statement I think.**
19 **That was effective from 1st -- 1st ... I'm sorry. I am**
20 **not sure again.**

21 Q. It is attached to the statement. We can check that.

22 **A. But it was from '7... -- I think it was maybe 1st**
23 **January '78.**

24 Q. We can certainly check that in any event, but --

25 **A. Yes. You have it on my statements.**

1 Q. On that -- on your statement from 2014.

2 Well, look, Bob, that's all that I wanted to ask you
3 about, but is there anything else that you feel you want
4 to assist the Inquiry with with regard to Kincora and
5 its operation? I will just give you the opportunity to
6 do so before I hand you over to the Panel.

7 **A. Well, I think the Panel already are aware that I did not**
8 **accept the views expressed by the Hughes Inquiry and**
9 **that I was allowed by the Board to put my response in**
10 **writing.**

11 Q. Thank you very much.

12 Questions from THE PANEL

13 CHAIRMAN: I wonder can I ask you a number of general
14 questions, Mr Bunting, about the structures of the
15 authorities that were responsible for child care during
16 your time? You start your career with what I might call
17 the old Belfast Welfare Authority.

18 **A. Yes, that's right.**

19 Q. Now Local Government has changed beyond recognition in
20 the nearly fifty years since then.

21 **A. Yes, yes.**

22 Q. But if we cast our minds back to the position in the
23 late 1960s, Belfast was a self-contained County Borough
24 Corporation.

25 **A. Yes.**

1 Q. Isn't that right?

2 **A. That's right.**

3 Q. And it was responsible for what was by far and away the
4 largest centre of population in Northern Ireland?

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. Now we must appreciate that before reorganisation the
7 big outlying suburban housing estates like Rathcoole,
8 Dundonald and so on, they were outside Belfast. Isn't
9 that right?

10 **A. That's right.**

11 Q. But Belfast Corporation was responsible for schools?

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. So for education?

14 **A. Yes.**

15 Q. For Social Services in your case, housing?

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. I think electricity?

18 **A. Yes.**

19 Q. Gas?

20 **A. Yes.**

21 Q. Buses?

22 **A. Absolutely.**

23 Q. So there was a huge local authority structure --

24 **A. Uh-huh.**

25 Q. -- that comprised Belfast Corporation covering a whole

1 range of areas. Isn't that right?

2 **A. That's right.**

3 Q. So in many respects it was almost -- I hesitate to use
4 the word "state" -- but it was a major -- it was by far
5 and away the biggest centre of population in Northern
6 Ireland and outranked all the other ones in terms of
7 size, responsibilities for numbers and that sort of
8 thing.

9 **A. Yes.**

10 Q. Now if we then look at the position as far as Belfast
11 Welfare Authority was concerned, you made the point in
12 your statement, if we just look at 198, please, that
13 both when it was Belfast Welfare Association --
14 Authority and later --

15 **A. Sorry. I haven't got it.**

16 Q. It is just the point you are going to make if you look
17 at paragraph 7 and paragraph 8. Now we have to remember
18 that the Belfast Welfare Authority as part of Belfast
19 Corporation was part of a body that drew much of its
20 income from the rates. Isn't that right?

21 **A. That's right. I think in relation to the child care
22 services 50% from the -- was the contribution from the
23 Welfare Authority towards the services.**

24 Q. Yes. So would it be a fair comment to say -- indeed
25 I think you have made this point -- that the interests

1 of the ratepayers --

2 **A. Yes.**

3 Q. -- were something that were not merely in but often at
4 the foremost in the minds of the members of the
5 corporation?

6 **A. Yes. I am pretty certain about that.**

7 Q. So it certainly was not the case I presume that you had
8 a free hand to spend without regard to the purse?

9 **A. Absolutely not, and I think the attitudes towards family**
10 **-- families who were running into difficulties and**
11 **weren't able to care properly for their children was**
12 **that the ratepayers should not be asked really to pay**
13 **for their inadequacies.**

14 Q. Yes.

15 **A. They regarded these parents as, you know, feckless and**
16 **-- generally and --**

17 Q. So --

18 **A. -- not carrying out their responsibilities in relation**
19 **to their children properly.**

20 Q. So does that mean that when it came to overall funding,
21 there was a tension between the appreciation of those at
22 the sharp end in the Welfare Authority of the needs for
23 child care --

24 **A. Yes.**

25 Q. -- and the view that perhaps too much money was being

1 spent on them anyway?

2 **A. Yes. That -- I think that is correct.**

3 Q. And then when one looked at that point of view in rather
4 sharper focus in relation to the child care in the homes
5 which the Welfare Authority did provide, was there
6 a concern -- I think you pointed this out in
7 paragraph 7, if we look on the page -- that they were
8 pointing out that at least in their view, rightly or
9 wrongly, the material standards in the home --

10 **A. Oh, yes. Uh-huh.**

11 Q. -- were better than the children --

12 **A. Uh-huh.**

13 Q. -- would have in their natural home?

14 **A. Yes, and, in fact, that is included in my first
15 statement --**

16 Q. Yes.

17 **A. -- in relation to the De La Salle home, boys' home.**

18 Q. Would it be fair to say that your perception was that
19 the standards in the homes were often deplorably low and
20 what you were trying to do was to provide not
21 a luxurious service but an adequate service for
22 children?

