17 November 1989

WALLACE

1. Many thanks for your undated letter received 10 November.

2. I confirm that the answer to Question 2(b)(v) was based almost entirely upon our reading of the Cameron report of April 1975, which was in fact a Damage Assessment. It was not a Security Service but an HQNI document, merely copied "blind" to our Legal Adviser. The exceptions were the comments about lack of Security Service involvement with WALLACE and the speculation about WALLACE’s sources.

3. With regard to Question 2(b)(vi) the answers at paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c) and (g) are based solely upon the Cameron report; (d), (e) and (f) are reflections of the study of our files and of our reference to the DO STAFF at Stormont. If specific intelligence information was ever released to WALLACE at or from Stormont its release would have been recorded on file, in accordance with Security Service practice: however, we have found no such file. Cameron’s statement to Sheldon that he had neither met nor spoken to WALLACE is quoted by us in the answer to Question 2(i)(iv): the answers he gave to Supt. Caskey’s written questions were in fact given by him orally to Sheldon and recorded by the latter in our file. Cameron, informally surmised that SIS Officer B had had dealings with WALLACE, but SIS can discover no record of official contact with WALLACE (see our answer to Question 2(i)(iv)).

4. Cameron issued specific instructions to his staff to have nothing to do with WALLACE. D-M15 Officer was present at HQNI, but not accredited to the GOC as was Cameron. He was subordinate to Cameron and previously to SIS Officer B but with no responsibilities connected with Army agent handling. Cameron’s statement about WALLACE was entirely on his own account. There was an RUC suggestion in December 1982 in relation...
to a HOLROYD investigation that he might be interviewed by Supt. Caskey. An answer from D-M15 officer to the effect that SIS officer B knew little or nothing of SIS officer B's operations was given to RUC in October 1983.

5. The files are silent on any relations with WALLACE. In accordance with practice, such relations if they existed would have been recorded. There is no need to provide lists of all SIS and Security Service staff in Northern Ireland 1972-75.

6. We have found no documentation to show that the Security Service staff were aware of IP activities. Neither is there any assumption to be made from the Cameron report.

7. As regards Question 2(e)(ii), our officer responsible for the case called on Michael Bell, PS to Sir Michael Cary, on 10 July 1975 in order to discuss what reports from MISSOURI might be shown to the CSAB chairman (Mr J Shaw). Agreement was reached that the papers referred to in paragraph 3(a), (b), (c) and (d) of our answer to Question 2(e)(ii) should be shown; MOD already had (d), so our officer left (a), (b) and (c) with Bell. In the course of discussions Bell said he wondered whether it might be possible to mention to Shaw some of the other matters on which we had reported to the MOD, either orally or in summary form where it was clear that WALLACE had given Fisk information which he knew to be classified. Our officer thought the only good example was the story relating to helicopters which had been passed to (DDSX Army), orally on 16 December 1974 for possible transmission to Sir Michael Cary together with the written material which was destined for Sir Michael Cary and referred to as (a), (b) and (c) above. He would be prepared to brief Shaw, also orally, on that aspect. (This material is referred to in paragraph 3 of our answer to Question 2(c)(i)).

8. We can find no particular reason for confining the briefing on the leak to oral presentation.

9. At our officer's meeting with Shaw on 21 July 1975, at which Michael Bell and his successor as PS to the FUS, John Howe, were also present, the helicopter story was given orally, but the other items were shown
in documentary form. Shaw asked no questions of note but was clearly impressed by the evidence of WALLACE's association with Fisk and of his being prepared to volunteer information which he knew to be classified; Shaw said that he would immediately forget that he had B-SOURCE PROTECTION and would certainly not refer to it in any way in any general briefing which he might give to the two other members of the Appeals Board.

10. On 6 October 1975 we heard from the office of the DFS (CM), E Broadbent, that Shaw was ill and that his place as Chairman of the CSAB would be taken by Sir Leslie Williams. Broadbent proposed to give Williams the background to the WALLACE case the following day and we were invited to send a representative to the meeting. Accordingly on 8 October Broadbent asked Williams whether he wished to be given the further background information (which had been given to Shaw). On receiving an affirmative reply Broadbent outlined the case to him, introduced our officer and gave him B-SOURCE PROTECTION material to read. From our file we conclude that Williams was not in fact given the helicopter spares information orally.

11. It is not immediately apparent why WALLACE's admission to Groves on 11 February was not used to support a further CSAB charge. It may have been that this information was so sensitive that it was felt that the Board as a whole should not know about it. We will re-check our files to see if there is any explanation.

12. In appeals to the three Advisers in PV cases, to the Three Wise Men in immigration cases, and to the Tribunal and Commissioner under the Security Service Act 1989, security and intelligence information is given to the arbiter which is not passed in any form to the appellant. Thus, the procedure is not strange and the law accepts the disadvantage to the appellant. The question is does CSAB have a similar procedure? WALLACE could not have been given the B-SOURCE PROTECTION source information for the purposes of his appeal, but it was necessary for the Board to be aware of it.
FROM: S L RICKARD, SIL
20 FEBRUARY 1990

IMMEDIATE

CC
PS/Secretary of State (L&B) - B
PS/Minister of State (L&B) - B
PS/PUS (L&B) - B
Mr Burns - B
Mr Thomas - B
Mr Chesterton - B
Mr Masefield - B
Mr Daniell - B
Mr P Cassell, Hdg GS Sec, MOD - FAX
D-MI5LEGAL ADVISOR
Mr D Ackland, F6, HO - FAX

PARLIAMENTARY CLERK - B

WALLACE CASE

I attach some supplementary material for PM’s questions. This complements a brief submitted by MOD, circulated separately, dealing with the various allegations set out in the early editions of the Sunday Times on 18 February.

S L RICKARD
SIL DIVISION
20 February 1990

Ext OAB 6466

SIL/14375/BAH
Can the Prime Minister confirm that [M15 OFFICER 3] was head of M15 in Belfast 1974?

It is not the practice to disclose details of the duties of individual civil servants who work, or have worked, in Northern Ireland.

Was [M15 OFFICER 3] involved in "Clockwork Orange"?

As has already been made clear, the account of "Clockwork Orange" which appeared in certain editions of the Sunday Times on 18 February was based on a misunderstanding. It is not the practice to discuss the duties, still less alleged duties, of individual civil servants working in Northern Ireland.
Mr Tam Dalyell

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what communication his Department had with General Sir Peter Leng, former Land Forces Commander in Northern Ireland, on Saturday 17 February, after learning from Mr James Adams, that General Leng had made a statement about the sanctioning of Clockwork Orange.

ANSWER

(Mr Archie Hamilton)

Lieutenant General Sir Peter Leng informed MOD officials that he had no reason to disagree with any statements recently issued by Ministers concerning Clockwork Orange or other matters pertinent to the case of Mr Wallace. He agreed that the Sunday Times should be advised that any impression they had to the contrary was incorrect.
BACKGROUND NOTE

On Friday 16 February the wife of Major General Garrett (CoG HQNI in the early 70s and D Sy(Army) until recently) had been distressed by telephone call from Mr Barry Penrose of the Sunday Times who indicated that he intended to identify her husband as responsible for Clockwork Orange. General Garrett is very seriously ill with leukemia. Later information indicated that Lieutenant General Sir Peter Leng (formerly CoHQNI in the early 70s) had also been approached by Mr Penrose and was reported to have said that he "authorised Clockwork Orange". Since recent Ministerial statements have relied on the only official records on the subject which state that Clockwork Orange was not cleared, it was considered prudent to enquire of General Leng what communication he had had with Mr Penrose.

A telephone call to General Leng secured confirmation that he had spoken to Mr Penrose, as had General King (formerly CoHQNI in the early 70s), and that he had given Mr Penrose information which he thought might be relevant in answer to questions which had included reference to Clockwork Orange. It was decided to obtain a full account from General Leng of his conversations with Mr Penrose. Whilst this was being arranged, CPR obtained confirmation from Mr James Adams of the Sunday Times that there would be a front-page article claiming that the Generals were challenging the truth of recent Ministerial statements.

CPR and Head of GS Sec met Generals King and Leng (at General King’s home) on the evening of 17 February. The Generals gave an account of their conversations with Mr Penrose and an assurance that they had neither sought to challenge Ministers nor had any information which they believed to be inconsistent with what Ministers had said. Connections between "Clockwork Orange" and the information given to Mr Penrose arose from the manner of the latter’s questioning, were not intended by the Generals and may have been misunderstood. The Generals were in favour of issuing a rebuttal of the story which Mr Adams had indicated would be published, and they agreed the words in which the rebuttal should be communicated to the Sunday Times. A manuscript copy of the agreed words was made and retained by General Leng: a typed copy is attached.

On learning of this rebuttal, the Editor of the Sunday Times listened to the tape-recording which Mr Penrose had made of his telephone conversations and decided that they did not support the story. The article was withdrawn; unfortunately, it was too late for it to be withdrawn from the first editions published in London and Belfast. A copy of a statement made by the Editor in amplification of his decision is attached.

The proposed draft Answer has been read carefully to General Leng over the telephone and he is happy with it. It is a true statement of what was conveyed by him to MOD officials. Therefore, nothing on the tape-recording can invalidate it.
Nevertheless, it would be prudent to read the transcript before sending the Answer for publication.

The Question's reference to James Adams may be an attempt to seek confirmation of the part played by him in having Mr Penrose's story withdrawn. Mr Adams seems to have acted with propriety throughout.
D/GS Sec/66/13/1

21 February 1990

PS/Min(AF)
Copy to:
APS/SofS
PS/USofS(AF)
PS/PUS
DUS(CM)
AUS(C)
CPR
Head of Sec(NATO/UK)(C)

External copies to:
Miss Phippard - Cabinet Secretariat
Mr Rickard - NIO
Mr Ackland - Home Office (please copy to Mr Muir - FCO
Mrs Marsh - LOD
Mrs Goldsworthy - Lord President's Office

WALLACE: SUNDAY TIMES TAPE

You will wish to have the attached copy of a statement issued by the Sunday Times about information obtained from General Leng.

2. The statement is generally 'good news'. But please note that there is a possible 'sting' in the last sentence. I think we may reasonably assume that Mr Dalyell and others will obtain a copy of the tape and dredge it for phrases about which to ask further questions. I have asked CPR's office to obtain a copy of the tape and propose to listen to it as soon as it is available.

W P Cassell
Head of GS Sec
MB5137 3299MB
has been suggested by several politicians in the House of Commons that under pressure from the MoD. The Sunday Times pulled a story about the Colin Mair affair from its first edition last Saturday night. That is untrue. They do so. The facts are as follows.

The Sunday Times first edition contained a page one story "General backs volkswagen claims" in which it was said that General Sir Peter Leng, Commander of forces in Northern Ireland from 1973 to 1975, confirmed the existence of Clockwork Orange and, further, claimed that it had been authorised by the Northern Ireland Office.

After the first edition went to press the MoD issued a statement which said at we had either distorted or misunderstood what the general had said. The general, said the MoD, had confirmed to the ministry that he had said neither the two statements attributed to him by The Sunday Times.

My reaction was simple: the MoD, realising the import of what the general had said, had got him to retract his statements as part of a damage limitation exercise. Luckily, I thought, two telephone conversations with the general had been tape recorded.

I asked to listen to the recordings so that I could pick the best quotes from a general in order to refute the MoD rebuttal. But after listening to the tapes I was forced to conclude that the general had neither confirmed Clockwork Orange nor its official authorisation. I had no choice, therefore, but to withdraw the story from all future editions of The Sunday Times, and issued corrections to that effect at 8.15pm Saturday night. At no stage did the MoD request any other official body ask for the story to be withdrawn, or put any pressure, directly or indirectly, on The Sunday Times to do so. The decision was taken for purely journalistic reasons, above all for reasons of accuracy. Full transcripts of the two interviews with the general are being prepared and will be made available to interested MPs.

(E.O.0)
Sir Patrick Wright GCMG
Permanent Under-Secretary of State

Sir Michael Quinlan KCB
Ministry of Defence

23 February 1990

Dear Michael,

WALLACE

1. Thank you for your letter of 15 February in which you asked whether material about the Wallace affair might still be lying undiscovered in this Department.

2. We have since seen a copy of Rucker's letter of 16 February to Len Appleyard, referring to a review of papers held by MOD, MI5 and the Security Service and indicating that FCO files might shed further light on events in the early 1970s because of IRD activities at the time. We are arranging access to this report urgently to double check that there are no new leads and I will write to you again when this is done. In the meantime I can confirm that we have made a very thorough check of the former IRD archive which was transferred to the Library and Records Department here in 1977 and to other IRD related papers still in the FCO. All leads relating however remotely to the Wallace affair have been thoroughly examined and the results passed to the MOD. In the unlikely event that the Rucker Report leads us to further papers we shall of course let you know immediately.

3. In your letter of 19 February you asked that we check with Hugh Mooney and [PROTECTION OF IDENTITY] on their recollection of events in 1974. We have been over the ground thoroughly with Hugh Mooney. He is adamant that he was not aware of any disinformation activity directed against Ministers; but we have asked him to reflect further whether he might have any relevant knowledge. [PROTECTION OF IDENTITY] has told us that in his role as Assistant Secretary (Political Affairs) he had no official dealings at all with Wallace or his information activities, and knew him only slightly. Our contacts with other officials concerned with possibly relevant aspects of IRD operations in the early 1970s have /similarly

ID7AAI
simply revealed no pertinent information. Needless to say, should any relevant information emerge from further contacts with individuals, I will let you and others concerned know.

Patrick Wright

cc: Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO
    Cabinet Office

Sir Clive Whitmore GCB CVO
    Home Office

Sir John Blelloch KCB
    Northern Ireland Office
WALLACE: THE RUCKER REPORT

1. Please refer to the Rucker Report, paragraph 44, and my letters referred to therein. Paragraph 44 refers to Cameron's surmise that SIS officer B might have had dealings with WALLACE.

2. Cameron based his surmise on recollections that after taking over as HQMI in 1974, he had found a few files for journalists who had been given codenames with some reference to WALLACE but little else in the files. These aroused his suspicion at the time and it lodged in his mind. I felt it proper to let you know of this doubt at the time but we have continued extensive researches to ascertain the facts. We have now done so. Far from establishing any professional operational relationship between SIS Officer B and WALLACE, our research has produced strong circumstantial evidence that there was none. I think we have found the explanation of the files Cameron recalled. Four journalists had been given codenames by the Army as they were contacts run by PR/HQMI, principally by Colin WALLACE. Information obtained from these contacts was passed by PR/HQMI to G3 Int. HQMI and drawn on for G Int's intelligence summaries. After WALLACE had moved, the system whereby information from these sources went to G Int, was suspended. At that time there was clear indication that the journalists had not been approached by the agencies. Moreover, WALLACE produced a list of all his journalist contacts, the terms of which established that none of these contacts was in contact with the agencies. It is clear from these exchanges that the journalist files were not the subject of professional co-operation between SIS Officer B and WALLACE.

A G Rucker Esq
AUS (SCS) MOD
Metropole Building
Northumberland Avenue
3. On this basis I will be grateful if you will remove the reference in paragraph [redacted] to Cameron's suspicions about [redacted] which are now found to have no foundation.

Copied to: S L Rickard, NIO London
D M Ackland, Home Office
Ms Sonia Phippard, Cabinet Office
NOTE

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: KINCORA, McGRATH AND THE ARMY

1. This minute summarises the documents which appear to show that the Army was aware of McGrath’s homosexuality, of his links with Kincora or of possible knowledge of the homosexual abuse of residents there. Refer also to 66/13/1P E42 and 66/13/1Q E31.

Documents 1 and 2

2. The earliest documents which have been identified are military intelligence reports prepared in 1973 by Capt H of the UDR (doc 2) which were apparently primarily concerned with McGrath and TARA. No copies have been traced (see Annex J, para 16 of Rucker report). However, it is understood that in statements made to the RUC in 1982 both officers indicated that they had been told that McGrath was a homosexual and was employed at a boys’ home (whose name they had not been told).

Documents 3 and 4

3. At para 329 the Rucker report states that security service records refer to information on McGrath held by the DCI STAFF in 1973. This was mentioned in an intelligence report (Doc 3) of September 1973 from the Army liaison officer at RUC HQ and was apparently based on RUC Special Branch information. This stated that McGrath was a boy’s hostel warden and “apparently homosexual”. Rucker also mentions at para 329 a later intelligence report (doc 4) in November 1973 which said simply that McGrath was a social worker at Kincora Hostel. No copy of either of these documents appears to have survived.

Document 5

4. The document (doc 5) reproduced at page 292 of the Foot book (press briefing notes on TARA) is also said to have been written in 1973. The document’s provenance has not been confirmed, and no copy has been found on files. However, Mr (the then Head of Secretariat, HQNI) believes that it is consistent in format and content with it having been prepared by Army intelligence officers. The handwriting appears to be that of (amongst others) Peter Broderick, Lt Col Pack and Mr Wallace.

5. That document says of McGrath:

“he is a known homosexual ...... and also runs a home for children on the Upper Newtownards Road .... Other people closely associated with McGrath and aware of his activities are Thomas Passmore, Rev Paisley, Rev Martin Smith, James Holyneaux and Sir Knox Cunningham QC, MP.”
6. There is no indication that that document was prepared as an expose of TARA as Foot claims (page 93), still less to expose homosexual abuse at Kincora (which is not mentioned).

Document 6

7. On 30 July 1986 Wallace sent to Mr Freeman (the then US of S(AR)) a photocopy of three pages of manuscript notes (doc 6) about TARA (the historical origins of the name etc) which he said he had written in 1974 as part of a press briefing aide memoire. He asked whether the MOD regarded those notes, which did not refer to Kincora or homosexuality, as genuine. It has not proved possible to make a meaningful assessment of the notes' authenticity, nor has any copy been found on MOD files.

Document 7

8. An intelligence report (doc 7) written by Maj C G GSO3 Int at HQNI on 6 July 1974 survived (see Rucker report para 333a) and a copy was given to the RUC during their investigations in 1982. This says that McGrath was CO of TARA, lived at 5 Greenwood Avenue, Upper Newtownards Rd and was a reputed homosexual. Kincora is not mentioned.

Document 8

9. It is understood that another intelligence report (doc 8) was written about TARA on the same day by Sg t A a Field Intelligence NCO, and was passed to the RUC in 1982. It referred to a Prank (sic) McGrath, but not to homosexuality or to Kincora.

Document 9A and 9B

10. Wallace claims to have written a memorandum about McGrath, Kincora etc on 8 November 1974. A copy of the memorandum (doc 9A) was passed to the Essex police on 21 November 1984 and is reproduced at Annex G to the Rucker report. According to Wallace a copy of a different version of the memorandum (doc 9B) was also included in the file sent to the Prime Minister on 1 November 1984. In a letter of 20 June 1986 to Min (DS) Wallace said that the main difference was that the references quoted in the two versions were different (see Rucker report, footnote 427). No copy of the final version, as sent to the Prime Minister, has been traced.

11. The provenance of the documents has not been established. No memorandum fitting Mr Wallace's description appears to have been shown to the Terry inquiry, and it is not specifically referred to in the "Political and Security Implications..." paper which was allegedly written in March 1982. (The relevant sections are on pages 5, 7 et seq, but Wallace might argue that there was no need to make specific reference to such a memorandum at that time). A copy of the memorandum (doc 9A) which was sent
to the Essex police was given to the Hughes Committee. The Committee's report cast doubt on its authenticity, partly because the RUC forensic scientists suggested that two different typewriters may have been used, and because none of the potential recipients could confirm having seen it. That version of the memorandum (doc 9A) states, in manuscript that it was addressed to Lt Col Railton in response to a request from Gen Langan or Col...

12. The memorandum sent to the Essex police (doc 9A) contains more specific statements relevant to possible knowledge of homosexual abuse at Kincora than other documents on file or in Foot's book. It says, inter alia:

    "...stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels... The Kincora hostel in Newtonards Road where he [McGrath] works... He does not, as the paper claims, "run the hostel" - he is employed as a 'housefather'. The Warden of Kincora is Joseph Mains and the Deputy Warden is Raymond Semple... Both men are known homosexuals..."

13. In addition at para 5 it refers directly to "allegations of assaults on the inmates" in a context which makes it clear that the author believed the RUC to be aware of the allegations. In typical Wallace phraseology the subsequent paragraphs refer to allegations without being specific as to what they are.

14. There are a number of reasons for thinking that the Essex police memorandum (doc 9A) may not be genuine (see the Rucker report paras 347 & 348). It should be noted, for example, that the memorandum refers to an "RUC background paper on TARA", whose existence the RUC has not been able to confirm (see 66/11/1 Pt Q E31).

Documents 10A - B

15. Some information on TARA et al was given to the press in the mid-1970s: it has not been possible to confirm exactly what may have been covered, or the dates when it was passed to journalists. However, David Mckittrick has produced a document (doc 10A) which he claims he was given at Lisburn during that period. A second version (with a manuscript addition) (doc 10B) was given to the RUC in 1982 from HQNI files. The documents name McGrath as the CO of TARA and state that he is "said to be a homosexual". There is no mention of Kincora.

Document 11

16. On 26 February 1975 Maj C wrote a further minute (doc 11) about McGrath. This said "subject first came to notice in April 1973 .... Enquiries with PR HQNI indicated that McGrath was homosexual and had Communist tendencies.... By Oct 73 further reports confirmed that McGrath was homosexual...." There is no mention of Kincora, or of his being employed at a boys' home.
However, this document does contain the paragraph which may suggest that McGrath was an intelligence source: "An intelligent though devious man, who needs extremely careful "handling". I do not at present fully trust him but he is undoubtedly a mine of useful information on past incidents, organisations and personalities". Once again, a copy of this document was given to the RUC in 1982.

Document 12 and 13

17. The Rucker report refers (para 329) to an report (doc 12) of March 1975 based on a report (doc 13) from HQ 39 Bde to the Assistant Secretary (Political) at HQNI. It described McGrath as the warden of the hostel, giving its full address, and said that he had had a homosexual affair with Roy Garland. There is no reference to homosexual activities by McGrath at Kincora.

Document 14

18. It is understood that in 1982 Capt Brian Gemmell (123 Int Section, 39 Inf Bde) told the RUC that in 1975/6 he had prepared a Military Intelligence Source Report (doc 14) based on information from Garland. No copy has been traced of the MISR but, from the information given to the RUC, it would appear to have covered McGrath's homosexuality and his employment at a boys home of which Gemmell knew the location (which he visited) but could not remember being told the name.

Document 15

19. A further report (doc 15), written on 28 January 1976 by Maj Halford-Macleod of HQ 3 Inf Bde, was based on information from an unnamed informant, and on documents in the possession of a Maj H of 3 UDR. This report (doc 15) includes the statements "McGrath is a homosexual and makes a practice of seducing promising young men" and "He is thought to be running some form of boys' home" (see Rucker report para 332). In his statement to the RUC in 1982 Maj Halford-Macleod had no recollection of having been given the name of the boys home at which McGrath worked.

Documents 16 and 17

20. It is believed that the "Folio document" (doc 16) first appeared in 1976, but its origin is uncertain (see letter from Sir Phillip Woodfield to Sir Frank Cooper, dated 11 Mar 1982 at 66/13/1 Pt N E89). This 1976 version does not refer to McGrath or Kincora. A further version (doc 17) was circulated later although it is not clear when; it is understood that a statement made by a journalist (John Hunter) to the RUC in 1982 would suggest that this was in 1981/2. Doc 17 included an introduction which said that the document was "part of an intelligence report given to British Army Intelligence by McGrath (Head of Kincora Boys' Home)". It added "A Social Worker employed by the Eastern
KIN-185019

Health Board sent a letter to the editor of the Belfast Telegraph 2½ years ago expressing the whole Kincora affair and the homosexual relationships involving prominent people who had influence over the Health Board”.

Documents 18 and 19

21. No other documents appear to have been prepared before the story broke in 1980. In 1982 HONI prepared a summary (doc 18) of the information then available on file. The author does not appear to have made a critical evaluation of the reliability of the reports available to him, apparently accepting them at face value. It includes a statement that “There does seem to be truth in these assertions” that the Army and RUC knew about Kincora before the mid-70s and that several RUC and other investigations were blocked.

22. The summary says that Kincora was identified by name on file for the first time in January 1977: that source document (doc 19) has not been identified. Also the summary says that the information given, to McKittrick by Wallace was on file (this may be doc 10B referred to at para 13 above whose origin is not actually certain) and that this said that McGrath was homosexual and OC TARA, but not that he was employed at Kincora or that he was involved in any vice rings.

Document 20 and 21

23. Wallace’s paper “Political and Security Implications…” (doc 20) is dated March 1982 and is said (in the introduction) to have been prepared as evidence for the Terry Inquiry. In it Wallace says that he first learnt of “the situation” at Kincora in early 1972. The paper refers specifically to sexual assaults on residents at Kincora by members of staff, and specifically by McGrath. McGrath was already known to Wallace from ‘P’ and ‘O’ files. Wallace claims to have raised the story with a member of Intelligence staff at HONI at the time, but to no avail. He alleges also that in 1973 he was given a written brief (doc 21) on McGrath and his “activities” which he was asked to get journalists to investigate, but again without success: this may be doc 5, referred to at paras 4 – 6 above. He makes no mention of the memorandum allegedly written in November 1974 (see para 9).

SUMMARY

24. It is clear that in 1973 intelligence sources had received information about McGrath’s reputed homosexuality, and his employment at a boys’ home, and by March 1975 this had been identified as Kincora (see para 15). Whilst later reports refer to McGrath’s homosexuality and employment in a boys’ home, Kincora would appear to be specifically identified in only one subsequent (1977) document (which has not been traced – see para 22 above) prior to the story breaking in 1980.
25. The only document which makes reference to the homosexual abuse of residents at Kincora is that allegedly written by Wallace in November 1974 (doc 9A and 9B). For a number of reasons (see para 12) that document must be regarded as suspect.
INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.

2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service’s response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service’s Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.

3. The Secret Intelligence Service, often referred to as MI6, was established in 1909 as the Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau. Until 1994, SIS did not have a statutory basis and its existence was not publicly confirmed. In 1992, SIS was formally avowed in 1992 and was put on a statutory basis with the Intelligence Services Act 1994.

4. The role of SIS, as set out in the Intelligence Services Act 1994, is to provide Her Majesty's Government with a global covert capability that facilitates the collection of secret intelligence and mount operations overseas to promote and defend the national security and economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, and to prevent and detect serious crime.

5. Following the increase in the threat of Republican terrorism in early 1972, the Irish Joint Section (IJS) was established in response to a request for more information from the province by the Permanent Secretary in the newly established Northern Ireland Office (NIO), Sir William Nield. The IJS was established by the Security Service (MIS) and SIS, with jointly staffed offices in Belfast and London.
117. I have signed this statement with the personal identification number 9004. This is a unique number issued to me by MI5 for the purposes of identifying myself without disclosing my full identity. This is a necessary practice for security reasons, and the only publicly named individual within MI5 is the Director General. Records held by MI5 link my true identity to my personal identification number.

Some Background on MI5 in Northern Ireland

118. Since 2007, MI5 has had lead responsibility for counter-terrorist intelligence work in Northern Ireland, in close co-operation with PSNI. However, during the 1970s MI5’s presence was much smaller. MI5 had a single liaison officer attached to the RUC in 1969. Following the imposition of Direct Rule in 1972 the post of ‘Director and Coordinator of Intelligence’ (DCI) was created within the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) at Stormont. Whilst the first incumbent of the DCI post was not from MI5, every subsequent post-holder was seconded from MI5 to the NIO. DCIs never directed intelligence operations in Northern Ireland, but acted as the Secretary of State’s main advisor on intelligence matters, and sought to provide strategic coordination of the intelligence effort. DCI also established an analytical staff comprised of seconded MI5 personnel who were responsible for the production of strategic intelligence summaries and assessments.

119. DCI also had senior liaison officers at RUC HQ and Army HQ Lisburn. This latter post was known as the Assistant Secretary (Political), or ASP. In the early 1970s, one of the functions of the ASP post was to provide some guidance for the Army’s nascent efforts in gathering intelligence from human sources in a civil conflict. This was prior to the establishment of the Forces Research Unit (FRU) in 1982, after which the ASP role became less hands on and more advisory in nature.

120. Another related unit set up in 1972, although not under the direct control of DCI, was the Irish Joint Section comprising a small number of Security Service and SIS agent running officers focused on obtaining strategic and political intelligence about the plans and intentions of paramilitary organisations.
117. I have signed this statement with the personal identification number 9004. This is a unique number issued to me by MI5 for the purposes of identifying myself without disclosing my full identity. This is a necessary practice for security reasons, and the only publicly named individual within MI5 is the Director General. Records held by MI5 link my true identity to my personal identification number.

**Some Background on MI5 in Northern Ireland**

118. Since 2007, MI5 has had lead responsibility for counter-terrorist intelligence work in Northern Ireland, in close co-operation with PSNI. However, during the 1970s MI5's presence was much smaller. MI5 had a single liaison officer attached to the RUC in 1969. Following the imposition of Direct Rule in 1972 the post of 'Director and Coordinator of Intelligence' (DCI) was created within the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) at Stormont. Whilst the first incumbent of the DCI post was not from MI5, every subsequent post-holder was seconded from MI5 to the NIO. DCIs never directed intelligence operations in Northern Ireland, but acted as the Secretary of State's main advisor on intelligence matters, and sought to provide strategic coordination of the intelligence effort. DCI also established an analytical staff comprised of seconded MI5 personnel who were responsible for the production of strategic intelligence summaries and assessments.

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Special Branch Office,
P.O. Station,
Castlereagh,
Belfast.

24th November, 1969.

To the Inspector General.

Sir,

I refer to your letter dated 16th November 1969.

In pursuance of your letter I have to inform you that the name of the person mentioned in your letter is: 

Kieran redditch, 4 greenwood avenue, belfast, 19 years, is not suspected of being a member of any illegal organisation or the communist party.

I visited the above mentioned premises where Kieran redditch works on the pretext of looking at a tape recorder. I got into a friendly conversation with him regarding recent troubles. At the time I was talking to redditch he was wearing the adc badge he had stated in the letter received by the Inspector General. I told him of my identity and asked him if he was a member of the said organisation. He told me he was not and had never been asked to join one. redditch told me that about 3 years ago he bought the badge in smithfield market for 45. It states that a dealer recently offered him £2.0 for it.

It is one of the early adc badges dating back around the early 1960's and the only reason he wore it is because of its rarity and that few of these badges are now to be had.

I cautioned redditch about wearing this badge and told him that the organisation known as the adc volunteer force was now an illegal organisation and by wearing same he would bring himself unfairly under notice and may cause offence in certain parts of the city. He apologised for wearing the badge and told me he would remove it from his coat, which he did in my presence.

From my conversation with this young man I feel that from what he told me, and which I believe there is no political significance in his wearing the badge.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

PSNI Docs - annotation
Added by the HIA Inquiry.
7. 7.1966 - Enquiry to D/Constable... re above-named who is known to have been on the platform at one of the Rev. Paisley's rallies in the Ulster Hall. See BCS.12/76
5. 8.1966 - D/Const. reports that above-named is Secretary of the Christian Fellowship and Irish Emancipation Crusade, 15 Wellington Park, Belfast, which is a pro-loyalist organisation and every opportunity is taken to display the Union Jack from its premises. Particulars of this man's family is also given. See BCS.12/35.

McGARTH, William Worthington  
4 Greenwood Avenue,  
Belfast.

D.O.B: 1950.  
Occ: Shop Assistant.

5.11.1969 - Per I.G. - an anon. letter has received by the I.G. regarding a/h who wears a badge with the letters U.V.F. thereon. See BCS.5/11
7.11.1969 - To I.G. - a/h is the person concerned. There is no political significance in the wearing of the badge. See BCS.5/11
16. Periods of service, if any, in H.M. Forces and particulars of rank:

\[ \text{None} \]

17. Have you given an undertaking which is still in force, to remain in the service of an Employing Body for a specified time? If so, please give details:

\[ \text{No} \]

18. Are you related to any Alderman, Councillor, Official or employee of the Belfast Corporation? If so, give details:

\[ \text{No} \]

19. Any other information you may wish to give in support of your application:

I have been self-employed most of my life in the Carpet Import business. In recent years I have developed an allergy to Carpet fibres (that is, the handling of them in bulk) that has compelled me to seek a new way of life. My position with Brian Morton is my present step but I would prefer something that would provide a deeper sense of vocation. This has always been an essential part of my life. When self-employed there was ample outlet for this.

Sincerely,

[Signature] William H. O'Boyle
would pay half the purchase price [to GARLAND] which he never did". GARLAND later took McGrath to Court in February 1972 to recoup the £1280.40.

6 Analysis of GARLAND’s accusations against William McGrath

The table below shows that from the early 1970s and following an acrimonious dispute over a £1200 loan, Roy GARLAND made a number of allegations against William McGrath to numerous individuals/organisations. These include individuals within the RUC, British Army, Social Services, Orange Order and a number of religious bodies. In the five year period between 1971 and 1976, GARLAND made repeated attempts to expose McGrath’s homosexuality and his exploitation of others. GARLAND’s ‘campaign’ against McGrath appears to have ceased in 1976.

