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Your Reference: K 5117

21 June 1976

21 SANCROFT STREET,
LONDON SE1 5UG

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of 12 May. I am sorry to have been so long in replying, but as I am sure you will agree this is a complex matter and I want my reply to be as full and as clear as possible. I must also apologise for the length of this letter, but this is unavoidable.

Of course I appreciate your need for fuller information, and that by putting your questions and suggestions you are not seeking to defend 'The Times'.

Your understanding of my complaint is broadly correct. It is that:

1. 'The Times' improperly published without my permission part of a manuscript which was my personal and private property, and which I intended for a book.

2. 'The Times' deliberately misrepresented the document as a confidential Army memorandum.

To this I would add:

3. 'The Times' has neither apologised to me for the publication nor withdrawn or corrected the misrepresentation.

4. The chances of my publishing the material, and the effect of what I want to say, have been diminished by the premature and unauthorised publication of an incomplete and unapproved draft of a fragment of the book, taken out of context.

It is part of my case that after publication 'The Times' did not give me an opportunity to put my case.

I can see why you think that 'The Times' may not be open to censure if it published the document without knowing its private character. My case is that 'The Times' (and by that I mean an editor) knew that I was the author, knew that I had written the document after leaving the Army, and had no justification for representing it as in any way official. In short, I am saying that the publication was not innocent.

To explain why I have this opinion necessitates my going into some detail about my work in Northern Ireland, my departure from that province, and the writing of the document.

From June 1970 to June 1974 I was in charge of the Army press office at Headquarters Northern Ireland at Lisburn, near Belfast. Because of the nature of my work, I was in daily touch with the journalists who were based in Belfast. Mr Robert Fisk of 'The Times' was no exception. We dined with each other frequently, and lunched with me in the Mess. We were on Christian name terms, and we spoke of each other frequently and at length. 
The end of my tour in Northern Ireland, my departure, and even my civilian appointment were well known to the press in Belfast. The last had been mentioned in the press as long as a year before my departure. As I left I gave a large party at the Headquarters to which all Belfast-based journalists were invited. I made farewell appearances on BBC television and Ulster Television. There is no possibility at all that Mr Pisk, who was in Northern Ireland before me and left after me, did not know that as I left the province in June 1974, I also left the Army.

After leaving the Army, I determined to write a book about my experiences with the press in Northern Ireland. I began to write it in July 1974, and by September 1974 I had composed a synopsis, an introduction, and the first draft of a couple of chapters. My workload in my civilian appointment then increased drastically, and my manuscript has remained virtually untouched since then.

In July 1974, I was put in touch with a peer who wanted information on the reporting of Northern Ireland for a debate in the House of Lords. I met him, and told him about the material I was assembling for my book. It was clear that part of it was relevant to his purpose, and I agreed to supply him with a copy of it when it was complete.

By about August 1974 I had completed, except for references, the first draft of a chapter dealing with specific press faults. This is the handwritten document of which I sent you a photostat copy with my letter of 11 March 1976. In August 1974 I sent a similar photostat copy to a civil servant who had worked for some years in the Army press office at Headquarters Northern Ireland. He had an intimate knowledge of the matters I had written about, and had access to a library of press cuttings from the Irish newspapers and the Irish editions of British newspapers. I asked him to obtain and write in the missing references in my manuscript and to return it to me. I told him that the manuscript was intended for a book, and that I wanted to use it for the information of the peer. After some weeks I telephoned him and asked him to make haste. I telephoned him a second time a few weeks later, but he never returned my manuscript. At the end of 1974 or early in 1975 I sent a photostat copy of the manuscript — with all its gaps and omissions — to the peer, apologising for its lateness and its incompleteness.

I would like to emphasise that I sent my manuscript not to 'the Army', but to a civil servant and former colleague for help with research, and that I made it quite clear to him that the material I had sent was private and for publication in a book. If, at some later stage, he caused my manuscript to be typed and communicated to someone else as a 'report', he was acting improperly. I realise, of course, that if he did so this might encourage 'the Times', for their reporter might have misled into believing the material to be official. If by some means yet another person had come into possession of my manuscript and done the same, I should have even less of a case against 'The Times'.

But I believe that both these hypotheses are incorrect. I believe that the civil servant gave the material to Mr Pisk, and that Mr Pisk had, or ought to have had, full knowledge of its purpose. To justify this contention, I must digress to describe certain events.

In February 1975, newspaper reports appeared stating that Mr Pisk had been interviewed in Dublin by a reporter with the recovery at his home of some confidential Army documents. It was not true.

In February 1975, Mr Pisk was transferred from Headquarters Northern Ireland to Headquarters Kuala Lumpur at Penang, Malaysia. At the end of 1975 he returned from the Far East to London. He was then confirmed to me by the Ministry of Defence that he was still in the Army and thus could not go into confidential details of his recent period as a correspondent.

In February 1976, two articles appeared on the front page of 'The Times', both by Mr Pisk. The first, on 10th February, disclosed that fake press cards had been issued by the Army in Northern Ireland to some of its personnel; the other, on the 24th, was the article about which I am complaining. Both dealt with documents which had been the particular subject of my book.

FCO Docs - annotation added by the HIA Inquiry
article which appeared on 24 February quotes from two documents: one I have acknowledged is by me. The other is referred to in the article as "a policy document sent to a senior military official at the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall" and is said to have been written in September 1975. According to the article, this document says that since my "report, very little has changed."

Mr Hickey, in his letter to me of 19 March, says that my document was "appendixed to a copy of a letter sent by an army officer at Army Headquarters at Lisburn to the Ministry of Defence in London. The document is referred to as a 'report' in that letter. It was filed in the offices of the headquarters building at Lisburn." In his letter of 6 April, Mr Hickey says that the accompanying letter is dated September 1975, and quotes from it: "Lieutenant Colonel Biddle's report (Annex A) gives a fairly accurate insight to our daily problems. Bearing in mind that the report is about two years old and was written after he left the Province, very little has changed."

During my service in Northern Ireland, the civil servant gave me a copy of an article written by a journalist called Kevin Lyons and published in late 1975 in the now-defunct Dublin periodical 'This Week'. He was fond of quoting from the article. Parts of the first 'confidential Army memorandum' quoted in the article in 'The Times' of 24 February 1976 are identical with parts of the article in 'This Week'. Thus:

'The Times': "...the news media are given privileges by the various combatants which, in many senses, make the reporter's job easier than it might be or should be."

'This Week': "...the news media are given privileges by the various combatants which in many senses makes the newsman's job easier than it might be."

'The Times': "Because of the sort of situation Northern Ireland has developed into, the spectacular story is better than no story; speculation is no more than an accepted area of work for the reporter who has a deadline to meet."

'This Week': "Because of the sort of situation Northern Ireland has developed into, the spectacular story is better than no story; speculation is no more than a proper area of investment for the reporter who has to meet a deadline."

Part of the letter said to have accompanied my document to the Ministry of Defence is also similar to the article in 'This Week'. Mr Hickey, in his letter to me of 6 April, quotes from the letter:

"...conscience searching is not a tradition of the media and ... individual prestige is more important than truth."

Kevin Lyons wrote in 1975:

"Conscience searching is not a tradition of the news media, particularly nowadays, when the individual prestige of newsman ... is acknowledged by politicians and laymen alike."

I am sure you will agree that the similarity of these plagiarised extracts, coupled with the civil servant's particular concern with the Lyons article, are sufficient evidence that the letter said to have accompanied my document and the first 'confidential Army memorandum' are one and the same, and that the author of both is the civil servant.

Mr Hickey wrote in his letter to me of 19 March that the letter was signed by an Army officer at Army Headquarters at Lisburn. If the civil servant signed it, this might be explained by the fact that he held commissions in the Ulster Defence Regiment, the Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve, and the Combined Cadet Force. Although he was based at Preston, he did take a number of return visits to Northern Ireland. If he was not the originator, the implications are more serious.

On 27 February 1976, the Secretary of State for Defence said in the House of Commons that an extensive search in official files had revealed no trace of either of the alleged 'confidential memoranda' referred to in the article in 'The Times'. This was confirmed officially either by the originator or the recipient. It is within my memory that the civil servant maintained private files in the Ministry of Defence.
It was well known to Sir Fisch that the civil servant's position in Headquarters Northern Ireland was a subordinate one, and that any letter written by him, particularly on an unofficial or semi-official basis, could not be a "policy document" as it is described in the article. For the same reason, I attach no importance to the use of the word "report" in the covering letter to describe my document. It may have been a document of words (or when there is other evidence in the writing I attribute to the civil servant), or it may have been used deliberately to elevate the importance of my document, for it is at least possible that the civil servant and the reporter were in collusion.

I turn now to the remaining questions you have put to me and which have not been answered by what I have said already.

I am not sure what point you are trying to make by attempting to distinguish between a retired officer and a private citizen. The essential point is that 'The Times' knew that I was not a serving officer. By definition, this made me incapable of making an 'Army document', confidential or otherwise. After leaving the Army, anything I say or write may be based on my military experience, and may or may not reflect official views; but it is a personal statement, and it is wrong to assume that it has been influenced by the Army or to attribute it to the Army. For instance, last year I was several times publicly critical of the Government decision to end detention in Northern Ireland, and this I know irritated Army commanders. For another instance, I have noticed the Ministry of Defence for certain information for use in my present case against 'The Times', and this request has been refused.

As you suggest, a retired officer or any other private citizen may submit a memorandum to the Army, and the document might then be said to have become an official Army document. But as I have explained, I did not do this. I sent my document to a former colleague for research: he was fully aware of its personal and private nature, and in fact, by the simplest and most elementary reasoning aimed at establishing the bona fides of the document, ought to have discovered this. If he did not do so, he failed in his duty as a journalist.

The fact that the document may have been typed when I was assistant editor of the Army. In the first place, there is the statement by no less than the defence minister that a search of official files has failed to confirm the existence of such a document. Even if it had, I consider such a definition to be misleading and ridiculous. If I said to Sir Fisch, taken to extremes it could be held to justify the search for the "true meaning of a real Army " for a Christmas pudding. All true confidential Army memorandum are labelled "GOVERNMENT" in red capital letters at the head and foot of every page, and Sir Fisch, who has considerable experience of them, knows this. It is not intended as a technicality, at least it must be allowed that many investigations will be outside the ownership and purpose of a document before using the word "official"; but even if it is intended to hold up the document as relevant to my argument, I do not know where to go for confirmation, but did not do so. The most usual type of investigation in this case would have established that neither document nor covering letter written by a junior civil servant, and that the document was sent to the author of the covering letter for information, not to make a story: I contend that in order to make one, it was necessary to imitate the papers as 'confidential Army memorandum'.

I do not think to be in any other doubt from what I have written that:

FCO Docs - annotation added by the HIA Inquiry
2. The civil servant was the informant who gave my manuscript to 'The Times' reporter. He knew from me that my document was private and unofficial and intended for publication in a book.

3. Mr Fisk knew that I was the author and that I had written the document after leaving the Army. He knew, or ought to have discovered from the civil servant, the Army, myself, or all three, its private purpose.

4. Mr Fisk not only ignored the private nature of my document but deliberately misrepresented it as a 'confidential Army memorandum' knowing it not to be such.

In the Press Council's adjudication in the case of Mr Trotz's complaint against 'The Observer', a copy of which you kindly sent me, it is clear that the publication of private papers without permission is held to be justified in extreme circumstances, such as "...one grave criminal conspiracy". The situation from which my complaint arises is, of course, quite different. The Army's views on the press are certainly of public interest; but I ask the Council to find that they are not a matter so extreme, so important, so confidential or so urgent that it was necessary to quote at length from a private manuscript intended for subsequent publication without any reference to the known author, and to the possible detriment of his commercial interests. Indeed, having carefully read the Council's adjudication in the Trotz case, I believe more than ever that my complaint is justified.

I believe very strongly indeed that basic and important issues of personal privacy and freedom are involved in this case. Although I disagree with it, I accept that the principle may have been established that official documents, whatever the wishes of their originators, are fair game for publication; and, as you have indicated, this principle is being extended to private documents in extreme circumstances. It would be a disservice to the public if my document were to be regarded as official or apparently official. It would be a dangerous extension of the principle if the publication of my document were to be regarded as being in the public interest. It would be a negation of the principle if 'The Times' were not censored publicly for publishing and misrepresenting an 'confidential Army memorandum' which was known, or ought to have been known, to have been my private papers.

It remains only for me to apologize again for the length of this reply; and to say that as a layman I hope and trust that I have not uttered any libel by writing what I have to you. I have no doubt that you would advise me if, by the further dissemination of the information I have given you, there were any danger of libel.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

[Fragment on the bottom of the page: "For any unclear feature here it is an insert: photostat. The reason is purely that the original is unread and conditions which were most"]
SECRET & PERSONAL

Mr Joy 5/24/75

COLIN WALLACE: PRESS LEAKS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

I had a long talk with the Brigadier during my visit to Ashnord yesterday.

2. He told me that Colin Wallace of the Army Information Services in Northern Ireland, had been disciplined in some way, following an investigation into the leaking of information to the Press.

3. Though I knew that Colin Wallace was leaving, I had no idea that this was the reason but did not admit this to Brigadier. He went on to say he thought the question had been badly handled, since Colin Wallace had been one of his best sources, when he had been Colonel GS (Intelligence) in Northern Ireland. He made it clear that Wallace was no longer working there having been suspended. There was at some stage a question of Wallace being prosecuted.

4. I was somewhat shocked to hear this, since, like Brigadier, I considered Wallace the most valuable member of the Army Information Services, who throughout the time I was there launched many very damaging stories against the I.R.A. and other extremists.

5. Two points arise, that I should be grateful if we could discuss:

   a. How far does the Wallace affair compromise my own operations there in the past?

   b. What safeguards exist in the present Army Information Services set-up for the handling of classified information in the light of the I.S. request to us to supply a research assistant?

   20.3.75

   H.P. Dooney

1. Mr. Dooney tells me that he feels there are two reasons why I should take an interest in this affair. These are:

   (i) That Wallace, with whom he worked closely in the past, might possibly, if embarrassed as a result of disciplinary action, be tempted to compromise the former I.S. role in Northern Ireland;

   (ii) That this case could affect the position of the Research Officer whom we have been asked to produce for the A.S. in Northern Ireland.
so far as the latter has a more restricted view on the leaking of classified material than we had.

2. He tells me that information about Wallace was given to him on a purely personal basis by Brigadier [Redacted] and that he was in fact responsible for leaking to the press the "Soviet submarine" story, about which there was a certain amount of trouble subsequently. The recent indiscretion appears to have been related to the passing of classified material - possibly only restricted - to the Times Correspondent, i.e., Fisk. On the other hand, it seems that Wallace did an excellent press briefing job and that Ir Mooney fears that he may have been the victim of a "terrible injustice" since, in his view, he may have received insufficient guidance from the Army IP Section on the clearance of classified material for attributable briefing. The effect of this recent decision may, in Mr. Mooney's view, mean the end of attributable briefing altogether in the context of Northern Ireland. I gather that Wallace is a citizen of Northern Ireland (a former member of the "B Specials" and a Major in the Ulster Defence Regiment) and that he had always been totally dedicated to his job. He doubts if he is in fact a security risk, but feels that this could not be excluded.

3. This is not a matter in which IRD could legitimately become involved directly, but perhaps, in so far as Wallace's disciplining could conceivably lead to further indiscretions about the previous IRD role in Northern Ireland, we should at some point speak to MOD liaison or even approach Colonel Railton of the Army IP Section in order to find out exactly what has happened. The difficulty is, of course, that we have not been informed officially of this development. Perhaps however our enquiry could take the form of an informal approach?

4. I doubt if we need to worry too much about the position of our prospective Resarch Officer at Lisburn, since he would not, presumably, be involved directly in contacts with the press.

24 March 1975

I think a word with Col Railton might be best, using Fisk's article in today's Times (attached) as the pretext.

The Research Officer project is, I understand, from the MOD, off.
CONFIDENTIAL

Circular No. 12/76

Immediate

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

5 March 1976

REVIEW OF IRD

1. In connection with the Review of Overseas Representation being conducted by the CPRS, the Permanent Under-Secretary has called for a special review of Information Research Department.

2. This review will be carried out by Sir Colin Crowe, a former Grade 1 officer, with the following terms of reference:

"To review the objectives and work of the Information Research Department of the FCO in relation to our overseas interests, including its organisation and relationship with other Government Departments and agencies; and in the light of this Review to make recommendations on the most suitable, effective and economic means of meeting the required objectives."

3. Sir Colin Crowe, who starts work on 9 March, will be in touch with a number of Under-Secretaries and Heads of Department whose area of responsibility is relevant to the work done by IRD.

4. He will occupy Room 79 on the third floor of Great George Street, telephone number 233-4452. His Personal Assistant will be Miss V R Phillips, telephone number 233-4354.

PERSONNEL POLICY DEPARTMENT

DISTRIBUTION:

Heads of Department and above

CONFIDENTIAL
The tasks envisaged for the new IRD are to:

a. help public opinion more accurately to understand foreign policy issues, and thus exert influence, by unattributable means, in favour of British objectives;

b. maintain and build up contacts overseas (through IIM Missions) and in Britain itself (notably in the Information media including domestic radio and television);

c. continue to prepare and disseminate periodicals though on a much smaller scale, but concentrating increasingly on bespoke productions for specialist clients of their own and of Missions abroad;

d. continue to promote discreet publishing and British press syndication arrangements;

e. maintain close contact with and provide discreet support for non-governmental organisations and individuals (especially inward and outward visitors) who have helpful propaganda potential (eg the Ariel Foundation);

f. maintain, with Research Department, consistent study for operational purposes of actual and potential hostile threats;

g. maintain, with Research Department and in cooperation with the relevant Political and other Departments, sufficient knowledge of those parts of the world where British interests are likely to be the object of hostile threats, in particular in the Third World;

h. maintain and build up its contacts in and liaison with countries, notably in North America, Europe and Australasia, having a common interest with Britain in resisting such threats.
OVERSEAS INFORMATION OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of the Overseas Information Services (FCO/COI) have been defined in order of priority as follows:

(i) To support Britain's position as a nation dependent upon trade. This involves in particular:

(a) Projecting Britain as a stable, skilled, forward-looking and technologically advanced nation and a commercially sound trading partner, inspiring overseas confidence in our ability and determination to overcome present economic ills and to promote our prosperity;

(b) Projecting British industries and services (including financial services and tourism);

(c) Helping British exporters to sell their goods and services locally through the use of highly selective publicity.

(ii) To present abroad both HM Government's domestic and foreign policies in such a way as to engender better understanding and support for Britain's most important overseas relationships and policies, namely:

(a) Our membership of the European Community;

(b) Our alliance with the United States in NATO;

(c) Our membership of the UN and the Commonwealth, especially as instruments for developing a common approach to the problems of the Third World; and the value to the Third World of our role as a member of the EEC.

(iii) To enhance British influence generally by maintaining and strengthening interest in and respect for British ideas and values by the promotion, inter alia, of cultural and educational links, including the use and knowledge of the English language.

GIPD 1975
misgivings that are now felt about IRD would tend to infect the rest of information work; possibly more than they do now. I am not sure how much importance to attach to this point. There is the converse point that by being closely associated with overt guidance IRD's work would tend to cover over its "Commie bashing" aspects which is what it has been trying to achieve since Mark II.

54. The Warburton objection, if I may call it that, might be circumvented to some extent by having these sections off to some secret part of HMS or section of the FCO. As I have tried to show earlier, however, there is no suitable slot for them outside the FCO. I have been much impressed with the argument that these sections of IRD must be part of an overt department. If they go underground as it were, they will tend to lose contact with reality, lose political touch and will become much more difficult to control. The experience of Northern Ireland is relevant. Here, as I understand it, they had a sort of psy-warfare outfit to which indeed two IRD people were seconded. It was very secret, full of enthusiastic young officers, got out of control and did some very foolish things. It had to be abolished. Mr Leacy, I believe, is now trying to set up a kind of central information unit with the sort of role I have in mind here.

55. The only department of the FCO who might be able to take SEU are FUSD. But here again the difficulty is that the sections are integral parts of IRD in that
they depend on IRD's research capability. They cannot be severed from their sources. Whatever happens they must be left where they are geographically and operational control must continue as it does now.

56. There is a possibility, however, of listing these sections purely for cover purposes under FUSD(b). Mr Tonkin is quite attracted by the idea since it would help to confuse the opposition! Moreover, his department already is involved with visa policy. He does not feel it would add to his work load - and indeed it should not do so since the whole idea would be to leave things as they are in reality, only changing the surface appearance. This would be a rather messy arrangement but such things have worked before. I suggest it be considered if the solution of simply leaving the secret sections with the Research element of an amalgamated Information department were not adopted.

57. Yet another difficulty is the existence of the separate IRD cadre. In my view such separate cadres are, in principle, undesirable. They create anomalies and special groups; and make administration much less flexible. In the long run I should like to see the IRD cadre gradually assimilated with the DS as a whole. But this would present problems both for the Administration and for the Staff Associations. The IRD people are recruited for specialist purposes and are not required to take on the obligations of the DS in full. They are specialists and continuity is necessary in their work. Although they equate to the B stream of the DS their mode of entry and career pattern bring them factor...
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This file must be passed direct to Fush Room No. BY BOX 249 for onward transmission and for custody. It must not pass through Departmental Bins.
HUGH MOONEY

Born 1936

1. Hugh Mooney, a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, joined IRD on 1 April 1969 as a contract writer in the Special Editorial Unit, having previously worked as a journalist in Ireland and for a short time in the Middle East, from early 1966 until about November 1967. He served twice on short term IRD assignments in Bermuda in 1970 and 1974.

2. Mooney became an established DS5 officer on 1 June 1972, and was a willing volunteer for early retirement when IRD was disbanded. He retired on redundancy grounds on 30 September 1977 and entered chambers to study for the Bar, possibly with the intention of specialising in legal journalism. Most recently, he was living on a houseboat while teaching law at a school in Cambridge during the week, returning home at weekends. By 1994 he had left this employment.

3. His wife Judy

Secondment

4. Following recognition that there was a need for a counter-propaganda effort both in Ulster and in the overseas press, Mooney was seconded to the Home Office in May 1971 for duties in Belfast; after direct rule he was transferred to the Northern Ireland Office. He was based with Army PR at Lisburn but was responsible to the UK Representative until January 1973, when he became part of the staff of the Director and Coordinator of Operations. His title was Information Adviser to the GOC as Director of Operations.