23 **A. Yes, that was a -- that would certainly have been my
24 view, that although they might have -- they would
25 certainly maybe have been a bit better later on, you**

1 **know, but not in welfare -- welfare days.**

2 Q. Yes. Now did that, if I may put it perhaps rather
3 pointedly but perhaps I hope justly, rather parsimonious
4 view on the part of those who had the ultimate public
5 and political responsibility --

6 **A. Yes.**

7 Q. -- carry through in any way to the new Eastern Board
8 structure?

9 **A. Well, I think the situation changed considerably**
10 **financially in the 1970s. We were under Direct Rule and**
11 **the Labour Government had a more generous attitude**
12 **towards social care, and, in fact, we also benefitted**
13 **from the area -- areas of special need initiative, the**
14 **initiative in relation to the family and childcare**
15 **services, because that initiative was related to areas**
16 **of special need in Belfast, and quite a lot of children**
17 **from those areas were in residential care. So we were**
18 **able to use quite a bit of money there in terms of the**
19 **development. So I think you could say that the '70s**
20 **were exceptional in relation to the funding of the**
21 **family and child care services --**

22 Q. Yes.

23 **A. -- and it didn't continue after the Conservative**
24 **Government came to -- came to power.**

25 Q. Then if we look at the way the structures changed, the

1 McCrory reforms in the 1970s removed from Local
2 Government and therefore from Belfast Corporation, which
3 ceased to exist in any event, a huge range of
4 responsibilities. Isn't that right?

5 **A. Yes, that's right.**

6 Q. But as far as health, and more specifically childcare
7 services were concerned, in effect the Eastern Board, as
8 you have pointed out, covered by far the largest number
9 of the population of Northern Ireland, which in any
10 event is concentrated in the Greater Belfast area.

11 **A. Yes.**

12 Q. You had North Down?

13 **A. Yes.**

14 Q. Newtownards?

15 **A. Yes.**

16 Q. Downpatrick?

17 **A. Uh-huh.**

18 Q. So the whole of the north of the County Down --

19 **A. Yes. Uh-huh.**

20 Q. -- and the big overspill estates that had been built --

21 **A. Yes.**

22 Q. -- in the '50s and '60s --

23 **A. Yes.**

24 Q. -- were now all inside one health authority?

25 **A. Yes, they were, and, in fact, there were overspill**

1 **estates on the outskirts of Downpatrick.**

2 Q. Yes. The Flying Horse.

3 **A. Flying Horse, Model Farm.**

4 Q. Yes.

5 **A. Two very large estates.**

6 Q. Then moving round clockwise, as it were, you have
7 already told us that you took in Lisburn as well.

8 **A. That's right, and there were new estates there --**

9 Q. Yes.

10 **A. -- and again high levels of deprivation and what have
11 you.**

12 Q. Then round North Belfast did you take in Rathcoole and
13 Newtownabbey?

14 **A. No. That reverted to County -- that was County
15 Antrim --**

16 Q. That would be the Northern Board?

17 **A. It was the Northern Board, yes, and, in fact, in
18 relation to that we lost two homes to the Northern
19 Board, a family group home and Bawnmore.**

20 Q. Yes. So Bawnmore, having been a Belfast --

21 **A. Yes.**

22 Q. -- home, moved into a different authority?

23 **A. Yes. It was now within the Northern Health & Social
24 Services Board --**

25 Q. Yes.

1 **A.** -- and at that stage we had plans in place to replace
2 Bawnmore with a purpose-built home. It wasn't going to
3 be a small group home. It was already in the pipeline
4 before I reorganised the -- into a small group system,
5 and it didn't go ahead because of this reorganisation.

6 **Q.** Yes.

7 **A.** But the plan had been approved by the Ministry of Home
8 Affairs.

9 **Q.** So again looking at the overall structure, as you have
10 pointed out, centred in Belfast was now an authority
11 that had responsibilities for estates as far away as the
12 outskirts of Downpatrick?

13 **A.** That's right.

14 **Q.** The outskirts of Lisburn?

15 **A.** Yes.

16 **Q.** North Down, Bangor, all that area?

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** Now when we focus in on Kincora, it is in a newly
19 expanded area, which is not just the eastern part of the
20 old city of Belfast --

21 **A.** Yes.

22 **Q.** -- but it takes in Castlereagh, which, whilst even today
23 notionally a separate local authority --

24 **A.** Uh-huh.

25 **Q.** -- is part of the Greater Belfast sprawl, to use that

1 expression.

2 **A. It is. Uh-huh.**

3 Q. Now the East Belfast & Castlereagh District was the
4 district that had day-to-day responsibility for Kincora
5 within its geographical area. Is that right?

6 **A. That's right.**

7 Q. But, as we understand it, the management of Kincora was
8 responsible to officers who were based in Purdysburn
9 Hospital grounds eventually. Is that right?

10 **A. The Director of Social Services, Mr Scoular, was based
11 at the District Headquarters at Purdysburn --**

12 Q. Now --

13 **A. -- and also the principal social workers.**

14 Q. So what one might call the district management of the
15 Board?

16 **A. Yes. The whole district management team was at
17 headquarters at Purdysburn.**

18 Q. Which, as we know, and a lot of this may seem obvious to
19 those who know this area, but that is some considerable
20 distance out of the centre of Belfast, isn't it?

