WALLACE TO WALK FREE SOON?

Kincora smears man gets probe into death case

From GERY LAWLESS in London

CONVICTED killer Colin Wallace, the man who could hold the key to the Kincora homosexual scandal, is hoping to walk free soon after serving less than three years of a 10 year sentence for the killing of his rival in love, after a Home Office probe was ordered into his case.

A court heard three years ago that Belfast-born Wallace, 46, the former boss of a British Army black propaganda unit in Lisburn, killed wealthy young antique dealer Jonathan Lewis by hitting him a deadly blow to the base of the nose which shattered his skull, and that he then dumped the body in a river. Wallace had fallen in love with Lewis's wife Joan.

Wallace being taken to jail - now he hopes for freedom
27. In *Who framed Colin Wallace* he is described as making an anonymous telephone call to Belfast Social Services after he left Northern Ireland in early 1975. Please describe when he made the call and to which office.

28. Please identify as best he can the person to whom he spoke on that occasion.

29. What did he say to them?

30. The Inquiry is aware that on 4 March 1984 Mr Wallace was reported as saying in the *Sunday World* newspaper that he saw a 3-page handwritten document containing the names of many individuals involved in a paedophile ring in Northern Ireland. Please state who showed the document to him, when and where.

31. Please state in what circumstances he saw the document.

32. Please give any of the names on that document that he can remember.

The Inquiry is working to a very tight timetable and so I would be grateful for your confirmation by return that Mr Wallace is willing to provide the Inquiry with a witness statement by close of business on Tuesday 3 May, 2016. If he is willing to provide a statement, and wishes to have legal representation to enable him to prepare the statement, please return the completed ALR1 form to me no later than close of business on Tuesday 26 April, 2016 to enable the Chairman to decide the amount of funding necessary to enable Mr Wallace to make the statement.

Should you no longer be acting for Mr Wallace please let me know immediately, but in any event please pass this letter and enclosures to Mr Wallace immediately, and let me know that you have done so.

I look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely

Patrick Butler,

Solicitor to the HIA Inquiry

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**CHAIRMAN: SIR ANTHONY HART  SECRETARY: ANDREW BROWNE**
RECORDED DELIVERY

Sir Anthony Hart
Chairman
The HIA Inquiry
PO Box 2080
Belfast
Northern Ireland
BT1 9QA

17 October 2016

Dear Sir Anthony,

In my previous letter to you dated 26 September 2016 I referred to a report in ‘The News of the World’ on 21 February 1982. I have now obtained a copy of that report (attached). It states:

"He (Wallace) warned of the male prostitution ring - and the British Intelligence knowledge of it - in 1975, five years before Independent MP Gerry Fitt raised the issue in the Commons in 1980."

Given that the reporter did not spell my name correctly, it is unlikely that he knew me personally, and I assume that he was probably given the information verbally by someone who had access to my disciplinary hearing procedure. I was in Wormwood Scrubs prison in February 1982 and had no contact with the press.

‘The News of the World’ report clearly corroborates my assertion that I highlighted, at the time of my disciplinary hearing in September 1975, the existence of what we believed to be “a male prostitution ring” in Belfast during the 1970s.

As I pointed out to you in my previous letter, my allegations about “homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast” were made to the MoD, the IPCS and to my former boss at Army HQ Ni, at the time of my disciplinary hearing. Copies of the information relating to my disciplinary hearing were sent by the MoD to Bernard Sheldon, then Legal Adviser to MI5 and to J P Waterfield (MI5 officer at the Northern Ireland Office). It was also copied in part to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief of the General Staff and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for the Army. I accept the latter addresses were probably only provided with a heavily MoD ‘sanitised’ version of the case. Indeed, as you know from my previous submissions, it is significant that Tam Dalyell, the Former Leader of the House of Commons) wrote to David Cameron on 29 August 2014 pointing out that Field Marshal Sir John Stanier (Head of the Army) and Sir Maurice Oldfield (Chief of MI6) had both approached him separately expressing his concerns about the way my case had been handled. There is, therefore, no doubt whatsoever that the relevant authorities, including the Intelligence
I am a Detective Inspector of the Royal Ulster Constabulary attached to Headquarters CI(a) Department. On 27 April 1982 accompanied by Detective Sergeant Elliott, I saw Mr Iain Macaskill at his office at 30 Bouvierie Street, London. Mr Macaskill was accompanied by his solicitor, Mr Keenly-Side. D/Sergeant Elliott who had previously interviewed Macaskill on 24.3.82 introduced me to Macaskill and his solicitor. He was asked if there was anything further to add to his previous interview and he said that he had been unable to contact his informants. I told Mr Macaskill that I had reason to believe that he may be in possession of a document which I believed emanated from Colin Wallace. Mr Macaskill, after some hesitation, admitted that he did have a document which was not at that time available to him. He stated that he received it in the post and could only assume that it came indirectly from Wallace or a relative. After further discussion we agreed that we would further interview Mr Macaskill when the document would be made available. On 29 April we again saw Mr Macaskill and his solicitor at his office. Mr Macaskill handed me two documents marked SRM9 and SRM9A. Mr Macaskill again confirmed that these documents were received by him in the post and he could only assume that they came from Wallace. Mr Macaskill said that he hadn't used the content of either document in any publication as he was not satisfied as to the truthfulness of the content. Mr Macaskill assured us of his full co-operation should any further information come to his notice.
PART 1

BACKGROUND: A SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICER (EQUIVALENT RANK TO LT. COLONEL) IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE'S PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ORGANISATION WAS A SENIOR OFFICER IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNIT WHICH OPERATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND UNDER COVER OF THE TITLE "INFORMATION POLICY" WITH THE ARMY INFORMATION SERVICES. HE ALSO SERVED AS A CAPTAIN IN THE UDR FROM 1971-75. FIRST REPORTED THE KINCORA VICE RING IN THE EARLY 70'S BUT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN. IN 1974 HE COMPLAINED TO SENIOR OFFICERS THAT A COVER UP OF THE KINCORA RING WAS PREVENTING THE KILLERS OF 10 YEAR OLD BRIAN MCDERMOTT FROM BEING APPREHENDED. NAMED THREE PEOPLE THOUGHT TO BE LINKED WITH THE VICE RING WHO WERE SUSPECTED OF THE KILLING. LATER AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION PLANNED TO DISCREDIT A NUMBER OF ULSTER POLITICIANS BY FALSELY IMPLICATING THEM IN THE RING. WALLACE REFUSED TO TAKE PART. HE DISCUSSED KINCORA WITH A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS IN 1974 AND WAS SUDDENLY POSTED OUT OF ULSTER, ACCUSED OF BEING PRO RUC AND OF GIVING INFORMATION TO THE PRESS WITHOUT AUTHORITY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT A NUMBER OF SENIOR MP'S AT WESTMINSTER INCLUDING SEVERAL CABINET MINISTERS WERE INVOLVED IN THE COVER UP. THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MAY BE OF SIGNIFICANCE - McGRATH QUESTIONED BY POLICE; WALLACE CHARGED WITH MURDER, A SENIOR TORY MINISTER RESIGNS, JOHN McKENZIE IS SHOT DEAD. ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS WALLACE WAS RECOMMENDED FOR DECORATIONS FOR SERVICES IN ULSTER. HE LEFT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND RESIGNED HIS COMMISSION IN THE UDR IN 1975.

FURTHER INFO: V.T. SPEAK TO (MIKE) TAYLOR, P.R.O. BASS CHARRINGTON, MANCHESTER FOR BACKGROUND IN THE INTERNAL RIVALRY BETWEEN M15, M16, DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AND THE RUC SB SEE "WHO DARES WINS" BY TONY GERAGHTY IN CONNECTION WITH THIS BOOK, THE FOLLOWING MAY BE OF INTEREST: WALLACE FORMED AND COMMAND "THE PHANTOMS" FREE FALL TEAM AND WAS THE ARMY'S SKYDIVING SANTA CLAUS. FURTHER INFO.: THE BRITISH PARACHUTE ASSOCIATION, LEICESTER, MEMBERSHIP NO. 3150. WAS ALSO A MEMBER OF "THE PHANTOMS" AND SERVED.

* BRACKETS IN ORIGINAL TEXT.
Q Was it in the context of McGrath?
A I'd rather not say.
Q Would your information be recorded - would other people know about it?
A Yes.
Q Are we talking in the context of William McGrath?
A There are others.
Q Again in the context of William McGrath?
A I don't wish to talk about it.
Q Is there other information about Kincora?
A I don't wish to be drawn into that.
Q You are not the only person aware of this information.
A A number of agencies including Army Intelligence. I don't wish to be drawn further.
Q If journalists were writing in the past 2 months speculating that you have information about MPs, Lawyers, Policemen - this could not have come directly from you?
A It could not have come from me. You're referring to the News of the World. It is highly inaccurate to say the least.
Q Have you met the reporter?
A I've met the reporter.
Q What are the inaccuracies?
A I won't say there is a secret list of 60. I couldn't confirm or deny or could I give any idea of the figure.
Q If there were other children at risk in Northern Ireland and if we don't have the information to assist the investigation, do you not think it would be helpful to us if you supplied information. Are there any children at risk?
A I couldn't say that. My knowledge stopped in 1974. I support the current investigation. The difficulties I face are greater at the moment but I can't judge the wider aspect.
Q Would you say there is still a danger?
A I can't say. My direct knowledge ended in 74.
Q Your direct knowledge?
A I don't wish to answer that.
my leaving Northern Ireland and during the period after I left Northern Ireland and also during the immediate period of my own case, the investigation and the trial, I do not wish to disclose the precise circumstances though I would be happy to do so if given the correct legal advice. I don't wish to dwell too much on it but it may be that the investigation might disclose no connection. It's because there may be a connection between events and Kincora that I am concerned about. So long as they are properly investigated I would be happy - no matter what the conclusion.

Q You have no knowledge then of boys in care of the Health Authorities that are exposed to moral danger?
Q Did it apply to Kincora?
A It's wider than that. There are other children's homes.
Q Can you locate the other homes?
A I wouldn't answer that.
Q Does it involve military?
A I wouldn't answer that.
Q A Portadown Home?
A No.
Q Lurgan?
A I wouldn't answer that.
Q If I said Clive Fleury you wouldn't say no?
A I wouldn't answer that.
Q Do you know him?
A I wouldn't answer that.
Q If I said you knew him would it make a difference?
A Yes.
Q Is it wider than Clive Fleury?
A I wouldn't wish to get drawn into that. If I say it does or doesn't it would give an indication to my knowledge.
Q Have you read any press comments lately?
Q  Six people have been convicted, does your evidence cover matters outside them. Are there people other than those six who, in your opinion, should be convicted purely for homosexual offences?

A  No I'm not sure.

Q  Would your evidence then purely relate to the cover-up aspect.

A  No I don't think that would be true. I looked at it from a security side and for that reason it obviously lead into various other fields, my evidence would not be aimed at homosexuality but the background to it and such lead me to be able to get more precise details.

Q  Do you believe that your evidence would assist us?

A  If I were doing the investigation I would like the information, we're shadow boxing so I don't know whether you already have my information. Your investigation, unlike Sir George Terrys, seems to relate to the mechanics whereas Sir George is dealing with the cover up.

Q  No that's wrong, our investigation covers all aspects.

A  I think I can say that on the basis of my evidence the RUC don't have anything to worry about.

Q  You are saying that you were aware of the goings on in Kincora back in 1974.

A  Yes.
Q  In Lisburn you would have had information relative to the
    Rev Ian Paisley and people like that?

A  Yes.

Q  McGrath?

A  Oh yes.

Q  Were you aware that McGrath was homosexual?

A  Oh yes, our interests would be the personalities of paramilitaries
    and their personality discrepancies. For obvious reasons we
    related to the Loyalist side in 74 with the UUWC Strike.

Q  Did you ever speak to or receive any complaint from a Kincora boy?

A  I wouldn't answer that, I certainly didn't interview them.

Q  Relating to the document we have, are you prepared to answer any
    questions in relation to its contents?

A  No.

Q  Is there anything we can do for you?

A  I'm stuck in the middle. I would like to help but I'm looking at
    my own problems first. If this had blown up after my parole it
    would be all right, I would be able to look after myself, my wife.
    I'm certainly worried about my case, the 2 stumbling blocks, the
    Official Secrets Act and the legal aid. You know I wanted

________________________
SIGNATURE of STATEMENT MAKER:
something done about Kincora in '74. It upset me that things were going on.

Q Why did you not act then?

A I wasn't in a position but I can tell you it really upset me.

Q Do we take it from that that you were aware of the assaults on boys?

A You can take it that I was very upset that nothing was done.

Q You could have done something then and you didn't?

A It still upset me, knowing that I was aware.

Wallace indicated that he was reluctant to answer any further questions on this line and the interview was then terminated.
The Chief Constable  
Royal Ulster Constabulary  
Headquarters:  
Brooklyn  
Knock Road  
BELFAST  
BT5 6LE  

10 July 1982  

Dear Chief Constable,

RE: THE KINCORA ENQUIRY - MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND JOHN COLIN WALLACE

I am writing to inform you that there will be no prosecution of John Colin Wallace for any breach by him of the Official Secrets Acts 1911–1939 in respect of any communication by him to a member or members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary of information relating to homosexual offences in Northern Ireland.

Mr Wallace may be so informed. When he is interviewed you will doubtless wish to arrange that it should be made clear to Mr Wallace that it is important that he should make full disclosure of all information which he has concerning the commission of homosexual offences in Northern Ireland at any time, and that in doing so he will not be liable to prosecution for breach of the Official Secrets Acts, irrespective of the source of his information.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
A I have made this clear before. On previous visits I made it clear that clearance should come from Sir Frank Cooper. The copy of the Official Secrets Act which I signed made it quite clear that I must have the written consent of the MOD before I disclose any information.

Q You are not satisfied by the immunity granted by the LFP in Northern Ireland?

A Certainly not - in the wording conveyed during this meeting.

Q If you were to get written clearance from the MOD, are you prepared to disclose all information in your possession in relation to Kincora and related matters?

A Yes, subject to other conditions being met -

(1) Firstly the legal aid situation. I would have to prepare a lengthy statement which would have to be vetted by legal representatives.

(2) Because of my current circumstances I do not have the opportunity to carry out research. This would have to be done by my solicitor.

(3) There is also the problem of documents and material needed by me being seen by third parties eg prison staff, because of vetting procedures, during the production of the statement.

(4) There would be a lengthy time involved, maybe 3-4 months.

(5) I am unhappy about various aspects of my own case. I state again that I did not commit the offence for which I was
convicted. There are, in my opinion, various matters which may be linked to various aspects of the Kincora investigation and I would therefore wish that these matters and all the evidence relating to my case be examined in the light of the information which I will supply about Kincora.

Q  This information that you have, you had it before your trial?

A  Not all of it, no.

Q  Why was it not raised at the trial?

A  Such information as I had at the trial was covered by OSA and such disclosure would have led me open to prosecution under the Official Secrets Act.

Q  Did you have that information prior to your Appeal?

A  Not all of it, no, but if I had, the same rules would have applied.

Q  Did you make an application to the Court of Appeal in relation to this 'classified' information?

A  No, I did at the first interview (to solicitor) express there were some difficulties (referring to Official Secrets Act) and to counsel, Mr Michael Kennedy QC.
Dear Mr Wallace,

Under the terms of the Official Secrets Act Declaration which you signed when you resigned your appointment with the Ministry of Defence, you undertook to seek authorisation from this Department before discussing with anyone information gained in the course of your employment. It is now necessary for the police to investigate fully allegations of criminal offences involving homosexual conduct in or connected with the Kincora Boys Home in Belfast. The purpose of this letter is to confirm that you may disclose to Superintendent G Gaskey and Inspector S E Cooke of the Royal Ulster Constabulary the information that is in your possession which is directly relevant to the investigation - including, where necessary, information which you gained in the course of your employment with the MOD and which is security-classified. You will, of course, appreciate that your responsibilities for safeguarding information not related to the police investigation remain unchanged and you must therefore be careful not to divulge any information other than that which is directly relevant to them.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Mr J C Wallace
25 October 1982
Q  I would have thought that the third sentence of
Major General Garratt's letter would have released you
from your obligations under the Official Secrets Act in as
far as Kincora is concerned and I quote "The purpose of this
letter is to confirm that you may disclose to Superintendent
G Caskey and Inspector S E Cooke of the RUC, the information
that is in your possession which is directly relevant to the
investigation including where necessary, information which
you gained in the course of your employment with the Ministry
of Defence and which is Security classified".

A  That is a matter of opinion. I do not believe that an adequate
opinion can be expressed on this matter unless one is in
possession of all the relevant information. Without adequate
legal advice in this matter I would not be prepared to take
such responsibility on the strength of your interpretation.

Q  At an earlier interview you stated that you were bound by the
Official Secrets Act and you considered if called upon to
give evidence you would need legal clearance to disclose the
information you have. You have now been served with a document
giving you immunity by the Director of Public Prosecutions
(Northern Ireland) and also with the document giving you the
clearance you suggested you required before you could release
this information. I suggest to you that the authorities have
been more than reasonable with you in meeting your demands and
your concern in relation to the Official Secrets Act and I,
as the police officer in charge of the investigation, can see
no bar in you divulging the information you allege you possess.

Signature of Statement Maker: [Signature]
A I have now made it clear to you or your representatives on four consecutive visits that owing to the legal complexities of this matter that I would require adequate legal advice relating to the disclosure of any information and on the alleged immunity which might be provided. The refusal by the authorities to allow me to have that advice leads me to believe that they do not wish all the information relating to this matter to be disclosed. I hope I have made my position very clear to you on each of these interviews with particular regard to the complexity of the information. Having regard to the totally negative attitude of the authorities in this matter, I do not think that I can be of any further help to you until I am properly advised.

Q Now that you have been given the clearance you sought from the Ministry of Defence I put it to you that you are in the same position as any other citizen in relation to the law to divulge any information you possess regarding any criminal offence is concerning Kincora in this instance.

A As a matter of fact your statement is incorrect. The wording of the alleged clearance given by the Director of Army Security is not the wording of the clearance which I specifically requested from you on at least 2 occasions and on the face of it, it is not only insufficient but ambiguous. I think it's fruitless going on any further with this interview.
Q. I would like to pursue one further question. The information ............... 

The interview terminated at 10.39 hours. The solicitor advised Mr Wallace not to continue with the interview. Wallace and the solicitor then got up and left the interview room. (The question was to relate to where he got his information and where it was to be found).
102. The interviewing police officers gained the impression that Wallace was clearly surprised with the terms of the Ministry of Defence letter. He gave the impression that his bluff had been called and stated that he thought it was fruitless going on any further with the interview. As already stated, on the advice of his solicitor, Wallace left the interview room in the company of his solicitor.

103. The interview did not progress beyond a discussion on interpretation of the immunity granted to Wallace.

104. No further interviews of Wallace have been requested by the police in respect of this enquiry.

105. In an article published by journalist, Jim Campbell, in the Sunday World on 14 March 1982, 3 senior Army Officers were named as being members of the same team as Wallace at Army Headquarters, Lisburn; they were -

(1) Colonel SILLITOE
(2) Major Richard STANNARD
(3) Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy RAILTON

106. Colonel Warren Sillitoe was killed in a motor accident in the south of England on 1 November 1980.

107. Enquiries have been made to locate Major Stannard who has resigned from the British Army with a last known address in Manchester. It is believed he is somewhere in South Africa having served for a period with the Rhodesian Army.
4 September 1985

Director of Public Prosecutions

JOHN COLIN WALLACE/FREDERICK JOHN HOLROYD

This file is the end product of an investigation which was commenced as a result of Frederick John Holroyd handing numerous documents to the Essex Police in November 1984. In the main these documents relate to grievances harboured by Holroyd in respect of his resignation from the Army and by Wallace in respect of his conviction on a charge of manslaughter.

However, amongst the documents is one (GC80) dated 8 November 1974 under the signature of Wallace which, if authentic, would indicate that both the RUC and the Army knew of homosexual activity in the Kincora Boys Home and of homosexual and other illegal activities by persons named in the document well before the Kincora investigation commenced in 1980. There is, however, nothing in GC80 or the other documents of a potentially criminal nature which has not already been investigated and reported to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

If the information in GC80 had been known to the RUC and Army prior to the date on the document and had this information been deliberately suppressed then both could be severely criticised for not taking the appropriate action to ensure that the allegations were fully investigated.

There is, however, doubt as to the authenticity of document GC80 both from forensic examination and also because those who might be expected to know of its existence or content have denied knowledge of it and in some cases cast doubt on its format.

Wallace has continually refused to co-operate with the investigating officer and has made pre-conditions before agreeing to be interviewed which he must know that the RUC cannot meet because some of them are beyond the jurisdiction of the Force. The door has been left open to Wallace to be interviewed about the document but he continues to prevaricate. If Wallace was able to prove that the document was genuine no further investigation into its content would in my view be warranted unless he can also produce other evidence to corroborate its content as all the allegations have already been investigated. I do not believe it would be possible to prove a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by the RUC or the Army or both as it has not been possible to trace any of the documents on which the contents of document GC80 purports to be based.

I therefore/
"TARA" - REPORTS REGARDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOMOSEXUAL COMMUNITY IN BELFAST

Reference A: Attached RUC background paper on 'TARA'.
Reference B: Attached RUC report on the death of BRIAN McDERMOTT.
Reference C: Your request for a press investigation into the matters referred to above.

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to 'TARA'. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor Intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2. If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify our involvement in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, 'TARA' is no longer of any security interest.

3. In theory, 'TARA' was basically a credible concept from a Loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body, no doubt, have made good use of the Orange Order's normal selection and 'vetting' system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had ready made facilities for clandestine training by making use of the Orange Halls throughout the Province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, mainly because of WILLIAM McCraith's rather strange political views which are more akin to Irish Nationalism or Republicanism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the Loyalist community at that time, sprang up during the period.

4. Reference A deals with McCraith's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincora hostel in Newtownards Road where he works was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of Belfast Corporation Welfare Department. He does not, as the paper claims, "run the hostel" - he is employed as a 'housefather'. The Warden of Kincora is JOSEPH MAHES and the Deputy Warden is RAYMOND SEMPLE. MAHES was appointed in 1959 and SEMPLE in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals. Indeed, various allegations of homosexual assaults on inmates of the hostel were investigated by senior Welfare Department staff in 1967 but no action was taken against anyone (see notes of a report by Mr. H. H. Wilson at flag 'W')
'TARA' - REPORTS REGARDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOMOSEXUAL COMMUNITY IN BELFAST

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Continued...
10 (c) continued.

Close examination because this is a natural area of fund raising for terrorists. There is, of course, the obvious problem of security with the possible blackmailing of civil servants, politicians etc.

Conclusions and recommendations.

I am far from happy with the quality of the information available on this matter, and I am even more unhappy because of the, as yet unexplained, failure of the RUC or the NIO to take on this task.

I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless they had specifically received some form of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level. If that is the case then we should be even more wary about getting involved.

On the other hand, if the allegations are true then we should do everything possible to ensure that the situation is not allowed to continue. The youngsters in these hostels almost certainly come from problem families, and it is clear that no one will fight their case unless we do. Those responsible for the murder of BRIAN McDERMOTT must be brought to trial before another child is killed, and if it can be proved that there is a connection with this homosexual group, then the RUC must be forced to take action irrespective of who is involved.

I would recommend therefore that:

(a) We make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter or at least discuss the matter with RUC/O.E. and/or MI5/6.

(b) We obtain very clear and unambiguous authority from London to proceed with a press disclosure.

(c) We approach a responsible journalist whom we are confident will make a thorough investigation of the matter and not simply write a sensational type story purely on the information he is given.

(d) We continue to look for additional information on this matter to ensure that we are not just being used as part of some political disinformation scheme.

[Signature]
J.C. Wallace
Senior Information Officer
To: Detective Chief Inspector SB24

Correspondence regarding this person rests at report dated 24.7.84 submitted by Detective Inspector SB25 which covers matters regarding one Colin WALLACE who is currently serving 10 years imprisonment for Manslaughter, at Lewes Prison Sussex.

During the afternoon of Tuesday 7 August 1984 HOLROYD telephoned the Fort unit at Southend Airport requesting to see the reporting officer because he had obtained further information.

After consultation with H.Q. Special Branch an appointment was made, and HOLROYD was seen at Westcliff Police Station by the reporting officer and Ds 203 SB26.

HOLROYD stated he had spent the previous day in Northern Ireland, with a film crew who were making a documentary for B.B.C. T.V. regarding the lack of progress in solving the problems which are connected with Northern Ireland. HOLROYD was featured in the production in the capacity of an ex-Army I.O. (Intelligence Officer) who compared the old methods of information and observation to the new technical methods of surveillance and information gathering. He entered Northern Ireland via Aldergrove Airport Belfast where he was seen by Ds SB1 of the R.U.C. Special Branch Port unit.

HOLROYD then produced a four page photostat document which he said was a report from Colin WALLACE in his capacity of information officer in Northern Ireland and stated this document was sent by WALLACE to an MI5 officer at HQ Northern Ireland office. The document was dated 8.11.74 and bore a signature similar to WALLACE’s.

The following details were blanked out on the heading of the report.

1) Classification
2) Person report was to be sent to
3) Other departments to circulate report to

The document was a report to an unknown person recommending certain lines of enquiry be made in London to obtain policy decisions on the following subjects.

1) R.U.C. investigation of KINCORA BOYS HOME. Homosexual incidents involving Government Minister.

2) The death of a boy from the Home - Brian McDERMOT.

3) Leakage of the subjects to friendly journalists in order to cause a press enquiry into problem.

4) To assess all information regarding the subjects from a disinformative point of view.
Contact D/Insp Cooke.

Contact D/Insp Roberts Essex Police re Harroyd's message for handing over documents.

Tel [redacted] x 203.

21 February 1990. Telephone D/Insp Roberts re documents. He stated with ref to CC30 that Harroyd had produced a photocopy stating that this had been removed from the original document and photocopied. Various things had been crossed out by Harroyd to protect the source. Harroyd stated he got the document from a "very high up well placed source". Dr Roberts believes that Wallace indicated to Harroyd where this document could be obtained. He also believes that Wallace was aware that Harroyd was producing these documents to the police.