5. Mooney's first terms of reference were never formally approved, and had later to be amended. NIO's lack of enthusiasm for the appointment, coupled with the undefined nature of his position, resulted in friction with the Press Liaison Officer (then a seconded DS officer). There were also problems with MOD. They complained that his terms of reference had been insufficiently discussed, considered his title too grand, and perceived non-attributable operations as prejudicial to the credibility of army PR. They later harboured misgivings, with some justification, about the attribution to army sources of some of the stories which he
surfed. Articles on the appearance of a Soviet submarine in Irish waters on Christmas Eve 1971, and Soviet rockets later being found in Belfast, caused considerable FCO concern (George Walden's minute of 5 January 1973 concluding that allegations of Soviet interference in Ireland had resulted in a cooling of bilateral relations). Mooney's Directive was consequently re-cast and his activity more closely supervised.

6. Mooney left Ireland in December 1973, having previously told the department that he wanted to return to London by January 1974. His recall had however been recommended independently of his wishes; in 1990 Mr Tucker, formerly Assistant Head of IRD, confirmed that Mooney had been pulled out because it was thought that he was something of an "unguided missile" and had become involved in unhelpful activities, but not the alleged campaign against MPs or Ministers (see below).

COLIN WALLACE

7. In the course of his activities in Ireland, Mooney worked closely with Colin Wallace, a civilian information officer with Army PR, for example briefing journalists together. In March 1975 Mooney wrote of him: "I considered Wallace the most valuable member of the Army Information Services, who throughout the time I was there launched many very damaging stories against the IRA and other extremists." Mooney left Ireland some nine months before a formal investigation into Wallace's activities was set in motion. On hearing that Wallace had been disciplined, Mooney expressed the fear that his own operations in Ireland might be compromised.

8. Wallace was dismissed in 1975 following a leak of classified information to a journalist (Robert Fisk of "The Times"), but was allowed to resign instead after he had appealed to the Civil Service Appeals Board. He subsequently made a series of allegations against the Army, and later also alleged the involvement of the intelligence agencies in his conviction on a charge of manslaughter in 1981. His case provoked several very high level inquiries and a number of embarrassing Parliamentary questions, some of which contain references to Mooney.

9. As the result of some records being mislaid, including a supplementary covert job description giving Wallace a role in disinformation, inaccurate advice was given to Ministers about the precise details of his work at HQNI. References to "Clockwork Orange", according to Wallace a project intended to defame leading politicians of all parties, whose existence was denied, were among the papers later found; they indicated that it was a disinformation campaign aimed at the Provisional IRA which had been proposed but not approved.
10. Wallace's story is the subject of Paul Foot's book "Who framed Colin Wallace", in which Tony Staughton, head of Army PR, refers to Mooney in the following terms:

"...Immediately after internment, the IRA started to get the upper hand. And from that time on, the Foreign Office and the Intelligence people insisted on much more say in public relations. They sent a man over called Hugh Mooney - he was from a department of the Foreign Office called Information Research Department (IRD). None of us ever knew what Mooney was about: who he reported to or what he was entitled to. All we knew was that they gave him a big house to live in and freedom to move at will throughout the barracks and Stormont." ....

11. A thinly disguised photograph of Mooney (who is bearded and easily recognisable) holding a firearm, appears in Fred Holroyd's book "War without Honour" over the caption "A senior member of IRD (Information Research Department) attached to HQ NI, who worked closely with MI5", but not naming him. Mooney alleges that the photograph was given to Holroyd by Colin Wallace without permission.

Wallace's Allegations
12. By 1990 a significant stage had been reached in Wallace's accusations about Mooney's involvement in the alleged campaign to denigrate Ministers. In a letter to the Prime Minister of 23 April 1990 (one of a series) Wallace enclosed a number of documents, three of which he alleged either bore Mooney's handwriting or were produced by him ('Sinn Fein', "American Aid for Northern Refugees' goes to IRA", and 'Soviets increase control over British Communists').

13. Mooney, who had been subjected to intrusive media interest and was showing increasing nervousness about his position, contacted the Head of the Special Editorial Unit (Mr Kos) asking for protection against false allegations made by Wallace. He nonetheless gave an interview to the Sunday Correspondent of 18 March 1990 in which he is quoted as saying that before he left Ireland he had been aware that Wallace was exceeding his authority and that his telephone was being tapped. Mooney's next move was to write to the Prime Minister on 25 March again seeking protection, and announcing that he was considering legal action against Wallace. After consultation with Legal Advisers, the Treasury Solicitor, the Cabinet Office and MOD, the PUS agreed that instead of a written reply, the AUS supervising Information Department (Miss Spencer) should see Mooney, attempt to allay his fears, and dissuade him from litigation. Security Department also offered Mooney, whose house was burgled at about this time, standard advice on self-protection.

14. In further correspondence with the Prime Minister,
Mooney registered disappointment at the results of his meetings with Miss Spencer and subsequently with former IRD colleagues, and in mid-1990 informed us that his solicitor, Lord Goodman, had issued three letters on his behalf seeking assurances that Wallace would refrain from further references to Mooney; that no further distribution would be given to a television programme "This Week"; and that no further copies of Holroyd's book would be offered for sale. Despite requests, we do not appear to have obtained sight of this correspondence.

15. Thereafter, it was agreed that former IRD colleagues would keep in touch with Mooney. This task latterly fell to [Min D an FCO information Department official] (who had some expertise in Irish matters). At a long meeting with her on 1 March, Mooney requested:

a) a letter confirming that he was a member of the FCO even when seconded to the HO/NIO, and not a member of SIS/Security Service;
b) to be kept informed of IRD disclosures;
c) an anodyne sketch history of IRD from beginning to end;
d) a contact point to check facts about IRD;
e) formal written explanation for checking manuscripts, with the name of the person he should contact.

December 1994
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Covering CONFIDENTIAL/CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION

From: Mr B
Historical Branch LRD
4 March 1994

CC: Mr M Murray, (PUSD) CN-

Mrs Yasame
Mr Bone

HUGH MOONEY/IRD/COLIN WALLACE

1. I apologise for the length of the attached Note but I believe that it is important to have a full record of my long meeting with Mr Hugh Mooney on 1 March. Subject to recipients' views, I also believe that the own agenda Note's contents and particularly some of the allegations are sensitive and should only be made available to officials who need to know them. I have not copied it to the MOD or the NIO who are the main Ministries involved in the Wallace case. I suspect that the more help he is given, the more he will expect.

2. Mr Mooney made the following requests:
   
   (a) He would like a written form of words recording his status in IRD ie confirming that at all relevant he was a member of the FCO even when seconded to the HO/NIO (not a member of SIS/Security Service);
   (b) he would like to be kept informed (not necessarily in advance) of IRD disclosures;
   (c) He wondered if it was possible to have some anodyne sketch history of IRD from beginning to end.
   (d) He is interested in a contact point with whom he can check his facts about IRD;
   (e) He would like a formal written explanation of the procedure for checking manuscripts and the name of the person he should contact.

3. I made no formal commitment beyond saying that I would do what I could on each point. I believe that it is in our interest to keep him alongside. He is not generally hostile although he is very critical of the MOD whom he believes would like to use him as a fall-guy and he is not convinced that we give him as much support as we should. He has frequently emphasised that it is not his intention to break any law of any kind. Nevertheless he is an unguided missile who feels that he has no alternative but to act himself to protect his interests. Previous suggestions that keeping quiet is the best way to stop the furor no longer convince him.

Action

4. (a) Status: I have Mr Mooney's Personnel files in my room and can check the position before agreeing a form of words with our friends. I suggested that a piece of paper would not convince the critics but he said that he would still like a formal letter or something CONFIDENTIAL
similar.

(b) He emphasised that he was not necessarily asking to be fore-warned, but people get in touch with him as one of the few exposed members of the department. I suggest that this might be a relatively easy means of keeping in contact with him and a possible means of monitoring his plans;

(c) He suggested that, unless something of this kind say 1,000 to 2,000 words, is easily available when IRD papers are released, the media accounts will reflect the history cobbled together from hostile sources. He recalled that the original stories originated from Soviet sources, largely through UNESCO, and published in the Third World. The first stories in the English press came from David Leigh who, he believes, perverted the story. I have since spoken to Mrs Yasamee who agrees that something is required. Perhaps a brief account could be based on the classified history of whose existence Mr Mooney will be unaware?

(d) This may be a problem in view of the uncertainty about my future position. I do not think that there is anyone now left in the Office who is known to Mr Mooney and who has experience of Northern Ireland, IRD etc. Mrs Bahar has found me the PRO reference for the Cabinet Office paper establishing IRD in which he expressed an interest but I reminded him that there are as yet very few IRD papers on the public record. May we discuss?

(e) I believe that the correct procedure would be for him to send for clearance any document based on knowledge obtained during his official service to Mr Bone as Head of LRD. The problem is that he has obtained a lot of information since he left the FCO. We do not have any clear idea of his sources. Some may be official, ex-army, etc, but not all. He is both a journalist and a lawyer. He commented that if he did decide to produce a book it would have to be delivered at a specific time: he was not interested in a lengthy period of "clearing" which would really be censoring, nor was he interested in a pre-emptive exercise in rubbing it. He jokingly added that he could always publish in Ireland or America provided he was prepared to leave the country.

5. Mr Mooney concluded that he was not sure how to proceed but he had been a journalist all his life. He warned that we should not rely just on the files - they do not contain the full story. I think this is true and it is in general helpful to us to have occasional contact with him. I suggest therefore that he should be sent a letter answering his queries as far as possible.

MRS B
FCO Information Dept official
NOTE FOR THE RECORD

1. Hugh Mooney, the IRD officer seconded to Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, came to see me on 1 March at his request after reading the Secretary of State's announcement that IRD records are to be reviewed for release. He remains very angry at Colin Wallace's activities which, he believes, have made him "unemployed and unemployable" with some consequent financial difficulties and keen to set the record straight in some, still unspecified, way.

2. Prior to joining IRD, Mr Mooney was a journalist and after leaving the FCO he qualified as a barrister. Most recently he worked as a teacher of law at a school in Cambridgeshire, leaving when he felt that his position had become untenable as a result of the publicity surrounding the Colin Wallace saga.

Membership of IRD

3. Mr Mooney's main concern was to establish his exact position when he worked for IRD. He pointed out that he has different duties in law depending on whether he was employed by the FCO or by our friends or the Security Service. He said that, prior to joining IRD, he had previously worked [Material considered irrelevant by the HIA Inquiry]

We agreed that the majority of people in IRD were unestablished civil servants working in the FCO but he wondered if there was any difference between membership of Special Operations Section/Special Editorial Unit and the other Regional Sections. He emphasised that he was not concerned about the work done by the Section - it was work that had to be done. He believes that he was initially a contract writer but became an established civil servant in about 1972. He mentioned that he had seen suggestions (from possibly Chapman Pincher and David Leigh) that IRD had been financed by the Americans but he thought that was unlikely although they might have been associated with some operations.

Northern Ireland

4. When Mr Mooney went to Northern Ireland (1971-1973) the understanding was that he would be seconded to the Home Office and that his superior would be the UK Representative. His original terms of reference were drafted by John McMinnies, Assistant in IRD. His exact title was Information Adviser to the...
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GOC, a title suggested by the Chief Civil Adviser to the GOC, the predecessor to John Howe. In practice Mooney made it his policy not to be listed on any papers if it could be avoided. Between the start of drafting his terms of reference and his arrival in Northern Ireland, the UK Representative changed from Ronnie Burroughs, whom he believed to have been an ex-head of IRD in one of its manifestations [not entirely accurate], to Howard Smith. The latter decided that Mooney would not work from the UK Rep's offices but from Army HQ although secretly he would still be on the UK Rep's staff. Consequently, although it looked as if Mooney was part of the army's Information Policy(IP), in fact he was not: they were his hosts. He worked closely with them, but only in certain areas. He had been tasked by the UK Rep to make personal contacts within the Catholic community and this had nothing to do with the army. He explained that the UK Rep felt he had contacts within the Unionist community but not among Catholics. Mooney's job therefore was "chatting, talking, making personal contact". He mentioned developing contacts with Oliver Napier and more particularly, Napier’s sister, and with Brian Walker (who at one time needed money to finance a peace organisation. Mooney reported this to Howard Smith who indicated that he would deal with it. Mooney did not know and felt he had no need to know the details). He looked into sectarian education, housing, met John Hearmon etc. The emphasis was on personal contact. He recalled that there had been a couple of occasions when he had disapproved of army activity: he discovered for example that the army were making bombs. He reported this to Howard Smith and the activity was stopped. Those concerned would have known that Mooney intended to report it but not to whom.

5. Mr Mooney is aware that I have been unable to discover his precise terms of reference [despite consulting the NIO who hold the relevant files for the period]. He recollects that he consulted them some 3 or 4 times at HQNI, ie there was an army document in army files, and remains certain that they incorporate the fact that he was to remain a secret member of the UK Rep's staff while HQNI provided him with an office. In the end he believes half the UK Rep's staff were friends and he would like the Office to confirm that he was a member of the FCO at all times even when seconded to HO/NIO and that he did not become a member of MI6 or MI5. He commented somewhat wryly that in terms of Ireland being in intelligence is a death sentence. He fully accepts that IRD developed close relations with SIS and the Security Service but believes that members of the department did so without becoming members of the agencies.

Colin Wallace

6. Mr Mooney said that in 1973 he became increasingly unhappy and eventually told IRD that he wanted to
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leave. [On paper it looks as if the Department asked for his return, but he has previously told us that he instigated the request.] He explained that he had put up several schemes which had been turned down by [DCI] (Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence 1972-73) and he began to feel that it was time to get out. In about March he had been asked to sign an undertaking not to "hawk" stories around the market-place. He was offended but agreed to sign on the understanding that this was not his practice at any time. He recalled two stories turned down by [DCI] to illustrate the situation. One involved an alleged split between Protestant paramilitaries who favoured a socialist orientation and those who did not. He now believes that this story may have been set up by Colin Wallace (see below). The second resulted from one of the regular searches of M Snape by HMPS. Any material found was put into plastic bags and brought into HQNI. Mooney found a letter in which the writer complained at the IRA investigation into embezzlement of funds (kangaroo courts at the Maze, etc). Mooney saw this in IP confines on a day when Colin Wallace was absent and therefore believes it to be genuine. With the knowledge of Lt.Col. Peck, head of IP, Mooney consulted Lt.Col. Warren Sillitoe, the senior soldier in PR, who suggested that it should be given to Chris Ryder (Sunday Times). Mooney went to [DCI] to clear the operation but it was vetoed. After leaving the FCO, he discovered that Chris Ryder had published what appeared to be the same story: he had had to leave the province and has reported Northern Ireland from Manchester ever since. Mooney assumes that [DCI] was doing something himself. He felt that [DCI]'s staff was involved in psy-ops and believes that Wallace would have been aware that there was a Joint Intelligence Staff at Stormont Castle involved in psy-ops.

7. He now realises as a result of research since he left the Office that the story of the Protestant paramilitary split was originally suggested by Colin Wallace at one of the regular information co-ordination meetings. He later told it to Mooney who now believes that this was the genesis of the "Ulster Citizens Army". Colin Wallace kept talking about the UCA but Mooney believes the organization to be a figment of Wallace's imagination and a "preposterous" story. The reference in Paul Foot's book to Jeremy Railton's minute about Mooney getting clearance for a low-level campaign about intimidation relates to this but Mooney believes that it was set-up by Wallace who created the fictional UCA for his own purposes. Mooney pointed out that three people named as UCA members were actually active UDA terrorists. The day after the alleged UCA manifesto it was condemned by Tommy Herron [Foot implies that he was a UCA founder member]. Mooney believes that Colin Wallace was already running his own war and referred me to allegations that Wallace was the third man present at the murder of Herron. [Hansard, 1 February
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1990 col.466 - Rev Martin Smyth (Belfast, South) - attached. He reminded me that John Groves had told Broderick that Colin Wallace was an active UVF terrorist although Broderick failed to confirm any such comment by Groves. Mooney is aware that Wallace was subject to electronic surveillance and believes that it was as a result of such surveillance that his terrorist connexions were discovered. The authorities were able to get him on the classified documents - the electronic surveillance was probably illegal and could not have been produced in a court of law. Shaking off the car which Wallace thought had military connexions when it followed him into the docks was not the action of an innocent man.

Conclusions

8. After a long discussion, Mr Mooney made one or two additional points: none of this could have happened if Brig Stanier [now F Marshall Sir John Stanier] had not decided that PR should take over IP and conduct psy ops - PR in London resented IP's success in Belfast. Whatever happened with Wallace had nothing to do with Mooney himself, IRD or the FCO. Wallace got around the problem of clearance by giving himself clearance. Finally Mr Mooney referred to a fake bomb sent to Mr Kevin McNamara MP, the Opposition spokesman on Northern Ireland. The organisation said to be responsible is alleged to be an IP operation - Mooney denies this. However Wallace claims it as "one of our's" ie IP. Mooney suggests that this means Wallace was behind the bomb.

9. Mr Mooney had some specific requests about his terms of employment (separate minute) and emphasised that it is not his intention to break any law of any kind. He has obtained a lot of material on Wallace since leaving the FCO which would not be subject to any restrictions. He remains concerned that there has been a lot of loose talk about what he was doing. Wallace who was lying has become nearly respectable and has become a pundit on defence and intelligence matters. Mooney wants certain left-wing pundits exposed as dupes and wants himself cleared as not being involved in eg killing, intelligence. He is unsure how to proceed. He did not think it would be a book (he said that he had been approached several times to write a book) or a thesis, but commented that he had been a journalist all his life.
Mr. King: As I am the Minister who has come to say that documents have been found, the hon. Gentleman should give me the credit for it.

Mr. Graham Allen (Nottingham, North): Does the Secretary of State accept that, however fascinating the history of this episode, there is currently great cause for anxiety about the activities of the security services? The Secretary of State, as Minister directly responsible for military intelligence, his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Surrey, East (Sir G. Howe), sitting on his right, who was formerly responsible for the secret services, and the Prime Minister, who is now responsible for all the security services, will be aware that the way in which things work is that they are informed on a "need to know" basis. Is he satisfied today that he knows all that he needs to know to ensure that such dirty tricks campaigns are neither happening now, with Colin Wallaces in new guises, nor will happen in the run-up to the next general election?

Mr. King: My statement and the answer given by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, as well as what the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) said, have made it clear that, whatever practices there may have been in the 1970s, they were clearly and firmly stopped. I have no evidence whatever that such a policy continued to be pursued, either in the right hon. Member's time of office or in mine.

Mr. William Ross (Londonderry, East): Surely it is inconceivable to any reasonable man or woman that the people with and for whom Mr. Wallace worked embarked on the operation without thinking it through and forming an objective? If I recall correctly, the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) said that, according to some documents, it was an objective of the generals. That is to say, they had an objective beyond and different from that of the elected Government of the day.

In Northern Ireland, we should like to know precisely what the political and constitutional objective was. We should also like to know why the information, misinformation or disinformation—call it what one will—has been referred to only in relation to Great Britain politicians.

All of us who work in politics in Northern Ireland know that, during the 1970s, the whole place was alive with rumours about leading politicians, especially those from the Unionist community. Many of those rumours were designed to injure the standing of those politicians, not only in their own communities but throughout the Northern Ireland community. Frankly, many of them were dredged out of a cesspool.

This is a serious matter. The Government and Conservative Members do not seem to understand that the present Government continue to be the victim of what happened in the 1970s. It was not an error but a deliberate policy perpetrated against the Government, and which the Government repeated to the House. That makes it a constitutional issue of the greatest importance. It is wrong for any Government to say that they will not carry out the fullest inquiry to discover what happened, if only for their own protection and that of the Prime Minister and of subsequent Cabinets.

Mr. King: It is clear, and the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) made it clear, that any policy of disinformation designed to denigrate individuals or organisations in the early 1970s was stopped. If there is any further evidence of such a policy, it should be brought forward. I have nothing to add to the statement that I have already made.

Mr. Cryer: But on the evidence from the Secretary of State's hon. Friend the Member for Arundel (Mr. Marshall)—Colin Wallace's Member of Parliament—documentation has been requested from the Department since 1986. Why has it taken four years to discover those documents? When was the search instituted and how many days ago was that handful of documents discovered? Will there be a search for the other five and a half or more files of documents that it is alleged have gone missing?

Is not the Secretary of State worried that the matter goes to the extent of treason? He seems to be prepared to defend the security services whatever dirty tricks they get up to, even to the point—this should be clearly noted by the House—and denigrating hon. Members for exercising their democratic options in the House. The aim of the security services was an attack on our very system of democracy. Would not an inquiry by the Select Committee on Home Affairs be a way of ensuring full democratic accountability? As the Committee is made up entirely of hon. Members, what is wrong with that?

Mr. King: I am not sure whether the hon. Member was listening to the answers that I gave earlier, including the answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel (Mr. Marshall). I have nothing to add to the statement that I have made about the approach that we should now adopt to these matters.

Rev. Martin Smyth (Belfast, South): While I welcome the narrow field in which the Secretary of State has responded, will he answer the questions asked earlier? Are any of those involved in disinformation or giving advice to Ministers still in responsible positions as advisers to the Government or in public service?

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the matter could go beyond the Ministry of Defence into other areas, even the Northern Ireland Office? Does he accept that it will take a wider inquiry to deal with the issues, the innuendo that still surrounds the people involved in the Kinora inquiry and the allegations that Colin Wallace was the third member present at the murder of Tommy Herron?

Mr. King: The hon. Gentleman chose to widen his questions into precisely the areas where I said that no evidence arising out of the matters that I have reported to the House has been substantiated or gives fresh ground for anxiety. On the question of who authorised Mr. Wallace, it is clear that he was already undertaking unattributable briefing activities, which may have included misinformation, before he was authorised to do so.

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover): The Secretary of State said that documents were overlooked. On what day were they found? What was the date? He must have it on file somewhere.

Mr. King: They were found early last year. The first document was found then. On the instruction of the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, a formal investigation was held to find out whether other information was available to guide us.
Secret and Personal

Permanent Under-Secretary's Department

The Wallace Affair

1990 1991

This file must not be passed through any other departmental registry

Please return to room 203(E)
WALLACE: SIR ROBIN BUTLER'S MEETING ON 6 APRIL

POINTS TO MAKE

- Follow up within MOD to Heyhoe report
  A matter for MOD.