21 **A. Oh, yes, it is.**

22 Q. So there was a degree of geographical remoteness --

23 **A. Yes.**

24 Q. -- between Mr Mains as the warden in charge and those
25 who were responsible in later years who were based in

1 Purdysburn?

2 **A. Yes.**

3 Q. And they in turn are geographically remote to
4 a considerable degree from the Board Headquarters, which
5 ultimately was in Linenhall Street?

6 **A. Yes. Uh-huh.**

7 Q. And in the '70s was it in University Street?

8 **A. It was in University Street, yes, I think until the**
9 **'80s.**

10 Q. So if people talk about headquarters --

11 **A. Yes.**

12 Q. -- they are talking about University Street?

13 **A. Yes, at that time, the '70s.**

14 Q. That's all very helpful to have that confirmed.

15 If I can now turn specifically to Kincora and the
16 nature of the allegations, as I understand it, and
17 I stand to be corrected, but after the 1967 complaints
18 were there additional elements of supervision put into
19 the oversight of Kincora in the shape of first
20 Mrs Wilson and then yourself coming as Children's
21 Officer to visit more regularly?

22 **A. Yes. My predecessor, Mr Moore, would have been the**
23 **Children's Officer --**

24 Q. Oh, sorry. Mr Moore now, yes.

25 **A. -- at that time, and I think at the time of the**

1 complaints, although they were late in the year,
2 Mrs Wilson was -- was not there. She was appointed with
3 effect I think from 1st January 1968.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. She was -- she had gone off -- she was -- originally she
6 was the homes officer in the early '60s. She then went
7 off for professional training and returned, and was
8 a senior child care officer in South Belfast and then
9 subsequently North & West Belfast, and she remained in
10 North & West Belfast until she was appointed to the
11 Assistant Children's Officer post in 1968.

12 Q. Well, we have to bear in mind that in 1969, 1970, 1971
13 there were enormous problems for Childcare, as with many
14 other --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- agencies, because of the turmoil --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- that was taking place.

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. Mass movements of population.

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. People leaving, whole streets being burnt out and so on.

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. And I'm sure in many respects this impinged on the
25 Social Services and Childcare Department with particular

1 severity.

2 **A. It certainly did, yes. I had first-hand experience of**
3 **it as I was running the relief services for West**
4 **Belfast.**

5 Q. So a small number of people were having to cope with an
6 enormously more demanding and much more complex --

7 **A. Uh-huh.**

8 Q. -- demand. Is that right?

9 **A. Yes. Uh-huh, but it left us in a position really that**
10 **we still had to continue -- in terms of the child care**
11 **services we still had to continue to run those services,**
12 **but at the same time we had to manage and deliver the**
13 **relief services, and the Ministry of Home Affairs at the**
14 **time I think didn't seem to recognise or realise that,**
15 **you know, this is very difficult to do, because we were**
16 **still expected to get our quarterly returns in and to do**
17 **all our visits and everything, you know, as if, you**
18 **know, nothing had changed.**

19 Q. Yes. Then we come to the 1971 letter.

20 **A. Yes.**

21 Q. As I understand what you have been telling us today, you
22 were in the Townsend Street office at that -- that's
23 where you were based at that time?

24 **A. Yes. I was Divisional Welfare Officer for West Belfast**
25 **from March 1969.**

1 Q. Yes.

2 **A. So I was there at the height of The Troubles.**

3 Q. So you saw the letter but not the envelope in which it
4 came?

5 **A. I didn't -- I didn't see an envelope. Ms Nichol brought**
6 **me the letter. In fact, it was Mrs Robinson who came to**
7 **me first. I was back a few days from my holidays.**
8 **I had been away for a fortnight's holiday.**

9 Q. I am more concerned about the content of the -- of the
10 letter.

11 **A. Of the letter, yes. Okay.**

12 Q. How -- how much did you understand about the nature of
13 the allegations at that point?

14 **A. I certainly understood.**

15 Q. Yes.

16 **A. It was very concerning.**

17 Q. Then the matter was referred to or taken on by
18 headquarters?

19 **A. Yes, it was, because they had received a duplicate**
20 **letter.**

21 Q. Exactly.

22 **A. Exact copy.**

23 Q. And after that point what was your understanding of what
24 subsequently happened? Was this something you just
25 heard about on the grapevine --

1 **A. Yes, yes.**

2 Q. -- or was there a formal instruction to people as to how
3 --

4 **A. There was no -- there was no actual feedback from
5 Mr Mason to us in West Belfast.**

6 Q. Yes. So does that mean, if I may put it this way, you
7 knew there was a problem. The problem had been
8 investigated. The outcome was that it wasn't being
9 taken to the police --

10 **A. Uh-huh.**

11 Q. -- but other than that and what you may have picked up
12 on the grapevine --

13 **A. Uh-huh.**

14 Q. -- you didn't know the details of --

15 **A. No.**

16 Q. -- the nature of the investigation?

17 **A. No, I didn't. I knew that Mr McCaffrey was involved in
18 it, and I asked about that, because it should have been
19 Mrs Wilson, and I think Mrs Wilson was on holiday, and
20 that was the information I had, and that is why she
21 wasn't involved in the investigation of the 1971
22 complaint.**

23 Q. But after the decision was arrived at by the Town Clerk
24 and the Town Solicitor --

25 **A. Yes.**

1 Q. -- and Mr Mason learnt, however he learnt about it --

2 **A. Yes.**

3 Q. -- that the matter was not to be referred to the police

4 --

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. -- may we take it that as far as you were concerned --

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. -- there were no procedures that you were aware of that

9 were put in place --

10 **A. No, no.**

11 Q. -- to enable any further complaints to be centrally

12 referred and -- in other words, so that any further

13 complaints would be properly assessed, because they were

14 all drawn to the same place? You were not aware of any

15 procedures for that?