The most detailed accounts of GARLAND’s accusations against McGrath were made to James McCormick and D/Con James Cullen. There are indications that Roy GARLAND told close family members, including his father and wife, of his accusations against McGrath. The main allegations levelled against McGrath by GARLAND were:

- McGrath was a homosexual
- He had indecently assaulted GARLAND
- He was involved in a homosexual/vice ring
- He had abused other boys he had met through religious or political circles, as well as lodgers to the McGrath family home
- He was employed in a Boys’ Home [Kincora]
- GARLAND also alleged that McGrath may have sexually abused women.

Whilst many individuals confirm that GARLAND had told them of McGrath’s employment at Kincora, there is only one reference to him abusing Kincora boys in the table below (see anonymous call to Social Services, January 1974). GARLAND told a number of people of his allegations against McGrath; the key individuals are listed in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details of GARLAND’s accusations re: McGrath</th>
<th>GARLAND’s motivation for exposing McGrath</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Jim McCormick | c. 1972 | - McGrath had made a homosexual approach to GARLAND in the 1960s  
- McGrath was employed in Kincora  
- McGrath used him [GARLAND] as a ‘facilitator’ in arranging for boys to be brought to McGrath for treatment for emotional blocks  
- McGrath’s method of treating the boys involved inducing them into homosexual acts [with McGrath]  
- GARLAND claimed he had brought 20 boys to McGrath in the 1960s  
- McGrath used similar techniques to abuse women | GARLAND had sued McGrath for over £2000. |

7 See Exhibit DBE16, part of C64/2/80  
8 The Gazette 21/2/72 published a record showing McGrath was required to pay off a debt of £1280.40 to GARLAND  
10 Statements of J McCormick, 30/04/1980 and 10/03/1982...
CHESHIRE CONSTABULARY

Occurrence No.  
Divisional File No. 
(Date)  

18th December 1971

From:—  
Te:—  

Manchester (Ringway) Airport Special Branch Unit.

Examined and submitted

Report re:— CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP CENTRE AND IRISH EMANCIPATION CRUSADE  
(founded 1941)  4 Greenwood Avenue, Belfast 4.

1. After 4.0 p.m., Friday, 17th December 1971, copies of a leaflet issued by the above organisation were found in various parts of this Airport.

2. The organisation appears to be Protestant, and the leaflet contains a message for the Protestants of England. It is boldly headed "ULSTER'S BATTLE TODAY WILL BE ENGLAND'S BATTLE TOMORROW". Briefly the message claims that Ireland is being attacked by Catholics so that Ireland can be used as a base for the Catholics to attack English Protestantism.

3. A search of Special Branch Records, New Scotland Yard, revealed a similar organisation - Christian Fellowship Centre, 400/43/51 - had been on record, but the file has since been destroyed.

4. A search of Special Branch, Royal Ulster Constabulary, revealed that the address on the leaflet is false, and that they had no knowledge of this organisation.

5. A search of the Airport was carried out for the distributor, but with negative results.

6. Copies of the leaflet are attached.


Detective constable  
Manchester & Salford Police

Submitted:  Finucane by this instrument  
4 Assistant Superintendent Surrey  
 Detective Inspector

CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT
KIN-55014

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL

as was issued that year by McGrath which spoke of resolved conflicts that could develop between the “children of God” and their enemies.

In September 1966, McGrath, goddaughter of the late Father John Black, visited his home to discuss loyalism, unity, and the Church. He was joined by Fr. Jack Black, William McCloskey, Harry Weir, Dr Norman Laird, Desmond Black, Brian Dunlop, and others. McGrath told me that, although he had agreed to attend except Norman Laird, who appeared to have had second thoughts, he did not have to leave the cancellation of the meeting. However, some loyalist groups subsequently were known to have visited McGrath for meetings at his home; some of the loyalist groups apparently were told that the present leader of the Official Unionist Party, Call for Platoons

At a special Tara meeting in the summer of 1969, it was decided that a Rotating machine should be purchased to produce literature to promote the cause. Paisley’s “say-so” was the basis of an agreement that guarantors for about £400 would be needed to secure the machine. Although the loan was to be secured through a financial intermediary who was a Tara member, I only know that the machine was never produced on this machine, a call for Platoons of 20 men to be formed for the protection of loyalist areas in August 1971 (see box). This was written by McGrath and the “chain command” referred to was Tara’s organisation.

Many loyalists felt under considerable threat during the winter of 1969-70 and it is not surprising that McGrath and Paisley were talking about the need for a "People’s Militia." What is surprising is that at the height of this violence, McGrath, Paisley, and myself and a man called Black from Armagh were talking to the police. When interviewed by RUC Headquarters in "The Clonsilla Club" about this, it was during the early hours of Thursday, August 5th, 1969. We were demanding that the "Sparrowhawks" and the "People’s Militia" be formed. This arose out of a meeting largely attended by leaders of Protestant Ulster Constitution Defence

Statement from Tara distributed in working class areas of Belfast on 12th August, 1971.

Being convinced that the enemies of our Faith and Freedom are determined to push us back into the wilderness, we call on all members of the loyalist organisations, and other responsible citizens, to organise themselves immediately into a People’s Militia. This body will be capable of acting as a Police Force. Every effort must be made to arm these platoons with whatever weapons are available to them. The first duty of each platoon will be to disarm and capture any Catholics attempting to armed insurrection. A strict structure of Command is already in existence and the various platoons will be linked to an co-ordinated effort.

Instruct: You are to take whatever steps necessary to avoid conflict with Her Majesty's Forces or the Police. If through wrong political direction your platoon is directed against loyalist people, members of platoons must do everything possible to prevent a confrontation. We, the loyalists, are Queen's subjects! Our enemies are the forces of Roman Catholicism and Communism. Members of platoons must act with the highest sense of responsibility and urgency in preparing our people for the full assault of the enemies within and without. The battleplan called for by Ulster Constitution Defence...
as was, that year-by-year McGrath which spoke of a deep conflict and tension in the relationship between the “children of God” and their enemies.

In September 1999, McGrath, still in the shadow of the peace process, met with the UVF and the Ulster Volunteer Force at a meeting in Kincora House, Co. Antrim. At the meeting, McGrath explained to UVF leaders that he had received a message from the UVF, informing him that they had been in the process of writing a letter to the Government of Ireland, stating that “Unionist party members were in the UDA, UVF, and Ulster loyalist paramilitary groups”.

The meeting was also attended by the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Ian Paisley. Paisley was clear that the UVF and the Ulster loyalist paramilitary groups were not a part of the peace process and that they were not interested in engaging in any form of dialogue with the Government of Ireland.

The meeting concluded with the UVF leaders agreeing to issue a statement condemning the actions of the loyalist paramilitary groups and their involvement in the conflict.

Call for platoons

With the Special Vanguard meeting in the summer of 1999, it was decided that a platoon would be formed to promote the cause. Paisley issued a call for volunteers to form a platoon, which would be formed to promote the cause.

The platoon would be a group of 20 men, to be formed from the ranks of loyalists in the area. The platoon would be known as the “20th Special Vanguard” and would be under the command of a man named John Smith.

The platoon would be responsible for carrying out operations to promote the cause, including disrupting meetings of loyalists and other activities.

The platoon would have the backing of Paisley and his Ulster Unionist Party, and would be seen as a symbol of the commitment of loyalists to the cause.

Statement from Tara

In 1971, Tara was the starting point of the Irish republican movement. The statement from Tara was a call for action to promote the cause and to bring about a new era of progress for the Republic of Ireland.

The statement was signed by the leaders of the Republican Movement and was widely distributed among the people.

It stated: “We, the leaders of the Republican Movement, call on the people of Ireland to rise up and fight for our freedom. We demand the establishment of a Republic of Ireland, where all the people of Ireland are equal and free.

Politically, this means the end of British rule in Ireland. We demand the establishment of a Republic of Ireland, where all the people of Ireland are equal and free.”

The statement was signed by the leaders of the Republican Movement and was widely distributed among the people.

Soul of Ireland

My duty as second-in-command in Tara was to carry the central message to the people. The central message was: “We demand the establishment of a Republic of Ireland, where all the people of Ireland are equal and free.”

The message was delivered to the people of Ireland through the media and in meetings with leaders of the Republican Movement.

The message was received with enthusiasm by the people of Ireland and was widely supported.

In conclusion, the establishment of a Republic of Ireland is the only way to secure the future of our people. We demand the establishment of a Republic of Ireland, where all the people of Ireland are equal and free.”

(More tomorrow)
McGRATH, William Worthington, 4 Greenwood Avenue, Belfast.

D.O.B: 1950.
Occ: Shop Assistant.

5.11.1969 - Per I.G's Reference Number - an anon. letter has received by the I.G. regarding a/n who wears a badge with the letters U.V.F. thereon. See BCS.5/1.

27.11.1969 - To I.G. - a/n is the person concerned. There is no political significance in the wearing of the badge. See BCS.5/11

7.7.1966 - Enquiry to D/Constable [redacted] re above-named who is known to have been on the platform at one of the Rev. Paisley's rallies in the Ulster Hall. See BCS.12/5.

5.8.1966 - D/Const. [redacted] reports that above-named is Secretary of the Christian Fellowship and Irish Emancipation Crusade, 15 Wellington Park which is a pro-loyalist organisation and every opportunity is Union Jack from its premises. Particulars of this man’s See BCS.12/55.
PART 1

JOIN A DEFENCES ORGANISATION WHICH HE AGREED TO DO AND ATTENDED A MEETING IN JUNE.

A. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN THE MOUNTAIN AND WAS ATTENDED BY ABOUT 50 MEMBERS OF THE ORGANISATION ON THE CONDITION OF THEIR SPONSORS. A PREREQUISITE TO ENTER THE ORGANISATION WAS MEMBERSHIP OF THE LOCAL ORGAN ISMT.

ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL SOURCES, A "POLICE COUNTRY" THIS Brought THE NUMBER OF NEW APPOINTEES TO THIS DATE DURING THE LAST MONTH TO ENOUGH PERSONS.

B. THE ORGANISATION, WHICH APPEARS TO REPRESENT ALL AREAS OF THE PROVINCE HAS THE TITLE "THE KAHRE BRIGADE" WHICH, IT WAS EXPLAINED LITERALLY TRANSLATED AS THE "KING'S BRIGADE" BUT WHICH THEY WOULD TAKE TO MEAN THE QUEEN'S BRIGADE. MCCRATH EXPLAINED THE AIMS OF THE ORGANISATION AS THE PREPARATION OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENCE FORCE AGAINST THE DAY WHEN IT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO UNDERTAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION BUT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT DRILL AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE WORK.

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

added by the HIA Inquiry
Subject: "Tara Brigade"

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL

In recent times we have had intelligence to the effect that a Protestant/
Loyalist organisation known as the "Tara Brigade" exist in the Province. This
organisation is reported to operate on a platoon basis each with a membership of twenty
including a platoon sergeant and three N.C.O.s in charge respectively
of transport, finance and weapons.

A prerequisite of membership of this organisation is prior membership of the
Loyal Order and new recruits must be sponsored. The main aim has been
described as the preparation of an effective defence against the day when it
would be required and those joining it have been told they will not be required
to undertake offensive action but would have to carry out drill and a certain
amount of intelligence work.

Members of this organisation are required to subscribe a fixed sum, every
month, of which a certain percentage goes towards the purchase of arms and
ammunition but the platoons are responsible for providing, as far as possible,
their own weapons (refitted to as washing machines, sawing machines and other
domestic appliances) these being stored in de-centralised places.

There has been a suggestion that firearms should be purchased from
sympathetic persons holding them legally on Firearms Certificates and a bogus
fly leaf set up to cover the owner when he is called to account for the weapon.

Areas where we have been told that platoons of the "Tara Brigade" already
exist are Newtownards (fully organised), Ballymoney, Rathcoole, Larne,
Cookstown and Belfast.

Most of those involved in this organisation are described as middle-aged
family men, mainly from the middle class, and there appears to be no criminal or
new criminal elements amongst them. The average age of persons being recruited
to platoon sergeant is said to be between the late thirties and early fifties
and includes members of the S.O.A. and ex-Servicemen, preferably ex-army.

It is not known if the attached leaflet, which is being widely circulated,
is a Tara product but it fits in with the foregoing description. There is also
some similarity in reports reaching us of other groups of Protestant vigilantes
and Defence Associations being formed.

Give this matter close attention. Where confirmation already exists report
immediately. Where it does not, developments should be reported as they come
to hand.

The security of this alert and its contents should be carefully safeguarded
and nothing done which might jeopardise the material already available to us.
Subject: George McGRATH, Special Branch

SB Number

Recent intelligence indicates the existence of a new Protestant/Loyalist group in Northern Ireland whose stated aim is the preparation of an 'offensive defense force against the day when it would be required'. It has not to date been identified with the U.U.C. associations or any of the other well known Loyalist groups.

The organisation is reported to exist in various areas of the Province and the 'officer commanding' is a man called McGRATH.

It has been suggested that this person might be identical with George McGRATH, ... Dungannon, but when ... was given a copy of the attached photograph of George McGRATH he commented that McGRATH, the 'officer commanding' of the organisation had similar features but had thinner hair on top, approaching baldness, wore glasses and is about 50 years of age. His remaining hair is a light sandy colour and he is thinner in the face then the person in the photograph. He is about 5’ 7” tall.

The photograph is about four years old and the appearance of George McGRATH of Dungannon may have altered in the intervening period. In view of this have a very close look at his recent activities and let us have an early report of what you have learned, for example, does he travel 'in-and-out' with any regularity, with whom he is presently associating - in other words is there anything to indicate that he is the person we are endeavouring to identify.

Turn your thoughts also to the fact that if he is the leader of the 'Group' you are likely to have a strong local branch of this organisation. In other words...
The Director General,
Box No. 980,
Parliament Street B.O.,
London, S.W.1, G.B.

24th September, 1972.

Dear Sir,

George McGRATH, Superintendent

Reference your reports dated 4th September and 5th September respectively, I attach two copies of a recent photograph of McGRATH in which he is wearing glasses.

1. If these were shown to it might assist in identifying or eliminating McGRATH.

2. We would appreciate details of any identification made.

Yours faithfully,

SB6

Enc.
KIN-55113

ON SUFFOLK LONDON

ROUTINE

REPORT NUMBER:


PART I

REFERENCE S.B. R.U.C. LETTER DATED 24.7.71

THE MORE RECENT PHOTOGRAPH OF MCGRATH SUPPLIED BY THE R.U.C.

WAS SHOWN TO ON 21 OCTOBER 1971. COMMENTED THAT WHILST

CERTAIN FEATURES WERE SIMILAR TO THE MCGRATH WHO WAS HEAD OF THE TARA

BRIGADE THAT MCGRATH HAD MUCH THINNER AND STRAIGHTER HAIR AND COULD

NOT, THEREFORE, BE IDENTICAL WITH THE MCGRATH IN THIS PHOTOGRAPH.

PART II

PART III

DOCUMENTS BY CONSUMER SECTION. (VALUE, INTEREST, PROBABILITY, EXTENT

TO WHICH CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES, ETC.).

COPY TO D.I.:

SEN BY:

RECEIVED BY:
Part I

Section and Officer of origin: 

Action copy to: 

Information copy to: 

Typing Date: 

The Tama Brigade

Further to the report number dated 14.6.71.

2. Attached to this report are two photographs, plus two copies of each: the one marked (a) is of George Johnson, one unmarked. The source has confirmed, on being shown these photographs, that his report on (a) was that the George 854 7/M, the commanding officer of the Tama Brigade, had much thinner hair on top, approaching baldness, wears glasses and is about 50 years old. His remaining hair is a light sandy colour. He is thinner in the face than in the photograph and is about 5' 7" tall. Otherwise his features are similar.

Part II

Comments by Section of Origin

I am taking over a copy of this report for the D. of I. and H.S. of R.G. together with the photographs.

Part III

Comments by Consumer Section

(Value, interest, probability, extent to which confirmed by other sources, etc.)
Subject: George McGrath

Headquarters,
Royal Ulster Constabulary,
'Brooklyn', Knock Road,
BELFAST,
BT5 6LS


D/Sergeant SB 5
Special Branch,
Dungannon.

It has now been established that the above-named is not the person sought as the 'officer commanding' the new Protestant/Loyalist group in Northern Ireland.

The photograph, supplied by you, was shown to \[\text{info not available}\] in October. \[\text{info not available}\] states that whilst certain features were similar to the McGrath who was head of the Tara Brigade he is in no doubt that George McGrath is not the person sought.

Markings

submitted, Belfast.

Markings

Assistant Chief Constable,
Special Branch,
Dungannon.

For Chief Constable.

Supt.

Remarks

Royal Ulster Constabulary
RUC Division
26 Nov 1971

Ref. No. \[\text{info not available}\]

Special Branch
Dungannon

SB 5

D/Sergeant SB
A meeting of the East Antoinette police was held at Northcote on the evening of 1st November, 1971 to discuss linking up each police. The formation of permit groups was considered.

In addition to those already mentioned, additional police officers of the East Antoinette police were reported to exist at Whitby, Horntower, Holywood, Loop and Slagle.

The command of the organization is said to be a George Mcdonald and the Intelligence Officer (Military) Mather.
Subject: Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade.

Headquarters,
The Royal Ulster Constabulary,
'Brooklyn', Knock Road,
BELFAST,
BT5 6LE.

10th January 1972.

Noted. A check with the Belfast Street Directory shows that No. 4 Greenwood Avenue, Belfast is occupied by a William McGrath and on record here we have a William Worthington McGrath, shop assistant, born about 1950, of 4 Greenwood Avenue, Belfast who was interviewed in late 1969 regarding the wearing of a U.V.F. badge. At that time he was employed with Frank Rea & Co. Ltd., 24/26 Chichester Street, Belfast.

Please have discreet enquiries made and furnish a report of what can be learned of McGrath and his activities and of the "Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade".

Transmitted for inquiry and report.

Submitted. Please find attached this office BGS. 12/55, a file dealing with the Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade, the organiser being one William McGrath, d.o.b. 11.12.1916 and who did reside at 15, Wellington Park, Belfast. This person is obviously the father of William Worthington McGrath. I believe this file will answer the queries required.

Also please find attached photostat copies of cards for the two persons named above and a copy of the Chief Constable's file in 1969 referred to.

This will confirm my telephone conversation with Inspector.
Part I

Report

Tara Brigade

Info reports that the Tara Brigade is now finally
active. [Redacted], who was its leader, has not been seen
since the first two weeks in December 1972. [Redacted] is a
Civil servant who was last working on the problem of drug
addiction in Northern Ireland it is believed. He also holds
a R.B.Z. post.

2. Info reports that many of the Tara Brigade members
have joined the C.D.R., I.L.I.V. and Vanguard and the militant
Protestant group, led by [Redacted] (I.R.L.). Details, such as are known, are as
follows:

Brother, of ox-9 Special, who has a brother called

[Redacted] has joined the Newtownabbey unit of the C.D.R.

[Redacted] [Redacted] have joined
the Carrickfergus unit of the C.D.R.

[Redacted] is a member of the [Redacted] group and
[Redacted] who was the platoon sergeant in Hannigale Street is
also believed to be a member of this group. [Redacted] who was the platoon sergeant in the Tara
Brigade is now staff sergeant in [Redacted]. He has
been one of the first to join. It is not yet known whether
any of the others mentioned are members of this group.

Part II

Police received Information

Part III

Comments by Consumer Section

File Number

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL

added by the HIA Inquiry
The Following Information is
forwarded for Information:

The Tara Brigade is now firmly established. McNAMARA who was its leader
has not been seen since December, 1971. Many of the members have joined the
U.D.L., L.A.P. and Vanguard and the militant group based at Holyhead, County
Belfast led by [Redacted] (f.a.e.)

[Redacted] a member of the [Redacted] Group has joined Montgomery
Unit U.D.L.

[Redacted] who was the Rathcoole Platoon Commander is now a Staff Sergeant
inMitchell's Group.

These members who have joined the U.D.L. claim that they are using it for
training, particularly for weapon training, and that if it comes to a crunch
they would be prepared to turn on their officers.

Chief Superintendent
for Chief Constable.
observed that Clifford L.K.H, 10 of the para brigade, seemed to have changed political horses. He was formerly a supporter of Paisley, Craig and Powell, whereas now he has started speaking at U.U.P meetings, the last one being at Carrickfergus on Thursday, 17th February.
The T A R A group which became public as announced in the Press on 11.4.73 is formed in platoons of 20. All membership is from within the Orange Order. Each platoon has 1 Sergeant, a Quartermaster and an Intelligence Officer. Dues of 50P per month are collected - one half of the dues go to a Central Fund and the other half to the platoon. Platoon, if requiring stores, would draw from the Central Fund.

The C.O. of TARA is William McRAGATE, 3 Greenmount Avenue, Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast. His resident is Frank HILLAR who lives on the .

The former intelligence Officer is Clifford SMITH, D.P.P. TARA Rep. The Administration Officer is David ROWN, close associate of PAISLEY and deputy editor of Protestant Telegraph who resides in Bangor.

An ex-member of TARA is UDR Captain N. An ex-member of TARA, aged 28 years, Work Study Engineer with E & M E.I.I., Belfast, Carryduff. He is now a frequent speaker on Vanguard platforms, although still a member of the Young Unionist Party. He joined TARA believing it to be a sincere organisation but learnt that it was otherwise.

The C.O. McRAGATE is a reputed homosexual and he is alleged to have kept members ensnared in the organisation by threatening to reveal homosexual activities which he had initiated. He used the Irish Emancipation Christian Fellowship, Wellington Park, Belfast as a front for TARA. Membership has been falling drastically and they went public to create a myth about their size.

Not Continued on attached sheet(s) No.

Grading

COMMENT BY ORIGINATOR

COMMENT OF SUBMITTING OFFICER (where applicable)

Further details, when obtained will be submitted.

COMMENT BY HEADQUARTERS

S.B. Number

Addendum: added by the HIA Inquiry

Noted...
REPORT

T I

T OF REPORT

The T A R A group which became public as announced in the Press on 11.4.73 is formed in platoons of 20. All membership is from within the Orange Order. Each platoon has 1 Sergeant, a quartermaster and an Intelligence Officer. Subs of 50p per month are collected - one half of the dues go to a central fund and the other half to the platoon. Platoons, if requiring stores, could draw from the central fund.

The C.O. of TARA is William McKendry, 3 Greenmount Avenue, Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast. His residence is Frankhill who lives on the road.

The former intelligence officer is Clifford Smith, D.B.E. MI6 Rep. The Administration Officer is David Brown, close associate of PAISLEY and deputy editor of Protestant Telegraph, who resides in Bangor.

An ex-member of TARA is UDR Captain N. An ex-member for 20 years, Work Study Engineer with M.I. 5, has been critical of the Unionist Party. He joined TARA believing it to be a sincere organisation but learnt that this was otherwise.

The C.O. McKENDRY is a reputed homosexual and he is alleged to have kept members ensnared in the organisation by threatening to reveal homosexual activities which he had initiated. He used the Irish Emancipation Christian Fellowship, Wellington Park, Belfast as a front for TARA. Membership has been falling drastically and they went public to create a myth about their size.

Further details, when obtained will be submitted.

Grading

COMMENT BY ORIGINATOR

COMMENT OF SUBMITTING OFFICER (where applicable)

SB Number

COMMENT BY HEADQUARTERS

SB Number

Grading

COMMENT BY HEADQUARTERS

Grading

SB Number

Grading

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL KIN-55076
Divisional Commander,
'2' Division.

8.30

23.5.73

8.30

24.5.73

276/3. There appears to be a vice ring which is centred in Wm. McGrath, 236 Upper Newtownards Road, who is employed as a Social Worker at Kinsore Boys' Hostel, 236 Upper Newtownards Road. McGrath practices various kinds of homosexual perversion, but is known to be indulging in other kinds of perversion as well. He is deeply involved in underground politics and boys of his are involved in all shades of Unionist Politics. Most of these young men would have been involved in perversion with him personally and he is not adverse to pressurising them into adopting policies according to his political objections which are unknown. He has contact with certain local MPs who are known for their homosexuality and it is thought this is the lever used to obtain his job as a Social Worker. He has contacts throughout N. Ireland and also in London and beyond. He is constantly in financial difficulty. He leads a secret Militant Organisation known as "Th." He is closely known among Loyalists and others, but mainly because of the shame and danger attached to exposing him and the repercussions he is allowed to continue. His methods of dealing with boys is to suggest homosexual activities will cure a variety of complaints. McGrath claims the boys are suffering. Once alles McGrath to get his hands on them they are wide open to exploitation, sexually, politically and financially.

Mike Geller.

Received 1505 hours 23.5.73.

Please cause this information to be investigated and report results.

Copy to S.O. Burye.
In response, Strachan:

On 16.12.71 I spoke to Mr. Walsh, head of the Kinvara Hotel. Upon reaching the hotel, Mr. Walsh stated that the deceased Mr. Grant has been employed there since 1972 and is a very quiet type of person who has never been involved in any way. Mr. Walsh is not aware of any statement of fact that the deceased could be due to harm Mr. Walsh.

I regret that my statement of facts is in response to your request. I am not aware of any statement of fact that the deceased could be due to harm Mr. Walsh.
Subject has told that the boat-man was to meet escape by County Down rail....
added by the HIA Inquiry

William McIlwain (enr) "Christian Fellowship Centre", 166 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast, has a Supervisor called RATHE at his work with Belfast Corporation.

Comment: McGrath is reported to be OC of RAG Brigade.

ACTION TAKEN BY HEADQUARTERS

ADMITTED OR DISCHARGED

entered by the HIA Inquiry
Dear Sir,

Information has recently been received at this office to the effect that William McLaughlin intends to visit Amsterdam on a date unknown. We will stay with William McLaughlin, born 11 December 1916, occupation - Social Worker, Linens Contract, Belfast - has been the subject of a number of reports as being the Officer Commanding, The Friends in Northern Ireland.

Intelligence on this group, which is believed to have close links with the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Orange Order, shows that it was dormant for some time prior to the 11 April 1973 when it made a public announcement in the frame of its re-launch. Little threat is offered by this group at present but while it has claimed a large membership throughout Northern Ireland it is in fact a small group of people operating in Belfast with a very small membership.

The purpose of McLaughlin's visit to Amsterdam is not known and there is no record at this office of

Yours faithfully,

Copy to:
Commander, Special Branch, New Scotland Yard,
DCI Stormont Castle.
Subject: Tara Brigade

Headquarters
The Royal Ulster Constabulary
"Brooklyn" Knock Road
Belfast BT5 6LZ.


Superintendent
SB Belfast

It is some time now since we heard of the Tara Brigade which we first heard of as a para-military outfit.

Please see attached advertisement in the News Letter of 20 June 1974 - a full page advertisement suggests a big money back up.

Please up-date as to present constitution, personalities, aims, objects, etc.

[Signature]
Assistant Chief Constable.

24.
OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL

KIN-55046

Assistant Chief Constable
Special Branch


The Tara Brigade was formed as a result of a split in the Unionist Organisation in 1968. Some Young Unionists did not agree with policy and political decisions taken by the parent organisation and a group called the Tara Brigade was formed. This body was to be used as a pressure group to try and influence decisions taken by the Unionist Party.

When the U.V.F. became a banned organisation they continued to be active and for a period called themselves TARA. At this time there was some confusion over the use of this name by the U.V.F. and, by reason of this, I am sure, it was wrongly associated as being those persons who originally broke away from the Unionist Party as being involved in Military action. As is known now this is far from the truth as the Tara Brigade we now know are not activists or militants, but are a group of people who are genuinely concerned about the situation in Northern Ireland.

The following persons are known to be associated with the Tara Brigade:

1. William McGrath, DOB 11.12.1916. This man was Secretary of the Christian Fellowship and Irish Emancipation Crusade.

2. Francis W A Agnew, DOB [redacted].

3. Frank Millar, DOB [redacted]. Number (3) MILLAR is an Apprentice Solicitor and was employed for some time by Trevor Smyth, Solicitor.

It is known that this organisation is strongest in the Ballymena area and the main body are people who are religious.

The delay in submitting this report is regretted.
KIN 301

To Kinora Boys Hostel, 236 Upper Newtownards Road, W5, 2EC.

2) Copy of SB50 to SB Number

(3) W/S Christian Fellowship and Irish Emancipation Committee, 15 Wellington Park, Malone, Belfast, W5, 2EC.

File Number

Signature: [Signature]

Date: 9/7/74

Extracted by: [Signature]

Date: 30/7/74

On 3/7/74 a/N was arrested for theft. A number of documents issued by TARA were found in his locker (Win Griffith is a local father of adult address).

A pamphlet titled "The Nation houses of faith" written by M. McGrath was published by the local organization.
FOLLOWING FOR SNIPER//...S

FROM RUG W//KNOCK

ROTIJE

B-CLASSIFICATION

E-DOCUMENT REFERENCE

E-DOCUMENT REFERENCE

YS,

1· WILLIAM NORTINGTON GIBRTH, 48, 5/1/1959, 130 UPPER

NEWTONARDS ROAD, BELFAST, FIRST REPT TO OUR ATTENTION BECAUSE HE WAS

ORGANISER OF THE CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP OF THE LIVER CATHOLIC

CRUSADE AT 13 WELLINGTON PARK, BELFAST. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THIS GROUP

IS "ULSTER HAS BEEN ATTACKED IN CRIT SO TOLE: WE CAN'T BECOME A

BASE FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST IT AGAIN..."

IN 1972 IT WAS LEARNE FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT

TARK ORIGINATED IN 1927 PRO-LIKELY THE ORGANISATION OR A SOCIETY AND

THAT THE LEADER WAS MIB HOBART

IN 1975 IT WAS LEARNE FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT NORTINGTON GIBRTH

WAS SECRETARY OF A GROUP CALLED REJOINING IN THE CATHOLIC

SCHOOL OF OUTREACH, "MAIEN" (MAIEN) AND THAT

ITS MEMBERS WERE OF THE GRADUATION+++ A VIOLATION

THE ABOVE MAY HAVE WORDS IN THE POSSIBLY AND ARE REGARDED

AS BEING SOMEWHAT ECCRATIC AND UNSTABLE. REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED

THAT NORTINGTON GIBRTH HAS A HOMOSEXUAL THOUGH WE HAVE LITTLE TO

CONFIRMCASE POSSIBLE THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE BEGINNING OF


MESSAGE ENDS

GR 39?
During May 1977 McGrath in a letter to the Chief Constable on behalf of TARA recommended the reading of a booklet enclosed with the letter. Nothing further was reported on subject from that date until the present scandal broke in the Press in 1980.

COMMENT: The foregoing is not a summary of the contents of McGrath's PR.


During enquiries as a result of Roboshone message No.2024 dated 23/24 May 1973 HAINES was interviewed by uniform police. Apart from this interview and subsequent report to Divisional Commander 'E' he was not known to Special Branch and there was nothing to suggest he was connected with (a) homosexual activities, or (b) TARA.


Subject was not known to Special Branch prior to his arrest.

There was not at any time a suggestion that TARA activity was taking place within Kincora but rather that as CO of TARA, McGrath had a group around him of Unionists, both Official and Democratic, who had in common membership of the Orange Order. Neither of his fellow employees, HAINES and SEMPLE, were reported as being members of TARA or indeed of being involved in any type of political activity.

A number of reports were received from the Army regarding both William McGrath and TARA. None of these reports mentioned Kincora Boys' Home.

---

Police officer

Chief Inspector

4 March 1982.
A MAJOR scandal erupted in the North last night on allegations of an official “cover-up” over the recruiting of boys at a Belfast children’s home for homosexual prostitution.

The matter is to be raised at Westminster by independent MP Gerry Fitt, who was “shocked to the core” by the reports. “If these allegations are true there has been some kind of Watergate cover-up, and those responsible should be brought to book.”

The shock allegations about the home on the outskirts of the city resulted in a police report being sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions. But no action was taken—and reports on certain cases were destroyed under orders from a senior member of the Social Services Department, it is claimed.

A member of the staff at the boys’ home is alleged to be involved with a Loyalist paramilitary group. Officials in the Health Department were told this, but he has retained his job—despite being suspected of encouraging children to engage in homosexual acts for money, and accepting payments for pimping.

The police reports name a number of important Northern businessmen as being involved.

So far, one of the children involved is alleged to have committed suicide, and another—now living with an elderly homosexual—is said to have attempted suicide.

Mr. Fitt said: “I am prepared to raise this matter at Westminster and call for a full inquiry.”

The situation first came to light in 1977. One boy who knew of the child prostitution is said not to have received any support from social workers when he faced a criminal charge—because it was thought advisable to have him locked up where he could not talk.

Files on the allegations currently exist in two police stations, Strandtown and Donegal Past, Belfast.

A detective at the Strandtown station is understood to have conducted an intensive investigation of the boys’ home and to have members under suspension, and to have worked on the report which was sent to the D.P.P.

A number of people with the information are ‘hidden’ under the Official Secrets Act from revealing what they know about the crimes and the official cover-up.

