

NAME: GEORGE CLARKE

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THE INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

Witness Statement of George Clarke, Detective Chief Superintendent, PSNI

I, GEORGE CLARKE, will say as follows: -

Introduction

1. I am a Detective Chief Superintendent in the Police Service of Northern Ireland. I joined the RUC in December 1994. I am the Head of Public Protection within the PSNI. This Branch is also known as "C7" Branch and is part of Crime Operations Department.
2. I have been the Head of Public Protection since April 2014 when the Branch was established, initially in shadow form, before becoming fully operational in April 2015.

Present PSNI Child Abuse Investigative Structures

3. My Branch is responsible for, amongst other functions, the investigation of serious sexual offending and child abuse, whether physical or sexual. It includes responsibility for the investigation of historic or non-recent abuse and appropriate safeguarding and multi-agency co-operation.

4. Within the branch the following resources are dedicated to the investigation of child abuse.
 - 1 Detective Superintendent Investigations who reports directly to me and has oversight of child abuse and serious sexual assault investigations
 - 1 Detective Chief Inspector Child Abuse Investigations
 - 5 Detective Inspectors who each lead a team of detective sergeants and constables. There are 5 teams which are coterminous with the Health and Social Care Trusts.
 - A Central Referral Unit. This unit manages and allocates all referrals and initially screens referrals in cooperation with Social Care, so as to ensure a multi-agency approach to safeguarding and investigation. Around 4000 referrals of child abuse are received per annum.

5. In total, approximately 100 detectives are dedicated to the investigation of child abuse. If necessary, these numbers can be augmented from within the Public Protection Branch or wider Crime Operations Department, if additional support is required, in terms of specialist knowledge or simple capacity.

6. A Child Abuse Detective will have completed the standard detective training and will have completed further specialist training in investigative skills, including specialist interviewing skills to assist in obtaining the best possible evidence from a child victim or witness. It is a highly specialist role.

7. The key concept underpinning the work of the PSNI is to be child centred and to attain the safety of the child as a priority. This requires that the police service

work very closely with Social Care. When a report of child abuse is received, the first step will be to safeguard the child – this is essentially ensuring that the child or other children are protected from further potential abuse. This will require fulsome and prompt information sharing with Social Care or other relevant stakeholders such as Education, family members or other caring professions.

To this end we work very closely with local Health and Social Care Trust Gateway teams and have recently been able to co-locate in a number of our teams a Child Protection Social Worker (where this is not in place already it is planned to be delivered in the near future).

8. Safeguarding may involve removing the child from a place or family setting, the removal of the alleged abuser (for example precautionary suspensions in certain professions) and/or the appropriate and risk assessed disclosure to persons who can care for the child or children (for example disclosing to a school community that a member of staff has been arrested for offences).
9. In tandem with safeguarding, an investigation will be commenced where there are grounds to believe that a criminal offence has taken place. The criminal investigation will be led by PSNI, but will be very much a joint undertaking with routine involvement of social workers throughout; for example, the interview of a child will involve a specially trained and accredited police officer and social worker.
10. This approach would not have been the case in the 1970s and 1980s in the RUC and, to the best of my knowledge, anywhere in the United Kingdom until the later

part of the 1980s when specialist units were established. In the RUC these were called Child Abuse and Rape Enquiry units and became known as CARE.

11. It is therefore the case that the investigation of offences, such as those committed against the boys resident in Kincora, would have been conducted by non-specialist CID officers who would not have had specialist training in investigating child abuse. Police officers would also not have been operating in an environment which had, at its core, a concept of a multi-agency approach, built upon information sharing and joint police/ social care working with the aim of effectively and promptly safeguarding victims and potential victims. These later developments will inevitably create a comparator which is critical of the past. It should therefore be noted that developments in police practice inevitably flow from police experiences.

PSNI/ HIAI Interaction

12. This statement has been prepared by me to assist the Historic Institutional Abuse Inquiry (HIAI) and in particular the Kincora Module. In preparation for, and to assist the HIAI, the PSNI established a HIA support team which was responsible for the location of all relevant PSNI material and its transmission to the Inquiry. The PSNI response to the HIA Public Inquiry resulted in significant voluminous research, through numerous storage facilities and districts throughout Northern Ireland in order to provide the material detailed below.

Searches included:

- Records stored across the various districts, within departments.

- Pre-CARE and CARE abuse files at Knocknagoney, (1970 to 2005) and matters identified across the Districts, totalling 31,770 physical case files.
- District Premises Officers and Record Managers within each District were required to identify locations within their area that may contain relevant historical records (1922 to 1995), then requiring the HIA Police Support Team to search, locate and recover available materials and to obtain a district certification regarding material recovered.

13. Police ICT Systems were also searched and accessed to complete significant abuser/victim research.

14. As a consequence of the above process, approximately 25,000 documents related to Kincora were located and have been supplied to the HIAI.

15. In preparation for the Inquiry an analytical cell was established. This cell comprised two experienced Higher Police Analysts. These Analysts had access to all relevant PSNI material.

16. This material includes intelligence reports, intelligence documents and the various elements (statements, actions, etc) created during the criminal investigations into these matters. These investigations were all led by D/C/Superintendent (retired) George CASKEY and were conducted between 1980 and 1985.

17. I have provided supporting references in this statement and appended tables and timelines that have been compiled by the analysts for the assistance of the HIAI.
18. Before setting out the timeline of police involvement with the Kincora case it may be of value to show some context of the operating environment of the RUC during those years which may have some particular significance to the Inquiry in relation to Kincora. I have described the specialist resourcing now in place within PSNI in relation to investigating child abuse, and commented that at the time of Kincora such was not in place either in RUC or elsewhere. This had the impact that such investigations would be conducted by non- specialist members of a force which, at that time, was under exceptional pressure due to the terrorist and civil disorder and disruption being experienced in Northern Ireland.
- In 1971 there were 177 victims in 134 terrorist related incidents (explosions, firearms related incidents, etc) across Northern Ireland; 117 of these deaths occurred in the Belfast area.
 - In 1973 there were 249 victims in 209 terrorist related incidents (explosions, firearms related incidents, etc) across Northern Ireland; 123 of these deaths occurred in the Belfast area.
 - In 1974 there were 220 victims in 185 terrorist related incidents (explosions, firearms related incidents, etc) across Northern Ireland; 89 of these deaths occurred in the Belfast area.
 - In 1976 there were 289 victims in 213 terrorist related incidents (explosions, firearms related incidents, etc) across Northern Ireland; 123 of these deaths occurred in the Belfast area.

- In 1977 there were 112 victims in 104 terrorist related incidents (explosions, firearms related incidents, etc) across Northern Ireland; 56 of these deaths occurred in the Belfast area.
- In 1980 there were 78 victims in 70 terrorist related incidents (explosions, firearms related incidents, etc) across Northern Ireland; 36 of these deaths occurred in the Belfast area.
- In 1981 there were 101 victims in 90 terrorist related incidents (explosions, firearms related incidents, etc) across Northern Ireland; 44 of these deaths occurred in the Belfast area.
- In 1982 there were 98 victims in 67 terrorist related incidents (explosions, firearms related incidents, etc) across Northern Ireland; 30 of these deaths occurred in the Belfast area.
- In 1983 there were 79 victims in 67 terrorist related incidents (explosions, firearms related incidents, etc) across Northern Ireland; 19 of these deaths occurred in the Belfast area.

19. Police officers were often the targets of these attacks. Consequently officers were frequently accompanied by the military and were required to patrol in significant strength, utilising armoured vehicles. Officers were required, due to the emergency situation prevailing in the country at that time, to work long hours. It is appreciable that in these circumstances routine policing would frequently have been secondary to dealing with, whether responding to or seeking to prevent, murder and violence that was so common.

20. This reality would also have been experienced by the CID officers who would be investigating the terrorist offences as well as the more 'ordinary' crimes; which would have included, in this instance, child abuse.

21. I shall now set out the timeline of police involvement with the Kincora Boys' Home. It is based upon an analysis of those documents held by PSNI. All documents which have been used for this analytical process have previously been supplied to the Inquiry.

22. In setting out this timeline I initially refer to two documents. These are:

GC1 – Kincora Strategic Analysis Timeline of Key Events linked to Kincora.

GC2 – Kincora Strategic Overview of knowledge of abuse in Kincora (RUC, Military and Social Services).

KIN 27

23. The first alleged occasion on which Police Officers of any rank or role were aware of concerns around Kincora was circa June 1971, when a resident,

KIN 27 absconded from Kincora, on a number of occasions. **KIN 27** stated that he was located by uniformed RUC officers and was returned to his mother rather than Kincora. **KIN 27** made two statements to police (1980 and 1982) in which he claimed that his allegations, of sexual abuse by Joseph MAINS in Kincora, were not believed by police. No police record can be found to identify those officers to whom **KIN 27** spoke to in 1971, nor any report that was made or action taken in respect of **KIN 27** allegations.

24. **A Personal Profile has been prepared of MAINS based on documents held by PSNI. This is marked GC3.**

25. Allegations were also made by **KIN 27** to two social workers. There is no record that the RUC were able to identify these Individuals; a social worker of **KIN 27** was spoken to but did not recall the allegations being made.

The 1973 'Robophone' Message and RUC Response

26. This will also be considered when intelligence held by RUC is commented on below.

27. At 3:05pm on the 23rd May 1973, an anonymous call was received on the RUC Confidential Telephone. The key points made by the caller were that a vice ring existed, which centred on William McGRATH, who was employed at Kincora; that he [McGRATH] was involved in homosexuality and exploited young boys, sexually, politically and financially. The caller also alleged that McGRATH was involved in "underground politics", was the leader of TARA and was in contact with a number of local, homosexual MPs. It was also claimed that McGRATH had got his job in Kincora through his association with these homosexual politicians. In 1982 Roy GARLAND admitted to Sussex police that he had made an anonymous phone call to police re William McGRATH.

28. **A Personal Profile has been prepared of William McGRATH based on documents held by PSNI. This is marked GC4.**

Police Response to the anonymous phone call

29. The Sub-Divisional Commander in Mountpottinger (Superintendent HAMILTON) directed uniform officers to provide him with an immediate report in response to the contents of the anonymous call. The matter was passed to a Constable LONG, Strandtown for investigation. As part of his enquiries, Con LONG went to Kincora and spoke to Joseph MAINS. Based on this conversation, LONG concluded in his report to his Inspector (McCULLOUGH), that "this information came from some crank" and that McGRATH was "a very decent type of chap and had deep religious convictions and is high up in the Orange Order". This assessment was accepted by Inspector McCULLOUGH who signed off the report to the Sub- Divisional Commander stating that the allegations [in the anonymous phone call] were malicious and did not merit further investigation.

RUC Knowledge of the information contained in the anonymous phone call

30. The transcript of the call was copied to ACC Special Branch, ACC Crime and Divisional Commander, 'E' Division. The following police officers were also aware of the contents of the anonymous phone call:

- C/Supt SHUTE (Divisional Commander 'E' Division) signed and actioned the message to the SDC Mountpottinger on the 24/5/1973. SHUTE told Sussex police in 1982 that he had "no recollection of this particular message".
- Supt HAMILTON (Sub Divisional Commander, Mountpottinger) received instruction from C/Supt SHUTE and sent action to Inspector McCULLOUGH on 25/5/1973 at Strandtown for immediate report. HAMILTON told Sussex police that he has "no recollection of the case".

- Inspector McCULLOUGH (Uniform Inspector, Strandtown) received instruction from Supt HAMILTON and forwarded it to Sgt CLINTON on 26/5/1973. McCULLOUGH received a copy of Con LONG's report and submitted a 51/1 to Supt HAMILTON on 5/6/1973. McCULLOUGH told Sussex police in 1982 that he had "no recollection of dealing with this matter".
- Sgt CLINTON (Sergeant, Strandtown) received instruction from Inspector McCULLOUGH and delegated the matter to Con LONG. CLINTON has no recollection of this matter.
- Constable LONG (Strandtown RUC) was tasked to investigate the contents of the anonymous phone call. He met Joseph MAINS on 4/6/1973 to discuss the allegations against McGRATH and submitted a report to Insp. McCULLOUGH.
- C/Supt MONAGHAN (Deputy Divisional Commander 'E' Division) received the 51/1 submitted by Insp McCULLOUGH and forwarded it on to the Chief Con's Office on 7/6/1973 "No Further Action Necessary". MONAGHAN has no recollection of dealing with this matter.
- W/Con Beryl WRIGHT (RUC HQ) updated the anonymous message 2024 with the words "call appears to be malicious" on receipt of the reply from the investigating station.
- C/Supt RUSSELL(oversight of RUC CID) - a copy of the transcript of the anonymous phone call and the accompanying 51/1 which outlined that no further police action was necessary bears his official stamp and initials. RUSSELL does not recall seeing this message.
- C/Supt James MILLAR (Deputy Head of RUC SB) - his initials appears on a 3 page document relating to the anonymous call. MILLAR acknowledges that

he had noted the contents of the message, though does not recall what, if any, action was taken at the time.

TERRY Review of the RUC handling of Robophone message 2024

31. In 1982 the TERRY Review probed the RUC handling of the 2024th anonymous phone call of 1973. It is worth noting that there was an average of 14 anonymous calls being received by the RUC daily at this time. TERRY considered whether or not the matter should have been passed to CID. It was noted by the TERRY Review that the RUC in Mountpottinger/Strandtown, at the time of the anonymous call, were operating under 'severe pressure', particularly in responding to paramilitary and terrorist-related activity. They concluded that the RUC had recorded, investigated and dealt with the call appropriately and apportioned no blame for failing to carry out a more thorough investigation, at the time.

32. It is reasonable to conclude that if there had been a record made of the 1971 (KIN 27) allegations (if they were of course made) and, if this had been connected to Kincora, the 1973 Robophone allegations may have been viewed with more significance and a more full investigation conducted. In particular if the Welfare Authorities' concerns had been known, some more effective action may well have been carried out. This may have led to the recording of criminal allegations from residents as occurred in 1980. Of potential significance may have been the 'weight' put (by Constable LONG) upon the assessment of MAINS regarding MCGRATH (in that MAINS is treated as a credible assessor). At this time, MAINS was already alleged to be a child abuser, in papers held by

the Welfare Department. There appears to be no record of Police sharing with the Welfare Authorities any concerns in relation to this anonymous call in May 1973; although the RUC by their own actions may have reasonably considered that they had alerted the relevant authorities by speaking to MAINS, who was the Officer in Charge of the Home.

33. The RUC were not aware of the Welfare Authorities concerns in respect of MAINS, dating back to 1967.
34. This sharing of information would now be standard practice and it would be expected that a multi-agency response comprising a safeguarding and investigative plan would be considered at least. This would include researching the Home on police systems, referring to the Social Services Gateway team to ensure that a full picture is shared by both agencies and then developing a joint approach. A comprehensive record would be created on police systems for further reference if required.

Roy GARLAND

35. During the 1982 TERRY Review (led by Sir George TERRY) which will be returned to later in my statement, a man called Roy GARLAND confirmed that he had made an anonymous call in 1973 "to provoke police reaction". He pointed out some "irregularities" in the transcript. This is contained in his statement of 30/03/82.

36. MCGRATH and GARLAND had known each other since 1955. GARLAND was aware of MCGRATH's sexual conduct and political opinions. They were also in business together around 1964 which ultimately led to a court case in 1972 for recovery of a debt.
37. **A Personal Profile has been prepared in relation to GARLAND and is attached, marked as GC5.**
38. GARLAND made allegations about MCGRATH to a large number of persons during the early 1970s to around 1976. Of note, with regard to the RUC's knowledge of events at Kincora, is contact between GARLAND and a police officer, D/Constable James CULLEN between late 1973 and 1976 and the involvement of ACC MEHARG.

D/Constable James CULLEN and ACC MEHARG

39. In 1974 D/Constable CULLEN was a Police Dog Handler with the RUC Drugs Squad. ACC William MEHARG was the ACC CRIME, responsible for the oversight of all CID investigations. The interaction between MEHARG and CULLEN was examined in great detail within the CASKEY investigations, the HUGHES Inquiry and, to a lesser extent, in the reports of Sir George TERRY's review.
40. CULLEN states that in November 1973 he had a conversation, arising from Drugs Squad matters, with a man called James MCCORMICK. MCCORMICK mentioned a man who had sexually abused his (MCCORMICK's) friend and was using his position as a lay preacher to "contact and influence young

teenage boys". Subsequently in March 1974 CULLEN spoke to the unnamed victim, who was GARLAND.

41. **A Personal Profile has been prepared of MCCORMICK and is marked GC6.**
42. GARLAND made allegations to CULLEN that he had been sexually abused by MCGRATH. He informed CULLEN that he would not be involved in any Court Case but would provide police with information about MCGRATH.
43. In March 1974 CULLEN briefed his ACC, William MEHARG, on the information he had gleaned from GARLAND. A written note was prepared by CULLEN for the information of MEHARG which is dated 21 March 1974, consisting of 23 paragraphs; it refers to having been produced following a meeting with MEHARG on the 2 March 1974. Whilst this report clearly states that MCGRATH was a 'Warden in Kincora Boys' Hostel', no other reference is made to Kincora. The majority of the document is related to MCGRATH's background and his political activities, with no references to his homosexuality or any suggestion of him being a risk to boys, nor is any apparent criminality disclosed.
44. In interview with Sussex Police, he (CULLEN) stated that he went directly to ACC MEHARG in March 1974 because of the nature of the allegations and in particular that prominent people (Clifford SMYTH and the Revd Dr Ian PAISLEY) were aware of MCGRATH's conduct. This rationale is not supported by the contents of the 21 March 1974 report which does not make any mention of 'prominent' individuals linked to sensitive allegations. Indeed, during the HUGHES Inquiry, CULLEN's report of 21 March 1974 was described by

Counsel as 'a rather innocuous document', which appears a rather apt description.

45. When pressed, during the HUGHES Inquiry, on the point of the 'innocuous' nature of his notes and reports to ACC MEHARG, CULLEN states that some of his more 'sensitive' findings were not committed to paper, rather being communicated to ACC MEHARG by oral brief. It is of note that CULLEN states that he had at least 4 meetings with MEHARG. No notes have been located of these meetings. CULLEN suggested during HUGHES, that this practice of not committing certain matters to writing was at the direction of MEHARG; MEHARG roundly rebuffed this suggestion.

46. It is not clear on the strength of the report of 21 March 1974, what CULLEN was enquiring into. Whatever matter was under CULLEN's ambit, it was not drugs related. Had it been a subversive enquiry, it would have been expected that it would be passed to either Special Branch for intelligence gathering, or CID for a serious crime investigation. That said, an investigation into serious crime would usually be allocated to a more generalist CID officer, rather than a specialist Drugs Squad officer, far less one who also had a role as a dog handler.

47. In papers held by the PSNI, there is an undated manuscript log, attributed to CULLEN, which appears to be very similar to a typed log dated 26 January 1980. This log is 54 paragraphs in length, the first 23 of which are identical to the report of the 21 March 1974. Within the remaining 31 paragraphs of the

document, reference is made to homosexuality but not to abuse of boys. Two further reports, also dated 26 January 1980, are also within PSNI records. This date (26 January 1980) is two days after the publication of the Irish Independent article which exposed the Kincora issue publicly. It appears that the production of these papers follows CULLEN being asked by CASKEY to obtain from BUNTING a further copy of the MASON file. Therefore these three reports may have been drawn up also at CASKEY's request but this is not clear.

48. The three reports dated 26 January 1980, when considered collectively, show the activities and research undertaken by CULLEN in course of his enquiries. PSNI are not in possession of CULLEN's contemporaneous notes or reports; however PSNI are in possession of diary entries from his police journal (provided by CULLEN to the TERRY review) and some undated handwritten notes, including photocopies. CULLEN produced these to the HUGHES Inquiry but not to CASKEY or TERRY. Therefore the only attribution of date is CULLEN's. It would certainly be expected now that an Investigating Officer in such an enquiry would furnish his authorities with regular reports showing the status of the inquiry and in particular any recommendation as to the closing of same when, for example, all lines of enquiry were complete.

49. In brief, CULLEN states that he carried on his investigation between 1974 and 1976 under the direction of MEHARG and without any supervision/mid ranking officers being sighted upon his actions. During questioning in the HUGHES Inquiry, CULLEN acknowledged that he had (without giving any details) made

his Drugs Squad supervisors aware that he was working directly to ACC MEHARG on a matter.

50. Until January 1976 (when GARLAND again contacted him) CULLEN states that he uncovered nothing “of a concrete nature by which proceedings could be instituted”. It is noted that, despite having been given a list of previous residents of Kincora by Mr BUNTING (Assistant Director of the EHSSB – see following commentary) in March 1976, there is no record of CULLEN attempting to locate and interview any resident of Kincora who may have been a victim of abuse. CULLEN’s only ‘complainant’ was GARLAND who had already indicated he would not give evidence and was also not a witness to abuse at Kincora.
51. It should be noted that DC CULLEN had no specialist training in Child Abuse (although this would not have been expected at that time) and was attached to RUC Drugs Squad. Much as he was the original recipient of the information, and being aware of the potential requirement for sensitivity and a covert approach, it does seem in retrospect, that he was not an appropriate officer to carry out this enquiry. It is not clear, why ACC MEHARG did not allocate the enquiry to a more appropriately experienced officer or introduce a more direct method of supervision to a junior officer.
52. In his first statement to the 1980 RUC Investigation, CULLEN stated that he did not know that MCGRATH was working at Kincora until January 1976. This is incorrect. When interviewed by Sussex Police CULLEN accepted knowing of MCGRATH’s employment in 1974; indeed this is shown in his report of 21 March 1974. CULLEN states that when he informed ACC MEHARG of MCGRATH’s employment (in 1976), ACC MEHARG directed that enquiries be

made with MCGRATH's employers, the EHSSB. It is not clear why this was not done in 1974 as would have been expected if, as CULLEN alleges, concerns were expressed about a person working with children. The 21st March 1974 report, submitted by CULLEN to MEHARG, states that MCGRATH worked at Kincora; the 'innocuous nature' of this report has already been discussed above.

The MASON File

53. An initial meeting with Mr BUNTING of the EHSSB occurred on 19 February 1976. During the follow-up meeting in March 1976, BUNTING gave CULLEN a copy of a file of an investigation, previously carried out by Henry MASON, into allegations of abuse at Kincora. This is known as the 'MASON File'.