(complete details overleaf)
I have now had an opportunity to read the transcripts of Module 15 (Kincora and Bawnmore) of the Inquiry. At this juncture I request that the Inquiry enter this letter into the evidence because, despite the best endeavours of this Inquiry, Government agencies are still not telling the whole truth about Kincora and there is a real danger that the public will continue to be misled about a number of key issues.

The Inquiry is clearly aware of Paul Foot's book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace' and there is no reason therefore for the Inquiry not to be aware of the issues involved. The book is well referenced and the Inquiry should have been able to check on any matters of interest.

I am writing this Response because I am very concerned about the factual inaccuracies, misleading information and use of innuendo unsupported by evidence that has permeated this stage in the proceedings of the Inquiry and specifically as they relate to me. This submission is, therefore, designed to put on record just a selection of information that I believe to be clearly relevant to the inquiry, but which, although it is already in the public domain, appears to have been omitted from the Inquiry's published considerations. This submission should not be regarded as the sum total of my concerns about the Inquiry and the ways in which it has used or misused information.

Although the Inquiry clearly has collected quite an amount of information about my story and my allegations, that information has been presented very selectively to avoid dealing with the extent to which the MoD and the Intelligence Services were involved in a range of questionable activities during the 1970s and also to sustain the fantasy put forward by Government agencies that little, if anything, was known prior to 1980 about William McGrath and his activities.

I believe the public in general, and the victims in particular, have a right to be made aware of the information in this submission because it has a clear bearing on the integrity of the Inquiry. The Inquiry cannot, at some future date, say that it was not made aware of this information, nor can it say that it considered all the matters fully and without bias. All of the information to which I refer is clearly referenced and can be easily checked.

My other concern is that the Inquiry has relied heavily on statements - some highly questionable - gathered during previous inquiries and investigations into the Kincora Boys' Home. Also it appears that a number of important witnesses were not even contacted by the Inquiry. For example, Counsel to the Inquiry (CTI) suggested that former British Army Captain Fred Holroyd of the Special Military Intelligence Unit (SMIU) might have re-typed a memorandum I wrote on Kincora in 1974. This suggestion appears to have been made in the total absence of any evidence.

Not only is that suggestion totally untrue - I briefed my solicitor on the memo in 1982, at least two years before I met Fred Holroyd when he visited me in Lewes Prison - but also the Inquiry is aware that when Captain Holroyd was at the British Army Intelligence School prior to deployment to Northern Ireland, he was told that Tara was a British Intelligence operation. I hope you will agree that the latter statement, if true, would be of great significance to the Inquiry. Despite this, the Inquiry has apparently made no attempt contact Mr Holroyd, either to check the memo typing allegation, or to seek further information about the Tara allegation. In the end, Mr Holroyd contacted the Inquiry. This is a very worrying failure.
8. If he did not type the memorandum himself, please name or otherwise identify the person(s) who typed it.

9. Was this memorandum a draft?

10. If so, is the version reproduced in *Who framed Colin Wallace* the first or a later draft?

11. How many drafts were there?

12. To whom was the memorandum addressed?

13. If this was a draft was a final version of the memorandum ever produced?

14. If a final version was produced, when was that?

15. Did he prepare the memorandum on his own initiative?

16. If not, when was he requested to prepare the memorandum, and by whom?

17. Please name every person to whom he showed the memorandum in any of its forms, that is whether draft or final, in Northern Ireland before he was posted to the North West of England in 1975.

18. Please name every person with whom he discussed its contents before he was posted to the North West of England in 1975 saying when, and in what circumstances, he did so.

19. Please state what every such person said when he showed them the memorandum.

20. Please produce all original versions (and not photocopies) of the memorandum-whether draft or final- for inspection by the Inquiry.

21. In *Who framed Colin Wallace* it is stated that he obtained expert reports on the authenticity of the memorandum. Please provide copies of any such reports.

22. When, from whom, and in what circumstances, did Mr Wallace obtain the documents referred to in the memorandum reproduced at pages 139 to 144 of *Who framed Colin Wallace*?

23. What did he do with these documents after he prepared the memorandum of 8 November 1974?

24. If any of the documents are still in his possession please produce the originals (and not photocopies) to the Inquiry for inspection.

25. Please identify every person with whom he discussed any concerns he had about Kincora when he was in Northern Ireland.

26. Please set out the contents of any such conversations in as much detail as possible.

Chairman: Sir Anthony Hart  Secretary: Andrew Browne
do everything possible to ensure that the situation is not allowed to continue. The youngsters in these hostels almost certainly come from problem families, and it is clear that no one will fight their case unless we do. Those responsible for the murder of BRIAN McDERMOTT must be brought to trial before another child is killed, and if it can be proved that there is a connection with this homosexual group, then the RUC must be forced to take action irrespective of who is involved.

I would recommend therefore that:-
(a) We make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter or at least discuss the matter with RUC.
(b) We obtain very clear and unambiguous authority from London to proceed with a press disclosure.
(c) We approach a responsible journalist whom we are confident will make a thorough investigation of the matter and not simply write a sensational type story purely on the information he is given.
(d) We continue to look for additional information on this matter to ensure that we are not just being used as part of some political disinformation scheme.

Various attempts throughout the years have been made to cast doubts on this document. The *Irish Times*, which published the document in full on 25 June 1985, eleven years after it was dated, submitted the four pages to forensic scientists together with other material which was written in Lisburn barracks in 1974. The tests were inconclusive because the memorandum had been photocopied. However, other checks on the document by the *Irish Times*, including the reference to the RUC background report on TARA and other documents referred to in the memo, indicated that the document was genuine.

The suggestion that the document has been forged, which was later repeated in an official report, is entirely groundless. The chief argument for its authenticity is that it fits closely with the press briefing documents which are confirmed by journalists who received them. Clearly, Colin Wallace knew about McGrath and TARA as early as 1973. In that context, the 1974 memorandum is wholly credible.

The section on the murder of Brian McDermott is probably, as the memo suggests, not strictly relevant to the Kincora scandal. McDermott's murder may well have been a one-off crime by a sexual sadist not necessarily connected to the Kincora gang. Certainly there is no direct evidence to point to Kincora, and the issue is mentioned only because of the suspicion of a connection with John McKeague.

The section on witchcraft throws some interesting light into the activities of Information Policy at the time. Colin's memo is anxious to cast some doubt on the suggestion in the RUC reports that there may have been some connection between the Protestant extremists operating at Kincora and the outbreak of witchcraft and demonology which had fascinated the media in Northern Ireland for several months in 1974, and terrified whole sections of both communities.

Colin's scepticism on this point was well founded. He himself, as he wryly admits, was instrumental in setting off the witchcraft hysteria. Information Policy, with the generous help of one or two selected serving officers, had set up 'magic circles' in derelict houses in the Republican areas. Colin bought bundles of black candles for the purpose. Out in the country the Army's own 'covens' were even more realistic. Colin and his colleagues managed to get hold of some genuine chicken blood and feathers. They made crosses which they hung upside down on bushes leading to the 'satanic sites'. He still has his notebook in which he has meticulously drawn up instructions on how to construct witches' circles. He read several learned books on the subject and became an expert on the order of satanic service.

The results were devastating. The popular press, delighted at some diversion from the 'troubles', fell headlong for the witchcraft allegations. The *Sunday World* in Dublin published a whole supplement on witchcraft ceremonies in an old castle near Newry, all of which had been instigated by Colin Wallace and his merry witches. The effect of the publicity on the population was instant. A naturally religious
(Kincora), or to the other five boys' homes, and the circumstances which led up to the problems."

Hansard 18 January 1984 vol 52 cc319-26

When asked on 'The World At One' (BBC Radio 4, 18th January 1984) if the inquiry would take evidence on the alleged activities of the intelligence agencies, James Prior, Northern Ireland Secretary of State, replied that if there was any evidence, it would.

Unfortunately, the Hughes Inquiry failed to do just that and no reason as ever been given for this failure. In his report, Judge Hughes makes it clear that:

"The conduct of the police, or elected representatives, or clergymen, or military intelligence or any other persons who may have been in receipt of allegations, information or rumours relating to Kincora or any other home, was not under scrutiny in this Inquiry."

Hughes Report page 5 para 1.2

Given the foregoing, it is easy understand why the public have so little trust in Government Inquiries!

Page 119 of the Hughes report refers to a four page document entitled "Tara: Reports regarding criminal offences associated with the homosexual community in Belfast." The Report said that the document had been passed to the RUC by the Essex Police. Page 124 of the Report says:

"The RUC investigation attempted #, inter alia, to validate the authenticity of the document dated November 1974. The statements of MoD Personnel, including purported addressees, did not establish its authenticity. A Forensic Report raised the possibilities that the first two pages had been tampered with and that two typewriters had been used, but was inconclusive as to its authenticity.

Mr Kevin McNamara MP - then Shadow Spokesman on Northern Ireland wrote on a number of occasions during 1989 and 1990 asking the Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Brooke, to provide a copy of the RUC forensic report and the identity of its author. All his requests were refused.

In the meanwhile, Paul Foot, submitted a copy of the document to two of the UK's foremost forensic document experts independently. Both experts concluded that there was no evidence that more than one typewriter and one typist had been involved in the production of the document.

On the face of it, the RUC claim appears to have been a crude attempt to pervert the Hughes Inquiry. It would, however, be easy for the HIA Inquiry to obtain the copy of the document that the Hughes Inquiry was given and send it to an independent forensic expert in the UK to determine if the RUC claim was correct.
8. If he did not type the memorandum himself, please name or otherwise identify the person(s) who typed it.

9. Was this memorandum a draft?

10. If so, is the version reproduced in *Who framed Colin Wallace* the first or a later draft?

11. How many drafts were there?

12. To whom was the memorandum addressed?

13. If this was a draft was a final version of the memorandum ever produced?

14. If a final version was produced, when was that?

15. Did he prepare the memorandum on his own initiative?

16. If not, when was he requested to prepare the memorandum, and by whom?

17. Please name every person to whom he showed the memorandum in any of its forms, that is whether draft or final, in Northern Ireland before he was posted to the North West of England in 1975.

18. Please name every person with whom he discussed its contents before he was posted to the North West of England in 1975 saying when, and in what circumstances, he did so.

19. Please state what every such person said when he showed them the memorandum.

20. Please produce all original versions (and not photocopies) of the memorandum—whether draft or final—for inspection by the Inquiry.

21. In *Who framed Colin Wallace* it is stated that he obtained expert reports on the authenticity of the memorandum. Please provide copies of any such reports.

22. When, from whom, and in what circumstances, did Mr Wallace obtain the documents referred to in the memorandum reproduced at pages 139 to 144 of *Who framed Colin Wallace*?

23. What did he do with these documents after he prepared the memorandum of 8 November 1974?

24. If any of the documents are still in his possession please produce the originals (and not photocopies) to the Inquiry for inspection.

25. Please identify every person with whom he discussed any concerns he had about Kincora when he was in Northern Ireland.

26. Please set out the contents of any such conversations in as much detail as possible.

**Chairman: Sir Anthony Hart**  **Secretary: Andrew Browne**
... Other RUC sources have told the Irish Times that an RUC background paper on TARA was indeed prepared by detectives in 1973/4, about a year before the Information Policy Unit document was allegedly written. The sources say that the description of this background paper in the document is generally accurate.

In addition to undertaking a polygraph test, Colin Wallace’s handwritten notes on ‘Clockwork Orange’ were submitted to Dr Julius Grant by Channel 4 News and by The Observer newspaper for forensic examination and possible dating. Dr Grant was then one of the foremost document examiners in the world. Dr Grant, concluded that the documents were consistent with being written in the mid 1970s. When asked by Channel 4 News if the documents could have been forged, Dr Grant said that the forger would have required a greater knowledge of inks and paper than he had!

All of the information provided above has been in the public domain for many years and should, therefore, now be in the possession of the HIA Inquiry. There is no obvious reason, therefore, why the Inquiry should not have pursued these matters vigorously.

For some of the victims, this is very likely to be the last opportunity they will ever have of discovering what really happened in Kincora and other homes. I feel the Inquiry must address the issues that I have raised in this letter - especially the obvious failures of the Terry and Hughes Inquiries - but it cannot do that unless it is willing to challenge robustly the evidence given by the Intelligence Services - evidence that is simply not credible in the current circumstances.

Were all the witnesses referred to above lying when they made their reported comments, or are the Intelligence Services now not telling the whole truth? Is this denial by the Intelligence Services and the MoD an attempt by the Government to avoid having to pay damages to the victims by denying that no one in authority knew anything prior to 1980 about the abuses that took place in Kincora and elsewhere? Could this be the real reason why the Government has stoutly refused to give the HIA Inquiry the same legal powers as the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse in London.

There is also a disturbing sense of ‘spin’ taking place to reassure the public that the Government is being totally open about what has taken place in the past. On 1 June this year, the Irish News reported:

_Hundreds of top secret police documents about the former Kincora Boys' Home have been declassified and handed over to a public inquiry, a lawyer has revealed. Barrister Joseph Aiken, counsel to the HIA, said:

"When the inquiry began this was all marked secret. At the request of the inquiry it has all been declassified by the PSNI and made available to the inquiry."

On the face of it, this is good news, but one cannot help wondering why the authorities did not make these ‘secret’ files available to previous ‘thorough’ inquiries!
INVESTIGATION NOTES

The following information was received from:

Peter BRODERICK (Ex Chief Information Officer HQ ST - 1973/74)

At 1530 hrs, on Mon 13 May 83 at Croydon Chamber of Commerce

Subject: KINORA Case Ref: ............

1. Mr Broderick was shown document GC/80 dated 2 Nov 74.

2. He has no knowledge of the document as he left NI in Sep 74.

3. He was aware that Wallace used two different typewriters - one was kept by Wallace for his un-attributable information leaked to Press.

4. GC/80 is written in the Wallace 'style'.

5. He is sceptical about the authenticity of the documents and whether the CIF would have asked for such a brief as the then GOC, General Frank King, was keen to pass control back to the politicians and ADC. There is no military objective to be achieved with the production of GC/80.

6. Wallace had the monopoly on the Northern Ireland scene. Everyone from GOC downwards relied on and took notice of his local knowledge.

7. Whilst Broderick was the Head of Information Services, Wallace had tremendous leeway and freedom and was not accountable to Broderick for his Information Policy work which was directed by GOC Royal Artillery.

8. Broderick only became aware of KINORA after leaving NI but believes that subsequent behaviour by Wallace in respect of 'classified' documents etc had some bearing on him. Broderick's lack of advancement in the Civil Service. Broderick had also written Wallace up for a MBE which didn't go through due to Wallace's behaviour.

File Note: Peter BRODERICK visited at his home address in Croydon (Tel: ....) at 1830 hrs on Sat 25 May 83 by Ed Moloney and Andrew Pollick of the Irish Times who were in possession of a copy of GC/80. Questioned Mr Broderick about the document and he declined to answer their questions. He informed Duty Officer MOD (A) Maj ...... at 1930 hrs. They also mentioned names Cameron, Yarnold, Peck and Hallton and asked about Information Policy (IP) which he told them was a section of GC in No 83 in the mid-1970s.

Sat 25 May 83

2030 SDO MOD (A)
2045 Peter Broderick
2100 Senior ADC Cushley
2120 SDO MOD (A) refer all sgs to NCIC ROC.
Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory

180 Newtownbreda Road Belfast BT8 4QR

Telex 747934 Telephone 045421

Our reference: 511/85

Detective Inspector Cooke

EXAMINATION OF TYPESCRIPT

The following documents were received for examination from D/Inspector Cooke:-

1. GC 80. 4 page report dated 8th November 1974.
2. GC 82. 1 page document dated 22nd September 1976.
3. GC 83. 1 page undated document.

All 4 documents are photocopies and the typeface details are not sufficiently clear to allow for useful comparisons in order to establish relationships.

All 4 documents classify similarly, within the limits imposed by photocopied material, to machines of the following makes:— Adler, Amaya, Facit, Imperial, Olivetti, Royal, SCM, Silver Reed, Smith Corona, Underwood — all of which would have been available in 1974. Further comparison, based largely on the style of the numerals, with a small collection of typestyles held in this laboratory, indicates a slight preference for Olivetti.

The presence of a portion of horizontal line almost 3 inches from the top edge and to the left-hand side of the first page of the 4 page document (1), just above the heading, could indicate the addition of a piece of paper to the top of this document, possibly to cover other information, at the time of photocopying. The apparent difference in the shape of the tail of the numeral '9' in the date 8th November 1974 from that of the 9s in the remainder of this document would appear to lend some weight to this possibility.

The shape of the 9 of the date on the first page of document 1 would appear to relate this part of document 1 to the typescript of document 4, dated 1984, rather than that of document 2, dated 1976. Whereas the 9s of the remainder of document 1 would appear to favour document 2.

The absence of 'CONFIDENTIAL' from the bottom of page 1 of document 1, yet present though obliterated at the top and bottom of the remaining 3 pages of this document, could be further evidence of interference to page 1.

Donald Budd

14 February 1985
Secondly, individual page numbering in this matter as it is in this document is not necessary for a confidential document. Thirdly, the word 'reference' would only appear once and A B and C would appear under it. I would also have expected each of these references to be dated as there may have been more than one report on any particular subject. The word 'continued' should not appear at the bottom of the page as it clearly states at the top of the report the number of pages the report contains. In relation to the flagging system used by the author I would say that this is incorrect and unusual in that the first item referred to is 'flag N' and a number of letters preceding this in the alphabet have not been used. In addition the letter 'o' would not be used to avoid confusion with a zero. I would also say that since reference is made to a number of flagged documents I would have expected to find a list of enclosures to the left of the signature block on page 4 of the document. I would also have expected to have seen all documents which had been flagged to enable me to check that the flagging was correct and also to enter any of the flagged documents which may have been classified into the Classified Documents Register. Every classified document, draft or otherwise, on receipt at my office would have been entered in the Classified Documents Register, stamped and given a serial number. The movement of the draft classified document would have been recorded as would its destruction. I see no such stamp on this document neither does the document have a reference number which it would have been given had it come through my office. Generally this document is incorrectly laid out and would never have been accepted by a military office. I can state that this draft would never have been presented to a senior military officer in its present form. The style of writing is as far as I can recall similar to that of Colin Wallace.

SIGNATURE of STATEMENT MAKER: R. PACE
STATEMENT OF: Roy PACE

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 enter "over 21"]: Over 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: Clerk

ADDRESS: C/o Banbury Police Station

I declare that this statement consisting of 2 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have willfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 6 day of June 1985.

(Sgd) Clerk

SIGNATURE of MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received.

(Sgd) R PACE

SIGNATURE of WITNESS

I am at present a clerk employed at Banbury Police Station. I have been shown a document marked GC 80 and would make the following observations on this document. I note that this document is dated 8th November 1974. I was Chief Clerk of Public Relations Branch HQNI from June 1973 until June 1975. My boss at that time was Peter Broderick who was replaced in October 1974 by David McDine. I recall that Colin Wallace the purported author of this document was a Press Information Officer. One of my prime tasks was maintaining the Classified Documents Register and accounting for classified documents. At the time that this document was apparently written the Public Relations Branch had become part of Army Information Services. I have examined this document and do not recall ever having seen the document before. Neither do I recall any decision on the content of the document. If such a document had existed at the time in question and had been passed to me I would have read it to establish the correctness of the service writing layout and in this I would have referred it back to the author for the following reason. Presuming that the obliteration at the top covers the word 'Confidential'. Firstly I would state that the security marking should appear at the top and bottom of every page. This is not the case on page one which is the most important page.

(Sgd) R PACE
Statement of: ELIZABETH EILEEN YARR

Age of witness [if over 21 enter 'over 21']: OVER 21

Occupation of witness: PERSONAL SECRETARY

Address: C/O H.Q.N.I.

I declare that this statement consisting of 7 pages signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 1st day of August 1985.

[Signature]

I am a Personal Secretary employed at H.Q.N.I. In 1974 I worked in the Public Relations Branch at H.Q.N.I. Colin Wallace worked in that Branch. I have been shown a document allegedly written by Colin Wallace in 1974 and marked GC 80. I can state that I did not type this document, neither have I any knowledge of the contents apart from what I have read and heard in the Press and media since Kincora hit the headlines. 

[Signature]

Elizabeth E Yarr
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Statement of: Major I

Age of Witness [if over 21 enter "over 21"]: Over 21

Occupation of Witness: Major (TA)

Address: TA Centre, [redacted]

I served at HQNI from March 1974 until March 1976 in the rank of Captain. For the first year of my service my duties were at the Army Press Desk. From February 1975 until I left in 1976 I was attached to the Information Policy Unit as a Staff Officer 3. I have read over and examined closely the document which is marked GC 80. I have not seen the document before. I note it is dated 8 November 1974 and is signed by John Colin Wallace who had an office in the Army PR organisation at HQNI at that time. My first reaction to this document is that I would have remembered it had I seen it before and I surely would have remembered if any of its content had been discussed at that time. Wallace's role at that time was to brief the Press and put over the security forces point of view. Although Wallace may have received intelligence briefings it is unlikely that he would have been given access to intelligence documents. I recall the organisation known as 'Fara'. I do not recollect any information about this group which relates to homosexual activity. I did not hear anything about Kincora Boys' Hostel until publicity was given to it about 1980.

While I was in N. Ireland I was not made aware of homosexual activity at any boys' home. On 28 May 1985 I had a visit from two journalists from Ireland - Ed Mokoney and Andrew Pollock. They said that they had a document and asked me if I knew some of the names on it. They did not produce the document but from what I have read in GC 80 it would appear that the information they referred to was the same.

I declare that this statement signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 19th day of July 1985,

G CASKY D/Supt

SIGNATURE of member by whom statement was recorded or received.

Major I

SIGNATURE of Witness
They asked me if I served in N Ireland and had my boss been Jeremy Railton. I confirmed that I served in N Ireland and knew Lt-Col Railton but I was not prepared to discuss any matters concerning my duties in N Ireland. The journalists did not say how they traced me to my business address in [redacted]. I should add that as the journalists could see I was reticent about disclosing matters they gave me an undertaking in writing that they would not compromise me. While I accepted this note I did not provide any information. I hand over this note marked [redacted] I.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STATEMENT OF: Adrian Gilbert Clement Weston Peck MBE

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 enter "over 21"]: Over 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: Lt-Col (Rtd) QOH

ADDRESS: C/o HQNI Lisburn

I declare that this statement consisting of 1 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 3 day of July 1985.

[Signature]

SIGNATURE of MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received.

A G C W Peck Lt-Col (Rtd)

SIGNATURE of WITNESS

I served at HQNI as a General Staff Officer Grade 1 from 8 June 1972 until June 1974 when I was succeeded by Lt-Col J D Railton QDG. I have been made aware of the allegations and I have examined carefully a document dated 8 Nov 1974 which is marked GC 80. While it is appreciated that I was not serving in HQNI in Nov 1974 nevertheless I can state that I have no knowledge whatsoever of any criminal activity as alleged in the document.

I do recall the organisation TARA but do not recall any discussion relating to TARA and homosexuality. In relation to the document I would state that it is likely that I would have been aware of the preliminaries into the document but this was not the case. With regard to the references A B and C I would likely have seen background papers on TARA but do not recall any papers relating to the subject matter on GC 80.

[Signature]

A G C W Peck

15
STATEMENT OF: Jeremy David Railton

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 enter "over 21"]: Over 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: Commercial Pilot

ADDRESS: C/o HQNI Lisburn

I declare that this statement consisting of 2 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 3 day of July 1985.

(Sgd) J D RAILTON

On 19 August 1982 I did provide for the Royal Ulster Constabulary a statement in which I said that I did not recall Mr Colin Wallace ever discussing matters relating to Kincora Boys' Home. As I said at that time I recall the organisation TARA but the name William McDrath meant nothing to me. I was a Lt-Col in the Information Branch of the Army at HQNI from June 1974 until October 1975. The two dates given in my previous statement are incorrect.

I have been shown a document marked GC 80 which is dated 8 November 1974. I have had an opportunity to read over this document and examine it and I would say that the context in which this document appears to have been compiled does not ring true. I note that the document is addressed to me in manuscript. I can state that I do not recall having seen this document before and can categorically state that I had no knowledge of homosexual activities at Kincora Boys' Home or any knowledge of the McDermot murder other than that which appeared in the Press at the time.

Had I been aware of the subject matter of GC 80 I would have brought this to the attention of the appropriate authorities.

I also note that this document was produced in response to a request from Commander Land Forces, General Leng, or from Colonel M (Int).

(SIGNATURE OF WITNESS: J D RAILTON)
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STATEMENT OF: Colonel F

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 enter "over 21"]: Over 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS:

ADDRESS:

I declare that this statement consisting of 2 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 16 day of July 1985.

Colonel F

SIGNATURE OF MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received.

From 1973 until Sept 1974 I held the appointment of Col G S (Intelligence) at HQNI. I would have been responsible for handling all intelligence on behalf of GOC HQNI. I have seen and read today a document dated 8 Nov 1974 and which is marked GC 80. I have not seen this document before nor any earlier draft of it. I can say that this document is produced in the style of the alleged author John Colin Wallace. Wallace was a very experienced and clever Press Relations Officer and produced material for the media as well as counter propaganda. Wallace at any time would not have been given access to intelligence papers or papers held in the intelligence community at HQNI. In the production of this document GC 80 Wallace is stating that he had access to intelligence papers from the RUC. I would state that any such documents would have come through me as Head of Intelligence and not have gone to the Information Policy Department where Wallace was employed. If this was a genuine document and had been produced at the time it would have been brought personally to the Head of the Intelligence Department who would have had the document researched and vetted. On no account would Wallace have been given access to intelligence documents. In relation to the content of GC 80 I do recall the organisation TARA but do not recall any details. I do not recall any complaints or allegations.

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS: Colonel F
of homosexuality in Boys' Homes in N Ireland. My personal observation of Wallace who I knew very well during my period in N Ireland was that he was a man of exceptional ability in producing this information. GC 80 makes reference to a number of flagged documents. This would have suggested that Wallace would have had access to a large number of military intelligence files. This would not have been the case.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STATEMENT OF: Maj-Gen Henry Edmond Melvill Lennon GARRETT

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 enter "over 21"]: Over 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: Director of Security (Army)

ADDRESS: C/o MOD London

I declare that this statement consisting of [number of pages] pages each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 16 day of July 1985.