16 **A. No. There wasn't anything I think in relation to that**

17 **or we would have been informed about it. The problem**

18 **I think was that while Mr Mason did an investigation**

19 **along with the Deputy Town Clerk, who I think the -- and**

20 **Mr McCaffrey, he did not record the outcome.**

21 Q. Yes. I am not -- we are aware of that.

22 **A. And I think that was a problem.**

23 Q. Yes.

24 **A. We didn't know -- and that would tie in with the fact**

25 **that nothing was --**

1 Q. Yes.

2 **A. -- was disseminated to us.**

3 Q. So the next stage, as it were, when Kincora appears
4 again in your consciousness --

5 **A. Yes.**

6 Q. -- is on the day that Mr Mason is retiring.

7 **A. Yes.**

8 Q. He is leaving and the new structure of the Eastern Board
9 is coming into existence.

10 **A. Yes.**

11 Q. And I gather from what you say that leading up to that
12 day there must have been an awful lot of work going on
13 to --

14 **A. Yes.**

15 Q. -- plan the new structures and so on.

16 **A. That's right. I had been appointed Assistant Director**
17 **Family and Childcare, and the principal officers had**
18 **been appointed for the districts, etc, and I had a team**
19 **of myself and the Principal Officers Fieldwork Services,**
20 **and we had to get all the policy and procedures in place**
21 **before the 1st October 1973, and we were working flat**
22 **out on that. So I think that was the situation at that**
23 **time.**

24 Q. So then Mr Mason hands you at least one file. You have
25 referred to thinking there was another one on the girls'

1 homes --

2 **A. Yes.**

3 Q. -- but we are not concerned with that at the moment. As
4 I understand it, am I right in thinking that this was
5 a matter that was no longer current from your point of
6 view?

7 **A. That's right.**

8 Q. A dead file?

9 **A. Yes, yes.**

10 Q. Now you put it in a drawer.

11 **A. Yes.**

12 Q. Between then and when Detective Constable Cullen comes
13 --

14 **A. Yes.**

15 Q. -- to University Street I take it --

16 **A. Yes, yes.**

17 Q. -- in 19... -- early in 1976 --

18 **A. Yes, February 1970 (sic).**

19 Q. -- had anybody to your knowledge ever mentioned to you
20 -- and by anybody I mean anybody in the professional
21 group of people that you were working with day by day --

22 **A. Uh-huh. Yes.**

23 Q. -- ever mention to you again --

24 **A. Yes.**

25 Q. -- about that file?

1 **A. No.**

2 Q. Have you ever heard any talk about it?

3 **A. No.**

4 Q. Then we understand that Detective Constable Cullen comes
5 to speak to you and so on.

6 **A. Uh-huh.**

7 Q. That has been explored in Hughes and I am not asking you
8 about that --

9 **A. Uh-huh.**

10 Q. -- not in general at least, but one thing you said a few
11 moments ago was that, if I may paraphrase it, although
12 Mrs Wilson told the Hughes Inquiry that Mr Mason had not
13 told her about the file --

14 **A. Uh-huh.**

15 Q. -- and she first learnt of it --

16 **A. Uh-huh.**

17 Q. -- in 1980 --

18 **A. Uh-huh.**

19 Q. -- your recollection is that she did know about it?

20 **A. Yes, most definitely.**

21 Q. Can you think of anybody else other than yourself and
22 herself who might have known about it in 1971 who was
23 still active in the Belfast area right through to 1974?

24 **A. I don't. I can't -- I don't think there were.**

25 Q. The final question I want to ask you, Mr Bunting, stems

1 from that, because an assertion has been made by
2 a gentleman called Colin Wallace --

3 **A. Uh-huh.**

4 Q. -- that a social worker, a female social worker, who he
5 doesn't name, and who the Inquiry have not been able to
6 find out from him --

7 **A. Uh-huh.**

8 Q. -- who it might be --

9 **A. Yes.**

10 Q. -- spoke to him certainly prior to November 1974 --

11 **A. Uh-huh.**

12 Q. -- about her concerns about what was happening in
13 Kincora.

14 **A. Right.**

15 Q. Can you think of anyone who might answer that
16 description?

17 **A. I can't. No, I can't, Chairman.**

18 Q. But if I understand what you are saying --

19 **A. The timescale again. '74? '74?**

20 Q. Some time over between '72 and November '74.

21 **A. Yes.**

22 Q. Do you ever recall any discussion inside -- by that
23 I mean informal discussion -- someone saying, "Well, do
24 you remember that Mason file of a few years ago"?