Since the police inquiry, two justices of the Peace in Belfast have continued to send boys to the home.

Children at the centre range from 10 to 17. Some of the alleged offences are claimed to have involved boys as young as 12.

Last night, a reliable source claimed that the man suspected of having made large amounts of money by “hiring out” boys still held a senior post at the home.
The Tara Brigade was formed as a result of a split in the Unionist organisation in 1968. Some young Unionists did not agree with policy and political decisions taken by the parent organisation and a group called Tara Brigade was formed. This body was to be used as a pressure group to try and influence decisions taken by the Unionist party.

In 1971 a split occurred within the "Tara Brigade" and a lot of members who were opposed to the low key profile, left and joined the UVF. At one time the UVF called themselves 'TARA'.

Then followed a period when Protestants sought to give expression to their feelings about the situation then evolving in N Ireland. A variety of organisations came into being ie. LAW, Vanguard, paramilitary groups etc. There were reports at this time about dual membership of some of these organisations by some reported members of Tara.

In April 1973 there was a poster campaign in local newspapers setting out 36 points which TARA considered the base for a united action by Protestants in N Ireland. Their campaign evoked a large amount of comment in the media especially as the group identified itself by name and labelled itself 'The Hard Core of Protestant Resistance'. It projected the image of being behind 'law and order' and called for support for the Security Forces.

At this time there was a report which identified WILLIAM McGRATH as the O/C of Tara, his assistant as FRANK MILLAR and the I/O as CLIFFORD SMITH. The report went on to state that McGrath was a reported homosexual who was alleged to have kept members ensnared in the organisation by threatening to reveal homosexual activities which he had initiated. He used the IRISH EMANCIPATION CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP, WELLINGTON PARK, BELFAST as a front for TARA. Membership had been falling drastically and they went public to create a myth about their size. A separate report stated that McGrath's son WORTHINGTON was also involved in the organisation.

At 1505 hrs on 23/5/73 robotphone No 2024 was received from a male caller, details as follows:

"There appears to be a vice ring which is centred in Wm McGrath, 188 Upper Newtownards Road, who is employed as a Social Worker at Kincon Boys' Hostel, 236 Upper Newtownards Road. McGrath practices various kinds of homosexual perversion, but is known to be indulging in other kinds of perversion as well. He is deeply involved in..."
<table>
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<tr>
<th>SB Number</th>
<th>McGrath</th>
<th>William Worthington</th>
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**OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL**
ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY

CRIME SPECIAL BRANCH

SUBJECT

DORMANT

McGrath, William - Father
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added by the HIA Inquiry

added by the HIA Inquiry
SPECIAL BRANCH

SUBJECT

SMYTH, CLIFFORD

FILE OPENED ON SEP 19 Y1

SECTION

NO OF RELATED FILES

SB Number

SUBJECT OF RELATED FILES

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**SUBJECT**

FISK, Robert  
(REPORTER "THE TIMES")

**NO. OF RELATED FILES**

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**SUBJECT OF RELATED FILES**

THIS FILE CONTAINS FILE ON PASSING OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS - JOHN WALLACE, SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICER, ARMY HQNI - LISBURN.
intelligence point of view, and whilst MI5 fulfilled
some of the more junior roles, there was more
representation from SIS in those early days.

The Joint Section was slightly different. It was
set up in 1972, run from London, and the Joint Section's
role was to provide intelligence to the DCI and other
(inaudible) parts of the agencies that might help
illuminate the security situation as it was developing
in Northern Ireland at that time, bearing in mind that
the Province was politically very unstable and there
were an awful lot of worries that the situation might
get out of control or it might even approach civil war.

Q. And as we will see, 9004, when we come to look at the
1982 interaction between the Service and the RUC, the
Irish Joint Section was not nec... -- it was doing its
own thing and not necessarily would other organisations
have been aware of that fact, and therefore when matters
touching on someone that you were running came to the
attention of the RUC, then that raised these difficult
issues which we are going to look at about how those
situations are managed --

A. Yes.

Q. -- to ensure that a police investigation can be
conducted and at the same time the issues that are of
importance to the Service are tried or attempted to be
A. It might be worth me adding that our focus was very much on the strategic and the sort of political at the top end of the paramilitary spectrum. The police were heavily engaged at the time in the insurgency that the Provisional IRA and the Loyalist paramilitaries groups were mounting. Our focus was much less tactical than that. It was much more strategic, and some of the agents that we were running at the time were providing effectively political intelligence that was not directly relevant to counter-terrorist policing work.

Q. Now one of the difficult issues that arise between services such as yours and public inquiries, amongst others, is the NCND principle, "neither confirm nor deny". I want to just allow you to explain the importance of that to the Security Service in the same way as the Secret Intelligence Service explained it yesterday. For the benefit of the Panel can you just in your own words explain the rationale behind that principle and why, including in today's world, it remains something of critical importance to what you are doing?

A. Certainly. It's been a long-standing Government policy to adopt that principle where it might concern Northern Ireland. In a number of different circumstances if you
that he just wasn't all that important to us at the
time. Even once we had identified him, he was the --
one of the leaders of a potential threat... -- a
potentially threatening organisation, Tara, but we -- it
wasn't as if we were doing a lot of intelligence work
around him. You know, we -- we were noting things that
were sent to us, but we didn't get active in tasking
other sources against Tara until later on as far as
I can see.

Q. It will become apparent -- perhaps of more significance
for the Panel, 9004, than you necessarily in terms of
what I am about to say -- but it will become apparent
that the timing of the letter we are talking about,
22nd March 1975, when that information is coming
through, it's around about that period when a different
train is travelling, which is Brian Gemmell and his
engagement with a number of individuals, including Roy
Garland, which leads to the interaction with Ian
Cameron, or, in fact, the interaction appears to have
occurred before the interaction with Roy Garland, and we
will look at that, but it is happening around the same
time as this separate piece of information is coming
from a different source it appears or a different
avenue, but ultimately leads back to the same place at
its origin.
Inquiry. Isn't that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. In unredacted form in every instance?

A. Absolutely, and the Inquiry has been able to check the redactions that we made to ensure that we're not redacting something that you might consider to be absolutely germane.

Q. Yes. Now although we have looked at what may appear, because we are focusing completely on Kincora and McGrath and anything related to those two matters, that there are quite a lot of documents, but if one stands back from the documents we have looked at today, those which the Inquiry considers relevant from your Service, it is the position, is it not, that they are a very small proportion of a very much greater volume of material that relates to the activities of all sorts of groups and individuals in Northern Ireland during the time we are looking at?

A. That's absolutely true. As I indicated earlier, our focus on McGrath and Tara, whilst there, was not that great. Tara was a potential threat, not an actual threat at most stages, and McGrath was a relatively peripheral figure to us.

Q. Yes. Just before I ask you to elaborate on him being a relatively peripheral figure, although you did not
15. In January 1977, MI5 continued to seek information about McGrath and Tara, enquiring about whether a source who had been able to report on McGrath in early 1976 would still be able to do so.

16. It was only in May 1977 that MI5 created a permanent file on William McGrath. Security Service policy requires two criteria to be met before a file may be opened on an individual. First, the individual must be fully identified. Secondly, the individual must meet an official Recording Category which, in the case of William McGrath, was on the basis that between 1971 and 1977 he had been an Irish Protestant extremist.

17. Inside MI5’s file on McGrath there is an envelope containing two index cards that at one time would have been used as a working aid to record brief notes about him. The earliest note is based on a report dated 18 April 1973, recording McGrath as the leader of a ‘refurbished’ form of the Tara Brigade.

18. Another entry, based on a report dated 13 November 1973, gives his occupation as Boys Hostel warder (sic) at Kincora Boys Hostel and also states that he is reported to be homosexual. McGrath’s date of birth is shown citing a report dated 20 January 1976. An entry citing a report dated 13 February 1976 states that he “has long made a practice of exploiting other peoples sexual deviations”. There is no entry reflecting the April 1972 report about Mr McGrath having being accused of ‘assaulting small boys’. (See Figures 9A & 9B: Index Card Working Aid Cards 1 & 2 on William McGrath.)
B - SOURCE PROTECTION

The meeting was held in the (redacted) and was attended by about ten men, a number of whom, like source (redacted), were accepted into the organisation on the personal recommendation of their sponsors. A prerequisite of membership is prior membership of the (redacted) Order.

3. The organisation, which apparently represented all areas of the province has the title "The Tara Brigade" which, it was explained literally translated as the "Kia's Brigade" but which they would take to mean the Queen's Brigade. No one explained the aims of the organisation as the protection of an effective offensive force against the day when it would be required. To emphasised that these joining would not be required to undertake offensive action but would be required to carry out drill and a certain amount of intelligence work.

B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

This report should not be passed to the D.C. but will be taken a copy over to Assistant Chief Constable Johnstone, personally.

Thank you. I have passed this to David Bartlett and P.A.ing this on a new OP. entitled "The Tara Brigade".
I have been told by the TAA C.O. McGrath had been accused of abusing small boys and that he could not account for any cash that had been handed to him over a period of twelve months.
Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 1 (Front)

Leader of the Refurbished Army of the IRA Brigade. Subject KIN 337.

He was a contact of a foreign leader believed to be involved in alimentary to Ireland.

He runs the Christian Fellowship Centre qv.

(Same ref. as above.)

Subject "gets them young and preaches religion to them" which may that he preaches bigotry and anti-Catholic sermons.

Possibly also a member of the UDA.

Add: 168 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast.

Occ: Boys Hostel warden at Kincora Boys Hostel, Belfast.

He runs the Irish Emancipation Crusade, a Greenwood Av.,

Belfast, which sent threatening letters to Birmingham firms.

(Same ref. as above.)

Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 1 (Reverse)

Subject: Alleged history of homosexual relationship between

Born: 11 Dec 1919.

Son: Worthington McGrath qv.

He first came to notice as organiser of the Christian Fellowship Centre & Irish Emancipation Crusade at 15, Wellington Park, Belfast. The philosophy of this group is "Ulster has been attacked in order that Ireland may become the base for operations against England."

1968 Founder of Co of the Tara Brigade qv.


Subject & his son appear to regard as somewhat eccentric & unstable. He is still head of Tara.

(Same ref. as above.)
T I

T OF REPORT

The T A R A group which became public as announced in the Press on 11.4.73 is formed in platoons of 20. All membership is from within the Orange Order. Each platoon has 1 Sergeant, a Quartermaster and an Intelligence Officer. Dues of 50p per month are collected - one half of the dues go to a Central Fund and the other half to the platoon. Platoons, if requiring stores, could draw from the Central Fund.

The C.O. of TARA is William McENAGE, 3 Greenmount Avenue, Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast. His resident is Frank HILLAR who lives on the 

The former intelligence officer is Clifford SMITH, D.I.R.P. PEKX Rep. The Administration Officer is David BROWN, close associate of PAISLEY and deputy editor of Protestant Telegraph, who resides in Bangor.

An ex-member of TARA is 28 years, Worx Study Engineer with N.H.S. Carryduff. He is now a frequent speaker on Vanguard platforms, although is still a member of the Young Unionist Party. He joined TARA believing it to be a sincere organisation but learnt that it was otherwise.

The C.O. McENAGE is a reputed homosexual and he is alleged to have kept members ensnared in the organisation by threatening to reveal homosexual activities which he had initiated. He used the Irish Emancipation Christian Fellowship, Wellington Park, Belfast as a front for TARA. Membership has been falling drastically and they went public to create a myth about their size.

Grading

COMMENT BY ORIGINATOR

COMMENT OF SUBMITTING OFFICER (where applicable)

Further details, when obtained will be submitted.

COMMENT BY HEADQUARTERS

SB Number
Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 1 (Front)

Leader of the refurbished form of the UDR Brigade. 

654 was in contact of KIN 337 

He was a contact of KIN 337, a Foreign card reader. 

Believed to be involved in all operations to Ireland, 

of 29 Nov. 73.

He runs the Christian Fellowship Centre v. 

(Same ref. as above.)

Subject "gets them young and preaches religion to them" which mean that he preaches bigotry and anti-Catholic sermons. 

Possibly also a member of the UVF. 

(Teduce document reference of 13 Nov 73.)

Add: 188 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast. 

Occ. Boys Hostle warden at Kincaid Boys Hostel, Belfast. 

He runs the Irish Emancipation Crusade, a Greenwood Ave., Belfast, which sent threatening letters to Birmingham firms. 

Reported to be Homosexual. (Same ref. as above.)

Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 1 (Reverse)

Subject in a chain of homosexual relationship between 

KIN 329. This man is said to be living with subject. 

(Teduce document reference of 28 Feb. 73.)

He is a member of the Fellowship Centre & Irish Emancipation Crusade, 15 Wellington Park, Belfast. 

His philosophy of this group is "Ulster has been attacked, in order that Ireland may become the base for operations against England." 

1968, founder of CO of the Tara Brigade v. 


Subject & his son are apparently regarded as commando, acentric & unstable. 

He is still head of Tara. (Teduce document of 20 Jun. 76.)
Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 2 (Front)

McGRATH William

He has long made a practice of exploiting other peoples sexual deviartions & TARA is vulnerable on this account. RAINSHAW expressed strong animosity towards subject.

He is strongly anti-communist & has accused the RUC of having communist tendencies.

Billy used to be secretary of Orange Lodge (1103) named Ireland's Heritage. He was looking for a Gaelic teacher for the lodge.

A letter (stf. ref) from subject was published in the Newsletter in 1976 attacking the IRA, Catholicism & the SDI as all trying to end protestant faith in Ireland.

The Tanaiste, Belfast Co said that subject had promised the E.Belfast group a consignment of guns as far back as 1969.

Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 2 (Reverse)

But it never materialised. He added that he knew that subject still owed £2,000 for the purchase of weapons now in possession of the Co.
22 March 75

One of two Copies
LINCO/CONCO East Belfast
2 REM Tac
BFPO 801
Belfast Civil

Personal for:
HQ 39 Inf Bde

E - CLASSIFICATION

- 2VT SPOTTING - Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

1. Over the past six months Sgt (LINCO) and Cpl (CONCO) have developed a good personal relationship with Cong (RUC SPG Int). As a result of this relationship, has passed over useful information.

2. Since November 1974 Cpl has been working on a project concerning the organisation known as TARA. has given background information on TARA. source for this information is one Miss V SHAW, who is employed as P'A to the Rev Ian PAISLEY.

3. The following is a summary of information passed to by Miss SHAW on Tara and personalities so far:

   William McGARATH: 188 Upper Newtonards Road - Warden of Kincoo Boys Hostel
   He used to live in 'Faith House', 25, Orpen Park, Finaghy. This was the house he lived in before the "scandal broke". He then moved to 5, Greenwood Park, where Clifford SMYTH stayed with him until SMYTH got married.
   There was a Scottish matron type that worked in Faith House, who became disenchanted with McGARATH's habits and packed up and went home. Source said she would know alot about his early activities.
   He is the Master of the Ireland Heritage Lodge, which meets in the John Knox Memorial Hall, 150, Cliftonpark Avenue, of which there is a suggestion that PAISLEY has some sort of control of.
   It was over the use of this hall that McGARATH and PAISLEY had a disagreement. McGARATH wanted to use the hall for a meeting, to which PAISLEY agreed. Source, on hearing this, went to PAISLEY with a set of letters and papers, written to one Roy GARLAND

KIN-105011
By McGrath when they were having an affair, to show Paisley what sort of man he was dealing with. Paisley then tried to prevent McGrath using the hall, to which McGrath replied by threatening to publicise Paisley's 'undemocratic usage of Orange Halls', and to organise a protest march, using the members of his lodge, outside Paisley's church.

In the late '60s early '70s, McGrath was collecting funds, reason not known. Garland had donated £400 in good heart. Somewhere along the line McGrath went crooked, used the money for his own ends, and Garland found out and demanded his money back. When McGrath refused Garland sued him, the outcome of which McGrath had to sell Faith House to pay off the debt.

Roy Garland: He owns his own business, something to do with chemicals. He is the man who was, in source's words, influenced by McGrath, and who kept the letters and papers exchanged between themselves whilst the affair lasted.

Clifford Smyth
For the last Convention the DUP party machinery was geared to support Smyth as one of its candidates. When Paisley read the letters and saw that Smyth was involved, it was too late to prevent Smyth standing without drawing publicity that would have destroyed the DUP. So he was allowed to stand. Sometime after Smyth was elected he was confronted by a DUP party committee and asked if he was a homosexual and in any way connected with Quidam. He denied this, and as nobody gave evidence against him, he was given the benefit of the doubt.

Ray Martin Smyth: Head of the Orange Order
He was trying to do 'something about Smyth'. He was involved in some action in Scotland to discredit Smyth politically. He also knew about McGrath.
Miss SHAW has a grievance to settle with McGrath, whom she dislikes intently for moral reasons. To this end she is prepared to pass information to Cons, TAPA, and hopefully TAPA, to Cons for his part is prepared to pass on this information to the military through Sgt MOD OFFICER R and Cpl MOD OFFICER D. It is doubtful if he will object to passing information direct to MI5I providing a suitable handler is found. He is adamant however, that he does not want the RUC or SB involved.

At present the following background is known on Miss SHAW:

She is a deeply religious person, a member of the Barbican Mission for the Jews, and generally involved with missionary work. She is a spinster and employed as PA to the Rev Ian PAISLEY.
11. In April 1976, Robert Fisk published an article mentioning Tara in the *New Statesman*. Fisk claimed that an account of Tara's activity had been "collated by an intelligence officer at Lisburn". MI5 ASP Ian Cameron wrote to other MI5 officers about the Tara component of the article which he believed was almost certainly a draft on Tara held in the Army Information Service (AIS) records at HQNI. (See Figure 6: MI5 ASP Letter, 22 April 1976.)
hold a file on McGrath at the time. (See Figure 2: RUC Letter to MI5, November 1973.)

8. A Daily Intelligence Summary issued by the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence in January 1976 included a Comment about McGrath which mentioned reporting from March 1975 having given his employment as warden of the Kincora Boys' Home. (See Figure 3: DCI Daily Intelligence Summary, 17 January 1976 - Extract.)

9. In April 1975, MI5 obtained via the Army a summary of allegations made to the RUC on an unknown date by Miss Valerie Shaw (PA to Dr Ian Paisley) during an RUC officer's investigation of Tara. Miss Shaw's information included details of McGrath and Tara. (See Figure 4: Report received by MI5 in April 1975 — originated 22 March 1975.)
significance that ought to feed back to the DCI, who was advising the Secretary of State, then he would be channelling that. So in his role he would be disseminating to the brigades what he felt the brigades needed to know, but also moving over to the ASP anything of a more political nature that he felt he needed to know.

Is that -- does that help the point you are making that it's a --

A. Yes.

Q. -- there's an assistance to intelligence generally, but there's an eye on the political ...

A. I think, going back to the reasons why the Director and Coordinator of Intelligence post was created in the NIO, it was to provide political intelligence to the Secretary of State in order to help the Government manage the Northern Irish crisis, and so anything that was of relevance on the politics or the -- even the strategic paramilitary intent would have been passed and channelled through the ASP office if it came from the Army.

There was also another role. I am sure the ASPs of the day would have been very keen to provide advice to Army agent runners when their casework started to take them into the quite grey, murky area between Protestant
paramilitarism and the Protestant politics of the day.

Q. If we can put on the screen, please, 4061, the area where we try and deal with Brian Gemmell as Captain Brian Gemmell working in 39 Brigade in intelligence in 1975, and the Panel have -- we will be looking at this again, but the Panel have looked at this, involving Jim McCormick, who was friendly with Brian Gemmell. That led on to the communication with Roy Garland, and then we have Brian Gemmell's communications with Ian Cameron. The -- you explain in paragraphs 45 to 48 of your statement that there appears to be conflation that has subsequently occurred in respect of Brian Gemmell over two separate individuals with whom he was involved at around the same time that we are talking about in the middle or pre-middle and middle of 1975.

Now, as you know, he would say, as he said to the police and then in a more augmented form to the media subsequently, that he was told brusquely not to interview Roy Garland and then the decision was subsequently reversed and he was permitted to interview Roy Garland, but to stay away from matters of homosexuality and then subsequently he would say Kincora.

In fairness to him, his view at least as far as the sequence of events as opposed to what was being
"These public meetings progressed to private meetings in which McGrath talked to the young men of 'mental blocks'. He wanted -- he would touch them on the privates, and if they objected, he would explain that they were tensed and keyed up and he called this a 'mental block'."

This never happened to my knowledge. I doubt McGrath would not have risked such an approach. From talking with victims I am convinced that the abuse was always conducted entirely in private and involved one victim at a time. It was so devious and camouflaged that a few victims insisted on denying having been abused. But this account seems inaccurate even in regard to the private abuse. He never talked of "mental blocks" but of "emotional blocks" which is different. Jim McCormick is credited with having made the following scandalous and unforgivable remarks:

"McGrath would then suggest that the boy needed liberating and in that manner induce them into homosexual acts. Garland said he had arranged for some twenty boys to be seen by McGrath for this purpose during the '60s. He said that McGrath used the same technique on women too."

I never ever said any of this and it did not happen. Neither do I believe Jim McCormick would have made such a hurtful and disgusting suggestion. Never has any victim of McGrath's abuse made such allegations. As I said Jim McCormick only knew what I told him and I certainly did not tell him this. It was he who introduced Brian Gemmell, then an officer in British Military Intelligence to me in 1975 after I agreed to talk with him. Gemmell has recently commented through emails, that "At no time, in all my Tara investigations, did I ever see anything stating, or even inferring, that you were homosexual or had a relationship with McGrath". He also said: "I am certain that Jim McC. would never have said such a thing. He was a man concerned with the truth and would not have made up things or embellished a story."

It is absolutely scandalous that such false allegations should be repeated publicly in a statutory inquiry. It is no excuse to claim that it reflects what some obscure document says. These are horrendous allegations. I did introduce a small number of young people to the Faith House Prayer meetings but would have been very angry had I thought McGrath had abused them. However what did happen, around 1970 – 1971, was that I talked with around a score of young and older people who admitted having been abused. What they said convinced me that McGrath was a serial and ruthless abuser. A number of these men were abused as long ago as the 1940s or early 50s. The lives of at least two of these and I believe some others, were seriously damaged. The pain they experienced remained with them for the rest of their lives. They never recovered. At least one was told by McGrath that he was a homosexual, which, being an evangelical, he found extremely damaging and painful. He became suicidal and spent time in a mental hospital. Now it would appear that the HIA Inquiry is using material, which seems to suggest precisely the same thing -that some, if not all, of McGrath’s victims were homosexuals in denial and the Inquiry is doing this in public. This I find scandalous and terribly cruel.
In fact once he has finished his degree - he is taking Economics and Business Administration - he would like to join our Service. He, of all he intends to take a short Service Commission, if possible, in the Intelligence Corps.

2. I was asked for my advice. I replied that we did not take students direct from the University preferring them to have gained some experience of life in whatever calling they chose. I said I thought a commission in the Army was good experience but any arm of the Services would be useful and the Intelligence Corps itself might not be the best by any means. However, I promised to have a word with our own personnel section and to seek their advice.

D - MI5 OFFICER

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STATEMENT OF:  BRIAN SMART GEMMELL

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 enter "over 21"]  OVER 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS:  EX ARMY CAPTAIN (NOW SALES MANAGER)

ADDRESS:  C/O ARMY HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN IRELAND.

I declare that this statement consisting of 3 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 16 day of July 1982.

(Sgd) G CASKEY D/SUPT
SIGNATURE of MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received.

(Sgd) B S GEMMELL
SIGNATURE of WITNESS

I was a Captain in the British Army Intelligence Corps and I was stationed in Northern Ireland from December 1974 until December 1976. I resigned my commission in June 1977. When I first arrived in N Ireland I was posted to 123 Intelligence Section 39 Infantry Brigade. I was Officer Commanding 123 Section and remained with this section for my period in N Ireland. Towards the end of my service there I was appointed Staff Officer, Grade 3, on the Brigade Headquarters Intelligence staff. My particular responsibility was to collate and disseminate intelligence on Protestant Para-military groups. It was well into my tour that I met Roy Garland through James McCormick of Carryduff. I got to know Mr McCormick through my interest and association with Evangelical Christian Groups in N Ireland. The question of Tara was raised at one stage and that its leader William McGrath was a homosexual pervert. It was Mr McCormick who actually spoke to me about this and he suggested that I should speak to Roy Garland who was ex Tara and Garland was trying to expose Tara and McGrath. I was introduced to Garland by McCormick and I remember the gist of what he said. Garland was afraid of McGrath and he mentioned that McGrath owed him a lot of money and also owed other people money. He told me how McGrath had recruited young boys into his

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SIGNATURE of WITNESS.
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manifestation being the main theme - how McGrath had spoken to small boys
about this subject. This occurred back in the 1960s and Garland was one
of these boys. Some of it developed into homosexuality and I believe that
this also included Garland. I recollect Garland saying something about
McGrath pursuing him after Garland got married and this was causing his
distress and that it might break up his marriage. I met Garland on two
occasions, first in McCormick's house and again in 39 Brigade Headquarters.

Corporal Q

may have been present on the second occasion. At

this meeting I had an Intelligence file on Tara and spoke to Garland on
this subject and the various personalities connected with this group. Again
McGrath's homosexual tendencies, his background and all aspects of Tara were
discussed. Although I can't remember if it was named I do know that Garland
told me about McGrath being in charge of a boys' home. However I do remember
going to the Newtownards Road area looking for this home. I went there to
get the picture in my mind as to what we were working on. I remember seeing
a large detached house which I thought it was. I did not go into this house.
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of a boys' home. I didn't feel too happy about it myself especially for
potential victims and the fact that McGrath was presenting an evangelical
front. Garland led me to believe that the Rev Ian Paisley was aware of
McGrath's activities. I made a written report of my second meeting with
Garland. I believe that this was a four side MISOR, which would have been
graded SECRET - UK eyes A. Because of the political implications surrounding
Tara the information was only passed to Headquarters N-Ireland and retained
at 39 Infantry Brigade HQ. After this interview I was debriefed by the
Assistant Secretary (Political) in his office at BQNI. I believe it was on
a Saturday morning just prior to lunch. The Assistant Secretary,
Mr Ian Cameron, was told by me the details of the interview I had with
Garland. I believe that the interview I had with the Assistant Secretary
was either tape recorded or his secretary, a female, took notes. When I told
Mr Cameron about the homosexual involvement of various persons in Tara he
reacted very strongly and said that we did not want to be involved in this
kind of thing. He was abrupt to the point of being rude and instructed me to
terminate my enquiries concerning Tara and in particular to get rid of
another informant with whom I had been associating. This other informant was
not throwing any light on the subject in question, ie the homosexuality.
However other events took place shortly afterwards which resulted in the
Assistant Secretary reversing his decisions and allowing me to pursue the enquiry concerning Tara through the other informant. I can't remember any other specific information regarding McGrath and the boys' home. As I said I had only two meetings with Garland and it was he who gave me this information about McGrath and the home.'
STATEMENT OF:

AGE OF WITNESS (if over 21 enter "Over 21") Over 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: Staff Sergeant

ADDRESS: Army Headquarters, Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn

I declare that this statement consisting of 2 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 22 day of July 1982.

(Sgd) Q

I was first posted to N Ireland in June 1974 and remained in N Ireland until February 1976. I was, during this period, attached to 123 Intelligence Section, Headquarters, 39 Brigade at Thiepval Barracks.

I held the rank of Corporal until about mid 1975 when I was promoted to sergeant. Captain Gemmell took charge of the Section near the end of 1974. It was through Captain Gemmell that I met Roy Garland.

Captain Gemmell was deeply involved with religion being the evangelistic type. I recall going to a 'vets' house in Carryduff with Captain Gemmell. The reason for going there was that Captain Gemmell had learned through his evangelist contacts that a Roy Garland was having some problem with a man called William McGrath. My Section was interested in McGrath at that time because he was a leading figure in TARA, a Protestant extremist group. Another reason was to get an introduction to Garland through the 'vet' - a Mr McCormick. On this visit McCormick related to us some of Garland's problem which in themselves related to some form of perversion and evil activity by McGrath. The 'evil' was related to the perversion. I don't recall homosexuality being mentioned. McCormick agreed to introduce us to Garland and Captain Gemmell and I saw him at McCormick's house. This happened about the summer of 1975 I listened to conversation between

(Sgd) Q

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL
1. In October 1976 Brian Gemmell gave us various papers on the above which he obtained from his army files. One of these was a copy of a letter from HQ 3 Infantry Bde Lurgan, (BEF 13912/2 Dated 28 January 1976) signed by [redacted]. Gemmell’s copy was addressed to G Int HQ 39 Inf Bde.

2. We gave a copy of this letter to SNUFFBOX who have now asked if the source mentioned in the letter could be retasked for further information.

3. We have spoken to Gemmell who has confirmed that there would be no objection to [redacted] discussing this letter with the Army.
dated 11 February 1977. There are no records to indicate that SIS was aware of McGrath's involvement in child sex abuse at Kincora prior to his conviction in 1981.

19. On 19 October 1976, an SIS officer based in London wrote a letter to MI5 on the subject of William McGrath attaching a copy of a letter originating from HQ 3 Infantry Brigade based in Lurgan (Article 1). In his letter, the SIS officer does not state how the document was acquired by SIS other than to say that it was obtained unofficially. MI5 was asked to ensure that no action is taken without reference to SIS.

20. The 4 page MoD letter that was enclosed is dated 28 January 1976 and also includes two newspaper articles published in the Belfast Telegraph and the Hibernia in October 1975 (Exhibit 1). The title of the letter is "EXTREMIST PROTESTANTS SECRET ORGANISATION - TARA" and contains sections on William McGrath, Tara, Ireland’s Heritage LOL 1303 and Ian Paisley.

21. On the same day (19 October 1976), a UK-based SIS officer initiated a Minute (Article 2) for distribution within SIS Headquarters in London. The subject of the Minute is Tara and is a cover document for attached papers handed to SIS by Brian Gemmell on 15 October 1976. Gemmell is a former Captain in the Intelligence Corps who claims that he passed on information relating to William McGrath’s involvement in sexual abuse at Kincora to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.
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   FILE REFERENCES

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   INTELLIGENCE RELATED MATERIAL HIA INQUIRY CONSIDERS NOT RELEVANT TO ITS WORK
22. The SIS officer comments that the papers attached to his Minute were obtained by Gemmell from his Army files and comprise a document entitled "Tara" – dated 14 October 1976 (Exhibit 2); notes on an interview with Roy Garland, made by Gemmell and an unnamed Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) following a "one off" meeting with Ian Cameron – undated (Exhibit 3); a media article entitled "The Paradox that is Tara" (Exhibit 4); and a copy of the Tara proclamation (Exhibit 5).

23. Three months later, on 31 January 1977, an officer from a UK-based SIS team initiated a telegram addressed to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland and copied to SIS London and MI5 (Article 3). The subject of the telegram was "William McGrath and Tara" and refers to various papers handed to SIS by Brian Gemmell in October 1976; in particular to the letter originating from HQ 3 Infantry Brigade, Lurgan dated 28 January 1976.

24. In his telegram the SIS officer confirms that a copy of the letter had been shared with MI5 who had asked if the source mentioned in the letter could be retasked for further information. The letter continues with the SIS officer saying that they had spoken to Gemmell who raised no objection to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland discussing the letter with the Army.
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masturbation being the main theme - how McGrath had spoken to small boys
about this subject. This occurred back in the 1960s and Garland was one
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another informant with whom I had been associating. This other informant was
not throwing any light on the subject in question, ie the homosexuality.
However other events took place shortly afterwards which resulted in the
They had meetings between themselves and RGS would single them out after meetings. RGS attempted to seduce them by claiming to play them emotional freedom to this end and he made them feel guilty by admitting to masturbation, therefore creating up their guilt complex. This is important to emphasise as it is the very beginning of RGSs hold on them.

And Co's. Journal Smith & UDR Captain N members of Young Unionist (YU). At one (YU) meeting addressed by RGS attended by Mallroy merchant banker gave card to R.G. 'INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION'. R.G. believes Mallroy helps TARA with finance.

Also with finance Clarence Hogg, Capt.Hogg (UDR) TARA one time treasurer arranged finance for printing machine. Current involvement of Mallroy & Hogg not known.

RGS suggested to C.S. R.G., that they should join LOM. R.G. joined Irish Heritage Lodge & became master (it had very few members). The idea was to get actions to the serious lodges which would gain momentum when they reacted the Grand Lodge. One such action put by R.G., framed by RGS was that Ulster should prepare a new Govt now "INISH" same to lodge.

Like that TARA when it was first formed (early 70s) was an elite, is laughable according to C.S. who claims to have 212 in RGS. Recruits were accepted by personal recommendation, there was no vetting as such. Man training etc was talked about, but, R.G. never to any weapons. Many people became disillusioned after joining either with RGSs convoluted reputation, or with all the talk and no action. The Christian overtones did not go down well with % of recruits.

Thomas Clark (PNI) is supposed to have carried out surveillance on RGS for several months and concluded that he is a communist.

Among persons attended early meetings of TARA R.G. mentioned elderly man named Dickworth, presumably John Dillworth.