- Further MOD digging on Wallace
  Again a matter for MOD.

- Rucker I
  This contained only minor references to FCO; some were slightly misleading (suggesting greater FCO involvement than was the case); we are in touch with MOD.

- Rucker II (sent to us in draft)
  We shall be commenting on points of detail, in particular a number of inaccuracies again leaving the impression of greater FCO involvement than was the case. We shall be in touch with MOD on these.

- Mooney
  He will call on Miss Spencer on Monday 9 April (earliest possible date). His concern is at journalists' probing of his own role and that Wallace's allegations have so far gone unchallenged: we shall seek to dissuade him from taking independent legal action against Wallace and journalists pursuing his allegations. Legal advisers consider Mooney would have difficulty sustaining his case.

Undiscovered FCO Papers

(If raised). We have been thoroughly through FCO papers. We have informed MOD of all papers relating to Wallace and his allegations. We have recently discovered that the MOD have not retained their copies of records of a series of liaison meetings in Northern Ireland between Mooney and army officers responsible for information policy (August 1971 to December 1972). We shall be sending copies to MOD. These papers appear to shed no further light on Wallace et al.

Information Department
5 April 1990
Dear Archie,

Thanks for keeping me in touch with the Colin Wallace affair.

He did come and see me at my constituency advice service somewhere about 1976/77. I cannot be more precise for two reasons first. After our contact long years passed without my hearing further from him or about him until his story was resurrected in 1987. By then I had only the vaguest recollection of our encounter.

Secondly my notes were lost in about 1980/81 and I have yet to trace them. This reinforces the bane of my memory.

My vague recollection is that he spoke to me of plots aimed at Northern Ireland politicians rather than Harold Wilson etc.

Sorry I cannot be more helpful.

Hope all goes well with you personally.

The Lebanon problem it just doesn't seem to have solved itself any day now.

Yours ever,

Roland Rees

MRS B
[FCO Information Department officer]
Meeting between Miss Rosemary Spencer (AUS) and Mr Hugh Mooney (ex-IRD), 9 April 1990

1. Mr Hugh Mooney, a former Information Research Department officer seconded to Northern Ireland 1971-1973, called on Miss Spencer on 9 April 1990 to discuss the concerns raised in his recent letter to the Prime Minister. m, b  (Information Department) was present.

2. Mr Mooney expressed his determination to take some legal action against Wallace, although it would not necessarily involve taking him to Court. He was willing to discuss at length his time in Northern Ireland. (The major details of his voluble account are in the attached annex). He remains on good terms with the FCO through former IRD colleagues and has agreed to talk to the MOD. It is clear from his account that there was considerable inter-departmental and military/civilian rivalry in Belfast in the early 1970s. Line management was unsatisfactory and roles were not very clearly defined in practice. Wallace himself had a pretty free hand after promotion(66666)

3. Mr Mooney thought his job had been a "community relations exercise": a research job to monitor propaganda and devise ways to counter it, and to open up lines to the community. He had worked in the Army's Information Policy unit under Col. Tugwell but did not take orders from him. Mooney believes that Wallace played one side against another. Wallace was a great "runner around" who never realised the importance of timing a story. Ultimately Wallace seemed to be fighting what he saw as the Army's battles against everyone, including HMG, though not at the Army's behest.

4. Mooney said that he had known nothing about Clockwork Orange. He recalled one meeting referring to Kincora but no reference to it as a homosexual honey trap run by MI5.
There are two questions relating to Mooney in the attached papers:

Q7, page 004 — The answer is on standard lines.

At our lengthy meeting with Mooney yesterday, Mr. Cassell and I pressed him about his knowledge of any investigation. His knowledge seems fairly detailed but is anecdotal and obtained during the last three weeks — he refused to be drawn on this source.

Q10, page 020 — Mooney reiterated his recollection that Wallace mentioned Kincora only once. He told Miss Spencer that he did not recollect Kincora being raised as a homosexual honey trap being run by M15. Mooney did not give evidence to either of the formal inquiries into Kincora but has shown no knowledge of any cover-up. I believe therefore that we should accept the reply drafted...

2. Mr. Mooney told us yesterday that he believed the TARA document in Paul Foot's book (Q5, Q15) may have been an intelligence document and that he may have requested it at Wallace's instigation. This is not proof, however and the A5 answer therefore remains valid.

3. Mr. Cassell asked for comments by close of play...
Today (Friday). He has previously indicated that initial returns are regarded as acceptance of drafts, but you may wish me to confirm by telephone.

20/4/90.

Mrs B, Information Dept
official

FCO

38A
SECRET AND PERSONAL

From: Miss R J Spencer
Date: 18 April 1990
cc: PS/All Ministers
    PS/PUS
    Chief Clerk
    Mr Broomfield
    Mr Goudien
    Mr Nixon, PUSD
    Mr George, RID
    Mr Mower, News Department
    Special Advisers

Hugh Mooney (Wallace)

1. We spoke before the weekend about Mr Hugh Mooney, the former
IRD officer who called on me on 9 April. I attach a brief
record of the meeting, together with an Annex setting out the
main points he made.

2. It was clear from my discussion with him and from subsequent
conversation over lunch between Mr Mooney and two former IRD
colleagues, Miss B. Fco Information Dept and Mr Tyrer (Information Department),
that Mr Mooney is determined to pursue legal action. But it is
not entirely clear whether he intends to take action against
Wallace directly, or against the Crown, with Wallace as a
subsidiary target. We shall try to clarify further. He intends
to consult his solicitors by the end of this month. He seems
fairly confident of his legal position (he is a barrister). He
also feels up against it. Having been exposed to damaging
innuendoes and believing that there may be some threat to his life
from the IRA as a result of his Crown service, he now finds
himself inhibited in defending his own record because of his
lifetime obligation of confidentiality. He also considers that
neither his reputation nor, possibly his life, is adequately
protected by his former employer (FCO/MOD). But he evidently
feels more strongly against the MOD than the FCO. In discussion
here he was friendly and generally cooperative. He commented
afterwards to his former IRD colleagues that his fire would be
aimed at the MOD, not the FCO. He will meet an MOD representative
on 19 April to discuss the Wallace affair. He indicated to us
that MOD's willingness - or otherwise - to provide documents that
might help him in his legal action could determine his readiness
to provide information to them.

Rosemary Spencer
NOTE FOR THE RECORD

MEETING BETWEEN MISS ROSEMARY SPENCER (AUS) AND MR HUGH MOONEY (EX-IRD), 9 APRIL 1990

1. Mr Hugh Mooney, a former Information Research Department officer seconded to Northern Ireland 1971-73, called on Miss Spencer on 9 April 1990 to discuss the concerns raised in his recent letter to the Prime Minister. Mr B (Information Department) was present.

2. Mr Mooney expressed his determination to take some legal action against Wallace, although it would not necessarily involve taking him to Court. (It was difficult to pin Mr Mooney down, particularly on this point: he later suggested that the legal action might be against the Crown with Wallace as a subsidiary target.) He was willing to discuss at length his time in Northern Ireland. (The major details of his voluble account are in the attached annex.) He remains on good terms with the FCO through former IRD colleagues and has agreed to talk to the MOD.

3. Mr Mooney suggested that there was considerable inter-departmental and military/civilian rivalry in Belfast in the early 1970s. Line management was unsatisfactory and roles were not very clearly defined in practice. Mr Mooney was sent to Belfast in 1971 at the request of Major-General Farrar-Hockley (Commander Land Forces) because the army felt that they were losing the propaganda war, that something more needed to be done, and that the traditional PR framework was insufficient. There were then two groups involved with information work in HQNI: the traditional large PR unit under Tony Staughton which was responsible for briefing mainstream journalists on mainstream stories, and the Information Policy (IP) Unit, under Colonel Maurice Tugwell, which was established to counter hostile propaganda. PR was regarded as an administrative unit but IP was regarded as operational: it had an input in all operational plans because of the need to consider their impact on public opinion.

4. Mr Mooney does not now have a precise recollection of his job description but considered that his job, which was a new appointment, was a "community relations exercise": a research job both to monitor hostile propaganda (eg from IRA supporters) and devise ways to counter it (eg by surfacing good news stories on the one hand and factual material, sometimes from sensitive sources, on the other), and also to open up lines to the community. He did not recall whether "psy-ops" was formally included in his terms of reference [probably not], but felt that in any case the Army had a different view of "psy-ops". He had worked in the Army's IP unit under Col Tugwell but did not take orders from him.
CONFIDENTIAL

5. Wallace was officially a member of PR but was used by IP when necessary to exploit stories. He squared his contacts with IP within the PR system and the two to some extent became enmeshed. Mr Mooney now believes that Wallace played one side against the other. He was a civilian but involved on the fringes of the Army in every way possible. He was very active in making contacts ("a great runner-around") who never realised the importance of timing a story. Ultimately Wallace seemed to be fighting what he saw as the Army’s battles against everyone, including other Government departments, though not at the Army’s behest. Wallace had had a pretty free hand after promotion (to Senior Information Officer - technically after Mooney had left Belfast, but in practice changes seem to have taken place before his departure).

6. Mr Mooney said that he had known nothing about Clockwork Orange. He recalled one meeting referring to the Kincora Boys’ Home, but no reference to it as a homosexual honey-trap run by MI5. IP had only been interested in Tara, the alleged Protestant paramilitary group.

7. Mr Mooney believes that he has been targeted by Wallace and journalists associated with him. He firmly believes that recent developments, particularly the publication of a clearly identifiable photograph of himself holding a gun (in the 1989 book "War Without Honour" by the disaffected military intelligence officer, Fred Holroyd, and elsewhere) have put him under threat from eg the IRA. He commented "keeping quiet harms me".
Mooney had originally thought that Wallace had suffered from an excess of zeal in supporting his views of the Army but the Paul Foot book "Who Framed Colin Wallace" was a new dimension: it amounted to a confession by Wallace to being involved in unauthorised activities.

Mooney considers he has one advantage over current civil servants: he knows that Wallace is lying about his involvement in events.

Mooney felt that he was being targeted by Wallace and journalists associated with him as a result of inter-departmental problems continuing from the early 1970s.

Mooney’s appointment arose from a request by Major-General Farrar-Hockley (Commander Land Forces). IRD had some initial reluctance about responding too quickly and insisted on secondment. Mooney was not sure that "psy-ops" were formally included in his terms of reference [probably not] but felt that in any case the Army and IRD had different views of "psy-ops".

Mooney believed that Army PR (under Mr Tony Staughton), which was responsible for routine information work, had hated his appointment. He in turn felt that Army PR was not effective at this time. The Information Policy (IP) Unit, responsible for countering hostile propaganda, had been set up in addition to Army PR because the Generals were not satisfied with earlier arrangements. Mooney had been told that his job would be a "community relations exercise" and had been warned that it would be welcomed by the Northern Ireland Government but probably not by Army PR.

Colonel Maurice Tugwell, Head of IP, had been "brilliant": he understood the Army, had the confidence of the Generals and had a sure touch. Under him, IP had an operational role, with an input to all operational plans because of their possible effect on public opinion. Mooney worked in Tugwell’s section but did not take orders from him.

Mooney believed that Tugwell had considered sacking Staughton - he had had sufficient rank and authority to have done so. It might have prevented later problems if IP had taken over PR.
CONFIDENTIAL

(viii) Army patrols were encouraged to bring back material (eg pamphlets, posters etc) for use in countering hostile propaganda - forgeries would not have worked.

(ix) Mooney had no access to any means of printing forgeries. Lt Col Peck (IP) had controlled the printing press but Mooney believed he was straightforward. Wallace, after he was promoted, controlled the press and could have authorised anything.

(x) Mooney had taken seriously (as an Official IRA document) the pamphlet "Fianna Fail and the IRA" which he had brought to the attention of IRD and Mr Howard Smith (UK Rep). Amazed at recent stories alleging that it was a forgery.

(xi) Wallace was always busy pursuing stories, but he never realised the importance of timing in releasing stories. He was fighting the Army’s battles including eventually against the NIO and Whitehall - but not at the Army’s behest.

(xii) In mid 1973,, following the promotion of Broderick (to Head of Army Information Services in Northern Ireland) there was an attempt to get rid of the "FCO element". (It was not clear if Mooney was referring just to himself or to a wider FCO involvement.) Mooney asked to come back; IRD agreed to his request by the end of 1973. Wallace was put into what was thought to be Mooney’s job but without the necessary controls - a management problem.

(xiii) Mooney had never understood why the results of SIB’s tapping of Wallace’s telephone were not given to the disciplinary hearing. (Presumably the tapping took place in 1974 and it was not clear how Mooney, who left in December 1973, knew about it. So far as we know there was no regular contact with Wallace after Mooney left Belfast.)

(xiv) Mooney had spoken to Kevin Toolis (Sunday Correspondent) about a week before the article which quoted him (18/3/90). He had not said everything attributed to him. He believed that Wallace will now be more circumspect: he will not know exactly what evidence is available against him.

(xv) Mooney knew nothing about Clockwork Orange, recalled only one reference to Kincora. IP was only interested in Tara. The italic handwriting on the Tara document reproduced on page 292 of the Foot
CONFIDENTIAL

book might be that of MOD OFFICIAL (according to Mooney an MOD intelligence officer); the format of the document indicated an intelligence source.

(xvi) Wallace needs to quote some higher authority to cover his actions before 1974. Reluctant to hit the Army. Mooney believed Wallace had built him up as a psy-ops expert for this purpose - and being isolated, he was an easy target.

(xvii) Wallace was not a member of IP - but was used by IP when necessary to exploit a story.

(xviii) Mooney had never been interviewed by the RUC, Sir George Terry or the Hughes enquiry. One previous discussion with FCO officials over lunch some 2-3 years ago about forged bank accounts.

(xix) Mooney had not been able to take Stauthon into his confidence after receiving certain security advice.

(xx) Mooney remained determined to pursue legal action: Wallace was part of a conspiracy of correspondents urging him and others to break the OSA - an offence. Photograph in the Holroyd book puts him and his family in danger from IRA. "Keeping quiet harms me".
May 8 [FCO Information Dept. Official]

This doesn't matter.

the briefly glanced list of alleged IRA staff.

Wrote meeting T

M C

[Signature]
FROM: Mas B
Information Dept

Miss Spencer

DATE: 1 May 1990

CC: Mr Murr
Mr Kos

Hugh Mooney (Wallace)

1. As you agreed, I spoke to Mr Mooney on Friday evening (27 April). I attach the record of our conversation.

2. Mooney has been told by his solicitor that he has a case for defamation against Messrs Colin Wallace, Fred Holroyd and David Leigh. He remains irked that we will not help him but said that "certain steps" were now under way. He refused to expand this comment.

3. Mooney, who has the advantage of knowing Wallace, firmly believes that the threat will make Wallace more circumspect. Certainly our impression is that Wallace did seem more subdued in David Leigh's "This Week" programme on 26 April, but we have no way of knowing whether his part was filmed before or after the Toolis (Sunday Correspondent) article on 18 March (which quoted Mooney, accurately or otherwise, on Wallace's own career). In "The Media Show" (29 April) Wallace seemed much more vocal and Leigh was listed as "agnostic", rather than a believer in Wallace's claims. "The Media Show" suggested that the Wallace story had been grinding into the ground by the late 80s and was only revived because "somebody" in the MOD decided to abandon the "cover-up". "The Media Show" also revealed that some journalists are sceptical about Wallace. Duncan Campbell, no lover of authority, commented that Wallace was "more expert" than anyone he had met at "stitching together fact and fiction".

4. Any revival of interest in these matters resulting from any action by Mooney, probably depends on timing. Wallace's allegations will not go away at least until after the results of the Calcutt enquiry are made public, perhaps

....after...

SP2AFE

FCO Docs - annotation added by the HIA Inquiry
after several months. Action before then could help to strengthen journalistic doubts about Wallace's integrity: later action might well revive publicity which, by this stage could be on the wane. In practice we probably cannot influence Mooney either way.

... 5. I attach a draft reply to PS/Mr Waldegrave.

Mrs B

Information Department
HUGH MOONEY (WALLACE)

1. We have no real evidence on which to base a reasoned assessment of the effect on Wallace of the threat of legal action by Mooney.

2. Mooney believes that his comments as reported in Kevin Toolis’ article (Sunday Correspondent, 18 March) have given Wallace pause for thought by indicating that there is more evidence against him than he might previously have believed.
3. Basically it seems a question of timing. "The Media Show (29 April)" suggested that the Wallace story had been grinding into the ground until the MOD announced that it had found some relevant papers and was establishing the Calcutt enquiry. Legal action while the story is still current may give added ammunition to Wallace's critics. Later action may only serve to revive publicity.

4. In practice we probably cannot influence Mooney either way. He has told us that his solicitor believes he has a case for defamation against Messrs Wallace, Holroyd and Leigh and that "certain steps" (unspecified) are under way.
**NATIONAL NEWS**

Telephones tapped to trace press department ‘nutter’ who issued bogus stories, claims expert who worked for Foreign Office

MI5 ‘investigated Wallace before sacking’

by Kevin Toolis

COLIN Wallace, dismissed from the Ministry of Defence press relations unit in Northern Ireland for leaking sensitive material, was the subject of an MI5 investigation months before he was sacked, it was claimed last night.

Mr Wallace and his superior Peter Broderick, head of Army Information in Northern Ireland, have always maintained Mr Wallace was secretly authorised to leak information to journalists as part of his work for the Information Policy Unit. The claims are to be investigated by David Calcutt QC in a government inquiry into the spectacular circumstances of Mr Wallace’s dismissal.

In an exclusive interview with The Sunday Correspondent, Hugh Mooney, a former Foreign Office “black propaganda” expert who worked in the same unit in Northern Ireland as Wallace, said the MI5 investigation began months before Wallace was transferred out of the unit in January 1975.

“Wallace was exceeding his authority. He was giving briefings that were in conflict with what was required of him. He was leaking stuff to journalists that he had no right to do,” said Mr Mooney.

“His telephone calls were monitored weeks before the first transfer and it was on that basis it was decided he had to be moved out of Northern Ireland.”

The Intelligence agencies and the Foreign Office had been particularly concerned about stories about the deployment of SAS and a bogus one, complete with a false picture, about Russian submarines landing IRA terrorists near Londonderry.

“Because there were so many agencies involved – the Ministry of Defence, Headquarters Northern Ireland, Army Press Relations, Central Military Intelligence and MI5 – in Information Policy it was only when there was a concerted effort to bring the department heads together that the problem was easily isolated to this ‘nutter’ in ‘relations,’ Mr Mooney added.

The man who supervised the investigation was Lt-Col Jeremy Ralston, head of the Information Policy Unit. In September 1975 Lt-Col Ralston was due to appear at Mr Wallace’s final disciplinary hearing to be cross-examined about the real nature of Wallace’s work for the Information Policy “psychological operations” Unit.

But on the morning of the hearing Mr Wallace told that Lt-Col Ralston had missed his flight from Belfast and that he would be unable to attend.

Lt-Col Ralston’s absence at the inquiry turned the whole disciplinary procedure into a farce, Mr Wallace said. “The Army did not want him to be cross-examined as that would have let the cat out of the bag. The safe way was for him not to be there.”

“As the man normally responsible for ‘psy-ops’ he was the only person that could have answered the questions about my real work. His evidence was crucial to the inquiry,” Lt-Col Ralston last night admitted that his non-appearance at the hearing was “strange.”

“One has to deduce from that that a reason like the plane being late would not be sufficient to explain my absence,” he said.

“There would have to be some other factors involved but I cannot really tell you more.”

“If, for some reason, a witness considered to be fairly critical is not available, the people in charge of the inquiry are going to find some other way of taking evidence. The fact that this was not done in this case is obviously indicative of some other factors.”

Mr Mooney also admitted that Mr Wallace had told him about the sex scandal at Kincora boys home in Belfast – adding further doubt on Government claims that the security forces had no knowledge of the long-running rape and buggery of children in care.

“I do know he mentioned it. He was dropping it in and feeling his way. He kept pushing it. But I could never understand why. I thought it was totally irrelevant to our concerns. I did get the feeling he was pushing this. But how the hell did he know? He certainly did not know by anything he was doing officially,”

Mr Mooney, from the Foreign Office’s department’s cold-war psychological warfare unit, the Information Research Department, along with Colin Wallace ran the black propaganda campaign to smear the IRA and other opponents of the Government.

Mr Mooney also attended high-level security briefings at the Northern Ireland Office to co-ordinate overall information policy in Northern Ireland in the mid-seventies and acted as a liaison officer between MI5 and the Foreign Office.

His role was confirmed by Col Maurice Tugwell, founder of the Information Policy Unit.

“Mooney had his own agenda. He reported to this extraordinary Foreign Office set-up that was run by Howard Smith, who later became head of MI5 in Belfast,” said Col Tugwell.

“It was the liaison office between the Foreign Office and the Northern Ireland situation. He was a very important man. Mr Smith was the security coordinator for Northern Ireland and later Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1976-78. He was Director General of MI5 from 1979-81.

Mr Mooney’s role was to plant stories in the foreign media, particularly the influential American papers. He cultivated foreign journalists on assignment to Northern Ireland.

The Foreign Office official confirmed that Mr Mooney had been seconded from the Foreign Office to the Northern Ireland Office for that period.

The Information Research Department was founded in 1947 to conduct secret propaganda operations against communist governments and run “hearts and minds” operations in Britain’s restless post-war heartland. Special training courses in psychological operations and senior civil servants were held at the Ministry of Defence’s Joint Warfare Establishment near Salisbury.

The department was closed by David Owen in 1977 when he was Foreign Secretary, in a row over its right-wing bias. Its function was transferred to a new Overseas Information Department.
SECRET

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INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

FILE NO. V

NAME OF FILE: THE COLIN WALLACE AFFAIR

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BACKGROUND NOTE

On Friday 16 February the wife of Major General Garrett (COS HQNI in the early 70s and D SY(Army) until recently) had been distressed by a telephone call from Mr Barry Penrose of the Sunday Times who indicated that he intended to identify her husband as responsible for Clockwork Orange. General Garrett is very seriously ill with leukemia. Later information indicated that Lieutenant General Sir Peter Leng (formerly CLF HQNI in the early 70s) had also been approached by Mr Penrose and was reported to have said that he "authorised Clockwork Orange". Since recent Ministerial statements have relied on the only official records on the subject which state that Clockwork Orange was not cleared, it was considered prudent to enquire of General Leng what communication he had had with Mr Penrose.