54. CULLEN states that he subsequently sent a copy of the MASON file to ACC MEHARG via internal RUC post; ACC MEHARG stated that he never received same. There are other queries and conflicts of evidence between CULLEN and MEHARG raised around the broader investigation. Additionally, queries were raised around the chain of command between CULLEN and MEHARG. These matters were considered by both the HUGHES Inquiry and the TERRY Review.

Summary regarding CULLEN and MEHARG

55. Based on the documents held by PSNI it is not possible to definitively determine the correct version of events. It does appear however, that in 1974 CULLEN (and quite possibly MEHARG) were aware of concerns around MCGRATH. Whilst not documented in his 21 March 1974 report, CULLEN

describes being aware of the homosexual behaviour of MCGRATH towards GARLAND and other young men, that he worked in Kincora and briefed MEHARG accordingly (in 1974). If CULLEN's dating of his handwritten notes is accepted (as per the HUGHES Inquiry), this is correct but leaves the question as to why he did not report/ record same formally.

56. This raises the question of what CULLEN's role or task was. During HUGHES CULLEN was adamant that he was not carrying out an investigation, rather he was gathering information or intelligence. It has been discussed above that this was surely not the role of a Drugs Squad officer. CULLEN's version is disputed by ACC MEHARG; during HUGHES, MEHARG was clear that he had instructed CULLEN to obtain evidence.

57. Given these conflicting versions, it seems fair to comment that CULLEN did not receive clear instructions or adequate directions from ACC MEHARG. That said, whatever CULLEN's objectives- either gathering intelligence or carrying out investigations, the end result was an ineffective response to the serious concerns he had been made aware of. This was potentially (and it is considered likely) a consequence of his lack of experience in such matters, as well as his somewhat cautious approach to the information, where he showed no obvious zeal or initiative. For example, CULLEN appears to have taken no proactive steps upon receipt of a list of Kincora residents from BUNTING; these boys could have provided CULLEN with the evidence MEHARG says CULLEN was tasked to obtain.

58. Equally, concerns exist as to the lack of management and direction provided by ACC MEHARG to CULLEN. MEHARG was considerably more senior in rank to CULLEN and, given his role and vast experience, the officer who was more likely to see the strategic significance and potential of the allegations. In HUGHES, MEHARG accepted that 'I had given him [CULLEN] improper directions and I regret that'.
59. There is explanation offered by CULLEN that he did not have sufficient evidence to proceed in carrying out a formal police investigation. In terms of the alleged homosexuality, there would have been difficulties in developing such a line of inquiry with a reluctant witness such as GARLAND. Nonetheless, a clear and comprehensive rationale, explaining the limited action taken in 1974 and the allocation of the investigation to a Drugs Squad Detective Constable Dog Handler, is not visible from the documents held by PSNI.
60. In current structures it would be the case that an officer conducting such an inquiry would be of appropriate experience and seniority and would receive appropriate supervision. It would now be a matter for a specialist Child Abuse Investigator, albeit such were not a feature of the RUC at that time.
61. It is also unclear what happened after 1976 and why the matter was not progressed to a more definite end; it appears from BUNTING's statement to the 1980 CASKEY enquiry that he believed that the matter was being dealt with by the RUC. Whilst it may be assessed that the EHSSB acted with considerable passivity in this regard, the RUC did not pursue matters to a conclusion either.

62. It is a professional observation that the disparate pieces of information held within the RUC and by other agencies were not being connected nor were the agencies co-ordinating their activities to safeguard children.
63. The documents held by Police indicate that this date (1976) is the first occasion on which the MASON File's existence is known to police and a copy of same is in the possession of any police officer. It is therefore appropriate to reflect on the contents of the MASON File at this point.

The MASON file is passed to the RUC (1976)

64. Documents held by PSNI indicate that in September 1967 two letters of complaint were sent by Kincora residents (**R 6** and **R 5** **R 5**) to Welfare Authorities. These letters contained allegations about consumption of alcohol and indecent assaults by MAINS.
65. In September 1967 Henry MASON, the Belfast City Welfare Officer, accompanied by a colleague Robert MOORE, interviewed Joseph MAINS. Whilst MAINS denied the allegations, it is clear that sufficient concern existed for a report to be submitted to the Belfast Town Clerk concerning the matter. It is not clear from the documents held by PSNI what happened in the intervening years, however in August 1971 a consolidated file of allegations (including a further allegation made against MAINS in 1971 by **R 8** , a Kincora resident) was compiled by Henry MASON and presented to the Town Solicitors Office with a recommendation that the matter be reported to the RUC.

66. There is no suggestion or evidence that the existence of the file was ever known to RUC before BUNTING supplies a copy to CULLEN in 1976. It should be noted that the MASON file relates solely to alleged offending by MAINS against Kincora residents.
67. It may be useful to consider recorded events around the submission of the MASON file to Belfast City Authorities.
- 25th August 1971 – Henry MASON submitted his file to the Town Solicitor, John YOUNG, in relation to complaints from the three Kincora residents (R 6, R 5 and R 8) (the MASON file). In his covering letter MASON recommended that there were sufficient grounds for referring the matter to police. Handwritten on the top of this covering letter is, “CWO to see TC on 20/9/71”. There is no record of a meeting between the CWO (MASON) and the TC (David JAMESON, Town Clerk) on 20/09/71; however a meeting between the two men took place on the 28/09/1971.
 - 1st September 1971 – There is an entry in Mr JAMESON, the Town Clerk’s diary for a meeting with Superintendent William THOMPSON at 9.30am. The purpose of this meeting is not clear, although Superintendent THOMPSON stated that he had never discussed Kincora with anyone.
 - 28th September 1971 – Henry MASON met with Mr JAMESON to discuss the content of the meeting between JAMESON and Superintendent THOMPSON on the 1st September 1971. Given THOMPSON’s recollection, it is unclear why this meeting would have taken place.

- 28th September 1971 – There is an entry, believed to have been marked as complete, in the Town Solicitor's Diary (Mr YOUNG) re: 'phoning Mr MEHARG on telephone number 650301'. Two previous attempts to contact ACC MEHARG are also listed in the diary for earlier in that month. MEHARG states he may have received a call from Mr YOUNG, but denies it was about Kincora. MEHARG confirmed that he knew YOUNG both professionally and personally. There are no other entries in the 1971 diary indicating further attempts to contact Mr MEHARG.

Valerie SHAW and D/Superintendent GRAHAM

68. Returning to RUC knowledge of Kincora, there is evidence to suggest further reporting to a Police Officer in 1974. Circa June 1974 Valerie SHAW contacts D/Superintendent John GRAHAM, Head of Belfast CID, who was at that time rapidly approaching retirement.
69. **A personal profile has been prepared of SHAW and is exhibited as GC7.**
70. In late September 1973 Valerie SHAW had been informed by a friend, Emma GREENWOOD, that she (GREENWOOD) had heard from a man called James MCCORMICK that an individual in Orange Order/Christian circles was using his position to "corrupt or attempt to corrupt young men and boys into homosexual practices" (**see GC6**).
71. In October 1973 SHAW met MCCORMICK and between then and June 1974 she attempted to have the matter resolved within Church circles. SHAW stated

that she raised the matters with the Revd Ian PAISLEY. PAISLEY was interviewed by the RUC during the 1980 enquiry and again during the TERRY review. It was PAISLEY's version that he had no reason to connect any of the allegations, brought to him by SHAW, to Kincora and rather saw the matter as relating to homosexuality. Although homosexuality was illegal he did not report this to the RUC.

72. However when this approach to PAISLEY did not bear fruit, SHAW contacted D/Superintendent John GRAHAM, Head of Belfast CID, with whom she shared a mutual acquaintance.
73. GRAHAM stated that he had passed the information received from SHAW on to a CID officer(s) at Mountpottinger. No record has been found of any report being made or recorded.
74. It would seem reasonable to conclude that a senior and experienced detective officer should have made a record of such information, to whom it was passed and that he would subsequently have satisfied himself that appropriate action had been taken. In her evidence to HUGHES, SHAW described GRAHAM as making notes during their 45 minute meeting. Recording this complaint and investigating it, may well have built upon, or alternatively supported, the other disparate allegations known to the RUC by June 1974. It is however appropriate to observe that it was Roy GARLAND who made the 1973 anonymous Robophone call, and who was also CULLEN and SHAW's source of information (see Exhibit **GC5**) in 1973/1974.

75. These observations echo, it must be acknowledged, comments made within the TERRY report.

Richard KERR

76. In October 1977 a Kincora resident, Richard KERR was arrested in relation to a series of burglaries.

77. A Personal Profile has been prepared of KERR and is marked as GC8.

78. During his detention at Strandtown Police Station KERR asked the Investigating Officer, D/Constable SCULLY, if MAINS would be attending the station. SCULLY had previous knowledge and suspicions of MAINS, particularly in relation to his homosexuality. A subsequent court appearance and comment by KERR to “tell all” if MAINS did not appear, gave rise to further suspicions about MAINS and his relationship with KERR in SCULLY’s mind.

79. SCULLY raised his concerns with Social Workers involved with KERR and Kincora. Several meetings then followed between D/Constable SCULLY, Sergeant SILLERY (the Juvenile Liaison Officer in ‘E’ District) and a number of Social Workers.

80. No criminal investigation appears to have been commenced, which is understandable given the absence of a criminal complaint. Instead, it appears that at this stage the RUC were passing their concerns to Social Care. There is no record of any mention to SCULLY or SILLERY of the existence or contents

of the 'MASON file'. It is clear that the suspicions aroused by the 1973 anonymous call, D/Constable CULLEN's work and KERR's reports were not being connected and acted upon.

81. In January 1980 an article appeared in the Irish Independent entitled "Sex Racket at Children's Home". This article was based on information supplied by two of Richard KERR's social workers. When interviewed by TERRY, the Social Workers concerned, indicated that they had done this as they were frustrated by the inaction of all agencies and in particular Social Services, regarding KERR and Kincora.

Formal RUC Investigations commence (1980)

82. Following the publication of this article, a significant RUC investigation, led by the then D/Chief Inspector George CASKEY, was launched into the allegations contained in the newspaper article. This investigation considered offending against boys at three other homes, namely Bawnmore Boys Home, Williamson House Children's Home (both Belfast) and De La Salle Boys Home, Kircubbin as well as Kincora.
83. It is noted that none of the Kincora staff were convicted of offending at any other Home and none of those involved with the other Homes were charged with offending at Kincora. As a consequence of the RUC investigation SEMPLE, MAINS and MCGRATH were all charged and pled guilty to a number of serious offences connected to the sexual abuse of residents of the Boys' Home.

84. **A Personal Profile of Raymond SEMPLE is attached and marked as GC9.**
85. Details of convictions and sentences imposed can be found in the relevant Personal Profiles.
86. Post the (1981) conviction of SEMPLE, MAINS and MCGRATH, a further "Phase II" investigation was commenced on 10 February 1982 by Mr CASKEY, by now promoted to D/Superintendent. This Phase II enquiry considered remarks made by the Trial Judge and a range of allegations made in media reports, both print and television. These allegations ranged from criminal conduct to negligence on the part of Health Officials, Police Officers, Military and public figures.
87. On 20 February 1982, Sir George TERRY, the Chief Constable of Sussex was appointed by HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary to consider matters relating to the previous RUC investigation. This had been requested by the Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir John HERMON. This review became known as the TERRY Review; Sir George TERRY also had oversight of continuing RUC enquiries.
88. D/Superintendent CASKEY in turn had oversight of a number of satellite enquiries involving homosexual abuse of other boys. Further, he was to inquire into allegations made around the knowledge or actions of military intelligence, particularly connected to the allegations made by John Colin WALLACE.

89. These enquiries led to the production of the TERRY Report and 2 further RUC prosecution files submitted to the DPP.

The TERRY Review

90. Following the TERRY Review, a report was submitted by Sir George TERRY on 27 May 1983.
91. The TERRY Review was led by D/Superintendent Gordon HARRISON and Superintendent Richard FLENLEY. HARRISON submitted a report focussed upon the criminal investigation matters and FLENLEY covered the allegations made in the press. These were covered by a summary report by Sir George TERRY.
92. TERRY's summary report is of 27 pages although the supporting reports of HARRISON and FLENLEY are more substantial and in his summary TERRY is clear that all three reports needs to be considered collectively.
93. It is clear from his report that TERRY saw his role as effectively re-investigating the initial Kincora enquiry; he describes "the task has been a mammoth one of great intricacy and very obvious importance demanding, as it were, a re-enquiry of the whole".
94. He in particular considers media allegations of abuse by unknown persons and states that the victims knew their abusers which "entirely gives lie to the media assertions that the boys were made over to a variety of other males of unknown

identity through the medium of any prosecution ring". In retrospect this is not actually correct as a number of unknown abusers have been described in statements recently analysed.

95. Potentially seven unknown abusers are described in documents held by PSNI but this is, it must be conceded is with the benefit of hindsight and dedicated trained analytical support. Some abusers are potentially identifiable to a balance of probability test rather than criminal evidential standard. This point is returned to later in my statement.

96. TERRY concluded that:

There was no evidence of 'homosexual rings' and therefore no involvement of police officers, civil servants, military personnel, JPs or legal people. There was no covering up of information by RUC personnel; rather he describes a lack of awareness or an inability to recognise or connect information.

97. No complaint was received of homosexual abuse however, "that being said there were several occasions when, through inadequacy of inefficiency, insufficient cognisance was taken by supervisory officers of the implications of information, which unsupported and lacking credibility from its original source should nevertheless have attracted greater interest and a more positive response."

98. No paramilitary organisation could be connected to the abuse in Kincora however, fear of MCGRATH's believed paramilitary links did prevent an EHSSB employee from exercising his professional functions.
99. TERRY also comments on issues of the recruitment and supervision of staff and other matters. These are for Social Services to comment upon. However, he does raise the consequence of the absence of formalised liaison between Social Services and the Police such as now exist within Northern Ireland. The consequences of this are reflected elsewhere within this statement.
100. It is important to note, when considering TERRY's conclusions, that TERRY makes it clear (at the first paragraph) that his report must be read in conjunction with the subsidiary reports of HARRISON and FLENLEY.
101. That said, it is of note that TERRY, in his summary report, makes no mention by name of ACC MEHARG, DC CULLEN or D/Supt GRAHAM, despite significant commentary about all of these men in the reports prepared by his subordinates. One of TERRY's findings, at paragraph 51 (b) is that he refers to CULLEN's information as 'extremely vague'; whereas the evidence would suggest that the information available to CULLEN from GARLAND was clear.
102. Although TERRY makes it clear that it was not his role to consider Social Services, he does make substantial references to them, including drawing a conclusion that an independent inquiry should be conducted into their actions.

103. During the review of documents generated by the TERRY Review, and subsequently the HUGHES Inquiry, adverse comment on the conduct of a number of Welfare Authority/ Social Service officials was noted. No evidence of criminality was set out. However, the actions of a number of officials examined during these processes were of concern and were commented on in a number of reports. For example, the handling of the MASON file and previous allegations about MAINS, the response of Social Services management to concerns raised about MCGRATH and the failure to address these (to some degree caused by MCGRATH's alleged paramilitary links) were amongst matters raised by both TERRY and HUGHES. TERRY noted that whilst Social Services were not strictly in his purview "nonetheless it is evident that there was a high degree of naivety, incompetence and in some instances an avoidance of responsibility by members of that very vital service".

104. TERRY concluded that the military had been "very frank" and "perfectly open" with him. TERRY also had oversight of CASKEY's investigations into military allegations and Kincora (1983 RUC File). As such he should have been aware of (former British Army Captain) Brian GEMMELL's allegations, made to CASKEY's team in July 1982, that Ian CAMERON (MI5) had ordered GEMMELL to cease his enquiries into McGRATH's activities; this instruction being given to GEMMELL in 1975.

105. **A Person Profile has been prepared on Brian GEMMELL and is marked as GC12.**

106. Given the difficulties experienced by CASKEY in interviewing CAMERON at a time when TERRY had oversight of the RUC investigation, it is hard to reconcile TERRY's positive assessment of the Army's cooperation.
107. GEMMELL is listed in the Index of the TERRY Review but features without any commentary as to his profession or role, and there is no record that TERRY's team ever spoke to GEMMELL. Further there is no mention of Ian CAMERON in the TERRY Review.
108. This may bring into question the 'weight' which can be placed on TERRY's assessment that there was no military awareness of homosexual activity at Kincora. We know this to be incorrect. TERRY failed to identify and interview GEMMELL, to mention the allegations that GEMMELL had made or to highlight the difficulties that CASKEY faced with regards to speaking with CAMERON; a potentially highly significant line of enquiry.
109. Colin WALLACE (former Civilian Information Officer at Army HQNI) refused to speak to the TERRY Review about allegations he had allegedly made concerning McGRATH and the Army's knowledge of abuse at Kincora, as he (WALLACE) stated that Sussex Police would not be impartial. In 1982 WALLACE was in prison having been convicted of the manslaughter of Jonathon LEWIS (husband of WALLACE's alleged lover). The killing of LEWIS was investigated by Sussex Police and in particular, it is believed that D/Superintendent HARRISON was the Senior Investigating Officer.

CASKEY's Investigations 1982, 1983 & 1985

110. CASKEY submitted a further file in 1982 that dealt with a number of allegations which surfaced during Phase I of the Kincora enquiry. These included further allegations of abuse by the Kincora subjects and media commentary of various "cover up" activities.
111. It also included suggestions of the existence of a vice ring, reported in the Irish Times and subsequently repeated in large degree in a BBC Spotlight programme broadcast in February 1982. No evidence was found of the alleged "vice ring" by DS/Superintendent CASKEY. It is noted that the boy who was the source/ subject of this Spotlight programme and in respect of whose abuse prosecution had previously been directed, was never a resident at Kincora and had no links to Kincora at all. No further charges were brought as a result of this investigation.
112. Allegations of military knowledge will be dealt with below.

John Colin WALLACE

113. CASKEY submitted two further files in 1983 and 1985 regarding allegations of a military/ intelligence cover up. Many of these allegations appear to emanate from John Colin WALLACE.
114. **A personal profile of WALLACE, based on documents held by PSNI has been prepared and is attached marked as GC10.**

115. The most immediate point is that, despite significant efforts by the RUC, and a range of undertakings of immunity from potential prosecution under the Official Secrets Act, WALLACE has never formally assisted any of the previous criminal investigations nor indeed did he assist the HUGHES Inquiry. It can be noted that some of these undertakings of immunity have been quite broad; for example, in October 1982, WALLACE was handed a letter from MoD by D/Supt CASKEY which stated that he (WALLACE) could disclose to CASKEY and another RUC officer 'the information that is in your possession which is directly relevant to the investigation – including where necessary, information which you gained in the course of your employment with the MoD and which is security classified'.
116. One document which has links to these allegations and is substantially connected to WALLACE has been referred to as **GC80**, its exhibit designation during the 1985 RUC investigation (GC referring to George CASKEY). It is appropriate to cover its existence and background.
117. Given its significance to allegations of a potential "cover-up" or inaction by the authorities, **a strategic overview of this exhibit was prepared and is marked GC11.**
118. On 7th August 1984, a former soldier, Fred HOLROYD, who had been engaged in covert/ intelligence duties in Northern Ireland, supplied a four page document to Essex Police; it was later shared with the RUC. HOLROYD told Essex Police that the document had been written by WALLACE and "sent to an MI5 officer at

HQNI". The details of the classification, the person the report was written to and the department it was to be shared with were blanked out on the document shown to the Essex Police. HOLROYD claimed he knew the identity of the MI5 officer but would not disclose it to the police officers. The RUC (D/Supt G CASKEY) was subsequently informed of HOLROYD's meeting with the Essex Police, where the report allegedly written by WALLACE was discussed. It is not however clear if the actual report (**GC80**) was copied and shared with the RUC at this time. Internal RUC communication from September 1984 shows that the RUC dismissed HOLROYD's information commenting that "there is nothing new that require any further investigation".

119. On the 21st November 1984 HOLROYD again met with Essex Police and handed over a quantity of documents, most of which related to correspondence between himself and WALLACE (who was, at that stage, writing from prison). Amongst this material was the four page document (**GC80**) which HOLROYD had referred to in the previous meeting with them in August 1984. Following the disclosure of this material, Essex Police "notified the appropriate authorities" of its existence and provided copies of same. The copy handed to Essex Police by HOLROYD, had, included in handwriting, the addressee and requester of the report noted at the top of the first page. On 21st February 1985 D/Con ROBERTS, Essex Police, informed the RUC that "with ref to **GC80** ... HOLROYD had produced a photocopy stating that this had been retyped from the original document and photocopied. Various things had been crossed out by HOLROYD to protect the source". It is unknown if the 'original' document was ever located. This confirms that the document subsequently received by the RUC had been altered prior to it being handed to Essex Police.

120. On 21st January 1985 RUC ACC CUSHLEY wrote to the Secretary of the HUGHES Inquiry to disclose the existence of **GC80**. CUSHLEY noted that "if this document is genuine it is relevant to the HUGHES Inquiry. RUC are doubtful if it could be genuine and an investigation into its authenticity is being pursued by a team of detectives under the direction of Detective Superintendent CASKEY". Following D/Supt CASKEY's investigations, significant challenges were identified touching upon the veracity of the document. Despite protracted correspondence between WALLACE (through his solicitor) and the Secretary to the HUGHES Inquiry between in 1985, WALLACE did not cooperate with the Judge-led Inquiry; despite having received authorisation from the MoD that he could disclose "relevant information to the Committee of Inquiry."
121. On the 4th April 1985 D/Supt CASKEY and DI COOKE interviewed HOLROYD at Rayleigh Police Station, Essex; HOLROYD was "uncooperative" with the RUC officers who questioned about his knowledge of the documents he had handed over to Essex Police. At this point HOLROYD refused to confirm who had given him a copy of **GC80**.
122. Repeated efforts were made by the RUC to speak with Colin WALLACE, then in HMP Lewes, between April and August 1985, without success (as set out above in GC11). To date, WALLACE has refused to cooperate with any police/statutory investigation into the allegations he proffers in relation to Kincora.