SIGNATURE OF MEMBER [by whom statement was recorded or received]

H GARRETT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

I held the appointment of Chief of Staff (Brigadier) at HQNI from 2 Nov 1972 until Jan 1975. I had responsibility for all the staff in HQNI and that included Intelligence but the normal practice was that the majority of intelligence was briefed direct by the Col G S Int or his staff to Commander Land Forces. I have examined a document marked GC 80. I have not seen this document before and I was not aware of the content of the document during my period in N Ireland. I knew the alleged author of this document, John Colin Wallace, during my tour in N Ireland and would state that had Wallace been in possession of this information at the time he would have brought this to me at any time as he was considered part of the team and as such had easy access to me. It would have been more likely that he would have discussed this with his immediate supervisors and if he had not got satisfaction at that level would then have felt he could have come to me. I do not recollect any such information being brought to my notice by Wallace or anyone else.

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS: H GARRETT
intelligence in Ireland, because Southern Ireland was a foreign country and it was more convenient and efficient to have the same intelligence arm working North and South. During 1973, however, there was a decisive shift in the organisation of Intelligence in the North. At Stormont, the seat of Northern Ireland government which was controlled directly by Britain, a new post called ‘Chief of Intelligence’ was created and filled by a senior MI5 officer, Denis Payne. Soon afterwards, the MI6 officer at Lisburn, Craig Smellie, left Northern Ireland. He was replaced by an MI5 officer, Ian Cameron. Effectively, MI6 dropped out of the picture and intelligence in Northern Ireland became almost the exclusive preserve of MI5.

In his biography of Maurice Oldfield, who was appointed head of MI6 by Prime Minister Edward Heath early in 1973, Richard Deacon writes:

Oldfield welcomed the replacing of some of MI6 by MI5, as he thought this made constitutional sense as well as preventing a lot of mistakes ... Unfortunately, though these moves made sense and initially all went smoothly, much later MI5 also committed blunders in Ulster. (C: A Biography of Sir Maurice Oldfield, London, Futura, 1985, page 174.)

Sir Maurice’s enthusiasm for the change was probably not entirely unconditional. From the moment of his appointment at MI6, he laid down firm rules about the behaviour of his officers. Assassination, for instance, whether directly by the British security forces or in league with one or other of the extremist paramilitary groups, was firmly ruled out. MI6 officers, including Craig Smellie, responded positively to these rules. They were men and women who had served, and expected to serve, in many different countries, and their approach to their business depended on a relaxed, well-informed understanding of the political situation. Because by their nature they had to work as diplomats with foreigners, they were marginally less vulnerable to the cliquish, racist and intrigue-ridden atmosphere — and the politics which thrived in such an atmosphere — which dominated MI5.

Not long after the change-over from MI6 to MI5 was completed, Colin was called to a high-level conference at Stormont. Senior MI5 officers were there, including Denis Payne. The subject for discussion was a new initiative to meet the deteriorating security crisis and to stem the rising tide of sectarian assassinations. A top secret information offensive was proposed. Its code name was to become ‘Clockwork Orange’.

The documents which were filed under ‘Clockwork Orange’ were not generally available to anyone else in the Information Policy department, a fact which Mike Taylor, an ordinary Army information officer, recalls very clearly. ‘I was the branch security officer,’ he says. ‘It was my duty to check that all documents were in all the right files. I did see the “Clockwork Orange” file — but whenever I had it out for inspection, all the documents were taken out of it first. We were told that this was because of the very high confidentiality of the project.’ (Interview with author, 9 December 1987.)

The Army’s involvement in Clockwork Orange was approved early in 1974 by the Commander of Land Forces, Northern Ireland, Major General Peter Leng. Colonel Peter Goss, the senior Army Intelligence officer at Lisburn, was instructed to release to Colin secret information on terrorists. Captain ‘Tim Perkins’, another Intelligence officer, was appointed to do the basic research and supply Colin with the results.

Colin’s instructions were to construct from Perkins’ material, and from other information from Intelligence sources, four mythical stories from mythical people who had been involved in terrorism or sectarian politics. Colin was chosen for the job because of his mastery of the language and habits of the people of Northern Ireland.

Originally, the purpose of the new initiative seemed
Clockwork Orange drew his attention to the Red Hand Commandoes, an extreme Protestant group whose members were trained to kill Catholics, and whose leader was a brutal assassin called John McKeague. McKeague was known as a homosexual and the information which Colin collected about him brought him back in a circle to William McGrath and TARA. McGrath and McKeague had both organized independent groups on the far right of Protestant politics and shared political and sexual inclinations, until they had fallen out and split. While Colin was preparing this line of information for Clockwork Orange, Army Intelligence approached him and asked him to have another go at exposing TARA in the press. He became puzzled and a little frustrated by the conflicting instructions: from MIS and Clockwork Orange to keep all this sexual gossip secret; from Army Intelligence to try to get the same gossip published.

The conflict grew during the year (1974), but after he broke with Clockwork Orange at the end of September, Colin made an attempt to resolve it, and to bring the Kincora business to a head.

He could not understand why, when so much was known to Intelligence and to the police about McGrath and where he worked, no action was taken over it. He suspected that the same political motives which inspired so much of the information he was getting under the heading of Clockwork Orange might be obstructing action on the scandal at Kincora.

His suspicions were well founded. TARA often intervened in such a way as to upset the unity of Protestant extremists. More than once, for instance, it issued a ‘proclamation’ calling on Protestants not to resort to violence – usually at times when violence was being advocated by most Protestant leaders. Such proclamations often upset the other paramilitary organisations, and helped to create an atmosphere of disarray where none in fact existed. A furious controversy was waged between TARA and the UVF in the pages of the Sunday News and the Belfast newsletter. TARA accused the UVF of ‘left-wing’ views, and the UVF lambasted TARA for extremism and sectarianism.

Colin wondered whether McGrath and his colleagues at Kincora were being ‘held in place’ to assist with such secret intelligence initiatives. If so, if the boys at Kincora were being sacrificed to the machinations of Intelligence, the process had gone too far. As with Clockwork Orange, the time had come to call a halt.

On 8 November 1974, Colin wrote a memorandum. He is not clear today (because he only has a copy) for whom the memo was intended, but it would certainly have gone to his superior officer Jeremy Ralton, Head of Information Policy, and almost certainly also to Army Intelligence and the Army’s RUC Liaison Officer at Police Headquarters in Belfast.

The memo was headed: ‘“TARA” – Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated With the Homosexual Community in Belfast’.

To the memo were attached three documents, none of which Colin managed to keep: an RUC paper on TARA (Reference A); a forensic report on the murder in 1973 of a ten-year-old boy called Brian McDermott (Reference B); and the Army’s earlier request for a press briefing on TARA.

1 Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to ‘TARA’. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2 If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop
The document bears the words "Clerks IP" written at the top. The handwriting is Peter Broderick's – he confirmed this in an interview with Paul Foot (Daily Mirror 08.02.1990).

"This week, for the first time, Peter Broderick, Wallace's boss at the time (1974), confirmed to me that he saw the document (The Tara press brief used by Wallace to highlight McGrath’s homosexuality and his role in running a children’s home) and wrote on it. ‘That is certainly my writing’, he told me. ‘I saw the document and approved it’.”

Peter Broderick also confirmed this to the Sunday Times (Sunday Times 11 Feb 1990).

Peter Broderick left Northern Ireland in September 1974, so the memo must pre-date that. Moreover, he has confirmed on the record to The Daily Mirror and The Sunday Times that he signed the document and authorised its release. I believe the Inquiry is missing the key point about this document and its contents. It also bears the handwriting of the GSOI Information Policy, Lt Colonel Adrian Peck, who was head of psyops at HQNI in 1973 and early 1974. Hugh Mooney, of IRD, left HQ Northern Ireland at the end of 1973, so the document was probably created in October that year when the ‘Clockwork Orange’ project was initiated. This is an example of how the Inquiry’s lack of detailed knowledge about the matter has resulted in significant evidence being overlooked or misunderstood.

A significant amount of additional information was added by me to ‘Clockwork Orange’ in November or December 1974 as a result of General Leng’s memo to Information Policy requesting that steps be taken to ensure that the RUC took action on the allegations.

Given that the documents referred to above contain William McGrath’s name, home address and telephone number, as well as the address and telephone number of his place of work, and that I shared that information with the press in 1973/74, how can the MoD and the Intelligence Services claim that they had little information about him at that time.

Moreover, General Leng makes it clear in his recorded interview with the Sunday Times in February 1990 that he was aware in 1973/74 of McGrath, where he worked and the “homosexual insinuations”. General Leng also recalls writing a memo pointing out that the sexual abuse allegations were a police matter.

An extract from that interview says:

PENROSE: The actual operation, I mean Clockwork Orange, when it was first mooted was in fact Denis Payne - several people have mentioned that - who was at NIO."

LENG: That's right. There was of course that branch as well. NIO would come in and cross fertilise if they wanted to keep something from the RUC - don't quote me again.

PENROSE: No, No. No."

[18]
"PENROSE: No, of course. It's just to see how, if you would forgive me, how the bureaucracy works. So, Clockwork Orange in this case comes from Denis Payne's office, so it's Intelligence to Intelligence, and then you're shown it.

LENG: I'm not always shown it. Only if they need to involve someone at a higher level.

PENROSE: Right.

PENROSE: Clockwork Orange was policy. This sounds like a statement rather than a question, but a statement asking for confirmation.

LENG: And Clockwork Orange was policy.

PENROSE: Yes. And so Denis Payne sends the file over and this is Policy from NIO.

LENG: I wouldn't have thought he would even send a file over if I may say so because the less that was committed to paper the better.

(Note: The latter comment is important because it shows that very sensitive or deniable information was not put on file and it should not come as a surprise to the Inquiry that most of the really key information relating to the matter under investigation is not on record. In essence, it had to be totally deniable. That is exactly what the MoD and the Intelligence Services are doing just now).

Another extract from the interview says:

PENROSE: You said in the memo according to [Mike] Taylor that the RUC and the social services I think ought to be brought in here because the file named men and boys who were obviously part of this abuse which we all know about since.

LENG: Yes, I recall that.

PENROSE: Do you? And you said take action. They waited because obviously there had been other members suggesting this from junior officers, but it was yours that finally convinced Taylor that this was going to happen, but of course it went on for another six or seven years, but again that wasn't your fault. It was just to remind you that there were homosexual abuses taking place, namely by the housefather named McGrath.

LENG: Yes.

PENROSE: who was also the leader of TARA, and of course eventually that was all proven in court some years afterwards, and also a man named McKeague, but I mean this is obviously outside ...

LENG: Yes, I do remember the homosexual insinuations and I do remember saying this is a police business, not ours."
Is it really credible that General Leng possessed this information about McGrath and the sexual abuse allegations and that neither MoD, nor MI5 nor MI6 knew anything about this? In the end, the public will have to make up their minds on this.

Those who served with General Leng will be well aware that he was a very professional and forthright officer who had great integrity. There is no doubt in my mind that his knowledge of McGrath and Kincora as expressed above would have been communicated very clearly and forcibly to those around him. I am amazed that the Inquiry transcripts indicate that the Inquiry made no determined attempt to challenge senior military and Intelligence witnesses over General Leng’s comments. I am also disgusted that those officers and officials, including the senior Information Policy officers, did not have the courage to speak out and confirm what General Leng had said.

I believe the Inquiry must face up to this issue because General Leng’s comments go to the very heart of the Inquiry’s investigation into Kincora. The Inquiry must decide: do they believe General Leng, who had no reason whatsoever to lie, or do they believe MoD and Intelligence witnesses who had very good reasons to lie. It is sad and very worrying that CTI has attempted to play down the significance of what General Leng said. If it had not been for the stance he took on this issue, I would not have been talking to the press in 1974 about McGrath’s homosexual activities. Although General Leng makes it clear to Barrie Penrose that he could not recall some of the detail relating to ‘Clockwork Orange’, it is very obvious that he was not in any doubt about some of the key facts referred to above. I am sure the tape recordings of General Leng’s interview still exist and the Inquiry should take steps to obtain copies of them because they are pivotal to the understanding of Kincora, and no amount of obfuscation by the MoD or its representatives can avoid that basic fact.

The Sunday Times story based on General Leng’s recorded interview with Barrie Penrose was published in the first edition of the newspaper on 18 February 1990. I was reliably informed that the MoD put pressure on the Sunday Times to withdraw the story. Indeed, the story was withdrawn from subsequent editions. It is not difficult to understand why the MoD reacted so negatively to the story because General Leng’s comments undermined almost everything the Department and its Ministers had been saying about ‘Clockwork Orange’ and Kincora.

Ironically, the story also referred to an incident when an NCO, who was a photographer with the Army Information Services at Army HQ in Lisburn in 1973/74, offered some of the ‘Clockwork Orange’ material to Len Adams, a journalist with the Sunday People. According to the ‘Sunday Times’, Len Adams told the paper: “I was taken to Lisburn by an NCO named Bill Bain”, said Adams. When he later called the unit to ask Bain if the story could be released, an officer told him that he had died. The ‘Sunday Times’ established that Bain was still alive and in the Army.”

Bill Bain was certainly not dead; he continued to serve in the British Army and became a commissioned officer. Clearly, if the MoD was willing to lie blatantly about ‘Clockwork Orange’ related material as it did in this incident, there is no reason to accept at face value anything the Department says, or has said, on this issue.

Bill Bain was not the only former member of the Army Information Services to be falsely described as dead by the MoD. When researching material for his book, ‘Who Framed Colin Wallace’, Paul Foot
It has been suggested by several politicians in the House of Commons that the affair from its first edition last Saturday night. That is untrue. The facts are as follows.

The Sunday Times first edition contained a page one story "General backs claims" in which it was said that General Sir Peter Leng, commander of the Ulster Force in Northern Ireland from 1973 to 1975, confirmed the existence of the "Clockwork Orange" and, further, claimed that it had been authorised by the Northern Ireland Office.

After the first edition went to press the MoD issued a statement which said that we had either distorted or misunderstood what the general had said. The general, said the MoD, had confirmed to the ministry that he had said neither the two statements attributed to him by the Sunday Times.

My reaction was simple: the MoD, realising the import of what the general had said, had got him to retract his statements as part of a damage limitation exercise. Luckily, I thought, our two telephone conversations with the general had been tape recorded.

I asked to listen to the recordings so that I could pick the best quotes from a general in order to refute the MoD rebuttal. But after listening to the tapes I was forced to conclude that the general had neither confirmed Clockwork Orange nor its official authorisation. I had no choice, therefore, but to withdraw the story from all future editions of The Sunday Times, and issue a correction to that effect at 8.15pm Saturday night. At no stage did the MoD or any other official body ask for the story to be withdrawn, or put any pressure directly or indirectly, on The Sunday Times to do so. The decision was taken for purely journalistic reasons, above all for reasons of accuracy. The full transcript of the two interviews with the general is being prepared and will be made available to interested MPs.

(Fin)
From the Editor

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

22 February 1990

The Right Honourable Merlyn Rees
House of Commons
Westminster
London SW1A OAA

Dear Mr Rees,

You expressed an interest in seeing the transcript of the conversations 'between The Sunday Times and General Sir Peter Leng and I have pleasure in enclosing that transcript.

I am only making this available to you because of the misunderstandings that occurred earlier in the week regarding our decision to drop a story on the Wallace affair from last week's Sunday Times. I would like to stress that the transcript is for your information only and is not, under any circumstances, for public use.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

Andrew Neil

Enc.
Dear Prime Minister,

I refer to my letter to you on 23 April which has still not been acknowledged and which sets out examples of political disinformation material that existed within the Intelligence services during the 1970s. Bearing in mind that Government Ministers have assured Parliament that no such evidence exists, I would be grateful for an early response to my letter.

You will recall that in reply to my earlier letters dated 19 and 21 February, the Ministry of Defence wrote to me saying, inter alia:

"You mentioned the story which appeared in the first editions of the Sunday Times on 18 February. As you may already know, the story was withdrawn by the Editor when it became clear that it was not supported by the tape recordings of the telephone exchanges with General Leng. General Leng has made it plain to the Ministry of Defence that he has not sought to challenge, nor does he recall anything which conflicts with, the recent statements made by Ministers".

Significantly, the letter fails to say that General Leng has not challenged anything in the Sunday Times account!

I attach for your information extracts from the tape recordings of the exchanges between General Leng and the Sunday Times. I think you will agree that they show:

1. Senior Army officers at HQ Northern Ireland were aware in the mid 1970s of allegations of homosexual abuse at the Kincora boys home.

2. That the 'Clockwork Orange' project originated at the Northern Ireland Office and involved members of MI5.
3. Setting aside the first paragraph of the story which I think is much too strong, the tape recordings do support the Sunday Times account of what the General allegedly said.

I also enclose a copy of my latest letter to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland regarding his continued refusal to explain the conflict that exists over the RUC's forensic examination of my 1974 Kincora memorandum and I would be grateful if your Government would now tell Parliament the truth about that matter.

Finally, I am informed that a number of potential witnesses for the Calcutt inquiry are having pressure put on them by the authorities to support the Government's version of events. I have no doubt that you will want to ensure that such such intimidation ceases forthwith.

Yours sincerely,

Colin Wallace
LEN: And the rest of them were army.

PENROSE: Yes. And Colin Wallace you would have known?

LEN: Well hardly... I mean known yes, but as he was a captain working right down the chain...

PENROSE: Yes.

LEN: I didn't. I mean I hardly came across him at all.

PENROSE: Because everyone, including Broderick, I must say, they speak so highly... and so do the records of him at the time, that he was hard working and so on, but that's something that obviously... you were at a level where you wouldn't have come across him very much.

LEN: Correct.

PENROSE: But it wouldn't surprise you that he was involved along with Broderick and the others and Taylor.....

LEN: If he was working under Broderick he would be involved.

PENROSE: With Clockwork Orange, Yes. And how many people would have known about Clockwork Orange? Would it... I'm just wondering....

LEN: Well I think that the senior intelligence officer would have known. Broderick would have known. Mike Garrett.

PENROSE: Yes. I remember that name.

LEN: ... who I'm afraid is very ill with leukaemia now, he would be more involved than the chief of staff, and then what I would be doing is to listen to the policy.

PENROSE: How long would an operation like that have lasted? (MORE)
Terrorists?
LEN: Correct.
PENROSE: Yes.
LEN: As far as I was concerned it was finding out information about
them.
PENROSE: Right, because there was Clockwork Orange one and two but I am
sure your memory probably doesn't stretch back that far?
LEN: It doesn't I'm afraid. I've got a terribly bad memory anyhow.
PENROSE: So - I mean - when it was mentioned to you, it was mentioned to
you as what?
LEN: Well, I don't want to be quoted, because I can't actually recall, but I think it was from rough memory, it was we have to investigate these
terrorist organisations and I said 'go ahead and investigate'.
PENROSE: Yes, and 73, 74 sounds about right does it?
LEN: Yes it does, in timing.
PENROSE: And who - I mean, that would have been army people talking to
you rather than...?
LEN: Well Peter Broderick was the army intelligence... information
policy officer.
PENROSE: Right
LEN: And he was a civilian.
PENROSE: Right

(MORE)
give quite a lot of evidence and would also cause the IRA perhaps to squeak. My answer as you can imagine was this is absolutely impossible to do - we are bound to be found out - stop it now.

PENROSE: Yes, otherwise it will rebound. You see on the other hand, the interesting thing is that it was never mentioned to you obviously by the people that they wanted to extend to politicians and in fact did so.

LEN: No, never.

PENROSE: Did you know there was a Clockwork Orange one and two?

LEN: Really?

PENROSE: No. And on Kincora you come out absolutely as one would expect, saying there has got to be action on Kincora. Do you recall that?

LEN: No.

PENROSE: Well, you should take your virtue because in fact Taylor says, I remember it very well and we were all delighted that the RUC were.... you said in the memo according to Taylor that the RUC and the social services I think ought to be brought in here because the file named men and boys who were obviously part of this abuse which we all know about now.

LEN: Yes I recall that.

PENROSE: Do you? And you said take action. They waited because obviously there had been other members suggesting this from junior officers, but it was yours that finally convinced Taylor that this was going to happen, but of course it went on for another six or seven years, but again that wasn’t your fault.

LEN: I think the action, now I recall it, was the absconding of boys, and if I’ve got the thing right, there were an awful lot of what I call (MORE)
... well I'll call them terrorist boys who were put away in the home, and they kept on absconding, and I do remember talking to the chief of staff, saying 'look we've got to stop these boys escaping from this remand home, and there is far too much escaping and they are going back into terrorism, so take action to stop that.'

PENROSE: It was also just to remind you that there were homosexual abuses taking place, namely by the house father says McGraph...

LENG: Yes.

PENROSE: ... who was also the leader of TARA, and of course eventually that was all proven in court some years afterwards, and also a man called McKay, but I man this is obviously outside...

LENG: Yes I do remember the homosexual insinuations and I do remember saying this is a police business, not yours...

PENROSE: Yes, because you probably know that since then, the suggestions have been that MIS or others, not the army but others, were in fact using, obviously, a blackmail hold on people like McGraph which he has since confirmed, I mean that is a matter of record now, that he was blackmailed into working for intelligence to inform and so on, so you can see the tug of war that was taking place from your side, saying pulive, social services take action, and the other side saying no, we need the information...

LENG: But of course, I wasn't part of the other side...

PENROSE: No, quite. Well look, I'll get this in the post... indiscreetly few words. May I leave a number at the office so you know who you're speaking to. Its 01...

LENG: Just wait one moment, I'll have to nip next door, I've just come in from the garden. Will you hold on?

PENROSE: Right - [censored] and my name is Penrose and it's Barry

LENG: Right, Barry, thank you very much.
said no minutes were taken: it was all done by discussion. Leng did not relate all this to Clockwork Orange before reading the Foot book. It was simply intelligence gathering, targeting "both sides". "I do not remember Clockwork Orange" he said. He had talked about this to Penrose and when asked about the passage of information had said that the General's received their orders from the politicians. There was no direction on information policy. They were simply gathering information about terrorists and leaders on both sides of the divide. Cassell to Leng: "Did you mean political figures?". Leng: "No. Unknown leaders. Godfathers." If Penrose had talked about links to politicians, Leng would have said that issue "never arose". Leng said that the information was gathered at unit level on IRA terrorists. There were no names of politicians. "We work on hard intelligence, not gossip," he said. Asked about local politicians, he said "not even local politicians". "I saw no intelligence that named any politicians in the Province as being directly concerned with terrorism." "It never became focused on politicians," he said.

7. On Kincora, Leng remembered discussing with the Chief of Staff the escapes of youngsters back into violence. Kincora came up in relation to escapes, he said.

8. Leng was questioned about Tara - "Don't remember". Magrath - "No bells". Homosexual activity at Kincora - "I have a nagging thought about that. Len Garrett may have discussed homosexuality there with me. My recollection is unclear".
STATEMENT

WITNESS

STATEMENT OF:  General Sir Peter Leng KCB MBE MC

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 enter “over 21”]: Over 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: former Commander Land Forces HQNI

ADDRESS: C/o HQNI Lisburn

I declare that this statement consisting of 2 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 2 day of July 1985.

[Signature]

SIGNATURE OF MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received.

I was Commander Land Forces N Ireland from Jan 1973 until March 1975. I have closely and carefully examined the document marked GC 80 and I can state that I have never seen such a document before. Documents of this nature would have been handled at a lower level and if a problem arose the subject in question would be discussed in my office with either the Chief of Staff, Brigadier Garrett, or for the major part of my tour by Colonel F, Col G S Intelligence or in the last 3 months by Colonel M. I always insisted on personal briefing rather than having to read a mass of documents. I would not therefore have received a document in draft and usually only handled the most important policy documents in final form.

Nor have I any knowledge of this document nor was the information contained in the document under question ever brought to my notice. I certainly cannot recall having heard of any of the hostels named in the document nor was I aware of any allegations of homosexuality in any boys' homes in N Ireland. However, I was aware of the remand home, St Patrick's, situated in west Belfast. In 1974 the Army Belfast Commanders were concerned about the number of young men on remand for terrorist charges who were absconding from this home and re-involving themselves in terrorist activities. I was aware of the

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS: P LENG

[Redacted]
Protestant organisation TARA but cannot recall at this late stage any of the personalities involved. I do not recall the McDermot incident. With regard to the press allegation in Irish Times of Jan 25 1985 I can state that there was an Army Information Policy Unit at my headquarters and its purpose was to produce quick reaction responses to the clear lies that terrorist organisations were putting out. With regard to the allegation that this Unit used "black propaganda" I can categorically state that I would not have accepted such as I was clear that in security operations the good name and integrity of the Army must ride above everything else.
Is it really credible that General Leng possessed this information about McGrath and the sexual abuse allegations and that neither MoD, nor MI5 nor MI6 knew anything about this? In the end, the public will have to make up their minds on this.

Those who served with General Leng will be well aware that he was a very professional and forthright officer who had great integrity. There is no doubt in my mind that his knowledge of McGrath and Kincora as expressed above would have been communicated very clearly and forcibly to those around him. I am amazed that the Inquiry transcripts indicate that the Inquiry made no determined attempt to challenge senior military and Intelligence witnesses over General Leng’s comments. I am also disgusted that those officers and officials, including the senior Information Policy officers, did not have the courage to speak out and confirm what General Leng had said.

I believe the Inquiry must face up to this issue because General Leng’s comments go to the very heart of the Inquiry’s investigation into Kincora. The Inquiry must decide: do they believe General Leng, who had no reason whatsoever to lie, or do they believe MoD and Intelligence witnesses who had very good reasons to lie. It is sad and very worrying that CTI has attempted to play down the significance of what General Leng said. If it had not been for the stance he took on this issue, I would not have been talking to the press in 1974 about McGrath’s homosexual activities. Although General Leng makes it clear to Barrie Penrose that he could not recall some of the detail relating to ‘Clockwork Orange’, it is very obvious that he was not in any doubt about some of the key facts referred to above. I am sure the tape recordings of General Leng’s interview still exist and the Inquiry should take steps to obtain copies of them because they are pivotal to the understanding of Kincora, and no amount of obfuscation by the MoD or its representatives can avoid that basic fact.