A telephone call to General Leng secured confirmation that he had spoken to Mr Penrose, as had General King (formerly GOCNI in the early 70s), and that he had given Mr Penrose information which he thought might be relevant in answer to questions which had included reference to Clockwork Orange. It was decided to obtain a full account from General Leng of his conversations with Mr Penrose. Whilst this was being arranged, CPR obtained confirmation from Mr James Adams of the Sunday Times that there would be a front-page article claiming that the Generals were challenging the truth of recent Ministerial statements.

CPR and Head of GS Sec met Generals King and Leng (at General King's home) on the evening of 17 February. The Generals gave an account of their conversations with Mr Penrose and an assurance that they had neither sought to challenge Ministers nor had any information which they believed to be inconsistent with what Ministers had said. Connections between "Clockwork Orange" and the information given to Mr Penrose arose from the manner of the latter's questioning, were not intended by the Generals and may have been misunderstood. The Generals were in favour of issuing a rebuttal of the story which Mr Adams had indicated would be published, and they agreed the words in which the rebuttal should be communicated to the Sunday Times. A manuscript copy of the agreed words was made and retained by General Leng: a typed copy is attached.

On learning of this rebuttal, the Editor of the Sunday Times listened to the tape-recording which Mr Penrose had made of his telephone conversations and decided that they did not support the story. The article was withdrawn: unfortunately, it was too late for it to be withdrawn from the first editions published in London and Belfast. A copy of a statement made by the Editor in amplification of his decision is attached.

The proposed draft Answer has been read carefully to General Leng over the telephone and he is happy with it. It is a true statement of what was conveyed by him to MOD officials. Therefore, nothing on the tape-recording can invalidate it.
Nevertheless, it would be prudent to read the transcript before sending the Answer for publication.

The Question's reference to James Adams may be an attempt to seek confirmation of the part played by him in having Mr Penrose's story withdrawn. Mr Adams seems to have acted with propriety throughout.
SUNDAY TIMES - GENERALS CHALLENGE MINISTERS RE WALLACE

Late on 16 February it was learned that the Sunday Times on 18 February, including editions published in Belfast, might carry a front-line story suggesting that General Sir Peter Leng and General Sir Frank King had contradicted Ministers' version of the truth about Mr Wallace's allegations.

On the evening of 17 February, the Generals agreed to MOD use of the following rebuttal:

REBUTTAL

"General King and General Leng have given us a very full account of the conversations that they have had recently with representatives of the Sunday Times. With their (the Generals') full agreement, we are able to say that the answers given to questions posed by the Sunday Times have been misunderstood.

General Leng does not recall a project which had the specific name "Clockwork Orange". In answering questions from the Sunday Times, he assumed that they had some basis for associating that name with the issues they raised."

IF NEEDED

"General Leng described un-codeworded activities related to legitimate Army intelligence gathering and public order matters, solely concerned with terrorists and terrorist organisations."

IF ASKED

"None of these matters were ever aimed at MPs, and General Leng has no recollection of any information about MPs coming to his notice in these contexts."

IF ASKED

"General Leng has no recollection of any information about homosexual activities at Kincora."

IF ASKED

"General King concurs."
has been suggested by several politicians in the House of Commons that, under pressure from the MoD, The Sunday Times published a story about the Colin Binnie affair from its first edition last Saturday night. That is untrue. The story was not published under pressure from the MoD or anybody else.

The first edition of The Sunday Times contained a page one story 'General backs Irish claims' in which it was said that General Sir Peter Leng, commander of forces in Northern Ireland from 1973 to 1975, confirmed the existence of attack-stand Orange. It was further claimed that it had been authorised by the Northern Ireland Office.

After the first edition went to press, the MoD issued a statement which said at the time there was no evidence to support what the general had said. The general said the MoD had confirmed to the ministry that he had said neither of the two statements attributed to him by The Sunday Times in his book.

The reaction was simple: the MoD, realising the import of what the general had said, had got him to retract his statements as part of a damage limitation exercise. Luckily, I thought, our two telephone conversations with the general had been tape-recorded.

I asked to listen to the recordings so that I could pick the best quotes from the general in order to refute the MoD rebuttal. But after listening to the tape I was forced to conclude that the general had neither confirmed the Orange Gate nor its official authorisation. I had no choice, therefore, but to withdraw the story from all future editions of The Sunday Times, and issued strictures to that effect at 8.10am on Saturday night. At no stage did the MoD ask for the story to be withdrawn, or put any pressure on the Sunday Times to do so. The decision was taken for purely journalistic reasons, above all for reasons of accuracy.

The full transcript of the two interviews with the general is being prepared and will be made available to interested MPs.

(END)
W P Cassell Esq
Head GS Sec
Room 5137
MOD Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1

27 February 1990

Dear Paul,

WALLACE: FCO OFFICIALS

1. Sir Michael Quinlan wrote to Sir Patrick Wright on 19 February asking that we check with Hugh Mooney and James Allan that in the light of their recollections we have got nothing materially wrong in recent Ministerial statements.

2. We have spoken several times since the Wallace affair broke to Hugh Mooney. He was, as you know, seconded from IRD in 1971-73 but was not in Northern Ireland in 1974. Mooney has confirmed to us that he is unaware of any disinformation activity directed against Ministers, that he has no new evidence to provide and that to the best of his knowledge recent Ministerial statements have been accurate. We have asked Mooney to double check his recollection on these points in light of recent press reports claiming the apparent existence of documents in his handwriting. Mooney is at present away from home; I will write to you again when we have this further clarification from him.

3. We were also asked to consult James Allan, now at the Royal College of Defence Studies. He was seconded to Northern Ireland in the early 1970s and because of a later posting as head of the FCO's Overseas Information Department, his name has appeared in articles critical of IRD. James Allan has told us however that in his role as Assistant Secretary (Political Affairs) at he had no official dealings at all with Wallace or his information activities, and knew him only slightly. We have found no
pertinent details or leads in our contacts with other officials who might have some helpful knowledge of aspects of IRD operations in the early 1970s.

R J S Muir
Information Department

cc: Miss Phippard, Cabinet Office
    Mr Rickard, NIO(L)
    Mr Ackland, Home Office
    Mrs Marsh, LOD
    Mrs Goldsworthy, Lord President's Office
25 February 1990

PERSONAL FOR:

Sir Michael Quinlan KCB
Permanent Under-Secretary
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2HB

Dear Sir Michael,

I have been concerned to read reports in which it is suggested that the Government may have been misled by its advisers over matters relating to my case. In particular, I am disturbed that most of the misleading information has come from the Ministry of Defence.

"It is obvious from my own correspondence with your Ministry that some of the inaccurate information could not simply have been the result of poor communication. For example, the Government have now admitted that I took part in a mock raid on Aldergrove Airport in 1974 as part of a security exercise. In addition, they have admitted that on that occasion we used forged Central Intelligence Agency identity cards. In a letter to Channel 4 News on 23 July 1987, Brigadier the Honourable Willie Rous, who was then Director of Army Public Relations, replied to a series of questions from Robert Parker and said:-

"One of your questions referred to a 'mock raid' at Belfast Airport which you understood was carried out under my control. I have no recollection of any such exercise."

As you know, a number of those who took part in that mock raid have now been interviewed by the press and all have confirmed quite independently that it took place as I described. It is surprising, to say the least, that Brigadier Rous, who initiated and was present at the exercise, should be the one person who has failed to remember anything about it. In the same letter Brigadier Rous also denies that I had a covert job description and that I was employed on disinformation work.

Similarly, I am concerned that the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister's office have claimed that there is no record that we carried captured IRA
-2-

weapons and explosives on that occasion. Bearing in mind that the press have been able obtain such confirmation from those who took part, it is remarkable that the investigations carried out by your Ministry have failed to establish similar confirmation.

The Government continues to claim that the Army had no knowledge of the homosexual assaults that took place at the Kincora boys’ hostel in Belfast during the 1970s or that one of the main offenders, William McGrath, worked there. During the past fortnight Mr Peter Broderick, former Chief Information Officer at Army Headquarters Northern Ireland and Deputy Director of Army Public Relations at your Ministry, has confirmed that in 1973 he read, annotated and authorised for release to the press a background briefing document which contains the address and telephone number of the Kincora boys home and the words:-

"McGrath uses a non-existent evangelical mission as a front for his homosexual activities and also runs a home for children on the Upper Newtownards Road ..."

In addition to Mr Broderick’s annotation, the document bears the hand-writing of Captain Tony Hervey, R Sigs (GSO 3 Int), Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Peck, QOH (GSO 1 Information Policy), Major Ken Harding RA (SO 2 Facilities) and one other, as yet unidentified, officer. To the best of my knowledge none of these officers has been interviewed by any government representative about the document or about the Kincora scandal and it is therefore absurd that the Ministry of Defence should persist with the claim that there is no evidence to support my allegations.

Furthermore, as you know, Mr Broderick’s claim has been corroborated by Mr Michael Taylor, who handled some of the Kincora documents at Army Headquarters Northern Ireland in 1974 and by General Sir Peter Leng in a recent tape-recorded interview with The Sunday Times. In that interview General Leng makes it clear that he knew about the Kincora situation in 1974 and tried to get the RUC to take action to bring the matter to an end.

The Defence Secretary has also claimed that the job specification covering my work with the Information Policy Unit was only a "draft document" and was never approved. That claim is totally false. The job specification was drawn up by Peter Broderick as part of the re-organisation of the Army Information Services in 1974 and I agreed the content with him before it was submitted to an Establishments Board at Headquarters Northern Ireland that same year. Indeed, it is obvious that the job specification was approved both by Mr Broderick and by HQ Northern Ireland because my post as Senior Information Officer within the Information Policy Unit was created on the strength of that approval. It was only after the psychological operations specification had been approved that the MOD decided to advertise a false specification to conceal the fact that a psychological operations unit existed in Northern Ireland. I am most concerned that the Defence Secretary is still misleading Parliament about this matter because at least three copies of the covert job specification existed at Headquarters Northern Ireland and it would be clear from them that they were not simply draft documents.

On the subject of 'Clockwork Orange', a written request was submitted from Peter Broderick to General Peter Leng asking for the release of Army Intelligence information relating to the PIRA for the project. General Leng
approved the request and authorised Colonel Peter Goss, Col GS Int, to make the relevant information available to me. Colonel Goss in turn detailed Captain Anthony Holman, GSO 3 Int, to undertake the necessary research and to act as a liaison officer between me and the Intelligence Branch. When the first part of the project was completed the text was typed by Miss Penny Sadler, a Security Service officer who was then working at HQNI. Your Ministry retained the top copy of the typed document and must therefore be aware of its content and the fact that it contains disinformation material designed to discredit the then Prime Minister, Harold Wilson and some of his government’s initiatives in Northern Ireland.

Bearing in mind the foregoing, I can find no justification whatsoever for the continued misleading statements that have been given to Parliament by the Defence Secretary and Defence Ministers. I am also annoyed that no-one from your Ministry has taken the trouble to interview me at any time during the past fifteen years to establish the veracity of my allegations.

In this letter I have of course confined myself to writing only about a few matters of immediate and direct relevance to your Ministry. However, I bring them to your attention because it is clear that, unless there is a determined effort to establish the correct facts, both the Calcutt inquiry and the Defence Select Committee inquiry will be misled by erroneous information supplied by your Ministry. I would request therefore that you instigate an urgent reappraisal of the information in your possession and ensure that this absurd cover-up is brought to an end.

Yours sincerely,

Colin Wallace
SECRET

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INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

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PCO Docs - annotation added by the HIA Inquiry
I attach a draft reply from the PS to Sir Michael Quinlan. I am afraid that there has been a misunderstanding about the IRD "archive". Sir Michael's letter of 15 February contains a misunderstanding about the IRD "archive".

The official IRD archive (PR files) was transferred to LRD on the closure of IRD and is currently being weeded. The archives remain under the protection of the Lord Chancellor's "blanket" for the time being. Certain publications produced by IRD have been passed to the PRO over the years. However, IRD also maintained separate collections of working files of some sensitivity which have no status in FCO terms being technically regarded as "ephemeral". Previous Heads of LRD (Miss Blaney and Miss Barnes) have confirmed...
this position to Mr. Kos (SPU). These papers continue to require protection. Some of these papers are in the care of International Section, Information Department, and some in the care of SPU which affords them special status. All these files have been investigated.

3. It may be worth recording that the files indicate that:

(i) IRD involvement in a political issue was authorised at a high level and that the Prime Minister was briefed,

(ii) that we have found no references to *Clockwork Orange* or Kincora,

(iii) that the IRD officer seconded to Northern Ireland was assiduous that he was not involved in black propaganda against UK politicians, and

(iv) that we have found only one reference to Colin Wallace, indicating that he provided the original briefing for what developed into a politically unhelpful story on Soviet involvement in Northern Ireland, and recording Wallace's dismissal and the anxiety of the relevant IRD Officer.
Office about problems that might arise if Wallace became embittered.

4. We learned yesterday for the first time that Wallace-related papers held by MI5, MI6 and the Security Service were apparently consulted our friends. The report indicated that FCO files might shed some further light on events in the early 1970s because of 1IR activities. We are trying to obtain a copy of the report in case it provides any additional leads.
**SECRET**

Permanent Under-Secretary's Department

FILE No. 2CZ 11/12 (Part...)

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CAPTAIN FREDERICK HOLROYD
AND MR COLIN WALLACE

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ONWARD TRANSMISSION AND FOR CUSTODY. IT MUST NOT PASS THROUGH DEPARTMENTAL REGISTRIES

FCO Docs - annotation added by the HIA Inquiry
IRD'S CONNEXION WITH MR COLIN WALLACE

1. We spoke. Before the abolition of IRD in April 1977 its terms of reference were "responsibility for the compilation of information reports for Her Majesty's Missions abroad". This was quoted in a Written Answer to a PQ from Mr Neil Kinnock (then a Government backbencher) on 1 February 1978, to which the Minister added that copies of some IRD papers "were also sent to a number of interested people in the United Kingdom". As you suggested, I have already passed a copy of this PQ, the text of which he originally approved when himself head of IRD's successor department (OID), to Mr Ray Whitney, who may refer to it, if necessary, in his own defence in the House later today.

2. Mr Whitney, as the only former head of IRD now to be an MP, is concerned that he has been put into a line of fire by the mischievous article in yesterday's Observer. In fact that rather muddled item is more concerned to allege that two unnamed Conservative MPs were involved in a plot, also involving dissident elements in MI5 and Mr Colin Wallace, to discredit the Wilson Administration. Mr Wallace's allegations have already been somewhat neutralised by the comments of a former Labour Minister, Mr Roland Royle, which were quoted in today's Guardian.

3. The connexion of all this with IRD is tenuous, but exists because Mr Wallace was professionally involved in Northern Ireland, 1970-76, with a seconded member of IRD, Mr Hugh Mooney. Together they ran an Information Policy Unit at Lisburn concerned with 'black propaganda' operations, peripheral to IRD's general work. The unit was closed down by 1976; it had not been conspicuously successful. According to Mr Wallace, it was "a propaganda group run jointly by MI5 and the Army" (he also asserts that his wife was a former MI5 employee). These allegations have been around for some years: the latest summary is in the Dublin magazine Magill, December 1985 (copy attached). From this article it is clear that Wallace was subsequently convicted of the manslaughter in Sussex in 1980 of a friend's husband - he claims to have been "framed by MI5" - and he was, in fact, only released from Lewes Gaol this week.

/His
His former colleague, Mr. Mooney, who had originally been a journalist, left the employment of IRD in about 1975 to become a barrister and stood at the last General Election as Liberal candidate in the Conservative seat of Lewisham West. Mr. Wallace's allegations about using IRD's machinery and overseas contacts for his anti-Wilson Administration operations (if indeed that is what he is in part alleging) seems intrinsically implausible, to put it mildly, if the implication is that successive heads of IRD were privy to any such arrangement. This is a point that, I gather, Mr. Whitney is inclined to make in the House or elsewhere if his personal integrity should be further challenged.
Mr Wallace 22/1/73
Mr Tucker 22/1/73

MR MOONEY'S TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Mr. Mooney discussed the latest version of his terms of reference with me today.

2. He said he was generally content with the new formulation, and thought it was an improvement. But he thought paragraph 4 could cause misunderstanding. If this came to the attention of Army PR, the latter would be likely to object strongly, on the ground that the FCO were seeking, through the Information Adviser, to be consulted over any "major information project or new initiative". If this phrase were interpreted literally, it could stop Army PR doing anything major or new, even in their own field, without consultation. In any case Mr. Mooney said that he, as Information Adviser, just did not have the power to ensure, by himself, that the Army did themselves clear major projects or new initiatives which might have foreign policy implications with the FCO. If that was our intention, we would have to make it clear to the MOD direct; and indeed all the other members of the JASWG would need to be given a directive on similar lines to that in paragraph 4.

3. I think there is a genuine difficulty here, though Mr. Mooney is perhaps making rather too much of it. I told him that I would be reluctant to re-draft the directive substantially since it had already been accepted by the GOC and the NIO. I suggested that the best solution might be for me to write to Mr. ... DCI making it clear that we naturally interpreted the phrase "major information projects or new initiatives" in paragraph 4 of Mr. Mooney's directive as applying to projects or initiatives of the Information Adviser; but that we would naturally expect the other members of the JASWG (and indeed of the existing Joint Information Policy Committee) to bear in mind the interests of the FCO when considering any major information project or new initiative which might have foreign policy implications.

4. It was left that Mr. Mooney would send me copies of the minutes about this which he has addressed to Mr. ... DCI, in the light of which I would consider writing to Mr. ... DCI in the foregoing sense.

5. He also asked about his formal status. Was he now seconded to the NIO? I said the NIO (ie Home Office) were still paying us for his services and his formal position thus remained unchanged.
unchanged. I saw no need to spell this out any further in the directive. I said we continued to attach importance to the continuation of the existing informal liaison direct between him and IRD, and hoped he would continue to visit us for informal consultations regularly as in the past.

T C Barker

19 January 1973
There is a possibility that I might be leaving Northern Ireland in July, October or December.

July: There is a chance that the new Director of Army Information Services in Northern Ireland might prefer not to have me working at HQNI. Such a decision would presumably have to be taken after consultation with the GOC and DCI. There is of course a possibility that DCI might wish me to work from Stormont Castle, under him or Keith McDowall.

October: I anticipate seeking to work out a relationship with Broderick between now and October. If this does not work, for whatever reason, then it would be logical time for me to leave. This personally would suit me very well, since I can take up life in London more easily in the autumn than any other time.

December: By then I shall have worked two and two thirds years in Northern Ireland and would welcome a change. I would hope to have worked out a practical working relationship for an IRD Officer, who could work himself into the job gradually.

I would like to feel that Broderick is not considering further weakening the Army Information effort and that he will want me to act as his adviser. However, he has at least three worries, which I have reported to DCI with the aim of discussing them with him next week and subsequently with Broderick and the GOC.

These worries can be expressed in three demands that Broderick will want granted before he can start cooperating with me:

1. He wants me under command
2. He wants to know what I am doing, particularly in "black propaganda".
3. He wants to have a brief to conduct all aspects of the army information war, including political or psychological warfare.

I have recommended that all these demands should be met for the following reasons:

1. It is impossible to operate through the Army PR service without the approval of the head of the Army information effort. I should also welcome one boss, who sees me at work, rather than the present system, where I have several bosses, who hardly see anything of what I do, simply because they are not in HQNI.

2. "Black propaganda" is unlikely ever to be used by the Army in Northern Ireland and certainly never has been in the past. The charge that the Army is involved in this activity is a tribute to the efficacy of IRA propaganda, the misconception of the IRD Departmental brief and my directive and the concern of PR departments, who were not consulted about my appointment. I should like all reference to covert and secret operation to be dropped from my brief and all machinery for discussing such matters to be disbanded. All my activities can be easily covered by the phrase "unattributable briefing".

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3. There is a danger that people will be frightened by the proposal to conduct political warfare, especially since I am, according to some interpretations, abandoning claims to carry it out as explained in sub para 2 above. However, Broderick, I am sure, merely means that instead of Army PR being entirely responsive, it should seek to exploit events to obtain support for army tactical operations and the overall policy of HMG. In addition, he would like to go for those who oppose and encourage moderates. This is in fact the activity that I have been carrying out and which I carry out successfully under Maurice Tugwell.

My main reason for approaching the department is to alert it to the possibility that I might require employment and to my wish to start working in the department again in January. I have not discussed other possibilities, such as moving from HQN, since this is properly initiated in HIC. I have minuted to DCI and hope to discuss the whole matter with him next week.

I should be grateful if my views are not discussed with anyone except DCI, since I have minuted to him on a secret and personal basis and have taken precautions not to have the correspondence come to the notice of anyone in the Army. Geoffrey Hutton, who took over from Maurice Tugwell, is being transferred on the arrival of Broderick. He is obviously upset and has not discussed the future with me. I feel I should not let him think that I am organising the future while he is still there.
DIRECTIVE TO THE INFORMATION ADVISER TO THE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS NORTHERN IRELAND

1. The Information Adviser will be responsible to the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence, through Mr Hill, the Foreign Press Liaison Officer at Stormont Castle. He will work in close liaison with the Army PR organisation at Lisburn, where he will be physically housed. He will be a member of the Joint Ancillary Services Working Group when constituted.

2. The task of the Information Adviser will be to apply the techniques of non-attributable, and where necessary covert, propaganda in support of HMG's policy objectives in Northern Ireland and the operations of HM Forces there.

3. The main policy requirements are that he should seek:

   a. to help Army efforts to improve the image of British soldiers in Northern Ireland.

   b. to expose, discredit and thus isolate the extremists.

   c. to exploit any tendencies to disagreement and rivalry within extremist groups.

   d. to counter inaccurate and tendentious publicity and to help propagate moderate Irish opinion, both Catholic and Protestant.

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e. to persuade the large middle, moderate section of the population that they are not dependent for their protection or for the attainment of their social and political aspirations on the extremists or on the use of violence, and that these should be rejected because of the harm they do to the community and of their ultimate fruitlessness.

4. It will be the Information Adviser’s responsibility to clear major information projects or new initiatives with the DCI through Mr Hill, or his successor as co-ordinator of the JASWG, who will ensure that other departmental interests are taken into proper account, especially those of the FCO as regards British relations with foreign powers.

GOC 24
8 Jan 73
9 April 1891

Dear Mrs B [FCO Information Dept. Official]

Could you let Hubert have a copy of both pieces?