Rank police Millar is amongst persons currently involved with TARA and is reported as sing engaged to RGS daughter. (paraphrased)

Brigginton CMC is still on TARA scene and is now also Sec of Irish Heritage Lodge.

Mr. MacFeird, Monkstown previously of Premier Dve is currently an official in TARA has to be given info regarding NHA/PINA from SP at a meeting in Russell Court early this year. He is thought to own a business on the N'Ards Rd, and was an associate of J.W. McKee.

C. claims that RGS was responsible for spreading rumour of J.D. McKee and McKee's homosexual activities, having posters posted around Belfast "NICO ROY McKee". According to R.G., A knows that RGS was responsible for this.

C. believes that current aim of TARA will have moderated, as CS is close to RGS also with Brown, but nevertheless, their basic aim remains to keep RGS down by force if necessary.

C. believes that although I.P. knows of RGS nefarious activities he would be better to do action because the expose would also affect CS therefore doing NOP no good. He further believes that RGS has knowledge of Paisley's involvement with the UDF in early 70s.

In present para militaries still regard TARA with degree of respect as they still have some like CS whose standing in society makes them privy to such info, which would not finally reach the para kids.

10 of TARA CS seeks info on various aspects of all Int. i.e. Southern Irish Army. The found on Bateson & Simpson were destined for CS. Among names & tel nos listed on
C3, currently IO TARA, wife Scots therefore has connections in Scotland believed to have TARA members in Scotland. Visits England and meets Phyllis Raffern (Nat Front). R.G. states C3 is a transvestite who has had assistance from McU regarding afore problem.
RESTRICTED

UDR Captain N

KIN-3002

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idea that TARA when it was first formed (early 70s) was an elite, is laughable according to C.S., who claims to have been ICO to MCC. Recruits were accepted by personal recommendation, there was no vetting as such. White training etc was talked about, but R.G. never saw any weapons. Many people became disillusioned after joining either with MCC's unsavoury reputation, or with all the talk and no action. The Christian overtones did it go down well with % of recruits.

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Rank postman Millar is amongst persons currently involved with TARA and is reported as being engaged to MCC's daughter. (\footnote{\textit{HIA Inquiry}})

Brigitte MacFerland, Monkstown, previously of Premier Dve, is currently an official in TARA and was thought to have been informed regarding IRA/INLA from SP at a meeting in Russell Court early this year.\footnote{\textit{HIA Inquiry}} He is thought to own a business on the N'Ard's Rd, and was an associate of J.W. McKeaneghe.

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C. believes that although I.P. knew of MCC nefarious activities he would be better to take action because the exposure would also effect CS: therefore doing DUP no good. He rather believes that MCC has knowledge of Paisley's involvement with the UAF in early 70s, a present para militaries still regard TARA with degree of respect as they still have there like CS whose standing in society makes them privy to such info which would not finally reach the para nats.

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half to the platoon. If the platoons require stores they draw from the central fund. Due to inflation the 50p was probably increased.

**MAJOR PERSONALITIES**

**1st. OC**

**IO**

**Admin Offr**

**Secretary**

William McGrath, 5 Greenwood Ave. May be stood down due to ill health.

Military intelligence and RUC Special Branch records have about 30 names of members or former members of the organisation in the Belfast area.

17. The 'raison d' être' of TARA seems to be the establishment and defence of a Protestant Ulster with the complete exclusion of the Roman Catholic Church. Their policy has always been based on the idea of the supremacy and purity of the Protestant faith and a change of direction is unlikely. Although Unionist, the greatest TARA driving force is Protestantism.
TARA

HISTORY

1. TARA first came to notice in 1964 as a ginger group, within the Orange Order, who campaigned for greater political action against Republicanism. A base for the organisation was established in 1969 when a room in Clifton St, Orange Hall, Belfast was obtained. This was ostensibly for meetings of a "Orange Discussion Group" but was in reality to organise and train TARA members. When the organisation was first set up it had support from the County Grand Lodge of Belfast and the Grand Orange Loyal Institution.

2. The organisation was formed out of a small but militant fundamentalist Protestant movement devoted to political and religious opposition to Roman Catholicism. Its members argue the ascendancy of the Protestant faith over Catholicism and claim it to be the national religion.

3. It first came to recent public notice in Jan 1972 with the issue to the press of an unsigned proclamation of intent. It was about this time that William McGrath formed TARA on its present day lines. The choice of name is strange as it is the name of a seat of ancient kings of Ireland, but it does symbolise the belief of TARA members that the whole of Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom - under a Protestant leadership.

MEMBERS OF TARA

4. Sources indicate that the TARA membership is small, possibly 300 Province wide and about 70 activists in Belfast. There is evidence that a number of the members are sexually deviant: William McGrath the past CC almost certainly is bisexual and there are homosexuals in his immediate circle of TARA associates. The organisation has always relied on tight security and information regarding its members was closely guarded. Some members have been identified and it is believed that the organisation has members and contacts in positions of influence throughout the Province in local politics, the Orange Order and commercial life. A number of members are known to be in the TAVR, RUCR and UDR.

5. One ex-member of TARA, claimed that membership had been falling drastically and the organisation went public to create a "myth about their size. (In 1973 a split had occurred within TARA and a lot of members who were opposed to the low-key profile left and joined the UVF)." A senior member of TARA recently claimed that although not a large organisation, it was able to operate through "pulling strings." This is believed to be factual.

6. In 1975 it was reported that many of the older members of the UDA were anxious to join TARA. Some had been in TARA prior to the formation of the UDA but left to join the new organisation. They later considered TARA to be more respectable of the two organisations, with a much stricter vetting procedure than the UDA and stronger ties with the Orange Order.

CONDITIONS OF ENTRY

7. Conditions for entry to TARA includes:

A. Applicants must have no criminal record.

B. They must be members of the Orange Order.

C. They must be proposed by someone who is already a member. Applicants are carefully vetted and the time lapse between application and acceptance can be up to six months while the applicant's background is negotiated.
held by RUC Special Branch was to the effect that William McGrath was a homosexual. This should be pedophile/child abuser/debauched person because he was far from being a “normal” homosexual. One report apparently mentioned his abuse of young boys and his involvement in a vice ring. However I told DC Cullen that the abuse of boys and young men had continued for many years at Faith House. I also introduced the young man who had been abused as a boy by McGrath. He talked freely and openly about serious abuse including oral sex. I was present as this courageous young man gave his unsettling testimony. I asked DC Cullen to keep this, or the details of it, confidential but the idea was to illustrate the seriousness of what had happened. Paul Foot recorded a conversation with DC Cullen in which Cullen admitted that the interview with the young man had taken place some years previously in, I believe, the 1960s.

It seemed clear that if abuse was taking place outside Kincora it was even more likely inside Kincora. After 40 years of abuse at Faith House is it hardly likely that McGrath would stop when given opportunities to abuse a captive audience at Kincora and would have felt protected by fellow abusers. I did not mention the names of victims who confided in me and have no intention of doing so. I was determined to protect them from public exposure but never expected to be maligned myself with misinformation and innuendo. I never imagined that I would have to defend myself from the kind of scurrilous allegations that I have found in the HIA Inquiry’s webpages.

Pages 147-148

"ACC Meharg disputed Cullen's account that he had been briefed in '74 on the paramilitary Tara involvement based on Cullen's account. Meharg told the Hughes Inquiry he had never received intelligence from Cullen before 1980 of a paramilitary involvement ... and stated that if he had such information 'I would certainly have alerted Special Branch'."

I told DC Cullen about Tara because of the extreme views of its leader William McGrath who did not even respect democratic norms. Because of McGrath’s views and actions, as Tara leader, I was convinced that he was an extremely dangerous man. He believed in a Protestant Ascendancy, which I interpreted as a fundamentalist Protestant Ascendancy, which I saw as dangerous. On top of this he told me that he did not believe in the Orange slogan “civil and religious freedom for all” – he said we can’t give freedom to enemies who are out to destroy us such as in his view, the Roman Catholic Church. He also insisted that the end justified the means and practiced this through what I regard as illicit actions including, ones to prevent Gusty Spence from facing the death penalty and the Rev Paisley from being linked with the UVF. The idea that the police did not know about the abuse at the hostel before 1980 is hardly credible when Jim McCormick was able to tell me earlier that there were three abusers employed at the Kincora Hostel. The fact that M15’s James Miller attended a Tara meeting in around 1970 confirms that M15 knew about McGrath.

"I consider the fact that Assistant Chief Constable Meharg and Detective Constable
Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing ...

EXHIBIT 8 (PAGE 2)

"I had been aware that McGrath was a child abuser since the 1940s," Mr Garland said.

He first became aware of it when McGrath, a born-again Christian, was carrying out a mission in Faith House. The premises in Belfast's Orpen Park has now been converted to an old people's home and has no connection with its role in McGrath's day.

A second source of information on McGrath was Mr Miller, an Englishman and former soldier who had settled in Northern Ireland.

He worked as a military intelligence and MI5 agent. In 1971 Mr Miller, who is now dead, was infiltrating Tara for the intelligence services and had reported his suspicions to his handlers.

He was told to drop the issue, and shortly afterwards he was expelled from Tara.

"I can tell you exactly what happened," Mr Garland said. "A number of UVF men were attending the meeting and they said that Miller was working for British intelligence. McGrath said: 'Tell him to go', so I went over and told him: 'I am sorry, you have to go,' and showed him out."

Mr Miller went on to join the UDA at his handler's request.

The third source was Mr McCormick, an evangelical Christian, who set up a meeting between Mr Garland and Mr Gemmell in 1974. Mr McCormick said at the meeting that there were three child abusers working at Kincora.

"I had been trying to bring this out for some time," Mr Garland said. "I had already given an account to police in Strandtown and the UVF had warned me that I was under threat of death as a result."

He and Mr Gemmell remain friends to this day, but at the time Mr Gemmell had his own agenda.
I was first posted to N Ireland in June 1974 and remained in N Ireland until February 1976. I was, during this period, attached to 123 Intelligence Section, Headquarters, 39 Brigade at Thiepval Barracks. I held the rank of Corporal until about mid 1975 when I was promoted to sergeant. Captain Gemmell took charge of the Section near the end of 1974. It was through Captain Gemmell that I met Roy Garland. Captain Gemmell was deeply involved with religion being the evangelistic type. I recall going to a 'vets' house in Carryduff with Captain Gemmell. The reason for going there was that Captain Gemmell had learned through his evangelist contacts that a Roy Garland was having some problem with a man called William McGrath. My Section was interested in McGrath at that time because he was a leading figure in TARA, a Protestant extremist group. Another reason was to get an introduction to Garland through the 'vet' - a Mr McCormick. On this visit McCormick related to us some of Garland's problems which in themselves related to some form of perversion and evil activity by McGrath. The 'evil' was related to the perversion. I don't recall homosexuality being mentioned. McCormick agreed to introduce us to Garland and Captain Gemmell and I saw him at McCormick's house. This happened about the summer of 1975 I listened to conversation between...
the Captain and Garland, which included that Garland was trying to get the police and other people to expose McGrath's homosexual tendencies and that he was working in a boys' home as a housefather. At this meeting an arrangement was made for me to meet Garland and bring him to 123 Section Headquarters. Before I could keep the appointment with Garland I was instructed by Captain Gemmell that it was forbidden to see Garland again. Shortly afterwards that instruction was changed and I kept the appointment to see Garland. I interviewed Garland as arranged at 123 Section Headquarters. I conducted the interview alone. I took notes of what Garland said and our conversation was being monitored and recorded in another room. This was being done by Corporal [REDACTED]. After the interview I made out my report in longhand and gave it to Captain Gemmell. I used the tape recording and my own notes to make out my report. I now see a military document classified 'Secret' Reference 13912/2 dated 28 January 1976. The information contained in this document is to the best of my recollection identical to the information obtained from Roy Garland during the interview I had with him. Before conducting this interview I had been told by Captain Gemmell to confine the interview to McGrath's involvement with TARA and not to dwell on the homosexual aspects. Whilst I tried to stay on the subject of TARA, Garland at this interview wanted to relate details of McGrath's perversions. His opening remarks were "to give you an idea of McGrath's depravity he once tried to get me to go with a dog" meaning sexually. He told me that McGrath was a housefather at a boys' home. I am sure that Kincora was never mentioned as a name. Garland did mention letters he had got from McGrath and I think that he showed me some of them. I did not meet Garland again and I did not follow up McGrath's employment. I have no record of the dates I saw Garland. The notes I made during the interview were destroyed when I made out my report to Captain Gemmell.
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knock at their doors but that knock never came.

It also appears to have been stated on the same day at the HIA Inquiry that “young male teenagers from the organization (were taken) to his home for pep talks”. This I am convinced never happened. Members of Tara after the first meeting in Clifton Street met elsewhere, wherever they could find a place to meet. McGrath never met them again and would not have trusted them to take them to his home for “pep talks”. It just never happened.

I first approached Jim McCormick on the suggestion of a fellow Tara officer and evangelical Christian who like me, had heard him speak at meetings at Faith House. He took the information I gave him very seriously and tried desperately to get something done about Kincora but failed. It was out of frustration that he asked me to talk with Valerie Shaw, who he said could get to the core of the Free Presbyterian Church, and with the RUC in 1973.

I also agreed to speak with a Christian Military Intelligence Officer in 1975. I did these things despite the serious risks involved. Another MIO officer took me to Thiepval Barracks where he left a file entitled “Tara” on the table in front of me. I was expected to pick this up but although I was interested, I did not pick it up because I suspected it was some kind of trap. Incidentally I never went to see Jim McCormick for “counseling” but we visited McCormick at the suggestion of a Tara colleague as someone we both knew who would take a dim view of sexual abuse being allowed to continue. He had a good understanding of cults and the way some operated in dubious ways. (Inquiry transcript 23 June 2016 page 7).

I tried desperately to get William McGrath out of the Orange Order believing that this would help stop the abuse but was told by a UDR officer who knew about UDR and British intelligence that other people (M15 I believe) were also trying to deal with McGrath. I was told I needed to be careful lest I interfere with their work. I got nowhere and left the Orange Order as well as Tara and the Young Unionists and did not return to the senior Unionist party for 20 years. It seemed to me at that time that too many people already knew about McGrath and seemed prepared to accept his extreme politics and abuse of young Christians. By then I had learned that he had abused scores and possibly hundreds of young people at Faith House, which incidentally did not close in 1960 as stated in the Inquiry transcript but continued, as I assume the abuse continued, at least until William McGrath was arrested in 1981. Nor incidentally was the associated mission nonexistent as the Inquiry transcript report suggests at 05 07 2016 pages 84 – 85. The name Faith House was used of all the various premises used in 1941. The following is another scandalous, foolish and completely untrue allegation that seems like a further attempt to damage my credibility:

...Valerie Shaw ... “went to Paisley with a set of letters and papers written to one Roy Garland.” If we scroll down, please: “By McGrath when they were having an affair...” Now the importance of this ... is Valerie Shaw being spoken to by a police officer, who is then conveying the information to the Army”
They held meetings between themselves and KCC would single them out after meetings. They attempted to seduce them by claiming to have no emotional reason for this and he made them feel guilty by admitting to masturbation and then making up their guilt complex. This is important to emphasise as it is the very beginning of KCCs hold on them.

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Orthington McC is still on TARA scene and is now also Sec of Irish Heritage Lodge.

MacFarland, Monkstown previously of Premier Dve is currently an official in TARA. He has to been given info regarding IRA/FFA from SP at a meeting in Russell Court early this year. He is thought to own a business on the N'Ard's Rd, and was an associate of J.W. McKeague.

G. claims that KCC was responsible for spreading rumour of J.D. McKeaguess homosexual activities, having posters posted around Belfast "MIC2 ROY McKeague". According to R.G., A knows that KCC was responsible for this.

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13. So far as I can recall Mr Garland said in the course of our conversation that he had been abused by Mr McGrath – although the language used at the time was different to now and I don’t think I fully understood the meaning or significance of what was being explained to me. I think Mr Garland also mentioned wider abuse at a boys’ home but he did not provide the name “Kincora”. Mr Garland mentioned that the boys’ home had some connection with Ian Paisley and that, as he thought public figures in the Protestant community were aware of this abuse, he was afraid to go to the police.

14. I arranged to meet with Mr Garland again for a further discussion.

Roy Garland (Second Meeting)

15. Before I could meet with Mr Garland I was instructed by Captain Gemmell to cut off contact with him. I was not given a reason for this other than it was a direct order from HQNI. This instruction was then reversed. (I believe the decision was reversed within a day or two of its being made but I cannot be certain of that.) Captain Gemmell made clear, however, that I was to confine my discussions with Garland to potential extremist activity and keep away from sexual matters. I was concerned that this would not be possible given Garland’s interest in discussing these matters and said this to Captain Gemmell. Captain Gemmell also appeared to find the instruction extraordinary.

16. I accordingly met with Mr Garland and brought him back to 123 Section HQ for interview. I am certain that Captain Gemmell was not present. I met with Mr Garland and carried out this interview alone (save that it was being monitored by Corporal George).

17. In the course of my interview Mr Garland again referred to the abuse of boys at a boys’ home connected to the protestant community. I do not believe he mentioned the name “Kincora”. Mr Garland appeared to think that Mr McGrath may have intended to use this to blackmail the boys when they moved into political life. As a result of the limits set for the interview I do not think we gained much further information than was gleaned at the previous meeting.

18. No tape recording was made by Corporal [REDACTED] as the tape equipment failed. I took notes of the interview. These would have been destroyed when I typed up my report. I
UDR Captain N

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C3 currently IO TARA, wife Scots therefore has connections in Scotland believed to have TARA members in Scotland. Visits England and meets Phyllis Raffern (Nat Front). R.G. states that C3 is a transvestite who has made assistance from NCO regarding afore problem.
"These public meetings progressed to private meetings in which McGrath talked to the young men of 'mental blocks'. He wanted -- he would touch them on the privates, and if they objected, he would explain that they were tensed and keyed up and he called this a 'mental block'."

This never happened to my knowledge. I doubt McGrath would not have risked such an approach. From talking with victims I am convinced that the abuse was always conducted entirely in private and involved one victim at a time. It was so devious and camouflaged that a few victims insisted on denying having been abused. But this account seems inaccurate even in regard to the private abuse. He never talked of "mental blocks" but of "emotional blocks" which is different. Jim McCormick is credited with having made the following scandalous and unforgivable remarks:

"McGrath would then suggest that the boy needed liberating and in that manner induce them into homosexual acts. Garland said he had arranged for some twenty boys to be seen by McGrath for this purpose during the '60s. He said that McGrath used the same technique on women too."

I never ever said any of this and it did not happen. Neither do I believe Jim McCormick would have made such a hurtful and disgusting suggestion. Never has any victim of McGrath's abuse made such allegations. As I said Jim McCormick only knew what I told him and I certainly did not tell him this. It was he who introduced Brian Gemmell, then an officer in British Military Intelligence to me in 1975 after I agreed to talk with him. Gemmell has recently commented through emails, that "At no time, in all my Tara investigations, did I ever see anything stating, or even inferring, that you were homosexual or had a relationship with McGrath". He also said: "I am certain that Jim McC. would never have said such a thing. He was a man concerned with the truth and would not have made up things or embellished a story."

It is absolutely scandalous that such false allegations should be repeated publicly in a statutory inquiry. It is no excuse to claim that it reflects what some obscure document says. These are horrendous allegations. I did introduce a small number of young people to the Faith House Prayer meetings but would have been very angry had I thought McGrath had abused them. However what did happen, around 1970 - 1971, was that I talked with around a score of young and older people who admitted having been abused. What they said convinced me that McGrath was a serial and ruthless abuser. A number of these men were abused as long ago as the 1940s or early 50s. The lives of at least two of these and I believe some others, were seriously damaged. The pain they experienced remained with them for the rest of their lives. They never recovered. At least one was told by McGrath that he was a homosexual, which, being an evangelical, he found extremely damaging and painful. He became suicidal and spent time in a mental hospital. Now it would appear that the HIA Inquiry is using material, which seems to suggest precisely the same thing - that some, if not all, of McGrath’s victims were homosexuals in denial and the Inquiry is doing this in public. This I find scandalous and terribly cruel.
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STATEMENT OF: BRIAN SMART GEMMELL

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 enter "over 21"] OVER 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: EX ARMY CAPTAIN (NOW SALES MANAGER)

ADDRESS: C/O ARMY HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN IRELAND.

I declare that this statement consisting of 3 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 16 day of July 1982.

(Sgd) G CASKEY D/SUPT

SIGNATURE of MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received.

(Sgd) B S GEMMELL

SIGNATURE of WITNESS

I was a Captain in the British Army Intelligence Corps and I was stationed in Northern Ireland from December 1974 until December 1976. I resigned my commission in June 1977. When I first arrived in N Ireland I was posted to 123 Intelligence Section 39 Infantry Brigade. I was Officer Commanding 123 Section and remained with this section for my period in N Ireland. Towards the end of my service there I was appointed Staff Officer, Grade 3, on the Brigade Headquarters Intelligence staff. My particular responsibility was to collate and disseminate intelligence on Protestant Para-military groups. It was well into my tour that I met Roy Garland through James McCormick of Carryduff. I got to know Mr McCormick through my interest and association with Evangelical Christian Groups in N Ireland. The question of Tara was raised at one stage and that its leader William McGrath was a homosexual pervert. It was Mr McCormick who actually spoke to me about this and he suggested that I should speak to Roy Garland who was ex Tara and Garland was trying to expose Tara and McGrath. I was introduced to Garland by McCormick and I remember the gist of what he said. Garland was afraid of McGrath and he mentioned that McGrath owed him a lot of money and also owed other people money. He told me how McGrath had recruited young boys into his
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STATEMENT OF: BRIAN SMART GEMMELL

AGE OF WITNESS [if over 21 enter "over 21"] OVER 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: EX ARMY CAPTAIN (NOW SALES MANAGER)

ADDRESS: C/O ARMY HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN IRELAND.

I declare that this statement consisting of 3 pages, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 16 day of July 1982.

(Sgd) G CASKEY D/SUPT
SIGNATURE of MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received.

(Sgd) B S GEMMELL
SIGNATURE of WITNESS

I was a Captain in the British Army Intelligence Corps and I was stationed in Northern Ireland from December 1974 until December 1976. I resigned my commission in June 1977. When I first arrived in N Ireland I was posted to 123 Intelligence Section 39 Infantry Brigade. I was Officer Commanding 123 Section and remained with this section for my period in N Ireland. Towards the end of my service there I was appointed Staff Officer, Grade 3, on the Brigade Headquarters Intelligence staff. My particular responsibility was to collate and disseminate intelligence on Protestant Para-military groups. It was well into my tour that I met Roy Garland through James McCormick of Carryduff. I got to know Mr McCormick through my interest and association with Evangelical Christian Groups in N Ireland. The question of Tara was raised at one stage and that its leader William McGrath was a homosexual pervert. It was Mr McCormick who actually spoke to me about this and he suggested that I should speak to Roy Garland who was ex Tara and Garland was trying to expose Tara and McGrath. I was introduced to Garland by McCormick and I remember the gist of what he said. Garland was afraid of McGrath and he mentioned that McGrath owed him a lot of money and also owed other people money. He told me how McGrath had recruited young boys into his
circle of influence and it was partly religious and partly sexual -
masturbation being the main theme - how McGrath had spoken to small boys
about this subject. This occurred back in the 1960s and Garland was one
of these boys. Some of it developed into homosexuality and I believe that
this also included Garland. I recollect Garland saying something about
McGrath pursuing him after Garland got married and this was causing his
distress and that it might break up his marriage. I met Garland on two
occasions, first in McCormick's house and again in 39 Brigade Headquarters.
Corporal Q may have been present on the second occasion. At
this meeting I had an Intelligence file on Tara and spoke to Garland on
this subject and the various personalities connected with this group. Again
McGrath's homosexual tendencies, his background and all aspects of Tara were
discussed. Although I can't remember if it was named I do know that Garland
told me about McGrath being in charge of a boys' home. However I do remember
going to the Newtownards Road area looking for this home. I went there to
get the picture in my mind as to what we were working on. I remember seeing
a large detached house which I thought it was. I did not go into this house.
I remember that Garland was quite outraged that McGrath should be in charge
of a boys' home. I didn't feel too happy about it myself especially for
potential victims and the fact that McGrath was presenting an evangelical
front. Garland led me to believe that the Rev Ian Paisley was aware of
McGrath's activities. I made a written report of my second meeting with
Garland. I believe that this was a four side MISOR, which would have been
graded SECRET - UK eyes A. Because of the political implications surrounding
Tara the information was only passed to Headquarters N-Ireland and retained
at 39 Infantry Brigade HQ. After this interview I was debriefed by the
Assistant Secretary (Political) in his office at HQNI. I believe it was on
a Saturday morning just prior to lunch. The Assistant Secretary,
Mr Ian Cameron, was told by me the details of the interview I had with
Garland. I believe that the interview I had with the Assistant Secretary
was either tape-recorded or his secretary, a female, took notes. When I told
Mr Cameron about the homosexual involvement of various persons in Tara he
reacted very strongly and said that we did not want to be involved in this
kind of thing. He was abrupt to the point of being rude and instructed me to
terminate my enquiries concerning Tara and in particular to get rid of
another informant with whom I had been associating. This other informant was
not throwing any light on the subject in question, ie the homosexuality.
However other events took place shortly afterwards which resulted in the
circle of influence and it was partly religious and partly sexual -
masurbation being the main theme - how McGrath had spoken to small boys
about this subject. This occurred back in the 1960s and Garland was one
of these boys. Some of it developed into homosexuality and I believe that
this also included Garland. I recollect Garland saying something about
McGrath pursuing him after Garland got married and this was causing his
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terminate my enquiries concerning Tara and in particular to get rid of
another informant with whom I had been associating. This other informant was
not throwing any light on the subject in question, ie the homosexuality.
However other events took place shortly afterwards which resulted in the
Assistant Secretary reversing his decisions and allowing me to pursue the enquiry concerning Tara through the other informant. I can't remember any other specific information regarding McGrath and the boys' home. As I said I had only two meetings with Garland and it was he who gave me this information about McGrath and the home.
3. Gemmell explained that as OC 123 (Int Sect) HQ 39 Bde he had carried out numerous interviews in 1975 with individuals who were members of various loyalist groups in Belfast. One organisation of considerable interest had been Tara. He had been accompanied on a number of occasions by CPL [redacted] of the INT CORPS who was a member of his INT Sect. Through his own quote evangelical contacts in Belfast unquote Gemmell had interviewed two prominent loyalists: First W J McCormick and then through him, Roy Garland (note both of these men have recently given statements to Caskey and confirmed that these interviews took place.) Garland had told Gemmell the following:

A. That William McGrath was an evil man, a sexual deviant who undoubtedly corrupted the boys in his care.


C. Garland had married in approx 1974 and his previous homosexual experiences as a juvenile with McGrath were causing him embarrassment. Gemmell could not elaborate on this.

4. Gemmell said that he saw Garland on two occasions although it was possible that CPL [redacted] might have seen him once more.

5. Following his interview with Garland, Gemmell had produced a four page military intelligence source report (MISR) which had a restricted circulation of 3 copies. He was sure that one copy had gone to ASP (Ian Cameron).
WOULD BE OF INTEREST UNQUOTE. THE GARLAND TRAILS ENDS THERE. WE HAVE NO OTHER PAPERS ON HIM NOR DO WE (OR ) KNOW WHERE THE MISR WAS FILED. THE ARMY ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THIS DOCUMENT.

9. WE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED INTERVIEW WITH ACOS G2 ( ). ALTHOUGH IS AWARE OF THE CASE ACOS FELT THAT OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE BEST SERVED BY NOT SPEAKING TO HIM PRIVATELY BEFOREHAND. HE ASSESSED CASKEY AND TO BE WELL AWARE OF OUR INTERESTS IN THIS MATTER AND THOUGHT IT BEST TO LET MATTERS TAKE THEIR COURSE.

10. HSB HAS ASKED ADCI, DCI REP KNOCK AND TO DISCUSS THE STATE OF PLAY AT 1000 20 JULY. WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO ATTEND. WILL THEREFORE REPRESENT HIS INTERESTS.
I am at present the G2 at Headquarters Northern Ireland. This means that I am the main co-ordinating Staff Officer in the G2 (Intelligence) Branch at Headquarters, Lisburn, Northern Ireland. When the police started their enquiries into the allegations surrounding Kincora Boys' Hostel and the Army was contacted, I was appointed by Colonel Westropp, the senior officer of my branch, to assist the police in their enquiries and to search and to provide any documentary evidence considered relevant. My subsequent search embraced not only Headquarters Northern Ireland but also the Headquarters of 39 Infantry Brigade. I was advised by D/Superintendent Caskey and Captain L of the SIB as to the nature of the documents which would be relevant to the enquiry. I have subsequently extracted the following documents which I now produce as exhibits SWJS1 - 10. Exhibit SWJS1 is a report classified 'Secret' signed by Major Halford-Macleod and dated 28 January 1976 with file number 13912/2. This document is number 2 copy of 4 copies. Number 1 copy of this document is contained in the HQNI 'Tara' file (5523/6). The number 2 copy I retrieved from the G2 Branch at 39 Infantry Brigade, Lisburn. The other 2 copies would have been produced for the internal use of 3 Infantry Brigade which was the source of this document. 3 Infantry Brigade disbanded in January 1981 and it must be presumed that copies 3 and 4 were destroyed. SWJS2 is a one-page document. This document is dated in two parts, 6 July 1974 and 13 July 1974. It is classified 'Secret' and marked...
'UK EYES A'. I understand this to mean that it would only be seen by regular army personnel. Exhibit SWJS3 is a Military Intelligence Source Report cover dated 22 May 1975. Exhibits SWJS2 and J like exhibit SWJS1 were received from 39 Infantry Brigade. SWJS4 is a secret memorandum signed by [Major C] dated 26 February 1975 and headed 'William McGrath (TARA)' which I recovered from HQNI TARA file numbered 5523/6. Exhibit SWJS5 is a two-page document headed 'TARA' with a file reference SF/704/TNT and is undated. This I recovered from HQNI TARA file reference number 5523/6. SWJS6 is an undated two-page document with a file reference number of 3350/18 which I recovered from 39 Infantry Brigade. Exhibit SWJS7 is a three-page typed document, unsigned, which I believe was produced in 1982 by Mr Noakes, a civil servant, employed in G2 Branch HQNI. SWJS8 is a one-page document which has attached to it a photocopy of a booklet by Clifford Smith. This was retrieved from 39 Infantry Brigade's file. Exhibit SWJS9 is a one-page document dated 10 July 1974. It is marked 'Secret UK EYES A' and signed by [Major C]. This document I got from the HQNI TARA file. Exhibit SWJS10 is a document dated 5.1.77 and is an extract from MIONI page 74 and graded B2 information. I recovered this document from HQNI TARA file and would appear to have originated from RUC Special Branch. It has the HQNI file number 5512. The documents that I retrieved from 39 Infantry Brigade all came from the same file which relates to TARA. I have been asked to research a document which has the following reference number POLIO 4782/9/76LB. It is marked 'Classified and Confidential' and is undated. Having studied this document it is my opinion that this is not a military document as it bears none of the hallmarks of military procedure. I cannot trace this file number or attribute it to a military origin. I also conducted a search for a copy of this document in military files and could not find one.

SIGNATURE of STATEMENT MAKER: (Sgd) S W J Saunders
STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STATEMENT OF: STEPHEN WILLIAM JOHN SAUNDERS

AGE OF WITNESS (if over 21 enter "over 21"): OVER 21

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS: MAJOR

ADDRESS: C/O HQNI LISBURN

I declare that this statement consisting of one page, each signed by me is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence at a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated this 18th day of February 1983

(Sgd) S E Cooke, Inspector

(Sgd) S W J Saunders

SIGNATURE OF MEMBER by whom statement was recorded or received.

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

Further to my previous 2 statements made to the Royal Ulster Constabulary regarding searches carried out at HQNI and 39 Infantry Brigade for documentation relating to Kincora and associated matters. I can state that none of these searches produced a four-sided NISOR relating to Roy Garland which was allegedly submitted by former Captain Brian Smart Gemmell.

(Sgd) S W J Saunders

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
Major Saunders -- I want to show you 30173 -- when tasked by the RUC on foot of Brian Gemmell's assertion that he wrote a MISR, Major Saunders in his fourth statement to the police Inquiry of 18th February 1983, explains that he has searched for and cannot find a MISR document relating to Roy Garland that was said to have originated from Captain Gemmell. So at least with the MISR that does exist you can see that Brian Gemmell is not wrong. He did contribute to a MISR, just not of the form that he describes. At least no-one has ever been able to find one of the form that he describes and, as you know, Ian Cameron would tell his colleagues in the Security Service, though not ultimately back to the RUC, that he never destroyed any MISR and couldn't remember receiving one about Roy Garland.

CHAIRMAN: Well, the position is, as we understand it, that over the years many, many efforts have been made to find the MISR.

MR AIKEN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN: Not just in 1983, but indeed right up to the present time.