The Sunday Times story based on General Leng’s recorded interview with Barrie Penrose was published in the first edition of the newspaper on 18 February 1990. I was reliably informed that the MoD put pressure on the Sunday Times to withdraw the story. Indeed, the story was withdrawn from subsequent editions. It is not difficult to understand why the MoD reacted so negatively to the story because General Leng’s comments undermined almost everything the Department and its Ministers had been saying about ‘Clockwork Orange’ and Kincora.

Ironically, the story also referred to an incident when an NCO, who was a photographer with the Army Information Services at Army HQ in Lisburn in 1973/74, offered some of the ‘Clockwork Orange’ material to Len Adams, a journalist with the Sunday People. According to the ‘Sunday Times’, Len Adams told the paper: “I was taken to Lisburn by an NCO named Bill Bain”, said Adams. When he later called the unit to ask Bain if the story could be released, an officer told him that he had died. The ‘Sunday Times’ established that Bain was still alive and in the Army.”

Bill Bain was certainly not dead; he continued to serve in the British Army and became a commissioned officer. Clearly, if the MoD was willing to lie blatantly about ‘Clockwork Orange’ related material as it did in this incident, there is no reason to accept at face value anything the Department says, or has said, on this issue.

Bill Bain was not the only former member of the Army Information Services to be falsely described as dead by the MoD. When researching material for his book, ‘Who Framed Colin Wallace’, Paul Foot
'TARA' - REPORTS REGARDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOMOSEXUAL COMMUNITY IN BELFAST

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to 'TARA'. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor Intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2. If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify our involvement in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, 'TARA' is no longer of any security interest.

3. In theory, 'TARA' was basically a credible concept from a Loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body, no doubt, have made good use of the Orange Order's normal selection and 'vetting' system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had ready made facilities for clandestine training by making use of the Orange Halls throughout the Province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, mainly because of WILLIAM MCGRAITH's rather strange political views which are more akin to Irish Nationalism or Republicanism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the Loyalist community at that time, sprang up during the period.

4. Reference A deals with MCGRAITH's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincora hostel in Newtownards Road where he was was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of Belfast Corporation Welfare Department. He does not, as the paper claims, "run the hostel" - he is employed as a 'housefather'. The Warden of Kincora is JOSEPH MAIRE and the Deputy Warden is RAYMOND SEMPLE. MAIRE was appointed in 1959 and SEMPLE in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals. Indeed, various allegations of homosexual assault on inmates of the hostel were investigated by senior Welfare Department staff in 1967 but no action was taken against anyone (see notes of a report by Mr H.G.SON at Flax 'N').
'TARA' - REPORTS REGARDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOMOSEXUAL COMMUNITY IN BELFAST

Reference A: Attached RUC background paper on 'TARA'.
Reference B: Attached RUC report on the death of BRIAN MCDERMOTT.
Reference C: Your request for a press investigation into the matters referred to above.

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to 'TARA'. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor Intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2. If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify our involvement in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, 'TARA' is no longer of any security interest.

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4. Reference A deals with McCrath's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincora hostel in Newtownards Road where he works was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of Belfast Corporation Welfare Department. He does not, as the paper claims, 'run the hostel' - he is employed as a 'housefather'. The Warden of Kincora is JOSEPH MAHNS and the Deputy Warden in RAYMOND SEMPLE's MAHNS was appointed in 1959 and SEMPLE in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals. Indeed, various allegations of homosexual assaults on inmates of the hostel were investigated by senior Welfare Department staff in 1967 but no action was taken against anyone (see notes of a report by MR E. MISON at flag 'R').

Continued...
5. It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kincora "began shortly after his appointment". As I have pointed out in para 4 above, allegations were made as early as 1957 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after MAWS was appointed.

6. Reference A claims that McGURTH "is a known homosexual" but it avoids any mention of his links with various other key figures in the local homosexual community, other than to intimate that a number of well known political personalities with whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of reference A, it is claimed that McGURTH left his previous employment "as a result of a lovers' quarrel" with his employer, whereas our information would tend to indicate that he left following a row over an outstanding debt. His former employer, ROY GARLAND, is well known in Unionist Party circles (see also CLIFFORD SMITH) and was for sometime 2½ of 'TARA'. Admittedly, some of the personal correspondence between the two men during this period cannot be regarded as normal between employer and employee (see flag 'M').

Whatever the real reason for the row between GARLAND and McGURTH, there is certainly considerable animosity between them at present, and GARLAND has been actively engaged in trying to have McGURTH removed from his post at Kincora. GARLAND's own version of events (see flag 'Q') is, of course, very enlightening, but I would suggest that it should be treated with caution until it can be substantiated because of the antagonisms between them. It would also appear that many of the RUC source reports on this matter after 1971 originated from GARLAND.

7. McGURTH was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation Welfare Department in 1972/73, following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints has been received about his behaviour and that, although the complaints had been passed to senior welfare staff and to the RUC, no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be confirmed, to some extent, by Mr ORR (see flag 'R') in 1973.

There were, of course, similar allegations relating to other hostels during this period (see Bannmore, Westwinds, Parmaide etc.) and this conflicts with reference A's assertion that the allegations were confined to Kincora.

9. It should be remembered that the 1967 Sexual Offences Act does NOT apply to Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors is a criminal offence. The apparent lack of interest, therefore, by the Welfare Authorities and the RUC is quite remarkable. Furthermore, the claim made by (see flag 'Q') that key individuals in the Welfare Department were themselves homosexuals and thus, not only appointed homosexuals to such posts but also covered up the offences that took place and protected the offenders, requires very serious examination. In particular, I view her allegations about MAWS with great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.

Reference F which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of BRIAN MCDERMOTT last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between the murder and the homosexual community is via JOHN MCKEAGUE. MCKEAGUE's own statements (see flag 'S') raise more questions than they answer. Certainly,
“I cannot find any evidence of more than one typewriter having been used as alleged. It is a poor photocopy, but all four pages are consistent.”

I do not know if my original document was re-typed after I submitted it to one of my superiors at HQNI in November 1974 and before it was passed on to other senior officers. I am only aware that General Peter Leng responded to the matter in a memo which instructed Information Policy to take action to ensure that the RUC took a more active part in the matters raised in the memo. I do not know why General Leng found it necessary to use the press as a means of drawing attention to William McGrath and his activities rather than raise the matter with the Chief Constable of the RUC. As a result of General Leng's memo I added a substantial amount of information about William McGrath and his activities to my 'Clockwork Orange' project working draft in December 1974.

I did not retain the various RUC documents referred to in my memo. Neither those documents nor the memo, were designed for release — indeed, I am not convinced that the Army was even meant to see the police documents. In any event, I had no authority to retain them. Also, it is almost certain that I would have re-attached them to the memo when I submitted it to my superiors. The memo by itself would have provided an incomplete picture.

A report published in the Irish Times on 25.06.1985 pointed out that although the RUC had not then been able to validate my memo, there were other similar documents in existence.

"Sources close to the new RUC inquiry say they are sceptical about the document's authenticity and say it will be three or four weeks before their inquiry is complete. But former military/ministry of defence sources contacted by The Irish Times, while unable to authenticate this document, say that at least three other documents containing similar information were in the files of the Information Policy Unit at this time.

These sources, who had knowledge of many top secret intelligence and psychological operations mounted from British Army headquarters, have no current connections with Wallace. They have told The Irish Times that there was an intensive investigation of Tara and McGrath in the early and mid-1970s by military and political intelligence agencies which revealed information about sexual assaults at Kincora.

Another military source, a high-ranking officer based at British Army Headquarters during this period, has also confirmed that the Information Policy Unit was asked by military commanders in 1974 to investigate homosexual offences involving members of Tara. "We were investigating everything at that particular time to see if there were implications for the security side," he said. However, the source, who asked not to be quoted by name, declined to comment further in the light of the new RUC investigation.

The 1974 Information Policy Unit document, four pages long and classified "confidential", refers to and quotes from an RUC background paper on Tara which in turn refers to allegations of assaults on Kincora inmates involving McGrath dating back to 1971. The RUC paper also refers to a claim that key loyalist political figures were "aware" of the Kincora situation.
5. It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kincora "began shortly after his appointment". As I have pointed out in para 4 above, allegations were made as early as 1957 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after MAINS was appointed.

6. Reference A claims that McGrath "is a known homosexual" but it avoids any mention of his links with various other key figures in the local homosexual community, other than to innuocate that a number of well known political personalities with whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of reference A, "it is claimed that McGrath left his previous employment "as a result of a lovers' quarrel" with his employer, whereas our information would tend to indicate that he left following a row over an outstanding debt. His former employer, Roy Garland, is well known in Unionist Party circles (see also Clifford @ Bill Smith) and was for sometime 2/3 of "Tara". Admittedly, some of the personal correspondence between the two men during this period cannot be regarded as normal between employer and employee (see flag 'f'). Whatever the real reason for the row between Garland and McGrath, there is certainly considerable animosity between them at present, and Garland has been actively engaged in trying to have McGrath recovred from his post at Kincora. Garland's own version of events (see flag 'q') is, of course, very enlightening, but I would suggest that it should be treated with caution until it can be substantiated because of the antagonism between them. It would also appear that many of the RUC source reports on this matter after 1971 originated from Garland.

7. McGrath was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation Welfare Department in 1972/73, following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints have been received about his behaviour and that, although the complaints had been passed to senior welfare staff and to the RUC, no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be confirmed, to some extent, by Mr O'Doherty (see flag 'q') in 1972. There were, of course, similar allegations relating to other hostels during this period (see Bammore, Westwinds, Bannside etc.) and this conflicts with reference A's assertion that the allegations were confined to Kincora.

8. It should be remembered that the 1967 Sexual Offences Act does NOT apply to Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors is a criminal offence. The apparent lack of interest, therefore, by the Welfare Authorities and the RUC is quite remarkable. Furthermore, the claim made by (See flag 'q') that key individuals in the Welfare Department were themselves homosexuals and thus, not only appointed homosexuals to such posts but also covered up the offences that took place and protected the offenders, requires very serious examination. In particular, I view her allegations about circumstances with great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.

Reference B which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of Brian McCormick last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between the murder and the homosexual community is via John McKee, McKee's own statements (see flag 'q') raise more questions than they answer. Certainly,
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STATEMENT OF: GEORGE CASKEY

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 omit "over 21"]: OVER 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT

ADDRESS: RUC HEADQUARTERS

I declare that this statement consisting of 1 page(s) signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 27th day of August 1985

SIGNATURE OF MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

On 7 August 1985 D/Inspector Cooke and I interviewed Ronald Orr at EHSS Office, Castlereagh Road. I produced the document marked GC 80 to Mr Orr in relation to paragraph 7. He stated that he did not at any time contact any Police Officer or Soldier in relation to social work. He stated that he had nothing to add to the statements he made to the RUC on 28 February 1980 and 19 June 1980.

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

29

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONA

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OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONA
31. It will also be noted in the RUC prosecution files that allegations in relation to inmates of these homes were investigated but none of these allegations were made before, as in the case of Westwinds 1975, Bawnmore 1980 and Burnside after 1980.

32. Paragraph 8 refers to a claim made by what appears to be a female, the name having been deleted, that key individuals in the Welfare Department were themselves homosexuals and not only appointed homosexuals to posts but covered up homosexual offences and protected the offenders. The name 'Joss Andrews' is printed in the margin opposite the second deletion in this paragraph. These are similar allegations to the ones which have already been investigated by the RUC.

33. Paragraph 9 refers to the murder of Brian McDermott and makes reference to "reference B" which is allegedly "attached RUC report on the death of Brian McDermott". This murder was the subject of an RUC investigation which is reported in the prosecution file already referred to at paragraph 5(9) of this report.

34. In this paragraph general comment is made on the details known to the authorities which were obtained during the course of the investigation of this murder. Reference is made to a theory that this killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones and that the only link that "can be identified between this murder and the homosexual community is via John McKeague".
5. It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kincora "began shortly after his appointment". As I have pointed out in para 4 above, allegations were made as early as 1957 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after MAINS was appointed.

6. Reference A claims that McGrath "is a known homosexual" but it avoids any mention of his links with various other key figures in the local homosexual community, other than to intimate that a number of well known political personalities with whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of reference A, it is claimed that McGrath left his previous employment "as a result of a lovers' quarrel" with his employer, whereas our information would tend to indicate that he left following a row over an outstanding debt. His former employer, Roy Garland, is well known in Unionist Party circles (see also Clifford Smith) and was for sometime 2½ c of 'Tara'. Admittedly, some of the personal correspondence between the two men during this period cannot be regarded as normal between employer and employee (see Flag 'H'). Whatever the real reason for the row between Garland and McGrath, there is certainly considerable animosity between them at present, and Garland has been actively engaged in trying to have McGrath removed from his post at Kincora. Garland's own version of events (see Flag 'Q') is, of course, very enlightening, but I would suggest that it should be treated with caution until it can be substantiated because of the antagonism between them. It would also appear that many of the RUC source reports on this matter after 1971 originated from Garland.

7. McGrath was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation Welfare Department in 1972/73, following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints has been received about his behaviour and that, although the complaints had been passed to senior welfare staff and to the RUC, no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be confirmed, to some extent, by Mr ORR (see Flag 'R') in 1973. There were, of course, similar allegations relating to other hostels during this period (see Barmore, Westwinds, Ernside etc.) and this conflicts with reference A's assertion that the allegations were confined to Kincora.

9. It should be remembered that the 1967 Sexual Offences Act does NOT apply to Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors in a criminal offence. The apparent lack of interest, therefore, by the Welfare Authorities and the RUC is quite remarkable. Furthermore, the claim made by [redacted] (see Flag 'Q') that key individuals in the Welfare Department were themselves homosexuals and thus, not only appointed homosexuals to such posts but also covered up the offences that took place and protected the offenders, requires very serious examination. In particular, I view her allegations about [redacted] with great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.

Reference F which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of Brian McDermott last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between the murder and the homosexual community is via John McKeague. McKeague's own statements (see Flag 'G') raise more questions than they answer. Certainly,
9. continued...

his boast that he will not be prosecuted because "he knows too much about some people" merits serious investigation, but I suspect that he will no be prepared to talk until he is released. It is also rather remarkable that no charges have been preferred against him, at least during the past 3-4 years. Our own investigations of instances of alleged witchcraft or other satanic rites in the Province would tend to disprove the RUC's theory that BRIAN McDERMOTT's murder could be part of these activities. In the past, 'Black Magic' practices etc have been mainly confined to groups operating from Republican areas, with the possible exception of three cases in Co Antrim. I think, however, that from a press point of view, we would be very foolish to give any credence to such claims without the most convincing evidence. The forensic reports on the McDERMOTT murder (see flag 'I') would tend to indicate that someone tried to dispose of the body by cutting it into pieces and burning them. It would also appear that when this failed, the pieces were dumped in the river. The inquisition made in the document regarding the boy's disappearance and the proximity of the Rev PAISLEY's home is dangerous nonsense.

10. Reference A claims that a number of key personalities in the political arena "are aware of" the Kincora situation, and, in particular, of McGRATH's background. It does not, however, explain the extent of their awareness nor of each individual's involvement with McGRATH. In summary, it would appear that the document is claiming that:

(a) Senior members of the Grand Orange Lodge are aware of the situation because of the discussions and correspondence relating to McGRATH within the Orange Order (see flag 'C'). It is further alleged that THOMAS PASSMORE and the Rev MARTIN SMITH have blocked any action against McGRATH.

(b) The Rev PAISLEY is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because of possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with McGRATH, DAVID BROWN and JOHN MCKEAG. On the face of it, the statements made by VALERIE SHAW and TOM MCNILL (see flag 'I') would tend to support the only part of such a claim. There are also a number of inconsistencies: McGRATH would appear to be strongly anti-communist and anti-U.V.F and this conflicts with the document's views on links with TOMMY HERRON, ERNIE 'DUKE' ELLIOTT, 'The Ulster Citizens Army' etc.

(c) Various public and political figures who hold positions of power and who are also homosexual protect each other from prosecution. The claims of a prostitution ring involving juveniles and centered on Bangor is not really substantiated, other than by GARLAND's own personal account. It would be interesting to check, however, the number of charges brought against people involved in homosexual activities in the greater Belfast area in the last 5 years. I also think that the RUC report on drug abuse in this connection merits

[Continued/......]
In 1987 I was contacted by a Robin Bryans (aka Robert Harbinson) who had read about me in the press and who claimed that he had information to share with me about Kincora. Fred Holroyd and I subsequently interviewed him at his home and he was also later interviewed by Paul Foot. Bryans was an author who had grown up in Belfast and who was, by his own admission, closely associated with a homosexual and paedophile network in Ireland, London and Brighton. He had also been closely associated with individuals who had been members of the Intelligence Services during World War 2 and afterwards. He told Fred Holroyd, Paul Foot and me that he had warned two Government Ministers in 1973 about the abuse that was taking place at Kincora. He also claimed that he informed the wife of a former Prime Minister about the abuse.

I do not know if what he alleged was true, but several of the people he referred to were also listed in my 'Clockwork Orange' notes. A copy of the notes I made of my meetings and discussions with Bryans is attached to the submission. I am satisfied that there was clearly a link between William McGrath, Sir Knox Cunningham and Peter Montgomery, but I am not in a position to comment on his allegations per se. I believe Paul Foot also tape recorded his interview with Bryans, but he decided that he could not make use of any of the material in his book about my story because the Bryans material was too complex.

I have not redacted from the notes I made of my discussions with Robin Bryans the various names he mentioned. I feel the Inquiry should be aware of these, albeit I believe that most of these are now in the public domain. I assume the Inquiry will, however, handle the information appropriately.

The Murder of Brian McDermott

CTI has claimed that I contradicted myself in terms of what I have said about the murder of Brian McDermott. I disagree. To the best of my knowledge, the British Army possessed no information about the murder of Brian McDermott other than that which we received from the RUC. Initially, we were told that a police suspect was an associate of John McKeague, but that others may also have been involved.

The main suspect was believed to be a member of the Rev Ian Paisley's church and may also have been involved with McKeague in the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee which was led by the Rev Paisley. He was believed to be a child molester who frequented Ormeau Park where Brian McDermott allegedly disappeared and that he had tenuous links with the Kincora Boys' Home. I cannot now recall the exact nature of his connection with Kincora, but I think he had also been questioned by the police about a sexual assault on a boy just before Brian McDermott was killed. From what we were told, the police were confident that they had identified the guilty person.

We were interested in two aspects of this information. The first was the suspect's alleged association with John McKeague. The second was the RUC's comments possibly linking witchcraft to the murder - McKeague and McGrath both had an interest in the occult. Also, Sir Knox Cunningham had links with both McGrath and McKeague. Later, the police appeared to change their views about their main suspect and apparently took the view that the killing may have been a domestic one. As far as I am aware, all of this information came from police sources and was generally reflected in the document referred to as 'Reference B' in my November 1974 memo. The British Army lost all interest in the matter when the original suspect ceased to be of interest to the police. The RUC records should show
whether or not the information the British Army had been given was an accurate account of what the RUC knew at that time.

I believe that John McKeague's claim that he would not be prosecuted because "he knew too much", was not linked to the murder of Brian McDermott, but to his paramilitary activities in general. As far as I can recall McKeague was arrested and was detained in the Maze prison when Brian McDermott was killed.

In 1974 we at British Army HQNI were given information that the RUC believed the original suspect had been protected by influential people and that attempts to prosecute him had been blocked. The Inquiry should ask the RUC for details of their investigations into Brian McDermott's murder to determine what links, if any, the original suspect had with John McKeague and/or Kincora, and if he was protected by influential people. However, as I pointed out to the police in 2008, I had no direct knowledge of the murder. Indeed, this is accurately reflected in Paul Foot's book, *Who Framed Colin Wallace* (London: Pan Books, 1990 (at page 145):

"The section on the murder of Brian McDermott is probably, as the memo (written by CW in November 1974) suggests not strictly relevant to Kincora. McDermott's murder may well have been a one-off crime by a sexual sadist not necessarily connected with the Kincora gang. Certainly there is no direct evidence to point to Kincora, and the issue is mentioned because of the suspicion of a connection with John McKeague."

Correspondence between Peter Broderick Chief Information Officer at HQ NI and John Groves at the MoD

I refer to the following extract from the transcript of Day 221 of the Inquiry.

"However, what I want to show you, given the letter we have just looked at of September 1976, is a letter written on 19th July 1976. If we can bring up, please, 102121. This is a letter written in confidence. If we can just scroll down to the bottom so you can see – on to the next page, please, so you can see who it's from: Peter Broderick. If we go back to the start, please:

"Dear John,

After many months of silence, Colin Wallace and his wife dropped in for a casual social visit yesterday. I thought you ought to know that he is still in my opinion" -- this is Peter Broderick, a supporter of Colin Wallace -- "unable to separate fact from fiction. Far from having accepted the honourable" -- Ms. Doherty: Resignation". Mr Lane: "Resignation". Mr Aiken: "resignation formula, he is now having a fresh round of lawyers' advice, seeing his MP (Roland Moyle, who is NIO incidentally) and still in touch with IPCS. He is contemplating an appeal to the Industrial Tribunal against the CS Appeal Board on grounds of incorrect" – Mr Lane: "Procedures". Mr. Aiken: "procedures and missing evidence. I tried to get him to clarify what evidence had been missing. He wasn't very coherent but I get the impression that in a final crunch" - Chairman: "He would not be averse to getting CLF ..." Mr Aiken: "... Commander of Land Forces, then Peter Leng and Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Railton (GI – Information Policy then) to own up for their parts in the various operations which, so he thinks, are now being pinned on him alone

[40]
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

John Colin Wallace
Name

Rank

AGE OF WITNESS (If over 18 enter "over 18");
Over 18

I declare that this statement consisting of two page, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this Eighteenth day of March 2004

SIGNATURE OF MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

During the 1970’s I was involved with the Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland. Part of this role was exploring the use of witchcraft within the realms of the paramilitaries. When Brain McDermott was murdered in September 1973 there was some speculation that his death had been something to do with witchcraft. This speculation was neither fact nor evidence based. It appeared to be hype that was sensationalised within the media. When I was writing about the McDermott case, I linked his death with witchcraft purely because it was an area I was exploring at that time. I had no evidence that witchcraft or any other occult associated with witchcraft was involved. As a result of linking the McDermott case with witchcraft, it followed that anyone associated with witchcraft became a possible suspect for the murder. One such person at that time was a paramilitary leader by the name of John McKeague, who lived and worked near the area that McDermott had gone missing. This was not based on any evidence, it was only a supposition on my part based on intelligence at hand being evaluated and linked. There were a number of issues in the 1970’s and into the 1980’s concerning the investigation into the abuse of children at the Kincora Boys Home in Belfast. I had...
concerns that the murderers of McDermott would not be apprehended due to a cover up in relation to this investigation, however, I had no knowledge that would have linked anyone from the Kincora investigation to the murder of Brian McDermott. I am not in possession of any information that would link anyone to the McDermott murder. I can confirm that I am not aware of any cover up concerning the McDermott case.
PART 1

BACKGROUND:— SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICER (EQUIVALENT RANK TO LT. COLONEL) IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE'S PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ORGANISATION WAS A SENIOR OFFICER IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNIT WHICH OPERATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND UNDER COVER OF THE TITLE "INFORMATION POLICY" WITH THE ARMY INFORMATION SERVICES. ALSO SERVED AS A CAPTAIN IN THE UDR FROM 1971-75. FIRST REPORTED THE KINCORA VICE RING IN THE EARLY 70'S BUT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN. IN 1974 HE COMPLAINED TO SENIOR OFFICERS THAT A COVER UP OF THE KINCORA RING WAS PREVENTING THE KILLERS OF 10 YEAR OLD BRIAN MCDERMOTT FROM BEING APPREHENDED. NAMED THREE PEOPLE THOUGHT TO BE LINKED WITH THE VICE RING WHO WERE SUSPECTED OF THE KILLING. LATER AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION PLANNED TO DISCREDIT A NUMBER OF ULSTER POLITICIANS BY FALSELY IMPLICATING THEM IN THE RING. WALLACE REFUSED TO TAKE PART. HE DISCUSSED KINCORA WITH A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS IN 1974 AND WAS SUDDENLY POSTED OUT OF ULSTER, ACCUSED OF BEING PRO RUC AND OF GIVING INFORMATION TO THE PRESS WITHOUT AUTHORITY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT A NUMBER OF SENIOR MPS AT WESTMINSTER INCLUDING SEVERAL CABINET MINISTERS WERE INVOLVED IN THE COVER UP. THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MAY BE OF SIGNIFICANCE — McGARTH QUESTIONED BY POLICE; WALLACE CHARGED WITH MURDER, A SENIOR TORY MINISTER RESIGNS, JOHN MC(KENZIE) IS SHOT DEAD. ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS WALLACE WAS RECOMMENDED FOR DECORATIONS FOR SERVICES IN ULSTER. HE LEFT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND RESIGNED HIS COMMISSION IN THE UDR IN 1975.

FURTHER INFO SPEAK TO (MKE) TAYLOR, P.R.O BASS CHARRINGTON, MANCHESTER. FOR BACKGROUND IN THE INTERNAL RIVALRY BETWEEN M15, M16, DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AND THE RUC SB SEE "WHO DARES WINS" BY TONY GERAGHTY. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS BOOK THE FOLLOWING MAY BE OF INTEREST: WALLACE FORMED AND COMMANDED 'THE PHANTOMS' FREE FALL TEAM AND WAS THE ARMY'S SKY DIVING SANTA CLAUS. FURTHER INFO: THE BRITISH PARACHUTE ASSOCIATION, LEICESTER, MEMBERSHIP NO. 3150... WAS ALSO A MEMBER OF "THE PHANTOMS" AND SERVED IN BRITISH MILITARY.
Q Without attempting to interfere with the confidence between you and your legal advisers, did the information you gave relate to offences of homosexuality and Kincora?

A It related to my employment in Northern Ireland and certain information which I gave them which might have a bearing on my case. I did not go into considerable detail because I was not certain at that time how much of that information I could disclose to my legal advisers.

Q Does the information you possess identify any person with having committed a criminal offence in relation to the enquiry I am carrying out?

A I would not be prepared to reply to that question at this stage.

Q Are you suggesting that there was a cover up by the authorities in relation to the Kincora Enquiry?

A I cannot reply to that question without the relevant clearance from the MOD.