25 **A. No, absolutely not.**

1 Q. And had you any hint whatever until Constable Cullen
2 came to you in '76 that there were these abuses taking
3 place?

4 **A. Absolutely not.**

5 Q. We have heard that there were -- I shouldn't have said
6 the last question -- we have heard that there were
7 a number of people who were employed in different
8 capacities in the Eastern board who heard rumours and so
9 on.

10 **A. Yes.**

11 Q. As you will recall from Hughes --

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. -- it became apparent that although some were passed up
14 the line a little bit, no action was taken and matters
15 of that sort.

16 **A. Yes, yes.**

17 Q. But is it fair to observe that at least a contributing
18 -- contributory factor to that problem was the absence
19 of any form of procedure put in place by Mr Mason after
20 1971 to ensure that any further --

21 **A. Yes.**

22 Q. -- queries, complaints, concerns about --

23 **A. Uh-huh.**

24 Q. -- the way Mr Mains was behaving or any other member of
25 staff --

1 **A. Yes.**

2 Q. -- came right to the top?

3 **A. Yes, I think that's right. I think that's right.**

4 Q. Yes. Thank you very much. I think my colleagues have
5 rather more specialised questions to ask you --

6 **A. Uh-huh.**

7 Q. -- but thank you.

8 MS DOHERTY: Thanks very much. That's been really helpful.

9 Can I just ask about Mrs Wilson's contact with
10 Mr Mains? Would that have been formal supervision, Bob,
11 as we would know it?

12 **A. Yes, it would have been, because she was responsible for
13 the management of all the homes.**

14 Q. So she would have sat down -- when she went to visit him
15 on a weekly basis --

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. -- she would have made sure she saw him --

18 **A. Yes.**

19 Q. -- and talked to him about ...?

20 **A. Absolutely.**

21 Q. When she came back and talked to you, did she ever give
22 you any indication, I mean, not about necessarily
23 Mr Mains, but about any concerns about the home and ...?

24 **A. She -- she never expressed any concerns about the home
25 or Mr Mains.**

1 Q. Okay, and was she involved in the recruitment of staff?

2 **A. Yes, she was.**

3 Q. So she would have been involved probably when Mr McGrath
4 was appointment?

5 **A. She was involved, because Mr Moore had left the Belfast
6 Welfare Department to take up a post of Deputy with
7 Co. Down before Mr McGrath was appointed. So it would
8 have been Mrs Wilson who was involved in appointing him.**

9 Q. And would -- as the senior person there, whether it's
10 Mr Moore or Mrs Wilson, would they have the carrying
11 vote in relation to recruitment? You know, if you were
12 recruiting and five or six people came forward for
13 interview --

14 **A. Yes.**

15 Q. -- would they have the final say in relation to who was
16 appointed?

17 **A. The people who did the interview?**

18 Q. Yes, but Mrs Wilson or Mr Moore in particular --

19 **A. Yes. Oh, yes.**

20 Q. -- the senior management?

21 **A. Yes, yes. I think it would have to have been approved
22 by Mr Mason. It wouldn't just, you know ...**

23 Q. So what would happen is that you've got a number of
24 people interviewing?

25 **A. Yes.**

1 Q. You have got a senior manager there on the interviewing
2 panel?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. But the final recommendation would go to Mr Mason?

5 A. It would, and I think prior to that he would have been
6 actually on the panel.

7 Q. So when you say "prior to that", what do you ...?

8 A. Now I'm not sure of the exact timescale I am talking
9 about here, but I seem to recollect that Mr Moore
10 probably made some appointments, you know, in relation
11 to other homes or whatever, and he wasn't involved, but
12 prior to that happening I can't -- I can't give you
13 a timescale on it.

14 You see, in Belfast Welfare Department in the '60s
15 the appointments had to be approved by the Welfare
16 Committee. When I was appointed as a social welfare
17 officer, I had to appear before the Welfare Committee,
18 and Mr Mason and others had interviewed me, first of
19 all. In fact, it was a deputy who interviewed me for
20 the social welfare officer post, and then Mr Mason
21 brought that to the Welfare Committee for approval.
22 That changed I think prior to the '70s, but it was going
23 on fairly well in the 1960s, probably 1967, '68.

24 Q. So at that stage it would actually have gone the whole
25 way up?

1 **A. It might have gone -- it might have gone -- that might**
2 **have gone to the -- or it would be very close.**

3 **I couldn't be absolutely sure about it.**

4 Q. But presumably as the staff group got bigger, that it
5 stopped.

6 **A. Yes.**

7 Q. That was actually -- would have been taken at a lower
8 level, those types of decisions?

9 **A. Yes. Oh, yes. Well, when we -- when we reorganised,**
10 **all that changed. It was left entirely to the staff.**

11 Q. Delegated to the staff?

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. Okay. I mean, I think you deal very well -- and Mr Lane
14 is going to talk to you about the Castle Priory --

15 **A. Yes.**

16 Q. -- but, I mean, you deal well with explaining the
17 situation --

18 **A. Yes.**

19 Q. -- of why it was difficult to get staff.

20 **A. Yes.**

21 Q. But equally at the time where you had Mr Mains working
22 by himself --

23 **A. Yes, yes.**

24 Q. -- for that length of time --

25 **A. Yes.**

1 Q. -- was there not an issue to say: is this hostel
2 sustainable? Is it possible to keep this service up?

3 **A. Absolutely. I would have thought so. I wasn't aware of**
4 **it, but that would be my opinion as well. I mean, it**
5 **seems, you know ... It also, don't forget, left him**
6 **very vulnerable indeed --**