MR AIKEN: Yes. When Mr Rucker was writing his report, files that were available were looked into and no-one found the MISR. Obviously it was a fundamentally important document for this Inquiry, that it asked the
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOURCE REPORT

(To be used as the initial report of intelligence received through military agencies. If initial reports are sent by signal, all paragraphs numbers in this report are to be used)

1. Unit/Sub Unit Initiating report ____________________________

2. Located at ____________________________

3. Source Ref. ____________________________

4. Casual contact/ Arranged Interview/ Screening ____________________________

5. Source/Agent interviewer (No. Rank, Name) ____________________________

6. Report written by (No. Rank, Name) ____________________________

7. Report can be witnessed/substantiated by (No. Rank, Name) ____________________________

8. Unit File Ref. ____________________________

9. DOI ____________________________

10. Reliability and Accuracy ____________________________

11. Text of Report (incl. relevant comments) ____________________________

Contact gave me the attached documents on 20 May 75.

Document A is one that was issued by TARA about mid 1973.

Document B contains the last pages of two letters written by William McGrath, date of origin unknown.

Letters appear to be to Ray McQuaid who was studying at Covenant Bible College in 1973/4. The letters probably date from the

Date of completion of report 22 May 75

Text continued overleaf

3. Comment/Assessment/Action by Superior HQ ____________________________

Distribution

Research Offr 39 Inf Bde (2) ____________________________

117 ____________________________

Do not return to ____________________________

Corporal Q
22. The SIS officer comments that the papers attached to his Minute were obtained by Gemmell from his Army files and comprise a document entitled "Tara" – dated 14 October 1976 (Exhibit 2); notes on an interview with Roy Garland, made by Gemmell and an unnamed Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) following a "one off" meeting with Ian Cameron – undated (Exhibit 3); a media article entitled "The Paradox that is Tara" (Exhibit 4); and a copy of the Tara proclamation (Exhibit 5).

23. Three months later, on 31 January 1977, an officer from a UK-based SIS team initiated a telegram addressed to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland and copied to SIS London and MI5 (Article 3). The subject of the telegram was "William McGrath and Tara" and refers to various papers handed to SIS by Brian Gemmell in October 1976; in particular to the letter originating from HQ 3 Infantry Brigade, Lurgan dated 28 January 1976.

24. In his telegram the SIS officer confirms that a copy of the letter had been shared with MI5 who had asked if the source mentioned in the letter could be retasked for further information. The letter continues with the SIS officer saying that they had spoken to Gemmell who raised no objection to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland discussing the letter with the Army.
1. We attach copies of papers handed to [REDACTED] by GEISEL on 15 October, which he obtained from his Army files. He made the following comments on these papers:

   a. TARA - Not to File 3350/18 Vol II - This paper was written by GEISEL and is based on the contents of his file on TARA.

   b. Notes on interview with Roy GARLAND. These were made by GEISEL and an NCO after a "one off" debrief sanctioned by Ian CAMERON.

   c. Proclamation - GEISEL believes that may have had a hand in the drafting of this (and we would agree).

2. These papers provide useful material.
half to the platoon. If the platoons require stores they draw from the central fund. Due to inflation the 50p was probably increased.

MAJOR PERSONALITIES

OC - William McGrath, 5 Greenwood Ave. May be stood down due to ill health.

IO -

Admin Offr -

Secretary -

Military intelligence and RUC Special Branch records have about 30 names of members or former members of the organisation in the Belfast area.

"The 'raison d' être' of TARA seems to be the establishment and defence of a Protestant Ulster with the complete exclusion of the Roman Catholic Church. Their policy has always been based on the idea of the supremacy and purity of the Protestant faith and a change of direction is unlikely. Although Unionist, the greatest TARA driving force is Protestantism."
"What particular intelligence was he looking for from you, from your source?"

"Intelligence largely of a political nature on the Protestant side, I think was where his largest interest lay, but of course you couldn't be picky. When I went back to him with information I gave him everything that I could remember and everything, apart from trivia, that I thought relevant. We got to know one another. He was a considerably older man than me. He treated me in a friendly way, in a fatherly way. He gave me encouragement."

3. James was already cultivating his TARA source when he heard through Christian contacts that someone else wanted to talk to him about the organisation. That someone was Roy GARLAND.

"...However there are sexual overtones to all this: when Mr. GARLAND begins to accuse Mr. McGRATH of a selection of sexual perversions."

"Does Roy GARLAND mention KINCORA?"

"Yes he tells me that at that stage McGRATH has a position in KINCORA and that KINCORA is a boys' home, he's very concerned about that."

"Does he mention KINCORA by name or does he just say boys' home?"

"I believe it's by name, I can't remember exactly but I believe it's by name. He doesn't know exactly what is going on but we are, putting 2 and 2 together and making 4 when history shows that we should have made 6."

"Does he say that he believes that boys or young people are being abused in the boys' home?"

"I think he says he believes it but he doesn't know it to be true."

"No evidence?"

"I do not think he has been into the boys' home, put it that way."

"Are you concerned at the allegation?"

"I am concerned at the allegation. Yes."

"Did you believe him?"

"I believed that Mr. GARLAND believes he is telling me the truth. It obviously has to be investigated and enquired into."

4. James wrote a report of his meeting and sent it up to his army superiors as a matter of routine. He says it was then passed to MI5 who shared the same building at Army Head Quarters. Next thing he knew James was summoned to see the senior MI5 officer.

"I can't honestly say I was expecting 3 gold stars but I went up feeling fairly positive, expecting a normal meeting."
3. Gemmell explained that as OC 123 INT Sect HQ 39 Bde he had carried out numerous interviews in 1975 with individuals who were members of various loyalist groups in Belfast. One organisation of considerable interest had been Tara. He had been accompanied on a number of occasions by CPL [redacted] INT Corps who was a member of his INT Sect. Through his own quote evangelical contacts in Belfast unquote Gemmell had interviewed two prominent loyalists; first W J McCormick and then through him, Roy Garland (note both of these men have recently given statements to Caskey and confirmed that these interviews took place.) Garland had told Gemmell the following:

A. That William McGrath was an evil man, a sexual deviant who undoubtedly corrupted the boys in his care.

B. McGrath owed Garland £2,000.

C. Garland had married in approx 1974 and his previous homosexual experiences as a juvenile with McGrath were causing him embarrassment. Gemmell could not elaborate on this.

4. Gemmell said that he saw Garland on two occasions although it was possible that CPL [redacted] might have seen him once more.

5. Following his interview with Garland, Gemmell had produced a four page military intelligence source report (MISR) which had a restricted circulation of 3 copies. He was sure that one copy had gone to ASP (Ian Cameron).
Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing ...

EXHIBIT 8 (Page 3)

His first move was to report it to Cameron, an MI5 veteran who was working under the cover of a political adviser in the Northern Ireland Office.

"Ian Cameron was very much a father figure to me at the time," Mr Gemmell said.

"I was in my mid-20s and he was in his early 60s. He was normally a very nice chap, but he reacted very strongly.

"He told me that MI5 did not concern itself with what homosexuals did and he ordered me to stop using an agent I had within Tara, who we had codenamed Royal Flush."

However, Mr Gemmell was aware of efforts to recruit John McKeague, a loyalist paramilitary and abuser of teenage boys, as an informant, so he knew Cameron was lying.

The refusal to investigate Kincora led to Mr Gemmell severing his relations with the intelligence services when he left the Army two years later.

"It was a profession in which lies and cover-up were tools of the trade. As a Christian, I could not make that separation between private and professional morality," he said.

Two previous Government inquiries, the Terry Inquiry and the Hughes Inquiry, concluded that there was no military intelligence knowledge of child abuse at Kincora. Mr Gemmell was not interviewed by either of them.

Background

The First Minister Peter Robinson, Amnesty International and politicians across the board have called for the possible role of the intelligence services in covering up child abuse at Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast to be investigated as part of a UK-wide inquiry. On April 3, 1980, three members of staff at the home - William McGrath, Raymond Semple and Joseph Mains - were jailed for the systematic sexual abuse of children in their care going back to the early 1970s. Rumours have persisted that the abuse ring went further and included prominent people, both here and in the UK. It has been claimed that the security services were prepared to blackmail key figures as a means of controlling elements within loyalism and unionism as the Troubles flared.
Brian GEMMELL – allegations about MI5 blackmail

72. There have been a number of allegations about MI5 having blackmailed McGRATH or others involved in a paedophile ring involving Kincora. We have seen absolutely nothing in the Security Service records to support any of these allegations.

73. We are also aware of a separate allegation by Brian GEMMELL that during a visit to London in 1976, an MI5 officer told him that MI5 had film of John McKEAGUE, a well-known Loyalist paramilitary figure, involved in homosexual activities and asked for his (GEMMELL) views on how susceptible McKEAGUE would be to blackmail.

74. We have examined this allegation and established that MI5 had no compromising film of McKEAGUE and never made any attempt to blackmail him. However, one MI5 officer did put forward an operational proposal (which was never endorsed) which involved using McKEAGUE’s homosexual activities in London in an attempt to recruit him. We describe the chronology of events below.

75. The MI5 records confirm that GEMMELL met two MI5 officers in London on 10 May 1976 in connection with the handling of an agent unrelated to McKEAGUE.

76. In June 1976 McKEAGUE visited London as part of a UVF arms procurement operation. At various times during his trip, he was under surveillance by MI5 who suspected the UVF’s plans. The MI5 officers conducting surveillance of McKEAGUE did take some photographs of him in Central London. However, the photographs were not compromising or sexual in nature. All of them were taken in public areas, but some showed him in the company of young men.

77. It was apparent to those conducting surveillance that McKEAGUE’s contact with these young men was to establish homosexual assignations rather than part of the Loyalist arms procurement operation.

78. On 07 September 1976 GEMMELL had lunch in London with an MI5 officer, following which he (GEMMELL) was to attend a formal meeting with another MI5 officer as part of his application to join MI5. No formal record of the lunchtime meeting exists. It is clear from MI5 records, however, that the meeting was held at the request of the MI5 officer who, having become aware of GEMMELL’s intention to visit to London, wished to seize the opportunity to discuss with him how to move forward an existing CHIS case of which GEMMELL was aware, but which was unrelated to McKEAGUE.
50. GEMMELL re-applied to join the Security Service in 1976 after leaving the Army but was rejected. (See Figure 17: MI5 Note for File, 26 November 1976.)

51. Brian GEMMELL – the ‘missing’ MISR

This section focuses on Brian GEMMELL’s allegation that, in his role as an Army Intelligence Officer, he had run CHIS who reported to him on McGRATH’s abuse of the boys at Kincora. GEMMELL publicly named his sources as William McCORMICK, Roy GARLAND and James MILLER. Despite extensive searches of MI5’s records, we have been unable to confirm GEMMELL’s claims that he (GEMMELL) reported these allegations to MI5 ASP Ian Cameron.
1. CEMIL was an Officer Assistant for Chief Superintendent who was recessed office on 23 November 1975. He joined MI5 on 12 November 1975.

D - MI5 OFFICER

26 November 1975

E - ADMIN ANNEXATION
good background knowledge of Loyalist paramilitary and associated organisations but had never heard of TARA before.

5. I have been provided with a redacted, three-page copy of this report and acknowledge that this was the same document I was shown. However, I distinctly recall other elements of the report which have either been redacted or the copy I have been shown is incomplete. The missing elements I refer to concerned details of the TARA organisation, including: it’s background, it’s aims, it’s ‘Doomsday’ remit {as a replacement government structure in the event of a sell-out of NI by Westminster}; it’s recruitment policy, including the professional, social and financial requirement for potential members and the preference that they should already have a legally-held firearm. There was also reference to several leading members of the organisation having homosexual tendencies.

6. I also recall Sgt [REDACTED] commenting that the report had been passed ‘up the chain’ and that the instruction came back that no further action was to be taken. I personally did not question this at the time; however, I later had several discussions with Captain Gemmell at HQ 39 Bde during one of which he described how the report had been disseminated up to HQNI, in the normal way, but that a strongly worded rebuke had come back from them to drop the matter immediately – whether this rebuke was in written or verbal form, or by whom, I do not know. I do know from other, later, discussions with him that he continued privately to pursue the matter of TARA and reports of the abuse of boys at the Kincora premises. Capt Gemmell eventually left the Province, I believe prematurely, and I later heard that he had resigned his commission.

7. On one occasion, the date of which I cannot recall – although it would have been in the period of early 1976 – I was instructed to drive and escort an individual into East Belfast from HQ Northern Ireland. Such instructions were not unusual and there were several occasions when I, and others in similar roles, were instructed to drive and escort visitors from outside the Province, both military and civilian, to specific addresses or areas in Belfast. In such circumstances, it was normal procedure for the driver/escort to receive advance details of the address/location to be visited so that a risk assessment and route plan could be conducted. However, on this occasion I did not receive any advance
October 1976. (See Attachment L.) We should also bear in mind that any decision on issuing a MISR, based on the content of the Major's letter at least, would have taken into account the 'F' grading given at his Paragraph 2, which indicates that the reliability of the source(s) of the intelligence was unknown.

71. Whether GEMMELL ever did produce a MISR or not, it is notable that his October 1976 Note, based on his Tara file and written at the end of his Army career, made no mention of McGrath’s involvement in paedophilia or his employment at Kincora Boys’ Home.

Brian GEMMELL – allegations about MI5 blackmail

72. There have been a number of allegations about MI5 having blackmail McGRATH or others involved in a paedophile ring involving Kincora. We have seen absolutely nothing in the Security Service records to support any of these allegations.

73. We are also aware of a separate allegation by Brian GEMMELL that during a visit to London in 1976, an MI5 officer told him that MI5 had firm of John McKEAGUE, a well-known Loyalist paramilitary figure, involved in homosexual activities and asked for his (GEMMELL) views on how susceptible McKEAGUE would be to blackmail.

74. We have examined this allegation and established that MI5 had no compromising film of McKEAGUE and never made any attempt to blackmail him. However, one MI5 officer did put forward an operational proposal (which was never endorsed) which involved using McKEAGUE’s homosexual activities in London in an attempt to recruit him. We describe the chronology of events below.

75. The MI5 records confirm that GEMMELL met two MI5 officers in London on 10 May 1976 in connection with the handling of an agent unrelated to McKEAGUE.

76. In June 1976 McKEAGUE visited London as part of a UVF arms procurement operation. At various times during his trip, he was under surveillance by MI5 who suspected the UVF’s plans. The MI5 officers conducting surveillance on McKEAGUE did take some photographs of him in Central London. However, the photographs were not compromising or sexual in nature. All of them were taken in public areas, but some showed him in the company of young men.

77. It was apparent to those conducting surveillance that McKEAGUE’s contact with these young men was to establish homosexual assignations rather than part of the Loyalist arms procurement operation.
78. On 07 September 1976 GEMMELL had lunch in London with an MI5 officer, following which he (GEMMELL) was to attend a formal meeting with another MI5 officer as part of his application to join MI5. No formal record of the lunchtime meeting exists. It is clear from MI5 records, however, that the meeting was held at the request of the MI5 officer who, having become aware of GEMMELL's intention to visit to London, wished to seize the opportunity to discuss with him how to move forward an existing CHIS case of which GEMMELL was aware, but which was unrelated to McKEAGUE.

79. It was not until November 1976 that this same MI5 officer suggested, in light of McKEAGUE's involvement in arms procurement, that "serious consideration should be given to using [his] homosexual tendencies in an attempt to recruit him". The MI5 officer accepted that McKEAGUE's colleagues already knew him to be a homosexual, but he doubted that they were aware of how McKEAGUE spent his time when visiting London. The MI5 officer also judged that McKEAGUE's conduct after returning to Belfast in June 1976 following his arms procurement visit to GB had all the indications of someone who was anxious to conceal his homosexual activities in London.

80. The MI5 officer's proposal was considered by other members of the Service including management. This ploy was, however, opposed for a variety of reasons and it was pointed out that MI5's Legal Adviser doubted that MI5's management would accept such a proposal.

81. Based on MI5's contemporaneous papers, the officer's intention would probably have been to exploit what McKEAGUE - as well as his terrorist associates - would have regarded as insecure conduct in London: picking up young men whilst engaged in a covert arms procurement operation. It is clear that MI5 knew that McKEAGUE's homosexuality was recognised by his associates in NI, and he was therefore not susceptible to pressure on that account. In other words, any pressure felt by McKEAGUE would not have been in relation to his homosexuality per se but to his lax tradecraft and consequential threat to the success of their arms procurement operation and those involved. As we have already indicated, MI5 neither took nor possessed any compromising photographs.

James MILLER – McGrath, Kincora and media misrepresentation

82. There have been a number of claims that James MILLER was a CHIS and that he reported to his handlers on Kincora. Brian GEMMELL has claimed to have been one of MILLER's handlers.
October 1976. (See Attachment L.) We should also bear in mind that any decision on issuing a MISR, based on the content of the Major’s letter at least, would have taken into account the ‘F’ grading given at his Paragraph 2, which indicates that the reliability of the source(s) of the intelligence was unknown.

71. Whether GEMMELL ever did produce a MISR or not, it is notable that his October 1976 Note, based on his Tara file and written at the end of his Army career, made no mention of McGrath’s involvement in paedophilia or his employment at Kincora Boys’ Home.

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80. The MI5 officer’s proposal was considered by other members of the Service including management. This ploy was, however, opposed for a variety of reasons and it was pointed out that MI5’s Legal Adviser doubted that MI5’s management would accept such a proposal.

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James MILLER – McGrath, Kincora and media misrepresentation

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50. GEMMELL re-applied to join the Security Service in 1976 after leaving the Army but was rejected. (See Figure 17: MI5 Note for File, 26 November 1976.)

Brian GEMMELL – the ‘missing’ MISR

51. This section focuses on Brian GEMMELL’s allegation that, in his role as an Army Intelligence Officer, he had run CHIS who reported to him on MCGRATH’s abuse of the boys at Kincora. GEMMELL publicly named his sources as William MCCORMICK, Roy GARLAND and James MILLER. Despite extensive searches of MI5’s records, we have been unable to confirm GEMMELL’s claims that he (GEMMELL) reported these allegations to MI5 ASP Ian Cameron.
dated 11 February 1977. There are no records to indicate that SIS was aware of McGrath's involvement in child sex abuse at Kincora prior to his conviction in 1981.

19. On 19 October 1976, an SIS officer based in London wrote a letter to MI5 on the subject of William McGrath attaching a copy of a letter originating from HQ 3 Infantry Brigade based in Lurgan (Article 1). In his letter, the SIS officer does not state how the document was acquired by SIS other than to say that it was obtained unofficially. MI5 was asked to ensure that no action is taken without reference to SIS.

20. The 4 page MoD letter that was enclosed is dated 28 January 1976 and also includes two newspaper articles published in the Belfast Telegraph and the Hibernia in October 1975 (Exhibit 1). The title of the letter is "EXTREMIST PROTESTANTS SECRET ORGANISATION - TARA" and contains sections on William McGrath, Tara, Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303 and Ian Paisley.

21. On the same day (19 October 1976), a UK-based SIS officer initiated a Minute (Article 2) for distribution within SIS Headquarters in London. The subject of the Minute is Tara and is a cover document for attached papers handed to SIS by Brian Gemmell on 15 October 1976. Gemmell is a former Captain in the Intelligence Corps who claims that he passed on information relating to William McGrath's involvement in sexual abuse at Kincora to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.
5. McGrath joined the Orange Order around 1964 and widened his audiences by preaching at numerous Orange Lodge meetings. The tone of McGrath's addresses was always concerned with the preparation of Northern Ireland Protestants for a coming conflict which would determine their future and that of countless millions of others. Roman Catholics was allied with communism and Protestant Ulster was the main stumbling block in the path of these twin evils.

6. McGrath is a homosexual and makes a practice of seducing promising young men. They include David Browne, Deputy Editor of the Protestant Telegraph and Clifford Smythe, who at one time lived in McGrath's house and is now secretary of the UUC and DUP Convention Member for North Antrim.

7. Two of the contacts gave distinct impressions that McGrath was somehow associated with communism. McGrath is said to have attended a Revolutionaries Conference in Dublin in the mid-sixties at which 3 representatives from Eastern Bloc countries were present. This association may account for his financial position. Details are very obscure, but he managed to live in sizeable mansions in Belfast even though his only visible means of support was the sale of second-hand carpets from his house. McGrath is currently described from the 1975 Belfast Street Directory as a Welfare Officer. He is thought to be running some form of boys' home.

9. One of the contacts felt that Tara might have had some weapons but it only ever saw one. McGrath's policy was that officers did not handle weapons and should remain "clean." At one stage it talked about men having been in action.

10. The following have been named as Tara members:

a. Clifford Smythe, Belfast (mentioned in Ref A as a former DUP Convention Member for North Antrim, described as a schoolmaster in the Belfast Street Directory.

b. David Browne, Bangor (mentioned in Ref A as Admin Officer) Deputy Editor of the Protestant Telegraph.

c. Frank Millar Jr, Belfast (mentioned in Ref A as Adjutant). He is to, or may already have, married McGrath's daughter. Initially DUP, he became Independant Unionist Member for North Belfast. Described as a caulker in the Belfast Street Directory.

d. David Lyle, Bangor.

e. KIN 347, Belfast, on the committee of the Martyr's Memorial Church. He is said to be a contact for Tara arms.

f. Worthington McGrath, confirmed as living at 182 Upper Newtownards Rd, Belfast, the son of William McGrath. He is a member of the RUC (R) stationed at RUC Strandtown. He works in Frank Rea's, 26-28 Chichester St, Belfast, from where he obtains electronic bugs.
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10. The following have been named as Tara members:

a. Clifford Smythe, [omitted], Belfast (mentioned in Ref A as a former IO) DUP Convention Member for North Antrim, described as a schoolmaster in the Belfast Street Directory.

b. David Browne, [omitted], Bangor (mentioned in Ref A as Admin Officer) Deputy Editor of the Protestant Telegraph.

c. Frank Millar Jnr, [omitted], Belfast (mentioned in Ref A as Adjutant). He is to, or may already have, married McGrath's daughter. Initially DUP, he became Independent Unionist Member for North Belfast. Described as a caulk in the Belfast Street Directory.

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WALLACE - CALCUTT ENQUIRY

1. One point remains outstanding in relation to the evidence produced to the Calcutt Enquiry. That is the
   that was not shown to WALLACE but was revealed to the Chairman of the CSAB enquiry. How is that
to be handled? It is still extremely sensitive and should not come to the knowledge of WALLACE or be otherwise
publicised.

W P Cassell Esq
Head of General Staff Secretariat
Room 5137
MOD
Main Building
WE WOULD PREFER NOT TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH 3 BDE. WITHOUT SEEING THE CORRESPONDENCE TO WHICH SNUFFBOX REFERS, WE DO NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHAT THE LETTER WAS ABOUT NOR TO WHOM IT WAS SENT (OTHER THAN G INT 39 BDE.), NOR DO WE KNOW WHO THE SOURCE WAS. WITHOUT THESE DETAILS, WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT HQNI RECEIVED A COPY AND WE WOULD PREFER NOT TO RELY ON GEMMEL’S ASSURANCE THAT IT WOULD BE IN ORDER FOR TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH 3 BDE. COULD WE HAVE A COPY OF THE LETTER AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT CORRESPONDENCE PLEASE?

SEN| AT | QSL 4 | PR

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**OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL**
I attach a note summarising the background to our projected investigation of RIS involvement with the Protestant Extremists in Northern Ireland.

4 February 1977
FOLLOWING RECEIVED
DATED AND RECEIVED 15.2.77

15 FEB 77 1127Z

ADDRESSE ONLY INFO
ADDRESS

E-CLASSIFICATION
IN SNUFF BOX TARA

1. IS TO BE CONGRATULATED ON FLUSHING OUT VIA THIS SOURCE ON TARA.

2. WE LOOK FORWARD TO LEARNING MORE ABOUT THE ORBAT AND FINANCES OF THIS ORGANISATION. WHEN WE HAVE SUCH INFORMATION WE MAY BE ABLE TO PUT TARA IN ITS PROPER PERSPECTIVE.

3. TWO POINTS RAISED IMMEDIATELY BY YOUR TELEGRAM:
   (A) DISCOVER THE NAME OF TARA RECRUITING CAMPAIGN OFFER
   (B) WOULD THE SNUFF HOLES TO PENETRATE TARA, IF WE CONSIDERED IT A WORTHWHILE TARGET?

SENT AT 15/1635Z QSL AT 15/1630
T  "What particular intelligence was he looking for from you, from your source?"

J  "Intelligence largely of a political nature on the Protestant side, I think was where his largest interest lay, but of course you couldn't be picky. When I went back to him with information I gave him everything that I could remember and everything, apart from trivia, that I thought relevant. We got to know one another. He was a considerably older man than me. He treated me in a friendly way, in a fatherly way. He gave me encouragement."

3. James was already cultivating his TARA source when he heard through Christian contacts that someone else wanted to talk to him about the organisation. That someone was Roy GARLAND.

J  ". . . However there are sexual overtones to all this: when Mr. GARLAND begins to accuse Mr. MCGRATH of a selection of sexual perversions."

T  "Does Roy GARLAND mention KINORA?"

J  "Yes he tells me that at that stage MCGRATH has a position in KINORA and that KINORA is a boys' home, he's very concerned about that."

T  "Does he mention KINORA by name or does he just say boys' home?"

J  "I believe it's by name, I can't remember exactly but I believe it's by name. He doesn't know exactly what is going on but we are putting 2 and 2 together and making 4 when history shows that we should have made 6."

T  "Does he say that he believes that boys or young people are being abused in the boys' home?"

J  "I think he says he believes it but he doesn't know it to be true."

T  "No evidence?"

J  "I do not think he has been into the boys' home, put it that way."

T  "Are you concerned at the allegation?"

J  "I am concerned at the allegation. Yes."

T  "Did you believe him?"

J  "I believed that Mr. GARLAND believes he is telling me the truth. It obviously has to be investigated and enquired into."

4. James wrote a report of his meeting and sent it up to his army superiors as a matter of routine. He says it was then passed to MI5 who shared the same building at Army Head Quarters. Next thing he knew James was summoned to see the senior MI5 officer.

J  "I can't honestly say I was expecting 3 gold stars but I went up feeling fairly positive, expecting a normal meeting."
Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing...

EXHIBIT 8 (Page 3)

"Ian Cameron was very much a father figure to me at the time," Mr Gemmell said.

"I was in my mid-20s and he was in his early 60s. He was normally a very nice chap, but he reacted very strongly.

"He told me that MI5 did not concern itself with what homosexuals did and he ordered me to stop using an agent I had within Tara, who we had codenamed Royal Flush."

However, Mr Gemmell was aware of efforts to recruit John McKeague, a loyalist paramilitary and abuser of teenage boys, as an informant, so he knew Cameron was lying.

The refusal to investigate Kincora led to Mr Gemmell severing his relations with the intelligence services when he left the Army two years later.

"It was a profession in which lies and cover-up were tools of the trade. As a Christian, I could not make that separation between private and professional morality," he said.

Two previous Government inquiries, the Terry Inquiry and the Hughes Inquiry, concluded that there was no military intelligence knowledge of child abuse at Kincora. Mr Gemmell was not interviewed by either of them.

Background

The First Minister Peter Robinson, Amnesty International and politicians across the board have called for the possible role of the intelligence services in covering up child abuse at Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast to be investigated as part of a UK-wide inquiry. On April 3, 1980, three members of staff at the home - William McGrath, Raymond Semple and Joseph Mains - were jailed for the systematic sexual abuse of children in their care going back to the early 1970s. Rumours have persisted that the abuse ring went further and included prominent people, both here and in the UK. It has been claimed that the security services were prepared to blackmail key figures as a means of controlling elements within loyalism and unionism as the Troubles flared.
6. Confirmed that no repeat no mention was made of during the interview with Gemmel.

7. Commented that throughout the interview Gemmel had appeared relaxed and co-operative. He made no attempt to widen the discussion but remained content to confine his answers to Caskey's questions which were centred on Garland. After the interview Caskey told MOD Officer that his next step was to trace and interview Ian Cameron and CPL [redacted] (now SSGT [redacted]). Caskey said that before doing this he proposed discussing the matter at HQ RUC ([redacted] has confirmed that he saw Caskey with H/SB on the morning of 19 July). He also wished to find the MISR produced from the Garland interview and what action was taken on it.

8. Gemmel’s interview with McCormick on 25 March 1975 (which included a request for authority to approach Garland) is filed on file. Responding to this request MOD Officer wrote a note for file recording that Gemmel and [redacted] were told on 4 April 1975 by ASP and [redacted] that quote it was in order for Garland to be interviewed on the strict understanding that the overt and clearly expressed reason was a requirement for information on Tara. It was emphasised that the Army had no interest in investigation of deviant sexual activities or religious aspects of the group which was solely the function of a specialist section of the RUC. Therefore this discussion should be steered away from this type of issue, anything Garland might say about personalities involving particularly...
circle of influence and it was partly religious and partly sexual - exacerbation being the main theme - how McGrath had spoken to small boys about this subject. This occurred back in the 1960s and Garland was one of these boys. Some of it developed into homosexuality and I believe that this also included Garland. I recollect Garland saying something about McGrath pursuing him after Garland got married and this was causing him distress and that it might break up his marriage. I met Garland on two occasions, first in McCormick's house and again in 39 Brigade Headquarters.  

Corporal Q may have been present on the second occasion. At this meeting I had an Intelligence file on Tara and spoke to Garland on this subject and the various personalities connected with this group. Again McGrath's homosexual tendencies, his background and all aspects of Tara were discussed. Although I can't remember if it was named I do know that Garland told me about McGrath being in charge of a boys' home. However I do remember going to the Newtownards Road area looking for this home. I went there to get the picture in my mind as to what we were working on. I remember seeing a large detached house which I thought it was. I did not go into this house. I remember that Garland was quite outraged that McGrath should be in charge of a boys' home. I didn't feel too happy about it myself especially for potential victims and the fact that McGrath was presenting an evangelical front. Garland led me to believe that the Rev Ian Paisley was aware of McGrath's activities. I made a written report of my second meeting with Garland. I believe that this was a four side MISOR, which would have been graded SECRET - UK eyes A. Because of the political implications surrounding Tara the information was only passed to Headquarters N-Ireland and retained at 39 Infantry Brigade HQ. After this interview I was debriefed by the Assistant Secretary (Political) in his office at HQNI. I believe it was on a Saturday morning just prior to lunch. The Assistant Secretary, Mr Ian Cameron, was told by me the details of the interview I had with Garland. I believe that the interview I had with the Assistant Secretary was either tape recorded or his secretary, a female, took notes. When I told Mr Cameron about the homosexual involvement of various persons in Tara he reacted very strongly and said that we did not want to be involved in this kind of thing. He was abrupt to the point of being rude and instructed me to terminate my enquiries concerning Tara and in particular to get rid of another informant with whom I had been associating. This other informant was not throwing any light on the subject in question, ie the homosexuality. However other events took place shortly afterwards which resulted in the
1. Having received a message from Ian Cameron that he was about to go abroad for three weeks and wanted to know whether there were any matters I wished to discuss with him, I spoke to him on Monday 1 November about the questions which the RUC wished to put to him.

2. Cameron had no comments on the first five questions apart from pointing out that his duties were covered by formal terms of reference and agreeing that they illustrated the difficulties which I had anticipated. He had the following comments on the remaining questions:

Q6. He agreed that in the course of his duties he received intelligence from Gemmell.

Q7. He remembered that on some occasion Gemmell had passed him information but his own recollection was that it came from 

Q8. He agreed that Gemmell had informed him of an allegation that McGrath was a homosexual but had no recollection of any reference to a boys' home and did not agree that McGrath headed TARA.

Q9. He agrees that he would have told Gemmell not to pursue the allegation of homosexuality. He was also clear that the Army should not handle investigations in this field which were designed to procure leads to Paisley.

Q10. He does not accept that he reversed his decision but is not sure what the police are getting at.

Q11. The conversation was not tape recorded and he has no recollection of a secretary being present.

Q12. Not applicable.

Q13. If a secretary was present it could have been any one of number of girls - particularly if the meeting took place on a Saturday.
that you obviously have access to and on that file you
were able to find the documents that you referred to
paragraph 8?

A. Yes.

Q. And you explained, as you do in your statement, that you
don't at this remove have a recollection of the doing of
that, of the file, of the documents, but the point you
make to the Inquiry is the record that you created at
the time in 1982 will e been an accurate record of what
you found?

A. That is correct.

Q. And you explain that there is on the file an interview
with Jim McCormick on 25th March 1975, which included
a request for authority to approach Roy Garland. That
was filed on a particular file that was a local file
and, as we were discussing, unfortunately the local file
appears to have been destroyed and the records you were
looking at that you refer to in this paragraph it seems
did not transfer across to London, or if they did, they
weren't put where they were supposed to be and the
result of that is that the file where they would have
been expected to be found, there is no record of them
ever having been on that file, and consequently nobody
is able to produce them. So you are the last person
that we can identify who has at least seen these
M15's records, we have been unable to confirm GEMMELL's claims that he (GEMMELL) reported these allegations to MI5 ASP Ian Cameron.