Q Did you have a meeting with News of the World journalist, Ian Macaskill?

A I would not be prepared to reply to that question.

Q Did you see that document SRM9(a)? It is a photocopy. Are you the author of that document?
STATEMENT OF: GEORGE CASKEY  CONTINUATION PAGE NO:  6

Q I suggest to you that you are the author of that document and that that is clearly identified by the content?

A I have already stated that I am not prepared to make any comment in relation to that document.

Q A serious allegation is made in the document that in 1974 a complaint was made to senior officers that a cover up of the 'Kincora Ring' was preventing the killers of 10 year old Brian McDermott from being apprehended and that 3 people were named who were thought to be linked with the vice ring who were suspected of the killing. Have you any comment to make about this?

A As I have said before I have no comment to make about this document.

Q I put it to you that the Official Secrets Act does not extend protection to any person who has information that would lead to the detection of persons suspected of murder?

The solicitor stated that the Official Secrets Act prohibits disclosures by his client without comment of any relevant information in his possession.
A If this information is so important why don't the Military just give permission. It is in the public interest for the MOD to give me the permission.

Q Do you have information that would lead to the identity of these suspected killers?

A Again I could not reply to that question.

Q To your knowledge, are these suspected killers still at large?

A I cannot make any comment on that.

Q Would you agree with me that it is a serious matter that if suspected killers are at large that every effort should be made to make them amenable to the law?

A I could not agree more.

Q If they are still at large, taking into account the terrorist situation in Northern Ireland, assuming that they are of the 'terrorist type' there is every likelihood of them committing further serious offences?

A This would apply even if they weren't terrorists, irrespective of who they were I would like to see them brought to book.

Q If you would like this then this is the time to disclose their identity?
A This is the time for the MOD to allow me to disclose this information.

Q Was there an intelligence organisation within the military in Northern Ireland prepared to discredit a number of Ulster Politicians by publicly implicating them in the Kincora vice ring?

A I could not make any comment on that.

Q You are not prepared to name the 3 men even though they may be killing today?

A I can't release any information.

Mr Morgan-Harris asked "Have any enquiries been made in the Security Forces?" I said "I will take that up".

Wallace then related 4 conditions:

1. In the event of me providing you with a statement of all the information which I consider relevant to your enquiry, will that information be supplied to the Sussex Police?

2. In the event of me being subpoenaed or voluntarily giving evidence to any public enquiry connected with Kincora, when would I be required to give my evidence?
TARA - REPORTS REGARDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOMOSEXUAL COMMUNITY IN BELFAST

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to 'TARA'. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor Intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2. If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify our involvement in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, 'TARA' is no longer of any security interest.

3. In theory, 'TARA' was basically a credible concept from a Loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body, if properly set up, could have made good use of the Orange Order's normal selection and 'vetting' system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had ready made facilities for clandestine training by making use of the Orange Halls throughout the Province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, mainly because of WILLIAM MCGRAITH's rather strange political views which are more akin to Irish Nationalism or Republicanism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the Loyalist community at that time, sprang up during the period.

4. Reference A deals with MCGRAITH's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincora hostel in Newtownards Road where he works was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of Belfast Corporation Welfare Department. He does not, as the paper claims, "run the hostel" - he is employed as a 'housefather'. The Warden of Kincora is JOSEPH MAHNS and the Deputy Warden is RAYMOND SEMPLE. MAHNS was appointed in 1959 and SEMPLE in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals. Indeed, various allegations of homosexual assaults on inmates of the hostel were investigated by senior Welfare Department staff in 1967 but no action was taken against anyone (see notes of a report by Mr. R. H. Mow at Flag 'R').

Continued...
RUC Ref: C64/22/85

AP Ref C64/22/85

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS IN RELATION TO KINCORA BOYS' HOSTEL
CAPTAIN FREDERICK JOHN HOLROYD
JOHN COLIN WALLACE

Chief Constable

Direction

I refer to this file the original (only) of which was delivered to the Director by the ACC Crime on 5 September 1985 with the ACC's covering submission dated 4 September 1985.

The facts and information contained in the file do not provide evidence of the commission of any criminal offence.

The Director has considered the document of 8 November 1974 and the facts and information which have been investigated and reported with regard to it. He has considered whether in the light of the whole of the information and evidence which has been reported to him (including information and evidence reported prior to 5 September 1985) any useful purpose in connection with the prosecution of offences would be served by the Director requesting further investigation to be undertaken by the Chief Constable. He has concluded that no such purpose would be served by requesting the Chief Constable to conduct any further investigation in relation to the document of 8 November 1974 either by way of interview of Colonel M or otherwise.

Accordingly upon the papers sent I direct no prosecution and do not request any further investigation.

I note from the submission by the ACC Crime dated 4 September 1985 his recommendation that if either Mr Wallace or Mr Holroyd makes any further allegation of criminal activity which has already been investigated each should be informed that no investigation will take place unless he is prepared to co-operate fully. In this connection I can only observe that there must be a serious question concerning the credibility and reliability of any potential witness who deliberately withholds relevant information and evidence. His motivation may well be so doubtful as to preclude any reliance being placed upon him. Should any further allegation of crime in relation to Kincora Boys' Hostel be made either by Mr Holroyd or Mr Wallace it will be necessary to consider whether in the light of all the allegations and investigations to date further police investigations are warranted and to what end.

The original file is returned herewith.

W R JUNKIN
for Director of Public Prosecutions

17 September 1985
9. continued...

his boast that he will not be prosecuted because "he knows too much about some people" merits serious investigation, but I suspect that he will no be prepared to talk until he is released. It is also rather remarkable that no charges have been preferred against him, at least during the past 3-4 years. Our own investigations of instances of alleged witchcraft or other satanic rites in the Province would tend to dismiss the RUC's theory that BRIAN McDERMOTT's murder could be part of these activities. In the past, Black Magic practices etc. have been mainly confined to groups operating from Republican areas, with the possible exception of three cases in Co Antrim. I think, however, that from a press point of view, we would be very foolish to give any credence to such claims without the most convincing evidence. The forensic reports on the McDermott murder (see flag 'I') would tend to indicate that someone tried to dispose of the body by cutting it into pieces and burning them. It would also appear that when this failed, the pieces were dumped in the river. The indignation made in the document regarding the boy's disappearance and the proximity of the Rev PAISLEY's church is dangerous nonsense.

10. Reference A claims that a number of key personalities in the political area "are aware of" the Kincora situation and, in particular, of MCGRAITH's background. It does not, however, explain the extent of their awareness nor of each individual's involvement with McGRATH. In summary, it would appear that the document is claiming that:

(a) Senior members of the Grand Orange Lodge are aware of the situation because of the discussions and correspondence relating to MCGRAITH within the Orange Order (see flag 'C'). It is further alleged that THOMAS PASSMORE and the Rev MARTIN SMITH have blocked any action against MCGRAITH.

(b) The Rev PAISLEY is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because of possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with MCGRAITH, DAVID BROWN and JOHN MCKEAUGER (see flag 'B'). On the face of it, the statements made by VALERIE SHAW and TOM McNEILL (see flag 'F') would tend to support the only part of such a claim. There are also a number of inconsistencies: MCGRAITH would appear to be strongly anti-communist and anti-U.V.F and this conflicts with the document's views on links with TOMMY HERRON, ERNE 'DUKE' ELLIOTT, 'The Ulster Citizens Army' etc.

(c) Various public and political figures who hold positions of power and who are also homosexuals protect each other from prosecution. The claims of a prostitution ring involving juveniles and centered on Bangor is not really substantiated, other than by GARLAND's own personal account. It would be interesting to check, however, the number of charges brought against people involved in homosexual activities in the greater Belfast area in the last 5 years. I also think that the RUC report on drug abuse in this connection merits...
227. R 23 alleged that he had been homosexually assaulted by another man named [redacted] while he R 23 had been employed as a full-time [redacted] in the [redacted] sometime in 1974/75. He said that when, on the first occasion ie 12 August 1975, he was interviewed by D/Constable Dobbin he overlooked telling the D/Constable about this offence. He states that his reason for not telling the police officer on the second occasion ie 25 September was that his father, [redacted], had come over from England to take him back on the next boat. He was anxious to put the whole issue behind him and felt that to tell the police of this incident might have delayed his departure.

228. The circumstances of this alleged offence will be dealt with later in this report.

229. It has been made clear by R 23 that there are no other offences outstanding and those outlined by him in his statements to the police involved no more than 4 men, one of whom was his uncle. The 3 other men he referred to are:

1. the man named [redacted]
2. the driver of the Mini car whom he met in Bangor, and
3. the man named [redacted].

230. In his reply to the allegation that there was in existence, for at least 3 years, a prostitution ring involving Northern Ireland Office Officials, policemen, legal figures,
businessmen and boys in care in Kincora Boys' Home, said "I was not aware of such a ring". He further stated "I was not influenced by the investigating police officers or anyone else to minimise or drop the complaints that I made". He also said "I did not supply the investigating police in 1975 with car registration numbers".

231. The uncle, KIN 183, was interviewed by D/Inspector Mack on 19 February 1982 to enquire if he could assist the Enquiry into these allegations. He stated that having served a period of imprisonment he considered that he had paid his debt to society for his crime. He had been approached by 2 press men on 10 January 1982 and had told them that he had nothing to do with Kincora and that his past life was behind him.

232. The press men, whose descriptions fit Moloney and Pollak, questioned KIN 183 about the allegations and offered him money for his story which they thought had a bearing on Kincora.

233. KIN 183 in his statement to D/Inspector Mack said that he had never been to Kincora Boys' Home nor did he know anyone who had homosexual tendencies who worked in Government or Legal circles, or the police.

234. When referring to the offences for which he was convicted KIN 183 could not put the circumstances beyond what his nephew had already alleged. He stated that he would endeavour to locate and identify those persons who had been involved in offences with R23 and him.
STATEMENT CONTINUATION PAGE

STATEMENT OF: ANDREW JOHN POLLAK

Senior Social Worker, who I don't wish to name but I will call Social Worker 'C', said the RUC told them that they already knew of the situation in Kincora and that the police and the Department of Health and Social Services were already liaising on it at 'very top level'. He was asked not to pursue his own enquiries because this would 'rock the boat' and might prejudice this high level enquiry. Some time previously, probably around late 1975/early 1976, Social Worker 'C' had been approached by whom he did not name to me, who complained that his uncle had been sleeping with him and prostituting him. alleged that his uncle was 'highly involved in a ring of homosexual people'. He alleged he was taken to hotels in the North Down area by his uncle and if any man in the group showed any interest in the boy his uncle would let him go off with the boy for the night. The boy alleged he was being used in 'a prostitution situation.' Social Worker 'C' said that it would have been difficult to prove that money actually changed hands but had expensive clothes, stereo equipment etc, which he said were presents from his uncle's friends. Social Worker 'C' said the policeman investigating the case indicated to him that he was coming across a lot of fairly influential people in the course of his enquiry. 'C' felt that the policeman was unhappy after the case was closed with the conviction of the uncle - who I later found out was - because there was a lot more to it. who 'C' did not name to me had said to someone that he would take other people with him. Social Worker 'C' also told me that Clive Scoular had told him in late 1977/early 1978 that he had seen a file at DESS Headquarters which was related to the top level investigation it was claimed was being carried out jointly by the RUC and the DESS. Social Worker 'C' said that he had spent a day with RUC detectives talking about the Ritchie Kerr case during the 1980 investigation, during which he had raised the case. Later when I talked to RUC Source 'A' referred to in Ed Moloney's statement, he told me that used to pick up his nephew from the . RUC Source 'A' also said had spent time at Kincora and another home in the Belfast area. I want to emphasise that our approaches both to Social Worker 'C' and RUC Source 'A' were made entirely at our initiative and I felt that they talked to us only as a last resort and out of a deep concern that there might be outstanding aspects to the Kincora affair which merited further investigation. I now wish to refer to a document which is marked EXN 9, which is material gleaned from four conversations from a source who I would like to refer to as Mr 'X'. This man is the Mr 'X'

SIGNATURE OF STATEMENT MAKER: (Sgd) Andrew Pollak
9. continued...

his boast that he will not be prosecuted because "he knows too much about some people" merits serious investigation, but I suspect that he will no be prepared to talk until he is released. It is also rather remarkable that no charges have been preferred against him, at least during the past 3-4 years. Our own investigations of instances of alleged witchcraft or other satanic rites in the Province would tend to dismiss the RUC's theory that BRIAN MCDERMOTT's murder could be part of these activities. In the past, Black Magic Practices etc have been mainly confined to groups operating from Republican areas, with the possible exception of those cases in Co Antrim. I think, however, that from a press point of view, we would be very foolish to give any credence to such claims without the most convincing evidence. The forensic reports on the McDermott murder (see flag 'T') would tend to indicate that someone tried to dispose of the body by cutting it into pieces and burning them. It would also appear that when this failed, the pieces were dumped in the river. The inhumation made in the document regarding the boy's disappearance and the proximity of the Rev PAISLEY's church is dangerous nonsense.

10. Reference A claims that a number of key personalities in the political arena "are aware of" the Kinora situation and, in particular, of McGrath's background. It does not, however, explain the extent of their awareness nor of each individual's involvement with McGrath. In summary, it would appear that the document is claiming that:

(a) Senior members of the Grand Orange Lodge are aware of the situation because of the discussions and correspondence relating to McGrath within the Orange Order (see flag 'C'). It is further alleged that THOMAS PASSMORE and the Rev MARTIN SMITH have blocked any action against McGrath.

(b) The Rev PAISLEY is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because of possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with McGrath, DAVID BROWN and JOHN MCKEAUGE. On the face of it, the statements made by VALERIE SHAW and TOM MCNEILLY (see flag 'F') would tend to support the only part of such a claim. There are also a number of inconsistencies; McGrath would appear to be strongly anti-communist and anti-U.V.F. and this conflicts with the document's views on links with TOMMY BERRON, ERNIE 'DUKE' ELLIOTT, 'The Ulster Citizens Army' etc.

(c) Various public and political figures who hold positions of power and who are also homosexual protect each other from prosecution. The claims of a prostitution ring involving juveniles and centered on Bangor is not really substantiated, other than by GARLAND's own personal account. It would be interesting to check, however, the number of charges brought against people involved in homosexual activities in the greater Belfast area in the last 5 years. I also think that the RUC report on drug abuse in this connection merits
5. It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kincora "began shortly after his appointment". As I have pointed out in para 4 above, allegations were made as early as 1957 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after MAINS was appointed.

6. Reference A claims that McGrath "is a known homosexual" but it avoids any mention of his links with various other key figures in the local homosexual community, other than to intimate that a number of well-known political personalities with whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of reference A, it is claimed that McGrath left his previous employment "as a result of a lovers' quarrel" with his employer, whereas our information would tend to indicate that he left following a row over an outstanding debt. His former employer, Roy Garland, is well known in Unionist Party circles (see also Clifford Smith) and was for sometime 2½/c of 'Tara'. Admittedly, some of the personal correspondence between the two men during this period cannot be regarded as normal between employer and employee (see flag 'HM'). Whatever the real reason for the row between Garland and McGrath, there is certainly considerable animosity between them at present, and Garland has been actively engaged in trying to have McGrath removed from his post at Kincora. Garland's own version of events (see flag 'Q') is, of course, very enlightening, but I would suggest that it should be treated with caution until it can be substantiated because of the antagonism between them. It would also appear that many of the RUC source reports on this matter after 1971 originated from Garland.

7. McGrath was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation Welfare Department in 1972/73, following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints has been received about his behaviour and that, although the complaints had been passed to senior welfare staff and to the RUC, no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be confirmed, to some extent, by Zarra (see flag 'R') in 1973. There were, of course, similar allegations relating to other hostels during this period (see Bannmore, Westwinds, Bannside etc.) and this conflicts with Reference A's assertion that the allegations were confined to Kincora.

8. It should be remembered that the 1967 Sexual Offences Act does NOT apply to Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors is a criminal offence. The apparent lack of interest, therefore, by the Welfare Authorities and the RUC is quite remarkable. Furthermore, the claim made by Zarra (see flag 'Q') that key individuals in the Welfare Department were themselves homosexuals and thus, not only appointed homosexuals to such posts but also covered up the offences that took place and protected the offenders, requires very serious examination. In particular, I view her allegations about Sewards with great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.

9. Reference E which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of Brian McErden last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between the murder and the homosexual community is via John McKee. McKee's own statements (see flag 'R') raise more questions than they answer. Certainly,
"There are literally hundreds of letters from Colin Wallace and people on his behalf and replies from those in officialdom answering his questions, queries, responding to allegations and all of that material that has been available to you as you have poured through them, and I am not going to be looking at vast quantities of that correspondence during the course of our public hearings."

Comment:

Why not consider all Colin Wallace's correspondence? I have found Colin Wallace straightforward, intelligent and caring. He knows what he is talking about. Surely even at this late stage his efforts should be rewarded with a genuinely open inquiry into the whole story of Kincora, Faith House and wherever abuse had taken place?

On 07 July 2016 the Inquiry transcript states at page 125:

"The claims of a prostitution ring involving juveniles and centered on Bangor is not really substantiated other than by Garland's own personal account."

Comment:

I never referred to Bangor in my “confidential” call but I understand Bangor was involved.

As we will see one of the documents that’s said to be available to the author is an account from Roy Garland. So Roy Garland is said in a document that's available to the author to be talking about a prostitution ring involving juveniles centered on Bangor.

Comment:

Not in Bangor – I believe I said in my “confidential”, anonymous telephone call that a ring existed – this was speculation based on what I saw and heard and guess work. It was an attempt to get something done. I was however told that William McGrath knew [redacted], a "missionary statesman" who abused overseas students at a College near Liverpool. I was told that McGrath knew [redacted]. He was also obviously in sympathy with a Belfast Baptist Pastor accused of abusing two boys. I believe he did not act alone but was at least in contact with other pedophiles and probably shared some of his secrets with them. But I also understand that Bangor was involved.

I was in fear of my life when I made that call and tried to disguise my voice. I believe I was extremely lucky to survive. When I spoke about this to [redacted] he told me that he had also lived in fear for his life for some time.
"I cannot find any evidence of more than one typewriter having been used as alleged. It is a poor photocopy, but all four pages are consistent."

I do not know if my original document was re-typed after I submitted it to one of my superiors at HQNI in November 1974 and before it was passed on to other senior officers. I am only aware that General Peter Leng responded to the matter in a memo which instructed Information Policy to take action to ensure that the RUC took a more active part in the matters raised in the memo. I do not know why General Leng found it necessary to use the press as a means of drawing attention to William McGrath and his activities rather than raise the matter with the Chief Constable of the RUC. As a result of General Leng’s memo I added a substantial amount of information about William McGrath and his activities to my ‘Clockwork Orange’ project working draft in December 1974.

I did not retain the various RUC documents referred to in my memo. Neither those documents nor the memo, were designed for release – indeed, I am not convinced that the Army was even meant to see the police documents. In any event, I had no authority to retain them. Also, it is almost certain that I would have re-attached them to the memo when I submitted it to my superiors. The memo by itself would have provided an incomplete picture.

A report published in the Irish Times on 25.06.1985 pointed out that although the RUC had not then been able to validate my memo, there were other similar documents in existence.

"Sources close to the new RUC inquiry say they are sceptical about the document's authenticity and say it will be three or four weeks before their inquiry is complete. But former military/ministry of defence sources contacted by The Irish Times, while unable to authenticate this document, say that at least three other documents containing similar information were in the files of the Information Policy Unit at this time.

These sources, who had knowledge of many top secret intelligence and psychological operations mounted from British Army headquarters, have no current connections with Wallace. They have told The Irish Times that there was an intensive investigation of Tara and McGrath in the early and mid-1970s by military and political intelligence agencies which revealed information about sexual assaults at Kincora.

Another military source, a high-ranking officer based at British Army Headquarters during this period, has also confirmed that the Information Policy Unit was asked by military commanders in 1974 to investigate homosexual offences involving members of Tara. "We were investigating everything at that particular time to see if there were implications for the security side," he said. However, the source, who asked not to be quoted by name, declined to comment further in the light of the new RUC investigation.

The 1974 Information Policy Unit document, four pages long and classified "confidential", refers to and quotes from an RUC background paper on Tara which in turn refers to allegations of assaults on Kincora inmates involving McGrath dating back to 1971. The RUC paper also refers to a claim that key loyalist political figures were "aware" of the Kincora situation.
Dear Lord Trefgarne,

I have been informed that recently you wrote to the 'New Statesman' magazine claiming that the memorandum allegedly written by me in 1974 in connection with the Kincora scandal and published in the Irish Times on 26 June 1985 was "not authentic".

If you have made such a claim, then it is totally incorrect and I am very concerned, although not really surprised, that neither you nor anyone else at the Ministry of Defence took the trouble to ask me if I had written such a memo, especially in view of our protracted correspondence about Kincora during the past year.

From my examination of the document it is almost certainly the carbon copy of my original draft version of the one now held by your Ministry. You will have noticed that the only differences between the two versions relate to the fact that I was originally under the impression that the "Reference A" referred to was entirely an AUC paper, whereas, as I later discovered, one part of it comprised an Army analysis/commentary upon the police report. When this was drawn to my attention I amended the final memo, i.e. the one which your Ministry now has, to take into account the correct attribution of source material. As a result, in your version "Reference C" has the title "Int comments upon the above" and a new "Reference D" has been added under the old "Reference C" title.

The important point to be made, however, is that the "Conclusions and Recommendations" sections in both documents are identical and the content of the final version has not been altered in any material way from the original draft published by the 'Irish Times'. It is, therefore, totally misleading for you to claim that the published document is not authentic, a fact which you...
8. If he did not type the memorandum himself, please name or otherwise identify the person(s) who typed it.

9. Was this memorandum a draft?

10. If so, is the version reproduced in *Who framed Colin Wallace* the first or a later draft?

11. How many drafts were there?

12. To whom was the memorandum addressed?

13. If this was a draft was a final version of the memorandum ever produced?

14. If a final version was produced, when was that?

15. Did he prepare the memorandum on his own initiative?

16. If not, when was he requested to prepare the memorandum, and by whom?

17. Please name every person to whom he showed the memorandum in any of its forms, that is whether draft or final, in Northern Ireland before he was posted to the North West of England in 1975.

18. Please name every person with whom he discussed its contents before he was posted to the North West of England in 1975 saying when, and in what circumstances, he did so.

19. Please state what every such person said when he showed them the memorandum.

20. Please produce all original versions (and not photocopies) of the memorandum—whether draft or final—for inspection by the Inquiry.

21. In *Who framed Colin Wallace* it is stated that he obtained expert reports on the authenticity of the memorandum. Please provide copies of any such reports.

22. When, from whom, and in what circumstances, did Mr Wallace obtain the documents referred to in the memorandum reproduced at pages 139 to 144 of *Who framed Colin Wallace*?

23. What did he do with these documents after he prepared the memorandum of 8 November 1974?

24. If any of the documents are still in his possession please produce the originals (and not photocopies) to the Inquiry for inspection.

25. Please identify every person with whom he discussed any concerns he had about Kincora when he was in Northern Ireland.

26. Please set out the contents of any such conversations in as much detail as possible.

**CHAIRMAN: SIR ANTHONY HART  SECRETARY: ANDREW BROWNE**
the 'Irish Times' in June 1985 which gives some indication of the extent of the knowledge of the scandal within the Security Forces during the 1970s. Even if only a fraction of the quoted sources is accurate, it shows that the Terry investigation was a total failure in that it did not identify the extent of intelligence knowledge and/or involvement in the scandal and thus enabled the Government to avoid setting up a proper judicial inquiry under the 1921 Act.

You will recall that I wrote to the Prime Minister on this very topic on 9 July 1985 following the publication of the 'Irish Times' report, but still no action was taken to make the inquiry more effective nor, as a result, did the Government release to the Inquiry ANY of the material which I had sent to Mrs Thatcher the previous year. The Government has since claimed that it later made available to the Committee (note it did not say it actually sent the documents) some papers from the dossier which I sent to Mrs Thatcher, but this only took place at the very end of the Inquiry and after pressure from my solicitor and others including yourself.

COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC Paragraphs IN THE REPORT

4.70 The Committee avoid explaining that I had been employed on 'psychological warfare' thus avoiding any reason why I might have been in possession of information about the scandal.

4.71 No explanation is given for my reasons for not disclosing information about the scandal to the Terry inquiry investigators despite the fact that I had written to Sir George Terry and Mr James Prior personally, nor are any details given of the contents of my correspondence during the period with the Director of Army Security, the Home Office or my Member of Parliament.

4.73 The document does not "purport to be an Army intelligence report" nor have I or anyone else representing me claimed that it was. As I have already made clear to Lord Treffaer in earlier correspondence, it was nothing more than the first draft of a memorandum relating to a request I had received in 1974 to draw media attention to the overall situation relating to 'Tara', William McGrath and Kinora.

The copy of the document which I have seen did not have "the names of the addressees" handwritten on it and, in any event, there was only ONE addressee.

4.74 No mention is made of the numerous security sources who confirmed that the intelligence services and the Security had extensive knowledge of Kinora or of those sources who confirmed that various documents similar to mine and relating to the scandal existed during the mid 1970s.

4.75 This paragraph is such a distorted summary of my narrative about the scandal and how I came to be aware of it that it totally misleads the reader as to the true events or their relevance to the Inquiry. It does not say what the document is, its title or how it came to be written. More important, it does not explain its relevance to the dossier which I sent to the Prime Minister in November 1984.

4.76 This is incorrect. I was contacted by the Home Office, through the prison governor, on 2 April 1985 asking if I would agree to be interviewed by
allow others to be identified, Judge Hughes said:

"We are not here to test the efficiency of the police or public representatives. They did not do anything and they were not required to do anything about the Kincora allegations. Their involvement was irrelevant and they were not to be mentioned by the inquiry."

The Belfast 'Sunday News' commented afterwards:

"This has the sound of background deals being done to keep the men away from the Committee"

So much for Mr Prior's assurances to the House of Commons.

Not unnaturally, the Hughes report was dismissed as a waste of time and a "whitewash" by most political groups in Ulster. The SDLP said:

"No investigation into Kincora can be considered complete until the role of those more widely involved - such as Government officials, military intelligence, police, administrators and others with political responsibility - is considered.