Hopy you get my drift: PB was hatchet man for Army PR which set out to destroy Ip but then took it over and destroyed it because of inexpence, if not worse.

Regards

Hugh
A brief review of Chapman Pincher's latest book: 
'The Truth About Dirty Tricks'
Published by Sidgwick & Jackson

This book is a mess. It can only be described even remotely as heavyweight on account of its size. Instead of being a serious study of Intelligence dirty tricks, it is mostly a rehash of old and unreliable hearsay, some of which Pincher attributes to people who are long dead and can no longer defend themselves or verify what he attributes to them. Not surprisingly, most of his ire is directed at Peter Wright whose much publicised court appearance in Australia highlighted Pincher's questionable financial dealings with him during the production of the book, 'Their Trade is Treachery'.

The unsavoury nature of Pincher's own arrogance is only surpassed by his attempts to denounce some of those whom he previously boasted were his close confidants, such as Sir Maurice Oldfield and Peter Wright. In his conversion to the gospel of MI5, which appears to be even more dramatic than that of St Paul on the road to Damascus, Pincher now asserts that he was misled by these erstwhile 'friends' and sources. There was, he now claims, never any MI5 plot against Harold Wilson, and his offices and 'phones were never bugged.

Ironically, only four years ago, Pincher was interviewed at length for The London Hotel Magazine in which he is quoted as saying:

"You can go through the files of the Express and my books and you won't find any wrong information. I don't ever remember getting a bum steer".

In Chapter 16 of his new book, Pincher claims that he is confident he knows the truth about my case. He then proceeds to present an account which contains false claims, unsupported assertions, innuendo and inaccuracies, and systematically excludes almost every item of the freely available evidence which conflicts with the version he wishes to present. Not only does he get much of the already published detail wrong, but also he misrepresents nearly all of the remaining 'facts'.

In researching the book, Pincher, who claims to be a serious researcher, did not take the trouble to contact me or my solicitor to check any of the details in his account and one must conclude, therefore, that either he could not be bothered to make the effort or that he was aware of the correct information and decided 'not to allow it to get in the way of a good story'.

He begins his book by claiming that:

"A dirty trick can be defined as an action carried out by an individual or group against another for the purpose of inflicting damage, usually surreptitiously and in a manner regarded as reprehensible in normal circumstances, the dirt being in the eye of the receiver".
After reading chapter 16, one is forced to the conclusion that, by the same definition, Pincher's grotesque account of my case is itself a 'dirty trick', or, to use the correct technical term, disinformation.

Despite the fact that he makes generous use of the material contained in Paul Foot's book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace', he appears to be quite incapable of copying the facts correctly and happily substitutes assertion for fact where there are any gaps. After all, why bother about the correct facts when you can make them up!

Here are just a few examples:

Page 160:

"Two years later (1968), when he was twenty-five and still working from his home in Randalstown, a senior Army officer who had spotted his enthusiasm asked him if he would like to work as a Army Press Officer....."

FACT:

I had moved from Randalstown thirteen years earlier, in 1955, and had not lived there after that.

Page 160:

"In the following year (1973) the new Head of the Army Information Services, Peter Broderick, whom I had known at Defence Ministry headquarters in London, decided to allocate Wallace more definitively to what was known as Information Policy. This was the mutation moment in Wallace's career. He was to engage in highly secret and controversial work...."

FACT:

The use of the words "was to" is thoroughly misleading in that it conceals the fact that I had been working for Information Policy from 1971. Peter Broderick's re-organisation of the Army Information Services, which transferred me to Information Policy, was, as he told the Civil Service Appeal Board, simply making formal and arrangement that had existed on an informal basis for several years. The MOD and the security services had, therefore, three years experience of my work with that unit before I was formally transferred to it on promotion. It is significant that neither MOD nor the security services prevented that transfer.
"Clockwork Orange attempted to link the IRA with the KGB and other foreign intelligence agencies supplying weapons and explosives. Wallace, for example, had the task of planting a false story that had been seen off the Irish coast and had landed three Russians."

FACT:

The Soviet submarine story was, as the relevant press cuttings show, published in 1972, two years before the 'Clockwork Orange' project was created.

Page 162:

"I have not been able to establish whether Ministers were told about Information Policy."

FACT:

As Pincher is aware, Merlyn Rees has repeatedly stated in Parliament and in the media that during his time as Northern Ireland Secretary and Home Secretary he was not aware that Information Policy existed ie at least five years after it was formed! To make matters worse, Mr Rees is on record as saying that when my case arose in early 1975 he was told by a senior MI5 officer at the Stormont that I was a "filing clerk". I wonder if Pincher can explain why MI5 should have lied to the Secretary of State about the nature of my work?

Similarly, Roy Mason has repeatedly denied that he was aware of Information Policy during his time as Defence Secretary or Northern Ireland Secretary.

Page 162:

"Information Policy was largely an Army and Defence Intelligence Service operation."

FACT:

Information Policy was staffed by the Army and the Information Research Department. During my time at HQ Northern Ireland none of the staff belonged to Defence Intelligence. Pincher's failure to mention the IRD involvement is very interesting because of the key input the department made to the unit and the fact that its presence there has been widely reported over the past years.

Page 163:

"It is certain that Wallace was involved in the rather crude
concoction of a diary of a disaffected IRA man, supposed to have been secured in a raid on an IRA house".

FACT:

The above comment indicates that Pincher does not understand even the basic parts of my story. The "diary of the disaffected IRA man", to which he erroneously refers, was in fact the first part of 'Clockwork Orange'. That particular episode was accurately reported in ITV's 'This Week' programme on 26 April 1990.

Page 167:

"His files apparently contained a copy of a forged letter to Merlyn Rees implicating him, quite incredibly, in contributing to the IRA fund Noraid. He showed it to journalists but there is no evidence that it came from any British official source".

FACT:

Although the letter to which he refers was reproduced in Paul Foot's book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace', Pincher does not even get the name of the alleged organisation correct. The letter purported to come from the 'American Congress for Irish Freedom' and not 'Noraid', as he claims. Also, contrary to what he says, I did not show it to any journalist, and I would challenge Pincher to name any reporter who was shown it by me during the 1970s. In fact, I only obtained a copy of the letter from a press source in 1987, when it was identified by a former colleague as an item from the 'Clockwork Orange' files. For good measure, Pincher claims that the document could have been an IRA forgery! Not surprisingly, Pincher fails to explain why the IRA should have wished to discredit Merlyn Rees at a time when Mr Rees had initiated various political initiatives, including the release of internees and political dialogue with Sinn Fein, is beyond me. I cannot recall any instance during my seven years at Army Headquarters when the IRA produced forged documents, let alone one of the quality of the one referred to. It is surprising, however, that Pincher does not comment on the origin of other forgeries such as the 'Bloody Sunday' one listing MPs David Owen, Stan Orme, Tony Benn, Paul Rose and Merlyn Rees; the one purporting to be Denis Healey's opinion of the Common Market or the Labour Party's election pamphlet. All of these were produced to a standard far beyond the technical or professional abilities of the Army Information Services.

Page 168:

"One note expresses his view that the next general election
would be dominated by personality factors, and that every effort should be made to exploit character weaknesses such as financial, sexual or political misbehaviour. It was followed by names such including Wilson, Heath, Maudling, Pym, Rees, Benn and Foot".

FACT:

Total rubbish! The note did not express my personal view in any way. As Paul Foot makes clear in his book, my handwritten notes were nothing more than extracts from documents passed to me in connection with 'Clockwork Orange'. As Pincher himself admits, he has never met me and, therefore, has no idea what my personal view of the named politicians was. It is, therefore, nothing short of disinformation for him to claim otherwise.

Page 170:

"Wallace claims that his MI5 contact, who used the pseudonym John Shaw, was asked to produce an analysis of the likely consequences if Ian Paisley was assassinated. This would have been a reasonable request is 'Shaw' was thinking of Paisley's possible assassination by the IRA, but Wallace seems to have indicated to Paul Foot that MI5 was planning to do it".

FACT:

The can be no justification for Pincher making such a claim. Paul Foot makes it clear in his book that the scenario for Ian Paisley's assassination was "a souped-up feud between rival Protestant factions".

This is yet another piece of disgraceful disinformation by Pincher.

Page 171:

"Evidence of Wallace's state of mind is contained in an essay, 'Ulster - a State of Subversion', which he admits we wrote himself. His own conclusion was that.....". This was Wallace's own thinking.

FACT:

Once again, Pincher is writing absolute rubbish. The "essay" to which he refers was part of 'Clockwork Orange' and did not reflect my own thinking. Indeed, the documents from which the "essay" was constructed are still in my possession and it is clear from them that the original material did not emanate from Northern Ireland. In other words, my role in
the production of the "essay" was similar to that of a sub-
editor. The "essay" was, as Pincher knows, later used by
Airey Neave to form the basis of a speech which he gave at
Seaton Delaval, Northumberland, on 10 September 1976.

Page 172:

"The commanders involved at the time, General Sir Peter Leng,
who was keen on psyops operations, and General Sir Frank
King, have been quoted by a Ministry of Defence spokesman as
saying that they were not aware of anything called Clockwork
Orange".

FACT:

Although Pincher is keen to quote the anonymous MOD
spokesman, he deliberately ignores the report which was
published in the Sunday Times on 18 February 1990 and
withdrawn from later editions following the intervention of
the Ministry of Defence. Below are extracts of the tape
recorded telephone conversation between Barrie Penrose of the
Sunday Times and General Sir Peter Leng which led to the
story. The telephone call begins with Barrie Penrose reading
to the General an extract from page 28 of Paul Foot's book,
'Who Framed Colin Wallace', in which Paul Foot refers to
General Leng and the 'Clockwork Orange' project.

Transcript:

PENROSE: ....And how many people would have known about
Clockwork Orange? Would it ... I am just
wondering...

LENG: Well, I think the senior Intelligence officer would
have known. Broderick [Chief Information Officer]
would have known. Mike [Len] Garrett [Chief of
Staff HQ Northern Ireland]...

PENROSE: ...The actual operation, I mean Clockwork Orange,
when it was first muted was in fact Denis Payne -
several people have mentioned that - who was at
NIO [MIS - Chief of Intelligence N Ireland].

LENG: That's right. There was of course that branch as
well. NIO would come in and cross fertilise if
they wanted to keep something from the RUC - don't
quote me again.

PENROSE: ....No, of course. It's just to see how, if you
would forgive me, how the bureaucracy works. So,
Clockwork Orange in this case comes from Denis
Payne's office, so it's Intelligence to
Intelligence, and then you're shown it...
LENG: I'm not always shown it. Only if they need to involve someone at a higher level.

PENROSE: Right....... 

PENROSE: ........Clockwork Orange was policy. This sounds like a statement rather than a question, but a statement asking for confirmation.

LENG: And Clockwork Orange was policy

PENROSE: ....So, you knew obviously there was a five [MI5] involvement in Clockwork Orange, but you obviously wouldn't have known ....

LENG: The detail.

PENROSE: The detail.

LENG: Correct.

It is difficult to reconcile the comments contained in the above transcript extracts with those of the MOD spokesman. Surely, anyone seeking after the truth, as Pincher claims to be, would have taken the trouble to listen to the tape recordings and reported on their contents, if only to achieve a balanced report.

Page 174:

"Some of the leaks seemed so pointless that Major General John Woodrow, another friend of mine who was in charge of Army Security at the time, was concerned about Wallace's motives".

FACT:

Like many of Pincher's alleged sources in Intelligence and Security, Major General Woodrow is now dead and cannot therefore confirm Pincher's claims. It is interesting, however, that Pincher fails to mention that General Woodrow had previously been Director of Army Public Relations and had played a key role in the setting up of the psychological operations unit in Northern Ireland. Even more interesting, is the fact that one of the most senior officers in the Directorate of Army Security at that time had joined the Directorate from Northern Ireland where he had worked closely with MI5. In particular, he ran an agent named James Miller who infiltrated 'Tara', the Loyalist paramilitary group linked with the Kinora child sex scandal. Last year, the BBC's 'Public Eye' programme broadcast details of how MI5 had covered up the sex assaults on children in the Home and had refused to co-operate with the Government inquiry set up.
under Sir George Terry. In an interview with the Sunday Times in 1987, Miller admitted that his Intelligence handlers had instructed him to help foment the Ulster Workers Council strike in May 1974 as a means of discrediting Harold Wilson. If General Woodrow did make the comments attributed to him by Pincher, he may well have had very good reasons for doing so. Reasons which had nothing to do with my alleged motives. Pincher's amnesia about such matters is truly remarkable!

Page 174:

"He (Wallace) says that he became concerned about the salacious material he was receiving about Wilson and Marcia during the election in October and handed over his Clockwork Orange files to his MI5 contact, whom he never saw again".

FACT:

Wrong! I withdrew from Clockwork Orange in September 1974 before the General Election was even announced. My main objection was that my more and more of my time was being diverted into political disinformation rather than fighting terrorism. Only a minute quantity of the political information I handled for 'Clockwork Orange' related to Harold Wilson or Marcia Williams personally.

Page 175:

"The RUC sent detectives to see Wallace in London, where he was spending a few days acquainting himself with his new position. The confrontation took place in Grove's office and Wallace was rather shattered when told about the documents".

FACT:

As the official records prove, this is a complete distortion of what actually took place. RUC statements show that I was never interviewed in London. I was interviewed by an RUC officer and an officer from the Lancashire police at Army HQ North West District in Preston on 6 February 1975. On that occasion I could not supply the officers with information about my work because of the security implications. Subsequently, I sought and was granted a private interview with John Groves on 11 February to find out how much information about psychological operations I could give to the RUC. Contrary to what Pincher claims, no police officers were present at that meeting - or any other meeting - I had with Groves. I then contacted the Head of Lancashire Police Special Branch the following day and gave him details about the background to the incident.
Page 176:

"He (Wallace) should have remained at home, but continued to frequent the office to the annoyance of those Army men who knew the circumstances".

FACT:

This is another example of Pincher's failure to get even simple facts of the story correct. During the time I was suspended from duty, I continued to live, at MOD's request, in the Officers Mess at Army HQ, North West District. The Headquarters was then located in an old country house known as Cuerdon Hall and comprised the headquarters offices, the officers mess and the GOC's residence. The MOD asked me to remain there for two reasons: to give the appearance of normality to any journalist inquiring about my whereabouts; to enable me to avoid having to return to my home in Northern Ireland where I would have had easy access to the Press. Even Pincher must realise that it would have been very easy for the Army to exclude me from the Headquarters has they really wanted to do so!

Page 176:

"Seemingly unable to desist from meddling, Wallace says that in July 1976 he wrote to Airey Neave, the MP who was later assassinated by the IRA in the precincts of Parliament. He claims that speeches which Neave made were based on material which he supplied....."

FACT:

This is another complete distortion of the facts, as Airey Neave's letters to me show. I contacted Airey Neave at his request in 1976. I do not simply "claim" that Airey Neave used my material in speeches, a letter to me from Mr Neave in August 1976 requested me to update one of the 'Clockwork Orange' disinformation papers, 'Ulster - a State of Subversion' - for use by him in a political speech on 10 September that year. Pincher is well aware of that fact and that I still have the original handwritten letter sent to me by Neave. Press cuttings relating to the speech show that Mr Neave did use the material. Similarly, an examination of further disinformation documents shows that other material from my collection was used in a speech by Mr Neave the Young Conservatives in Brighton on 6 August 1976 and in a Conservative Party paper about Northern Ireland issued in September that year.

Furthermore, as Mr Neave's other letters to me show, I continued to do work for him during the following year until
I moved from London to Sussex. Pincher does not explain why, given Airey Neave's excellent contacts with the Intelligence Services, he continued to work with me and use my disinformation material at a time when, according to Pincher, I was regarded as a security risk by MI5 and others with whom Mr Neave was in regular contact.

Page 177:

"On 5 August, after reading the row caused by my report of the alleged bugging of 10 Downing Street, Wallace wrote to Lord Wilson assuring that his fears that MI5 were trying to discredit him and undermine his position were justified, and claiming that he had been part of the plot. He gave examples and claims that he asked for an interview with Wilson. He received no reply".

FACT:

I wrote to Sir Harold Wilson, as he then was, on 2 August 1977 following the publication of an article in the Sunday Observer (not by Pincher!) about the former Prime Minister's concerns about MI5. Marcia Williams (Lady Falkender) wrote to me on 5 August asking for details of my allegations which she could forward to Sir Harold who was then on holiday in the Scilly Isles. I did forward the details to her and she confirmed that she had received the material. More recently, in a letter to me dated 23 February 1987 she wrote:

"I did indeed reply to you in 1977 but I am afraid your letter to Lord Wilson has now gone into storage with all his papers".

The fact that I wrote to Harold Wilson in 1977 about attempts by MI5 to undermine him and his Government is important because Pincher and others who have tried to discredit my claims have insinuated that I only made such allegations after Peter Wright's became public or after I was convicted in 1980. In particular, Pincher ignores the fact that my London solicitor and I met with Labour junior minister, Roland Moyle, in January 1976 and repeated the allegations to him.

Page 179:

"The Ministry had also failed to disclose the full nature of Wallace's authorised work at the hearing. The brief document giving the full description of Wallace's task was classified because it mentioned his involvement in disseminating disinformation, though without any mention of Clockwork Orange, and the Board members did not have the security clearance to read it".
FACT:

This is simply nonsense. As the written statements made at the Appeal by the Deputy Director of Army Public Relations and the Institution of Professional Civil Servants show, the Board was told that I did have a job description which was classified 'secret' and that I was involved in disinformation or 'black propaganda'. The members of the Board, as former senior civil servants, were cleared to receive classified information, but the MOD denied that any second classified job description existed! In other words the MOD misled the Board to discredit the evidence provided by the DDPR (A) and the IPCS, not because the true facts were classified, but because some psychological operations were unlawful and/or 'unconstitutional'.

On the one hand, Pincher claims that Clockwork Orange was "actually of such small significance that little could be recalled of it at the Ministry of Defence" (page 168) yet on the other hand he asserts that my work was so sensitive that "the Board members did not have the security clearance to read it" (page 179).

Throughout his highly selective account, Pincher is at great pains to try to distance MI5 from Clockwork Orange, and in page 174 he says: "it is inconceivable to me that MI5 was authorising his (Wallace's) activities".

Here again, Pincher's selective reporting is obvious. Documents submitted to David Calcutt show that on 29 September 1975 I wrote to the Institution of Professional Civil Servants about my Appeal and amongst the comments I made were:

'The Security Service officer who typed the anti-Wilson draft is .......... She can be contacted on the Lisburn Military number, but her home address is 4 Trayherne Gardens, Lisburn. Tel: Lisburn .... The enclosed document 'supporting' the Wilson-Rees revolutionary leadership is another forgery and purports to come from the 'Workers League'. I do not know who did the actual forgery, but it was supplied to me with the other material from Stormont Castle'.

I would be very interested to know how an MI5 officer was involved in typing the first draft of 'Clockwork Orange', which contained disinformation about Harold Wilson, without MI5 knowing anything about it! Indeed, if I had been engaged in any unauthorised disinformation activity, I would not have involved a member of MI5 in its production. Moreover, the fact that a major part of the project was completed and typed by MI5 shows that the project was not as he claims stopped after a short time. In fact, it lasted for some 10 months.

Pincher's portrayal of John Groves' role in the case is particularly misleading:
"While the Information Policy exercise was in progress, the Chief of Public Relations at the Ministry of Defence in London, John Groves, had not been regularly informed by the Army about it. When he got wind of the way his staff were abusing their contact with journalists to plant disinformation he objected, verbally and in writing, to the Civil Service chief at the Defence Ministry, Sir James Dunnett, and to the Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Carrington".

He goes on to say:

"At that stage, both Dunnett and Carrington declined to interfere. Groves was to persevere with his objections".

"John Groves assured me that he had never heard anything about it" (Clockwork Orange).

"In the middle of September (1974), Sir Frank Cooper, the Civil Service chief at Stormont, had taken a decision that Information Policy must stop and, in particular, that Wallace must be removed. Cooper had been under sustained pressure from John Groves, the Defence Ministry's Chief of Public Relations, and had also received reports about Wallace's conduct from Army Security. He held a meeting with Sir Michael Carey, the Defence Ministry's Permanent Secretary, and Groves, in Carey's office in London; agreement was reached that the Army should revert to its proper role in support of the civil power and that it should not be allowed to go on 'doing its own thing, in the disinformation field'".

In the three extracts quoted above, Pincher gives the impression that for at least a year before I was finally moved from Northern Ireland, the Head of MOD PR was greatly concerned about the activities of Information Policy in general and my role in it in particular, yet he was totally unable to control or move his own staff! That is pure fantasy. Had Groves wished to move me out of Northern Ireland at any time he could have done so without any warning and certainly without having to consult either the Defence Secretary or the Defence Permanent Under Secretary. In any event, he had accepted the reorganisation of Army Public Relations in Northern Ireland in 1974 in which Information Policy was incorporated into the Army Information Services for the purposes of cover. Part of that reorganisation included the creation of my new post and the publication of my false job description!
Moreover, Pincher is at pains to conceal from readers the fact that I was promoted to Senior Information Officer in September 1974 to fill a long-term psychological operations post in Northern Ireland. My promotion was approved by John Groves and without any objection from the security services. Had Groves or the security wished, they could have filled the post with another officer or refused to establish it.

Furthermore, as Pincher well knows, had the security services been concerned about my behaviour at any time, not only would they have moved me out of the Province instantly but also they would have blocked my appointment to such a sensitive post. They could also have withdrawn my security clearance. However, if Pincher’s allegations had been true, it is inconceivable that Army security or MIS would have allowed me to take up a post of similar grade at an Army headquarters in England.

Pincher’s account of Groves’ role in the case has the distinct smell of disinformation about it and this becomes more obvious when one reads a report which was published in The Observer on 4 February 1990 in which Peter Broderick, Deputy Director of Army Public Relations at the Ministry of Defence in 1974, is quoted as saying:

“A few days before Wallace’s Appeal, the chief of public relations for the MOD [Groves] in London spoke to me on the phone.

He told me: ‘You know this Wallace chap is an active member of a militant volunteer force. He is an active terrorist, a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force’. The suggestion was laughable - that sort of thing would have been known about”.