7 Q. Absolutely.

8 **A. -- you know. There's a safety in having, you know, at**
9 **least two staff on duty --**

10 Q. Uh-huh.

11 **A. -- you know.**

12 Q. That's absolutely right. There's a monitoring.

13 **A. Because -- because it's his word against the -- whoever**
14 **is alleging that he abused them.**

15 Q. Yes, and, I mean, again accepting what you say about
16 younger children coming in sometimes, an emergency
17 coming in with older siblings --

18 **A. Yes. Uh-huh.**

19 Q. -- but what we are looking at there, Bob, is quite --
20 something -- a practice that needs quite skilled and --

21 **A. Yes.**

22 Q. -- people to deal with young children coming in in
23 emergencies --

24 **A. Yes.**

25 Q. -- older adolescents around.

1 **A. Yes.**

2 Q. You are really not talking about a holding position
3 there.

4 **A. No, no, you're not.**

5 Q. You would actually need well staffed and well skilled.

6 **A. Yes, yes, yes, and I think I said in my statement that**
7 **this was the core problem for us throughout the whole of**
8 **the timescale of this Inquiry, and thankfully because we**
9 **were able to professionalise the service, we ended up**
10 **with the best care standards in the UK.**

11 Q. No, you absolutely did. You can see where the Eastern
12 Board, you know, led some of the developments and --

13 **A. Well, we led -- we led all the developments I think.**

14 Q. But prior to that at the time we have got Mr Mains
15 working by himself and we have got emergency placements
16 and whatever --

17 **A. Yes, yes, yes.**

18 Q. -- within the management structure in the Board --

19 **A. Yes.**

20 Q. -- were there discussions going on? Was there
21 an overview that said --

22 **A. Yes.**

23 Q. -- "Let's look at how the homes are being used. What's
24 happening in Kincora?" Do you know, was there a ...?

25 **A. Well, there should have been. I -- Mr Moore was on**

1 holiday and he might have been here instead of me,
2 because I had only two years. Now I spoke to him
3 probably nearly a week ago and he said that it was
4 appalling, you know, the situation that they were in.
5 They could not get anybody. Even if you had the posts,
6 you couldn't get anyone to fill them, and I think I've
7 referred to that in my statement as well. Even though
8 you had an establishment of seven or whatever, there's
9 no guarantee that you would fill those posts, because --
10 I think Belfast as well, and particularly after the
11 Troubles it was even worse, because not too many people,
12 if they had a choice of going to County Antrim or, you
13 know, somewhere else, they weren't -- and be paid the
14 same salary, they weren't going to come into Belfast.
15 This was one of our problems as well.

16 Q. But within that context, I mean, just going back to the
17 situation of Mr Mains being there for that length of
18 time by himself --

19 **A. Yes.**

20 Q. -- there would have been a higher level responsibility
21 to say, "Just a second".

22 **A. Yes.**

23 Q. "Is this safe?"

24 **A. Yes, absolutely.**

25 Q. Your own words: "Is this safe?" and that didn't happen?

1 **A. Well, it wasn't -- it wasn't safe. It couldn't be safe**
2 **with just one person there.**

3 Q. Okay. Thank you. One of the things I noticed was --
4 and you may not be able to comment on this -- but there
5 was a SWAG inspection in 1979.

6 **A. Yes.**

7 Q. And interestingly one of the comments they made at that
8 time was that because the home was actually meeting all
9 of the children's needs in terms of cooking for them and
10 laundry and whatever --

11 **A. Yes, yes.**

12 Q. -- that it was actually creating dependence. Rather
13 than preparing young people for independence --

14 **A. Yes.**

15 Q. -- it was creating a dependency.

16 **A. Yes, yes.**

17 Q. Do you -- and there was a suggestion --

18 **A. Well, you see -- you see, that would have been a change,**
19 **as I said earlier, from what was envisaged when this**
20 **hostel was established, because they were to take part**
21 **in making their own meals and, you know, chores about**
22 **the hostel and cleaning and all the rest of it. So**
23 **I don't know why that transpired, you know.**

24 Q. Because it seems to be that at the start it was nearly
25 like lodgings.

1 **A. Yes.**

2 Q. I mean --

3 **A. It was.**

4 Q. -- there was a kind of a --

5 **A. It had become more like lodgings.**

6 Q. Uh-huh. There was a newspaper --

7 **A. From a youth hostel it had become more like lodgings.**

8 Q. Lodgings, yes. I mean -- and that seems to be a bit
9 about what the remit was.

10 **A. Uh-huh.**

11 Q. There seems to be some confusion.

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. Because at the start when it is in the newspaper, it
14 really suggests it's nearly about creating a service for
15 young men coming into Belfast to work --

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. -- and giving them somewhere safe.