It is vital that this is done and the SDLP will exert unremitting pressure until the full and final truth about Kincora is brought into the open."

In response to my earlier correspondence about the memorandum on Tara and Kincora which I had written in November 1974, Mr Freeman refers to Lord Trefgarne's letter to Peter Archer MP on 15 April and to references to the document in the Kincora Inquiry's report. The Kincora report claims that a "Forensic Report raised the possibilities that the first page had been tampered with and that two typewriters had been used, but was inconclusive about its authenticity."

I response, I would like to make the following points:

a. The document was, indeed, 'authentic' in that the version published in the 'Irish Times' was entirely consistent with the memorandum written by me in 1974.

b. I have seen a photocopy of the original memorandum but, contrary to what the Kincora Inquiry said, the names of the addressees on that document were NOT handwritten and, indeed, there was only ONE addressee.

c. There is no question whatsoever of the first page being tampered with nor of two typewriters being used, albeit the Forensic Report apparently claims that this is only a "possibility."

d. At no time since the document's publication in 1985 did anyone at the MOD ask me about the document or its authenticity and I find this most odd bearing in mind the apparent importance which the Committee placed on it and its contents. This is even more remarkable when one considers that I was the alleged author and that I was engaged in extensive correspondence with the Department during the period.

e. I would very much like to know, however, how any alleged changes to the
front page could possibly have altered the overall content of the memorandum or what the significance is of the Report's claim that two
typewriters were allegedly used - other than to make the alleged
alterations. The Report is a pains to avoid saying which part of the front
page has been altered, I can only assume that these comments are nothing
more than 'red herrings' to detract from the central issue regarding the
memorandum's existence in 1974. Furthermore, the document's authenticity
has already been confirmed independently by other sources who were aware of
its existence during the period, and the 'Irish Times' report correctly
claims that it was not the only official document concerning the scandal to
be in circulation at the time.

Despite the foregoing, the matter of the document's authenticity is
important to me and I intend to pursue this at some length in due course.

All of this brings us to the role of MI5 in the overall affair and to MOD's
claims that they have "no knowledge" of the Security Services involvement
in various matters. Such denials are 'per for the course' and I am well
aware from my own personal experiences that I was frequently asked by
senior officers to undertake certain projects on the basis of, "don't tell
us the details because we may have to deny all knowledge of our involvement
at a later date." There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that MI5 would
acknowledge to Mr Freeman or any other Government Minister their true
involvement in the matters referred to in my various papers. MI5's
attitude towards government queries was well explained in 'The Daily
Telegraph' - a newspaper not known for its Left Wing or anti-establishment
views - on 2 March 1985, when it commented:

"The strength of MI5's position resides in the vagueness of its terms of
reference and lack of accountability for its operations under the Maxwell
Fyfe Directive of 1952, which still applies, notably the fatal paragraph 6
which endorses 'the well established convention whereby Ministers do not
concern themselves with the detailed information which may be obtained by
the Security Service in particular cases, but are furnished with such
information only as may be necessary for the determination of any issue on
which guidance may be sought.'

In other words, they need only tell the Minister anything when he asks for
it, and then only as much as they judge necessary."

The current legal proceedings in Australia over Mr Peter Wright's book
demonstrates very dramatically that the Government is not concerned in the
slightest about what illegal activities the Security Service engages in,
only that the public are not made aware about them. In this prison, and in
every other prison, there are numerous men serving custodial sentences for
offences which are very, very minor compared with those committed by MI5.
In the case of the prison inmates, the Government, through the courts, has
demanded that the law must take its course and must be applied to everyone
without exception. When is this doctrine going to be applied to the
Security Service and when will the Government stop shielding the Service
from proper scrutiny when allegations of unlawful activity allegedly
carried out 'in the national interest' are raised?

I think it is most important that I again state clearly what my attitude is
Dear Lord Trefgarne,

I have been informed that recently you wrote to the 'New Statesman' magazine claiming that the memorandum allegedly written by me in 1974 in connection with the Kincora scandal and published in the Irish Times on 26 June 1985 was "not authentic".

If you have made such a claim, then it is totally incorrect and I am very concerned, although not really surprised, that neither you nor anyone else at the Ministry of Defence took the trouble to ask me if I had written such a memo, especially in view of our protracted correspondence about Kincora during the past year.

From my examination of the document it is almost certainly the carbon copy of my original draft version of the one now held by your Ministry. You will have noticed that the only differences between the two versions relate to the fact that I was originally under the impression that the "Reference A" referred to was entirely an RUC paper, whereas, as I later discovered, one part of it comprised an Army analysis/commentary upon the police report. When this was drawn to my attention I amended the final memo, i.e. the one which your Ministry now has, to take into account the correct attribution of source material. As a result, in your version "Reference C" has the title "Int comments upon the above" and a new "Reference D" has been added under the old "Reference C" title.

The important point to be made, however, is that the "Conclusions and Recommendations" sections in both documents are identical and the content of the final version has not been altered in any material way from the original draft published by the 'Irish Times'. It is, therefore, totally misleading for you to claim that the published document is not authentic, a fact which you
RECORDED DELIVERY

Sir Anthony Hart
Chairman
The HIA Inquiry
PO Box 2080
Belfast
Northern Ireland
BT1 9QA

26 September 2016

Dear Sir Anthony,

I have not yet had the courtesy of a response to the submission I sent to you on 9 September and I would be most grateful if someone from the Inquiry would acknowledge receipt of that material. I do not expect an immediate reply to the points I have raised with you, but a simple acknowledgement would be very welcome.

I also attach two further documents for your consideration. These clearly indicate that some of the information presented to your Inquiry by Government witnesses was false or deliberately misleading.

A story in the Guardian on 30 May 1990 refers to an interview between one of its reporters and a Mr Cliff Crook of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants. The Guardian report says:

"A letter sent by Mr Wallace to Cliff Crook, an official of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, in 1975, refers specifically to the homosexual allegations and smears against leading Labour politicians.

Mr Crook said yesterday that General Garrett [Director of Army Security] did not appear at Mr Wallace's appeal. If he had, Mr Crook said the Civil Service Appeal Board could have discussed the 'extra work' assigned to Mr Wallace, a reference to his covert work."

This clearly refers to my letter dated 29 September 1975 to Mr Crook in which I said:

"I am concerned that we have still not received a reply to my letter of 2 July to John Groves requesting access to the various documents listed. You will recall that when I had a brief interview with him on 11 February to seek guidance on what information I could give to the RUC about my work on psychological operations, he said that I should confine my comments to justifiable activities directed at the PIRA and not at Loyalists. My concern now is that there may be an attempt by the Ministry to deny any form of official 'dirty tricks' organisation existed within the Security Forces. For example, in the Ministry's summary of my oral representations made to John Groves and Mr Fairbairn on 10 May reference is made in paragraph 3 to "actions" which I was asked to launch during the UWC strike. The word
“actions” appears to have been used by MOD to conceal the fact that I referred to the attempts made by the Security Service to discredit various Loyalist politicians, including the Rev Ian Paisley, by the use of forged documents and by linking the MPs with Loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast. I can fully understand why the Ministry would not want to put such information on record, but I wonder if evidence of that nature will be made available to the Board sub rosa.”

It is clear from the above, therefore, that, within six months of leaving Northern Ireland and some 5 years before the Kincora story surfaced in the Irish Independent, I had been referring to “homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast”. I also sent a copy of the above letter to my former boss at HQ Northern Ireland, Tony Staughton. Moreover, it is clear that the MoD and the Intelligence Services were well aware of the allegations I was making at that time. This is totally at odds with comments made by Government witnesses and by Counsel to the Inquiry during the Inquiry’s hearings. My point is that quite a number of people in Government service were aware of the allegations I was making in 1975 and there is no valid reason why your Inquiry should not have been made aware of this. The selective disclosure of information favourable to the Authorities is indicative of a co-ordinated cover-up.

The attached letter dated 24 February 1982 shows that, just 5 days after the Terry Inquiry was announced, I wrote to my solicitor to make arrangements to brief him fully about my knowledge of Tara and Kincora. The letter also refers to a report published in the ‘News of the World’ about Kincora. Bearing in mind that I was in Wormwood Scrubs prison at that time, I had no access to the press. Shortly after I wrote to my solicitor, he visited me at the prison and I briefed him in some detail on the background to Tara and Kincora. I also arranged for him to receive various documents relating to the matter. Soon after my solicitor’s visit to me, his offices were broken into and searched, but nothing was taken. Fortunately, he had put my papers into a place of safekeeping! I am sure my solicitor would be very willing to confirm this to your Inquiry should you consider it important.

Finally, the HIA website contains the following comment:

"In due course we will place on our website all those documents we consider are relevant and which do not contain private information, such as medical or social services records, which might cause distress to applicants or others such as family members and others who were not applicants to the Inquiry, or information which need not be published."

This is rather selective in terms of who the Inquiry’s comments are potentially causing distress to. What about those of us who have been subjected to the publication of totally false or deliberately misleading information about us in the transcripts of your Inquiry’s hearings? I can see no evidence of anyone from your Inquiry challenging the obviously highly questionable claims being promulgated by the Authorities.

Yours sincerely,

Colin Wallace
TARA - REPORTS REGARDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOMOSEXUAL COMMUNITY IN BELFAST

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to 'TARA'. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor Intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2. If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify our involvement in what is purely a moral and political matter because, in my opinion, 'TARA' is no longer of any security interest.

3. In theory, 'TARA' was basically a credible concept from a Loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body could, no doubt, have made good use of the Orange Order's normal selection and 'vetting' system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had ready made facilities for clandestine training by making use of the Orange Halls throughout the Province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, mainly because of William McGrath's rather strange political views which are more akin to Irish Nationalism or Republicanism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the Loyalist community at that time, sprang up during the period.

4. Reference A deals with McGrath's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincora hostel in Newtownards Road where he worked was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of Belfast Corporation Welfare Department. He does not, as the paper claims, "run the hostel" - he is employed as a 'housefather'. The Warden of Kincora is Joseph Main and the Deputy Warden is Raymond Semple. Main was appointed in 1959 and Semple in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals. Indeed, various allegations of homosexual assaults on inmates of the hostel were investigated by senior Welfare Department staff in 1967 but no action was taken against anyone (see notes of a report by Mr R. Lindsey at Flag 'R').
May the following representations be taken into consideration, in addition to those made by me to Mr J D Groves, CPR, on Friday 30th May 1975.

1. During my IP handover, Lieutenant Colonel Railton had access to all documents, both classified and unclassified, in my possession. Those not selected by him for retention within the IP Branch were destroyed or left in my filing cabinet for use by my successor or as the CIo directed.

2. Owing to a shortage of time on the day of my departure, I was unable to call on Colonel Railton before leaving HQN. I did however, telephone him from the ferry and confirm that I would be returning to N Ireland as agreed on 14th February 1975 and would call on him to discuss any outstanding IP matters. There was therefore no question of my IP handover being complete when I left the Province.

All information was given to RNAN on the basis that it would be treated "off the record "or in specific parts, " unattributable".

\[Signature\]

J O Wallace
June 1975

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE
SUMMARY

16. Mr Wallace summarised the reasons for his actions as:—
Fisk with his good sources in Stormont and the RUC was a threat.
If he, Wallace, had resigned or remained in N. Ireland he would
have been at risk of being shot because his position with the
Services had been compromised.

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY MR GROVES

17. Having received confirmation from Mr Wallace that he had
completed his representations Mr Groves reminded him that a record
of what he had said had been made. He must not assume that the
explanations given had necessarily been accepted as valid. He
would be given an opportunity to see and comment on the record
of these discussions and to make additional points in writing if
he so wished.

........................

Record seen and agreed, subject to the following observations:—

Para 4, Line 5, Delete " provided by the Loyalists " and substitute " leaked
to him from the Northern Ireland Office."
Para 4, Line 7, After "in " insert " black propaganda."
Para 5, Line 1, After " an " insert " to "
Para 6, Line 6, Delete " produced a paper " and substitute " written a story."
Para 5, Line 8, Delete " paper " and substitute " copy of the NIO document."
Para 6, Line 14, Delete " in Ireland " and substitute " at HQNI."
Para 7, Line 5, After " book " insert " on the UUC strike."
Para 7, Line 6, After " feared " insert " regarding the possible exposure of
Army and NIO III operations."
Para 7, Line 12, Delete " conference " and insert " study period for units."
Para 7, Line 12, Delete " information policy " and insert " HQ NI policy on
press information."

Para 9, Line 5, Delete " on " and substitute " by."
Para 10, Line 3, After " had " insert " briefings for."
Para 10, Line 5, After " swx discuss " insert " outstanding."
Para 7, Line 7, Delete " Colonel Bailton and."
Para 8, Line 6, After " Irene " insert " on these feature articles."
Para 8, Line 9, Delete " thought " insert " said."
Para 10, Line 10, Delete " he was not sure about Mr McDade but."
Para 12, Line 7, Delete " him " and insert " his department."
Para 12, Line 11, Delete " understood " and insert " believed."
Para 12, Line 11, After " the " insert " cover."
Para 12, Line 13, Delete " releasing " and insert " publishing."
Para 12, Line 15, Delete " after " that " insert " in his statement to the police."
Para 14, Line 11, Delete " mid-March " and insert " mid-April."
Para 16, Line 3, Delete " or " and substitute " and."

J. C. Wallace
June 1976
I have briefly reviewed Mr Taylor's personal file (we have not seen his security or discipline files).

He was born in 1938, and worked in various jobs in the Midlands from 1953-63, except for two years National Service in the Army Air Corps from 1957-9. He moved to Belfast in 1963, joining the Ulster Museum in September 1968. He was a member of the Army Cadet Force from 1965-7 with Colin Wallace.

He applied to join the AIs on 20/12/70. The application was initially rejected on 18/10/71, but this was changed on 21/11/71. He was invited for interview and selected: his two referees were Tony Stoughton and Colin Wallace. He had known the former since ‘mid-1969’ and the latter for 9 years. Both were apparently ‘directors’ of the company Photo/Press Ltd which failed to produce a reference for Taylor. This has brought to light the fact that Taylor was (in 1969) one of Wallace’s referees when they had known each other for 4 years (inconsistent).

Taylor took up appointment on 1.3.72. In the meantime a check with the Army Records Office showed his National Service to have been with the RAOC (not AAC).

First attended a board for an SI0 post on 15.11.72, and another on 8.7.74, and again in October 1974. He was posted to Berlin in January 1976. He was posted to MOD HQ against his wishes, in January 1979. In July 1979 he...
was refused assistance from public funds for purchasing a house near (to live near his invalided brother). In August 1979 he resigned, w.e.f. 30 September 1979.

His main responsibility whilst in HANI was as Editor of News, which was his idea and responsibility. His reports were quite good (mostly box 2/3). Said to be extrovert, got on better with civilians than military; good at positive PR, but less good at administration. However, it was also said that he did not always apply attention to detail, and was reluctant to accept guidance, a 'barrack-room lawyer' (McDine).
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

MICHAEL ROBERT TAYLOR  
KIN-30133

AGE OF WITNESS (if over 21 enter "over 21"): OVER 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSULTANT

ADDRESS: [Redacted]

I declare that this statement consisting of two pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 9th day of June 1982

(Sgd) S R Mack, D/Inspector

(Sgd) M R Taylor

SIGNATURE OF MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received.

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

I worked as an Information Officer for the Ministry of Defence in Northern Ireland from 1972 until 1976. The exact dates I am not sure. It may well have been March 1972 until September 1976. On completion of this duty I was posted to Berlin where I served until September 1979. Whilst at Northern Ireland I served with a chap called Colin Wallace. I knew Colin prior to my appointment in Ulster, for about three years prior. I resided in Northern Ireland from 1962 until I left in 1976. I worked at the Ulster Museum from 1969 until I went to work with MOD. Colin Wallace and I were serving as officers in the Army Cadet Force and this is where my contact with Wallace was initiated. Initially Wallace and I were both on the same grade but later in my service with MOD, Wallace was promoted to Senior Information Officer. Wallace was at no time answerable to me and we were both involved at a level in similar work. I have been asked if I ever heard about Kincora Boys' Home in my capacity whatsoever. I have never seen any official document, to my knowledge, on Kincora Boys' Home although I do recognise as a result of the situation that prevailed in Northern Ireland at this time, it may have been discussed verbally. If Wallace may have discussed Kincora with me, I cannot remember any specific detail. The names McGrath and McKeague mean something to me, although I cannot connect McGrath with any verbal conversation regards Kincora. I did not know that McGrath worked at Kincora Boys' Home, but his assumed association with the Protestant Military Organisation called 'TARA' was on record. I have

(Sgd) M R Taylor

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
Roy Garland: One of the main things they asked me about was the visit to the military intelligence officers which were in the... was in these notes, and they suggested to me that perhaps these intelligence officers were actually just ordinary soldiers, and I was unhappy, I felt that I was being asked to explain things away.  

Robert Parker: You feel that they were trying to say that you'd seen only soldiers, not intelligence officers.  

Roy Garland: Yes they made that explicit.  

Robert Parker: Although Garland's account conflicts with the official version of events, other evidence seems to support what he is saying. It derives from the case of Colin Wallace, the former Army Press Officer based at Lisburn in the 1970s whom the Government has now acknowledged was engaged in psychological operations. Wallace has always maintained that the Army knew all about Kincora and McGrath by 1972, eight years before it was exposed.  

When he first produced these two Army memos to support his claim he'd just completed a gaol sentence for manslaughter, and his credibility was discounted by Government spokesmen. They said he was a fantasist who'd made it all up. But now this man says he can vouch that the memos are genuine.  

Michael Taylor worked at the time in Army Information at Lisburn. He was responsible for filing and checking all documents in the section of Army headquarters called Information Policy where Wallace worked.  

Michael Taylor: They formed a file that had been established on the ... all aspects of Kincora, in which we had discovered various events going on there and those
events related to the possible attraction of paramilitaries, and consequently the Army intelligence put together a documentation file of Kincora itself.

Robert Parker: You have no doubt at all that you've seen these documents before in 1973 and 1974.

Michael Taylor: No doubt whatsoever.

Robert Parker: The first of these memos was written in 1973 and is principally about Tara, the paramilitary group formed by McGrath. It states - The officer commanding is William McGrath. He is a known homosexual who has conned many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he himself initiated. He is a prominent figure in Unionist party politics and in the Orange Order.

It continues:- McGrath also runs a home for children on the Upper Newtownards Road, giving both the telephone number and the address. And there's further corroboration for the authenticity of these documents. At the top of the 1973 memo is a filing instruction - Clarks IP - Clarks Information Policy. The man who wrote it is Peter Droderick*, in 1973 the Head of Army Public Relations in Northern Ireland. He's confirmed to us that this is indeed his writing and he left Lisburn in 1974.

Not only do the documents suggest that the Army knew about McGrath years before his activities were stopped, they also suggest that the RUC knew as well. The 1974 memo written by Colin Wallace cites three sources of material on which it is based. The first, reference A, an RUC background paper on Tara.

The memo says:- Reference A deals with McGrath's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in
a number of respects. It adds:— He does not, as the paper claims, run the hostel, he is employed as house father.

In conclusion Wallace recommends:— We make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter.

And Michael Taylor at Information Policy not only remembers this memo but also the background papers from the RUC on which the memo was partly based.

**Michael Taylor:** It was quite obvious that an element that went into this memorandum came from the RUC. I don't know at what level, I don't know from what rank, but it was quite clear that there was certainly knowledge by the RUC of what was going on in Kincora at the time.

**Robert Parker:** Taylor says that this Wallace memo was sent up to General Sir Peter Leng, at the time Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland. It came back with a note attached from the General.

**Michael Taylor:** The document attached to the memorandum was signed by Sir Peter, endorsing the document, to say that he agreed with the conclusions of the memorandum and that the appropriate authorities should be notified and take action. His recommendation was that this should be brought to the notice of the RUC who were the correct body for carrying out any further investigations, and if necessary, prosecuting the people concerned.

**Robert Parker:** No prosecutions followed. And there are other witnesses who say that the police were told about Kincora in the early '70s. For example, Valerie Shaw, at the time a missionary in Ian Paisley's church, had tried to expose the matter and finally contacted one of Belfast's most senior detectives.

**Valerie Shaw:** Superintendent Graham phonod my homo and
"PENROSE: No, of course. It's just to see how, if you would forgive me, how the bureaucracy works. So, Clockwork Orange in this case comes from Denis Payne's office, so it's Intelligence to Intelligence, and then you're shown it.

LENG: I'm not always shown it. Only if they need to involve someone at a higher level.

PENROSE: Right.

PENROSE: Clockwork Orange was policy. This sounds like a statement rather than a question, but a statement asking for confirmation.

LENG: And Clockwork Orange was policy.

PENROSE: Yes. And so Denis Payne sends the file over and this is Policy from NIO.

LENG: I wouldn't have thought he would even send a file over if I may say so because the less that was committed to paper the better.

(Note: The latter comment is important because it shows that very sensitive or deniable information was not put on file and it should not come as a surprise to the Inquiry that most of the really key information relating to the matter under investigation is not on record. In essence, it had to be totally deniable. That is exactly what the MoD and the Intelligence Services are doing just now).

Another extract from the interview says:

PENROSE: You said in the memo according to [Mike] Taylor that the RUC and the social services I think ought to be brought in here because the file named men and boys who were obviously part of this abuse which we all know about since.

LENG: Yes, I recall that.

PENROSE: Do you? And you said take action. They waited because obviously there had been other members suggesting this from junior officers, but it was yours that finally convinced Taylor that this was going to happen, but of course it went on for another six or seven years, but again that wasn't your fault. It was just to remind you that there were homosexual abuses taking place, namely by the housefather named McGrath.

LENG: Yes.

PENROSE: who was also the leader of TARA, and of course eventually that was all proven in court some years afterwards, and also a man named McKeague, but I mean this is obviously outside ...

LENG: Yes, I do remember the homosexual insinuations and I do remember saying this is a police business, not ours."
"I cannot find any evidence of more than one typewriter having been used as alleged. It is a poor photocopy, but all four pages are consistent."

I do not know if my original document was re-typed after I submitted it to one of my superiors at HQNI in November 1974 and before it was passed on to other senior officers. I am only aware that General Peter Leng responded to the matter in a memo which instructed Information Policy to take action to ensure that the RUC took a more active part in the matters raised in the memo. I do not know why General Leng found it necessary to use the press as a means of drawing attention to William McGrath and his activities rather than raise the matter with the Chief Constable of the RUC. As a result of General Leng's memo I added a substantial amount of information about William McGrath and his activities to my 'Clockwork Orange' project working draft in December 1974.

I did not retain the various RUC documents referred to in my memo. Neither those documents nor the memo, were designed for release -- indeed, I am not convinced that the Army was even meant to see the police documents. In any event, I had no authority to retain them. Also, it is almost certain that I would have re-attached them to the memo when I submitted it to my superiors. The memo by itself would have provided an incomplete picture.

A report published in the Irish Times on 25.06.1985 pointed out that although the RUC had not then been able to validate my memo, there were other similar documents in existence.

"Sources close to the new RUC inquiry say they are sceptical about the document's authenticity and say it will be three or four weeks before their inquiry is complete. But former military/ministry of defence sources contacted by The Irish Times, while unable to authenticate this document, say that at least three other documents containing similar information were in the files of the Information Policy Unit at this time.

These sources, who had knowledge of many top secret intelligence and psychological operations mounted from British Army headquarters, have no current connections with Wallace. They have told The Irish Times that there was an intensive investigation of Tara and McGrath in the early and mid-1970s by military and political intelligence agencies which revealed information about sexual assaults at Kincora.

Another military source, a high-ranking officer based at British Army Headquarters during this period, has also confirmed that the Information Policy Unit was asked by military commanders in 1974 to investigate homosexual offences involving members of Tara. "We were investigating everything at that particular time to see if there were implications for the security side," he said. However, the source, who asked not to be quoted by name, declined to comment further in the light of the new RUC investigation.

The 1974 Information Policy Unit document, four pages long and classified "confidential", refers to and quotes from an RUC background paper on Tara which in turn refers to allegations of assaults on Kincora inmates involving McGrath dating back to 1971. The RUC paper also refers to a claim that key loyalist political figures were "aware" of the Kincora situation.

[33]
Statement

Surname: HOLROYD
Forenames: FREDERICK JOHN
Date & Place of Birth: [redacted]
Height:
Occupation: UNEMPLOYED
Address: [redacted]
Identity Card No.: [redacted]
Date arrived in Command: [redacted]
Status: CIVILIAN
Date to leave Command: [redacted]

I was formerly Captain (477424) Frederick John Holroyd, Royal Corps of Transport.

From 7 Jan 74 until Jun 75 I held the appointment of MIO at 'J' Division RUC which included South Armagh.

My duties required that I was in close contact with members of the RUC both Special Branch and CID Officers.

I am unable to be specific but I would estimate that during the middle of my tour the name 'Kincora' came to my attention. I understood that Kincora was a home, (probably run by the Social Services in N Ireland) for boys.

To the best of my recollection I became aware of 'Kincora' through recreational conversation in RUC Stations. It certainly did not come to my notice through any official briefing or intelligence and I did not attach any significance to 'Kincora'.

The only information which came to my attention was that of rumour to the effect that a homosexual liaison had been formed between certain leading politicians and a number of boys in the home. This was general talk on occasions when I was in company with RUC officers. I am unable to recall any police officer by name who mentioned the events or alleged events at 'Kincora'. It was not my understanding that this had ever been the subject of an official complaint to the RUC.

I did not attach any significance to this information and did not on any occasion pass the rumour about 'Kincora' to my direct superior in the Army nor to any other officers in HQ Northern Ireland.