52. In July 1982 an MI5 officer conducting research to assist with police inquiries into Kincora, reported finding in an Northern Ireland file a record of GEMMELL's interview with McCORMICK on 25 March 1975. The same MI5 officer wrote that GEMMELL and an Army colleague had been told on 04 April 1975 by ASP/Cameron and another MI5 officer that they could interview GARLAND on the strict understanding that it was to obtain information on Tara. The two MI5 officers emphasised that the Army had no interest in the investigation of "deviant sexual activities or religious aspects of the group" which was a matter for the RUC. Cameron had directed that their discussion with GARLAND should be steered away from this type of issue, by which we presume he meant homosexuality. (See MI5 Telex of 19/20 July 1982 - extract.)

53. We have confirmed that the NI local file seen by the MI5 officer which had contained GEMMELL's McCORMICK interview report has since been destroyed on an unknown date. The file in question did not relate to McCORMICK who, as far as we can tell, was never the subject of an MI5 file. GEMMELL's interview report has not been found elsewhere during any of the subsequent searches of M15's records.

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**MI5 Telex of 19/20 July 1982 – extract**

[VCSP: Will be crop of original in final version.]

GEMMELL's INTERVIEW WITH MCCORMICK ON 25 MARCH 1975 (WHICH INCLUDED A REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO APPROACH GARLAND) IS FILED ON [REDACTED] PF. RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST [REDACTED] WROTE A NOTE FOR FILE RECORDING THAT GEMMELL AND [REDACTED] WERE TOLD ON 04 APRIL 1975 BY ASP AND [REDACTED] THAT QUOTE IT WAS IN ORDER FOR GARLAND TO BE INTERVIEWED ON THE STRICT UNDERSTANDING THAT THE OVERT AND CLEARLY EXPRESSED REASON WAS A REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION ON TARA. IT WAS EMPHASISED THAT THE ARMY HAD NO INTEREST IN INVESTIGATION OF DEVIANTE SEXUAL ACTIVITIES OR RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE GROUP WHICH WAS SOLELY THE FUNCTION OF A SPECIALIST SECTION OF THE RUC. THEREFORE THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD BE STEERED AWAY FROM THIS TYPE OF ISSUE.

54. Although GEMMELL claimed subsequently to have written a MISR (Military Intelligence Source Report) on this topic, we have been unable to find one in MI5's records during extensive searches conducted for the HIAI. Earlier efforts have also been unsuccessful, including those conducted by an MI5 officer in 1982. However, MI5 records do contain an Army letter written in January 1976 not by Captain GEMMELL, but by Army Major A, which we judge to be of some relevance and
6. CONFIRMED THAT NO REPEAT NO MENTION WAS MADE OF DURING THE INTERVIEW WITH GEMMEL.

7. COMMENTED THAT THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEW GEMMEL HAD APPEARED RELAXED AND CO-OPERATIVE. HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO WIDEN THE DISCUSSION BUT REMAINED CONTENT TO CONFINCE HIS ANSWERS TO CASKEY'S QUESTIONS WHICH WERE CENTRED ON GARLAND. AFTER THE INTERVIEW CASKEY TOLD THAT HIS NEXT STEP WAS TO TRACE AND INTERVIEW [IAN CAMERON AND CPL (NOW SSGT)]. CASKEY SAID THAT BEFORE DOING THIS HE PROPOSED DISCUSSING THE MATTER AT HQ RUC (HAS CONFIRMED THAT HE SAW CASKEY WITH H/SB ON THE MORNING OF 19 JULY). HE ALSO WISHED TO FIND THE MISR PRODUCED FROM THE GARLAND INTERVIEW AND WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN ON IT.

8. GEMMEL'S INTERVIEW WITH MCCORMICK ON 25 MARCH 1975 (WHICH INCLUDES A REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO APPROACH GARLAND) IS FILED ON . RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST WROTE A NOTE FOR FILE RECORDING THAT GEMMEL AND WERE TOLD ON 4 APRIL 1975 BY ASP AND THATquote it was in order for Garland to be interviewed on the 'strict understanding that the overt and clearly expressed reason was a requirement for information on Tara. It was emphasised that the army had no interest in investigation of deviant sexual activities or religious aspects of the group which was solely the function of a specialist section of the RUC. Therefore this discussion should be steered away from this type of issue, anything Garland might say about personalities involving particularly...
WOULD BE OF INTEREST UNQUOTE. THE GARLAND TRAILS ENDS THERE. WE HAVE NO OTHER PAPERS ON HIM NOR DO WE KNOW WHERE THE MISR WAS FILED. THE ARMY ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THIS DOCUMENT

9. WE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED INTERVIEW WITH ACOS G2 ( ). ALTHOUGH IS AWARE OF THE CASE ACOS FELT THAT OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE BEST SERVED BY NOT SPEAKING TO HIM PRIVATELY BEFOREHAND. HE ASSESSED CASKEY AND TO BE WELL AWARE OF OUR INTERESTS IN THIS MATTER AND THOUGHT IT BEST TO LET MATTERS TAKE THEIR COURSE.

10. HSB HAS ASKED ADCI, DCI REP KNOCK AND TO DISCUSS THE STATE OF PLAY AT 1000 20 JULY. WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO ATTEND: WILL THEREFORE REPRESENT HIS INTERESTS.

BT
I spoke to Sir John Hermon, Chief Constable RUC, on 11 November about the RUC's efforts to obtain a statement from Ian Cameron on Kincora. Initially it was clear that Hermon thought that our objections were bureaucratic but his attitude altered when I deployed the arguments set out in LA's letter of 3 November to DCI and made the point that this line had been cleared with the Attorney General and his Legal Secretary. I also told him that the Attorney General had described the information available to Cameron as "hearsay upon hearsay" and I stressed the fact that it was in no way specific. Hermon then said that it now appeared that we were seriously concerned that the intelligence effort could be impaired if the RUC were to continue down this road. I confirmed this and invited Hermon's attention to the opening questions in the proposed RUC questionnaire and the difficulty Cameron would have dealing with these, now that he was retired, and given his obligations under the OSA.

2. Hermon then said that he was going to the USA on the following morning and would not be back in office until the first full week in December. He would then go into the whole matter again with a view to stopping these enquiries to Cameron. But he said that he did have difficulties. First his primary concern was to ensure that the RUC handled this enquiry in an entirely professional and competent way. The matter was politically controversial and he did not want there to be any apparent failing in the RUC's enquiries which could be used to support charges of a cover-up. In this connexion he said that he had not yet received the report of the Chief Constable of Sussex (George Terry) into the RUC's past enquiries. Secondly, although he anticipated no trouble with Whiteside or Casoble in discontinuing the Cameron sideline, there were other more junior detectives involved whose motives he suspected and who could possibly leak any apparent failure in this area to those with a malicious political axe to grind. It was left that Hermon now understood and sympathised with our position, that he would take the question up again on his return from the States and would almost certainly be in touch with me then.

... / ...
2. The following points should be noted in relation to the meeting with RUC:
   a. the object of the meeting is to get guidance from SB on how we approach CASKEY;
   b. Declaration of Source Protection

This is unavoidable and we suggest (subject to clearance) that [redacted] should be 'declared' to HSB as soon as possible. We do not think this should be too damaging. It is a political source and HSB knows that we run political sources. It is of course important, that the declaration should be presented in such a way that it does not jeopardise the excellent relations between [redacted] and RUC SB and our expectation of further useful developments on that front. [redacted] will be the best judge of how to play this;

c. CASKEY

It will be important to get a view of CASKEY, a steer on how he should be approached and by whom, and some indication of how best his attention can be focussed on matters strictly relevant to KINCORA and away from [redacted] issues.

d. The Enquiry

We need to know more about the mechanics of the Enquiry. To whom will CASKEY's reports go, for instance, and is he likely to ask for papers?

e. Our team should not volunteer more than is necessary about GEMMEL, Ext ASP (Cameron) etc and it is important that what they say should not conflict with information already available from the Army;

f. On the question of CAMERON's involvement in GEMMEL's activities (vis a vis GARLAND and McCORMICK) and the fact that information from these sources about McGrath's et al was never passed to RUC at the time, we suggest that you say that CAMERON suspended the case as soon as discussions between [redacted] and GEMMEL entered these murky waters.

1. Insert 'NNNN' as last line of text, or 'CCCC' if using another continuation sheet.
8. We were obliged in conversation to say rather more to Caskey about Gemmel then we had intended and he knows of his activities and his application to the service. We did not mention but referred to Security Service Intelligence activities. We were all impressed by Caskey who in turn obviously respected HSB. Without bending any rules Caskey will do what HSB wants. We emphasised that our sole concern was to ensure Intelligence matters did not receive an airing in Public.

9. We will keep you informed of further developments.

BT

07/)
E - TRANSMISSION METHOD

FROM STORMONT
DATED AND RECEIVED 5.8.82
IMMEDIATE

E - CLASSIFICATION
OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL

E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE
FOR LA AND DES
BT

TO SNUFFBOX IMMEDIATE
IN SNUFFBOX FOR LA AND
IN RUC HQ KNOCK PERSONAL FOR
FROM KINCORA AND CAMERON
REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM ADDSD OF 23 JULY 1982.

E - TRANSMISSION METHOD

1. FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSION ON 26 JULY I GAVE YOUR VIEWS TO HSB WHO SAID HE WOULD HAVE A WORD WITH CASKEY AND THEN ASK ME TO REPEAT PARAGRAPH THREE OF YOUR TUR TO CASKEY.

2. I HEARD NO MORE UNTIL 4 AUGUST WHEN CASKEY PHONED FROM DSHB’S OFFICE. HSB WAS AWAY FOR THE DAY AND CASKEY WAS TO START LEAVE ON 5TH. I ESTABLISHED THAT HSB HAD NOT SPOKEN TO CASKEY SO I WENT OVER TO KNOCK, EXPLAINED THE PROBLEM TO DSHB (WHO SAW THE DIFFICULTY) AND HE CALLED IN CASKEY TO WHOM I EXPLAINED YOUR PRINCIPLE – THAT NO SERVING OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE SECURITY SERVICE SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED BY THE POLICE.
I THEN GAVE HIM CAMERON’S RECOLLECTIONS AS IN PARA. 3 OF YOUR TUR.

3. CASKEY MADE A NUMBER OF POINTS:

A. ONE OF THE ASPECTS OF THE ENQUIRY THAT HE IS PURSUING IS THAT ‘MILITARY INTELLIGENCE’ WAS AWARE THAT MCGRATH WAS COMMITTING CRIMINAL OFFENCES BUT THEY CONCEALED THIS OR DID NOT REPORT IT FOR THEIR OWN REASONS; THIS, IF TRUE WAS A CRIMINAL OFFENCE. GARLAND HAS ALLEGED THIS AND WALLACE HAS HINTED AT IT TO CASKEY SEMI COLON

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FROM STORMONT
DATED AND RECEIVED 5.8.82
IMMEDIATE

E. CLASSIFICATION
E. DOCUMENT
REFERENCE
FOR LA AND DES
BT
TO SNIFFBOX IMMEDIATE
RP IMMEDIATE

IN SNIFFBOX F02 LA AND DES
IN HQNI FOR IMMEDIATE
IN RUC HQ PERSONAL FOR IMMEDIATE
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/ B. ......
B. WALLACE HOWEVER HAS NOT YET GIVEN A STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH GRANTED LIMITED IMMUNITY BY DPP HE WANTS MOD TO ABSOLVE HIM FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER OSA. (HE ALSO SAYS THAT WITHOUT RETURNING TO LISBURN TO EXAMINE THE RECORDS (WHICH HE THINKS WOULD TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS) HE CAN'T BE MUCH HELP EXCLAMATION MARK CASKEY FORESEES DIFFICULTIES FOR MOD AND NIO SEMI COLON

C. ACC WHITESIDE HAS AGREED THAT ALL ASPECTS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THAT CASKEY HAS TOUCHED ON IN HIS ENQUIRY (GEMMELL, WALLACE, CAMERON ETC) WILL BE IN A SEPARATE SECRET REPORT TO DPP SEMI COLON

D. CAMERONS RECOLLECTIONS TIE IN WITH WHAT GEMMEL SAID:

E. GEMMELL MADE IT CLEAR TO CASKEY THAT DID NOT PROPOSE TO SHOULDER THE BLAME FOR HIS PART IN THIS AFFAIR. HE STATED CLEARLY THAT CAMERON ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION ON GEMMELL'S REPORT SO IF AT ANY PUBLIC ENQUIRY CAMERON DOES NOT APPEAR GEMMELL COULD EMBARRASS WIS. SEMI COLON

F. CAMERON COULD BE SUBPOENA'D TO APPEAR AT A PUBLIC ENQUIRY SEMI COLON

G. CASKEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET LA, EXPLAIN TO HIM WHAT QUESTIONS HE WANTED CAMERON TO ANSWER AND THEN RECEIVE A WRITTEN STATEMENT DRAWN UP BY LA AND CAMERON. CASKEY RETURNS FROM LEAVE ON 23 AUGUST AND WOULD LIKE TO MEET LA SOON AFTERWARDS IF THIS IDEA IS ACCEPTED

/ H. ........
At a meeting with the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (at which Mr Steel, the Acting Legal Secretary, was also present), I referred to the police investigations into Kincorra House. I had previously informed the Attorney General of my intention to do so and had given him a brief description of developments.

2. I said that SIB (acting in conjunction or on behalf of the RUC) had taken a statement from a former Army intelligence officer to the effect that one of his agents reporting on a different subject (TARA) had reported on his behalf that McGrath of Kincorra House was engaged in homosexual activities. He said that he had made a report about this to Ian Cameron, a member of the Security Service on secondment to HQNI, who had told him to take no further action. I said that the RUC had wished to interview Cameron who of course required authority to make any disclosures which might involve his work. We had seen Cameron who had confirmed that, although he no longer remembered the details, he had received such a report from the Army officer and would have told him that he should cease collecting information of this sort upon the ground that it was not his business. We had asked Cameron whether he had made any report to the RUC and he had said that he would not have done so as neither he nor the Army officer had any direct information on the subject and had no means of knowing whether it was true. I said that this had been reported to the RUC but we had been unwilling to allow Cameron to make a formal statement. He had no personal knowledge which was relevant to any alleged offence and it also appeared that the RUC thought that they were collecting evidence for an enquiry as well as investigating criminal offences. If there were other factors which had not been declared to us, we would of course reconsider the position and equally if there should be a public enquiry we would discuss the handling of any relevant information which we might have (and I thought we had none) with those responsible for setting it up. We were not, however, willing to create statements which did not appear to assist in the criminal investigation and which might touch upon the organisation of intelligence in Northern Ireland – particularly as we had no idea who would have access to the statements or whether their creation might not automatically lead to their disclosure in the event of an enquiry. I said that the Chief Constable had been informed of our position and that I wished the Attorney and the DPP to be aware of it also to facilitate discussions about the handling of any problems of which we were unaware. The Attorney General commented that any information which Cameron could give would appear to be "hearsay upon hearsay". The DPP, Barry Shaw, said that this problem had not been reported to him and he would ascertain the position.
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3. After a meeting with the Attorney General on 24 September, Jim Nursaw and Henry Steel told me that Barry Shaw had raised the subject again with the Attorney in the interim and appeared to have obtained some sympathy for his attitude. Nursaw said that he had developed an argument that he needed to know whether Cameron had made a report to people in the Northern Ireland Office where there were some suspects. Their failure to take action in that event might be significant. Nursaw said he regarded this as very far fetched and had suggested that the police should set out a clear list of questions to which they wished to have answers. He thought that this advice would be followed. I said that we would consider any such request on its merits but the police would also have to come clean with us about their objectives. If there was a real as opposed to a fanciful problem we would certainly wish to find ways of helping.

Bernard Sheldon

LA
1 October 1982
SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH MR IAN CAMERON

Assistant Chief Constable 'C'

It is essential to the Kinora Enquiry that Mr Ian Cameron be interviewed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in relation to intelligence concerning Kinora Boys' Hostel allegedly passed to him by Military Intelligence Officers.

I hereby submit a list of questions to be put to Mr Cameron.

It will be necessary in the first instance to ask Mr Cameron to provide such personal details as full name, age, occupation, address or contact address.

Whilst it is intended to adhere to the list of questions now supplied answers to these questions may demand a follow-up question or questions:

Q1 What was your period of service in Northern Ireland? - giving dates
Q2 In what capacity were you employed?
Q3 Where were you employed?
Q4 What did your duties entail?
Q5 Do you accept that you were attached to UDR at Edenderry?
Q6 In the course of your duties were you supplied with intelligence by Captain Brian S Greemell who was the Officer Commanding 12) Intelligence Section 39 Infantry Brigade and later Staff Officer Grade III on the Brigade Headquarters Intelligence Staff?
Q7 Mr Greemell has alleged that on a Saturday morning between December 1974 and December 1976 that he had a meeting with you in your office at RUC when he passed on information he had obtained from a Mr. Roy Garland.
Q8 Mr Greemell has also alleged that at this meeting he passed on to you, intelligence provided by Garland which included information that a William McGrath who headed an organisation named TARA was a homosexual and was employed in a boys' home.
Further to your conversation last week with the Chief Constable about this subject I forward herewith a report by the officer conducting the police investigation into the Kintra Scanda, Superintendent George Cameron.

The questions are all relevant and clearly define the area of police interest. It may be that if Mr Cameron answers certain questions in a certain way further unscripted questions may have to be asked in order to clarify some points so raised. I mention this lest there would be any misunderstanding about unscripted questions being asked.

E-SIGNATURE

J A WHITESIDE
Assistant Chief Constable "C"

J Boarn Beg
Northern Ireland Office
Stornoway House
Belfast
BT4 2ET
Jim Nusraw, the Legal Secretary to the Attorney General, spoke to Barry Shaw, the Northern Ireland DPP, last week about the questions which the RUC wished to put to Cameron. He told him that in his view these questions did not properly arise on any investigation. Shaw said he had no knowledge of them and made it plain that he was not behind them. He gave Nusraw to understand that he would not be concerned one way or another whether they were answered. Nusraw did not get an opportunity to speak to Philip Woodfield or Jack Hermon.

2. I have made it plain to Nusraw and to Barry Shaw and the Attorney General that our unwillingness to authorise Cameron to give a statement should not be taken as meaning that we have anything to hide in connexion with homosexual offences or that we wish to be obstructive. We believe that we have nothing to contribute to any criminal investigation and are unwilling to allow statements to be taken from Cameron which will disclose intelligence arrangements to those who have no need to know. We are conscious that once a statement has been taken we will have no control over who has access to it and that its very existence could cause problems if an enquiry is ordered. If an enquiry is ordered, we would of course be in touch with those responsible for arranging evidence for it (this would normally be the Treasury Solicitors) if it was thought that we had some contribution to make. Nusraw has suggested that it might be sensible to explain the position informally to the Chief Constable and to stress that we have no knowledge of criminal offences.

3. By chance Cameron phoned at the end of last week to enquire whether there were any questions I wanted to put to him before he went overseas for another /.../ or so. I spoke to him yesterday and attach for your information his comments on and answers to the RUC questions. I have also sent this to /.../ and have asked them to let me know who was aware of the Gemell report so that we can assess the issues. In logic the RUC would wish to put similar questions
I spoke to Sir John Hermon, Chief Constable RUC, on 11 November about the RUC's efforts to obtain a statement from Ian Cameron on Kincora. Initially it was clear that Hermon thought that our objections were bureaucratic but his attitude altered when I deployed the arguments set out in LA's letter of 3 November to DCI and made the point that this line had been cleared with the Attorney General and his Legal Secretary. I also told him that the Attorney General had described the information available to Cameron as "hearsay upon hearsay" and I stressed the fact that it was in no way specific. Hermon then said that it now appeared that we were seriously concerned that the intelligence effort could be impaired if the RUC were to continue down this road. I confirmed this and invited Hermon's attention to the opening questions in the proposed RUC questionnaire and the difficulty Cameron would have dealing with these, now that he was retired, and given his obligations under the OSA.

2. Hermon then said that he was going to the USA on the following morning and would not be back in office until the first full week in December. He would then go into the whole matter again with a view to stopping these enquiries to Cameron. But he said that he did have difficulties. First his primary concern was to ensure that the RUC handled this enquiry in an entirely professional and competent way. The matter was politically controversial and he did not want there to be any apparent falling in the RUC's enquiries which could be used to support charges of a cover-up. In this connexion he said that he had not yet received the report of the Chief Constable of Sussex (George Terry) into the RUC's past enquiries. Secondly, although he anticipated no trouble with Whiteside or Caskie in discontinuing the Cameron sideline, there were other more junior detectives involved whose motives he suspected and who could possibly leak any apparent failure in this area to those with a malicious political axe to grind. It was left that Hermon now understood and sympathised with our position, that he would take the question up again on his return from the States and would almost certainly be in touch with me then.

... / ...
search for information about TARA as too sensitive to be handled by the Army,

c. I said that CAMERON was a senior officer of MI5 who had been seconded to HQNI to advise upon the conduct of Army intelligence operations. TERRY said that he personally had not previously been aware that he was anything other than a civil servant,

d. DCI's meeting with the Deputy Chief Constable of the RUC,

e. my discussions with the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions MI in October at which I informed them of the action we had taken and had stressed that if there were problems of which we were unaware we would wish to take part in discussions to resolve them,

f. the list of questions prepared by the RUC which they wished to put to CAMERON. These confirmed our fears that, if permitted, they would lead to an unacceptable identification of UK intelligence officers and their functions,

g. meeting with the Chief Constable in November 1982 and his belief that HERMON would sort matters out on his return from the United States,

h. DG's meeting with HERMON on 13 January at a FBI party at which HERMON said that WHITESTEIDE had told him two days earlier that their enquiries were at an end,

i. CASKEY's interview with SSgt A on 11 January and his references to a Security Service cover up. I said that I understood that there had now been a further interview with Major C at which CASKEY had made similar remarks,

j. the meeting with Sir Philip Woodfield on 20 January at which it had been agreed that Woodfield would attempt to arrange a meeting in London to be attended by HERMON, NURSAW the Legal Secretary and myself. At the same meeting with Woodfield it had been agreed that I should seek a meeting with TERRY to see whether there was any part which he could take in the resolution of this matter and whether he would be prepared to do so,
SECRET

24 February 1983

THE KINORA ENQUIRY - IAN CAMERON FORMER OFFICER IN THE SECURITY SERVICE, NOW RETIRED

You will recall that I wrote to you on 11 October 1982 regarding this subject. I received a verbal reply from the Deputy Chief Constable on 16 November 1982 which indicated that Mr Cameron was not available for interview by the RUC and there were no replies to the questions listed in an attachment to my letter.

Since then the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office and the Chief Constable of the RUC have had further discussions on this subject and, as a result of what was agreed I request that arrangements be made for the RUC officers conducting the investigation of allegations concerning the so-called Kincora Scandal to interview Mr Cameron or, if this is not possible, to obtain from him a statement, and forward it to me, as to any knowledge he may have of the matters specified in the attached copy of a report by D/Superintendent Caskie dated 11 October 1982.

If there is any difficulty about RUC officers having an interview with Mr Cameron, or obtaining a statement from him, may I ask you to inform Her Majesty's Attorney General in order that he may obtain such information as requested and which he considers relevant. Obviously it will be for the Attorney General to decide whether to forward the information to the RUC or the DPP or to retain it until the RUC report reaches the DPP.

J A WHITESIDE
Assistant Chief Constable

Mr J E Bourn
Deputy Under Secretary of State
Northern Ireland Office
Stornont Castle
Stornont
BELFAST
DIRECTOR’S OFFICE MEMO

Tel
To

MR JOHN BLELLOCH

Date 12 February 1982

File No. ED.146

Called.

SUBJECT KINCORA INQUIRY

Mr John Blelloch, Deputy Secretary, NIO, telephoned me at approximately 12.30 pm today. He said he had been speaking to the Permanent Secretary (Philip Woodfield) who had suggested that Mr Blelloch should speak to me. He was speaking in the light of statements made by QC (Ferguson and McCartney). It was a possibility the Chairman of the present Inquiry, Mr Stephen McGonagle, would be holding a press conference later today.

Mr Blelloch indicated that although he had not hitherto been directly involved with this matter he had had discussions today within the NIO against the background of public comment being hostile to the Government. The public remains unpersuaded that the Inquiry goes sufficiently wide and seemingly does not understand or accept the parallel action being undertaken at the same time, i.e. police investigations. Consideration has to be given to possible change in the form of Inquiry and the (alternative of) reminding the public that the due and proper process of the law should not be subverted or perverted.

Mr Woodfield wished to know how I view matters this morning.

I expressed the view that a statement needed to be made forcefully clarifying the fact that police investigations are under way and that it is duty of people who have information to make it available to the police. I referred Mr Blelloch to section 5 of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967. I said that I understood the Inquiry to be into administrative and disciplinary aspects of how the Home was run and this fact together with the police investigation aspect should be re-emphasised. In the course of our discussion I said that I was not aware—because I had not sufficient knowledge—of any useful inquiry procedure between the present Inquiry and a full scale tribunal of inquiry. Mr Blelloch expressed himself to be similarly in the dark. I said that if there were to be a full tribunal of inquiry there would certainly be requests for immunity from prosecution and I was doubtful if at the end of the day there would be likely to be prosecutions. My interest as Director was to have the way clear for any prosecutions which ought to be brought. I therefore favoured police investigations continuing. I said that whether the Inquiry should be left as it is or a tribunal set up is however a political decision.

Mr Blelloch said my analysis agrees with the lines of thought within NIO who have to consider whether events are manageable as they are going. The theoretical choices are between the same Inquiry and staying silent i.e. making no statement or changing the form of inquiry (possibly short of a full blown tribunal?) or the same Inquiry and making a statement, in which event the questions would be who would make the statement, when and in what terms? I deprecated strongly and conveyed to Mr Blelloch my depreciation of Ferguson QC, a Silk in the Inquiry withdrawing from it and speaking as he has done. I said I did not know whether McCartney QC is or has been professionally involved with the Inquiry. Mr Blelloch said he did not know.
week before publication (I gathered that meetings between these two were either unknown or very rare).

5. FLENLEY did not believe that CASKEY thought that there had been any Security Service involvement in the affairs of KINORA and stressed that he was pursuing his enquiries to protect his own position.

h. FLENLEY explained how CASKEY had come to learn of the arrangements for my visit. His Chief Constable had asked him to expedite the delivery of a draft report from CASKEY which was expected the following week. CASKEY had expressed surprise at the urgency of this request as FLENLEY was due to visit Ulster on the following Monday. In the circumstances he had thought it better to tell him.

i. In the course of our discussions I also referred to NURSAW's discussions with the DFP in Northern Ireland and to SHAW's unwillingness to give directions to the investigating officers. We had inferred that this was connected with his well known desire to maintain the integrity of his office. TERRY expressed great surprise at this reluctance and said that in his view the DFP ran the HUC and not the Chief Constable. FLENLEY also confirmed that HUC officers consulted the DFP on all sorts of matters which were not properly within his province.

j. I asked TERRY whether he should attend the meeting with HERMON. He said he was willing to do so and that he had a part to play. When I returned to London I confirmed that Woodfield would welcome his presence and, as agreed with me, TERRY spoke to HERMON to tell him of my visit. He confirmed that HERMON too would welcome his presence.

Bernard Sheldon  
IA  
3 February 1983
3. After a meeting with the Attorney General on 24 September, Jim Nursaw and Henry Steel told me that Barry Shaw had raised the subject again with the Attorney in the interim and appeared to have obtained some sympathy for his attitude. Nursaw said that he had developed an argument that he needed to know whether Cameron had made a report to people in the Northern Ireland Office where there were some suspects. Their failure to take action in that event might be significant. Nursaw said he regarded this as very far fetched and had suggested that the police should set out a clear list of questions to which they wished to have answers. He thought that this advice would be followed. I said that we would consider any such request on its merits but the police would also have to come clean with us about their objectives. If there was a real as opposed to a fanciful problem we would certainly wish to find ways of helping.

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1 October 1982
Jim Nursaw, the Legal Secretary to the Attorney General, spoke to Barry Shaw, the Northern Ireland DPP, last week about the questions which the RUC wished to put to Cameron. He told him that in his view these questions did not properly arise on any investigation. Shaw said he had no knowledge of them and made it plain that he was not behind them. He gave Nursaw to understand that he would not be concerned one way or another whether they were answered. Nursaw did not get an opportunity to speak to Philip Woodfield or Jack Hermon.

2. I have made it plain to Nursaw and to Barry Shaw and the Attorney General that our unwillingness to authorise Cameron to give a statement should not be taken as meaning that we have anything to hide in connexion with homosexual offences or that we wish to be obstructive. We believe that we have nothing to contribute to any criminal investigation and are unwilling to allow statements to be taken from Cameron which will disclose intelligence arrangements to those who have no need to know. We are conscious that once a statement has been taken we will have no control over who has access to it and that its very existence could cause problems if an enquiry is ordered. If an enquiry is ordered, we would of course be in touch with those responsible for arranging evidence for it (this would normally be the Treasury Solicitors) if it was thought that we had some contribution to make. Nursaw has suggested that it might be sensible to explain the position informally to the Chief Constable and to stress that we have no knowledge of criminal offences.

3. By chance Cameron phoned at the end of last week to enquire whether there were any questions I wanted to put to him before he went overseas for another "reference" or so. I spoke to him yesterday and attach for your information his comments on and answers to the RUC questions. I have also sent this to you and have asked them to let me know who was aware of the Gemmell report so that we can assess the issues. In logic the RUC would wish to put similar questions
Director

I read this file contemporaneously with Mr Junkin with a view to its expedition. We have also spoken to you and the Deputy Director about it and the Brian MacDermott murder file.

The various matters dealt with are set out by Mr Junkin. Suffice to say that neither Wallace nor anyone else whom Superintendent Caskey has approached has produced any evidence of a criminal offence. Whilst Wallace claims to have important information he has declined to give it either on foot of your offer of immunity or General Garrett's release from undertakings in relation to classified information (part IV page 20). It is the investigating officer's view that Wallace is bluffing. The facts suggest that this view may well be correct.

Clearly there is no basis for prosecution on these papers.

C H COSSHAM
6 April 1983
DPP Ref: 1328/83
RUC Ref: C64/5/83

Subject: KINCORA ENQUIRY - MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND JOHN COLIN WALLACE

Chief Constable

Direction

Such information and evidence as is contained in this file does not warrant the initiation of criminal proceedings against any person.

It is however appropriate for me to refer expressly to two particular lines of enquiry which the investigating officer has sought to follow. Firstly, from the course of the interviews of Mr J C Wallace it seems that no information or evidence of materiality is likely to be made available to police by him. Either he has no such information or evidence or, if he has, he is unwilling to impart it. Further, I am not satisfied that he could be put forward as a credible witness upon any issue dependent on his testimony. Secondly, although Mr Cameron has not been and is not available to the police for interview, it does not appear that there is any admissible evidence which can be given by him relevant to any crime or crimes known to the police.

In such circumstances and in the light of the whole of the careful and protracted investigations which Superintendent Caskey has conducted, it does not appear to me to be necessary or appropriate for me to request further investigation of whatever matters or may be within the knowledge of either Wallace or Cameron. I have concluded without their full and voluntary co-operation the consideration of possible criminal proceedings cannot be advanced. Accordingly, but subject to consideration of any further facts or information which may otherwise come to light, I direct that this file be marked no prosecution.

W R JUNKIN
for Director of Public Prosecutions

17 May 1983
I do not know if the Director saw the full answers given by Mr Cameron. (See also Q1). However I am also asked in Question 7 for a view on what the Director was likely to have done. In that context I believe everyone, whether in the legal profession in Northern Ireland or otherwise, who knew him well would have regarded Sir Barry Shaw as a person who was very conscious of his responsibilities as a public prosecutor and who was meticulous and thorough in the conduct of his professional duties as the Director. Certainly that was my own experience of his approach to his work. If a document was available with the full answers I would be surprised if he accepted a gist of it or that he did not insist on seeing it in order to reach his decision in the case.

8. Please describe Sir Barry Shaw's approach to note-taking and record-keeping. Is it likely that he would have made a note of any conversations he might have had with the AG on this subject? Where would such a note, if one was made, have been placed?

As indicated at Q7 the Director was meticulous and thorough in all aspects of his professional duties. I would have expected either that he saw and agreed a copy of the minute of the meeting which would have been taken by one of the AG's officials in the normal course of events and held in the AG's Office or he made his own attendance note after meeting the AG. I do not recall the Director's personal arrangements for filing but I would have thought a file, at least for his own attendance notes, if any, of meetings with the AG, would have been maintained in his private office.

9. Is it possible that Sir Barry Shaw personally drafted the direction of the 17th May 1983 in the light of any information he had obtained from Sir Bernard Sheldon (or anyone else) about Cameron's answers to the 30 questions? Can you recall if this was the case? If Sir Barry Shaw had had discussions or meetings with the AG, or Sir Bernard Sheldon or anyone else about this matters, would he have informed you of such discussions / meetings?