18 **A. Absolutely.**

19 Q. And then we find it a mixture of children, different
20 ages.

21 **A. Uh-huh. Yes, yes, yes. No. I agree entirely with you,
22 you know, and as I say -- all I can say is one of the
23 big issues was it was not monitored properly.**

24 Q. Yes (inaudible).

25 **A. All of this will be picked up, though I think, as I have**

1 **already said, this should all have been -- we should**
2 **have been made aware of all of this at headquarters.**

3 Q. ...quarters, yes, and, I mean, it is interesting, the
4 whole issue about monitoring, because you could say
5 Mrs Wilson visiting weekly --

6 **A. Yes.**

7 Q. -- was a high level of monitoring.

8 **A. It really was.**

9 Q. And I don't make -- I don't mean that to make any views
10 about the quality of what she did --

11 **A. Uh-huh.**

12 Q. -- but it was.

13 **A. Yes.**

14 Q. There was an investment in monitoring, but it actually
15 wasn't raising some of those more general issues about
16 the remit or ...

17 **A. No, it wasn't, and if they were happening at that time,**
18 **she was not picking up on them, because she never**
19 **expressed any concerns about it to me. So, you know ...**

20 Q. I just want to go back to two things about Detective
21 Constable Cullen just to confirm, you know, for the
22 record.

23 **A. Yes.**

24 Q. Clearly one of the things he asked you after he got the
25 Mason file --

1 **A. Yes, yes.**

2 Q. -- was for the names of the children that were -- had
3 been resident.

4 **A. That's right.**

5 Q. And was your assumption from that that there was going
6 to be a wider investigation?

7 **A. No. I think the reason he wanted those names was to see
8 if Mr McGrath had made contact with them --**

9 Q. But you --

10 **A. -- and that they might be involved in paramilitary
11 activities.**

12 Q. Oh, I see. So you think it was more about the
13 paramilitary ...?

14 **A. Oh, most definitely. That's my perception of it.
15 I think the Hughes Inquiry came round to that view as
16 well.**

17 Q. So that it was less about the protection of the children
18 or if there had been any other children abused?

19 **A. Absolutely.**

20 Q. It was more about whether connections ...?

21 **A. And why would -- why would an Assistant Chief Constable,
22 who is responsible for investigation of crime throughout
23 the whole of Northern Ireland, be involved? It would
24 have been dealt with at a much lower level than that.**

25 Q. Okay. Okay. That's great. Thank you very much.

1 MR LANE: Thank you. To tie up one or two loose ends, first
2 of all, the two ladies who were on the staff were
3 clearly a cook and a domestic person.

4 **A. Yes, that's right.**

5 Q. Did -- just to be absolutely clear, did they have any
6 caring roles at all or was it purely the practical?

7 **A. Purely practical.**

8 Q. Because we have heard that one of them was asked to get
9 boys up at one stage.

10 **A. Right. That certainly was not her role.**

11 Q. Right. So again they wouldn't have been included in the
12 calculations about the Castle Priory ...?

13 **A. No, I have not included them in that.**

14 Q. Now you said that Castle Priory was applied, but
15 actually you ended up with only three staff in the home.

16 **A. Yes. It was the -- it was the '69 I think that that --**

17 Q. It was published then.

18 **A. -- establishment related to and it was revised in 1972.**

19 Q. Uh-huh.

20 **A. So I think the '72 would have been higher, as they are,
21 as you just -- as you have outlined to me.**

22 Q. Well, three staff isn't actually sufficient to keep one
23 on duty throughout the whole day. If you take account
24 of handovers and holidays and training and all sorts of
25 other things --

1 **A. Yes.**

2 Q. -- it's quite short of that.

3 **A. Yes. Sorry.**

4 Q. Would that have been true in all the other hostels run
5 by Belfast?

6 **A. It would have been the case I would think in the girls'
7 hostel.**

8 Q. Uh-huh.

9 **A. Those are the only two hostels that we had.**

10 Q. I thought there were another two as well that I've seen
11 listed.

12 **A. No, not in Welfare days, no.**

13 Q. Right. Not in Welfare days. Okay. In terms of the --
14 sorry. Let me just check. Yes. In terms of the
15 expenditure on these things --

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. -- as I understand it, when a new establishment was
18 opened --

19 **A. Yes.**

20 Q. -- the revenue consequence of that got added to the
21 budget --

22 **A. Yes.**

23 Q. -- of the Board.

24 **A. Yes.**

25 Q. In which case if you had a bigger building programme in

1 the East, shall we say, than the other Boards --

2 **A. Yes.**

3 Q. -- did you then have greater increases in consequence?

4 **A. Yes, we would have had. You see, because of the**
5 **substantial increase in the number of children coming**
6 **into care, although we had -- in Belfast Welfare I had**
7 **developed quite a number of homes, and three or four of**
8 **them had become operational shortly after reorganisation**
9 **into maybe '74, this increase after reorganisation,**
10 **a very substantial increase, meant that we had to**
11 **develop further homes quickly, as quickly as possible --**

12 Q. Uh-huh.

13 **A. -- as we were not even at that stage then, because of**
14 **this huge increase --**

15 Q. Yes.

16 **A. -- up to their norms. So they funded all of the new**
17 **development to get up to their planning norms.**

18 Q. And were they mainly the small group homes that you're
19 --

20 **A. Yes, they were, because that was my system.**

21 Q. You also had Palmerston as well.

22 **A. We had Palmerston Assessment -- that was a residential**
23 **assessment centre --**