I do not think there was any official police enquiry into 'Kincora' at that time. I am not acquainted with Colin Wallace. I was not getting any military intelligence from anyone working or involved at Kincora and my knowledge of the subject is limited to what I have outlined in this statement. F J HOLROYD

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1540 hrs on Saturday 22 May 1982 at [redacted].
STATEMENT OF: FREDERICK JOHN HOLROYD

AGE OF WITNESS (if over 21 enter "over 21") OVER 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: UNEMPLOYED

ADDRESS: 5A THE DRIVE, SOUTHEND, WESTCLIFF-ON-SEA

I declare that this statement consisting of one page, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 8th day of June 1982

(Sgd) S R Mack, D/Inspector

SIGNATURE OF MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received

(Sgd) F J Holroyd

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

I wish to make reference to a statement I made to Captain L on 22 May 1982. In that statement I said that during the middle of a tour of duty in Northern Ireland the name Kincora came to my attention, and to the best of my recollection through recreational conversation in RUC Stations. Since my meeting with Captain L I have found a reference to Kincora in my notebook. The note is undated but was made in May 1973 prior to the 13th. It states 'Kincora Belfast - Rev Smyth's, Paisley's lot - queers'. As far as this entry is concerned I did not act on it as it was rumour and meant nothing to me. I do not know who gave me this information but I may have got it from someone in Portadown Police Station. I would be more specific and state that I definitely got this information in Portadown Police Station, in the station or at a social function run by members in the station. My contacts in Portadown Station were members of the CID and Special Branch. I had no contact with uniform personnel. I did not hear anything about Kincora at any other police establishment. I have given thought to who may have talked to me about Kincora. I have the feeling it may have been Detective Sergeant McMahon but on this point I'm not sure. D/Sergt SB 2, SB may be able to assist you because he had a good knowledge of all going on at that time. I wish to retain my notebook but I will produce it if required.

(Sgd) F J Holroyd

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
T I

T OF REPORT

The TIRA group which became public as announced in the Press on 11.4.73 is formed in platoons of 20. All membership is from within the Orange Order. Each platoon has 1 Sergeant, a quartermaster and an Intelligence Officer. Dues of 50p per month are collected - one half of the dues go to a Central Fund and the other half to the platoon. Platoons, if requiring stores, could draw from the Central Fund.

The C.O. of TIRA is William McCART, 3 Greenmount Avenue, Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast. His resident is Frank McCART who lives on the same street.

The former Intelligence Officer is Clifford SMITH, D.J.P. (PAI) Rep. and deputy editor of Protestant Telegraph, who resides in Bangor.

An ex-member of TIRA is UDR Captain N., 20 years, Work Study Engineer with MM 881, Carryduff. He is now a frequent speaker on Vanguard platforms, although is still a member of the Young Unionist Party. He joined TIRA believing it to be a sincere organisation but learnt that it was otherwise.

The C.O. McHAIR is a reputed bisexual and he is alleged to have kept men members ensnared in the organisation by threatening to reveal homosexual activities which he had initiated. He used the Irish Emancipation Christian Fellowship, Wellington Park, Belfast as a front for TIRA. Membership had been falling dramatically and they went public to create a myth about their size.

Further details, when obtained will be submitted.
KIN 301

living at Kincora(Boys' Hostel,
236 Upper Newtownards Road) was arrested on 7.7.74 for theft.

The attached documents issued by HIA were found in his locker
but it is noted that one of them is written by a William McGRATH;
William McGRATH is employed as a housefather at Kincora
hostel.

Not/Continued on attached sheet(s) Noa.

ACTION TAKEN BY HEADQUARTERS

KIN-55081
In a letter ACDS (Ops) 70/1 dated 02.07.1971, from the Director of Defence Operational Plans, Brigadier H. M. G. Bond, to the Commandant of the Joint Warfare Establishment, the Brigadier states:

"You obviously realise, from your caveat on Reference A, that the subject of Psy Ops in Northern Ireland is a matter for UK EYES ONLY. Therefore, it is a subject which cannot be discussed in front of audiences containing non-UK officers. On the subject of security, the answers to your questions at paragraph 2 of the reference would all be classified SECRET or higher and most of the answers would be restricted on a 'need to know' basis.

We would advise that your Psy Ops staff avoid all mention of Northern Ireland and that if questions are asked on the subject that a reply be given as follows:

Northern Ireland is basically an Internal Security operation. As you must all appreciate our methods of operations and tactics employed when involved in IS operations are obviously highly classified and cannot possibly be discussed in an open forum such as this."

On 14.06.1973, Colonel C. R. Huxtable (Col GS MO4) wrote a loose minute to the Deputy Under-Secretary (Army) at the MoD saying:

"There has been some reluctance to admit to the use of psychological operations in Northern Ireland. Partly for this reason the term "information policy" was coined to cover all Army information activities in the Province... Whatever terms we may use to cloak such activities in a more acceptable guise we do in fact use a fairly full range of information techniques in Northern Ireland though, of course, with some limitations imposed by the nearness of the Province, broadcasting policy and the political situation... However, the subject verges on the taboo within the Army and an unwritten policy prevents free discussion even in closed audiences..."

The Inquiry transcripts show that Major General Len Garrett, claimed that Information Policy's (Psy Ops) role was simply to provide a "quick response" to the media. As the MoD internal correspondence on Psy Ops demonstrates, General Garrett's claim is highly misleading. Brigadier (as he was in 1974) Len Garrett was Chief of Staff at HQNI and was part of the Establishments Board that approved my 'secret' job description. As Chief of Staff, he saw my Annual Confidential Reports and he was aware of what my role actually entailed.

The Barron Inquiry into the Dublin-Monaghan Bombings 1974

CTI have claimed that, although I gave evidence to both the Barron and Saville inquiries, both inquiries "rejected" my evidence. CTI produced no evidence to support this claim and it is manifestly wrong.

In a personal assessment of me and my evidence, Judge Barron said:

"In person, Wallace comes across as intelligent, self-assured, and possessed of a quiet yet unwavering moral conviction. Though he has reasons enough to be bitter - the abrupt and unjust ending of a promising career in Northern Ireland, five years spent in prison on a conviction which has since been quashed - he displays no outward signs of resentment towards individuals or institutions. He remains
intensely loyal to his country and to the Army: insofar as he has a quarrel, it is with individuals rather than the institutions concerned. He says he believes that much of the propaganda work undertaken by Information Policy was justifiable in the interests of defeating subservives and promoting a political solution to the Troubles. When speaking of matters directly within his own experience, the inquiry believes him to be a highly knowledgeable witness. His analyses and opinions, though derived partly from personal knowledge and partly from information gleaned since his time in Northern Ireland, should also be treated with seriousness and respect”.

Nowhere in his Report, does Judge Barron say that he “rejected” my evidence. On the contrary, he is very positive about my contribution. His comments are apparently being misrepresented by the Inquiry.

The Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday 1972

It is ironic that CTI should refer in the same way to my evidence to the Saville Inquiry. Again, he produces no evidence to support his claim, but it is at odds with submissions made at that Inquiry. In those submissions, lawyers representing the families of those shot by the British Army on Bloody Sunday claimed that “British intelligence officers have obstructed and misled its six-year investigation.” This article appears in the 21.03.2004 edition of The Sunday Tribune:

“The Bloody Sunday Inquiry has been told that British intelligence officers have obstructed and misled its six-year investigation into the Derry killings.

In closing submissions to the Tribunal under Lord Saville, solicitors Madden and Finucane (M&F) argue that a pattern of manipulation and misrepresentation, begun at the Widgery Tribunal 32 years ago, has continued into the proceedings of the present Inquiry.

The firm, representing a majority of the Bloody Sunday families and wounded, declares that, “It may well be that the...Cabinet fully intended that all relevant official documentation would be available to the Inquiry.” but if so, “this intention has been frustrated.”

M&F suggests that "vital documents...have been deliberately destroyed and/or suppressed," and that "Intelligence material has been supplied by the Government in a manner designed to mislead the Tribunal." M&F argues that the apparent disappearance of more than 1,000 British Army photographs of the Bloody Sunday events "gives rise to the inference that they have been deliberately destroyed and/or concealed by the Army or the MoD in order to suppress damaging evidence."

The Tribunal, established in January 1998, adjourned in February after hearing more than 900 witnesses. It will reconvene at Derry Guildhall on June 6th, when legal teams will comment on each other’s submissions. Expectations that Saville would deliver his report early next year have been thrown into doubt by a Tribunal request 10 days ago for lawyers to produce documents relating to their clients which had previously been considered confidential. It is not now known when Saville will publish his findings.

M&F bases its allegations on the testimony of serving and former military and intelligence officers, including "psyops" (psychological operations) officer Colin Wallace and the former member of the Force Reaction Unit (FRU) known as Martin Ingram. The firm says the evidence shows that around the time of Bloody Sunday, the intelligence agencies MI5 and MI6 and psy-ops unit, the Information Research Department (IRD), effectively controlled the dissemination of political and military
Colin Wallace, who in January 1972 was a civilian Army public relations officer based at HQNI, gave evidence to this Inquiry that unionist politicians took an entirely different view of events at Magilligan Strand and were furious at the apparent inability of the Parachute Regiment to deal effectively with the marchers. His recollection was that the Stormont Government was very concerned about the adverse reaction of Protestants who saw on television images of apparently illegal marches unchecked by the security forces. Colin Wallace stated that complaints from Unionist politicians to Downing Street led to the Ministry of Defence issuing a directive to the effect that the scenes such as those at Magilligan should never again appear on television screens.  

1 KW2.7

No documents have been found that provide support for this evidence of Colin Wallace. The only documents that Colin Wallace recalled seeing were two telegrams sent by Donald Maitland, the Prime Minister’s Chief Press Secretary, to Clifford Hill, the United Kingdom Government’s Press Liaison Officer in Northern Ireland. The Tribunal has seen these telegrams, neither of which refers to events at Magilligan Strand or suggests disquiet about any previous inability on the part of the Army to deal with marchers. The press reports available to the Inquiry do not suggest that there was any public perception of a lack of action on the part of the Parachute Regiment at Magilligan Strand.

1 G81 551; G90 549

In evidence to this Inquiry, Edward Heath and Lord Carrington both said that they had no recollection of having been concerned about events at Magilligan Strand. On 26th January 1972 Sir Burke Trend sent to Edward Heath a briefing note for the GEN 47 meeting that was to take place on the following day. In that note he suggested that Edward Heath might like to raise with Lord Carrington the allegations made in the press and on television to the effect that the Parachute Regiment had overreacted at Magilligan Strand and had thereby provoked resentment among the peaceful elements of the Roman Catholic population. This suggestion is inconsistent with the proposition that Downing Street was displeased with the Army’s failure to take firm control of the march. Further, both Edward Heath and Lord Carrington told this Inquiry that the subject was not in fact raised.

1 Day 262/127; Day 260/36

2 G75CA 462.5 4

In these circumstances, we are of the view that we cannot rely on Colin Wallace’s evidence on this point. We consider that his recollection in this regard is faulty.
withholding of the truth has continued throughout those interviews, throughout those statements, and continued there in the witness box so that there has been an attempt to hoodwink you, then, however painful it may be for a man of such excellent character and such good service to the community, if you are driven to the conclusion from which there is no escape, that his demeanour there in the witness box was too smooth by half, that he could not really answer the questions, that he was too composed, that is where you come in, members of the jury, because the prosecution say that he was now in this man's company at 6.30 to some time after 7. There is only one car with blood in the boot, and that car is the one which this man drove.

I finally conclude by saying, doing the best you can, face up to this very difficult challenge which is part of your duty: "Are we sure that that man has lied to us?" If you are not sure that he has lied to you, acquit him. If you are sure he has lied to you, then ask yourselves why. Are not lies, cover-ups, evasion of the truth, an attempt to hoodwink the jury for the reason that the prosecution say is the real reason, that in his heart of hearts he knows he did it? It is entirely a question for you, and that is the problem which faces you."

The Crown contend that the judge's approach to this aspect of the case was correct. It is argued that the course of deception, prevarication and dishonesty on which the appellant embarked is capable of only one explanation, namely that he was responsible for the assault and drowning of the deceased. That conclusion, the Crown submit, is inescapable, whether on the factual basis put to the jury or on what now appears to be the true factual basis.

It is not in our judgment useful or desirable to consider whether the direction of the trial judge to the jury on this aspect of the matter was in accordance with the law as it stood at the time of the trial, although it is to be noted that no complaint was made on the application for leave to appeal against conviction. Plainly the law on this subject has developed in the 15 years since the trial took place. This development is not the result of pedantry but of recognition of a danger that juries may, unless carefully directed, convict a defendant who is shown to have given a dishonest explanation of his conduct without adequately considering the possibility of innocent reasons for his dishonesty and without focusing on the essential question, which is whether such dishonesty can in the context of all the evidence safely be regarded as clear evidence of guilt. That is the principle clearly underlying the statement of principle in R v Burge and Pegg [1996] 1 Cr App R 163 at 174:

"The mere fact that the defendant lied is not in itself evidence of guilt since defendants may lie for innocent reasons, so only if the jury is sure that the defendant did not lie for an innocent reason can a lie support the prosecution case."

There can be no doubt but that the appellant's dishonest and deceptive course of conduct raised and raises a formidable case against him. It may be that even if directed in accordance with the most recent authorities and on the facts as they have now emerged, a jury would still have convicted and properly convicted. But this is now the substantial case against the appellant. There are, as shown above, real difficulties in the Crown's factual case as now advanced. We have to consider whether in the light of all the material now before us we think that the conviction of the appellant was unsafe. We conclude that it was. If the conviction is to be upheld on the basis of his dishonesty alone, we must be able confidently to exclude the reasonable possibility of any innocent explanation for the appellant's conduct. We feel unable to do so. It seems to us possible, even if unlikely, that the appellant initially withheld reference to his meeting with the deceased out of a desire to conceal the subject matter of that meeting; and that from that moment onwards he found himself drawn into an ever-increasing spiral of deception.

IX

We are fortified in our view that we cannot regard this conviction as safe by considering the evidence of Miss Amanda Metcalfe, a witness called by the Crown at the invitation of the defence, and regarded as honest by the Crown, although thought to be mistaken. Amanda Metcalfe was a riding instructor who worked part time in the Golden Goose, her parents' public house which was situated in The Causeway, Arundel, further from
homosexual nature of John McKeague and they wondered could this be used to make McKeague cooperative as an informant.

Aside from the discrepancy in moral attitude between these MI5 officers in London and the political adviser in Lisburn, the question of using McKeague’s homosexuality as a lever to push him into providing information was a really strange development. I have spoken to another former Army Intelligence officer (Dennis from this point) at present domiciled in Northern Ireland who recalls that when he came here in 1975, one of his tasks was to take over running McKeague who had, apparently, previous dealings with a different Army Intelligence agent. Dennis had another interesting tale to tell.

When Dennis reported to Castlereagh Barracks in East Belfast in November 1975 for his second tour of duty in Army Intelligence, he was given a briefing by the officer he was succeeding. They went through the files, pausing at one on a loyalist group known as Tara. The outgoing officer informed Dennis that he had collected some intelligence on this organisation and filed it away because he could not find an existing file to place the information... at least nothing in his own office. His departing colleague warned Dennis that if he knew what was good for him he should not do any digging on Tara. However, Dennis did dig around and when he had sufficient material he prepared a report which was sent up the chain of command. This produced a rocket from above, telling him in no uncertain terms to drop his enquiries, and he realised he had touched on a ‘hot potato.’ He had no authorisation to look at Tara and he believed from the nature of the rebuff that his report had gone from brigade level all the way up to Lisburn. As far as he could recall, the report mentioned McGrath being a homosexual but did not mention Kincora. He never again looked at the file.

At the end of 1975 or early in 1976, Dennis was tasked by his boss to escort a civilian around Belfast. There was nothing unusual about this type of request; it happened quite often when visiting intelligence officers wanted to see around the city. There was no explanation or introduction by name. The stranger was simply taken to a car where Dennis and a colleague were to drive him wherever he wished to go, but unlike many others in this situation who depended of the drivers to show them around Belfast, this individual had his own ideas about where he wanted to be taken. Dennis said he spoke with an English accent and was dressed smartly in jacket, trousers and cravat. He directed them to a house in East Belfast and left the two men in the car as he went inside. It was not until the Kincora story broke in 1980 that Dennis realised the house where he had dropped the stranger was in fact Kincora.

In 1990, I made contact by telephone with the political adviser at his home in England. He simply referred me to the Northern Ireland Office.
OBITUARY

SIR MAURICE OLDIELD
Former head of British Intelligence

Sir Maurice Oldfield, GCIMG, CBE, who was head of MI6 from 1973 to 1978, died yesterday at the age of 65. From letters he wrote to his family in the middle of last year, he had been security coordinator in Northern Ireland, but then asked to be relieved because of ill health.

Starting from a Derbyshire farm, where he was born on November 16, 1915, Maurice Oldfield won a scholarship to Oxford, where he gained a First in History in 1937, and an MA in 1938 for research into the position of the clergy in Parliament in the later Middle Ages.

Elected to a Fellowship at Manchester in the same year, he would have proceeded to a Doctorate—most probably a long and distinguished academic career, quite possibly a nursery—had he not left Oxford in 1945.

In the Army, he became a sergeant in Field Security, in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria; he was commissioned in 1945, and promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1945. His talent for Intelligence, which was confirmed by the MI6, had been spotted by Brigadier Roberts, then in charge of Field Security in the Middle East, who wrote of him: "He is the best counter-intelligence officer both from the theoretical and practical point of view, that it has been my privilege to meet. He is quite outstanding."

Leaving the Army in 1947, Oldfield occupied a succession of posts in the Foreign Service both at home and abroad, particularly in South-East Asia, where he was on the staff of the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in 1950-52. He became First Secretary in Singapore in 1954, returning to London in 1955, and then as the best all-round intelligence officer in the Foreign Service, with a remarkable memory and an outstanding knowledge of South-East Asia.

He devoted much time to liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency as the Americans dominated the post-war years, and was worth winning their confidence. Although this may have led him to be insufficiently critical of their work, his efforts were relatively significant when he was posted to Washington in 1960 as MI6 liaison with the CIA and other United States intelligence agencies, where the wounds caused by the Philby debacles took long to heal.

Oldfield was in fact "blown" in 1968 by Kim Philby's defection, where he was described as "formidable." Following his return earlier to London in 1965, his standing in the inner circle of Whitehall and inside MI6 itself continued to grow, and in 1973 he was appointed as "C"—the head of MI6—and there was general dissatisfaction in the service at that last someone had been promoted from inside.

His main strength had been as Counter-Intelligence officer, rather than as an active procurer of information, and under him the service tended to become more organized and indeed less active in the field. He discouraged initiatives of the "Special Operations" type, and while this could be criticized, he was apparently right in insisting on never confusing Intelligence with such doubtful operations as "sabotage or assassination if an Intelligence service is to be respected, as it was with the events in America to show.

As head of MI6, Oldfield had direct access to the Prime Minister, or perhaps this might on occasion be better expressed as the Prime Minister having access to him, with the result that during his (now Sir) Harold Wilson's last term in office Oldfield was under pressure to pursue ministerial fears about nefarious operations by ill-wishers, both British and foreign.

Although he himself may have tended to be over-secretive, Oldfield's identity as the head of MI6 had become public knowledge, and as a result he may have been the target of the IRA bomb planted in 1975 on the premises of a restaurant in which he frequently dined: "Characteristically, he was unaffected by the experience, as he was equally unaffected by the later embarrassment of having to lunch in the Athenaeum under the eye of personal guards."

He commanded warm loyalty and affection as "MI6 was in the hands of a man who remained unchanged both by promotion and by honour, who started with his MI6 in 1946, culminated in a GCIMG in the Birthday Honours of 1973, and ill health. His resignation even accorded a head of the Secret Intelligence Service, from which he had retired in 1978.

On retirement, he was made a Visiting Fellow of All Souls,' and was given an audience with the Queen in the history of the Secret Intelligence Service from 1912 onwards; but the papers proved too rudimentary to drop the fact of continuing his earlier work on the medieval clergy. In the event of his retirement to act as Security Coordinator in Northern Ireland, where his work and experience had been married to produce a great improvement in relations between the various intelligence agencies, and he was himself a keen organisational whiz.

An excellent companion and classmate in the world of old boys, Oldfield was much admired by his former colleagues, and the rights and wrongs of their personal affections were for his family: father, mother, brothers, sisters, and numerous nieces and nephews. He was a great lover of music and music, and he himself was a keen organist.

His penchant for good stories can be illustrated with the following story: he told of a retired MI6 officer who was a prison visitor and who was on trial for being a prisoner who had been convicted of burglary. It turned out that the prisoner had once had a job which involved a visit to the very offices of MI6, and he had taken the opportunity to "case" the room. Wilson had remarked to the prisoner that it must be a queer organization that worked there, because people did not talk to one another in the lift and in the lounge. The prisoner replied: "Nothing worth nicking there; he knows that the prisoner summarized — and Oldfield said that if he ever worked at MI6 another time he would write: "Nothing worth nicking there would be its title."
22nd November, 1979

The Prime Minister and the Home Secretary had a short discussion yesterday evening of the matter which you raised with me in your letter of 19th November, on the basis of a report received by the Commissioner of Police.

The Prime Minister recalled that the present appointment of the man in question had always been intended to be a relatively short-term appointment, perhaps for a period of something like six months. It was unlikely that he himself would want to continue for much longer, for quite separate reasons: to live for any length of time in that degree of security risk and protection created its own strain, and he was thought to be keen to return to his other work.

In the light of the report enclosed with your letter, his present appointment should not be extended, and it should be brought to an end as soon as was reasonably possible. It was as yet too soon to review with those concerned how he was doing and how long he would be likely to need; but I was instructed to raise that matter with those concerned early in the New Year, and report back to the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary when I had done so.

In the meantime, no further action is to be taken, and no further circulation was to be given to the Commissioner's report or any of the subsequent correspondence.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Sir Brian Cubbon, KCB
Dear Robert-

You saw Sir Maurice OLDFIELD on 7 March 1980 about an allegation that he was a practising homosexual. Although he denied the allegation, you asked that a full review of his Positive Vetting clearance should be undertaken. This was carried out by D of this Service who reported the results to you on 31 March 1980: OLDFIELD had confessed that he had engaged intermittently in homosexual practices over a number of years. As a result you informed him that an investigation would have to be undertaken in accordance with the arrangements, since his homosexuality might have come to the attention of a hostile Intelligence Service and might have been exploited by them.

2. The investigation of OLDFIELD, to whom the codename CODEWORD was allocated, has now been completed. There have been thirteen interviews, between 25 April 1980 and 7 January 1981, with CODEWORD himself which covered his life since leaving school. A number of other interviews in which we did not reveal our particular interest in CODEWORD were undertaken with people who, it was hoped, could shed light on his formative years. Security Service and SIS files and records were consulted, as were the memories of those indoctrinated into the case who had personal and professional knowledge of CODEWORD. As you know the caretaker of his flat and the Police Officer involved were also interviewed.

3. Although CODEWORD revealed further details of his homosexual activities during the investigation, it is probable that he did not admit the full extent of those activities. It is clear that he was not very

Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO
CABINET OFFICE
discreet in his homosexual relations and that he laid himself dangerously open to compromise, notably through his admitted homosexual relations with hotel stewards in the Far East during the 1950s.

4. **CODEWORD** political sympathies were also re-examined in the light of an earlier unsubstantiated allegation that he had once been a member of the Young Communist League. Our enquiries centred on possible communist connexions whilst he was at University in the late 1930s and early 1940s. We concluded that there was no evidence that he was ever a member of the Communist Party or indeed sympathetic to it.

5. Because of **CODEWORD** vulnerability on account of his homosexuality, his career after leaving university was examined in detail in order to ascertain whether his actions, or omissions, might at any time have been affected by pressure or blackmail exercised by a hostile Intelligence Service. We found no such evidence and the favourable outcome of many cases of which he was conscious during his thirty years in SIS is a strong argument against his having been recruited by a hostile Intelligence Service. Our examination did however reveal a number of disquieting features, for example his persistence in some imprudent friendships and contacts, his "softness" in relation to some potentially significant personnel security cases, his indiscretion and his failure to tell the full truth about certain episodes in his personal and professional career.

6. To sum up, **CODEWORD** was indiscreet and vulnerable. He was also less than frank with us on certain matters. But no evidence has emerged that he was ever approached or recruited by a hostile Intelligence Service, and on the evidence available it would be reasonable to conclude that this did not happen. Our full report on the investigation has been sent to "C" and will be shown to Lord Trend when he calls here on 24 February for his annual **CODEWORD** visit.

7. The PV investigation showed that a number of SIS officers suspected **CODEWORD** of being at least a latent homosexual and our enquiries have confirmed that other senior officials of SIS held similar suspicions. The fact that they did not report those suspicions at an earlier stage is perhaps relevant to consideration of whether the case should be referred to the Security Commission. My view, however, is that there is not a job for the Security
I interviewed MO in my office on 28 March. I first explained to him that I had been charged with reviewing his PV and urged him to be perfectly frank with me. Subsequently, at a sensitive point in the interview, I promised not to reveal unnecessarily to other people the details of his private life which he gave me.

4. Early on in the interview MO was encouraged to provide an outline history of his sex life. He produced the details with a very natural reluctance.
STATEMENT CONTINUATION PAGE

STATEMENT OF:  STEPHEN GEOFFREY HEWITT  CONTINUATION PAGE NO: 2

colleagues in the United Kingdom and the Northern Ireland Civil Service. I would be prepared to say that Mr England did not suffer fools gladly and may not have been popular with all those with whom he came in contact. I believe Mr England died about 12 months after leaving the NI Office in about 1979. I acted as Private Secretary to Sir Maurice Oldfield during the time he was Security Co-Ordinator in Northern Ireland. For security reasons Sir Maurice always travelled in Northern Ireland with a police escort and was accompanied by police officers whenever he left the Stormont Estate. I have read certain allegations about Sir Maurice's private life in the magazine, Private Eye. From my knowledge of the man I would totally repudiate these allegations. I know of nobody, including British Civil Servants who might have been involved in homosexual activity in Northern Ireland. It has been suggested to me that there may have been somebody involved in such activity who drove a flashy Mini car. I can think of nobody who might fit this description.

281

SIGNATURE OF STATEMENT MAKER: (Sgd) Stephen G Hewitt

Form 38/36 [a]
(Plain)
team. SIS has made enquiries with both MI5 and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on the possibility that SIS may have passed papers relating to Oldfield to these organisations on or after the 12 March 1981. Searches conducted by both organisations failed to identify anything on their corporate record to indicate that material had being received from SIS in relation to this matter.

30. The codeword used to describe the Private papers is that used for the investigation conducted by MI5 in 1980 to determine to whether Oldfield's homosexuality may have been used to compromise him in a way which damaged national security at any point during his career.