123. The HUGHES Inquiry concluded that WALLACE has never “authenticated or repudiated the papers which we have seen [**GC80** included] ... Even if Mr WALLACE was prepared to authenticate them, they would in themselves be of very limited use to the Inquiry since they consist of bald or generalised allegations without supporting detail or confirmation. It would have required his testimony to remedy this and this was not forthcoming”.

Military Documents (1983 CASKEY investigation file)

124. Military documents held by PSNI as part of the 1983 RUC File ‘Military Allegations and John Colin WALLACE’ (C64/5/83) were analysed. It is understood that these documents were made available to CASKEY in 1982.

Document Reference	Date	Author	Synopsis of information
SWJS5 C64/5/83 ‘TARA’	Undated	Believed to be John Colin WALLACE	2 page typed document. Provides background information on TARA - structure, objectives and personalities involved. Refers to McGRATH’s homosexuality and that he had conned many people into membership by threatening to reveal homosexual activities they had been involved in.
SWJS8 C64/5/83 TARA (attachment – The RUC Target for Treachery by Clifford SMYTH)	19/10/1973	Hugh MOONEY	Appears to be a memo addressed to a Miss BUNBURY, G3 INT, “ <i>I understand you have an interest in this extremist Protestant organisation...</i> ”. Document refers to information provided to “PR” [Colin WALLACE] by a Sunday Times journalist, Gerald BARLETT and also a booklet by Clifford SMYTH. BARLETT told Colin WALLACE that PAISLEY was implicated with TARA.
SWJS11 C64/5/83 “ <i>Extremist Protestants- Secret Organisation- TARA</i> ”	6/7/1974	Major C GSO3 Intelligence Officer at HQNI	2 page document consisting of 7 points on the background, organisation and personalities involved in TARA. Re McGRATH, “ <i>...CO of TARA; has Communist leanings and a reputed homosexual</i> ”.

Document Reference	Date	Author	Synopsis of information
SWJS2 C64/5/83 "TARA"	Para 6: 6/7/1974 Para 9: 13/7/1974	Para 6 only- Staff Sergeant A Army Int. Corps, Special Military Int. Unit, Castlereagh. Para 9-u/k	Para. 6: Background information on TARA. Document names Clifford SMYTH, Frankie MILLAR jnr and a 'Frank' McGRATH as being connected. Report claims that <i>"a large number of TARA members were homosexual"</i> . Para 9: Refers to the structure of TARA in the Larne and Ballymena areas.
SWJS9 C64/5/83 "Extremist Protestants- Secret Organisation- TARA"	10/7/1974	Major C GSO3 Intelligence Officer at HQNI	Document to be read in conjunction with SF/704/INT, dated 6/7/1974. Brief 1 page, 4 point document listing Frank MILLER, Clifford SMYTH and Fred MAGLA as involved with TARA, which, as an organisation, has homosexual connotations. Document also states that TARA has links to the UVF but not the UDA.
GC 80 C64/22/85 "TARA – reports regarding criminal offences associated with the homosexual community in Belfast"	08/11/1974	John Colin WALLACE	4 page document consisting of 10 bullet points re: TARA. Makes reference to homosexuality and abuse at boys' hostels. Specifically names McGRATH and his involvement in homosexuality, employment at and abuse of boys at Kincora.
SWJS4 C64/5/83 'William McGRATH (TARA)'	26/02/1975	Major C GSO3 Intelligence Officer at HQNI	Short report of 4 paragraphs of an assessment of McGRATH. Refers to McGRATH as a homosexual and knowledge of his homosexuality by the Military from April 1973. The document also refers to police reports during October and November 1973 re McGRATH visiting Holland. McGRATH is described as <i>"an intelligent though devious man, who needs extremely careful 'handling'"</i> .
SWJS3 Military Intelligence Source Report	22/05/1975	Corporal D CONCO East Belfast	MISR information refers to contact giving Corporal D 'attached documents' on 20/05/75. Document A is one which was issued by TARA in mid-1973. Document B contains the last pages of 2 letters written by McGRATH. A handwritten comment on the MISR notes that the letter appears to be to Roy GARLAND c. 1963/64.

Document Reference	Date	Author	Synopsis of information
SWJS6 C64/5/83	Not dated	Unknown	2 page typed document. Document provides a detailed assessment from Roy GARLAND on some of the key individuals involved in TARA, including McGRATH, Clifford SMYTH, UDR Captain N and Clarence HOGG.
SWJS1 C64/5/83 "Ref 13912/2 – Extremist Protestants Secret Organisation – TARA"	28/01/1976	Major APL HALFORD-MACLEOD, HQ, 3 Inf. Brigade	4 page document with 2 appendices attached. Outlines TARA, William McGRATH and Involvement of PAISLEY with TARA. This report makes reference to two documents: Reference A – SF/704/INT dated 06/07/74 and Reference B - SF/712/INT dated 05/06/75. Document refers to Worthington McGRATH (McGRATH's son) as being a member of the RUC(R).
EGM3 C64/5/83	Sept 1976	Unconfirmed	2 page document made up of 9 points – contains allegations against leading unionists, focusing on Peter ROBINSON and Ian PAISLEY.
SWJS10 C64/5/83 "Here is an extract from MIONI P74"	05/01/1977	RUC Special Branch	Re a letter in the Newsletter the previous week 'regretting' the Queen's mention of the Peace People in her Xmas message. States letter was written by William McGRATH or his son, at the request of Frank MILLER. Document states that Frank MILLER used to reside at Kincora and that McGRATH was Housefather there. Document also states that McGRATH, MILLER and Clifford SMYTH are members of TARA.

125. A number of documents refer to MCGRATH's homosexuality and the homosexual leanings/ tendencies common to many members of TARA.
126. Of these documents, none bar **GC80**, allege that MCGRATH was involved in sexual abuse of residents in Kincora.

127. One document (SWJS1) dated 28/01/1976 does describe MCGRATH as potentially 'running some form of boys' home' but does not mention Kincora specifically nor does it refer to abuse.
128. A further document dated 5/1/1977 (SWJS10) does describe MCGRATH as working at Kincora but is again not related to any child abuse or homosexual activity relating instead to the authorship of a letter published in a local newspaper criticising HM The Queen's mention of the Peace People in her Christmas message.
129. With the exception of this last document in the table (an RUC SB document), there is no evidence that the RUC were ever sighted on these documents before the 1980 and subsequent criminal investigations.

Brian GEMMELL

130. In addition to allegations made by WALLACE, allegations of military or intelligence service knowledge and inaction in respect of Kincora have been made by a retired soldier, GEMMELL.
131. **A personal profile has been prepared of GEMMELL and is attached as GC12.**
132. During his tour of duty in Northern Ireland where he served as an Intelligence Officer, GEMMELL's main responsibility was to collate and disseminate

intelligence on Protestant paramilitary groups; this led him to become interested in the activities of TARA and its leader, William MCGRATH.

133. Through GEMMELL's personal friendship with James MCCORMICK (see GC6), he was introduced to Roy GARLAND in 1975. GARLAND was one of GEMMELL's sources of information in TARA and MCGRATH.
134. Brian GEMMELL gave a statement to the RUC in July 1982; this is the only statement he made to any police investigation into Kincora.
135. GEMMELL claimed that he submitted a four page written report (called a MISR – Military Intelligence Source Report) concerning Kincora in 1975. The army searched for this in 1982 and did not find it. There is no record of such a document being supplied to the RUC.

Ian CAMERON

136. Brian GEMMELL told the RUC in 1982 that, in addition to this MISR, he verbally briefed Ian CAMERON, an officer of MI5, about matters he had been made aware of following his two meetings with Roy GARLAND. (It should be noted here, that when interviewed (1982) by D/Supt CASKEY, GARLAND described that GEMMELL 'was interested in MCGRATH but not in the homosexual context'. GARLAND further told police he had gone to see GEMMELL about Kincora but GEMMELL wasn't interested.
137. According to GEMMELL, the meeting with CAMERON ended acrimoniously and CAMERON ordered GEMMELL to drop GARLAND as a source of

information on TARA and MCGRATH. In his statement provided to CASKEY in 1982, GEMMELL stated that having briefed CAMERON “about the homosexual involvement of various persons in TARA he reacted very strongly and said that we did not want to be involved in this kind of thing”. GEMMELL did not, per his statement, mention abuse of boys at Kincora.

138. As part of the RUC investigations into Military Intelligence and John Colin WALLACE (1983 File), attempts were made to interview Ian CAMERON; “it is considered that CAMERON has an explanation to offer for his reasons for allegedly ordering Captain GEMMELL to discontinue his intelligence gathering in relation to homosexuality and which included GARLAND’s fears of MCGRATH’s activity in a Boys’ Home”.
139. A pre-prepared list of 30 questions to be put to Ian CAMERON was drafted by D/Supt. CASKEY and submitted, in writing, to the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) on 11th October 1982. On the 16th November 1982, ACC WHITESIDE (RUC) was informed that CAMERON would not be made available for interview and that there were no replies to the 30 questions. Subsequent high level discussions between the RUC (at Chief Constable level) and senior officials in the NIO, in early 1983, failed to secure either an interview with Ian CAMERON, or a response to CASKEY’s questions.
140. A report prepared by the MoD and NIO in 1989, is at variance with this version. This reports states that from July 1982, the Security Service had been requested to make Ian CAMERON available for interview by the RUC. A series

of meetings involving the Attorney General, his Legal Secretary, DPP (NI) and a Mr SHELDON (Security Service Legal Advisor) “had sought agreement that it was unnecessary to call Mr CAMERON, whose preliminary answers to questions had already been forwarded to the RUC”. There is no mention or reference to CAMERON’s ‘preliminary’ answers in any RUC documentation that has been analysed.

141. According to the same NIO/MoD report, the written questions prepared by CASKEY were put to Ian CAMERON by Mr SHELDON on the 1st November 1982. It is claimed that the then RUC Chief Constable, Sir John HERMON, was verbally told of CAMERON’s responses and agreed with Mr SHELDON’s view, “that Mr CAMERON’s answers were in no way specific as to criminal activity”.

142. Noted in the MoD/NIO report is the following, “It is understood that Mr CAMERON’s answers to D/Superintendent CASKEY’s written questions were eventually sent to Northern Ireland. But there is no record that they were communicated to the RUC...”. Thus, there is no record of the RUC ever having received a response from Ian CAMERON.

RUC Intelligence

143. Intelligence held by PSNI in relation to Kincora was viewed by the HIAI and included documents which appear to have originated from RUC, Military and Security Service. A synopsis of those documents requested to be shared with the HIAI are outlined below.

Document Type	Date	Author	Title	Synopsis of information
Police Report (RUC)	24/11/1969	D/Sgt 5787 Castlereagh SB Office	Anonymous Letter received by the Inspector General on 5th November 1969	<p>Report addressed to District Inspector Belfast "A" on William Worthington McGRATH [son of William McGRATH] who was identified as being the 'young man' referred to in the anonymous letter received by the Inspector General on 5th November 1969.</p> <p>William Worthington McGRATH is noted as being 19, employed in Frank Rea & Co as a shop assistant and 'of the Protestant faith, loyal and trustworthy'. D/Sgt 5787 states that he visited McGRATH at his place of work and made himself known to McGRATH. He asked McGRATH (who was wearing the UVF badge) if he was a member of the UVF. McGRATH stated that he was not, nor had ever been. McGRATH told the SB officer that he only wore the badge because 'of its rarity'. McGRATH was cautioned about the wearing of his badge as the UVF was an illegal organisation and his wearing of it 'would bring himself unfavourably under notice and may cause offence in certain parts of the City'. McGRATH subsequently removed the badge. Report concludes 'I believe there is no political significance in him [McGRATH] wearing the badge'.</p>
Police Report (Cheshire Constabulary)	18/12/1971	Manchester and Salford Police	Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade	<p>Report of 7 points, addressed to Manchester Airport SB Unit, following the discovery of leaflets on 17/12/1971, issued by the CFCIEC found in locations within Manchester airport. It notes at point 4, "A search of SB RUC, revealed that...they had no information on this organisation".</p>
Police Report (RUC)	10/01/1972	Supt. for Chief Constable Supt. SB D/I SB 'E' Division	Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade	<p>Letter addressed to Supt. SB Belfast which begins 'Noted'. Refers to William McGRATH at 4 Greenwood Avenue and William Worthington McGRATH, shop assistant 'who was interviewed in late 1969 regarding the wearing of a UVF badge'. Asks for 'discreet enquiries made and furnish a report of what can be learned of McGRATH and his activities and of the Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade'. Passed to D/I SB 'E' Division for inquiry and report.</p> <p>Report back with attached file [not attached in copy for this report] dealing with the Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade (CFCIEC). Copies of SB Card indexes for William McGRATH 11.12.1916 and William Worthington McGRATH 1950 are also included.</p> <p>SB Index card for William McGRATH senior lists him as Secretary of the Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade. Two date entries; first entry on card is 07/07/1966 when he was on the platform on one of the Rev. PAISLEY's rallies in the Ulster Hall. Second entry is 05/08/1966 describes CFCIEC as a ' pro-loyalist organisation'.</p>

Document Type	Date	Author	Title	Synopsis of information
				SB Index card for William Worthington McGRATH lists his occupation as Shop Assistant. 2 date entries, first 05/11/1969 re an anonymous letter received regarding 'a/n who wear a badge with the letter UVF thereon'. Second entry 27/11/1969 'a/n is the person concerned. There is no political significance in the wearing of the badge'.
Extract – original from SyS	23/02/1972	SyS		Names Clifford SMYTH as IO of TARA Brigade and notes that he seems to have changed "political horses".
RUC SB50	16/04/1973	Newtownards SB office	TARA	Information on TARA, 'which became public in the Press 11/04/1973'. The C.O. of TARA is listed as William McGRATH, with Frankie MILLAR [son-in-law of William McGRATH] his assistant. A number of other current and former TARA members are listed. Report states that TARA membership had been falling 'drastically' and they went public to 'create a myth about their size'. The final paragraph of the reports states, '...McGRATH is a reputed homosexual...alleged to have kept members ensnared in the organisation by threatening to reveal homosexual activities which he had initiated'.
Annex C to 1127G (Military)	18/04/1973		'Intelligence Summary: Protestant Subversive Activities'	At point 5 'TARA Brigade' it is noted that TARA had re-emerged and refers to a series of posters in which TARA presented itself as the new "law and order" Protestant group. 'TARA has in fact existed since 1970'. McGRATH is named as Belfast Brigade Commander and is said to be a homosexual.
Transcript of Robophone Message	23/05/1973			Transcript of a call received on the RUC confidential telephone on 23/05/1973 at 15:05 from a male caller. Information to be 'investigated and results reported'. Caller alleged the key points made by the caller were that a vice ring existed, which centred on William McGRATH, who was employed at Kincora; that he [McGRATH] was involved in homosexuality and exploited young boys, sexually, politically and financially. The caller also alleged that McGRATH was involved in "underground politics", was the leader of TARA and was in contact with a number of local, homosexual MPs. It was also claimed that McGRATH had got his job in Kincora through his association with these homosexual politicians. Handwritten at the bottom of the report is 'Copy to SB Belfast'.

Document Type	Date	Author	Title	Synopsis of information
Police Report (RUC)	04/06/1973	RUC Strandtown	Anonymous Information Received on Confidential Telephone Line	Addressed to Insp., Strandtown. Author of report had gone to Kincora on 04/06/1973 and spoke to MAINS about the allegations and Mr McGRATH, who he described as "a very decent type of chap and had deep religious convictions and is high up in the Orange Order". MAINS told the officer that the call was 'some form of crank' but had no idea who had made the call.
Police Report (RUC)	05/06/1973	Inspector 6383 Supt. Supt. for Ch Supt. 'E'	Anonymous Information received on Telephone Reference No. 2024	Report to 'SDC, ED' – follow up to the message received on the confidential telephone line. The report concludes that "there is nothing to indicate that he is engaged in the type of conduct alleged by the caller". Closed as 'No Further Action Necessary'. Forwarded report to Divisional Commander 'E' Forwarded to Chief Constable. 'For Information. No further action necessary'.
Police Report (RUC)	1974	ACC D H JOHNSTON	Tara Brigade	Request to Supt. SB Belfast for an update on the 'present constitution, personalities, aims, objects, etc.' of TARA, 'which we first heard of as a para military outfit'. This request followed a full page advert in the Newsletter on 20/06/1974.
RUC SB50	1974			KIN 301 29/10/1956, living at Kincora was arrested on 03/07/1974 for theft. Searches of his locker in Kincora found documents issued by TARA. KIN 301 refused to say where he obtained the documents, though one was noted as written by William McGRATH.
RUC SB Records Action Slip	1974			Action taken: 'Please extract' based on the following information: 'On 3/4/1974 A/N was arrested for theft. A number of documents issued by TARA were found in his locker (W McGRATH ... is a House-father at above address).A pamphlet ...written by Wm McGRATH was published by above organisation. (1) KIN 301 29/10/1956 N/T, c/o Kincora Boy's Hostel, 236 Upper Newtownards Road.
Police Report (RUC), 51/1	04/02/1980	RUC D/I, C1 Criminal Intelligence Sect.	Brief Outline of the Organisation Known as TARA and some of its Principle Members for the information	3 page report addressed to Superintendent C1(1) [an Investigative Branch]. Report provides background to TARA, dating the formation of the organisation back to 1968. The report refers to newspaper and magazine articles from April 1973, April 1974, May 1974, June 1974, October 1974, February 1977, March 1977 and October 1979.

Document Type	Date	Author	Title	Synopsis of information
			of C1(A)	<p>There is also reference to previous 'reports' including:</p> <p>c. April 1973 when William McGRATH was a reported homosexual who was alleged to 'have kept members ensnared in the organisation by threatening to reveal homosexual activities which he had initiated'. The same report stated that McGRATH used the Irish Emancipation Christian Fellowship as a front for TARA.</p> <p>23/5/1973 Robophone message to the RUC</p> <p>April 1974 report stating that TARA consisted only businessmen not connected with any other organisation</p> <p>3/7/1974 recovery of TARA documents from locker of KIN 301 in Kincora</p> <p>November 1974- re requirements for acceptance into the TARA group</p> <p>December 1974- TARA was centred around members of the DUP</p> <p>The report concludes 'the allegations of homosexuality by some of its members has been a recurring issue about which there is little factual detail'.</p> <p>An attached sheet with the details of 9 individuals listed in the report is included.</p>
Police Report (RUC)	06/03/1980	Con. 9317 Sgt. 6588	Sir Maurice OLDFIELD	<p>Report to Sgt; Sir Maurice OLDFIELD had disclosed to the author of the report that he had been informed by Scotland Yard officers that there was a threat on his life.</p> <p>Forwarded to Supt. Security.</p>
RUC SB50	1980			<p>PIRA had ascertained that Maurice OLDFIELD regularly attended Sunday morning worship at St George's Church, High Street Belfast. PIRA know that OLDFIELD is accompanied by bodyguards but still think that they could carry out a successful assassination. Document marked NDD. Handwritten on the document is the following, 'Mr Slevin told Mr Whiteside no further action need be taken'.</p>
Police Report (RUC)	19/2/1982	Ch Supt. J CARSON for ACC 'E'	Kincora Investigation	<p>Addressed to Superintendent E3, asking for records to be checked, as a matter of urgency, in relation to:</p> <p>What do SB know of Kincora and the personalities involved</p> <p>Any matters of value linked to TARA</p> <p>Army involvement by way of intelligence or reports made available to SB</p>
Police Report (RUC)	04/03/1982	DCI	Kincora Investigation	<p>2 page report addressed to Supt., E3 on William McGRATH, Joseph MAINS and Raymond SEMPLE. Refers to a number of [SB] reports on McGRATH and TARA.</p>

Document Type	Date	Author	Title	Synopsis of information
				<p>Re MAINS, this report states that he was not known to SB other than in relation to his interview in 1973 about the contents of the Robophone message.</p> <p>SEMPLE was not known to SB prior to his arrest.</p> <p>The final paragraph concludes, 'A number of reports were received from the Army regarding both William McGRATH and TARA. None of these reports mentioned Kincora Boys' Home'.</p>
Police Report (RUC)		Supt. for C/Supt. SB	Tara Brigade	<p>Report addressed to ACC SB in response to the HQ request of 20/06/1974. Provides an assessment as 'a group of people who are genuinely concerned about the situation in Northern Ireland'.</p> <p>The report lists William McGRATH, Francis AGNEW and Frank MILLAR as persons associated with TARA.</p>

144. The intelligence covers MCGRATH's involvement in the Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade, TARA and his alleged homosexuality. A number of other individuals linked to TARA, including Worthington MCGRATH, Frank MILLAR and Clifford SMYTH and also referred to in this intelligence.

145. Analysis of the intelligence requested by the HIAI shows that William MCGRATH first came to the attention of the RUC SB in July 1966. The first time MCGRATH was noted as a homosexual was in April 1973 in a document believed to have originated from the Military. The first occasion when it is recorded that he is working in Kincora is in May 1973 in the Robophone message.

146. None of the intelligence analysed in the table above indicates that the RUC had any knowledge that William McGRATH was sexually abusing residents in Kincora.

147. My assessment of the intelligence referred to in the table above, is that the RUC had no intelligence prior to 1980 that William McGRATH was abusing boys in Kincora. Indeed the intelligence does not refer to any abuse in Kincora.

148. Homosexuality was illegal in Northern Ireland and as such a criminal investigation could have been carried out into the allegations that MCGRATH was involved in homosexual activity. However, such an investigation would have been extremely challenging in the absence of a complainant. The only complainant known to the RUC was GARLAND who, at the commencement of his discussions with CULLEN made it clear that he would not participate in any criminal court process.

149. It could be suggested that had the allegations of MCGRATH's homosexuality been shared with Social Services earlier (i.e. when CULLEN receives his initial information from GARLAND in 1974) and at a higher level than the direct Kincora management (i.e. MAINS) a decision may have been made to either withdraw him from working with boys or to more closely supervise Kincora.

150. It must be clearly and abundantly understood that there is no rationale whatsoever to conclude that a homosexual man is, on the grounds of his sexual orientation, unsuitable to work with boys or predisposed to paedophilia.