Pincher’s account of what was going on during this period is also damned by several other factors. During the period when Groves was allegedly wringing his hands in despair about what action to take to stop Information Policy, I was twice recommended by Army Headquarters in Lisburn for the MBE for my work. This was confirmed to Paul Foot by my superiors of the period when he was researching his book. Also in 1974, when this alleged security panic about my activities was at its height, my superiors, including the Chief of Staff at Army Headquarters, wrote the following comments in my Annual Confidential Report that year:

Assessment of Performance: ‘Outstanding’

'Mr Wallace's main aim is to feed stories to the press and to influence their writing. He does this better than anyone I have ever met'.

(Note: This contrasts sharply with what Pincher says at page 163: )
"Contrary to the recent media view, Wallace was not much good at inducing seasoned journalists to swallow the disinformation and print it in good faith").

Special Factor: 'His total dedication and sheer professionalism'.

Professional Knowledge: 'He teaches the rest of us'.

Next Job: 'He wishes to remain in Northern Ireland. He is irreplaceable.'

Opinion: 'One of the most effective personal contributions of any to the standing and reputation of the Army in these troubles. For knowledge, loyalty, professionalism, Mr Wallace is in a class of his own'.

At my Appeal in October 1975, Peter Broderick told the hearing:

"I do not hesitate to say that Colin Wallace is the best thing that ever happened to Army Public Relations in Northern Ireland; that had it not been for his talents, knowledge and efforts the Army could well have won the propaganda war; and I could not wish to meet anyone more dedicated to the Army than he was and, so obviously, still is".

Pincher is, of course, well aware of the above documents and I have no doubt he knows David Calcutt QC confirmed their existence at the MOD. The fact that Pincher suppressed such information from his account raises major questions about not only the credibility of his account, but also his motives.

Page 174:

"His (Wallace's) telephones at home and in his office were tapped".

FACT:

It would have been physically and technically impossible to tap my home telephone for the simple reason that I never had a telephone installed there. Moreover, I had not lived at my home from 1970 until I left the Province in 1975.

Another example of his slanted reporting of my story is given at page 164 where he attempts to create a mystery over information about Operation Motorman which I gave to Angus Macpherson, the Defence Correspondent of the Daily Mail.

In simple terms the Army was anxious not to be involved another 'Bloody Sunday' type incident when it moved into the Bogside area of Londonderry - until then, a 'no-go' area.
As a result, I was tasked by the Colonel Maurice Tugwell, Colonel GS Information Policy, and the Commander Land Forces to ensure that IRA would withdraw across the Border before the Operation began, rather than risk a gun battle in a built up area in which innocent civilians might be killed. This was done by a series of planted 'leaks' with a number of journalists to indicate the scale of the operation and the fact that converted tanks were to be used to breach the barricades. The ploy was a great success in that the IRA did run and the Army removed the barricades without opposition or casualties. The fact that Pincher should try to attach some sinister motive to this activity without even taking the trouble to ask me about it is a further indication of his true intentions.

Pincher's selective amnesia about my story is particularly acute when it comes to dealing with disinformation which he himself published. In page 163 he says:

"According to Wallace, quoted in a book by Paul Foot, I am supposed to have published in the Daily Express in March 1972 some of his faked information, suggesting that American ex-Vietnam soldiers might be recruited to fight with the IRA as mercenaries. I have no record of it, but if I did run such a story it was given to me by a Defence Ministry source in London for I have never met Wallace or had any contact with him or with the Ulster office".

To show that Pincher's records are incomplete, I attach a copy of the article to which Paul Foot refers. The story certainly did originate at Lisburn, with the help of IRD, and if Pincher did obtain it from MOD sources then it only reinforces my claim that the dissemination of such material was not confined to my office!

In defence of MIS, Pincher attempts to explain away the various forged documents and papers relating to my story, but he is at pains to avoid dealing with some of the more interesting ones. Here is a short selection:

Document 1.

SINN FEIN ARD FHEIS 1971 - RESOLUTIONS. This document is a forged copy of the resolutions submitted to the Sinn Fein Annual Party Conference in 1971. At the top right hand corner of the front page it bears the handwritten words "File under Sinn Fein IRA". The handwriting is that of the former Information Adviser to the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland - a member of the Information Research Department (IRD). Resolutions 34 and 35 falsely purport to ask that the Irish Communist Party should be permitted to join Sinn Fein and that Sinn Fein members be permitted to take part in the activities of the Irish Communist Party. In this context, resolution 67 proposes that Sinn Fein and the British Labour Party jointly publish a booklet against full membership of the EEC. That resolution is also a forgery.
Document 2.

'ADDENDUM TO THE 'IRELAND TODAY' DOCUMENT - JUNE 1969'. In paragraph 5 of page two of this document it says:

"There was unanimous agreement on the need for a 'national liberation front' type of movement; there was some unease at the use of the word 'front', so henceforth we use the term 'movement' and refer to the concept by the label NLM for short. There was, naturally, unanimous support of the vote catching 'Clann road', seeking the Labour alliance with British Labour Party under its present Communist leadership".

This document is significant in that the above forged section purports to show that there was an agreed policy by Sinn Fein to link up with the Labour Party in Britain for joint activity as early as 1969 - the year the present Ulster unrest began.

Again on page 3, paragraph 3, the document claims:

"The radical groups include such bodies as the Communist Party of Northern Ireland, the Irish Workers' Party and Connolly Youth Movement, as well as a number of groups such as the Irish Communist Organisation, the People's Democracy and the British Labour Movement".

Document 3.

'AMERICAN AID FOR NORTHERN "REFUGEES" GOES TO IRA'. This document, produced by the Information Adviser to the GOC and bearing his handwriting, contains the following section on page 4:

"Among those who have received funds from the AOH [Ancient Order of Hibernians] was John Hume the SDLP MP as Chairman of the Northern Ireland Resurgence Trust Fund received 10,000 dollars for non-sectarian distribution on housing, factories and job training. The payment was made in 1970 (see bank account). It would be remarkable if the money could be spent in the manner envisaged by the AOH, since these areas were and remain the responsibility of Government. In 1971, the Roman Catholic Primate of all Ireland, Cardinal Conway, received 10,000 dollars for non-sectarian relief. A similar sum went to Maynooth College, Dublin, for relief. It is not known how these funds are administered".

There is little doubt that this document smears John Hume MP by insinuating that he misappropriated money which had been sent to him from the United States for 'relief' work in Northern Ireland, and gave it to the Provisional IRA.

Document 4.

'SOVIETS INCREASE CONTROL OVER BRITISH COMMUNISTS'. This is a
draft unattributable press briefing document which bears the
Information Adviser’s handwriting on it in a number of places.
The document deals with a visit by senior Soviet officials to the
Communist Party of Great Britain and contains the following
extracts:

".....The consultants on this occasion were not, however, McKinsey
or Urwick Orr. They were an exceedingly high-powered delegation
from the Soviet Union who visited their failing British comrades
with the full knowledge of the British Government and their
friends in the Parliamentary Labour Party........

.....The Soviet delegation came to examine the whole structure
and leadership of the British Party. They were headed by I V
Kapitonov, Secretary of the Soviet Central Committee and a leading
expert on administration........

.....Another person whose stern eyes looked gloomily at our own
Communist party were V M Tsybulko, First Secretary of the Kiev
Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. He was
accompanied by B I Gostev, a member of the important Central
Auditing Commission and an 'Agit-Prop' man; Z M Kruglove, another
top auditing man and a major figure in Leningrad; N V Matkovskiy,
a 'security' boss, and V K Kekrasov, deputy chief editor of
Pravda........

.....Although the inquisitors were accompanied by three
interpreters, no doubt Mr Matkovskiy used his fluent English; he
was, after all, at one time a KGB agent in the United
States........

.....Mr Gostev, for example, helped purge the unfortunate Czechs.
His presence must have caused considerable unease to Mr Tony
Wedgewood Benn's long-time friend, John Gollan, and his
colleagues........

.....Mr Matkovskiy had a long chat with the golden boy of British
industrial relations, Mr Jimmy Reid. This was one interview that
did not take place before television........

.....Comrade Matkovskiy, an expert on Irish affairs, apparently
made clear his dissatisfaction at the lack of good liaison between
the party and those Labour MPs who maintain close links with Sinn
Fein........

.....The examiners pointed out that since Cuba is the IRA
revolutionary model for an all-Ireland socialist republic, the KGB
has employed the Cuban Direccin General de Inteligencia in
furtherance of Irish exploits........

.....In terms of espionage, the party is, of course, a non-
starter and has to rely almost entirely on friends within the
Parliament. It is within the unions that Mr Gollan and his
colleagues will undoubtedly have been able to draw a strong
argument for progress and efficiency. Trotskyists and anarchists
may have a new appeal to students and intellectuals, but in
industry there is no more determined, efficient and persistent
group of politically motivated men than the Communists....

......The Soviet examining body paid tribute to the excellent
contacts built up in the past between Labour Party activists and
the Soviet Trade Delegation in London. In particular they spoke
warmly of the work done by Harold Wilson during his four years at
the Board of Trade and his help in enabling the Soviet Government
to purchase the latest Rolls Royce engines (Derwent and Nene) in
1947. This spirit of co-operation said the inquisitors did much
to foster the good relations that have existed between the Soviet
people and British workers since the end of the war......

......Needless to say the Soviet visitors forgot to tell their
unquestioning hosts that the Soviet Trade Delegation for whom
Wilson and his friends had played 'Santa Claus' was the main front
for Soviet Intelligence operations in Britain......

......Communists need their industrial folk heroes, and they
haven't had one in Britain for some time. The events of the Upper
Clyde have, however, given Jimmy Reid and the philosophy of sit-
is an aura of fashion. The Soviet delegation were impressed by
the success of Mr Reid and his colleagues at winning the battle
and forcing the Conservative Government to invest millions in a
spot by the river which is too shallow to build large tankers of
the future....."

The document is clearly a smear on the Parliamentary Labour Party
in general and Harold Wilson and Tony Benn in particular. It is
also significant that an extract from it was published in the
Daily Telegraph on 6 September 1976 as a quotation from a paper by
John Biggs-Davison MP, 'The Strategic Implications for the West of
the International Links of the IRA in Ireland'. Moreover, the
handwritten editing on the document by the Information Adviser to
the GOC adds to the political smear material rather than reduces
it!

Document 5.

'I CHALLENGE TED HEATH' by Karen Cooper. This 32 page document,
bearing the official stamp of the Army Information Services and
the handwriting of one of its senior officers, was one of a number
of anti-Heath items held by the Army Information Services at
Lisburn in 1974 and had allegedly been produced by the woman who
threw ink over Edward Heath at Egmont Palace, Brussels, on 22
January 1972. The leaflet, which carries a fake photograph of Mr
Heath in women's clothes and seated on a park bench with Jeremy
Thorpe bearing the caption, 'Should there be a place for Heath in
politics?', is a very expensively produced propaganda item. It
begins by claiming:
"Heath is unfit for the responsibilities of political life. Knowing the facts about Heath at close hand and having observed the disastrous effect of his homosexuality on his political leadership, I feel I have duty to bring into the open these facts about Ted Heath and force him to resign as leader of the Tory Party, to hand over the reins to another person and to retire from political life".

I have no idea who produced the document, but it is difficult to justify why it should have been held by Army Public Relations!

**Document 7.**

**BANK STATEMENT - REV IAN PAISLEY MP.** This forged document purports to be a montage of financial documents belonging to the Rev Ian Paisley MP. I was also aware of another forged bank statement purporting to belong to John Hume MP (see Document 3) above. The Rev Paisley has already confirmed publicly that disinformation based on this document was in circulation in Northern Ireland during the mid 1970s.

The above is only a selection of political disinformation material which can be shown to have been in circulation within Army Headquarters Northern Ireland during the mid-1970s. Bearing in mind that some of the documents bear the handwriting of the Information Adviser to the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland, who was also a member of the Information Research Department it is absurd for Pincher to claim that the security services were not engaged in political disinformation against elected politicians during the 1974 general elections.

In attempting to explain away my handwritten notes, Pincher claims:

"It has been suggested that the whole of the Notes in Wallace's hand were written recently in an attempt to bolster his frame-up story".

Pincher then quite deliberately ignores the various forensic examinations which were carried out independently at the request of the Press on those documents. This is a very odd omission for a writer with a scientific background to make. For example, he fails to tell his readers that one of the world's leading experts on dating inks and papers, Dr Julius Grant, examined the notes and confirmed that they were entirely consistent with having been written in 1974. When asked by Channel 4 TV News about the possibility that they had been forged he replied that a forger would have to have had a knowledge of inks and papers greater than his!

Similarly, two of Britain's leading experts on typewritten documents independently examined the Clockwork Orange draft and
several other documents from my collection and confirmed that they had been produced on the same typewriters as other documents issued to the press by Army HQ Northern Ireland during the 1970s.

Pincher is equally careful to avoid any reference to the fact that I successfully undertook a polygraph examination which was carried out by the company which the Government retained as its advisers when consideration was given to the introduction of the polygraph at GCHQ. My examination covered my work for MI5 on Clockwork Orange, the source of the forged documents and the events leading up to my conviction.

Throughout the chapter relating to my case, Pincher claims that he has long been aware of the work of Information Policy in Northern Ireland and that he has spoken with senior officers who knew about 'Clockwork Orange'. In January last year, Mrs Thatcher admitted to Parliament that over the years she and her Ministers had inadvertently misled the House about my case, the nature of my work in Northern Ireland and the existence of 'Clockwork Orange'. Given the length of time that the House was repeatedly misled, is it not odd that neither Pincher nor any of his well informed sources took the trouble to point out to the Government that they were giving false information to Parliament?

Pincher appears to have great difficulty trying to fit various items of information into his thesis. In page 175 he says:

"Fisk was out, so he (Wallace) left an envelope containing a restricted document of several pages - a script for a study day in which representatives of the Army, the RUC and Ulster Defence Regiment were to be briefed on the latest situation concerning Information Policy".

Given that the document had the lowest possible security grading, 'Restricted', and that the study day included the RUC and the ÚDR, it would appear that the document and the role of Information Policy were not highly secret, especially if the "latest situation on Information Policy" to be disclosed to those with limited vetting.

In the next paragraph, however, Pincher claims:

"As Information Policy was regarded as a highly secret subject and the RUC was involved, the RUC headquarters took the matter seriously once the material was read there".

So, Information Policy is now a "highly secret subject. But wait, to add to the confusion Pincher goes on to say that an "official source" has confirmed to him that the contents of the document "were innocuous". Is it really possible to have "innocuous" details about a "highly secret" topic? Perhaps such things are possible in Pincher's world of fantasy.
Mr. Fier

Mooney

Since drafting the earlier minute, Mr. Judy Mooney has telephoned:

1) She will remind Hugh this weekend to send us the Goodmaw letters.

2) Mr. Mooney now believes that he asked Army Intelligence for material on TARA — a briefing was passed to Hugh and also to the Press Office. The material named the TARA OC, who worked at Kinona. The information is two-edged — Army Intelligence knew that the man worked at Kinona, but the information did not originate with Colin Wallace as he now claims. I shall pass to Mr. Cassell for what it is worth. [Redacted]
THE FOURTH ESTATE: HMG's RELATIONS WITH
THE MEDIA IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972-79

"What is at issue in Northern Ireland is, as we all know, at bottom a propaganda war".

Mr Merlyn Rees,
Home Secretary, letter to Mr Roy Mason of 18 March 1977
# HMG's RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1972-79

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**Information objectives, June 1976**

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FCO Docs - annotation added by the HIA Inquiry
THE FOURTH ESTATE: HMG'S RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Introduction

1. Throughout the terrorist campaign of the 1970s, HMG was engaged in a battle against the paramilitary forces on two fronts. One campaign took place in the streets and the countryside of Northern Ireland, and was directed towards the physical elimination of terrorism by the Security Forces on the ground. The second took place in the hearts and minds of the people of Northern Ireland, and on their television screens; it was directed towards persuading the public and their representatives that nothing but harm could come from continued support, active or passive, for the paramilitary forces; that in the conduct of their physical campaign, the Security Forces were the best available defenders for the community as a whole, and were upholding the law while acting themselves strictly within it; and that society should unite against those who sought to impose their ideas by force.

2. These two campaigns were inextricably linked. Success in one was impossible without success in the other. There is frequent evidence in the departmental records that this was recognised by Ministers and officials of successive governments. As the Home Secretary, Mr Merlyn Rees, told his successor as Secretary of State, Mr Mason, in 1977, "what is at issue in Northern Ireland is, as we all know, at bottom a propaganda war". Ministers of the previous Conservative administration had shown themselves no less aware of the importance of propaganda in Northern Ireland, as when the Prime Minister, Mr Edward Heath urged the NIO in August 1972 to flood the Province with psychological warriors and to spare no expense or resources in trying to win the information battle.

3. In this propaganda war, television played a rapidly increasing role. The 1970 phase of the troubles coincided with a dramatic expansion in the importance of television as a medium of mass communication in the Province. In 1959, there were only 5 minutes local television per day (on BBC Northern Ireland, receivable by 40,000 sets); by 1975, this had grown to 10 hours per week (on 3 channels, receivable by 400,000 sets). This communication explosion had far reaching implications, both for the manner in which Ministers put across to the public in Northern Ireland and elsewhere their policies towards the Province, and for the Security
Hockaday, might "impair the credibility" of Army PR's more conventional efforts, particularly as they were sometimes attributed too closely to Army sources. The FCO sought to restore balance by appointing a more experienced officer to the work, Mr—A—Ashworth, an ex-Army officer serving as regional information officer in Hong Kong; but the appointment was delayed by illness and other difficulties and never materialised. In late 1972, further controversy was created by a sensational news story based on a Soviet submarine sighted near Irish waters, implying a change in the policy of the Soviet Union in favour of supplying arms to the IRA, a line for which there was no evidence, and which had not been cleared politically. In August 1972 the GOC had successfully resisted an MOD attempt, supported by the NIO, to move Mr Mooney from Lisburn to Stormont, saying that he was "too valuable". Early in 1973, the terms of reference of the Information Adviser were re-drafted by the GOC to make clear that, following the appointment of a single Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) at Stormont Castle, the adviser would in future, while still being based at HQNI, be responsible to the DCI through the member of the Northern Ireland Office responsible for liaison with the overseas press. Mr Mooney's post eventually lapsed in 1974 without replacement; his opposite number in HQNI, a Mr Colin Wallace, was in the following year, as described below, dismissed for leaking confidential information without authority; Mr Wallace's indiscretions were instrumental in increasing the reluctance of NIO officials and Ministers during the Labour administration to consider any covert propaganda operations sympathetically.

**Information Work after Direct Rule**

17. Meanwhile the introduction of Direct Rule had other, more general effects on the official and Ministerial attitudes to information work. The change shifted the focus of information activity from Belfast to London. The NICS Information team prudently kept their heads down while waiting for a lead from their new masters in Whitehall. The NIO in London took over from the Home Office general responsibility for information work on Northern Ireland and appointed a Director of Information of their own, Mr Keith McDowall, an experienced ex-journalist who, it was envisaged, would exercise supervisory control over a unified NI Information Service operating in both Belfast and London. With the concurrence of the first Secretary of State, Mr Whitelaw, he took a conventional view of the role of the new department's information machine, concentrating on getting the arrangements for traditional and responsive press work in good repair. An early indication of this cautious attitude was seen in his...
relation to conventional civilian information work, and the need to keep separate from it any unconventional activity.

28. Two separate and unrelated developments made this outcome inevitable. The first was the Provisional IRA ceasefire, which to the NIO meant that the publicists as well as the combatants on the ground should stop firing at each other. The second was a series of damaging leaks about information policy which, as described in more detail below, were eventually traced to a civilian official in the HQNI information team, Mr Colin Wallace. In articles in the Times of 8 February and 25 March 1975, Mr Robert Fisk reported in detail, first that as a result of the Information Policy Committee's recommendations, HMG were considering a fundamental change in their information policy in Northern Ireland towards a much more aggressive stance, including inter alia committing the Army and Police in Northern Ireland to use information on the personal lives of extremist leaders in order to discredit them; and secondly, that HMG, alarmed by the controversial nature of a number of the methods canvassed, such as rumours and false posters, which he alleged had been used in the past with unfortunate results, had decided that all psychological operations activity of the kind known in the Army as "Information Policy" must be brought under close political control. A mole was clearly at work, and prudence necessarily prevailed.

29. As regards overseas information work, on the other hand, the IPCC was less inhibited by political constraints. A meeting was held in April 1975 at which Mr Cudlipp led for the NIO and MOD, COI and all interested FCO departments were represented, to improve the arrangements for presenting information overseas on policy and events in Northern Ireland, particularly the USA. Working relations with the overseas departments on these aspects were thereby for a time noticeably improved.

30. Another positive development during Mr Cudlipp's tenure of office was that in mid-1975 he became actively involved in the public relations aspects of the NIO's emergency planning for another Loyalist strike. The lessons of the UWC failure were taken to heart, and guidelines agreed for a future occasion. These included the provision at the earliest possible stage in a future emergency of a co-ordinated central briefing room manned 24 hours a day for the use of media representatives, situated close to, and in direct communication with, the new emergency operations room being established by NIO in Stormont Castle; and the conscious decision systematically to make available Ministerial and official spokesmen for frequent appearances and
RESTRICTED
SECRET

statements on television and radio. In accordance with the latter principle, on which Mr Cudlipp had strongly insisted, a later NIO(L) Emergency Planning paper on the controversial question to what extent Government should seek to control broadcasting in a very serious civil emergency, wisely concluded, after consultation with the Chairman of the D Notice Committee and the Home Office Broadcasting Department, that "a strategy of harnessing the media to our advantage would be far more constructive than any attempt to impose censorship". The physical and other emergency arrangements set in train in Belfast in accordance with this philosophy, and the policy decision to put Ministers and officials' views across to the media at every possible opportunity in a future civil emergency in Northern Ireland, stood HMIG in good stead when the Government's resolve was next put to the test during the NUAC stoppage in May 1977; the planning initiated by Mr Cudlipp must share the credit for the Government's greatly improved media performance on that occasion.