OLDFIELD SIS PAPERS

31. Whilst reviewing sensitive papers relating to Sir Maurice Oldfield the HIA Inquiry identified a note originated by an SIS officer on 2 May 2001 in relation to papers on Colin Wallace, Oldfield and Northern Ireland (Article 9). The author of the note, at that time, was in a role that handled personal and staff related matters.
1. I attach the papers relating to Maurice OLDFIELD. They seem to fall into two categories.

a) Tracing on the papers appear to have been taken from OLDFIELD’s file on a loan slip in 1984.

b) Papers relating to Colin WALLACE, OLDFIELD and Northern Ireland. I do not know the background to this. The papers mentioned in the pink memo is a reference to a large collection of papers found in a waste bag after he left the service (all torn in half – hence the sellotape). I assume they are not the originals, but have no idea where the originals might be filed.

2. Sorry to dump these horrors on you.

2 May 2001

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32. The note contains annotated comments made by an unknown SIS officer, in which the individual writes in paragraph 3 "MO. was in N. Ireland at the time". SIS has been asked by the HIA Inquiry to conduct research in order to identify any material in SIS records that could assist the Inquiry to understand the meaning of the unknown SIS officer’s comment in paragraph 3 or what it refers to.

33. The author of the note left the Service in July 2001 and SIS has been unable to find any information to help ascertain the identity of the unknown SIS officer who made the annotated comments. Efforts to date, to contact the author of the note has proved unsuccessful.

34. Research conducted by SIS for information associated with the note that could help ascertain what the annotated comment is in reference to, has identified no relevant
October 2011

5. In 2011, Officer G held a post equivalent in 2016 to Deputy Director with responsibility for matters relating to operational security. In his first note, dated 25 October 2011, Officer G begins by providing summary of the main points covered (Article 1):

The papers include full details of the investigation into allegations that he was a homosexual and possibly a KGB agent – the first was true, the second not.

The relationship had with the Kincora Boys Home (KBH) in Belfast and subsequent ‘rentaboy sex scandal’ is, in my view the only remaining potential sensitivity in the papers.

The sensitivity being that may have a link to (by association through his friendship of the KBH head) of the alleged crimes at the boys home - given the current climate surrounding similar cases, it may at some point emerge as an issue.

6. The investigation referred to by Officer G’s in the first paragraph of the summary was conducted by MIS in 1980 to determine whether Oldfield’s homosexuality may have been used to compromise him in a way which damaged national security at any point during his career. The investigation concluded in February 1981 that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that national security had been compromised, and indeed that Oldfield had contributed notably to a number of security and intelligence successes which would not have been achieved had there been a breach of security.

7. Officer G describes the papers as (Article 2):

Paper holding has four ring binders containing the investigation papers and correspondence between the Service and the then Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert Armstrong. There is a separate manilla folder containing copies of private correspondence to and from . It is not clear that the file is complete.

8. After providing a description of the papers located in the four ring binders (and the separate manilla folder), Officer G confirms that “I have read all the papers in these files.”

9. In the same note Officer G explains in more detail the references he made in the document summary in relation to Oldfield and the Kincora Boys Home (Article 3).
10. The final version of the note was passed to Officer J who at the time was Director with responsibility for matters relating to security and compliance, and Officer G’s senior officer. After reviewing the document, Officer J annotated the note agreeing with Officer G’s proposals for the four binders of sensitive material to be retained in the secure area and that the issue should feature on a schedule of possible future risks. Officer G’s note was added the sensitive papers and returned to the secure area for storage.

August 2014

11. In 2014, the underlying papers and Officer G’s 2011 note were reviewed by SIS Officer H who had recently taken over from Officer J as the acting Director with responsibility for security and compliance. Officer H noted the conclusions made by Officer G and that they did not appear to accurately reflect the information contained in the papers themselves. Officer G (now retired) was therefore contacted and invited to conduct a second review of the papers in order to clarify the conclusions he reached in his 2011 note and what they were based on.

12. On 14 August 2014, Officer G visited SIS London to review his 2011 note and the underlying material. He subsequently drafted a second note (Article 4) in which he begins:

13. Officer G goes on to explain that he has been asked in particular to clarify the statement he made in paragraph 5 of his note dated 25 October 2011. After reviewing all the papers Officer G wrote (Article 5):
Having been given full access to the papers, though my focus was on volumes 1-3, I conclude that my original statement was imperfectly drafted. As it stands this particular sentence is at odds with that which immediately follows it: “This institution became the focus of press allegations of an homosexual vice ring – was never implicated.”

Article 5

14. In concluding his second note, Officer G adds a short explanation as to the reasons why he had recorded his review of the papers.

I do recall vividly reviewing the papers. My overall impression was and is – based on the papers – that there were a lot of unsubstantiated rumours – largely in the Irish press, which hinted at or directly linked [redacted] to the Kinora Boys Home.

Article 6

Interviews with SIS officers

15. At the request of the HIA inquiry, SIS conducted an interview with Officer G and other officers with knowledge of the notes and the papers relating to Oldfield. Background information on the officers interviewed by SIS is as follows:

- Officer G - responsible for drafting the 2011 and 2014 notes. In 2011, Officer G held a post equivalent to the present Deputy Director with responsibility for matters relating to operational security. Officer G's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland. Officer G retired from SIS in March 2013.

- Officer H - in 2014 Officer H was acting Director with responsibility for matters relating to security and compliance. Officer H's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland. Officer H retired from SIS in June 2016.

- Officer I - in 2011 and 2014 Officer I was managed by Officer G and was responsible for ensuring the secure storage and access to sensitive records, including the collection of papers relating to Oldfield. Officer I's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland. Officer I retired from SIS in September 2015.

- Officer J - in 2011 Officer J was Director with responsibility for matters relating to security and compliance. At the time, Officer J was Officer G's line manager. Officer J's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland.

16. On 30 September 2016, Officer I was interviewed in SIS London about her recollection of the Oldfield papers and the circumstances of Officer G's review and his 2011 note. Officer I explained how in October 2011, she was in the process of reviewing and rationalising paper holdings in her office at a time of office moves. Among the paper holdings, she came across four 'sensitive investigative files' associated with Sir Maurice Oldfield in one of their four-
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SIS DESIGNATOR

2 May 2001

SIS DESIGNATORS

INFORMATION KNOWN TO THE HIA INQUIRY AND CONSIDERED NOT RELEVANT

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Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995

Witness Statement of Clifford Smyth

I, Clifford Smyth, say as follows to the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1992 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry):

1. I was born on the 2nd February, 1944.

2. I have been asked by the HIA Inquiry whether I have any evidence for the propositions in my contributions to Chris Moore’s 1996 book “The Kincora Scandal” that William McGrath was an agent of the State and that Kincora involved an operation run by the intelligence agencies. My contributions can be found at Exhibit 1 to this statement.

3. I confirm that I did not and do not have any evidence for the propositions. I was writing at a time when there had already been years of speculation about William McGrath and the involvement of intelligence agencies in Kincora. The allegations were met largely by silence from the authorities. That is why I speculated as I did in the book.

4. I spoke to the RUC in May, 1980 and I confirm the content of that statement which can be found at Exhibit 2 to this statement. It is the case that the interactions with McGrath over my sexual problems in the mid 1980’s, and his supposed “treatment” of them, went as far as him masturbating me, but this did not involve others. I questioned his so-called therapy / treatment and I felt uncomfortable. The whole episode came to an end when McGrath encountered me dressed in women’s clothes in my flat in Fitzwilliam St. His reaction surprised me – he simply abruptly left without speaking. Later when I quizzed him about the whole matter he stated that I was ‘cured’ and these incidents were never referred to again. I did not want to speak of the extent of his behaviour to the RUC because of embarrassment; however I did describe the sessions in which I was passive.

5. I also spoke to officers from Sussex police in 1982, and I confirm the content of that statement which can be found at Exhibit 3 to this statement.

6. I was a rent paying lodger in William McGrath’s home, where he lived with his wife and 3 children, from about 1968 until 1973 when I left to get married.

7. I was involved with him in TARA, unionist politics and the Orange Order from about 1965 to 1975. To clarify, I returned to Northern Ireland in 1962 from Scotland and shortly
thereafter joined the Orange Order. I then joined the Ulster Young Unionists and became very active in both. I met McGrath through Orange circles in 1965 and was closely associated with him when he set up TARA in the autumn of 1969. My association with TARA and McGrath continued until about 1975.

8. While 2 individuals spoke to me about McGrath in the 1970’s I was not persuaded that he was a homosexual as the claim was inconsistent with what I saw of him and his family. After 1980 I could not begin to understand his compartmentalised life and why he was able to deceive someone like me who thought he knew McGrath reasonably well. I concluded you could not know him at all.

9. I have been asked about a document by the HIA Inquiry which I had never seen before it was shown to me by the Inquiry. I am advised that the document appears at pages KIN30216-30220 of the Inquiry bundle. I wish to state categorically that I have never been blackmailed by McGrath or any other person for that matter.

10. As the HIA Inquiry is aware in 2005 I revealed publicly in the Belfast Telegraph the struggle that I have had with transvestism all through much of my life. The articles can be found behind Exhibit 4 to this statement. That was what McGrath was supposed to be helping with during the “treatment” in the 1960’s. I obviously recognise now that his motives were not for my assistance. Allegations about my private life were thrown at me in the 1970’s when smearing and attempting to undermine and damage people about such things was common. However, I have addressed the affliction of transvestism through sessions with a number of counsellors and finally through an NHS psychiatrist. I now lead a stable and relatively normal life. I would prefer not to have to discuss the subject in public.

11. I can say that it was not until 1980 that I learned that William McGrath was said to be sexually abusing boys in his care in Kincora. I appreciate that it could be said I should have realised what he was capable of because of my own experiences, but I believe that is a claim based on hindsight which is unfair. The fact is that I did not suspect him during the 1970’s, and no claims or rumours of him abusing his position in Kincora ever came to my attention until after 1980.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.
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FOREWORD

The Kincora sex scandal is etched on the collective memory of Northern Ireland. All who have heard the sordid story of the systematic molestation of young victims who were under the care and protection of Northern Ireland's Eastern Health and Social Services Board are left with deep feelings of unease. No other scandal in the province's recent past has prompted so much speculation and rumour. Now we can get as close to the truth as is humanly possible.

Journalistic investigations into the Kincora sex scandal have centred on the personality, character and bizarre motivation of one individual, William McGrath. It was the multi-various, corrupt and sinister activities of McGrath which led to a massive cover-up in Whitehall, a cover-up which to this day withstands attempts to penetrate its wall of secrecy.

This book will expose for the first time the fact that even as McGrath was going to trial for sex offences, a whole litany of criminal activities on behalf of Ulster loyalism was also coming to light. Highly placed security officers charged with the investigation of McGrath's secret world already knew that this middle-aged sex offender had run guns into Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the police knew that McGrath had been instrumental in founding an organisation called Tara. There is evidence to suggest that this organisation may have been controlled and manipulated by British Intelligence for its own ends.

This book will argue that in forming Tara, William
McGrath acted on the directions of his intelligence handlers and that he set in motion events which led directly to the emergence of loyalist paramilitarism or counter-terrorism. He was not alone; others served similar ends. The questions that such evidence raises are devastating. Did British intelligence maintain a shadowy but firm control over loyalist paramilitarism from the early 1970s onwards? Were the innocent lives and future prospects of male adolescents sacrificed to the cynical manipulation of one of the most mysterious and intriguing figures to emerge from the tragedy of Northern Ireland?

It is immediately apparent that the story of William McGrath reaches into the very heart of Northern Ireland's troubles. He was able to build on the fears of grassroots loyalists while promoting a heady doctrine of unionism, evangelicalism and Orange fervour. Given the gravity of the charges contained in this book and the new perspective that such revelations bring to our understanding of the crisis in the North, the reader needs to be assured that the scandal about to unfold is based on careful, tenacious and well documented research, research which has taken the author sixteen years to amass, collate and analyse. In the course of that research the author has interviewed one hundred and three people, many at great length and on numerous occasions. The author has been the recipient of numerous documents from both official and unofficial sources, which have also made a vital contribution to our understanding of William McGrath and the seamy world he inhabited. He found it necessary to broaden the enquiries and the scope of the investigation by making visits to the Republic of Ireland, England and Scotland and communicating with people now living in France and South Africa.

Because of the nature of these enquiries it has not always been appropriate or possible to publish the names of the author's sources. It will be obvious to the reader when a witness has been given a cover name. All who have contributed to this story are to be commended, particularly those who have allowed their names to go forward.

The real story behind the Kincora cover-up took years to emerge. The author was finally able to dismantle part of the wall of silence and open this sordid affair to the gaze of the public.

Clifford Smyth, loyalist historian,
ex-member Tara and Democratic Unionist Party
Belfast, 1 February 1996
Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995

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STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STEPHEN GEOFFREY HEWITT

STATEMENT OF

AGE OF WITNESS (if over 21 enter "over 21") OVER 21 YEARS

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: CIVIL SERVANT

ADDRESS: C/O THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, LONDON

I declare that this statement consisting of 2 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 7th day of April 1982

(Sgd) D.B. ELLIOTT, D/Sergeant

SIGNATURE OF MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received

(Sgd) Stephen G. Hewitt

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

I am a Civil Servant employed by the Northern Ireland Office. I joined the NIO in May 1975 and remained in London until May 1976, when I moved to Stormont Castle, Belfast. I worked in the Law and Order Division and my boss was the late Mr Peter England. In May 1977 I became Private Secretary to Mr Ray Carter who was the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the NI Office. I remained in that post until September 1978 when I returned to the London Office. I returned to Northern Ireland again in October 1979 as Private Secretary to Maurice Oldfield. I returned to the London Office again in July/August 1980 and took up a post in Personnel Management in the London Office which is my present position. During the period May 76 to May 77 I met Mr England in an official capacity on a regular basis and thereafter met him from time to time until he left the NIO some time in 1978 to return to the MOD in London. It has been suggested to me that I was on one occasion assaulted by Mr England. No such incident ever took place. I have never visited any Welfare Establishments in Northern Ireland in a private capacity although I accompanied Mr Carter to various local authority establishments on many occasions as his Private Secretary. I have visited numerous bars in the Bangor and Crawfordsburn area with my colleagues in the NIO and with my girlfriend of that time who was also employed by the NIO. I have never been into a bar in Northern Ireland on my own. I have no reason to suppose that Mr England was a homosexual or ever engaged in any homosexual activity. Mr England was widely respected by his

(Sgd) Stephen G. Hewitt

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

FORM 38/36 (Plain)
355. Peter Tiaras Earl England was employed as a Senior Civil Servant in the Northern Ireland Office from 18 November 1974 to 13 November 1976. He died on 24 August 1978. A copy of the Death Certificate is attached to Part IV and a statement from D/Sergeant Elliott at Part II refers.

356. In London on 7 April 1982, Mr Peter Neville Bell a Civil Servant in the Northern Ireland Office, was interviewed by D/Superintendent Caskey and D/Sergeant Elliott. He denied involvement in homosexual activity in Northern Ireland and dismissed the allegations as 'absolute and complete rubbish'. He knew nothing about England's sexual activities and had no reason to believe anything other than that he was a happily married man. Bell stated that he was attached to the Northern Ireland Office in Belfast from July 1975 until September 1976 when he was posted as a Principal to what is now the Constitutional and Political Affairs Division of the Northern Ireland Office. Part of his official duties was involvement with the Homosexual Law Reform in Northern Ireland including the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order. He was also involved in a case which had been brought before the European Commission and later the European Court of Human Rights, by a homosexual in Northern Ireland.

357. Bell stated that his involvement in this work may be the reason for these wholly unfounded rumours. He stated that he is the holder of a Provisional Licence which enables him
got on well with him as one of my superiors in the War Office and Ministry of Defence. In my last appointment as Head of AG Secretariat from 1976 to 1978, he was DUS(Army) for some of this time and we had many dealings over official business. This was the only time he was my line manager.

10. I was asked if I knew the late Sir Maurice Oldfield. I never met him and learned of his name only when he was appointed to an official position in Northern Ireland in 1979.

11. I was asked if I knew Colin Wallace, who I was told had been employed in Public Relations at HQNI Lisburn. I have a vague recollection of his name but it may be from his subsequent activities.

12. I am not married. In 1972 when Direct Rule from London was introduced, the security situation in Belfast was such that unmarried or married unaccompanied personnel were chosen. In my time there, only three men had their families with them.

13. I volunteered the information that my name appeared in Private Eye in, I think, August 1979 in connection with a court case in April 1979 when I pleaded not guilty to a charge of masturbating in a public place. I was conditionally bound over for one year and paid costs of £50. The remainder of the Private Eye piece was completely wrong about my being a recruiter for an intelligence organisation. The court case was defended strenuously and I feel that the outcome was unjust. I had been returning from an evening rugby match where I had consumed a very large quantity of alcohol over a long period. I have a weak bladder so that I needed to relieve myself before I caught a train home. I did not appeal, as there was no Press publicity until the Private Eye publication and there has been none since. Despite what might be thought from the outcome of the case, I am not a homosexual, and never have been, and certainly had no such relationships when I was in Northern Ireland in 1972/73. Most of my waking hours were taken up in a very heavy involvement with the security situation in the worst years of violence and deaths in the present emergency.

14. I am subject to security vetting in the Ministry of Defence and I took up my present appointment two weeks after the alleged
Mr William D Flackes was interviewed by D/Superintendent Caskey on 6 April 1982 on the basis of this information which had already been in the Detective Superintendent’s possession since 29 March 1982. Flackes declined to make a written statement but said he did not have a document as alleged by Mr Gilliland nor did he know of the existence of any such document. He stated that the information concerning the 4 officials was common gossip and had been for years. He had no knowledge of any criminal acts and nothing to indicate a vice or prostitution ring.

Flackes, when re-interviewed, was asked if he could elaborate on the information concerning Mr Meharg. He stated in an interview with Inspector Coles on 2 July 1982 that he had no evidence in respect of the allegation against Mr Meharg. He stated that this was just a rumour circulating among journalists and others. He declined to make a written statement.

On 7 April 1982, Stephen Geoffrey HEWITT, a Civil Servant, attached to the Northern Ireland Office in London, was interviewed by D/Superintendent Caskey and D/Sergeant Elliott. Hewitt stated that he was appointed as Private Secretary to Sir Maurice Oldfield in 1979. He also stated that in 1976/77 he met Peter England in the course of his official duties. He denied ever being assaulted by England. He knew no one who might have been involved in homosexual activity in Northern Ireland.
he was asked to assist the MI5 Legal Adviser’s (LA) response to information requests. MI5 Officer 1 retired from this post in April 1980 and has since died.

5. Commencing in 1989, long after the events arising from Kincora, Arthur Rucker, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), was carrying out an investigation on behalf of the Cabinet Office after it emerged that parts of a 1987 Prime Ministerial letter about WALLACE to the Chairman of the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee (TCSSC) had been inaccurate in some respects. The MI5 meeting with SIS on 11 October 1989 had been held to discuss the response required from MI5 to some questions posed by Rucker.

6. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Witness Statement of 27 May 2016 stated, in terms, that they had found nothing to support the SIS officer’s 1988 reference to an agent having been aware of sexual malpractice at Kincora. It is apparent from that officer’s Minute of 12 October 1989 that the part relating to Kincora was based on the SIS officer’s understanding of what he thought the MI5 officer had told him.

7. We have located a Note for File (NFF) dated 17 October 1989 written by MI5 Officer 1, containing his own record of the same meeting. [See Exhibit 3] The part of the NFF relating to the discussion about Kincora is explicit in referring to a particular CHIS (Covert Human Intelligence Source). MI5 Officer 1 expressed the view that some of the information on the CHIS’s file could be “incorrectly interpreted”.

8. The CHIS’s identity has been disclosed to the HIA inquiry who have had, and continue to have, access to all of the documents relating to this particular CHIS. These documents reveal that prior to 1980 the CHIS had been told by his (non-MI5 or SIS) handler that McGrath was a homosexual. Material on file indicates that the CHIS knew nothing about, and never reported on, Kincora or sexual malpractice there. The files also show that the CHIS only discussed such matters with his handlers after the matter became public in the media post 24 January 1980 and illustrate that he had no knowledge of abuse at Kincora at any time.

9. The Inquiry has viewed in unredacted form the contents of the files of those CHIS who may have been judged or alleged to have been in a position to have been able to provide information about Kincora. Extensive reviews of its files enables MI5 to confirm that no MI5 CHIS produced intelligence about child abuse at Kincora prior to the media revelations of January 1980.

10. Following the 1980 publicity, the Kincora issue became a point of discussion between MI5 and some CHIS who reported on the matter as it was reflected in the media and amongst paramilitaries and political circles. None of these CHIS had any personal knowledge of the alleged child abuse at Kincora. It was and remains the position of MI5 that none of its officers was aware of child sexual abuse at Kincora prior to the publicity in 1980.

Reference by ADCI to ‘false files’ in 1982

11. The Inquiry invited MI5 to explain why the MI5 Assistant DCI (ADCI) referred to ‘false files' in a 1982 telex about RUC Det Supt Caskey’s investigation into Kincora.

Exhibit 3: MI5 Officer 1 NFF of 17 October 1989.
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6. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) Witness Statement of 27 May 2016 stated, in terms, that they had found nothing to support the SIS officer's 1988 reference to an agent having been aware of sexual malpractice at Kincora. It is apparent from that officer's Minute of 12 October 1989 that the part relating to Kincora was based on the SIS officer's understanding of what he thought the MI5 officer had told him.

7. We have located a Note for File (NFF) dated 17 October 1989 written by MI5 Officer 1, containing his own record of the same meeting. [See Exhibit 3] The part of the NFF relating to the discussion about Kincora is explicit in referring to a particular CHIS (Covert Human Intelligence Source). MI5 Officer 1 expressed the view that some of the information on the CHIS's file could be "incorrectly interpreted".

8. The CHIS's identity has been disclosed to the HIA inquiry who have had, and continue to have, access to all of the documents relating to this particular CHIS. These documents reveal that prior to 1980 the CHIS had been told by his (non-MI5 or SIS) handler that McGrath was a homosexual. Material on file indicates that the CHIS knew nothing about, and never reported on, Kincora or sexual malpractice there. The files also show that the CHIS only discussed such matters with his handlers after the matter became public in the media post 24 January 1980 and illustrate that he had no knowledge of abuse at Kincora at any time.

9. The Inquiry has viewed in unredacted form the contents of the files of those CHIS who may have been judged or alleged to have been in a position to have been able to provide information about Kincora. Extensive reviews of its files enables MI5 to confirm that no MI5 CHIS produced intelligence about child abuse at Kincora prior to the media revelations of January 1980.

10. Following the 1980 publicity, the Kincora issue became a point of discussion between MI5 and some CHIS who reported on the matter as it was reflected in the media and amongst paramilitaries and political circles. None of these CHIS had any personal knowledge of the alleged child abuse at Kincora. It was and remains the position of MI5 that none of its officers was aware of child sexual abuse at Kincora prior to the publicity in 1980.

Reference by ADCI to 'false files' in 1982

11. The Inquiry invited MI5 to explain why the MI5 Assistant DCI (ADCI) referred to 'false files' in a 1982 telex about RUC Supt Caskey's investigation into Kincora.

Exhibit 3: MI5 Officer 1 NFF of 17 October 1989.
C) The identity of CJI former LO and his subsequent running by the IJS semi-colon

D) The role of ASP (This is the least problem)

It is unlikely that the wool can be pulled over Caskey's eyes.

4. CJI, DIGESTATION and I consider we should ask HSIB and DHSB (who recently joined) SB from CID whether Caskey is discreet and can be trusted to leave all mention of the matters, which we are confident are irrelevant to Kincora, out of his report. We do not think that Caskey will accept our word or the word of anyone else that they are irrelevant when there has been such other suspicion and cover-up over Kincora. Before we see HSIB/DHSB's views however, we need your agreement to the declaration of a source protection to SB. This need not be an embarrassment because he is a source and does not report on matters of direct interest to SB. Once we have HSIB/DHSB's assessment we can with you decide whether to take Caskey into our confidence which will include giving access to the HG file for the source protection. We will also ask HSIB/HSB about the status of this particular enquiry and what is likely to happen to any report that is produced. We assume Caskey is an astute police officer and we should be in difficulty if we attempt to deceive him and manufacture false files or deny the existence of real ones.

5. We are under pressure to reach a decision quickly because the UKF has responded to Caskey by 5 July. CLF has authorised them to stall until then, but Caskey wishes to return generally as a dress in England and has asked further questions of officers at HQ1 about individuals whose names have cropped up in the enquiry.

6. We should be grateful therefore if you would give urgent consideration to authorising a declaration to declare HSIB/HSB which will enable HSIB/HSB to send them out about Caskey. We really need to do this by 1 July. If you decide this course /should.......

[Signature]

From: [Redacted]
C) The identity of [redacted] and his subsequent running by the TJS semicolon.

D) The role of [redacted] (this is the least problem.)

It is unlikely that the wool can be pulled over Caskey’s eyes.

4. O&I, and I consider we should ask HSB and HCSB (who recently joined SB from CID) whether Caskey is discreet and can be trusted to leave mention of the matters, which we are confident are irrelevant to Kincora, out of his report. We do not think that Caskey will accept our word or the word of anyone else that they are irrelevant when there has been such other suspicion and cover-up over Kincora. Before we see HSB/DHSB’s views however, we need your agreement to the declaration of a source protection to SB. This need not be an embarrassment because he is a source and does not report on matters of direct interest to SB. Once we have HSB/DHSB’s assessment we can with you decide whether to take Caskey into our confidence which will include giving access to [redacted]’s file for [redacted] we will also ask HSB/HSB about the status of this particular enquiry and what is likely to happen to any report that is produced. We assure Caskey is an astute police officer and we should be in difficulty if we attempt to deceive him and manufacture false files or deny the existence of real ones.

5. We are under pressure to reach a decision quickly because the [redacted] responded to Caskey by 5 July. CLT has authorised them to stall until then, but Caskey wishes to now generally address the [redacted] and has asked further questions of officers at HQ about individuals whose names have cropped up in the enquiry.

6. We should be grateful therefore if you would give urgent consideration to authorising [redacted] to declare [redacted] to HSB/HSB which will enable [redacted] and me to send them out about Caskey. We really need to do this by 1 July. If you decide this course /should...