151. A decision to more closely supervise Kincora, given concerns about MCGRATH's overall 'behaviour', may have led to an earlier detection of his offending. However, the Welfare Authorities were aware of allegations (made by several named residents of Kincora) of the sexual abuse of boys by MAINS since 1967 and of additional allegations made by different complainants against MAINS in 1971 and no action had been effectively taken into either this or more general concerns about MAINS supervisory abilities.
152. Considering MCGRATH, an anonymous allegation of "making improper suggestions to the boys" and that he (MCGRATH) "had gone to live in the hostel for this purpose", was made to Social Services in January 1974.
153. Similarly, in May 1974, **R 15** a resident of Kincora made an allegation (to his Social Worker) of indecent assault against MCGRATH. **R 15**'s parents also complained about this and subsequently **R 15** and his brother were both removed from Kincora and returned to the family home.
154. None of these allegations concerning MCGRATH or MAINS were shared with the RUC for criminal investigation.
155. The observation could be made that had MCGRATH's possible incitement of boys to involve themselves in the activities of TARA been shared with the Welfare Authorities, different decisions could have been made. This relates in

particular to the finding, in 1974, of TARA literature in the Kincora locker of **KIN 301** a resident of the Hostel. It is not known what investigation was made into this literature as the search was related to non-terrorist crimes. However, it is believed that some of the literature was known to have been written by MCGRATH. There is no evidence that MCGRATH was questioned about this matter and it is recorded that **KIN 301** refused to co-operate when questioned. Had MCGRATH's apparent incitement in this way, of boys in his care been known to the Welfare Authorities, it is possible that he would have been removed from his position.

156. However, it is known that when MCGRATH came under notice later (around 1977), his paramilitary connections are alleged to have caused unease in dealing with him by Social Services management; Mr Clive SCOULAR commented to the TERRY review that 'I was very careful in my dealings over Kincora and MCGRATH. I did not want a bullet in the head..'. It is therefore possible that actually no action would have been taken if MCGRATH's TARA activities had been formally raised to the authorities in 1974.

157. It is also worth reflecting that the process of vetting staff to work with children in the 1960s and 1970s was in no way comparable with or equivalent to current processes. Although a register existed in England and Wales of persons who were not suitable to work with children, no such register had (at the relevant time) been implemented in Northern Ireland. Checking of suitability appears to have solely required the provision of references.

158. Additionally there was no requirement, prior to an offer of employment being made, to obtain a police report as to the applicant's suitability to work with children; this (non-checking with police) was the case across the United Kingdom, hence the authorities in Northern Ireland were acting consistently with colleagues in England and Wales in not seeking such reports.

159. Now, a person seeking to work with children must undergo a more thorough vetting, which will include checks of criminal records and police intelligence as well as any other relevant information, including checks with the Disclosure and Barring Service which will utilise reports of concern made about a person working, in this instance, with children.

160. It cannot be said that any of the Kincora suspects would have failed checks at the time of their initial employments. However, a more intrusive and ongoing vetting process may well have led to those subsequently convicted of abuse being removed from their positions at an earlier stage, i.e. when allegations were made.

161. This would particularly have been the case had the allegations known to RUC and Welfare authorities had been more effectively 'joined up'.

Assessment of CASKEY investigations

162. The inquiry has asked for professional comment on the efficacy of the CASKEY investigations.

163. The actions issued by the RUC investigation teams in 1980 and 1982 were reviewed to assist in gaining an understanding of why certain persons were/were not traced as part of previous police enquiries. Actions were not issued to locate every resident. Similarly not every member or staff who was a **possible** witness was traced. It could be reasonably observed that a more complete approach would be to locate and interview every possible witness; this would have been a massive undertaking but would be expected in the current method of investigation. This might now include, for example, press releases. However, even allowing for the huge public profile around Kincora and the passage of time a very small number of previously unknown victims have come forward and the number of previously un-investigated abusers is also very small. This is returned to below.

Analysis of Kincora Register

164. To assist in this regard, a review of PSNI held material was directed by me in order to address the following concerns:

- Were there any unidentified victims?
- Were there any potential victims who could be identified from the statements of others but had not themselves already been identified or interviewed?
- Were there any other offenders who had not been identified?

165. A number of victims have come forward after the passage of time and either made additional allegations or made fresh allegations having either been interviewed or not during the CASKEY enquiries. The allegations made by this

group of boys were also considered in the preparation of a detailed examination of the Kincora Register.

166. **This document has been prepared and is exhibited as GC13.**

167. The original Kincora Register was transcribed onto an Excel Spreadsheet to assist analysis. It was used as the starting point in determining that all former residents were identified.

168. A record of all those who had provided statements to the RUC or TERRY investigations in the 1980s was also established and this was cross referenced with the Register. This revealed that a former resident was not included on the original register but had provided a statement to the RUC in 1980. He was subsequently added to the list of residents. There is no evidence that any other names are missing from the Register, at this stage.

169. This analytical review identified 309 boys who were resident in Kincora Boys Home between its opening in 1958 and its closing in around 1980. This figure had never previously been ascertained. The analysis highlighted that 115 boys were traced by Police, and in cases where evidence existed of abuse, 105 boys provided statements as victims or witnesses. 46 boys were allegedly victims of abuse in Kincora. A total of 48 charges in respect of 32 boys were laid against MAINS, SEMPLE and MCGRATH, although not all were proceeded with.

170. In his covering report for the 1980 File, CASKEY stated that, “a total of 186 boys resided there [Kincora] at various times between 1963 and January 1980. Of this number, 104 boys have been traced and interviewed by police”. This would have meant that the RUC had traced 56% of former residents in their accepted time period.
171. From the analysis of the Kincora Register undertaken in 2016 (with an understanding that it is the original and same as that referred to by CASKEY) the total of 186 boys in Kincora between 1963 and 1980 is wrong. The analysis shows that there were 245 boys in Kincora between 1963 and 1980; 59 more than the 1980 total. This alters CASKEY’s assessment that he had traced over half of the boys in Kincora between 1963 and 1980. He had in fact traced 42% of former residents.
172. The figures from the Kincora Register used by the RUC in 1980 were accepted unchallenged by the TERRY Review team in 1982. The TERRY Team do not appear to have checked whether the RUC interpretation of the Register was accurate and make no comment on the 1963 ‘cut-off’ date.
173. However, as is commented on in **GC13**, it does not appear that this has had any detrimental impact on CASKEY’s investigation.
174. In **GC13** it is noted that no witness identified a boy as a victim of abuse, whose abuse was not already known in some degree to police. A number of victims have come forward since the completion of previous Kincora investigations. In

many of these cases the abusers were identified by the victim as MAINS, SEMPLE or MCGRATH.

175. **GC13** identified 3 named abusers (other than MAINS, SEMPLE and MCGRATH) who had not been prosecuted. Two of these abusers were former Kincora residents who had themselves been victims of abuse by MAINS whilst resident at Kincora. It is not clear why these former residents were not proceeded against in 1980.
176. The remaining named abuser was identified by a third party report made by a person who had had a sexual relationship with a former Kincora resident. The person reporting stated that the former resident had disclosed the abuse around 2000. The alleged victim had however been interviewed by the RUC in 1980 and had complained solely about abuse by MAINS. Although MAINS was charged he was not prosecuted for these offences. This 3rd party report of abuse was made to police around 2014 when both victim and alleged abuser were dead. There is no corroborative or other evidence to substantiate this allegation and the person alleged to have been an abuser was subject of no other complaints in relation to Kincora.
177. It is the case that no prosecution was directed in any co-resident abuse (i.e. between residents) reported to DPP by the RUC, for a variety of reasons including age and issues of consent. A number of these alleged Peer abusers were, prior to their own offending, victims of abuse by MAINS. The investigation of co-resident abuse within Kincora appears not to have been a major focus for the CASKEY investigation.

178. As such a number of co-resident abusers were not proceeded against, a position which appears to have been supported by the DPP.
179. **A report on Homosexual Abuse amongst residents in Kincora Boys' Hostel has been prepared and is exhibited as GC14.**
180. Finally this review sought to identify any victim who had described a previously unidentified abuser who was not subsequently identified and prosecuted. There were six victims in this category.
181. **B3/R1** alleged abuse by a former unnamed Kincora resident and **KIN 179** alleged abuse by an unnamed student worker on placement in Kincora. These matters were investigated by the RUC in 1980 and the abusers could not, on the evidence available, be identified.
182. Garry HOY stated that he had been abused by an 'old man' at Raymond SEMPLE's house in the 1970s. HOY was resident in Kincora for a very brief period in 1972 and again for 10 months in 1978. He further alleged that he was abused by a person who he believed to frequent or be an employee at Kincora. These allegations were made in 2013; the victim had not disclosed any abuse when interviewed by the RUC in 1980. It was not possible to identify either abuser.

183. **KIN 135** did not make any allegations in the 1980s as he was not traced by Police (RUC or Sussex) although efforts were made. He came forward in 2012 and alleged that he had been abused by MAINS, MCGRATH and SEMPLE (all by then deceased) and two other men. Both these abusers were in their 20s and no other meaningful descriptions could be provided. It should be noted that **KIN 135** was not resident in Kincora when MCGRATH worked there.

184. **KIN 279** was interviewed by both the RUC and Sussex Police in the 1980s and did not make any complaint. In 2014 he contacted PSNI and made allegations that he was abused by William MCGRATH and an unidentified man. He could not provide any description of the unidentified abuser.

185. **KIN 238** was not traced by any of the original RUC or Sussex enquiries. It is now known that he was outside the jurisdiction but he was subsequently aware of police attempts to locate him made at that time (this involved contact with his Father). He contacted the RUC in 1998 and was interviewed. He alleged abuse at a private dwelling in East Belfast by MAINS, a police officer in full uniform and a man he described as 'the Housemaster'. This took place on two occasions. It was not possible to definitively identify the 'Housemaster' as **KIN 238** would not view photographs, however if it is assumed that his abusers were MAINS and SEMPLE or MCGRATH, all these men are dead. The Police Officer was not identifiable from any of the descriptions given. It is known that MAINS did have a lengthy homosexual relationship with a man who served within the uniformed elements of the RUC at or around the relevant time. In terms of this man, there are no allegations of

abuse made against him and it must be stressed that he is not described or named by **KIN 238** who merely states that his abuser was a man in an RUC uniform.

186. In summary therefore, within the documents held by PSNI there are no boys identified as witnesses or victims of abuse who were not traced and interviewed.

Complaints made post 1982

187. Since the conviction of MAINS, SEMPLE and McGRATH in December 1981, a number of residents have come forward to allege abuse at Kincora. Some had previously made statements to police, others had never been traced.

Resident	Allegation(s) of sexual abuse	Police Action	Investigation Open/ Closed
KIN 83	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Made the allegation as a defence in his own court case in 1983 Provided police with a statement outlining allegations of abuse by MAINS in Kincora 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The allegation was put to MAINS who denied same Police concluded "the evidence of an indecent assault is extremely nebulous... and KIN 83 would probably be an unwilling witness and MAINS is already serving 6 years for homosexual offences." 	Closed – IP deceased
KIN 238	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RUC were unable to trace KIN 238 in 1980 KIN 238 came forward in 1998 and provided a statement in 2003. In this statement he alleged abuse by MAINS, 'the Housemaster' of Kincora and an unidentified police officer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Attempts made to identify police officer and house in which abuse allegedly occurred 	Open
James MILLER	MILLER was included as part of the original indictment against McGRATH in 1980 Awaiting details of allegations contained in interview by RCMP	MILLER contacted PSNI in 2014 and maintained correspondence with investigating officers but has not disclosed details of his allegations MILLER is currently resident in Canada, therefore interview to be carried out by RCMP	Open
KIN 135	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Police were unable to trace KIN 135 in 1980 KIN 135 contacted police in Manchester in 2012 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIN 135 made allegations during an ABE interview by GMP of sexual abuse against MAINS, SEMPLE and 	Closed

Resident	Allegation(s) of sexual abuse	Police Action	Investigation Open/ Closed
		McGRATH; also alleged abuse by 2 unknown males <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No prosecution recommended – all suspects deceased 	
Garry HOY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> He had provided a statement in 1980 but did not allege any abuse at this stage HOY contacted police in 2011 with allegations of abuse at Kincora 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Made allegations of sexual abuse against MAINS, SEMPLE and McGRATH in ABE interview in 2013; also abuse by an 'old man' and a male who frequented or was employed at Kincora File sent to PPS, no prosecution recommended as all 3 suspects are deceased 	Closed
KIN 24	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> He had been traced by police in 1980 and 1982 but did not allege any abuse Alleged sexual abuse by MAINS in Kincora 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIN 24 made allegations of abuse to police in 2015 in ABE interview No further police action as suspect is deceased 	Closed
KIN 377	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIN 377 had made allegations of abuse to police in 1980 re: MAINS 3rd party report made to MET police in 2014 KIN 377 allegedly told 3rd party of abuse by a named suspect 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investigation closed as both suspect and victim are deceased 	Closed
KIN 279	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIN 279 had been traced by police in 1980 and 1982 but did not allege any abuse KIN 279 contacted PSNI in 2014 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Took part in an ABE interview in 2015 where he alleged abuse by McGRATH and a second unidentified male No further police action as suspect is deceased 	Closed
KIN 133	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Police were unable to trace KIN 133 in 1980 Following an RTC, KIN 133 alleged to police in 2016 he was raped by MAINS in Kincora 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No further police action – KIN 133 did not wish to make a complaint 	Closed

188. Similarly the unidentified abusers are as set out and are 7 in number. Two of these are described as being known (to a degree) to the boys in that they were ex-residents or working in some capacity at the Home. There are two allegations of trafficking in that boys were abused having been taken to other private addresses from Kincora. These allegations were not made to either CASKEY's investigations or the TERRY review.

189. The above findings must be considered as, to a large degree, supportive of the effectiveness of the CASKEY Investigations. It is also important when considering the efficacy of police action to bear in mind that the Kincora case has attracted much media attention over the intervening years since it closed. This has included television, books and the press. A number of allegations have been made in the media and on occasion the witness or victim has expanded their account over time, including additional allegations not made at the time of their RUC interview. The work carried out by PSNI analysts, and upon which I base my commentary, was focussed solely on allegations made to police.
190. The efficacy of the CASKEY investigations was reduced however by a number of factors outside the control of CASKEY.
191. Firstly, there remains the question of CAMERON. It is stated in papers that the questions which CASKEY required answered by CAMERON were answered and the answers were of no significance to the inquiry (allegedly agreed by persons including the Attorney General and Sir John Hermon, then Chief Constable of the RUC).
192. Nonetheless a direct interview of CAMERON by RUC officers would have dealt with the issues raised by GEMMELL.
193. CASKEY was additionally hamstrung, as have been subsequent inquiries, by the attitude of WALLACE. As has been shown above WALLACE's allegations

are most concerning; equally they have apparently altered over time and have never been formalised. WALLACE's unwillingness for a regrettably kaleidoscopic set of reasons, to give evidence has never allowed these to be addressed. Therefore they continue to fuel the theories of cover up and conspiracy around the dreadful abuse experienced by boys at Kincora.

194. Similarly a number of other witnesses have altered their versions of events, for example making allegations in the media which were not put forward when previously interviewed by police. Such developments may undermine, unreasonably, the assessment of the efficacy of CASKEY's investigation.

Dr Morris FRASER

195. Recently there has been media comment on the potential connection between Kincora Boys' Home and a Psychiatrist and convicted child abuser called Dr Morris FRASER. In particular allegations have been made by Richard KERR that he was abused by FRASER.

196. In summary, there is no record of FRASER ever having cause or authority to commit a boy to Kincora; Kincora does not appear to have had any therapeutic or treatment facility or role for assisting boys with psychiatric illness. In the RUC's 1980 file there are references to four psychiatric reports concerning Kincora residents. None of these were used to admit a boy to Kincora and none are by FRASER.

197. There is no record in the papers held by PSNI concerning KERR that he ever saw FRASER. There is one Psychiatric Report on Richard KERR (Exhibit ASC 1, 1980 RUC File). It was prepared by a Mr A.S. CLENAGHAN on 20th December 1977 whilst KERR was in Rathgael. CLENAGHAN provided a statement to Phase 1 and does not refer to having previously treated KERR. The assessment does not make mention or indeed refer to any previous psychiatric assessment on KERR, prior to 1977. A Social Services File on Richard KERR was exhibited as part of Phase 1 and does not include any other psychiatric assessments nor any reference to any involvement of Dr FRASER with KERR.

198. Other than KERR's recent media allegations there have been no previous allegations of a connection between FRASER and Kincora or that MAINS and FRASER were known to each other, although this cannot be definitively refuted. There is an entry in the Kincora Visitor's Book dated 24/11/1972 which appears to be in MAINS' handwriting. This refers to the visit of a Consultant Psychiatrist called Mr NORRIS. It is of course possible that this relates to Dr FRASER; it is also possible that it does not.

Consideration of a 'cover-up'

199. Since the conclusion of the last RUC Criminal Investigation led by D/Chief Superintendent CASKEY, persistent allegations or concerns have remained about a potential cover up of events at Kincora Boys' Home. These could be characterised in general terms as follows:

Namely that abusers were facilitated to abuse boys at Kincora or further that action was not taken to end abuse when it was detected.

200. It has been noted above that there are a number of occasions (1971, 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1977) when concerns were allegedly raised with the RUC in varying levels of detail or evidence. It is a reasoned observation that it is unclear what action was taken in some cases or how effective the action taken was. It is equally clear that there was no central co-ordinating structure to ensure the sharing of information within the RUC and externally with other agencies.

201. It is speculation what would have been the response to the Robophone message in 1973 if the allegations made by **KIN 27** in 1971 had been known to the Police. This must be put in the context of the Police approach to child abuse in that time, there was no effective central structure and this was, it is understood, the norm across the UK. The high tempo of public disorder and extreme levels of terrorist violence also must be understood to have had an exceptional and readily appreciated impact on civil policing.

202. The effectiveness of the RUC's response cannot also be adjudged without reference to the documentary evidence held by PSNI which shows that information sharing with the RUC by other agencies was deficient. It is speculative to suggest what the outcome would have ultimately been had officers been aware, for example, of the knowledge about Kincora which were held in the late 1960s by Welfare Authorities. It is again speculative to say if different steps may have been taken with regard to **KIN 27**'s allegations in

1971. Similarly the allegation of a vice ring in the 1973 Robophone message was discredited in the eyes of the RUC, in large part, by the supporting commentary of MAINS offered to the RUC, in respect of whom the Welfare Authorities had had significant concerns since around 1967.

203. It is not clear why the 1967 and subsequent allegations against MAINS (MASON File) were not shared with the RUC nor why the File was not passed to RUC until 1976, and then only when the RUC contact the EHSSB regarding concerns about MCGRATH.

204. It is also not clear why the 1974 anonymous call received by Social Services was not shared with the RUC. Documents held by PSNI however, indicate conversely, that not all information which came to the attention of the RUC was shared contemporaneously with the Welfare authorities, most notably the 1971 allegations made by **KIN 27** (albeit **KIN 27** states he told Social Workers) and the 1973 Robophone message which was only, it appears, shared with MAINS. Clearly this must also be taken in conjunction with the architecture of Child Protection at that time, a point which I have referred to previously and is returned to below.

205. A remaining source of public concern is the allegation of vice rings or conspiracies to procure boys for abuse, centred on Kincora. Of those boys who have come forward to police, the vast majority of abuse took place within the Kincora building or on Kincora trips.

206. Similarly, there is little abuse reported as being perpetrated by unknown abusers. Only two victims have described to police being taken to a location other than Kincora and being abused by unknown abusers – as set out above in both instances members of the Kincora staff were also participants in the abuse. There are therefore no victims or witnesses to such a ‘cover-up’ or paedophile ring.

207. The suggestion of prominent persons being abusers has never been substantiated by any evidence held by the RUC or PSNI.

208. The suggestion of a conspiracy to permit large numbers of men to visit and abuse boys at Kincora is also not substantiated. The abuse at Kincora which has been reported to the RUC/ PSNI can be laid at MAINS, SEMPLE and MCGRATH, two former residents and a small number of unidentified men. Abuse outside Kincora has been considered above.

Child Protection Structures RUC/ PSNI

209. It may be of benefit to the inquiry to consider what structures existed within the RUC to respond to child sexual abuse allegations at the time of Kincora and subsequently.

210. During the period up to and including the 1985 RUC investigation, the investigation of child abuse within the RUC (as was the case across UK) was a matter for non-specialist officers. Dependent upon the seriousness of the

allegation this may have been a uniform officer or a CID detective. After developments in England and Wales in 1988 the first CARE (Child Abuse and Rape Enquiry Units) were established, as a result of lessons learned in the Cleveland Enquiry, and other child abuse investigations, both in Northern Ireland and other UK police services.

211. Partnership working between the RUC and the relevant Social Care Authorities were also not fully formalised until 1992 when this matter was addressed by the introduction of joint working arrangements as outlined in 'Protocol for Joint Investigation by Social Workers and Police Officers of Alleged and Suspected Cases of Child Abuse - Northern Ireland'.

212. A multi- agency response to allegations of child abuse is now clearly the modus operandi of the various agencies concerned. The Safeguarding Board for Northern Ireland (SBNI) was established in 2012 in recognition of the fact that children are more likely to be protected when agencies work in an all-inclusive, co-ordinated and consistent way. As the Head of Public Protection Branch, I am a member of this group on behalf of the PSNI. The role of the SBNI is to ensure that organisational boundaries between professionals, agencies, including the Police Service for Northern Ireland, and sectors do not act as barriers to protecting children and young people up to the age of 18.

213. The work of the SBNI has been underpinned by legislation, The Safeguarding Board (Northern Ireland) Act 2011, placing a statutory duty on member agencies, including the police service, to cooperate with one another and to

make arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. This includes children who pose a risk to themselves. The 'duty to cooperate' is fundamental to its work.

214. The requirements, as set out in the above legislation, have been translated into the following agreements/documents –

- The 'Protocol for Joint Investigation by Social Workers and Police Officers of Alleged and Suspected Cases of Child Abuse – Northern Ireland' (last reviewed March 2016),
- Department of Justice 'Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings - Guidance on interviewing victims and witnesses, the use of special measures, and the provision of pre-trial therapy' (last reviewed 2012),
- College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice, and the
- Regional (SBNI) Child Protection Policy and Procedures
- Co-operating to Safeguard Children (DHSSPS 2016)

215. Knowledge requirements for all police officers and police staff, including specialist Child Abuse Investigators, are outlined in the College of Policing's training programmes and have been drawn principally from the above protocols, guidance documents and legislation (or English equivalent).