I believe the Director drafted the direction of 17 May 1983 himself (see Q2 and Q4). It is possible that the Director drafted the direction in the light of information received about Mr Cameron's answers but I cannot say whether or not that was the case in fact since I do not recall being informed about any such meetings or discussions with any of the above named persons. (See also Q1)

10. Are you aware of any meetings or discussion between Sir Barry Shaw and the Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir John Hermon concerning Ian Cameron's
and to CASKEY that morning. They only wished to have a statement from CAMERON confirming that he had received a report from GEMMEL and had taken no action on it. Such a statement would conclude their investigations. I said I found this difficult to understand. CAMERON was the recipient of mere gossip and in logic if they wished to take a statement from him they would also wish to take a statement from anyone else who may have heard the same gossip. The list of written questions for CAMERON which CASKEY had submitted to us in October showed that these fears were justified. These showed he had wished to interview CAMERON about the nature of his duties, whether notes of the conversation with GEMMEL were available and to whom the information had been passed and about the identity of his secretary. I said that we had recently had reports that CASKEY had conducted interviews of an Army Intelligence Officer and of an army officer in Germany in which he had referred to the Security Service cover up and had sought information about the identities of other staff. HERMON said that he thought this must have happened before his agreement with BORN but when X said that our information was that these interviews had taken place on 11 and 12 January he agreed that this was not so.

6. HERMON did not attempt to reconcile CASKEY's list of questions for CAMERON or his subsequent interviews with army personnel with his statement that they merely wanted a short statement from CAMERON. He did say that they would need to tell the DPP that they had been unable to interview CAMERON and asked whether this was acceptable to us. I said that it was and assured him that I had already told the DPP that this was the position. He then agreed that they would proceed upon this basis and that their enquiry was now closed.

7. WOODFIELD reverted to the general problem of reconciling police enquiries with the need to protect HMG's intelligence interests. He asked that in future any problems which might arise should be elevated to a more senior level. He thought this was preferable to, for example, CASKEY pursuing his enquiries by other means. We all agreed that this was an acceptable way to behave.

8. There was some talk about the HOLROYD case and HERMON said that he thought similar problems would arise there. He said that they had serious allegations of crime to investigate and that they would do so. I said that we all accepted that the HOLROYD case was quite different to the KINCORA enquiry and that the police had a duty in relation to it. I said that we had now received requests to interview members of the service one of whom had been at material times a serving army officer. We did not know the background to the requests to interview. I said that I hoped that the issues and the requirements would be explained to us. We had no reason to suppose that we had no contribution to make to the HOLROYD investigations but we had no desire to be obstructive and without giving serious consideration to any proper request arising from it. HERMON said that he
THE HOLROYD CASE

It was very good of you to call and see me at such short notice earlier this week. I promised to follow up our discussion with a letter setting out the procedure which it is proposed should be adopted if the RUC in investigating a number of allegations made by Mr Holroyd wish to interview Army personnel. Our object is to ensure that we preserve the necessary confidentiality of intelligence operations and structures in Northern Ireland without impeding police investigations into alleged criminality.

The procedure which we propose to introduce is as follows:

a. Any requests for Army personnel to be interviewed by the RUC should in future be addressed by the RUC to a named colonel at HQNI. When providing HQNI with the names of the Army personnel whom they would like to see, the RUC will be asked to give an indication of the line of questioning which they intend to pursue.

b. The colonel at HQNI will discuss the RUC's requests with his colleagues at HQNI and, having taken account of any views they might have, will pass on the details to Major General Garret, the Director of Army Security in the Ministry of Defence in London. General Garret, in consultation with the Security Service and the NIO as necessary, will decide whether the line of questionning which they intend to pursue.
questioning which the RUC wish to follow in any given case is innocuous or not, so far as the risk of revelations about past and current intelligence operations and structures in Northern Ireland is concerned. If he judges that the RUC’s inquiries will not be likely to lead them on to sensitive ground, he will tell HQNI that the RUC can be told that there is no problem about their seeing the individual concerned.

c. If, however, General Garret concludes that the RUC’s line of questioning would be likely to take them and those being interviewed into the area of intelligence work, HQNI will discuss the matter with the RUC at a level which will allow the issues to be aired fully. It that leads the RUC to drop or modify their line of questioning so that the problem disappears, then that will be an end to the matter.

d. If, however, the RUC are not persuaded, the matter will then be referred to you for you to decide whether the information which the RUC is seeking is relevant to their inquiry and how important it is that they should have it, bearing in mind the implications for intelligence.

e. Whenever General Garret agrees that someone in the Army should be interviewed by the RUC, the Director of Army Legal Services will arrange for him to be briefed on how he might answer the questions put to him, what his legal rights are and so on. Part of this briefing will also be a guarded explanation of what the RUC’s inquiry is all about: this is essential if those being interviewed are not to be put at a disadvantage.

When we met and discussed this procedure in outline, you were kind enough to say that on the basis of the information I had given you, you saw no objections to the procedure in general and would be happy to play the part envisaged for you in particular. I should
be grateful if, after you have reflected on the terms of this letter, on which I understand you may wish to consult the Attorney General, you would let me know if that remains your view. If it does, the next step will be for the GOC to put the new arrangements to the Chief Constable for his consideration, indicating that I have been consulted and am in agreement. I would also contemplate seeing the Chief Constable myself if that seemed helpful. Can you confirm that you are content that the Chief Constable should be told that you are aware of what is proposed and are prepared to play your part?


SECRET AND PERSONAL

3-3

SECRET PERSONAL
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Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

SECRET AND PERSONAL
On Tuesday 22 March I attended a meeting with the Attorney General and Mr Steel, his Legal Secretary, to discuss the implications of a letter which Barry Shaw, the DPP, had received from Philip Woodfield, the PUS NIO. Steel showed me a copy of the letter which I had not previously seen and it substantially repeated the proposals contained in the letter of 23 February 1983 from Clive Whitmore to Woodfield about the HOLROYD case and the procedures which MOD wished to apply to future RUC interviews. I gathered from the Attorney General that Barry Shaw was nervous that he might be dragged into matters which were not his responsibility and that this might affect the integrity of his office. All were agreed that given the history of Northern Ireland, it was important that the office of DPP should not be exposed to suggestions of lack of impartiality.

2. The Attorney General asked me to remind him of the problems which had arisen in connexion with the Kincora and HOLROYD investigations. I made the following points:-

a. That both the Ministry of Defence and the intelligence services had a duty to protect classified information (which also included the organisation of intelligence and intelligence operations) and that the intelligence services had the additional problem of protecting the identities of their officers. The latter point produced procedural problems about the form of statements (eg the use of Mr A etc to conceal identities) and the manner in which they were transmitted to the DPP to ensure that they did not needlessly fall into other hands.

b. In the case of these investigations there was the additional problem that they were being carried out by CID officers of the RUC. Knowledge of most aspects of intelligence operations - particularly where they were directed against Protestant activity - was strictly confined to selected officers of the RUC Special Branch and to the Chief Constable. There was also material classified UK Eyes A where the classification meant that it should not be given to members of the RUC or the Northern Ireland civil servants.
c. It appeared that in the course of the Kincora and HOLROYD investigations RUC officers had been given free access to members of the Army and that no guidance had been given to those interviewed or any procedure established by which the Army knew what had happened. This meant that no attempt had been made to balance the needs of the investigation with the equally important need to protect classified information. As a result, three members of the Security Service (Cameron, [MI5 OFFICER 4], and [MI5 OFFICER 5]) had been identified as such to the RUC. There was also evidence that RUC officers had had access to classified information including some classified UK Eyes A.

d. The procedure which had been suggested as a result of meetings between Woodfield, Whitmore, the DCI and myself were designed to allow proper consideration to be given to all the relevant factors. It was envisaged that problems should in the first instance be elevated to a more senior level within the police but that in some cases the DPP's advice might be needed on questions of the relevance of information which the RUC were seeking.

3. The Attorney General understood the problem and remarked that there might well be cases in which the public interest would preclude a prosecution. He acknowledged that it was for the Ministry of Defence or the Security Service as the case might be, to decide whether officers should give statements and that even if the DPP attached importance to acquiring certain information they might decide that they could not help. He said he would like to be assured that if the DPP was consulted and said that the evidence was of importance, serious consideration would always be given to his request. I assured him that this would always be the position of the Security Service and that I had made this clear when I had discussed the Kincora case with him and Barry Shaw on 1 October 1982. I said that I had little doubt that the Ministry of Defence would take the same attitude.

4. We also briefly discussed the distinction between the Kincora and the HOLROYD investigations. In the former there was no substantial suggestion that any member of the Security Service had been involved in any impropriety whereas in the latter HOLROYD had made allegations that the Army had been involved in criminal activities. It was much easier to refuse to give a statement in the first type of case as there could be no credible suggestion of cover-up than in the second type when we could be made to appear to be obstructing necessary and proper police enquiries. We recognised that in the Kincora
investigation there was the additional problem of a subsequent judicial enquiry. I said that we would want to keep these two issues quite separate. We would deal with the police and the DPP as one matter. If an enquiry took place we would expect to cooperate with the Treasury Solicitor if he was charged with the preparation of papers for it.

5. Philip Woodfield, Clive Whitmore, Barry Shaw and I attended a conference with the Attorney General at the House of Commons at 1530 on Tuesday 29 March. Henry Steel was also present. The Attorney General obtained an assurance from Whitmore that if the DPP requested information, they would give serious consideration to his request at a high level. He again emphasised that the final decision on whether a statement should be given rested with the Ministry of Defence or the Security Service as the case might be. He also said that cases of difficulty could be discussed with him as was already a frequent occurrence with the Security Service. He implied that I might have a role to play on behalf of the Ministry of Defence.

6. Barry Shaw confirmed that these arrangements were acceptable to him. He made it clear that he wished to keep to his statutory responsibilities. He also emphasised that he could not give directions to the RUC about the conduct of their investigations but believed that the RUC would not persist in attempts to obtain information which he advised was unnecessary for the purposes of a prosecution under consideration by him. It was agreed that Henry Steel would draft a record of the meeting which would be circulated to Shaw, Woodfield, Whitmore and myself.

7. At the conclusion of the meeting I told Shaw that the RUC had been reluctant to explain their requirements with sufficient clarity and that persistence in this attitude made it difficult for us to assist. I expressed the hope that in cases referred to him at least the requirement would be fully explained. The Attorney General separately told me that he would ask Barry to report all such cases so that he could ensure that the position was fully explained to me.

8. There was a brief discussion between Woodfield and the Attorney about the judicial enquiry into Kincora. The Attorney thought that a firm commitment had already been given but Woodfield appeared to suggest that no enquiry might be necessary once the Terry report had been received. He also said that the Northern Ireland Chief Justice had refused to co-operate unless the enquiry was set up under the 1921 Act and the Secretary of State doubted whether he would get approval for such an enquiry from the House of Commons. I was told that the arrangements for such an enquiry would probably be in the hands of the Northern Ireland Crown Solicitor with the support of the Treasury Solicitor.
I said that we would wish to treat requirements on that enquiry as a separate matter from the RUC investigation. We would of course seek to cooperate if it came about.

Bernard Sheldon

LA
30 March 1983
MI5 - new claims of political interference

MERYLN REES, the former home secretary, said last night for a royal commission or similar judicial inquiry into allegations that MI5 attempted to destabilise the Wilson government in the mid-1970s.

Last week James Callaghan, the former prime minister, and Rees increased pressure on Mrs Thatcher to investigate alleged "dirty tricks" operations.

Callaghan's surprise intervention followed a Sunday Times report about James Miller, a former MI5 agent who claimed that the security service helped to promote the Ulster workers' strike in 1974 in a plot to discredit and undermine the Wilson government.

Miller said The Sunday Times report broke new ground, outside the scope of the limited inquiry into MI5 activities he had instigated in 1971. Rees told The Sunday Times: "In view of the allegations that are being made there is a need for an urgent royal commission-style inquiry."

New claims by Miller this week are likely to add further weight to demands for an inquiry. Miller, an Englishman recruited by the security service in Northern Ireland in 1970, casts doubt on the conclusions of an official inquiry into the sexual abuse of inmates at the Kincora boys' home in Belfast.

The inquiry, chaired by Sir George Terry in 1983, who at the time was chief constable of Sussex, concluded "there is no evidence that army intelligence had knowledge of homosexual abuse at Kincora."

Rumours that Kincora was a sex "honeypot" used by MI5 to compromise intelligence targets, including Loyalist politicians and paramilitary figures, have appeared since the early 1980s. The stories have always been dismissed by the authorities.

However, Miller claims that the intelligence services had known about the activities at Kincora for a number of years, and believes the boys' home was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information.

Miller has revealed that his first task for the intelligence services was to spy on William McGrath, a former housefather at the Kincora home.

McGrath, who was jailed for his part in the abuse of 13 children in his care between 1973 and 1979, once headed the Tara Loyalist paramilitary organisation. Miller says that McGrath's sexual tendencies were common knowledge inside Tara.

Miller said: "My MI5 case officer later told me to leave McGrath to them and I understand they used the information to recruit him as an informer." Last night McGrath confirmed that he knew Miller but would not comment on any other aspect.

Miller's claims are borne out by an official army briefing paper signed by Colin Wallace, a former army intelligence officer who was attached to MI5 operations in Ulster during the 1970s. The document is dated November 8, 1974, a period when McGrath was employed as housefather in Kincora.

The paper makes clear that army intelligence had inside knowledge of young boys being sexually exploited at the home seven years before the Kincora scandal broke publicly. Wallace's detailed four-page report was seen by several senior officers at army headquarters.

The so-called "Tara - Reports Regarding Criminal Activities of Individuals Associated with the Homosexual Community in Belfast", the report was requested by Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Dixon, then chief of army intelligence who worked closely with MI5 at the Royal Ulster Constabulary headquarters at Knock in west Belfast.

According to the document, "allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1957." It concludes: "It is very difficult to accept that the RUC has consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless they had specifically received some form of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level."

Despite Miller's and Wallace's specific warnings, McGrath was still employed as a housefather at Kincora between 1971 and 1979. And it was not until 1981 that he was jailed for four years on 18 counts of abusing boys.

In Ireland, Wallace has claimed he was eventually instructed to use the Kincora information as part of a black propaganda operation against Loyalist politicians under the codename "Clockwork Orange 2". It was this operation, says Wallace, which widened to include smear tactics against national politicians in all three political parties.

Last night, Rees, who was the Northern Ireland secretary in the mid-1970s, said he had no first-hand knowledge of Kincora. "But I do see a clear conflict of interest with conversations I heard at the time. This whole affair must be investigated."
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JAMES MILLER: 29 MARCH 1987

1. I understand that you spoke today to an official about the latest call we have received from James Miller. A summary of the call is as follows.

... Miller telephoned an official on the morning of Sunday 29 March. During their short talk Miller expressed anger about the second Sunday Times article, of 29 March, which claimed that he had made further allegations during the previous week about events in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. Miller was anxious to make it clear that he had not spoken to Barry breathtaking on the phone again, and as a throw-away gesture, said that he might seek legal advice about mis-representation. He told an official that there had been further press enquiries from the Sunday Times during the past week, seeking details of his current whereabouts.

2. Miller confirmed that both he and McGrath knew each other, but from Miller's comments the acquaintance seems to have been nothing more than casual. Miller did however confirm that he had mentioned his acquaintance with McGrath to Benrose, whose second article Miller claims "was built on machinations" and scraps of detail he had not used in his original story.

5. We shall learn more about the link between Miller, McGrath, Wallace and the Kinora School when Miller is seen later this week by two officials.
c. Kincora Boys Home (29 March article). The reference to "new claims" by [Redacted] about the Kincora Boys Home was pure fabrication. The implication that [Redacted] had made further revelations to PENROSE since the 22 March article was false. [Redacted] had indeed been questioned by PENROSE about the Kincora scandal but had told him honestly that he knew nothing about this episode except what he had read in the newspapers. His [Redacted] had never given him any reason to suppose that MI5 were interested in the place. He told PENROSE that he had fleeting contact with William McGrath in the latter's capacity as a leader of the TARA Brigade. But [Redacted]'s membership of TARA was shortlived; he resigned from the organisation when it became clear that he was under suspicion as possible Security Forces infiltration agent. Though there had been speculation in Loyalist circles that McGrath was a homosexual, [Redacted] did not know him well enough to comment on / allegations, and was unaware at the time of his "housefather" role at Kincora. The reference to Lt Col Brian Dixon, described as Chief of Army Intelligence at Knock, RUC Headquarters, meant nothing to [Redacted]. He had never known anyone of that name.
88. It seems clear from what MILLER told the officials that he had no information of any abuse being carried out at Kincora, no knowledge of McGRATH's paedophilia and no knowledge of his employment at Kincora Boys' Home. The account provided privately to officials by MILLER differs dramatically from what was published by journalists Clarke and Penrose.

89. Despite extensive searches of papers we have been able to find only a single document which provides any support to the allegation published in the Sunday Times article of 29 March 1987.

90. We located a letter written by Mr MILLER dated 07 April 1972 in which he reported having been told by an associate that the Tara Commanding Officer, whose name was given as McGRATH, "had been accused of assaulting small boys". (See Figure 24: Mr MILLER's Letter, 07 April 1972 – Extracts.)

91. However, Mr MILLER did not provide McGRATH's first name. He did not indicate anything about McGRATH's sexuality or employment, and he did not expand
Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 1 (Front)

Leader of the refurbished Sinn Fein IRA Brigade. He was a contact of KIN 337 a foreign carder and believed to be involved in an operation to Ireland in Nov 1971. He runs the Christian Fellowship Centre. He was also a member of the UVF.

Add: 168 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast
OCC: Boys Hostel warden at Kincoma Boys Hostel, Belfast
He runs the Irish Emancipation Crusade, a Greenwood Ave, Belfast, which sent threatening letters to Birmingham firms.

Subject "gets them young and preaches religion to them" which means that he preaches bigotry and anti Catholic sermons.

Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 1 (Reverse)

He is said to have been living with subject...

Son: Worthington McGrath qv.

He first came to notice as an organiser of the Christian Fellowship Centre & Irish Emancipation Crusade at 15, Wellington Park, Belfast. The philosophy of this group is "Ulster has been attacked in order that Ireland may become the base for operations against England".

1968, founder of CO of the Tara Brigade qv.

1970: Set up Tara 'Bag' in L'Derry which became UVF in 1971.

Subject & his son are apparently regarded as somewhat eccentric & unstable. He is still head of Tara CO.

Born: 11 Dec 1916

MI5 Docs - annotation added by the HIA Inquiry

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL KIN-105008
Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 2 (Front)

McGRATH William

He has long made a practice of exploiting other peoples sexual deviations and TARA is vulnerable on this account. PRINSE has expressed strong animosity towards subject.

He is strongly anti-communist and accused the RUC of having communist tendencies.

Believed to be secretary of Orange Lodge (LOL) 1305 named "Ireland's Heritage". He was looking for a Gaelic teacher for the lodge.

A letter (st. I refuse) from subject was published in the Newsletter in Jan 76 attacking the IRA, Catholics and the Ulster Volunteers as all trying to end Protestant faith in Ireland.

Of 2 Feb 76 -

The IRA, Belfast Co said that subject had promised the E. Belfast group a consignment of guns as far back as 1966.

Index card Working Aid for William McGrath - Card 2 (Reverse)

but it never materialised. He added that he knew that subject still owed £3,000 for the purchase of weapons now in possession of the Co.

Of 11 Feb 77 -
So you've got three stages.

You have said the first stage, someone is a homosexual, that wouldn't be reported.

If the information was, "He is a homosexual and he is working in a boys' home", does that change the position, or does the position not change until presumably the third position, when it definitely does change?

A. I think, as we have said earlier, the number of slurs and innuendos that were being spread around in this field, Cameron would have been conscious that he didn't just want to propagate slurs, and also, you know, in the absence of anything concrete which suggested that abuse was taking place, just the mere fact that someone who happened to be a homosexual was working in a boys' home I don't think would have met that criteria at all.

Q. If we move that next step to the third section where the information that was coming that day was, "This man is a homosexual. He is working in a boys' home and it is being said to me that he is abusing boys in his care" -- now I appreciate that's not what Ian Cameron recollects and we have looked at the documents from 1975 -- but if that had been said, even in 1975, would that have met the threshold that you would have expected then the matter to be transferred through the channels so that
Q. So it was not an interest in homosexuality per se but its potential availability as a means of pressuring an individual, whether, as we will see in the case of John McKeague, whether for the benefit of recruiting someone potentially, but more so in terms of within the organisations pressure being placed that would cause breaches of national security?

A. Yes, that is correct. I mean, I would say SIS at that time and -- would not use blackmail in that way, but our concern would have been over other -- others using blackmail on people who were homosexual. So that's why we would have had concern for that vulnerability.

Q. In this section of your statement in paragraph 19, if you can see it, Officer A -- if we just scroll down, please, on the screen to paragraph 19 -- you explain and are in a position to provide a series of documents to the Inquiry that Brian Gemmell, then Captain Brian Gemmell, gave to two of your officers on 15th October 1976. That's the position?

A. Yes, that is right, yes.

Q. The fact he appears to have done something he should not have done in terms of giving your officers Army documents -- whether the rights and wrongs of doing that -- that has been of considerable assistance to the Inquiry in that the Secret Intelligence Service were in
1. In October 1976 Brian Gemmell gave us various papers on the above which he obtained from his army files. One of these was a copy of a letter from HQ 3 Infantry Bde Lurgan, (BEF 13912/2 Dated 28 January 1976) signed by [blacked out]. Gemmell's copy was addressed to G INT HQ 39 INF BDE.

2. We gave a copy of this letter to Snuffbox who have now asked if the source mentioned in the letter could be task for further information.

3. We have spoken to Gemmell who has confirmed that there would be no objection to [blacked out] discussing this letter with the army.

INTELLIGENCE RELATED MATERIAL HIA INQUIRY CONSIDERS NOT RELEVANT TO ITS WORK
27. On 17 February 1977, Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland responded by telegram to SIS London’s question on whether the Tara recruitment campaign could be exploited by the IJS (Article 6). Paragraph 1B of their telegram indicates that Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland knew very little about Tara’s recruiting campaign beyond knowing that one existed and were therefore not yet in a position to identify any opportunities for the IJS to exploit. However, they share MI5’s view that Tara is a worthwhile target and that individuals had briefed to "find traces on this elusive organisation".

28. On 30 May 1977, an MI5 officer wrote to SIS in London to request information on the subscriber of an international telephone number, who is believed to be a contact of William McGrath (Article 7). A name provided by the source of the information produced no trace in MI5 records. This is the final piece of material in the SIS record on Tara.
prostitution scandal with an "immensely distinguished public servant, now dead" (Articles 11 & 12). In the second article, published on 29 January 1982, WAUGH was more specific and mentioned Sir Maurice Oldfield, a former Chief of SIS, by name. SIS has reviewed all the material it holds on its former Chief and has identified no material to indicate that Sir Maurice Oldfield had visited Northern Ireland during his SIS career or to associate him with the Kincora Boys’ Home, other than articles published in the media. Both the Sunday Telegraph articles have been made available to the HIA Inquiry.

64. On 23 April 1987, in a written statement to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that the Security Service (MI5) had conducted a lengthy and thorough investigation into Sir Maurice Oldfield’s homosexual activity to examine whether there was any reason to suppose that national security may have been compromised. The conclusion was that, though Sir Maurice Oldfield’s conduct had been a potential risk to security, there was no evidence or reason to suggest that security had ever been compromised. I understand that MI5’s statement to the HIA Inquiry provides details of the security investigations into Sir Maurice Oldfield carried out by investigating officers from that agency.

65. On 12 February 2016, whilst reviewing MI5 material, the HIA Inquiry made SIS aware of a second hand account from 1983, which reported that a former member of SIS had told another individual that Sir Maurice Oldfield’s removal from Northern Ireland related to events at Kincora. Searches conducted by SIS established that the former member of SIS who made the allegation had retired in April 1970, 13 years before the comment was made. Further searches conducted by SIS into the officer’s allegation or the circumstances in which it was made found no material on the SIS record. It is my understanding that MI5 concluded that it was a senseless allegation. The officer concerned died in March 1985.

CONCLUSION

66. This statement is a full and accurate disclosure of the SIS material deemed relevant by the HIA Inquiry. I have seen nothing to indicate any involvement on the part of SIS officers in abuse at the Kincora Boys’ Home, or in any attempts to cover it up.

67. SIS does not exploit children or vulnerable adults for operational purposes, nor tolerate their abuse either by their staff, or those that work on their behalf or in their support including SIS agents. In dealing with cases of child abuse or exploitation, our guiding principle is, as is set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and in the Children Act, that the best interests of the child should always prevail.

Signed

SIS Officer A

Date

27 MAY 2016
Intelligence Service in terms of its operational remit and what it was interested in and looking for? I am leaving out of that the issue over John McKeague that we will come back to in terms of a potential compromise, but was homosexuality and investigating it or being involved with looking at it something that was of interest to The Secret Intelligence Service?

A. That would have been.

Q. We will, as I say, come back to look at the issue over John McKeage.

When we come to mention Sir Maurice Oldfield at the end of your evidence, it was -- homosexuality was a bar to vetting up to much more recent times. Was that because it fell into the category of an issue over which someone could have been susceptible to pressure in the same way as financial problems or infidelity or matters of that kind that might expose someone to pressure from other individuals?

A. Yes. Our concern -- our concern would have been -- the concern around that would have been that people who were practising homosexuals at the time, at a time when it was possibly illegal in some parts, or certainly not as socially acceptable in other areas, might come under pressure from hostile foreign intelligence services or others seeking to undermine our national security.
Q. So it was not an interest in homosexuality per se but its potential availability as a means of pressuring an individual, whether, as we will see in the case of John McKeague, whether for the benefit of recruiting someone potentially, but more so in terms of within the organisations pressure being placed that would cause breaches of national security?

A. Yes, that is correct. I mean, I would say SIS at that time and -- would not use blackmail in that way, but our concern would have been over other -- others using blackmail on people who were homosexual. So that's why we would have had concern for that vulnerability.

Q. In this section of your statement in paragraph 19, if you can see it, Officer A -- if we just scroll down, please, on the screen to paragraph 19 -- you explain and are in a position to provide a series of documents to the Inquiry that Brian Gemmell, then Captain Brian Gemmell, gave to two of your officers on 15th October 1976. That's the position?

A. Yes, that is right, yes.

Q. The fact he appears to have done something he should not have done in terms of giving your officers Army documents -- whether the rights and wrongs of doing that -- that has been of considerable assistance to the Inquiry in that the Secret Intelligence Service were in
MY APPOINTMENT.

5. Following an investigation by your enquiry team which resulted in the conviction of the three principal offenders and others, and then continuing press commentary and statements in the House of Commons, you issued statements on 18th February 1982 and on the same day the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced that you had requested H.M. Chief Inspector of Constabulary to appoint the Chief Constable of another Force to carry out an investigation. In consequence I agreed to carry out that task.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

6. These were summarised by the Secretary of State in the House as follows:

"To investigate allegations about the way in which the Police have conducted their enquiries and in addition to have general oversight of the continuing investigations".

7. The part of the terms of reference concerning the investigation of allegations about the way in which the enquiries had been conducted referred to assertions that there had been a cover-up, and the second part of my terms of reference related to the ongoing enquiries then under way by your own investigation team. To me a natural consequence was also to put my mind to the possibility of operational or administrative inefficiency and inadequacy in the Force.

8. From the onset it was clear that it was not my direction to undertake an enquiry into the area of responsibility and the action by the Social Services Department, although inevitably my enquiries would have to touch upon them.
38. As regards criminal immunity, there was a discussion in late October 1983 between the DPP (NI) and the then Under Secretary (Law and Order); the DPP on 1 November wrote to NIO to confirm that the Attorney-General would approve an immunity from prosecution for witnesses in the following terms:

"Neither the evidence of any witness before the Inquiry, or any statement furnished by such witness for the purposes of the Inquiry, nor any document the witness is required to produce to the Inquiry, shall be used against the witness in any subsequent criminal proceedings for an offence involving homosexual relations between male persons or attempting, aiding, or abetting, counselling or procuring, soliciting or inciting or conspiracy to commit any such offence or withholding information about any such offence." [Doc 17 on Sp(B) 291/360/01C].

39. This assurance (naturally enough) did not cover prosecutions under the Official Secrets Act.

Publication of Terry Report

40. On 28 October 1983 the Chief Constable published the conclusions, recommendations, and "final comment" of Sir George Terry. The RUC press release [Doc 13 on SP(B)291/360/01C] noted that the Report, together with extensive supporting documents and exhibits (ie the Superintendent's reports), had been put before the DPP (NI) for consideration. The DPP had directed no prosecution of any person on foot of the report.

41. It was clear from public responses to the published part of Terry that there would indeed be a need for a further inquiry. At the Assembly debate on 9 November, whilst few members were prepared directly to challenge Sir George's conclusions, it was made quite clear that the Terry Report was regarded as "in many ways unsatisfactory"; and the demand for a full judicial inquiry was reiterated.

42. Officials therefore pressed forward rapidly to tie up the remaining details. Final advice on the terms of reference and other detailed administrative matters was tendered on 16 November 1983 [Doc 53 on SPB 291/360/01C]. It remained to settle a Chairman. The front runners were Sir Hilary Talbot, recently retired from the Queen's Bench, and Judge Brown, the former Recorder of Belfast. Sir H Talbot, in the event, declined, as did Judge Brown. An approach was accordingly made to Judge Sumner, a former English circuit judge; whilst a Scots Sheriff, J B W Christie, was held in reserve. Judge Sumner duly refused; Sheriff Christie proved to be on holiday at the crucial time, and consideration focussed rapidly on the "next" name on the list, Judge Hughes. He at length, on 8 January 1984, accepted the appointment.
MY CONCLUSIONS

50. It is of particular significance to state under this heading that the Director of Public Prosecutions having received and given what I can only describe as very careful consideration of all of the reports which concluded the enquiries by your R.U.C. team, the contents of which we were aware, has decided that no further action should be taken against any persons for criminal offences.

51. My conclusions after the fullest possible investigation are:

a) There is absolutely no evidence that residents of any children's home were involved in anything remotely resembling homosexual "rings" as asserted by the media or the latter's contentions that this so called ring involved Police officers, civil servants, military personnel, Justices of the Peace or legal people.

b) There was no cover up or concealment of evidence or disciplinary breaches by the R.U.C. personnel. There was some degree of lack of awareness over information/intelligence but this was at a time of intense terrorist activity which placed an excessive strain on Police resources and undoubtedly dictated priorities. There was, therefore, at this time an understandable inability to recognise that extremely vague information which arose in 1974, if probed thoroughly, may well have revealed that which was finally discovered in your 1980 investigations. In 1976 there was some other information which was not thoroughly recognised as relating to that

19.
which came to hand in 1974. In no way, however, by any stretch of imagination was this a question of a cover up, only, I repeat, a lack of awareness, of interpretation and recognition. Any later critics had the benefit of what never exists at the time, namely, hindsight. In fact, it was D/Superintendent CASKEY's excellent work which ultimately focussed attention upon this!

c) No complaint was ever received by the Police from any victim at Kincora or other boys' homes of homosexual abuse by the staff until your 1980 enquiry team was launched. In the absence of such complaints there are constraints and limits to the action which can be taken by the Police on the basis of unsubstantiated rumour or allegations even where they emanate from well-motivated and genuine people. That being said there were several occasions when, through inadequacy or inefficiency, insufficient cognizance was taken by supervisory officers of the implications of information, which unsupported and lacking credibility from its original source, should nevertheless have attracted greater interest and a more positive response. I do not consider, however, despite those lapses of professionalism, that an earlier investigation would reasonably have been prompted on the basis of the information available to those officers.

d) Your team's investigation in 1980 and indeed their continuing activities endeavoured but could not establish the existence of any para-military organisation connected with the homosexual misconduct in any boys' home or of any attempts to recruit persons to a para-military organisation through residents in a boys' hostel. My team's enquiries also covered this ground fully and we can confirm the conclusions of your team that no such viable para-military organisation in fact exists beyond an ideological concept of a few ineffectual individuals with hopes and aspirations which never materialised or reached the stage of criminal activity. However, we traced evidence that a member of the Eastern Health & Social Services Board in Belfast was put off from exercising properly his supervisory role because it was believed that one of the Kincora Hostel staff,
nee, for some prosecutions would then never have arisen.

1] In spite of the extensive enquiries carried out by the R.U.C. team in 1980 and subsequently, and all of the work undertaken by my team in re-interviewing, no further complaints of homosexual activity from any Kincora inmates were received. I, therefore, conclude that so far as is humanly possible all complaints have been registered, investigated and proceeded with according to the evidence, and there certainly is nothing which could be justifiably interpreted by the media as amounting to anything remotely resembling a homosexual prostitution ring.