The Dangers of Private Enterprise: a case history

31. Of the two unrelated developments which have already been described as combining to make inevitable the progressive blunting by the IPCC of all the cutting edges in the Army's proposals for a more active public relations policy in late 1974 and early 1975, the more important was the Provisional IRA's ceasefire. When the Army's first drafts to the IPCC were written, the information campaign they recommended was conceived as one element in a wider strategy designed to compel the Provisionals to cease fire. By the time the IPCC had finished with the papers, the Provisionals had already ceased fire, and all NIO Ministerial and official energy was directed to encouraging them to continue; in these circumstances, a propaganda offensive was considered otiose. The contributory cause was the series of leaks to Mr Fisk of The Times of which the two already mentioned were by no means the most serious, and which between August 1974 and mid 1975 cumulatively made NIO Ministers and officials even more unsympathetic to proposals for greater propaganda activity, especially those of an unconventional type. The leaks had so clearly measurable an effect on Government attitudes towards information matters that the main sequence of events deserves briefly to be recorded.

32. On 31 August 1974, an article by Mr Fisk, The Times' ambitious and energetic staff reporter in Northern Ireland, accurately forecast Mr Rees' intention to increase the size of the RUC, the RUC Reserve and UDR, in terms clearly based on an NIO departmental submission of 29 August entitled...
"Policing in Northern Ireland". The full leak procedure was at once put in train; and following an investigation by the Security Service, suspicion centred on Mr Colin Wallace as the source of this and other leaks to Mr Fisk, notably that of material about Ministerial attitudes to the Army's involvement during the UWC strike. Mr Wallace, an Ulsterman, had been employed by the MOD since 1968 as a civilian assistant Information Officer at HQNI, Lisburn; over the years he had come to be used extensively by the Army as an unattributable press briefer, a role for which his wide knowledge of the by-ways of the local Ulster scene, particularly in the paramilitary field, and his earlier service with the UDR appeared to make him particularly suited. He worked closely with Mr Mooney during the period of the latter's appointment. As the enquiries proceeded, a confusing but disquieting pattern of relationships emerged. Both the official and the journalist were seeking to exploit their relationship to their own professional advantage; but the official was using confidential information as an inducement to the journalist to publish the kind of story which he thought would help Northern Ireland's interest. In this judgment of what to leak, he was both mistaken, and also acting without clear political guidance. There appears never to have been any question of money or corruption, and Mr Wallace's motives seem to have been those of misplaced loyalty and enthusiasm. But both he and Mr Fisk had friends in sensitive areas, and both clearly knew too much for HMG's comfort.

[Personal information considered irrelevant by the HIA Inquiry]

33. Over the six months from September 1974 onwards, the pace and damaging nature of the leaks quickened, just at the time when Mr Cudlipp was seeking, through the new IPCC machinery, to reverse the Government's public relations failure over the UWC strike and get the official information services of all the agencies involved in Northern Ireland back into good repair under unified political direction and control. In October 1974 Mr Fisk disclosed the Army's force reductions plan. In February 1975, possibly the most harmful leak of all occurred from the Information Services point of view; an article by Fisk reporting an alleged change in HMG's information policy in Northern Ireland towards more aggressive methods. A subsequent article in March
alleged that ministers, alarmed by the controversial nature of such proposals, had resolved through the IPCC to bring "information policy" under firmer control, and no longer to sanction the leading by the Army and the RUC of information on the personal lives of extremist leaders in Northern Ireland with a view to discrediting them. The RUC in due course interviewed both Fisk and Wallace. The former made the most of these police attentions in further articles in The Times; the latter in a statement to the police, mentioned with much circumspection detail a number of psychological operations with which he had been associated in the past, none of them particularly controversial, but some arguably imprudent and cumulatively indicative of the degree of latitude which he had been allowed "at a time when there was general support in Whitehall for positive steps to counter IRA propaganda." The Secretary of State, Mr Hees, duly accepted the watered-down IPCC paper on information policy, and as already described agreed with Mr Mason that there should be no "black propaganda" in Northern Ireland without Ministerial authority. The Attorney General decided that Mr Wallace should not be prosecuted at NIO's insistence, and in spite of the GOC's preference for some delay for fear of stimulating further leaks, the MOD decided to post Mr Wallace elsewhere quickly pending consideration of disciplinary charges. He finally overreached himself by returning to Northern Ireland after formally relinquishing his appointment there and putting a classified document through Mr Fisk's letter-box. He was eventually dismissed by the MOD, in spits of outspoken praise for his loyalty and diligence from his last Chief Information Officer at EGNi, Mr Peter Broderick, the author of the Army's original IPCC paper on psychological operations. The damage appeared to have been contained.

34. When Mr Cudlipp's period of appointment ended in mid-1975, the NIO decided to replace him from within the public service. They appointed Mr J G Leahy, at that time Head of News Department in the FCO, to succeed him. For the first time, the direction of the whole information effort in Northern Ireland and of the official political function there, was united in a single post of Under Secretary (Belfast) responsible both for the NIO's Political Division at Laneside and the NIO's Information Services both in Northern Ireland and London. At the same time an arrangement was agreed with the MOD and Army whereby Mr Leahy would also be responsible for "the direction and co-ordination, in consultation with the GOC, of the Army's information services under the latter's command". This was a significant innovation. The departing GOC, Sir Frank King, welcomed the appointment as "providing the right injection of much needed motivation".
35. Subsequently, the Northern Ireland Office greeted the news of Mr Wallace's appointment to the Arun Council, Sussex, with relief as the end of an unhappy chapter. Their and MOD's relief was increased when Mr Fisk's book on the UWC strike, "Point of No Return", was published at the end of 1975: it was described in an MOD minute to No 10 as "a non-event". But although the Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Defence had agreed in mid-1975 that no black propaganda should be attempted again in Northern Ireland without specific Ministerial authority, Mr Fisk continued to embarrass the Government with articles on 16 February 76 alleging the use by the Army of forged NUJ cards, and on 24 February 76 quoting alleged Army documents to the effect that the Army regarded the media as hostile. The former was an old canard, but the explanations necessitated much correspondence at Ministerial level before the story could be put to rest; the latter turned out to be based on papers written by a retired officer in a purely private capacity. Ironically for the Government, Mr Fisk received the award of Journalist of the Year for 1974 for his work in Ulster, going on to a successful career in India and the Middle East. Unhappily, the story does not end there. Mr Wallace was sentenced in 1981 to ten years imprisonment for manslaughter; the press treated him not unkindly as another victim of the Ulster conflict.

Political and Information Work under a single Under Secretary from mid-1975

36. On arrival in Belfast in mid-1975 Mr Leahy soon became aware that the Army were growing increasingly dissatisfied with what they saw as the NIO's excessively low information profile during the ceasefire and the Convention. The Secretary of State had made no major TV or radio speech since the autumn of 1974, and Ministers felt inhibited from public comment on political matters while the Convention lasted. The Gardiner Report's two sole recommendations in the information field (that it should be an offence for newspapers to publish advertisements for illegal bodies and that the BBC and IBA should re-examine their policies about contacts with, and reporting about terrorist organisations), had not been pursued. The Army's activist papers to the IPCC had been superseded by an information policy paper approved by Mr Rees which said inter alia that silence was often the best policy. The Army were not the only restive party. Mr Montgomery's "Hearts and Minds" exercise, for which in its original version a budget of £1m over 5 years had been envisaged, had seen its allocation slashed in the 1974 economies to £100,000 per annum over 5 years and then in March 1975 to £99,000 for an initial trial year only, being further
DEFENCE COMMITTEE

Third Special Report

PAPERS RELATING TO ADMINISTRATION
AND POLICY OF THE MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE IN THE CASE OF
COLIN WALLACE

Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed
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THIRD SPECIAL REPORT FROM
THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE

The Defence Committee is appointed under SO No 130 to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Ministry of Defence and associated public bodies, and similar matters within the responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

The Committee consists of a maximum of eleven Members, of whom the quorum is three. Unless the House otherwise orders, all Members nominated to the Committee continue to be members of it for the remainder of the Parliament.

The Committee has power:

(a) to send for persons, papers and records, to sit notwithstanding any adjournment of the House, to adjourn from place to place, and to report from time to time;

(b) to appoint persons with technical knowledge either to supply information which is not readily available or to elucidate matters of complexity within the Committee's order of reference;

(c) to communicate to any other Committee appointed under Standing Order No 130 and to the Committee of Public Accounts its evidence and any other documents relating to matters of common interest; and

(d) to meet concurrently with any other such Committee appointed under Standing Order No 130 for the purpose of deliberating, taking evidence, or considering draft reports.

MONDAY 13 JULY 1992

The following were nominated Members of the Committee:

Sir Nicholas Bonsor
Mr Menzies Campbell
Mr Churchill
Mr Michael Colvin
Mr Frank Cook
Sir Nicholas Fairbairn
Mr Bruce George
Mr John Home Robertson
Mr John McWilliam
Mr Neville Trotter
Mr Peter Viggers

Sir Nicholas Bonsor was elected Chairman on 15 July 1992.
THIRD SPECIAL REPORT

The Defence Committee has agreed to the following Special Report:

1. In the course of the last Parliament, the previous Select Committee carried out an inquiry into “the implications for aspects of the policy and administration of the Ministry of Defence of recently identified documents relating to Colin Wallace”. The discovery of these MoD documents had been revealed in a number of written answers and deposited papers of 30 January and 1 February 1990, and further discussed in a statement by the Secretary of State on 1 February 1990, and in subsequent debates. Over the next 12 months, MoD responded to a number of written questions from the Committee. In May 1990, the government placed in the Library the conclusions and recommendations of a report by Mr. David Heyhoe into how certain Government papers had hitherto been overlooked; and in September 1990 the advice of Mr. David Calcutt QC on the presentation of Mr. Wallace’s case to the Civil Service Appeal Board in 1975, and his recommendation on compensation. We now think it appropriate to place in the Library the information obtained by our predecessors on these and related matters, listed in the Annex.

2. We also draw the attention of the House to the constraints on Select Committees seeking to inquire into matters of this kind, in the absence of powers of access to departmental papers, and as a result of current conventions on scrutiny of the intelligence services.

ANNEX

1. Letter from the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 13 February 1990 (A81)
2. Letter from Clerk of Committee, 14 February 1990
3. Letter from the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 23 February 1990 (A91)
4. Letter from Clerk of Committee, 23 February 1990
5. Letter from the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 27 February 1990 (A95)
7. Letter from the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 30 November 1990 (B22)
8. Letter from Clerk of Committee, 12 December 1990
9. Letter from the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 11 February 1991 (B70)
10. Letter from Clerk of Committee, 13 February 1991
11. Letter from the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 11 March 1991 (B102)

The above memoranda have been reported to the House, but to save printing costs they have not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Record Office, House of Lords, and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to the Record Office, House of Lords, London SW1 (tel 071-219 3074). Hours of inspection are from 9.30 am to 5.00 pm on Mondays to Fridays.
Dear Margaret,

Since talking to you about the House of Commons Defence Committee's special report on Colin Wallace, I have had a chance to look at the documents and fear that the Ministry can be accused of misleading the Committee.

In his letter dated 14 February, the clerk to the committee asked for a copy of a document relating to TARA reproduced on page 292 of Paul Foot's Who Framed Colin Wallace. In her reply, the private secretary said: "We have not been able to establish whether this is an official document."

This is surprising since the MoD has identified the official who originated the document from his distinctive italic note which said: "Some off the cuff information on TARA for the Press." I myself recall passing the document to Wallace. Other manuscript notes on the page show that it was entered as page 45 of an Information Policy file at Headquarters Northern Ireland. All this is known to Wallace and his supporters, who can be expected to raise it. The MoD will be found to have lied and Wallace's credibility will have been increased.

Far from strengthening the Wallace case, the TARA document weakens it. The information contained in the document actually came from Mr Wallace himself as he has admitted. He actually asked me to go to "Int" to get it. Imagine my surprise when I not only got information but clearance for Press use. The first and only time such a thing happened. I assumed that Mr Wallace had been the source at the time and that I was being used as a conduit if not a Patsy.

The fact remains that Information Policy did not give clearance for any press briefing about Kincora (the name was not mentioned. The MoD has sold the pass by mentioning the name) nor about homosexuality. We were unaware of any desire to protect McGrath because he was an informer; after all, the document exposed McGrath as leader of a terrorist group. The TARA document is a classic Wallace operation involving planted information; deception of the British and unauthorised personal attacks on individuals which do nothing to advance the fight against terrorism.

The record should be put straight. Perhaps you could do something?

Yours truly,

Hugh P. Mooney
Dear Paul,

Hugh Mooney

1. We spoke about Hugh Mooney's telephone conversation with me on Friday morning during which he expressed his fear that the MOD might be accused of misleading the House of Commons Defence Committee. I enclose the letter which has now reached me, further explaining his concern.

2. Hugh believes that the official who wrote the distinctive italic note is a Mike Cunningham and that he is still employed at the MOD. I pointed out that identifying the handwriting is not the same as identifying the originator of the document nor that it was officially produced. I am not confident that he accepted this. Presumably he feels that because he can remember the origin of the document others concerned eg Mr. Cunningham, can also remember and that the information is therefore available to the MOD.

3. Para 4 of Hugh's letter contradicts the account in Paul Foot's book (p93) of how Wallace obtained the document on TARA. According to Foot, Wallace admits taking the TARA story to Intelligence at Lisburn in the summer of 1972. The account goes on to claim that "Colin heard nothing more about it until early 1973, when Information Policy was approached by Army Intelligence and asked if they could arrange for publication of a press expose about TARA" - the exact opposite of Hugh's version.

4. Hugh commented to me that the TARA document is an example of a document which looks official but which was in practice manufactured by Wallace who seemed alarmingly well-informed about certain extremists and homosexuals.
He thinks that Wallace was actually “paddling the Protestant canoe” but was never able to check his doubts.

5. Hugh is concerned about the HCDC reference and my attempts to reassure him (para 2 above) were insufficient. The problem remains that he has a number of useful contacts in journalism and legal circles - I do not know what he might do if he decides to pursue his point further. He has previously commented that, since the Wallace allegations were last publicised, he has been reading widely and believes that he has sorted it out in his mind. He is puzzled why Whitehall has not allowed a full enquiry which, he appears to believe, would have revealed the weaknesses in Wallace’s claims.

[MAPS & ]

Library and Records Department
OAB G94
Part 1

Issue 24 of the Covert Action Information Bulletin (Summer ’85) is chiefly devoted to recent activities of U.S. government agents and agents provocateurs inside radical and labour organisations: the 'anti-imperial movement', the Native American movement and one industrial dispute, are analysed as case studies. They are preceded by a long essay, The New State Repression, by Ken Lawrence, a frequent CAIB contributor and member of CAIB's Board of Advisors. In his essay, a kind of theoretical framework for the case studies which follow it, Lawrence seeks to document "striking advances (which) have emerged in the functioning of the (U.S.) secret police." For Lawrence, "by the end of the sixties it was clear to the establishment that its traditional methods of social control were weakening, and that its repressive apparatus was insufficient as a backup. A new approach was needed, one that started from scratch and challenged some of its own most fundamental beliefs about social order. The person who responded to the needs was... (British) Brigadier Frank Kitson." Kitson's book Low Intensity Operations (London 1971) is "the basic manual of counter-insurgency method in Western Europe and North America."

At this point in his essay Lawrence starts to get things wrong. He begins with Part 1 of Kitson's three-stage sketch of the typical insurgency, The Preparatory Period.

"Kitson says the police and the army have to take advantage of the first stage of popular struggle to deploy themselves, to infiltrate the enemy. That is when people are not on their guard, when the police can get their spies and provocateurs 'in place' so that when open rebellion develops, as he says it must, agents are already there."

This really isn't an accurate sketch of Kitson's Preparatory Period. Kitson writes:

"Looking in retrospect (emphasis added) at any counter-subversion or counter-insurgency, it is easy to see that the first step the police and the army (emphasis added) should take is to provide the enemy from gaining an ascendency over the civilian population, and in particular to disrupt his efforts at establishing his political organisation." (p67)

Kitson is thinking here of British operations in Kenya and Malaya in the 1950's in which he played a minor part. But, in retrospect the 'Preparatory Period' of each of these campaigns was certainly not what Lawrence describes as "nothing is happening; all is calm." In practice, as Kitson notes, his suggestions for the P.P. are "difficult to achieve because for a long time the government may be unaware that a significant threat exists." (p67)

The central difficulty for Kitson-type theorists is distinguishing between the preparatory stages of insurgency and ordinary political activity: they may look the same. Precisely because this is so Kin-son'sque ideas are so dangerous. Unable to distinguish real subversion from genuine subversion in embryo and ordinary non-subversive political actions, it is rational for the state to treat all critical political activity as potentially subversive: But it is important to grasp that Kitson doesn't advocate this: he just doesn't address the problem, assuming that a 'significant threat' can be readily identified early on.

For Kitson, the Army - and the book was written for and about the Army, not the police - "should become involved as soon as a threat is detected." Notice that Kitson is talking about 'subversion', defined by him as "all illegal measures short of armed force taken by one section of the population against the government" (pp34/ emphases added). This is hardly Lawrence's "police, prepare themselves and start penetrating the opposition" in a period when "nothing is happening, all is calm." Kitson is much more circumspect than Lawrence's account suggests.

Lawrence's loose interpretation of Kitson's writings extends to his version of Kitson's biography: "the commander of British counter insurgency forces in the North of Ireland for many years" - actually he was commander of a single battalion in Belfast for just two years, 1970-72; and to the sources of Kitson's book - most of his examples...are drawn from Britain's war in Ireland and the US war in Indochina - which just isn't the case. The examples he uses are from all over the world, particularly from Britain's post WW2 colonial experience. Northern Ireland hardly gets a mention. How could it? Kitson wrote his book in 1970 when the British Army had been in Northern Ireland for a year, a year Kitson had spent at Oxford University reading the literature on counter insurgency.

Lawrence makes much of Kitson's advocated use of the "pseudo" or "counter" gang - "which he (Kitson) claims to have invented in Kenya." But in the first place this isn't true. Kitson is very careful in his memoir Bunch of Five (London 1977) not to claim this:

"There was in fact nothing original about the idea itself, variations of which have been used in countless wars throughout history." (p49)

And in the second place, although Kitson claims that the 'counter gang' was important in the war against the Mau Mau in Kenya, it takes up a tiny section of Low Intensity Operations - half of page 100 as far as I can see, and then in the context of an insurgency (defined above). This is a very long way from Lawrence's view of 'pseudo gangs' as an 'excellent example of the way repressive forces attempt to criminalise their political opponents.' (emphasis added)

Lawrence's fragmented and inaccurate account of Kitson's complex proposals is offered as the explanatory framework for some recent U.S. developments - basically the work of one Louis Guiffrida. Lawrence quotes one section from a manual written by Guiffrida which he says, "borrows from Kitson." This is the first section of that "borrowing."

"Most students of the revolution would agree that "peaceful dissent" is the first step towards revolutionary and that this trend signals the opening phase of the 'new revolution'. These issues be they social, cultural, political or economic, snowball and often appear to the casual observer as being full of truth and least justified. In short, they are fashionable to direct smears, threats and even open hostility towards the policeman. He is, symbolically, at least,
Lawrence’s central point is that there is a lack of any evidence that the insurgen- cy of Kilts’ ideas outside the UK. But then it is not obvious to me that Kilts’ ideas are anything more than they appear to be: a synthesis of a wide range of counter-insurgency experience. Kilts happened to do the synthesis but any bright graduate student could have done the same. (3)

The extent to which Kilts’ book was merely a synthesis of previous experience becomes very clear as soon as you read, say, an account of the Malay ‘killing squads’ this use of this. (as seen from the top of the British administration in Malaya - is contained in the recent Templar: Tiger of Malaya, by John Cloake (London 1985). Reading this after re-reading Kilts and Eveleigh, what struck me most forcibly was the extraordinary powers that Templar had as Combined High Commissioner (civil administration) and Director of Operations (military administration). Templar was an absolute dictator, and as dictator was able to achieve the kind of comprehensive and coordinated intelligence, police, military and propaganda operation which is at the heart of Kilts’ thesis, but which was never really achieved in Northern Ireland.

One of the striking sections of the Templar book is an excerpt from one letter Templar wrote in 1954.

“Tell the areas to be skimmed of troops I propose to use special squads of jungle fighters... they will be killers’ squads” (though I can promise you I won’t call them that, with any view to the questions you may have to answer in the House). They will be at the disposal of the Special Branch... to use on any good information which comes in. We have always set our face against the use of ‘killer squads’ in infantry battalions or the police generally, since it has a bad effect on the fighting morale of all those who are not in the ‘killers’ squads since they never get a proper crack. This new conception is, however, quite different.” (emphasis added) (p260)

Curious that he thought it a new conception. Very similar things had been done in Palestine by the British in the late 1940’s. (4) In those Palestine operations an ‘anti-terrorist’ squad was set up under the leadership of one ex-SECE and one ex-SAS man.

“The squads consisted largely of ex-soldiers rather than experienced police or intelligence personnel” and their overall commander used them “to exploit existing intelligence to capture or kill insurgents themselves.” (5)

In contemporary Northern Ireland the SAS and EAA, the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s Mobile Support Unit have had a similar role. (6)

The Palestine ‘killer squads’ grew out of a unit called the Police Mobile Force and one of their operations which has been documented involved the use of a laundry van as a cover. In one of those curious historical parallels, one of the British covert operations in Northern Ireland, the so-called Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF) also used a laundry van as cover until it got blown and several MRF personnel got killed. The MRF is the analogous example of a ‘pseudo gang’ we have from Northern Ireland. (7)

In The Kilts Experiment, (London/Dublin 1983), the French Jewish Roger Faligot makes a reasonable case for the proposition that some of Kilts’ synthesis was tried out in Northern Ireland. But his claim (p21) that “from 1975 onward (Kilts’ ideas) were totally implemented” (emphasis added) sits uneasily with post ’75 reports of competing and conflicting counter-insurgency and intelligence operations in Northern Ireland. (8)

Eveleigh’s book, in essence, is a series of arguments for specific proposals which would lead to an approximation of Templer’s coordination-through-dictatorship in Malaya. Two of Eveleigh’s main proposals -
acquiring Hong Kong back in 1997, the only surprise, surely, is that they

Kitson's 1970 survey of the counter-insurgency operations around the world is essentially a survey of defeats for state forces or temporary successes followed by political defeat. Northern Ireland is going down as another defeat, and not just because of the British state’s failure to defeat the military aspects of the insurgency there.