216. On 1st April 2015, the PSNI significantly restructured its response to public protection, including child abuse and protection, to further ensure that the police response was effective considering various local, national and international developments in this field.

217. The new public protection structures have taken into consideration matters concerning staff, processes, technology, facilities and, importantly, the needs of victims/service users, as well as other key stakeholders. The aim was ultimately to have a better alignment of resources to organisational objectives, including safeguarding children and tackling child sexual exploitation. Amongst other matters this has improved upon performance management and improved communication between the PSNI and external stakeholders, ultimately ensuring better protection for members of the public.

218. In particular:

- Local Public Protection teams have been aligned to the 5 Health & Social Care Trusts, under one single command structure, Public Protection Branch, within Crime Operations Department. This new Branch is led by a Detective Chief Superintendent, 2 D/Superintendents and 4 D/Chief Inspectors. The Branch incorporates the work of the Child Abuse Investigation Units, the Child Internet Protection Team, Rape Crime Units, Public Protection Arrangements for Northern Ireland (PPANI), Domestic Abuse Officers and has created new posts, 'Child Sexual Exploitation' (CSE) Officers, within each Trust area.
- Policy Leads have been brought under this same command structure to align practice and policy closer together.
- One regional Central Referral Unit (CRU) has also been created to, amongst other matters, provide a consistent and robust approach to the management

of referrals and information i.e. those relating to child safeguarding and domestic abuse, as well as managing CSE related risk assessments.

Conclusion

219. The HIAI has asked PSNI to consider if any systemic failures within the RUC caused, facilitated or failed to prevent abuse at Kincora.

220. **I have read nothing to suggest that RUC actions caused abuse in Kincora, nor was abuse facilitated by the RUC.**

221. It is clear that the structures of the time, in terms of the overall police organisation, the specialised police approach to child abuse and broader child protection structures, such as Welfare/ Social Care systems, were not as developed as today.

222. For example, within the RUC there was not, at the relevant time, computerisation of systems so as to ensure effective internal sharing of information. The intelligence formation which was in possession of the RUC has been discussed. There would have been an opportunity for a fuller and richer picture to have been developed around Kincora, and particularly MAINS and MCGRATH, had same existed. An officer responding, for example, to the Robophone message about Kincora would not have been able to research Kincora and find reference to **KIN 27**'s allegations had such been made (which, it must be acknowledged, does not appear to have been the case).

Additionally when CULLEN commenced his inquiry into MCGRATH he was not, it appears, aware of the previous Robophone message.

223. The table below outlines the information known to have been held by the RUC.

Date	Reported to RUC	Additional Information
<u>1971</u> Jun	KIN 27 told police about abuse by MAINS in Kincora, after absconding from the Home.	No action was taken by either the RUC or social workers re: KIN 27 's complaint; KIN 27 later returned to Kincora.
<u>1973</u> April May Dec	McGRATH is named as Belfast Brigade Commander of TARA and is said to be a homosexual. Anonymous phone call to the RUC claiming McGRATH was a homosexual, part of a vice ring and employed at Kincora. D/Con CULLEN learnt of Roy GARLAND's accusations against McGRATH, through James McCORMICK.	The RUC carried out investigations, including speaking to Joseph MAINS; they concluded that the call was 'probably malicious'. CULLEN subsequently met with GARLAND several months later.
<u>1974</u> Mar Jun Jul	D/Con CULLEN first met Roy GARLAND D/Supt John GRAHAM was told by Valerie SHAW that McGRATH worked in Kincora. GRAHAM was also made aware of homosexual abuse allegations against McGRATH. RUC searched the locker of KIN 301 Kincora resident and recovered TARA documents.	CULLEN wrote a report to ACC MEHARG which included information that McGRATH worked in Kincora. D/Supt GRAHAM states that he told CID in Mountpottinger, about SHAW's allegations concerning McGRATH. This has never been confirmed. KIN 301 refused to say where he got the documents though one of the documents was noted as having been written by McGRATH.
<u>1976</u> Mar	RUC became aware of the existence of the Mason File from Social Services.	Copy of Mason File given to D/Con CULLEN who claims he passed it on to ACC MEHARG; this is disputed by MEHARG.

<p><u>1977</u> Oct</p>	<p>D/Con SCULLY raises concerns to Social Services re: relationship between Richard KERR and Joseph MAINS.</p>	<p>A number of meetings were held between RUC and Social Services to discuss concerns. A weekly monitoring system was introduced at Kincora to highlight "untoward" daily events.</p>
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224. There is no evidence to suggest that the Army information described previously was known (with the exception of the RUC SB information connected to HM The Queen's comments on the Peace People), to have been in possession of the RUC in advance of 1982. Of these Army documents, however, none bar **GC80**, allege that MCGRATH was involved in sexual abuse of residents in Kincora.

225. In relation to these pieces of information I comment that:

226. There were no identified victims except **KIN 27** and GARLAND until CASKEY made his inquiries. (It is accepted that it appears that CULLEN did not seek to approach any resident). GARLAND was never a resident in Kincora.

227. The Robophone message was investigated, albeit perhaps to a more limited extent than would now be accepted, and shared with the Kincora Management – unforeseeably this was MAINS, also a paedophile abuser.

228. MCGRATH is alleged to have been a homosexual in April 1973, by which stage he was a 56 year old man, married with three children. This has been previously discussed in my statement. Similarly, MCGRATH was believed to be

the leader of a paramilitary organisation and to have been the author of inciting literature found in a Kincora resident's locker.

229. The information obtained by both GRAHAM and CULLEN was not handled appropriately.

230. It is also clear that information, potentially of relevance, held by other agencies was not shared with the RUC; the same can be said in reverse. There is potential that had all of this information been connected and followed up and investigated more proactively the offending of MAINS, MCGRATH and SEMPLE may have been ended earlier; for example the CASKEY investigation outcomes could have been achieved earlier. However, had no victim co-operated, this may not have occurred.

231. There is further potential that had the concerns been shared with the Welfare Department or Social Services, the abusers may have been removed. This may have been the case; however it is also the case that these authorities were themselves, independently and substantially in advance of the RUC, with regard to MAINS especially, already aware of many of the concerns about Kincora which had led to no such action. For example, the MASON file and allegations against MAINS going back to 1967 only reach the RUC in 1976, some nine years later.

232. Internally the RUC structure also did not have a co-ordinated and specialist response to allegations of child abuse. Thus the allegations made by

GARLAND to CULLEN were not investigated by an appropriately trained, experienced, supported or supervised officer.

233. The RUC response was also, as would again have been common to other UK forces, based on the investigation of crime rather than the present safeguarding centred approach. This would have the impact of causing inaction when criminality was not proven. This 'criminality centred' approach then connects unfortunately with what might be categorised as a 'silo' approach of the various agencies who did not, as would now be the case, co-operate and share information as a matter of course with the impact as described above. To illustrate the point, the engagement of CULLEN with BUNTING in 1976 is not appropriately followed up by either agency, a situation which a more formalised multi-agency approach as now pertains should prevent from arising.

234. It is clear from the documents held by the PSNI that there was a substantial body of information held by Social Services about abuse in Kincora which was not shared with the RUC in a timely manner. This dates back, in the MASON file instance, to 1967.

235. It may be considered that, had the Army information located in 1982 been shared earlier with the RUC, and a consolidated intelligence picture been developed by either agency, a different outcome may have been reached. A similar point arises as with regard to the sharing of information between the Welfare Authorities/ Social Services and the RUC.

236. The Army's intelligence was more substantial in relation to MCGRATH and Kincora than that held by the RUC, however it must be clearly understood that the Army's role and function was directed towards terrorism. The Army had no responsibility to deal with criminality and they may have not actually understood the significance of what they were being told.

237. It is speculative what could have arisen if GEMMELL's allegations are true and he had been allowed to continue his inquiries. However, this is a hypothesis built on an unproven allegation.

238. Such limitations as have been identified in CASKEY's investigations, appear to have had either little discernible effect (i.e. the decision to start enquiries in 1963 as opposed to 1958), or were outside his control (the inability to interview CAMERON). The subsequent research rather supports a conclusion that the appropriate victims or witness were traced and those abusers identified after reasonable steps were brought before the authorities.

239. **Effective information sharing and cooperation may well have led to a swifter cessation of the abuse in Kincora and potentially better outcomes for the victims.**

240. Key Observations

- There was no coordinated response to child abuse, within the RUC, at this time.
- There was a lack of central information systems to record allegations, concerns or information, available to all police officers responding to allegations.
- The CULLEN and MEHARG 'investigation' provided an opportunity to investigate and thereby potentially stop abuse at Kincora which was not taken.
- The failure of D/Supt GRAHAM to appropriately handle concerns surrounding a boys' home was also a missed opportunity; akin to CULLEN and MEHARG,
- Lack of a joined up approach and two-way information sharing between Welfare Authorities and RUC, prevented an effective, joint response to abuse in Kincora.
- Rumours of vice rings, cover-up and conspiracy are not substantiated, however, the fact that Brian GEMMELL's allegations were not definitively addressed, leaves this 'stain' on the investigation.
- Ultimately a number of allegations by certain witnesses have changed significantly over time. Based on material held by the PSNI, and with the exception of those discussed in **GC13**, it is clear that those responsible for carrying out the vile and significant child abuse at Kincora were members of Kincora staff and were appropriately identified and prosecuted.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed 

Dated 20th May 2016.



RESTRICTED

Kincora – Exhibit GC1

Strategic Analysis - Timeline of Key Events Linked to Kincora

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

1.0 Introduction

This detailed timeline has been produced to accompany the strategic analytical review of Kincora related material held by the PSNI and should be read in conjunction with a number of other analytical reports.

The first entry on the timeline dates back to 1955 and concludes in December 1981 with the trial of the three accused Kincora staff members. The timeline reflects key events over this 26 year period, which link directly and indirectly to the Kincora case.

This report has been prepared using information contained in the Kincora related material held by the PSNI, notably the police prosecution files from 1980, 1982, 1983 and 1985.

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
c.1951	R 36 began lodging with William McGRATH; they had started a homosexual 'relationship' in 1948.			In 1958 R 36 suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of the relationship he had had with McGRATH. He may have had a further breakdown in the 1970s. Valerie SHAW was aware in the late 1970s of the earlier 'relationship' between R 36 and McGRATH through a friend () who managed a day care centre which R 36 was then attending for psychiatric issues, including suicide attempts.	Statements of R 36 , 24/06/1980, , 02/06/1980 and , 07/08/1980
December 1955	Roy GARLAND first met William McGRATH at Faith House, Finaghy. GARLAND alleges that he was indecently assaulted by McGRATH at this meeting.			GARLAND was 15 years old when he alleges he was first abused by McGRATH. GARLAND alleges the abuse continued until 1962.	Statement of WR GARLAND, 30/03/1982
01/01/1956	Joseph MAINS began employment at Park Lodge Boys' Home, 700 Antrim Road, Belfast.			MAINS worked as an Assistant to the Housemother for approximately 1 year. No complaints are known from Park Lodge residents re: MAINS and abuse.	Exhibit JOMcC1, part of C64/2/80
February 1957	Joseph MAINS employed for a week at Williamson House.			At least one complaint of abuse was made against MAINS by a resident of Williamson House.	Statement of Con W GIRVAN 16/7/1980 re interview of J MAINS 29/5/1980

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
18/02/1957	Joseph MAINS commenced employment at Abbeydene Old People's Home as an attendant.				
January 1958	Kincora Boys' Hostel was opened by the Belfast Welfare Authority.				
01/03/1958	Joseph MAINS took up the position as Officer in Charge, Kincora Boys' Home.				Exhibit JOMcC1, part of C64/2/80
31/03/1958	D/Con James Price CULLEN joins the RUC.				
06/05/1958	Official opening of Kincora.				Exhibit JOMcC1, part of C64/2/80
10/05/1958	First residents moved into Kincora – [REDACTED] and KIN 70 .				
13/07/1958	Elizabeth McCULLOUGH starts employment at Kincora as a Domestic Assistant.				Report by Mr R BUNTING contained in DPP File, Preliminary Police Papers
September 1958	Joseph MAINS resigned from the Ulster Special Constabulary, 'B' Specials.			MAINS resigned due to "existing conditions of employment".	Exhibit 21, Sussex Police Enquiry
July 1961	Joseph MAINS and BAR 1 first met.			BAR 1 and MAINS were working at separate summer camps organised by the Belfast Welfare Corporation when they met.	Information provided by BAR 1 during Police interview on the 23/6/2000. See File Ref C64/19/04

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
21/09/1961	Letter from Joseph MAINS to Social Services recommending the establishment of the post of Deputy Warden at Kincora.				JOMcC1, Phase 1 Exhibit
08/09/1964	Raymond SEMPLE started work at Kincora as Deputy Warden.			Raymond SEMPLE had been volunteering at the home from 1959.	Statement of J MAINS, 01/04/1980.
c.1964	Roy GARLAND and William McGRATH entered into a business arrangement together.			Ultimately this business venture failed as GARLAND accused McGRATH of incurring debts in GARLAND's name and failing to repay a loan.	
c.1965	KIN 388 lodged with McGRATH when on business in Belfast. During his final stay with McGRATH, UDR Captain N told KIN 388 that McGRATH was involved in "homosexual activity".				Statement of D/S ELLIOTT, 30/07/1980 re: interview with KIN 388 .
c.1965	Clifford SMYTH began boarding with William McGRATH at the McGRATH family home at 15 Wellington Park, Belfast.			Clifford SMYTH continued to board with McGRATH until April 1973 when he left to get married.	Statement of AC SMYTH 05/04/1980.
28/02/1966	Raymond SEMPLE resigned as Deputy Warden at Kincora.			SEMPLE told police he had resigned because his mother was ill; however, his resignation coincides with MAINS uncovering SEMPLE's abuse of a Kincora resident, R 1	Statement of D/Con McGLADDERY 06/07/1980 re interview of R SEMPLE on 01/04/1980

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
Spring 1966	██████████ replaced SEMPLE in Kincora; his duties included 'living-in'.			Sussex Police noted that ██████████ was "not believed to have committed offences against the boys at the Hostel"; how they were able to make this assessment is unclear but is assumed to have been made based on uncorroborated information provided by MAINS. There is no evidence that the 1980 RUC investigation knew of ██████████ employment in Kincora. ██████████ was never traced by any police investigation into Kincora.	Sussex Police Enquiry, Exhibit 4- Interview notes made by D/Supt HARRISON and C/I FLENLEY of J MAINS, 20/09/1982 in HMP Maze
Summer 1966	William McGRATH first came to the notice of the RUC after he had appeared on the platform at one of Rev PAISLEY's rallies in the Ulster Hall.				Intelligence Brief- William McGRATH
Summer 1966	██████████ KIN 384 worked at Kincora as an assistant to Joseph MAINS.			██████████ KIN 384 appointment was for approximately 5 months.	Statement of ██████████ KIN 384, 24/09/1982.
19/07/1966	██████████ KIN 167, Kincora resident, drowned whilst on a Kincora summer camp at Downhill Beach.			Newspaper reports from the time indicate that this was a tragic accident.	
19/07/1966	██████████ R 4 alleges he was assaulted by Joseph MAINS at the Kincora Summer Camp.			██████████ R 4 claims he was comforted by MAINS in his tent the night following the drowning of ██████████ KIN 167, who was LEGGE's friend.	Statement of ██████████ R 4 03/04/1980

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
15/11/1966	Elizabeth SMYTH started employment as a domestic assistant at Kincora.			<p>Mrs SMYTH was employed at Kincora until 1980.</p> <p>She was traced by police and provided a statement in which she denied any knowledge of abuse during her time in Kincora.</p>	Statement of E SMYTH 12/03/1980
Exact dates unknown 1966/67	BM 1 was on student placement in Kincora from Rupert STANLEY College.			<p>A former Kincora resident, KIN 179, told police that a student in Kincora had exposed himself and masturbated himself in front of KIN 179, before asking KIN 179 to masturbate him. KIN 179 was in Kincora on three separate periods over 1966, 1967 and 1968. BM 1 was spoken to by RUC officers on 09/06/1980 about KIN 179's allegations and refuted any knowledge of same; he declined to make a written statement.</p> <p>Enquiries made by detectives in the original Kincora investigation with Rupert Stanley revealed that BM 1 was "the only student on placement 1967/68 in Kincora".</p>	<p>RUC Phase 1, Actions 386 &392</p> <p>Statement of KIN 179 19/04/1980</p>

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
Exact dates unknown 1967/68	KIN 66 worked in Kincora c. June 1967			<p>KIN 66 allegedly warned a number of Kincora residents to be wary of Joseph MAINS and was in attendance at the summer camp in 1967 where the actions of MAINS led to R 5 and R 6 submitting a complaint to the Welfare Department (part of the Mason File).</p> <p>KIN 66 was never traced during any police investigation into Kincora.</p>	<p>RUC Phase 1 Action 27</p> <p>Statement of KIN 14 29/2/1980, R 5 23/2/1980 and R 6 1/9/1967 (part of the Mason File).</p>
July 1967	Kincora Summer Camp to Portrush.	See R 5 complaint below.		<p>R 2 and OV 4 stayed at the summer camp as guests of MAINS.</p> <p>MAINS' behaviour at this summer camp was the catalyst for some Kincora residents to make complaints to Social Services/Welfare Department.</p>	Statement of OV 4 27/02/1980.

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
08/09/1967	Complaint made by a Kincora resident to Social Services about MAINS' behaviour.	R 6 and R 5 complained to Social Services about MAINS' behaviour and made a statement to Mr William ROSS at College Street.		<p>First known official complaint at Kincora. R 6 alleged that MAINS had indecently assaulted him in Kincora and had asked him for a kiss. R 6 also alleged that MAINS regularly returned to the Hostel drunk at weekends.</p> <p>R 5 statement to the Welfare Department in 1967 made reference to MAINS' drinking on duty at the Summer Camp in Portrush. R 5 also alleged that MAINS had indecently assaulted him in Kincora after the Summer Camp.</p> <p>Both the R 5 and R 6 complaints were 'investigated' by Henry MASON (City Welfare Officer) and became part of the 'Mason File'.</p>	<p>Exhibit GC21, part of GC3 see file C64/2/80</p> <p>GC20A, part of GC3 see file C64/2/80</p>
11/09/1967	Joseph MAINS was interviewed by Henry MASON about the allegations made by R 5 and R 6			City Welfare Officer, Henry MASON interviewed MAINS made 3 recommendations; none of which appear to have been followed up.	Exhibit GC3 (C64/2/80).
20/09/1967	MASON report passed to the Town Clerk.			Following his interview with MAINS, Henry MASON reported the matter to the Town Clerk. No disciplinary action was taken against MAINS; no information is available to determine if the RUC were made aware.	Statement of H MASON, 08/02/1980

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
14/03/1968	During an inspection visit to Kincora, Mary WILSON, commented that <i>"Mr MAINS is feeling the strain of having to be so long off without an assistant but in spite of this is doing good work with the boys."</i>				Exhibit MJW1 (C64/2/80)
01/05/1968	Colin WALLACE begins employment as Assistant Information Officer (unestablished) with MoD, at HQNI.				See Exhibit GC10 - 2016
9 th – 17 th July 1968	██████████ provided relief cover for MAINS who was ill.			A ██████████ was a Housefather in Bawnmore (late 1960s/early 1970s) and this may be the same person. ██████████ was never traced by police during any Kincora investigation.	Exhibit MJW1 (C64/2/80)
10/06/1969	Raymond SEMPLE reappointed as Deputy Warden at Kincora.			SEMPLE told police that after an advert for the job appeared in a newspaper, MAINS called at his home and asked him to apply for the post. MAINS gave him a reference for the job.	Statement of R SEMPLE 1/4/1980
25/08/1969	James HEYBURN, PAISLEY's financial secretary (and close ally) acted as 'guarantor' in a Hire Purchase agreement for William McGRATH.				GC64 (C64/2/80 (1982))

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
25/09/1969	Disappearance of two teenage boys from East Belfast - [REDACTED] (13 years) and [REDACTED] (15 years)			An investigation was carried out in 1982 and concluded <i>"there is no evidence to connect either of the boys with the Kincora incident"</i> .	RUC File Ref C2/1/82
October 1970	Robert MOORE, Children's Officer, appointed his assistant, Anthony McCAFFREY, to carry out an enquiry at Kincora re an allegation that MAINS had physically assaulted a Kincora resident.			McCAFFREY spoke to MAINS and concluded that MAINS' explanation was plausible and took no further action.	Report of the Hughes Inquiry, paragraphs 3.133-3.140
03/11/1970	Alan CAMPBELL jnr, charged with an offence of gross indecency against [REDACTED] KIN 43 .			CAMPBELL was charged with gross indecency on [REDACTED] KIN 43 in December 1970 [REDACTED] KIN 43 was a resident of Bawnmore at the time of offence, later a resident in Kincora).	Para 21-115 of D/Supt CASKEY's report dated 26/08/1982 Statement of A CAMPBELL 19/05/1980
27/05/1971	Alan CAMPBELL jnr appears at Belfast Magistrates Court charged with gross indecency – case was dismissed.			CAMPBELL claims that McGRATH told him, prior to his trial in May 1971, that he would <i>"be able to get the case squashed"</i> . CAMPBELL refused to discuss the matter with McGRATH. CAMPBELL also alleged that McGRATH claimed to be able to cure homosexuality.	Para 21-115 of D/Supt CASKEY's report dated 26/08/1982 Statement of A CAMPBELL 19/05/1980

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
C. June 1971	KIN 27 absconded from Kincora and made allegations of indecent assault against MAINS to police and social workers.	KIN 27 complained to two social workers re: MAINS having indecently assaulted him and made inappropriate comments.	KIN 27 told police who found him about abuse by MAINS in Kincora; referred to MAINS as a "queer".	No action was taken by RUC or social workers re: KIN 27 complaint; KIN 27 later returned to Kincora.	Statement of KIN 27, 17/04/1980
June 1971	Rev. PAISLEY conducted the marriage of McGRATH's son (Worth) at Martyr's Memorial Church.				Exhibit SEC2 (C64/2/80)
22/06/1971	William McGRATH began employment as Housefather at Kincora.				CASKEY covering report C64/2/80 (para. 28)
August 1971	Roy GARLAND told George McCoubrey and Fraser Agnew that William McGRATH was a homosexual and was working in a Boys' Home.			GARLAND claimed that he had specifically mentioned that McGRATH was working in Kincora to George McCoubrey; this is denied by McCoubrey. There is no evidence to suggest that either McCoubrey or Agnew did anything with the information that had been given by GARLAND.	Statement of WAF Agnew 10/05/1982 Statement of G McCoubrey 22/05/1982

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
12/08/1971	Complaint of homosexual behaviour against Joseph MAINS, by Kincora resident, R 8 .	R 8 wrote letters of complaint to his Social Worker, Margaret ROBINSON and Robert MOORE, Head of Social Services. R 8 highlighted that he'd been offered money to rub MAINS' back and that MAINS was regularly sleeping with R 2 .		Margaret ROBINSON was "horrified" at its contents and showed the letter to her superior, Eddis NICHOLL. NICHOLL established that Mr MASON was aware of the letter and its contents and was to carry out the necessary investigations. R 8 complaints were considered as part of the 'Mason File', together with the complaints made by R 6 and R 5 in 1967.	Exhibit GC24, part of GC1. Statements of Margaret ROBINSON, 27/02/1980 and Eddis NICHOLL, 10/04/1980
23/08/1971	Mr MASON interviewed R 8 and R 33, Kincora residents, re: R 8 allegations.			R 33 was mentioned in R 8 letter as having also been abused by MAINS.	Statement of H MASON 08/02/1980
25/08/1971	MASON submits his report to the Town Solicitor, [REDACTED]; referred to as the 'Mason File'.			The covering letter from Henry MASON to [REDACTED] recommended that there were sufficient grounds for referring the matter to the police. There is no evidence to suggest that the RUC were made aware of the contents of this file at this time.	