2] In [a] above I deal with what I can only describe as the fictional allegations about a homosexual prostitution ring. However, in view of the comments regularly featured in the media, I think I should add further emphasis to the fact that with my team I have particularly looked to see if any evidence at all can be found to indicate an involvement in any homosexual practices by British officials in the Northern Ireland Office or any action by them to suppress Police enquiries in this connection. I conclude without hesitation that there is no justification in this allegation and that no evidence exists.

k] The media have also given a degree of prominence to the fact that some Military circles were aware of homosexual mis-practice in the Kincora Boys' Hostel. The Military sources have been very frank with me and perfectly open during the ongoing enquiry by your own team under D/Superintendent CASKEY. Let me say quite clearly that once more I sought evidence from all sources including the
RECOMMENDATIONS

52. Arising from the whole my recommendations are few but very firmly based as follows:

i) An enquiry within the Social Services elements in the Province appears highly desirable to prevent shortcomings which have been clearly revealed, and in my view this can only be effectively accomplished by practical contact during the enquiry with members of my team. This should encompass more careful consideration as to the recruitment and screening of persons suitable for employment in residential homes; their qualifications which may well be reflected by the remuneration they receive are vital. In fact there is clearly a desperate need within this selection process to eliminate from any appointments persons with a propensity towards misbehaviour with young persons under their care.

ii) As a consequence of the last recommendation it follows that the best possible training should be afforded to all Social Workers. This particularly relates to basic practicalities leading towards the elimination of naivety and lack of worldliness by those who have to deal with the complexity of the well-being of young persons. Therefore, the whole history of the Kincora Hostel saga should form the basis of hard, bitter experience which should convey how a repetition can best be avoided.

iii) I feel that some not over-elaborate form of education should be evolved of children placed in care, especially having regard to their often previous unfortunate backgrounds with the object of creating a sensible but not fearful awareness of
Having taken full account of all the factors, I have come to the conclusion that it is appropriate to proceed with the Committee stage next week.

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover): In relation to the Bill dealing with concessionary fares for London to be considered next week and the following week has the Leader of the House had any representations from Conservative Members to try to get concessionary fares for people in areas where there is no local authority undertaking? If the Bill were widened to include those areas, they could be treated in the same way as many other rural areas that Opposition Members represent. Taking into account that this is one of the declarations of intent of the delegates representing several million pensioners who are discussing the matter in Westminster Hall, now that the Government have decided to handle the money for concessionary fares for pensioners, surely the Bill ought to be extended to cover all pensioners throughout Great Britain.

Mr. Pym: That is a point which the hon. Gentleman can make when we debate the Second Reading of the Bill. Clearly we shall proceed with the Bill in the form in which it is to be published today, I think. We must leave the matter there.

Mr. David Ennals (Norwich, North): On the Canada Bill, will the Leader of the House recognise that serious concerns were expressed yesterday by many hon. Members, including many who voted for the Second Reading? Does he not feel that there is unseemly and unnecessary haste about taking on Tuesday the Committee stage of a Bill that received a Second Reading only yesterday? Will he think again about the timing of the Committee stage of the Bill?

Mr. Pym: I have thought about it carefully. I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there is haste, either unseemly or unnecessary. As I indicated just now, I have had to take many factors into account. Before deciding to proceed with the Committee stage next week, I thought not only about those but about the powerful points made by the right hon. Gentleman and others in the course of the debate yesterday. Having taken full account of all the considerations, the Government have decided, and I have announced, that we will proceed with the Committee stage next week. We believe that to be in the general interests of the countries concerned.

Mr. John Silkin (Deptford): On Monday's business, will the Leader of the House ensure that the debate on opposed private business at 7 o'clock is opened ended so that the House may be able to see the conclusion of the matter?

Mr. Pym: I have received a formal request from the First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means to suspend the rule. In accordance with what I understand to be the practice in those circumstances, it is my intention to do so.

Kincora Children's Home

3.54 pm

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr. James Prior): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement on Kincora children's home, and related matters.

As a result of intensive police inquiries five persons in positions of responsibility in homes and hostels for children and young persons in Northern Ireland have been sentenced to imprisonment for sexual offences against those in their care.

At the conclusion of the trials I set up a committee to investigate past management of the homes and to make recommendations for the future. I also said that there were still some outstanding matters being pursued by the police. Three of the members of the committee have since said that they felt unable to take part until all police inquiries were completed, but added that they would be glad to serve on a committee after that.

The cases have aroused widespread disquiet in Northern Ireland and have been accompanied by allegations or suggestions that there has been a cover-up to protect other guilty people from being prosecuted. It is being urged that a public judicial inquiry should investigate these and similar rumours. If such an inquiry did disclose new criminal offences it would in the process have made it impossible for any offenders to be prosecuted either because immunities had had to be given or because the publicity which the disclosure would have received when the evidence was given in a public inquiry would make it impossible to find a jury which would not be seen as prejudiced. It is essential to hold to the principle that allegations of criminal activities are investigated by the police and that offenders are dealt with by the courts.

The Chief Constable has stated that further investigations are being pursued vigorously and that it is the duty of any person who has evidence or information about any relevant matter indicating a crime to come forward immediately and assist the police in the certainty that it will be fully investigated. He has also announced that he has requested Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary to appoint the chief constable of another force to investigate allegations about which the police have conducted their inquiries and in addition to have general oversight of the continuing investigations. In due course he will forward a report to the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and the conclusions will be made public. I am placing a copy of the Chief Constable's statement in the Library.

I do not propose to reconstitute the existing inquiry into homes and hostels for children and young persons, but the need remains to investigate the failure to identify earlier malpractices in some of them and to examine and assess present policies, procedures and practices for their administration. In the circumstances, after the current police investigations and any consequent criminal proceedings are complete, I intend to appoint a committee, with a High Court judge as chairman, sitting in public. The terms of reference of such an inquiry and the powers it might need cannot be determined until the results of the present investigations are known. But I am anxious that there should be no lasting cause for public disquiet that the truth has not been wholly discovered.
The powers of the High Court to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents can only be conferred on a tribunal appointed under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. Because of its wide-ranging inquisitorial powers the House has traditionally been wary of approving the appointment of a tribunal under the Act. In considering whether there is need for such a tribunal I will take into account both the widespread concern about this affair and also the views of the House and the recommendations of the Royal Commission on tribunals of inquiry of 1966.

Meanwhile, as soon as evidence of malpractices came to light in 1980, steps were taken to improve the supervision and management of homes and hostels for children and young persons. This process is continuing vigorously, and any right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services is making further expert advice available to me.

Mr. J. D. Concannon (Mansfield): I thank the Secretary of State for his statement. The Opposition concur with his view that a judicial inquiry should consider this sordid episode following the RUC investigations. Our only reservation is about the protection of the innocent, many of whom now have wives and families of their own. If possible, they should give their evidence without having their names and addresses published. We would be pleased if there were complete anonymity for them.

Finally, I have the permission of those of my colleagues whom I have been asked to contact who served in the last Administration in Northern Ireland to say that at no time during our term of office did anything relating to this case come before us.

Mr. Prior: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his support over what is now an important and difficult matter in Northern Ireland. The answer to the problem about innocent people is that if they have any allegations to make or information to give at this stage, they should give it to the police. That information could be given in confidence. I hope that that is what they will do. One of the points that has always worried me about judicial inquiries of this nature is that many innocent people can suffer severely as a result. It is only when one reaches as serious a position in Northern Ireland as we are reaching now that we have to consider other methods.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): How did it come about that the right hon. Gentleman was so seriously misled as to the scope and scale of the criminal investigation still in progress at the time when he took his original decision? When he is considering the form of a future inquiry, will he bear in mind, despite the known objections to the 1921-type of tribunal, the undesirability of inventing yet new ad hoc forms of judicial inquiry?

Mr. Prior: The answer is "Yes" to the right hon. Gentleman's latter point. The House will have to consider seriously when the time comes whether we should have a 1921-type of inquiry.

With regard to the earlier part of the right hon. Gentleman's question, I do not think that I was ever misled. Since the setting up of the departmental inquiry under the former Ombudsman for Northern Ireland certain further evidence has become available. When I say "evidence", I mean that certain allegations have been made including allegations to the police. That has put a different complexion on the need for a more extensive inquiry. If I underestimated the feeling in Northern Ireland, I assure the right hon. Gentleman and the House that in no way were we concerned with a cover-up, but in every case I was concerned to try to protect innocent people.

Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest): Do we not all agree that at this stage it is right to pursue the matter rigorously, with further police inquiries, having regard to what my right hon. Friend said about a judicial inquiry being an impediment to further prosecutions?

Mr. Prior: Yes, Sir. That must be right. The sooner the allegations are looked at by the police and decisions reached by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the better.

Mr. Gerard Fitt (Belfast, West): The Secretary of State will be aware that on the Order Paper there is an early-day motion in the name of the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley), whom we would have expected to be in the House today, calling for a full judicial inquiry. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the need for the police investigations to come to a conclusion as quickly as possible, so that the idea is not implanted in people's minds that time may erase the matter from the memories of those in Northern Ireland?

It is important that the right hon. Gentleman should tell us whether the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 would empower the inquiry to take out of prison those who have already been convicted who are believed to have been involved at Kinora? Would it enable Mr. Colin Wallace, a former British Army security spokesman, who gave an interview to journalists in 1975 and made them aware of all the aspects of Kinora, to be brought before the inquiry or the courts? Will the right hon. Gentleman take into account the real feeling in Northern Ireland that since the allegations were made in 1980 the RUC has acted with commendable zeal? However, we really want to know what the RUC was doing between 1961 and 1980.

Mr. Prior: I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is a matter of great urgency. I know that the police regard it as a matter of urgency, too. With regard to the hon. Gentleman's last point, that matter will be relevant to the inquiry to be carried out by the chief constable of another constabulary.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the powers of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act. He asked whether, if we decided on that type of inquiry, the inquiry would have power to call for people who had been imprisoned for one offence or another. Such an inquiry has complete powers to call for evidence from whomsoever it desires. Therefore, the answer to his question is "Yes".

Mr. Edward Lyons (Bradford, West) rose—

Mr. Joseph Dean (Leeds, West) rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall call both Members, and we shall then move on to the second statement.

Mr. Lyons: In view of the terrible corruption of the young at Kinora over 20 years and the failure to pursue effectively the complaints made throughout most of that time about those events, is the Minister aware that everyone will applaud the setting up of an inquiry? Is the further assurance that that inquiry should be armed with considerable powers? The police part of the inquiry should be carried out immediately, but powers and composition...
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Sir George Terry's Report, just received. At a short meeting on 12 July, [doc 53, same file] Sir Philip Woodfield concluded that a 1921 Act Inquiry should be avoided if at all possible, notwithstanding that the Secretary of State had to some extent committed himself to this course of action at his 28 March meeting with the NI party leaders.

30. On 20 July 1983, fresh advice was accordingly submitted to the Secretary of State [doc 55 on Sp(B) 291/360/01B]. This discussed the prospects for a 1921 Inquiry; a non-statutory inquiry without formal powers; and a H&FSS (NI) Order 1972 Inquiry. The considerations which weighed against a 1921 Act inquiry were set out as:

i. The principles recommended by the Salmon Commission (Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry) of 1966 against light or idle use of a 1921 Act Inquiry;

ii. the insubstantial nature of the allegations circulating in Northern Ireland;

iii. cost - upwards of £2 million was anticipated for a 1921 Act inquiry;

iv. the possibility that witnesses with relevant experience would come forward to disclose information about the working of the security forces, and in particular about the intelligence services. Two particular former public servants were referred to. One was serving a prison sentence for a manslaughter charge. The other was described as "a born again Christian who served in military intelligence - whose evidence could reveal (unless special arrangements were made) the structure and activities of the intelligence services without disclosing anything improper about the conduct of members."

31. The submission went on to suggest that:

"One possible way forward after the Terry conclusions are published would be to concentrate on the child-care aspects alone, on the grounds that the Terry report had rebutted the wilder allegations."

32. In a subsequent discussion with Sir Philip Woodfield on 26 July, Mr Prior hoped that, whilst much would depend on public reaction to publication of the Terry Report, it would be possible to resist establishing an inquiry under the 1921 Act. He was "attracted" to the alternative suggestion of an Inquiry under the 1972 Order, with a Northern Ireland High Court Judge.
The reaction of officials to the Report was one of disappointment. As PUS put it to Mr Prior: "the document as a whole is a slightly disappointing one - a view which the Chief Constable privately shares. It is written in parts in peculiar English, which could be mocked by sophisticated commentators, there is a tendency to homily and some passages about the child care service need to be looked at carefully if they are to be published" [doc 49, same file].

21. Other officials rejected the presentation of the Report as "remarkably inept" and it was even proposed "to try to release a Principal ... give him the three reports, and ask him to produce in condensed publishable version which can be offered to Sir George as a draft" - although this suggestion was not acted upon. [doc 51, same file].

Preparations for a further Inquiry

22. While Sir George Terry's report had been in preparation (indeed since February 1982) NIO and DHSS (NI) had been considering the form of the eventual further inquiry. At desk level, officials were already inclined to favour a new inquiry under Article 54 of the H&PSS (NI) Order, similar to the one disbanded in February 1982. It was noted that, in the eyes of Lord Salmon's 1966 Royal Commission of Tribunals of Inquiry, use of the 1921 Act should be limited to "matters of vital public importance concerning which there is something of a nationwide crisis of confidence". A debate in Parliament would be required to set up a tribunal; it would be a lengthy affair, and very costly; a general immunity from prosecution for witnesses would normally be considered necessary; the public hearings of a tribunal would attract media coverage, and perhaps provide a platform for those anxious to make political mileage or satisfy personal grudges. An Article 54 Inquiry was seen as speedier, and less likely to become a media circus. [Doc 37 on Sp(B) 291/360/01A]. These considerations were reflected in advice put to Sir Philip Woodfield on 15 March [doc 52 on same file]. This advice noted also that whilst a H&PSS Order Inquiry would have powers of subpoena only in respect of persons in Northern Ireland, a 1921 Act Inquiry would have powers extending throughout the United Kingdom (a point which later became of significance to the attempts of the Hughes Inquiry to interview Wallace). It added that some form of criminal immunity would be appropriate for witnesses giving evidence to any inquiry whether under the 1972 Order or the 1921 Act. Immunity from civil proceedings, on the other hand, would be much more difficult to arrange.

23. This advice was considered at a meeting held by PUS on 30 March 1982. It was noted that there was a choice between a 1921 Act Inquiry and one held under the H&PSS (NI) Order. The former was open to objection on the grounds that the issues at stake did not warrant such a procedure, and that it was doubtful whether matters to be investigated were of "urgent public importance" as required by the Act. There was also a history of unsatisfactory inquiries under
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the 1921 Act. On the other hand, public expectations had been aroused; and the wider powers of subpoena of the Act gave it an advantage over the 1972 Order. It was agreed that, in the absence of powerful arguments to the contrary, a 1921 Act inquiry would be required. [doc 59 on Sp (B) 291/360/01A]. Here, for a time, consideration rested.

Assembly Debate

24. The Northern Ireland Assembly had shown great interest in the Kincora affair, reflecting its prominence in the media in Northern Ireland. On 22 March 1982 the Assembly debated the matter; and the following day the leaders of the parties represented in the Assembly (Mr Molyneaux, UUP, Dr Paisley, DUP, and Mr Napier, Alliance,) sought a meeting with the Secretary of State to discuss it. The brief for the meeting submitted by the then Under Secretary (Law and Order) [doc 13 on Sp(B) 291/360/01B] contained the following passage:

"Assembly members, prompted by the press, have been especially suspicious of military intelligence activities in the 1970's. While we should avoid any discussion of that, the Secretary of State should know that Army intelligence records of that time do not contain any evidence relating to criminal activities on the part of any individual at Kincora or involving juveniles elsewhere. They do contain information showing that William McGrath was a homosexual, that he was working at boys' home (not named) that he had connections with prominent Loyalists and that he may have used homosexuality as a lever for purposes of influence. Army personnel involved in intelligence work related to the illegal activities of Loyalist paramilitary groups were told at the time that there was no interest in investigating deviant sexual activities or religious aspects of those organisations or their members."

25. The meeting of the party leaders was duly held on 28 March [doc 14, same file]. They pressed Mr Prior for a 1921 Act inquiry with wide terms of reference, as soon as possible. He, in response, undertook to discuss the possibility of such an inquiry with his colleagues.

The 1980 Parliamentary Answer

26. At the same time, officials were engaged in tidying up the matter of a misleading parliamentary answer in 1980. The then Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, had told Mr Peter Robinson MP in a written answer on 27 February 1980 that the police only became aware of allegations of child prostitution (at Kincora) on 22 January 1980. Mr Robinson then asked a further question about the first date of police investigations of homosexuality (at Kincora). The reply to this latter question, which issued on 13 March 1980, stated that "since the police had received no
allegations of any homosexual practices at an earlier date, their investigations began, as I said in my answer on 27 February, after they first became aware of allegations of child prostitution (at Kincora) on 24 January".

27. By 1982, it was clear, in fact, that policemen had been aware of suggestions of homosexuality several years before the date stated in the reply of 13 March 1980, and that at least one policeman was aware of specific allegations. It seemed likely that there had been confusion during telephone conversations in 1980 over the precise terms used (child prostitution/homosexuality; offences at Kincora/offences elsewhere; firm allegations/vague intelligence). The DUP was well aware of the misleading nature of the second reply (indeed had mentioned it to the Secretary of State on 28 March and earlier). On 1 April 1982, officials submitted advice [doc 60 on Sp(B) 291/360/01A] which canvassed, but rejected, the possibility of writing to Mr Robinson to correct the reply of 13 March 1980. The Secretary of State subsequently endorsed this advice; and the matter was laid to rest.

The decision to proceed with a H&PSS Order Inquiry.

28. Consideration of the kind of enquiry which might follow Terry had been left following the meeting on 30 March 1982 (para above). The reins were taken up again in March/April 1983, as the Terry Report neared conclusion. A tentative draft of a submission, prepared on the assumption that a 1921 Act Tribunal would be required, was circulated on 11 April [doc 28 on Sp(B) 291/360/01B]. This draft was considered further at a meeting of officials on 28 April 1983, which concluded that:

"It was likely that the extent of concern in the Province would mean that only the institution of such a wide ranging and powerful inquiry [as the 1921 Act Inquiry] would represent a sufficient response by Government".

29. This proposition (and certain of the detailed arrangements related to it), were discussed with Home Office Legal Advisers on 6 May 1983. On 30 June 1983, however, the picture began to shift. [Doc 48 on Sp(B) 291/360/01B]. Officials had discussed the possibility of a 1921 Act Inquiry with the Security Service, who were concerned about the likely intrusion of the proposed inquiry into intelligence matters, should the terms of reference be as wide as those which NIO had in mind. At least two possible witnesses could come forward with evidence which might, perhaps gratuitously, reveal information about the structure and range of activities of the intelligence services at the time in question. At the same time, the Chief Constable was expressing his view very strongly against any public inquiry with terms of reference which permit "all the rumours to be aired yet again" [doc 49, same file]. Officials were mindful also of the injunction against further inquiries in
Sir George Terry's Report, just received. At a short meeting on 12 July, [doc 53, same file] Sir Philip Woodfield concluded that a 1921 Act Inquiry should be avoided if at all possible, notwithstanding that the Secretary of State had to some extent committed himself to this course of action at his 28 March meeting with the NI party leaders.

30. On 20 July 1983, fresh advice was accordingly submitted to the Secretary of State [doc 55 on Sp(B) 291/360/01B]. This discussed the prospects for a 1921 Inquiry; a non-statutory inquiry without formal powers; and a H&PSS (NI) Order 1972 Inquiry. The considerations which weighed against a 1921 Act inquiry were set out as:

i. The principles recommended by the Salmon Commission (Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry) of 1966 against light or idle use of a 1921 Act Inquiry;

ii. the insubstantial nature of the allegations circulating in Northern Ireland;

iii. cost - upwards of £2 million was anticipated for a 1921 Act inquiry;

iv. the possibility that witnesses with relevant experience would come forward to disclose information about the working of the security forces, and in particular about the intelligence services. Two particular former public servants were referred to. One was serving a prison sentence for a manslaughter charge. The other was described as "a born again Christian who served in military intelligence - whose evidence could reveal (unless special arrangements were made) the structure and activities of the intelligence services without disclosing anything improper about the conduct of members."

31. The submission went on to suggest that:

"One possible way forward after the Terry conclusions are published would be to concentrate on the child-care aspects alone, on the grounds that the Terry report had rebutted the wilder allegations."

32. In a subsequent discussion with Sir Philip Woodfield on 26 July, Mr Prior hoped that, whilst much would depend on public reaction to publication of the Terry Report, it would be possible to resist establishing an inquiry under the 1921 Act. He was "attracted" to the alternative suggestion of an Inquiry under the 1972 Order, with a Northern Ireland High Court Judge.
APPENDIX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

THE HEALTH AND PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1972

Following:

i. the investigations of the Royal Ulster Constabulary into possible homosexual offences related to children’s homes and young persons’ hostels in Northern Ireland;

ii. the investigation by the former Chief Constable of Sussex Sir George Terry CBE, QPM, DL, and the publication of his conclusions and recommendations; and

iii. the report of the team of child-care experts made available by the Secretary of State for Social Services to consider the ways in which the Department of Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland carries out its role in relation to the supervision and management of homes and hostels for children and young persons;

the Department of Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland, in pursuance of the powers conferred on it by Article 54 and Schedule 8 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, hereby appoints the following persons:

Chairman: His Honour Judge William Henry Hughes

Members: Mr Harry Whalley
Mr William James Patterson, OBE


to

a. inquire into the administration of children’s homes and young persons’ hostels whose residents were subjected to homosexual offences which led to convictions by the Courts or where homosexual misconduct led to disciplinary action against members of the staff, and into the extent to which those responsible for the provision of residential care for children and young persons could have prevented the commission of such acts or detected their occurrence at an earlier stage;

b. consider the implications for present procedures and practices within the system of residential care, including in particular the adequacy and effectiveness of arrangements for the supervision and protection of children and young persons in residential care; and

c. make recommendations with a view to promoting the welfare of such children and young persons and preventing any future malpractice;

and to report thereon to the Department of Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland.

Sealed with the official seal of the Department of Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland this 1st day of March 1984

SECRETARY

DR M N HAYES
manuscript notes on a piece of casework that was unconnected with Kincora or child abuse.

Those three files -- you are right -- we were passed them to examine the contents some time by Rucker in about 1989. We still had them in our possession as late as 18th June 1990, but I am afraid we have got no record of what happened to them subsequently, and all of the logs or files being passed in and out of those buildings have long since been destroyed. So we can't say with any certainty at all what happened to them. We might have passed them back to the MoD, but they have got no record of them. They might have been destroyed for one reason or another, but we've got no record of that either, I am afraid.

Q. If you are right and they are post 1980 files, the Inquiry is aware from the police investigation of a major in the Army looking at the -- if I can call them the actual Tara files that were held in HQNI, because he was able to produce various documents from them to the police, and we have at least those documents available, but whatever was in the files that was available to Rucker and to the Security Service in '89 and '90, all that we can say about them is what's in the Rucker analysis and The Security Service analysis in respect of those files?
not a field officer, and therefore that meant it would really be a very exceptional thing for you to ever meet a source, as it were, on the ground. Your job was to receive reporting from field officers and to make assessments about that with your colleagues and to disseminate that information as you considered was appropriate for the work you were doing?

A. Yes.

Q. You explain to the Panel in paragraph 6 of your statement, Major C, that in terms of -- we talk about the word "source", but you explain that a source could be a wide category of individual from an actual agent who was being handled by the brigade Intelligence officer to a conversation taking place in a pub that has been overheard by an individual who didn't realise they were being overheard?

A. Not entirely. It could have been a conversation or from a soldier on a patrol speaking to someone over, say, a garden fence as you walk around or indeed in a pub, and then when he got back to base he might think that was of interest and report it as that. So that's a source in the loose term of the word, but not otherwise.

Q. What you are saying is there needs to be an understanding that if information was received it
EXTREMIST PROTESTANTS
SECRET ORGANISATION - TARA

1. The existence of a loyalist organisation known as TARA has been known since 1972. It is believed that the organisation has close links with the Orange Order. The name TARA is taken from the "Kingdom of Tara" which was formed in Ireland in 500 BC, and is the "Seat of Irish Kings".

2. Little was heard of TARA until the appearance of posters in Belfast on 11 Apr 73. The posters were issued by TARA which called itself "The hard core of Protestant resistance". The TARA message was "Resistance with Responsibility".

3. TARA is formed in Platoons of 20. Each platoon has one Sgt, a Wd, and an IO. Each member pays 50p dues per month; one half goes to a central fund and the other half to the platoon." This info dated 16 Apr 73.

4. James Hanna (deceased, Ex B of Opn UVP) stated that TARA was a network of cells throughout the Province composed of loyal Protestants each of whom possessed a legal weapon. These men were prepared to use their weapons in an emergency. TARA was not a Doomsday force.

5. Other than this, very little is known about TARA which has always been shrouded in mystery. (It claims to be a secret organisation). Some personalities known are:-

   a. William McGrath, 5 Greenwood Ave, Upper Newtownards Rd, Belfast.
   b. Frank Millar, [redacted], Belfast. Adjt TARA. Connections with Opns.
   c. Clifford Smyth, possibly Carryduff, North Belfast. Former IO of TARA.
   d. David Brown, Bangor. Adm Officer TARA. Subject is a close associate of Paisley. He is also Deputy Editor of the Protestant Telegraph.
   e. UDR Captain N, [redacted], Carryduff. Ex member of TARA and a frequent speaker on DUP platforms.

6. A recent report stated that a TARA organisation has appeared in the Larne area, with the HQ approximately 10 miles outside Larne. Personalities are:-

   a. [redacted] Frequents the HQ regularly to receive his instructions.
   b. [redacted] Ex UDA Company Commander; is also regularly in touch with TARA groups.
didn't regard it as a secret organisation. Tara may have thought they were a secret organisation, but to us they were just an organisation, but the rest of what you said is correct, yes.

Q. In paragraph 5 of the document of July '74, if we just scroll down a little bit in the chamber, please -- other than this very little is known about Tara. You then set out what is known about the various individuals. So at this stage in July '74 you have had access to something that suggested William McGrath was reputed to be a homosexual and that's at 5A in the document. I was asking you would that have had any particular significance for the Army, what someone's sexuality was, and you were saying to me that it really wouldn't have been of material importance. It's a piece of information like another piece of information about someone, but it was not something that would have been of great import to you in your work?

A. That is correct.

Q. You explain in your statement that as part of us discussing these matters, you have been shown the document which is at exhibit 2 of your statement, which is the document headed "Tara". If we can look at 2515 in the chamber, please, this is the document, where you have written the word "section" across the top
agent to an unwitting member of the public, who had made a comment to a member of the security forces, which that individual thought may have some relevance. Information gleaned from sources would have been passed to HQNI in reports from Field Intelligence Officers and NCOs working with the brigades. The reports would generally have been called MISK's (Military Intelligence Source Reports), although the information would not necessarily have been drafted on a pro forma document. As a desk officer the identity of a source who was providing information to a field operative writing the report was never disclosed to me.

7. I have been asked by the HIA Inquiry to examine a series of documents, some of which I authored.

8. I should make clear at the outset that TARA was an organisation of limited interest to the Army. My main focus was the terrorist and extremist groups on the Loyalist side.

9. Relevant information on organisations of interest, including TARA, was recorded on a card system. Each card would have recorded what G Int knew about that organisation and those involved in it. There may well have also been a file on the organisation that included the underlying reporting material.

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10. This is a 2 page report, prepared by me on the subject of TARA dated 6 July 1974 that I sent to 8 Brigade, and copied in 3 Brigade. It is likely, though this is an assumption by me, that I decided it was not necessary to copy in 39 Brigade as most (if not all) of the information came from material already held by 39 Brigade. The document can be found at Exhibit 1 to this statement.

11. I cannot now recall why I produced this document but I can speculate that it was probably in response to a request from 8 Brigade for general information on TARA, an organisation about which they may have had scant knowledge.
didn't regard it as a secret organisation. Tara may have thought they were a secret organisation, but to us they were just an organisation, but the rest of what you said is correct, yes.

Q. In paragraph 5 of the document of July '74, if we just scroll down a little bit in the chamber, please -- other than this very little is known about Tara. You then set out what is known about the various individuals. So at this stage in July '74 you have had access to something that suggested William McGrath was reputed to be a homosexual and that's at 5A in the document. I was asking you would that have had any particular significance for the Army, what someone's sexuality was, and you were saying to me that it really wouldn't have been of material importance. It's a piece of information like another piece of information about someone, but it was not something that would have been of great import to you in your work?

A. That is correct.

Q. You explain in your statement that as part of us discussing these matters, you have been shown the document which is at exhibit 2 of your statement, which is the document headed "Tara". If we can look at 2515 in the chamber, please, this is the document, where you have written the word "section" across the top
of times for various reasons, but it refers to McGrath's homosexual activities and keeping people in his organisation ensnared in it under the threat of revealing homosexual activity which he had initiated?

A. Where -- sorry, where are you pointing to now?

Q. On the bottom of the first page, of the document?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. There's a section:

"Other information that has come to light ...

A. Yes.

Q. So the document you get from Colin Wallace says he is said to be a homosexual. He is said to utilise that to keep his members ensnared by threatening to reveal their activities. Am I right in saying that whether or not he did that within his organisation again wouldn't have been something of any great interest to you in your role?

A. You are correct in saying that. I wouldn't have asked Colin Wallace for any background detail on that, I suspect, because it wasn't of interest. I was taking this document as a bit of information on Tara without actually going into the detail of it with Colin Wallace.

Q. You explain in paragraph 15 of your statement, on page 3 of it that the geography of HQNI, as it were,
The name TARA is supposed to be derived from the place name where the ancient high kings of Ireland were crowned. The Guardian of April 12, 1973, said that the organisation was formed from a small but militant evangelical protestant movement devoted mainly to anti-catholicism and it described itself as 'the hard core of protestant resistance'. It claimed that protestantism in Northern Ireland was threatened with extinction and recommended a ten-point plan which included the proscription of the catholic church. It was imperative that all protestants were prepared to bear arms so that all resources were in a state of readiness.

TARA also recommended that 'responsible' protestants should gain a thorough knowledge of guns and military craft, that protestant areas should be physically cleared, law and order should be restored, 'true' protestant ministers should be established in all churches and that there should be integrated education with all religious teaching done by evangelical protestant organisation was said to be against intimidation, sectarian murder, hijacking and illegal drinking clubs.

The Sunday Independent of April 22, 1973 commented on the non-emergence of TARA as nothing had been heard since first reports in the press ten years previously.

Other information that has come to light includes the name of the O/C - William McGrath. He is said to be a homosexual and has coerced many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he had initiated. He is also thought to owe more allegiance to the Red Flag than to either the Union Jack or the Tricolour.
William McGrath (TARA) - 188 Upper Newtonards Rd  

1. Subject first came to notice in April 1973 when Jean Coulter said he was leading TARA and that his son was also involved. Enquiries with PR HQNI indicated that McGrath was homosexual and had Communist tendencies. Clifford Smyth (TARA and DUP) was reported to be living at McGrath's house at that time.

2. By Oct 73, further reports confirmed that McGrath was homosexual and was using the Puritan Printing Co for propaganda purposes. During October and November 73, police reports indicated that McGrath received a visitor from England, a Miss de Vries, and 2 Dutch journalists, one of them called Elisabeth Schuit. We do not know the purpose of these visits but on 6 Nov 73 an A2 report stated that McGrath intended to visit one Stephen Parry of Amsterdam.

3. McGrath again came to light in September 1974 when a TARA/ULP propaganda cassette tape was transcribed which exhorted the listener to send funds to McGrath, giving his previous address, 5 Greenwood Avenue, Belfast.

4. An intelligent though devious man, we need extremely careful "handling". I do not at present fully trust him but he is undoubtedly a mine of useful information on past incidents, organisation and personalities.
A. Yes. I wouldn't have assumed this chap was a straightforward person and therefore I used this word "devious". Yes, I agree with you.

Q. But you know you had never met him and you were making a personal assessment, but I am right in saying you are doing your best today to look back at the material and try and think what it's likely you would have thought, but you don't yourself remember what you were thinking 40 years ago when you were writing this. You just know that you didn't meet him?

A. Yes. Alas, you are right in that. I don't remember and I know I didn't meet him or ever intended meeting him. That's a pure paper assessment.

Q. And you have explained the same thing. Police statements tend to be in starker form, but you have explained that fact to the police in 1982 or '83, whenever they came to Germany to speak to you?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. You were shown exhibit 6 then, which was Major Halford-MacLeod's letter in January 1976. You by that stage had left Northern Ireland, left your post with G Intelligence, and didn't have access to that document, but you are aware towards the end of the discussions that we had, and now you have addressed it in your
Miss SHAW has a grievance to settle with MCGRATH, whom she dislikes intensely for moral reasons. To this end she is prepared to pass information and hopefully to Cons, to Cons for his part is prepared to pass on this information to the military through Sgt and Cpl. It is doubtful if will object to passing information direct to MI5 providing a suitable handler is found. is adamant however, that he does not want the RUC or SB involved.

At present the following background is known on Miss SHAW:
She is a deeply religious person, a member of the Barbican Mission for the Jews, and generally involved with missionary work. She is a spinster and employed as PA to the Rev Ian PAISLEY.