In an interesting recent paper, Don Parsons shows how far from just being the victims of some Kitson-esque campaign by the British state, the Protestant and Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland’s urban areas have taken control of large areas of community life - what might be called the local welfare state - areas, the control of which both Kitson and Evelage saw as essential to any successful counter-insurgency operation. Parsons offers this, from one John Oliver, a senior civil servant in Northern Ireland among his evidence: “A well-meaning but dangerously vague concept of community action is offered as a replacement (to party politics). Potentially more dangerous still is the astonishing new growth of community associations some with dubious connections (ie the paramilitaries - Don Parsons) but nonetheless intent upon imposing their will on housing, roads, development, community halls; libraries and so on to the virtual nomination of elected politicians and of rational argument, financial considerations, ordered priorities and the other realities of public administration.” (16)

The shootings and bombings of the past 15 years in Northern Ireland may have been less significant than the failure of the British state’s social and economic policies. If what we have seen in the past ten years is, as Faligot claims, a coordinated counter-insurgency campaign, and I don’t believe this - then both military and civil wings of that campaign have been failures. The British state is withdrawing from the north of Ireland.

Part 2

In the present political climate the news of yet another (the fifth) inquiry into the Kincaid boys home scandal must be assumed to be yet another holding operation by the British state. Even if the British state would now find some of the dirt buried there useful to use against the Loyalist politicians in Northern Ireland, the ramifications are so enormous and so dangerous that the entire episode remains a total ‘no-go’ area.

Below we reproduce two long articles, one directly related to the Kincaid and one which throws some light on the milieu in which the scandal took place. These articles are, literarily, just the tip of an iceberg of colossal dimensions. When - if - all this comes out it will make Watergate look relatively insignificant.

However, for the moment all we can offer is these two pieces, and it is appropriate that it is the Ramsay half of the Lobster who is trying to write this introduction, because I find the entire Kincaid episode extremely difficult to get a grip on and suspect that almost everyone else reading this does, too. This, then, is a beginner’s introduction to Kincaid, written by a beginner.

There are three major strands in the early part of the story. There was a boys home in Belfast, called Kincaid. Several of the male staff running Kincaid were homosexuals and assaulted some of the boys. Complaints were made as far back as 1967 but nothing was done. One of the staff was William McGrath, who is the second strand. McGrath tried to set up his very own Protestant paramilitary group
called TARA. Quite what TARA did, and whether it was McGrath's idea alone, or something cooked up by British intelligence, is not clear to me. TARA does look rather like what I can only call a would-be paramilitary group. The second of the two documents refers to it never getting beyond the planning stages. Whose planning isn't clear.

The British state's "security forces" are the third strand. They heard about the events at Kintra (presumably through their contacts with the Royal Ulster Constabulary) and found it of interest (a) because of TARA qua paramilitary group; (b) because in the little world of Orange politics McGrath knew many of the leading figures; and (c) because homosexuality being an offence in Northern Ireland, Kintra - and its related events - offered potential for blackmail by the security forces.

Intimately involved in this was Colin Wallace, whose biography is given in the first of the two documents. Wallace worked in/with - which isn't yet clear - the Secret Intelligence Service. Of the British Army in Northern Ireland, appears to have become disgusted with some of the things that were going on there, got forced out of his job and eventually convicted of manslaughter. He claims he was framed. As the material below shows, the Psyps operations were directed against both Republican and Loyalist groups.

The second of the two pieces below is a reprint from the Irish Times of an internal review of the Kintra episode written by Wallace while still working for the British state. This document alone proves that all the subsequent official denials of a 'cover-up' of the Kintra events are lies.

The first of the pieces is by, and about, Captain Fred Holroyd. Like Wallace he was involved in, and became disgusted by, some of the things that he witnessed in Northern Ireland, and has subsequently blown the whistle on them via articles in the New Statesman with Duncan Campbell and on Channel 4 TV.

Some extent the Wallace/Holroyd/Kintra stories are now interlinked.

The political significance of all this is impossible to exaggerate. The British public (and many of its politicians) are still almost totally ignorant of the things that have been going on in Northern Ireland by the British intelligence services. As far as I am aware only Roger Faligot (see above) and Kennedy Lindsay have produced substantial accounts of some of the counter-insurgency operations in Northern Ireland, and these fragments from Wallace and Holroyd serve to show that even Faligot and Lindsay's accounts are still scratching the surface.

If Holroyd's account of battles within the British intelligence services hardly supports Faligot's claim that an integrated Kitson-esque regime was introduced in Northern Ireland, the activities he describes here speak of a campaign savage enough. Holroyd's reference to cooperation between the British intelligence and security forces and some of the Protestant paramilitary groups shows one operational response of the British state to the problem of being 'piggy in the middle' - they joined forces with the side which was, supposedly, 'loyalist'. My enemy's enemy is my friend.

If, at a micro-level, the 'Loyalist' paramilitary forces have on occasion been co-opted by the British state, at a macro-level they have mostly been an obstacle in the way of any kind of solution to the 'problem'. How the British government will deal with this 'problem' now that the deal has been struck with the Republic remains unclear. The recent arms charges against a group of Protestants in Glasgow, and the appointment of ex-SAS men to the top three positions in the British Army in Northern Ireland might suggest that one's assumption of a serious clamp-down on the Protestant side will turn out to be correct.

If there was ever a political process chalice, it is currently being proffered the Dublin Government by the British state.

Captain Fred Holroyd writes:

Captain Fred Holroyd, whose revelations of unlawful activities by members of the Security Forces in Ulster in the early 1980s initiated an RUC and MI5 inquiry, is currently in correspondence with Mrs Thatcher. He has pointed out to her that the Ulster Director of Public Prosecutions' statement that 'there was insufficient evidence to bring charges against anyone' is simply not true. The Special Investigation Branch (SIB) of the Royal Military Police carried out their own investigation of Holroyd's allegations and found them to be true. Ministry of Defence officials decided that only a minimum of cooperation would be given to the RUC team in the hope that the investigations would be dropped. This aim appears to have been achieved. However, the case will not go away. The New Statesman, which published Holroyd's allegations after checking them out with TV's Diverse Reports programme, has received a statement, made in 1978, which not only confirms the allegations made, but also describes how MI5 was responsible for a campaign of denigration against Holroyd after he resigned his Commission in the Army.

This statement, which is highly detailed, was given to the safekeeping of a Surrey solicitor in 1980 by none other than Colin Wallace, the civil servant employed at Headquarters Northern Ireland until 1978 as "Head of Production Services" in the notorious 'black propaganda' unit, Information Policy.

Wallace is now aware that the RUC detectives who came to the Lewes Prison to interview him on his knowledge of the Kintra affair, frequently left him to interview Holroyd before returning to Ulster. These detectives were aware that Wallace knew the background to Holroyd's case, and could independently support his allegations, but never once asked him to make a statement, nor indeed ever even mentioned Holroyd. Wallace's independent evidence was never mentioned by the RUC team to Holroyd; in fact the detectives went to great lengths to try and convince Holroyd that they could find no supporting evidence for his allegations. This extraordinary behaviour by Superintendent George Caskey and his subordinates Inspectors Ronnie Mack and Edward Cooke has not been explained, and can only lead to grave suspicions of yet another cover-up of events of a politically embarrassing nature.

In January of this year (ie 1985) Wallace sent a comprehensive dossier to Mrs Thatcher which included the material relating to Holroyd's allegations. At this time the RUC investigation had been going on for over two years and the Ulster Director of Public Prosecutions' decision to terminate it with no prosecutions was made on exactly the same date as the Prime Minister's office acknowledged receipt of the dossier. The decision was made before the DPP could see the contents of the file. This sudden decision, after two years, before the RUC had to accept the evidence independently corroborating Holroyd's allegations, appears to support the belief in a Government-inspired cover-up.

Captain Holroyd was an officer in the Royal Corps of Transport, who, after volunteering for 'special duties', was trained at the Joint Services Intelligence (JSI) Centre at Ashford in Kent as a Military Intelligence Officer (MIO). After three months at
Holroyd, although he later became aware that his role was to be used to drag impartial policemen. Time after time loyalist terrorists would operate without any serious attempt by the RUC to impede or catch them. On the few occasions when Loyalists were caught red-handed, police action was minimised and the culprits were soon back in action. One specific Special Branch officer handled Loyalist terrorist affairs. His lack of impartiality was commented upon initially in an unfavourable way by HQ 3 Brigade. But in the middle '70s the covert SAS troop based at Castleldill, and controlled by 3 Brigade, were operating hand in glove with this officer. This was at a time when murders and political assassinations became rampant and 'own goals' like the bomb which went off at the ambush of the Miami Showband, revealed the participation of Loyalists from Portadown.

Holroyd also became aware of a series of "dirty tricks" being carried out by HQ 3 Brigade - weapon "planting", arms cache booby-trapping, blackmail and coercion, kidnapping and the like. After making known his feelings about these activities, Holroyd began to experience a series of odd incidents, remarkably similar to those experienced by Colin Wallace, who had also been making the point that unlawful activities, especially those involving innocent people, were absurdly counterproductive to the forces of law and order and would eventually lead to a lack of belief in their credibility.

It would appear that the element of MI5 at Stormont and HQNI, who by 1975 had taken control of intelligence in the province after a bitter struggle with MI6, decided that either Holroyd and Wallace became implicated with the "dirty tricks" exponents, or, alternatively, they would have to be removed, and, if necessary, discredited so that any revelations that they might make, would not be believed. Both men were approached and asked to carry out unlawful tasks. Holroyd was given an unattributable weapon by WO2 Eric Hollis, Intelligence Collator at HQ 3 Brigade and asked to plant it on a victim. In fact he handed it to the RUC Special Branch. Wallace was asked to prepare a paper named Clockwork Orange 2, a feasibility study designed to be used to discredit British politicians in England. (Clockwork Orange 1 was a study of methods of disregarding Ulster public figures, used most effectively by the Security Forces.)

Wallace's prevarications led to what can be considered stage 2 of MI5's policy: both Wallace and Holroyd were informed quite separately that their "covers" had been blown and that they were in grave danger of assassination. It was suggested to them both that it was in everyone's interests if they left the Province and returned to Britain. Holroyd was able to prove to the staff of HQ 3 Brigade, who were the executors of MI5's plan in this case, that this proposition was nonsense. Wallace, who also realized that no new events pointed to his being assassinated, also made objections to being posted.

More extreme measures were called for and now MI5 decided that whatever was necessary to be done, would be, in order to remove the perceived threat of these outspoken critics of MI5's policies.

Part 3
every British government assurance that there was no 'cover-up of the affair nor any knowledge of it in British military circles.'

Confidential

To: - (-) November 8th 1974.

ARA' - Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated with the Homosexual Community in Belfast.

Reference A: Attached RUC background paper on 'TARA'.
Reference B: Attached RUC report on the death of Brian McDermott.
Reference C: Your request for a press investigation into the matters referred to above.

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to 'TARA'. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2. If we are to interest the press in this matter, with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know, I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify our interest in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, TARA is no longer of any security interest.

3. In theory, TARA was basically a credible concept from a loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body, could, no doubt, have made good use of the Orange Order's normal selection and 'vetting' system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had ready-made facilities for clandestine training, by making use of the Orange halls throughout the province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, mainly because of William McGrath's rather strange political views which are more akin to Irish Nationalism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the loyalist community at that time, sprung up during the period.

4. Reference A deals with McGrath's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincaid hostel in Newtownards Road where he works was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of the Belfast Corporation welfare department. He does not, as the paper claims, 'run the hostel'. He is employed as a 'housefather'. The Warden of Kincaids is Joseph Mains and the Deputy Warden is Raymond Semple. Mains was appointed in 1959 and Semple in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals. Indeed, various allegations of homosexual assault on the inmates were investigated by senior ----- in 1967 but no action was taken against anyone. (See notes of a report by Mr ---- at flag 'N')

5. It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kincaids began shortly after his appointment. As I have pointed out in para 6 above, allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that similar assaults may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after Mains was appointed.

6. Reference A claims that McGrath 'is a known homosexual' but it avoids any mention of his links with other key figures in the local homosexual community, other than to insinuate that a number of well-known political personalities with whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of reference A, it is claimed that McGrath left his previous employment as wireless out airformation officer and then took up work on the do... which was well known in unionist circles. He was for some time (see flag 'M') and McGrath... has been actively engaged in trying to have McGrath removed from Kincaids. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints had been received about his behaviour and that although the complaints had been passed to ....... to the RUC, no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be confirmed, to some extent, by Mr (see flag 'R') in 1973. There were of course similar allegations relating to other hostels during this period (see Bawnmore, Westwinds, Burnside etc) and this conflicts with reference A's assertion that the allegations were confined to Kincaids.

7. It should be remembered that the 1967 sexual offences act does NOT apply to Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors is a criminal offence. The apparent lack of interest, therefore, by the RUC authorities and the RUC is quite remarkable. Furthermore the claim made by Mrs .......(see flag 'Y') that key individuals in the ....... were themselves homosexuals and thus ........... but also covered up the offences that took place and protected the offenders, requires very serious examination. In particular, I view her allegations about Joss Cardwell with great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.

8. Reference B which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of Brian McDermott last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between the murder and the homosexual community is via John McKeague (see flag 'S'). McKeague's own statements raise more questions than they answer. Certainly his boast that he will not be prosecuted because 'he knows too much about some people's affairs' is not very reassuring. I do suspect that he will not be prepared to talk until he is released. It is rather remarkable that no charges have been preferred against him.....

Our own investigations of instances of alleged witchcraft or other satanic rites in the province would tend to dismiss the RUC's theory that Brian McDermott's murder could be part of these activities. In the past 'black magic' practices etc have been generally confined to groups operating from republican areas, with the possible exception of three cases in C. Antrim. I think, however, that from a press point of view we would be very foolish to give any credence to such claims without the most convincing evidence. The forensic reports on the McDermott murder (see flag 'R') would tend to indicate those specialists tried to dispose of the body by cutting it into pieces and burning them. The insinuation made in the document regarding the boy's disappearance, and the proximity of ........... is dangerous nonsense.

9. Reference A claims that a number of key personalities in the political arena are aware of the Kincaids situation and, in particular of McGrath's background. It does not explain the extent of their awareness nor of each individual's involvement with McGrath. In summary it would appear that the document is stating that:---
(a) the Grand Orange Lodge are aware of the situation because of the discussions and correspondence relating to McGrath within the Orange Order. It is further alleged that ............ and ........ have blocked any action against McGrath.

(b) is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because of the possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with McGrath, and John Mcleague. On the face of it the statements made by ........ and (flag ‘F’) would tend to support only part of such a claim. There are also a number of inconsistencies: McGrath would appear to be strongly anti-communist and anti-UVF and this conflicts with the document’s view on links with Tommy Herron, Ernie ‘Duke’ Elliot, “The Ulster Citizens Army” etc.

(c) Various public and political figures who hold positions of power and who are also homosexuals protect each other from prosecution. The claims of a prostitution ring involving juveniles is not really substantiated by anything in his own personal account. It would be interesting to check, however, the number of charges brought against people involved in homosexual activities in greater Belfast area in the last 5 years. I also think the RUC report on drug abuse in this connection merits close examination because this is a natural area of fund raising of terrorists. There is, of course, the obvious problem of security with the possible blackmailing of civil servants, politicians etc.

Conclusions and recommendations

I am very far from happy with the quality of the information on this matter, and I am even more unhappy because of the, as yet unexplained, failure of the RUC or the NIO to take on this task.

I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless that(sic) had specifically receded some form of political direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level. If that is the case then we should be even more wary about getting involved.

On the other hand, if the allegations are true then we should do everything possible to ensure that the situation is not allowed to continue. The youngsters in these hostels almost certainly come from problem families, and it is clear that no one will fight their fight unless we do. Those responsible for the murder of Brian McDermott must be brought to trial before another child is killed, and if it can be shown that there is a connection with this homosexual group, then the RUC must be forced to take action irrespective of who is involved.

I would therefore recommend that:

(a) We make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter or at least discuss the matter with RUCLO.

(b) We obtain very clear and unambiguous authority from London to proceed with a press disclosure.

(c) We approach a responsible journalist whom we confident will make a thorough investigation of the matter and not simply write a sensational type story purely on the information he is given.

(d) We continue to look for additional information on this matter to ensure that we are not just being used as part of some political disinformation scheme.

J.C.Wallace (Senior Information Officer)

Notes

1. In Internal Security Defence Review Nol (March ‘83) p 43, the anonymous authors quote from an account of the wars against the American Indian suggesting that the use of ‘pseudo gangs’ was as far as the 1870’s.

2. The FBI and the American Legion Contract Program, Athan Theoharis in Political Sci-ence Quarterly Summer ‘85

3. It is worth noting that Kitson’s book appeared after the revised Army Manual: Land Operations Vol 2 (counter revolutionary opera-tions) appeared in 1969. I haven’t seen this and have no way of knowing how much, if any, input it into Kitson made. The manual is briefly discussed in an essay in October/November 1978 pp20-21. The outline given there suggests that it is similar, in broad terms, to the Kitson/Eveleigh view of the world.


There is, quite clearly, a study to be written of the continuities through the experience of SOE to the post-war counter-insurgency operations. To give just one example, some of the people imported into the Malayan operation came from Palestine and were (apparently) resented as ‘the Palestinian mob’. Charters shows one example of SOE methods being (wrongly, in his view) used in a counter-insurgency situation.

5. Charters - see note 4

6. On E4A, most recently and accessibly, see Chris Ryder, Sunday Times 11 August 85.


8. This is extremely complicated. There is little doubt that between 1969 and 1974 something akin to chaos reigned in the British counter-insurgency efforts in Northern Ire-land. All accounts agree on this, and also that from around 1975 the chaos was reduced. How this was done, and how effective it was in practice is difficult to determine in any detail. Faligot describes lots of bits and pieces, many of which look like aspects of a Kitson-esque coordinated counter-insurgen-cy campaign. But, to give just one recent example (and there are others in Fred Holroyd’s piece here), the Belfast Sunday News 21 July ’85 reports the existence of SAS-trained ‘ghost squads’ of armed civilians, squads whose existence had not been notified to the RUC.

The essential difficulty for any integrated counter-insurgency campaign in Northern Ireland has always been that Northern Ireland is part of the British state and so all the civil arms of that state, are present and, as far as I am aware, unwilling to surrender their powers over to the Army. Solving this particular problem is one of the main threads of Eveleigh’s book.

9. See Eveleigh, especially around p 110

10. “Regional Commissioners” are a part of current government Emergency Powers propos-als on the stocks in case of an internation-al crisis (ie the threat of war). These ‘Regional Commissioners’ would be junior Cabinet Ministers. (see Duncan Campbell in New State
man 6 September '85). It isn't clear to me if this represents any kind of adoption of Eveleigh's proposals. But then it isn't clear to me exactly what the relationship is between these 'Emergency Powers' and possible mainland insurgency. If anyone has information on this I would like to hear from them.

11. The lack of clarity mentioned in note 10 above extends to my understanding of the relationship between the Civil Defence structure and possible reactions to insurgency in the UK. This whole area is - looks like - a complicated muddle. If someone could clarify it they would be doing us all a big favour.

12. "The Army's counter-insurgency doctrine... was not designed for domestic use, that is, for a semi peace-keeping role between two warring communities within the UK." David Charters, Intelligence and Psychologi-

**Shorts**

Paul Johnson, former editor of the New Statesman turned "new right" Thatcherite, turned his back to KAL 007 in a review of Alexander Dallin's Black Box KAL 007 and the Supercruisers (University of California Press 1985) in the Times Literary Supplement (August 23 '85).

Johnson asks the question: "How could a Korean pilot skilful enough to land a damaged airliner on an unknown frozen lake, make what was described as "the worst navigational error in modern aviation history?"

(Johnson is referring to a previous incident, of course.)

His answer? "We know that they(sic) could, because they did.

Johnson wants to explain the 'mistake' by 007's pilot by referring to a previous 'mistake'. As well as begging two questions at once - the status of both 'mistakes' - Johnson's logic is familiar to students of the dreadful Edward J. Epstein. In his Legend he says something to the effect that the best evidence that Oswald's rifle could fire three shots in the time allotted is that he did, in fact, fire three shots.

Johnson's most spectacular recent outburst is his 'Flights of Dark Fantasy' in the Daily Telegraph, 16 March '85. In a bizarre attack on 'conspiracy theorists' Johnson equates Marx, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Hitler, Kennedy assassination buffs and Tam Dalyell MP. "Conspiracy theory is a modern superstition, a poor substitute for angels and devils."

Like others of his ilk, Johnson seems to be blissfully unaware that their beliefs about the Soviet Union are frequently conspiracy theories in their purest form, and theories with a good deal less substance than is the case with most of the beliefs held by Tam Dalyell about the Belgrano, or the JFK buffs. But then this is axiomatic. If the conspiracy theories around these events - and this is to ignore the question of how much of them are conspiracy theories - were just the nonsense Johnson and his ilk keep telling us they are, they wouldn't need to keep telling us, would they?

Johnson, who was a participant at the 1983 Jonathan Institute conference on Soviet-inspired terrorism (See his Wanted: World War on Terror, in the Times 10 August '84), really has done a Sidney Carton num-

ical Warfare-Operation in Ireland in RUSI journal April '87 p 25

Nor, of course, was it designed to combat people capable of highly sophisticated technical operations. On the Provo's use of intercepts of British signals see Sigint Used by Anti-state Forces by Frank Doherty in War and Order ed. Celine Bledowski (London 1983)

13. The essence of the programme is in The Listener. 31 October '85

14. in Listener (above)

15. Chris Ryder in Sunday Times see note 6 above.

16. Don Parsons, Politics Beyond the Point of Production: class struggle and regional underdevelopment in Northern Ireland in Review of Radical Political Economy (New York) Summer '85

No greater sacrifice can a man make than he lay down his brain for a cause.

Brian Crozier (see review of his novel in this issue) was also at that Jonathan Institute conference.

In Lobster 2 the Ramsay half of the team half-seriously speculated that the assassination of JFK might have been the result of a plan to fake an assassination attempt which got hijacked by, and provided the perfect cover for, a real assassination.

In Norman Mailer's latest novel, Tough Guys Don't Dance, he has a character say at one point: "That always happens with master plans... The better the plan, the more you can count on something unforeseen getting in to bend the works. I'll tell you the real story of how Jack Kennedy got killed someday. It was supposed to be a miss! What a set of accidents! The CIA didn't know ansus from aperture that day." (p123)

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Lobster reader writes that he repeatedly finds that photographs taken of military installations come back from the developers/printers blank - ie the frame before and the frame after the military installation perfect, but the middle blank.

Has anyone else experienced anything like this, and is there an explanation? A "film fogger' near sensitive installations?

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