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
28/09/1971	<p>MASON met the Town Clerk, Mr JAMESON to discuss the 'Mason File'.</p> <p>██████████, Town Solicitor, phoned ACC MEHARG.</p>				<p>Statement of William JOHNSTON, 22/02/1980</p> <p>1971 Diary for Town Solicitor- included amongst Kincora original documentation. No Exhibit number.</p>
09/10/1971	<p>MAINS wrote a report on ██████████ R 8 at the request of Mr MASON.</p>			<p>The date of MAINS' report on ██████████ R 8 postdates the submission of the Mason File to the Town Clerk.</p>	<p>Exhibit GC20, part of GC3 (C64/2/80)</p>
12/10/1971	<p>Mary WILSON conducted a supervisory visit to Kincora during which MAINS told her that he was <i>"not very satisfied with McGRATH's work but feels he may improve"</i>.</p>				<p>Exhibit MJW1 (C64/2/80)</p>
10/02/1972	<p>Stubbs Gazette listed William McGRATH as having a debt of £1280.40.</p>			<p>This refers to a debt following the collapse of a business arrangement between William McGRATH and Roy GARLAND.</p>	
30/05/1972	<p>Mary WILSON, Ass. Children's Officer, recorded that a number of Kincora residents were members of Tartan Gangs and giving trouble.</p>				<p>Exhibit MJW1 (C64/2/80)</p>

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
c.1972	Roy GARLAND told Jim McCORMICK that William McGRATH was a homosexual and employed in Kincora.			McCORMICK subsequently facilitated GARLAND to report his allegations about McGRATH to the RUC (D/Con CULLEN), the British Army (Capt. GEMMELL) and Valerie SHAW (Free Presbyterian Church).	Statements of J McCORMICK 30/04/1980 & 10/03/1982
20/09/1972	Kincora boys involved in the UDA.			A Social Worker, Mary WILSON, was told by MAINS that he was having difficulty with some of the boys because of their involvement with the UDA. It was acknowledged that <i>"all the boys in the area are involved and the Kincora boys want to do likewise"</i> .	Exhibit MJW1 (C64/2/80)
23/05/1973	Robophone message 2024 to RUC alleging McGRATH was a homosexual working in Kincora and who was part of a vice ring.		Anonymous phone call to the RUC re: allegations of abuse by McGRATH and his link with Kincora.	The RUC received an anonymous call (believed to be from Roy GARLAND) to the confidential telephone line. The caller made a series of allegations about William McGRATH, Housefather at Kincora. It is believed that this is the first notification of any homosexual activity in Kincora. RUC carried out enquires into the allegations, including speaking to Joseph MAINS. Police concluded that the matter <i>"did not merit any further investigation"</i> .	Exhibit SEC 18, part of C64/2/80 (Phase 2).

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
04/06/1973	Con LONG prepared a report re: his enquiries into the allegations made in the confidential telephone call to the RUC.			Con LONG spoke to MAINS re: allegations. LONG concluded the allegations were " <i>totally malicious</i> " and did not " <i>merit any further investigation</i> ". No action taken against McGRATH. The findings of Con LONG's 'investigations' were accepted by his superiors and no further action was taken re the contents of the anonymous phone call.	Exhibit GC65
June 1973	Mr BUNTING, Deputy Director EHSSB, claims he received the Mason File for the first time, prior to Mr MASON retiring.			Despite recommending in 1971 that the contents of the Mason File should be passed to the police; it appears that Social Services/ Welfare or Mr BUNTING, took no further action.	Statement of Robert BUNTING, 13/05/1980
Late September 1973	Emma GREENWOOD approached Valerie SHAW re: rumours of McGRATH's homosexuality which she had heard from Jim McCORMICK.				Statement of V SHAW, 29/03/1982
October 1973	Valerie SHAW met Jim McCORMICK (Evangelist) to discuss William McGRATH and his homosexuality. SHAW subsequently met Roy GARLAND, who confirmed these allegations.			James McCORMICK was a central figure in the knowledge of McGRATH's abuse and homosexuality. He was also the facilitator in GARLAND exposing McGRATH to police, army and religious figures.	See Exhibit GC7 - 2016

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
29/10/1973	Valerie SHAW first raised her 'concerns' over McGRATH's homosexuality and exploitation of young men to Rev. Ian PAISLEY.			PAISLEY offered to speak to Clifford SMYTH (who had previously lodged with the McGRATH family) about the situation and meet with McGRATH. Clifford SMYTH told police that PAISLEY never spoke to him about McGRATH	Statements of V SHAW 02/03/1980 and 29/03/1982; statement of A C SMYTH 05/05/1980
30/10/1973	SHAW once again spoke to PAISLEY re McGRATH.			On learning that McGRATH was to take part in a Gunpowder Plot Commemoration Service at the John Knox Memorial Free Presbyterian Church, SHAW contacted PAISLEY who said he would "deal with it"	Statement of V SHAW 29/03/1982
01/11/1973	SHAW obtained from Roy GARLAND, copies of letters sent to him from McGRATH.			In anticipation of PAISLEY seeking evidence re: McGRATH's homosexuality, SHAW had obtained these letters.	Statement of V SHAW 29/03/1982

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
02/11/1973	Rev PAISLEY meets with William McGRATH in his office in Martyrs Memorial Church.			Prior to McGRATH's arrival at PAISLEY's church, SHAW offered PAISLEY copies of the letters between McGRATH and GARLAND; PAISLEY dismissed them and left to meet McGRATH with James HEYBURN. PAISLEY later told SHAW that he hadn't put the homosexual accusations to McGRATH. PAISLEY confirmed to police that he had met William McGRATH in his Church premises but did not put any of the allegations being proffered by SHAW re homosexuality to him, as <i>"she had no proof to offer"</i> .	Statement of V SHAW 29/03/1982 Statement of D/S ELLIOTT 07/06/1980 re interview of Ian PAISLEY on 15/05/1980.
05/11/1973	PAISLEY asked SHAW for copies of the letters from McGRATH to GARLAND.			PAISLEY had first-hand knowledge of McGRATH's homosexuality through these letters, admitting the contents were <i>"horrible"</i> .	Statement of V SHAW 29/03/1982 Statement of D/Supt HARRISON 27/05/1982 re interview of Ian PAISLEY 18/05/1982
Late November 1973	D/Con James CULLEN met James McCORMICK to discuss GARLAND's allegations.				Statement of D/Con J CULLEN 30/04/1980
04/12/1973	D/Con CULLEN attends a 6-week Initial CID Course in London.				

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
January 1974	Valerie SHAW arranged a meeting between PAISLEY and Roy GARLAND.				Statement of Valerie SHAW 02/03/1980
23/01/1974	Anonymous call to Social Services which claimed that McGRATH had made improper suggestions to the boys at Kincora had written to one of the boys and had gone to live in the hostel for this purpose.	Anonymous phone call received by Colin McKAY, Senior Social Worker at Hollywood Arches office re: McGRATH.			Exhibit MJW1 (C64/2/80)
29/01/1974	Mary WILSON spoke to MAINS following the anonymous call received by Social Services.			<p>MAINS was interviewed by WILSON re the anonymous call to Social Services.</p> <p>MAINS dismissed the allegations in the anonymous phone call as being politically motivated because of McGRATH's involvement with the Orange Order.</p> <p>No further action was taken by social services; RUC unaware of the call.</p>	Exhibit MJW1 (C64/2/80)
04/02/1974	Mary WILSON and Colin McKAY met with McGRATH at Kincora re: the allegations made in the anonymous call to Social Services and a letter McGRATH had received containing the same accusations.			No further action taken as both WILSON and McKAY were "very satisfied" that there was no truth to the allegations.	Paragraph 282 of Report by D/Supt HARRISON, Sussex Police.

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
01/03/1974	D/Con CULLEN was introduced to Roy GARLAND. GARLAND told CULLEN he had been sexually assaulted by McGRATH and that McGRATH was working in Kincora.			<p>This was further information to the RUC confirming that William McGRATH was working in Kincora (following on from the anonymous phone call made to Strandtown in May 1973).</p> <p>This was the first meeting between GARLAND and a member of the RUC during which a number of allegations were made by GARLAND against McGRATH.</p>	Statements of D/Con CULLEN, 30/04/1980 and 19/06/1980
02/03/1974	D/Con CULLEN briefed ACC MEHARG on what GARLAND had told him.			MEHARG instructed CULLEN to further his enquiries and report back to him.	Statement of D/Con CULLEN, 30/04/1980
21/03/1974	D/Con CULLEN submitted a written report to ACC MEHARG based on the information provided by GARLAND.				Exhibit DBE16 part of C64/2/80; Exhibit 7 Sussex Police
17/05/1974	R 15, Kincora resident, made allegations to his mother that McGRATH had tried to "interfere with" him.	raised Clive's allegations with his Social Worker, Sharon McCLEAN.		Sharon McCLEAN raised this with her superior, NL 210 McCLEAN also discussed the allegation with Joseph MAINS; MAINS confirmed he knew of the allegation but felt there was no truth in it.	Exhibit PJM2 (C64/2/80)

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
June 1974	Valerie SHAW tells D/Supt John GRAHAM of the allegations being made by GARLAND against McGRATH.		Valerie SHAW told D/Supt John GRAHAM (Head of Belfast CID) of McGRATH's abuse and his employment in Kincora.	D/Supt GRAHAM was close to retirement but told SHAW a police investigation would be carried out and passed the information to CID at Mountpottinger. When spoken to by Sussex police, GRAHAM could not remember who in Mountpottinger CID he passed the information on to; no CID officer in Mountpottinger could recall being briefed by GRAHAM.	Statement of J GRAHAM 07/04/1982
03/07/1974	[REDACTED] KIN 301, Kincora resident was arrested for theft.			Police search of [REDACTED] KIN 301 locker in Kincora located documents relating to TARA, which were believed to have been written by William McGRATH.	RUC Report "Brief Outline of the organisation known as TARA and some of its principle members, for the information of C1(A)", dated 04/02/1980
July 1974	John Colin WALLACE temporarily promoted to Senior Information Officer at HQNI.			This promotion coincided with the creation of the PSYOPS Unit and WALLACE's prominent role therein. WALLACE maintained his 'official' duties whilst being part of the Army's 'black' propaganda unit.	Report from MoD Annex B to D/DS6/7/44/18 dated 10/08/1982, Part 4 of C64/5/83

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
16/09/1974	Second complaint by ██████ family to Social Services re McGRATH.			<p>Mrs McCLEAN again spoke to MAINS who confirmed that he was aware of the allegation and had reported it to Social Services and informed other Kincora staff.</p> <p>MAINS spoke to McGRATH about this allegation and instructed him to no longer waken the boys in the mornings.</p>	Statement of E SMYTH, 21/09/1982
17/09/1974	Meeting between ██████ and Social Services.			<p>On learning of the ██████ allegations from Sharon McCLEAN, ██████ NL 210 dismissed them on the grounds that <i>"with the low level of credence I attached to ██████ report and my expectation that the Officer in Charge of Kincora could be relied on, I did not require any further investigation once assurances that no sexual interference was occurring, had been given."</i></p>	Statement of ██████ NL 210 28/02/1980
20/09/1974	Social Services released the ██████ brothers from Kincora.			<p>Despite dismissing the allegation, ██████ NL 210 returned the ██████ brothers to their parents within 3 days of the second complaint and took no further action against McGRATH.</p>	Statement of R ██████ NL 210 28/02/1980

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
October 1974	Colin WALLACE claims he was identified by certain journalists as being involved in black propaganda activities against paramilitary organisations.			The decision was taken to transfer WALLACE to HQ North West District.	Report from MoD Annex B to D/DS6/7/44/18 dated 10/08/1982, Part 4 of C64/5/83
08/11/1974	4 page document, 'TARA- Reports regarding criminal offences associated with the homosexual community in Belfast'			This document contains allegations that both the RUC and Military had knowledge of William McGRATH's homosexuality but failed to investigate any allegations of homosexual assaults on residents of Kincora Hostel. This report further claims that similar allegations had been made concerning other residential children's homes in Northern Ireland.	Exhibit GC80, part of C64/22/85
December 1974	Captain Brian GEMMELL posted to Northern Ireland as Officer Commanding 123 Section, 39 th Infantry Brigade.				Statement of B GEMMELL, 16/07/1982
04/02/1975	WALLACE delivered a RESTRICTED document to the home of Robert FISK, a journalist with the Times.				See RUC File- C298/4/75
05/02/1975	WALLACE was transferred from HQNI to HQ North West District, Preston as SIO.				

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26/02/1975	Military document, 'William McGRATH- TARA', describing McGRATH as " <i>an intelligent though devious man, who needs extremely careful 'handling'</i> ".				SWJS4, part of C64/5/83
25/06/1975	WALLACE was informed that he would be dismissed from the Civil Service for unauthorised passing of information.			WALLACE subsequently challenged this decision.	Information obtained from an NIO response to a Parliamentary question December 1989- enclosed as part of correspondence between the Permanent Under Secretary at the NIO and the Deputy Chief Constable RUC.
27/06/1975	Richard KERR transfers from Williamson House to Kincora.				Kincora Register of Residents, Exhibit PJM3 , part of C64/2/80
June 1975	Valerie SHAW resigned from the Free Presbyterian Church.			Valerie SHAW claimed she had resigned mainly over the McGRATH matter.	Statement of V SHAW, 29/03/1982

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
Summer 1975	<p>Roy GARLAND spoke to Captain Brian GEMMELL and Corporal Q [REDACTED] (39th Infantry Brigade) and told him of McGRATH's homosexuality and that he was in charge of a boys' home on the Newtownards Rd, Belfast.</p> <p>After a second meeting between GEMMELL and GARLAND, GEMMELL allegedly verbally briefed Ian CAMERON (MI5).</p>			GEMMELL alleges that CAMERON ordered him to get rid of GARLAND as a source and told him that homosexuality was not of interest.	<p>Statements of Brian GEMMELL 16/7/82 and Sgt Corporal Q 22/7/82 & 23/12/82</p> <p>Statements of Brian GEMMELL 16/7/82</p>
Aug/Sept 1975	Valerie SHAW spoke to Rev Martin SMYTH about her concerns over McGRATH.			Rev. SMYTH told SHAW he would discuss the matter with Rev PAISLEY and did so at prior to a meeting at Stormont.	Statements of V SHAW, dated 29/03/82 and Rev M SMYTH 16/04/80
1975 exact date unknown	Rumours were circulating in Social Work circles that MAINS was a homosexual and was interfering with boys in Kincora.			KIN 384 (who had previously worked in Kincora for 5 months in 1966) told Sussex police that he was aware of "rumours circulating within social work circles to the effect that MAINS was a homosexual" in 1975. KIN 384 also told police that he was aware of rumours that MAINS was sexually abusing boys in Kincora. KIN 384 did not pass on the details of the rumours to his superiors.	Statement of KIN 384 24/09/1982

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
31/12/1975	WALLACE resigned from the MoD as an alternative to dismissal.				Report from MoD Annex B to D/DS6/7/44/18 dated 10/08/1982, Part 4 of C64/5/83.
Early January 1976	GARLAND again made contact with D/Con CULLEN.			There was a gap of almost 2 years from GARLAND's first meeting with CULLEN and again making contact.	Statement of J CULLEN, 30/04/1980
21/01/1976	D/Con CULLEN met with ACC MEHARG re GARLAND's allegations.				Sussex Police, Exhibit 8
22/01/1976	Rev PAISLEY conducted the marriage ceremony of Elizabeth McGRATH and Frank MILLAR jnr at Martyr's Memorial Church.				Exhibit SEC2, part of Phase 2 C64/2/80
24/01/1976	D/Con CULLEN met with ACC MEHARG re GARLAND.			MEHARG instructed CULLEN to continue with his enquiries and to contact the EHSSB to confirm if McGRATH worked in Kincora.	Sussex Police, Exhibit 8
28/01/1976	Military Document, 'Ref 13912/2-Extremist Protestant Secret Organisation TARA', makes reference to William McGRATH as a Welfare Officer and running some form of boys' home.				Exhibit SWJS1, part of C64/5/83

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
19/02/1976	D/Con CULLEN met with Deputy Director EHSSB (BUNTING) to discuss McGRATH and his employment at Kincora.			It appears unusual for a D/Constable (Dog Handler in Drugs Squad) to meet a senior EHSSB official alone to ask questions about this matter. BUNTING says that CULLEN told him at this meeting that <i>"even the senior staff in his division were not aware of this"</i> . On learning about the contents of the MASON file, CULLEN became aware for the first time that previous complaints of a homosexual nature against staff at Kincora had been made to social services.	Report by R. BUNTING, 05/02/1980
February 1976	Edward GILLILAND (Dir, EHSSB) made aware by Robert BUNTING that D/Con CULLEN was carrying out a 'special' investigation into William McGRATH.			GILLILAND instructed BUNTING to brief SCOULAR and other appropriate staff to make arrangements to monitor Kincora more closely. BUNTING briefed SCOULAR, as instructed, and gave him a copy of the Mason File.	Statement of E GILLILAND, 15/05/1980
24/02/1976	Kincora staff mentioned a homosexual incident involving resident, [REDACTED] R 9 to his Social Worker.			No further details on this <i>"sort of homosexual incident"</i> are known.	Exhibit MJR1, part of PJM 6 (c64/2/80)

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
Feb/Mar 1976	Marion REYNOLDS, Social Worker, was contacted by Elizabeth FIDDIS, Health Visitor and asked if she had any knowledge of Joseph MAINS being a homosexual.			Mrs FIDDIS had picked this up from conversation in the house of an aunt/mother of an ex-Kincora resident. Mrs REYNOLDS did not have any knowledge but told Lorna McGRATH (Principal Social Worker) and TL 3 (Senior Social Worker) of the conversation.	Statements of Marion REYNOLDS, 23/02/1982, TL 3 , 26/02/1982 and Elizabeth FIDDIS, 09/03/1982
15/03/1976	Copy of the Mason File handed to RUC (D/Con CULLEN) by Social Services.		RUC became aware of the existence of the Mason File.	Copy of Mason File given to D/Con CULLEN who claims he passed it on to ACC MEHARG; this is disputed by MEHARG.	Report by D/Supt G CASKEY, dated 23/02/1982, para 47
21/03/1976	D/Con CULLEN reports sick for duty.				RUC Person File for D/Con CULLEN
19/04/1976	D/Con CULLEN reports fit for duty.				RUC Person File for D/Con CULLEN
October 1976	R 36 wife approached Valerie SHAW and made her aware of R 36 breakdown and attempted suicide due to his homosexual associations with McGRATH.			See entry for 1951. R 36 had lodged with the McGRATH family in the 1950s and had had a homosexual 'relationship' with William McGRATH during this time.	Statement of R JOHNSTON 21/03/1980
December 1976	Captain Brian GEMMELL'S Tour of Duty in Northern Ireland ended.				