24 Q. Yes.

25 **A. -- with a multi-disciplinary team to decide what was the**

1 **most appropriate form of care. I mean, they might have**
2 **gone to foster care from there or whatever.**

3 Q. Yes, and that was used for reception and emergency as
4 well?

5 **A. It was only for children coming into care long stay.**

6 Q. Ah, right.

7 **A. What happened was because of the substantial increase,**
8 **it got blocked --**

9 Q. Yes.

10 **A. -- and also the short-term admission unit, short stay,**
11 **which would be -- the maximum would be six months --**

12 Q. Uh-huh.

13 **A. -- that they would remain in care, it got blocked as**
14 **well. We were putting extra beds up in the**
15 **short-term -- short stay unit, you know, to deal with**
16 **it.**

17 Q. Is that perhaps one of the reasons why Kincora had to
18 take in --

19 **A. Yes.**

20 Q. -- children who were actually unsuited to it?

21 **A. Absolutely. That was the only reason, the only reason.**

22 Q. The impression I get is that in some ways you thought
23 the home was quite reasonably run. I mean, you didn't
24 get complaints coming through --

25 **A. No.**

1 Q. -- from Mrs Wilson?

2 **A. No, none whatever.**

3 Q. If there had not been the actual allegations, it would
4 have carried on?

5 **A. It would. Yes, it would, but it wouldn't have carried
6 on because of my decision to have a hostel for more
7 troubled adolescents --**

8 Q. Right.

9 **A. -- and to be a mixed hostel, boys and girls.**

10 Q. Yes, and you would have changed the staffing
11 arrangements and everything about that?

12 **A. Yes. If I had been able to implement it -- the
13 development plan was that --**

14 Q. Yes.

15 **A. -- and it was planned that that would happen to the two
16 hostels in 1974. If I had been able to implement that
17 --**

18 Q. Right.

19 **A. -- that would have been it.**

20 Q. Right. Was Kincora subject to the Children's Homes
21 Regulations (inaudible)?

22 **A. Oh, yes, it was.**

23 Q. Because we also heard that some -- some of the residents
24 complained of having corporal punishment and being
25 beaten and so on.

1 **A. Well --**

2 Q. Would that have been the sort of thing that would have
3 been acceptable at that time?

4 **A. No, it wouldn't at all, because I think, as I said the**
5 **first time I was giving oral evidence, is that we were**
6 **totally opposed to corporal punishment and I had tried**
7 **to get it removed from the -- the --**

8 Q. Regulations?

9 **A. -- regulations, and the explanation given was that it**
10 **was in accord with societal norms, although they had**
11 **every sympathy for my views, and they didn't therefore**
12 **remove it, but it was -- you didn't have to use it.**

13 Q. Yes.

14 **A. So we didn't use it, and I had met with the -- again it**
15 **is in my first statement -- that I had met with the**
16 **Principal Officers Fieldwork Services Residential and**
17 **Day Care in 1973, and we had decided -- even before that**
18 **-- we weren't using it in Welfare Days by that time --**
19 **we decided that there would be no corporal punishment**
20 **permitted in our homes.**

21 Q. Right.

22 **A. Now we didn't officially get rid of it until 1978**
23 **I think --**

24 Q. Uh-huh.

25 **A. -- officially, but there was no -- it wasn't allowed in**

1 **our homes from '7... --**

2 Q. Yes, because there was a -- something in effect in the
3 schools round about then as well I think, wasn't there?

4 **A. Yes, there was.**

5 Q. Just one more question and it's a clear conundrum.

6 **A. Uh-huh.**

7 Q. Do you have any inkling how it came about that three out
8 of the three staff were all into abusing children in
9 this way?

10 **A. That has exercised our minds I can tell you for a long**
11 **time. We just cannot believe that we were so**
12 **unfortunate as to have three abusers in the one home.**
13 **It's just unbelievable.**

14 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.

15 CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr Bunting, thank you very much indeed for
16 coming back to speak to us. It has been very helpful
17 indeed to have the benefit of your recollections of your
18 experiences all those years ago. I don't imagine when
19 you started off as a Children's Officer in Belfast in
20 the peaceful days before the Troubles that you ever
21 envisaged that you would be sitting here nearly
22 fifty years later --

23 **A. Absolutely not.**

24 Q. -- describing things that happened many years ago --

25 **A. No.**

1 Q. -- and in relation to which this Inquiry has to probe --

2 **A. Absolutely.**

3 Q. -- and revisit areas that have already been gone over,
4 but thank you very much for coming back to speak to us
5 again, because we do recall how helpful you were in the
6 past, but thank you for coming back.

7 **A. Thanks very much.**

8 **(Witness withdrew)**

9 MS SMITH: Chairman, that concludes the witness evidence
10 I think today. I am not totally certain.

11 CHAIRMAN: Yes. I think you can take it it does.

12 MS SMITH: Well, I am not sure if Mr Aiken is intending to
13 continue to deliver any more material today or not.

14 CHAIRMAN: Well, no doubt if he is, we will discover that
15 very soon, but if not -- we will take a break now in any
16 event, and if we don't resume in a few minutes, ladies
17 and gentlemen, it will be 9.30 tomorrow morning.

18 (3.40 pm)

19 (Inquiry adjourned until 9.30 tomorrow morning)

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