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
05/01/1977	RUC Intelligence Document, 'MIONI P74', mentions McGRATH's employment in Kincora.			This is the first time Kincora is mentioned by name in the documents provided by the Military to the 1983 CASKEY investigation; that said it is an RUC SB report as opposed to a military generated intelligence report.	Exhibit SWJS10, part of C64/5/83
June 1977	Captain Brian GEMMELL resigns his Commission from the British Army.				See Exhibit GC12 - 2016
16/08/1977	Kincora resident, R 18, made allegations against McGRATH to Social Services.	R 18 alleged to his Social Worker (Anna HYLAND) that he had been indecently assaulted by William McGRATH.			
17/08/1977	Social Services discussed the allegation made by R 18 against McGRATH.			HYLAND raised the allegations with Joe MAINS but was dissatisfied with his attitude to the matter and informed her superior Alan CHARD. A copy of HYLAND's report was forwarded to Gordon HIGHAM.	Report by D/Supt G CASKEY, dated 23/02/1982, para 27-30
September 1977	Joseph MAINS contacted Richard KERR's social worker, Helen GOGARTY, as he was "mildly concerned" about KERR and wanted her to talk to him.			It is not clear what MAINS' concerns over KERR were. GOGARTY did not discuss this with KERR as he was arrested for burglary in early October 1977.	Exhibit GC14, part of GC10 (C64/2/80)

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
September 1977	Clive SCOLAR was informed by Gordon HIGHAM of R 18 allegation against William McGRATH.				Statement of C SCOLAR, 30/04/80
30/09/1977	Stolen jewellery recovered from Stephen WARING's locker in Kincora.			Following this discovery, WARING ran away from Kincora to London. He was returned on 2/10/1977.	R v WARING and KERR, Court Prosecution Summary 21/10/1977
04/10/1977	Richard KERR and Stephen WARING were arrested by the RUC for burglary offences.			Following the arrest of KERR and KERR'S behaviour whilst in police custody, D/Con SCULLY became suspicious of the 'relationship' between MAINS and KERR.	Statement of D/Con SCULLY 28/01/1980
October 1977	Helen GOGARTY, Richard KERR's Social Worker raised concerns with her senior David MORROW about Kincora.			GOGARTY's concerns had been heightened following a conversation she had had with D/Con SCULLY. SCULLY's highlighted an increase in criminality by Kincora residents and concerns over " <i>some form of sexual activity between ... Joseph MAINS and some of the boys</i> ".	Statement of D MORROW, 13/02/1980

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
11/10/1977	Joseph MAINS submitted a report to Social Services re R 18's allegations against McGRATH.			Joe MAINS submitted a report to his authorities and it was considered by Clive SCOLAR. The evidence, MAINS concluded, was "very inadequate" and what had happened could be construed as "an affectionate gesture". Gordon HIGHAM wrote to SCOLAR suggesting MAINS speak to McGRATH. HIGHAM also indicated that the situation would be discussed in a month's time; during the interim MAINS and HYLAND would "keep a particular close eye on the whole situation".	Exhibit SGH3, part of GC1
12/10/1977	Case Conference held to discuss R 18. Differing reports from Mrs HYLAND and Joseph MAINS were considered.			No action was taken against McGRATH and R 18 was to remain in Kincora.	Exhibit GC38 part of GC2 (C 64/2/80)
14/10/1977	KERR appeared at Belfast Juvenile Court charged with a series of burglaries.			KERR was remanded in Custody to Rathgael.	Exhibit GC12, part GC10 (C64/2/80)
20/10/1977	Clive SCOLAR wrote to Gordon HIGHAM commenting on the two differing reports in relation to R 18's allegations against McGRATH, as prepared by Anna HYLAND and Joseph MAINS.			HYLAND believed R 18's allegations; MAINS did not. SCOLAR added that "the situation is further complicated by Mr MAINS' reticence about freely discussing what goes on in Kincora with you [HIGHAM]".	Exhibit SGH4, part of GC1

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
21/10/1977	KERR re-appeared at Belfast Juvenile Court on burglary charges.			KERR was returned to Kincora Hostel	Exhibit GC12, part GC10 (C64/2/80)
01/11/1977	Meeting between Clive SCoulAR, Lorna McGRATH and Gordon HIGHAM to discuss concerns about Kincora. Richard KERR accused of stealing £80 from Raymond SEMPLE's locker in Kincora.				Statement of Clive SCoulAR, 30/04/80 Exhibit GC14, part of GC10 (C64/2/80)
02/11/1977	A handwritten noted from Gordon HIGHAM to Clive SCoulAR outlining concerns raised by the RUC in Strandtown re: Kincora.			Highlighted concerns particularly in relation to Richard KERR and homosexuality. Concerns also raised by others including RUC and Social Worker at Rathgael.	Exhibit SGH6, part of GC1 (C64/2/80)
07/11/1977	Richard KERR transferred to Rathgael following arrest for theft of £80 in Kincora.				Exhibit GC14, part of GC10 (C64/2/80)
09/11/1977	Further meeting between Clive SCoulAR, Lorna McGRATH and Gordon HIGHAM to discuss Kincora.			As a result of this meeting it was decided that SCoulAR would raise the matter with Robert BUNTING, Assistant Director of EHSSB.	Statement of C SCoulAR, 30/04/1980

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
14/11/1977	Meeting to discuss Kincora and KERR held at SCoulAR's office involving Lorna McGRATH, Gordon HIGHAM, David MORROW and RG 241 [REDACTED]			Decision taken to introduce an additional monitoring system for Kincora in the manner of a weekly return to highlight "untoward daily events". RG 241 recalled a rumour in social work circles that someone had been threatened about visiting Kincora by paramilitaries.	Statement of C SCoulAR, 30/04/1980 Statement of RG 241, 15/02/1980
14/11/1977	HIGHAM and SCoulAR went to Strandtown to see Sgt SILLERY and D/Con SCULLY to discuss Kincora.			SILLERY was to carry out research into crimes committed by Kincora residents ahead of a further meeting.	Statement of C SCoulAR, 30/04/1980
25/11/1977	David MORROW (Senior Social Worker) rang Gordon HIGHAM to inform him that, after speaking to him in Rathgael, KERR had told him McGRATH had made a sexual approach on him. KERR told MORROW that neither MAINS nor SEMPLE had any "sexual dealings" with him.			HIGHAM discussed this allegation with David MORROW and concluded that it was untrue "because previously all Richard's allegations had been towards Mr Joseph MAINS".	Exhibit SGH7, part of GC1
27/11/1977	Stephen WARING jumped overboard from the MV Ulster Prince travelling from Liverpool to Belfast.				

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
05/12/1977	Meeting between SCoulAR, SILLERY and SCULLY re Kincora. SCULLY outlined his suspicions over the relationship between KERR and MAINS.				Statement of C SCoulAR, 30/04/1980
07/12/1977	Richard KERR appeared at court on theft charges.			KERR was sent to Millisle Borstal.	
21/12/1977	KERR sentenced to 3 years Borstal training at Belfast Juvenile Court.				R v KERR Prosecution papers
23/12/1977	KERR wrote to MAINS from Millisle asking him to visit.			KERR wrote on at least two occasions inviting MAINS to visit him; KERR claims that MAINS did visit him.	Exhibit SGP2 (C64/2/80)
06/01/1978	R 18 alleged that MAINS returned to the hostel drunk and woke him. R 18 claimed that MAINS had queried whether he liked Kincora and asked if there was anything wrong. R 18 alleged this happened on several weekends.	R 18 reported the incident to his Social Worker (Anna HYLAND).		HYLAND passed this information on to Gordon HIGHAM who agreed to speak to MAINS about the matter by "asking him [MAINS] about any discussions he has had with R 18 about the Hostel".	Exhibit GC35a, part of GC1 (C64/2/80)
09/01/1978	KERR wrote again to MAINS asking him to visit.				Exhibit SGP2 (C64/2/80)
02/02/1978	Richard KERR made a suicide attempt following the failure of his Appeal Hearing.			KERR was taken to the military wing of Musgrave Park Hospital, where he stayed until 31/03/78.	Exhibit GC14, part of GC10 (C64/2/80)

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
09/02/1978	An enquiry into WARING's death was held under the Merchant Shipping Act 1970.			Enquiry concluded that "Stephen WARING was lost at sea believed killed or drowned following a fall from the vessel".	Exhibit GC3 (C64/2/80)
09/05/1978	Richard KERR transferred to Woburn House, Millisle from Maze Prison Psychiatric Unit.			During this stay in Millisle, KERR met William EDMONDS (a Medical Orderly), who alleged that he indecently assaulted KERR at Millisle. It is further alleged that KERR and EDMONDS continued a homosexual relationship on KERR's release from Millisle.	Statement of W EDMONDS, 10/04/1980
October 1978	Judith HERRIOTT began a placement from QUB at Kincora- attended Case Conferences re R 18			HERRIOTT read the Kincora File held at Purdysburn and became aware of previous allegations of a homosexual nature against McGRATH. Spoke to HIGHAM who assured her that the matter had been dealt with and the persons involved " <i>rigidly interviewed</i> ".	Statement of J HERRIOTT 06/02/1980
1978	R 2 suffered a nervous breakdown and was hospitalised in Purdysburn.			MAINS visited R 2 in Purdysburn as their relationship had continued since R 2 left Kincora.	Statement of D/Sgt G WILSON, 15/07/1980 re: interview of R 2
09/02/1979	KERR discharged from Millisle Borstal and transferred to Williamson House.			KERR alleges that during this stay in Williamson House, Eric WITCHELL buggered him on several occasions.	Exhibit GC15, part of GC10 Statement of R KERR, 26/10/1982

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
14/03/1979	Social Worker report on Richard KERR re unsuitability of Kincora to accommodate KERR on his release from Millisle. The report notes that Kincora was ruled out because it was <i>"under investigation because of the Warden's alleged involvement with a homosexual circle"</i> .			There are two copies of the report prepared by Judy KENNEDY; one contains the comments about the Kincora Warden's alleged homosexuality and the other copy has this section blacked out at the request of KENNEDY'S supervisor Roy BLAIR. BLAIR had asked for the reference to homosexuality in Kincora to be removed as it was an <i>"unsubstantiated comment"</i> .	Report of JKENNEDY- GC15, part of GC 10 Statement of R BLAIR 12/03/1980
c. May 1979	Richard KERR left Northern Ireland and moved to Preston, Lancashire to live with an aunt.			KERR confirmed that Judy KENNEDY, Social Worker, had given him the money for his fare to Preston.	Statement of R KERR, 25/02/1980
c.1979	Alan MORRIS, PSW, recalls being told by HIGHAM and MORROW that MAINS was a homosexual and was having a homosexual relationship with one of the Kincora residents.				Statement of W A MORRIS, 23/09/1982
July 1979	Michael HALL was on student placement from QUB during summer months.			HALL claims that during his time in Kincora, R 18 talked to him about his homosexuality.	
August 1979	BM 1 worked as Houseparent in Kincora.				Action 392, RUC Investigation Phase 1

Date	Summary	Abuse Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Abuse Reported to RUC	Further Information	Reference Document
December 1979	Concerns re: Richard KERR led to social workers (Judy KENNEDY and Helen GOGARTY) contacting a journalist to expose issues at Kincora.				Statement of J KENNEDY 21/04/1982
24/01/1980	Irish Independent publish article, "Sex Racket at Children's Home".				
04/03/1980	MAINS, SEMPLE and McGRATH received precautionary suspension notices; served on them by Clive SCOLAR.				Statement of Edward GILLILAND, dated 15/05/1980
05/08/1980	Murder of Jonathan LEWIS (a Brighton-based Antiques dealer) - his body was found on the banks of the River Arun.			WALLACE was accused of murdering LEWIS (WALLACE had allegedly been having an affair with LEWIS' wife, Jane). The two men were due to attend a dinner party together on the night the murder took place.	
18/09/1980	Sussex Police charged John Colin WALLACE with the murder of Jonathan LEWIS.				
20/03/1981	WALLACE pleaded not guilty to murder but was found guilty of manslaughter and imprisoned for 10 years.				
16/12/1981	Trial of MAINS, SEMPLE and McGRATH.				

RESTRICTED

Kincora – Exhibit GC2

Strategic Analysis- Overview of Knowledge of Abuse in Kincora (RUC, Military and Social Services)

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

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1. Introduction

This report should be considered in conjunction with other analytical products, which together provide a strategic overview of the material held by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), in relation to Kincora Boys' Home.

This analysis provides the reader with a detailed overview and summary of the key dates in relation to RUC, Military and Social Services' knowledge of complaints of (sexual) abuse and mismanagement at Kincora Boys' Home.

2. Sources of Information

Documentation held by the PSNI has been reviewed and analysed to assist in the production of this report. In particular, information contained in relevant statements from RUC and Sussex Police investigations¹ into Kincora have been considered and are referenced throughout this report.

3. Key Findings

- In 1967 the **Belfast Welfare Department** received their first complaint from Kincora residents about the behaviour of Joseph MAINS; this was followed by a separate complaint in 1971. Collectively these complaints were considered as part of the 'Mason Investigation'.
- An anonymous call was received by the **RUC** in May 1973, in which allegations of McGRATH's homosexuality, employment in Kincora and involvement in a vice-ring centred on the Home were made. The RUC carried out an investigation into the phone call and concluded that the call was probably 'malicious'.
- **Military** may have had knowledge of abuse in Kincora by 1974.
- On a number of occasions between 1967 and 1980, the **Belfast Welfare Corporation** and later the **Eastern Health and Social Services Board (EHSSB)** were made aware of serious allegations of abuse and indecent behaviour by Kincora staff on residents. Some reports were followed up, others were not, but at no time was any [disciplinary] action taken against Kincora staff.
- By the late 1970s, rumours of homosexuality and improper relationships against Joseph MAINS appear to have been circulating amongst **social workers**.
- By 1973/74 the **RUC** (including at ACC rank and the Head of CID) knew that William McGRATH worked in Kincora, was suspected of being a homosexual, leader of a loyalist paramilitary organisation and involved in the abuse of young boys. Despite this knowledge, no serious investigation was carried out by the RUC prior to 1980.

¹ RUC Crime Files- C64/2/80, C64/5/83 and C64/22/85

4. Overview of Knowledge of Abuse at Kincora pre 1980

Date	Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Military Knowledge	Reported to RUC	Action Taken
<u>1967</u> Sept	R 6 and R 5 (Kincora residents) made separate complaints to Social Services about the indecent behaviour of Joseph MAINS.	.		The City Welfare Officer (CWO), Henry MASON, interviewed MAINS and reported the matter to the Town Clerk. No disciplinary action was taken against MAINS; no information to suggest that the RUC were made aware of the complaints.
<u>1971</u> Jun	KIN 27 , Kincora resident, alleges that he complained to his social workers about the indecent behaviour of Joseph MAINS.		KIN 27 claims he told police about abuse he had suffered by MAINS in Kincora, after absconding from the Home.	No action was taken by either the RUC or social workers re: KIN 27 complaint; KIN 27 later returned to Kincora.
Aug	R 8 , Kincora resident, wrote letters to Social Services which contained allegations of homosexual behaviour against MAINS.			R 8 complaints were investigated by MASON whose findings were submitted to the Town Solicitor. His file covered the allegations by R 6 , R 5 and R 8 against MAINS. Mr MASON recommended that the matter be passed to the RUC. There is no evidence to suggest that the RUC were made aware of the contents of this file at this time.
<u>1973</u> May			Anonymous phone call to the RUC claiming McGRATH was a homosexual, part of a vice ring and employed at Kincora.	The RUC carried out investigations, including speaking to Joseph MAINS; they concluded that the call was 'probably malicious'.
Dec			D/Con CULLEN was made aware of Roy GARLAND's accusations against McGRATH, through James McCORMICK.	CULLEN subsequently met with GARLAND several months later (see below).
<u>1974</u> Jan	Anonymous phone call to Social Services re: McGRATH.			MAINS and McGRATH were both interviewed about the anonymous call to Social Services. Senior Social Workers were "very satisfied" that there was no truth in the allegations. No further action was taken by Social Services; RUC unaware of the call.
Mar			D/Con CULLEN first met Roy GARLAND.	CULLEN wrote a report to ACC MEHARG which included information that McGRATH worked in Kincora.

Date	Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Military Knowledge	Reported to RUC	Action Taken
<p>1974</p> <p>May</p> <p>Jun</p> <p>July</p> <p>Sept</p> <p>Nov</p>	<p>█ R 15 █, Kincora resident, complained to his Social Worker that he had been indecently assaulted by William McGRATH.</p> <p>█ R 15 █, Kincora resident, made a second complaint to his Social Worker that he had been indecently assaulted by McGRATH.</p>	<p>4 page document consisting of 10 bullet points re: TARA. Makes reference to homosexuality and abuse at boys' hostels. Specifically names McGRATH and his involvement in homosexuality, employment at and abuse of boys at Kincora.</p>	<p>D/Supt John GRAHAM was told by Valerie SHAW that McGRATH worked in Kincora. GRAHAM was also made aware of homosexual abuse allegations against McGRATH.</p> <p>Following his arrest for theft, TARA documents were found by the RUC in the locker of █ KIN 301 █ (Kincora resident).</p>	<p>The █ FAMILY Social Worker raised the complaint with Joseph MAINS and her supervisor, █ NL 210 █</p> <p>D/Supt GRAHAM states that he told CID officers in Mountpottinger about SHAW's allegations concerning McGRATH. There is no record any action being taken by GRAHAM, or any other office in the RUC.</p> <p>Following investigations by Social Services, including speaking to MAINS, both █ R 15 █ and his brother were released from Kincora and returned home. RUC not informed.</p> <p>There is no evidence to suggest that this document was shared with the RUC. See Exhibit GC11- GC80.</p>
<p>1975</p> <p>c.</p> <p>Aug</p> <p>Exact date u/k</p>	<p>James MAYBIN, Social Worker, EHSSB became aware of a rumour that MAINS "was sexually interfering with the boys in his custody at Kincora".</p>	<p>British Army Officer, Brian GEMMELL, met Roy GARLAND and was told of McGRATH's homosexuality and employment in Kincora.</p>		<p>GEMMELL brought GARLAND to HQNI for a further debrief on William McGRATH. See Exhibit GC12- Person Profile Brian GEMMELL</p> <p>MAYBIN did not pass on any information to his superiors.</p>

Date	Reported to Welfare Department/ Social Services	Military Knowledge	Reported to RUC	Action Taken
<p>1976 Feb</p> <p>Hilary NEILL, Social Worker, was told by Kincora staff of a homosexual incident in the Hostel involving R 9.</p> <p>Mar</p>			<p>RUC became aware of the existence of the Mason File from Social Services.</p>	<p>No further action appears to have been taken by Social Services.</p> <p>Copy of the Mason File given to D/Con CULLEN who claims he passed it on to ACC MEHARG; this is disputed by MEHARG.</p>
<p>1977 Aug</p> <p>Kincora Resident, R 18, made allegations to his social worker re: McGRATH.</p> <p>Oct</p> <p>Social Services became aware of RUC concerns about "events" at Kincora.</p> <p>Nov</p> <p>Richard KERR made allegations of indecent assault by McGRATH to a social worker in Rathgael.</p>			<p>D/Con SCULLY raises concerns to Social Services re: relationship between Richard KERR and Joseph MAINS.</p>	<p>Social Services concluded that R 18 allegations were 'questionable'.</p> <p>A number of meetings were held between RUC and Social Services to discuss concerns. A weekly monitoring system was introduced at Kincora to highlight "untoward" daily events.</p> <p>No further action taken following KERR's allegation.</p>
<p>1978 Jan</p>	<p>Further allegation from R 18 re: MAINS' behaviour whilst on duty.</p>			
<p>1979 Mar</p>	<p>KERR'S Social Worker, Judy KENNEDY, reported to her superior, that Kincora was ruled out as suitable accommodation for KERR as it was "apparently under investigation because of the warden's alleged involvement with a homosexual circle".</p> <p>A senior Social Worker in the EHSSB was told by Gordon HIGHAM that MAINS was suspected of being a homosexual and having a relationship with a Kincora resident.</p>			<p>There are two copies of the report prepared by Judy KENNEDY; one contains the comments about the Kincora Warden's alleged homosexuality and the other copy has this section blacked out at the request of KENNEDY'S supervisor Roy BLAIR. BLAIR had asked for the reference to homosexuality in Kincora to be removed as it was an "unsubstantiated comment".</p> <p>No further action was taken by Social Services, except ruling out Westwinds as a potential alternative address for Richard KERR, on his release from Borstal.</p>

5. Key Dates of Knowledge of Abuse 1958-1980

Employment of Convicted Kincora Staff

- **January 1958** – Joseph MAINS took up the position of Warden at Kincora Boys' Home.
- **8th September 1964** – Raymond SEMPLE took up the position as Deputy Warden at Kincora Boys' Home (he had been volunteering at Kincora for a number of years previously).
- **28th February 1966** – Raymond SEMPLE resigned from his position as Deputy Warden.

Social Services - The Mason File 1967– 1971²

Three Kincora residents made separate complaints to Social Services between 1967 and 1971 against Joseph MAINS, Officer in Charge of Kincora. Following enquiries, a consolidated file was compiled by Henry MASON, City Welfare Officer and presented to the Town Solicitor in August 1971, with a recommendation that the matter be passed to the RUC.

- **September 1967** – **R 6** (Kincora resident) – made a number of allegations against Joseph MAINS in a letter he sent to Social Services. These included alcohol consumption by MAINS and inappropriate (sexual) contact⁴. **R 7** claims to have been involved in composing this letter together with **KIN 10**, **KIN 5** and **R 6**. Neither **KIN 10** nor **KIN 5** mentions this letter reporting abuse; **KIN 10** goes as far as to deny his involvement.
- **September 1967** – **R 5** (Kincora resident) – made a number of allegations against Joseph MAINS in a letter he sent to Social Services. **R 5** claimed that MAINS tried to indecently assault him in the bathroom in Kincora. The allegations continued that MAINS had brought two men, not connected to Kincora, **R 2** and **OV 4** to the summer camp. **R 5** made further allegations of MAINS drinking whiskey whilst on duty⁵.
- **11th September 1967** – Henry MASON, City Welfare Officer, accompanied by Robert MOORE, a senior official in the Belfast Welfare Corporation, interviewed Joseph MAINS regarding the allegations made by **R 5** and **R 6**.
- **20th September 1967** – MASON reported the matter to the Town Clerk and submitted the relevant papers⁶. It is unclear what, if any, action took place thereafter. There is no evidence that the matter was reported to police at this stage.

Employment of Convicted Kincora Staff

- **10th June 1969** – Raymond SEMPLE is reappointed as Deputy Warden.
- **22nd June 1971** – William McGRATH is appointed as Housefather at Kincora Boy's Home.

RUC- **KIN 27**, Kincora Resident⁷

Kincora resident, **KIN 27**, made a number of allegations against MAINS, which weren't followed up and not considered as part of the Mason File.

² Exhibit GC3, part of RUC Crime File C64/2/80

³ Statements of **R 7** 31/03/1980 and **KIN 10** 25/06/80

⁴ Exhibit GC21, part of GC3 (C64/2/80)

⁵ Statement of **KIN 5**, 23/02/1980

⁶ Statement of Henry MASON, 08/02/1980

⁷ Statement of **KIN 27**, 17/04/1980

- **C. June 1971** – **KIN 27** told two unnamed social workers that MAINS was a “*queer*” and that MAINS had indecently assaulted him and made inappropriate comments⁸. **KIN 27** absconded from Kincora, was picked up by police at Orangefield Park and told them of the abuse at Kincora⁹. On this occasion, police returned **KIN 27** to his mother and not Kincora; **KIN 27** felt neither police nor social workers believed his allegations.

Social Services - The Mason File 1967– 1971

- **12th August 1971** – **R 8** (**Kincora resident**) – wrote two letters containing a number of allegations against Joseph MAINS, to his social worker (Margaret ROBINSON) and Head of Social Services (Robert MOORE). “*I now can say truly that I have never met such a filthy, dirty man (sexually) as Mr MAINS*”. **R 8** alleged he was offered money to rub MAINS’ back. **R 8** further alleged that MAINS regularly slept with **R 2** ... “*I think his open approach to homosexuality is disgusting ... and a mind like that is not fit to look after boys*”¹⁰. **R 8** told the RUC in 1980 that he did not report the matter to the police in 1971 as he believed his social worker would pass a copy of this letter to the police.
 - **12th August 1971** – Margaret ROBINSON, social worker for **R 8**, received a copy of the letter from **R 8** and was “*horrified*” at its content. ROBINSON showed the letter to her superior, Eddis NICHOLL. NICHOLL established that Mr MASON had a similar copy and he was to carry out the necessary investigations¹¹.
- **23rd August 1971** – MASON interviewed two Kincora residents, **R 8** and **R 33** (who **R 8** had mentioned in his letter as having witnessed Joseph MAINS and **R 2** in bed together), along with Mr JOHNSTON, Deputy Town Clerk and Charles McCaffrey, Assistant Children’s Officer. McCaffrey, however, denies seeing the letter, interviewing **R 8** or knowledge of the Mason File¹².
- **25th August 1971** – Henry MASON submitted his file to the Town Solicitor, **R 8**, in relation to complaints from the three Kincora residents **R 6**, **R 5** and **R 8**; this became known as the Mason File. In his covering letter MASON recommended that there were sufficient grounds for referring the matter to police¹³. Handwritten on the top of this covering letter is, “*CWO to see TC on 20/9/71*”¹⁴.
- **1st September 1971** – There is an entry in Mr JAMESON, the Town Clerk’s diary for a meeting with Superintendent William THOMPSON at 9.30am. The purpose of this meeting is not clear, although Superintendent THOMPSON stated that he had never discussed Kincora with anyone¹⁵.

⁸ Statement of **KIN 27**, 17/04/1980

⁹ Statement of **KIN 27**, 01/04/1982

¹⁰ Letter by **R 8**, (Exhibit GC 24, part of GC1) and statement of **R 8**, 25/02/1980

¹¹ Statements of Margaret ROBINSON, 27/02/80 and Eddis NICHOLL, 10/04/1980

¹² Statements of Charles McCaffrey, 17/03/1980 & 13/03/1982

¹³ Exhibit GC17, part of GC3 – (Letter from Mr MASON to Town Solicitor)

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Statement of William THOMPSON, 18/03/1982

- **28th September 1971** – Henry MASON met with Mr JAMESON to discuss the content of the meeting between JAMESON and Superintendent THOMPSON on the 1st September 1971. This meeting between MASON and JAMESON would have been a “departure from the usual procedures”¹⁶.
- **28th September 1971** – There is an entry, believed to have been marked as complete, in the Town Solicitor’s Diary¹⁷ (Mr YOUNG) re: ‘*phoning Mr MEHARG on telephone number 650301*’. Two previous attempts to contact ACC MEHARG are also listed in the diary for earlier in that month. MEHARG states he may have received a call from Mr YOUNG, but denies it was about Kincora. MEHARG confirmed that he knew YOUNG both professionally and personally¹⁸. There are no other entries in the 1971 diary indicating further attempts to contact Mr MEHARG.

RUC– Anonymous Telephone Call

The RUC received an anonymous call to the confidential telephone line. The caller made a series of allegations about William McGRATH, Housefather at Kincora. It is believed that this is the first notification of any homosexual activity in Kincora.

- **23rd May 1973** - Anonymous call to police reporting the activities of William McGRATH. Amongst the allegations - made by the caller, was that there was a vice ring, centred around McGRATH, who worked at Kincora. The caller also alleged that McGRATH practiced “various kinds of homosexual perversion” and was involved in Unionist politics, suggesting that McGRATH knew certain local homosexual MPs who had helped get him the job in Kincora. Further, the caller claimed that McGRATH exploited boys sexually, politically and financially¹⁹. GARLAND confirmed to Sussex police that he had made an anonymous call in an effort to “*provoke some Police action*”²⁰ but when shown the transcript he pointed out a number of ‘*irregularities*’.
- **4th June 1973** – Report prepared by Constable Long re: enquiries into allegations received on the confidential telephone line. After calling at Kincora to speak with Mr MAINS, these enquiries concluded “*that the subject, McGRATH, is a decent type of person and there is nothing to indicate that he is engaged in the type of conduct alleged by the caller ... the allegations are totally malicious and would not ... merit any further investigation.*” McGRATH claimed that this was a “*political attack*” on him, probably from the UVF²¹. LONG’s assessment was accepted and no further police action took place.

The Mason File

- **June 1973** – Mr BUNTING, Deputy Director EHSSB, claims he received the Mason File prior to Mr MASON retiring²².

¹⁶ Statement of William James JOHNSTON, 17/03/1982

¹⁷ 1971 Diary believed to belong to Mr YOUNG, Town Solicitor

¹⁸ Statement of William MEHARG, 22/04/1982

¹⁹ Exhibit SEC18, (c64/2/80- 1982 file).

²⁰ Statement of Roy GARLAND, 30/03/1982

²¹ Statement of D/S ELLIOTT, 28/07/1980

²² Statement of Robert BUNTING, 13/05/1980

Valerie SHAW²³

Valerie SHAW was a long-standing member and employee of the Free Presbyterian Church from 1952.

- **October 1973** - Jim McCORMICK told Valerie SHAW about William McGRATH and his involvement in homosexual sexual practices, corruption of young boys and his association with the Free Presbyterian Church. McCORMICK had been told this by Roy GARLAND. SHAW subsequently met GARLAND who confirmed these allegations and told her that McGRATH was working in Kincora Boy's Home.
- **29th October 1973** – Valerie SHAW contacted Rev. Ian PAISLEY after learning of McGRATH's employment at Kincora and his homosexual corruption of Christian boys from their church.
- **30th October 1973** – SHAW again contacted PAISLEY on learning that "*Brother McGRATH was to be involved in a ... commemoration service in a Free Presbyterian Church.*" PAISLEY said that he would "*deal with it*".
- **1st November 1973** – SHAW obtained the original letters for PAISLEY from GARLAND, written by McGRATH to him, as proof of homosexual behaviour.
- **2nd November 1973** – SHAW copied the letters and offered them to PAISLEY ahead of his meeting with McGRATH. PAISLEY did not look at the letters and "*brushed them aside*". PAISLEY and James HEYBURN (financial director of Martyr's Memorial Church) met McGRATH but they did not put the homosexual allegations to him and the meeting appeared to end cordially. HEYBURN had previously acted as 'guarantor' in a hire purchase agreement for William McGRATH (HP Agreement 25/08/1969).²⁴
- **5th November 1973** – PAISLEY asked SHAW for the letters between GARLAND and McGRATH to read. He later agreed they were "*horrible*".

RUC - D/Con James CULLEN

D/Constable CULLEN was a Drug Squad, Dog Handler who knew Jim McCORMICK through Evangelical circles.

- **C. November 1973** – D/Con James CULLEN first spoke with Jim McCORMICK about McGRATH and sexual abuse based on Roy GARLAND's version of events.

Valerie SHAW²⁵

- **January 1974** – SHAW "caused PAISLEY to meet Mr GARLAND"²⁶. There is no information available to the authors to ascertain what was discussed at this meeting, or indeed if the meeting took place.

²³ Statements of Valerie SHAW, 02/03/1980 and 29/03/1982

²⁴ Exhibit GC64, C64/2/80 (1982 Investigation)

²⁵ Statements of Valerie SHAW, 02/03/1980 and 29/03/1982

²⁶ Statement of Valerie SHAW, 29/03/1982

Social Services- Anonymous Telephone call²⁷

Social Services at Holywood Road received an anonymous call. The caller made a number of allegations about William McGRATH, Housefather at Kincora. Despite being aware of the previous anonymous phone to the RUC in May 1973 (which made similar allegations against McGRATH), Social Services appear to have taken no further action. The contents of this phone call were not shared with police.

- **23rd January 1974** – Social Services staff (Colin McKAY) at the Holywood Road Office received an anonymous call stating that McGRATH had made “*improper suggestions to the boys*” at Kincora and had gone to live there for this purpose. He reported the contents of the call to a superior, Brian TODD, who subsequently informed the Principal Social Worker, Mary WILSON, who was at home at the time.
- **29th January 1974** – Mary WILSON, Senior Social Worker discussed these allegations with Joseph MAINS who told her that he believed the allegations were false and that there was a political reason behind them. MAINS also told Mrs WILSON that a similar anonymous phone call had previously been made to the police. WILSON had previously been present when Henry MASON had interviewed MAINS about a complaint of sexual abuse by MAINS on a Kincora resident²⁸.
- **4th February 1974** - Mary WILSON and Colin McKAY spoke with McGRATH at Kincora re the allegations made in the anonymous phone call. At the conclusion of the meeting, both WILSON and McKAY were “*very satisfied*” there was no truth in these allegations and no further action was taken. WILSON had also informed Clive SCOLAR of the anonymous call and the results of her enquiries²⁹.

RUC - D/Con James CULLEN

McCORMICK facilitated the initial meeting between D/Con CULLEN and Roy GARLAND; CULLEN became aware that McGRATH was working in Kincora. CULLEN subsequently began briefing ACC MEHARG directly on the information gleaned from GARLAND re: McGRATH.

- **1st March 1974**- D/Con CULLEN was introduced to Roy GARLAND through Jim McCORMICK. GARLAND told CULLEN he had been interfered with by McGRATH and that McGRATH was working in Kincora³⁰. CULLEN was accompanied by D/Con DUFF at this meeting.
- **2nd March 1974**- D/Con CULLEN personally briefed ACC MEHARG on what he had been told by GARLAND re: McGRATH. MEHARG instructed CULLEN to further his enquiries and to report to him³¹.
- **21st March 1974**- D/Con CULLEN submitted a written report to ACC MEHARG based on information received from Roy GARLAND³². CULLEN also claims that he gave D/Con SCULLY sight of this report³³.

²⁷ Exhibit MJW1

²⁸ Statement of Mary Jane WILSON, 16/03/1982

²⁹ Paragraph 282, report by D/Supt HARRISON, Sussex Police

³⁰ Statements of D/Con CULLEN, 30/04/1980 and 19/06/1980

³¹ Statement of D/Con CULLEN, 30/04/1980

³² Exhibit DBE16

³³ Sussex Police Enquiry, Exhibit 7

Social Services – R 15, Kincora Resident

R 15 made two allegations that William McGRATH had indecently assaulted him. On the first occasion he told his parents and Joseph MAINS, who both subsequently informed Social Services. On the second occasion he reported it to his parents who, again, contacted Social Services. Three days after the second complaint was received, R 15 and his brother were removed from Kincora and returned to their parents. There is no evidence that the RUC were made aware of either complaint and no disciplinary action was taken against McGRATH.

- **17th May 1974** - Mrs [REDACTED] reported to her son's social worker (Sharon McCLEAN) that McGRATH had interfered with her son R 15 in Kincora. McCLEAN³⁴ raised this with her superior, NL 210. Sharon McCLEAN also discussed the allegation with Joseph MAINS, by phone, who confirmed that Mrs [REDACTED] had already complained to him directly. MAINS felt there was no truth in the allegations which he had discussed with Mr McGRATH.

Valerie SHAW

- **C. June 1974**- Valerie SHAW contacted D/Supt John GRAHAM, Head of Belfast CID. Made him aware of McGRATH's employment at Kincora. Although D/Supt GRAHAM was approaching retirement, he suggested that a police investigation would be carried out. GRAHAM says that he made CID Officers at Mountpottinger aware of SHAW's allegations; no police enquiry to date has been able to identify the Officer to whom GRAHAM passed SHAW's information³⁵.

RUC – Arrest of KIN 301, Kincora Resident

- **3rd July 1974** – KIN 301 was arrested for theft; this resulted in a follow-up search of his locker at the hostel by the RUC. Documents were discovered in the locker relating to Tara (one of which was written by McGRATH). KIN 301 refused to say where he had obtained the documents.

Social Services – R 15, Kincora Resident

- **16th September 1974** - Mrs [REDACTED] complained to Sharon McCLEAN for a second time, about McGRATH indecently assaulting her son, R 15. McCLEAN undertook to contact MAINS about this. Mr R 16 claims that a social worker in the Shankill Road office had asked him not to report the matter to police as she would be reporting it to her superiors³⁶. There is no evidence to suggest that this social worker did pass the complaint on to the police.
 - McGRATH confirmed that MAINS had spoken to him about this complaint. His rebuttal against this complaint was that he'd received a phone call from police suggesting he should wash the [REDACTED] children on their arrival in Kincora. McGRATH claimed he had washed R 15 and this would have been the nearest he'd have been to touching R 15³⁷.

³⁴ Statement of Sharon GREY, 27/02/1980

³⁵ Statements of John GRAHAM, 16/04/1980

³⁶ Statement of R 16, 30/03/1980

³⁷ Statement of D/Sgt ELLIOTT, 28/07/1980

- MAINS told police in 1980, that he had reported this allegation to Social Services and informed the other staff at Kincora of the allegation. This is confirmed by the other members of staff³⁸. As a result of the [REDACTED] complaints, both Social Services and other Kincora staff members were aware of allegations of inappropriate behaviour by William McGRATH towards residents.
- On learning of the [REDACTED] allegations from Sharon McCLEAN, [NL 210] dismissed them on the grounds that *“with the low level of credence I attached to Mrs [REDACTED] report and my expectation that the Officer in Charge of Kincora could be relied on, I did not require any further investigation once assurances that no sexual interference was occurring, had been given”*³⁹.
- **17th September 1974** – a meeting was held between [NL 210], Sharon McCLEAN (nee GREY) and Mrs [REDACTED].
- **20th September 1974** – as a result of the above meeting [R 15] and his brother, [KIN 224] were returned to their parents from Kincora.

Military Knowledge of Abuse in Kincora (Colin WALLACE)

John Colin WALLACE is a former member of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Information Policy Unit attached to HQNI between May 1968 and January 1975.

- **8th November 1974-** A Senior Military Intelligence Officer, Colin WALLACE, based at HQNI, alleges that he wrote a document *“TARA- Reports regarding Criminal Offences associated with the Homosexual Community in Belfast”*. WALLACE commented in his report on McGRATH’s homosexuality, employment in and his abuse of residents in Kincora. The report also refers to that abuse in Kincora was known about by Social Services in 1967 and that there had been repeated, unsuccessful, attempts to ‘expose’ Kincora by requesting the RUC investigate the abuse. The validity of this document remains questionable.

Social Services

- **1975** – James MAYBIN, Assistant Principal Social Worker, EHSSB became aware of a rumour at this time, circulating in social work circles, that MAINS was a homosexual. At the same time, MAYBIN also became aware of a further rumour that MAINS *“was sexually interfering with the boys in his custody at Kincora”*⁴⁰. MAYBIN told Sussex police that he did not recall passing on this information to any of his superiors or anyone else. MAYBIN had previously assisted MAINS in Kincora in 1966 for a period of five months.

Military Knowledge of Abuse in Kincora (Captain Brian GEMMELL)

Captain Brian GEMMELL was Officer Commanding in the 123 Section of 39th Infantry Brigade, based at HQNI between December 1974 and December 1976. GEMMELL had, at least, two sources of information reporting on TARA and William McGRATH, one of whom was Roy GARLAND.

³⁸ Statement of Elizabeth, SMYTH, 21/09/1982

³⁹ Statement of [NL 210], 28/02/1980

⁴⁰ Exhibit PJM1, C64/2/80

⁴¹ Statement of James MAYBIN, 24/09/1982

- **Summer 1975**- Through James McCORMICK, GEMMELL was introduced to Roy GARLAND who relayed to GEMMELL his allegations of homosexuality and abuse against McGRATH. GEMMELL was also made aware of McGRATH's employment in Kincora. There followed at least one other meeting between GEMMELL and GARLAND, including one at HQNI. GEMMELL claims that he passed on the information he had received from GARLAND to a senior MI5 official, as well as writing a four page Military Intelligence Source Report (MISR). Neither the alleged meeting between GEMMELL and Ian CAMERON (the MI5 officer) nor the report written by GEMMELL have been verified.

RUC - D/Con James CULLEN

- **January 1976** – GARLAND again met with CULLEN. GARLAND advised that a William MAGOWAN had been instrumental in getting McGRATH the job at Kincora⁴².
- **21st and 24th January 1976**- CULLEN states that he had two meetings with ACC MEHARG, who instructed him to continue with his enquiries. MEHARG was unable to recall these meetings but later accepted that this was "*probably accurate*"⁴³.

Liaison between RUC and Social Services re Kincora

The Mason File was shared for the first time with the police in 1976 when handed to D/Con CULLEN.

- **19th February 1976**- D/Con CULLEN met with Robert BUNTING (Assistant Director EHSSB) – CULLEN became aware for the first time of complaints of a homosexual nature against (other) Kincora staff. CULLEN informed BUNTING that he had information from an ex-student at QUB, that McGRATH was involved in a paramilitary organisation and homosexual activity. CULLEN told BUNTING that he thought that McGRATH's activities were outside of Kincora. BUNTING alleges that CULLEN "*implied that prominent members of the community were involved in his enquiry*"⁴⁴. At this meeting BUNTING confirmed to CULLEN that McGRATH worked at Kincora.

Social Services

- **24th February 1976** – [REDACTED] R 9 social worker, Hilary NEILL, was informed by Kincora staff of a "*homosexual incident*" involving [REDACTED] R 9 in Kincora. Although aware of the alleged homosexual incidents, Hilary NEILL did not discuss the matter with [REDACTED] R 9 as it would "*possibly unnecessarily upset and embarrass him*".⁴⁵
- **Feb/March 1976**- Marion REYNOLDS (Social worker) was contacted by Elizabeth FIDDIS (Health Visitor) and asked if she had any knowledge of Joseph MAINS being a homosexual. Mrs FIDDIS had picked this up from conversation in the house of an aunt/mother of an ex-Kincora resident. Mrs REYNOLDS did not have any knowledge but told Lorna McGRATH (Principal Social Worker) and Hilary REID (Senior Social Worker) of the conversation⁴⁶.

⁴² Statement of D/Con CULLEN, 30/04/1980

⁴³ Statement of William MEHARG, 22/04/1982

⁴⁴ Statement of Robert BUNTING, 10/03/1982

⁴⁵ Statement of Hilary NEILL 24/04/1980

⁴⁶ Statements of Marion REYNOLDS, 23/02/1982, Hilary REID, 26/02/1982 and Elizabeth FIDDIS, 09/03/1982

Liaison between RUC and Social Services re Kincora

- **15th March 1976**- BUNTING gave CULLEN a copy of the Mason File at a meeting, also in attendance was BUNTING's superior, Edward GILLILAND. BUNTING states that he also made Clive SCOLAR, District Social Services Officer, aware of CULLEN's enquiries and asked him to pass on any information which may assist the RUC. (GILLILAND claims that this is the first time he was aware of the Mason File and the allegations contained within). MEHARG asked CULLEN to obtain a copy of these papers but MEHARG denies ever receiving the Mason file and that he did not know the content of it.⁴⁷ This is the first noted receipt by the RUC of what was known as the Mason File.
- **1976** – Rev Martin SMYTH, having been approached by Valerie SHAW spoke to a Mr JACKSON in EHSSB to draw his attention to allegations against McGRATH; no trace has ever been made of Mr JACKSON⁴⁸. Despite enquiries, Mr JACKSON was never traced by police. A Mr JACKSON, however, is referred to in the prosecution file⁴⁹ re: Eric WITCHELL when WITCHELL was subject to a disciplinary hearing in "Mr JACKSON's office" on 31/05/1977.

Social Services – R 18, Kincora Resident

R 18 reported to his Social Worker and MAINS that McGRATH had indecently assaulted him.

- **16th August 1977** - **R 18** - Confided in his social worker, Anna HYLAND⁵⁰, that he had been indecently assaulted by McGRATH. HYLAND raised the matter with Joseph MAINS and was dissatisfied with his response. She reported this to her supervisor, Alan CHARD and a copy of her report was forwarded to Gordon HIGHAM (District Social Services Officer). HYLAND was also concerned that MAINS had failed to bring this to her attention as **R 18** had told her he had reported this to MAINS already.

Social Services – Richard KERR, Kincora Resident

- **September 1977- Richard KERR**- MAINS contacted KERR's Social Worker, Helen GOGARTY, as he was "mildly concerned"⁵¹ about KERR and wanted GOGARTY to speak with him. This she agreed to but was unable to meet with KERR prior to his arrest for burglary offences in October 1977 (see below). It is unclear what had prompted MAINS to make contact with GOGARTY.

Liaison between RUC and Social Services re Kincora – Richard KERR

Richard KERR's arrest in October 1977 and the subsequent involvement of D/Constable John SCULLY in his case, led the officer to become suspicious about a number of irregularities concerning Kincora. SCULLY shared these concerns with officials from Social Services.

- **C. October 1977** – David MORROW, Senior Social Worker was briefed by Helen GOGARTY, Social Worker to Richard KERR, re: concerns she had about Kincora, following a conversation she'd had with D/Con SCULLY. Subsequently MORROW met with SCULLY at Strandtown Police Station, where SCULLY raised his concerns over Kincora. These included an increase in criminality by Kincora

⁴⁷ Statement of William MEHARG, dated 22/04/1982

⁴⁸ Statement of Martin SMYTH, 16/04/1980

⁴⁹ Police Papers re: Eric WITCHELL.

⁵⁰ Statement of A HYLAND, 08/02/1980

⁵¹ Exhibit GC14, part of GC10

residents and concerns over “*some form of sexual activity between ... Joseph MAINS and some of the boys*”⁵².

- **C. October 1977** – Clive SCoulAR, District Social Services Officer, first became aware through HIGHAM that police in Strandtown were concerned about “*events*” at Kincora. This is confirmed in a handwritten note from HIGHAM to SCoulAR dated 02/10/77⁵³
 - *Known homosexual esp. [REDACTED] P’Burn*
 - *Preference for R KERR*
 - *Drinking sherry*
 - *RK – friends two middle aged males*
 - *Georgie WRAY / nights*
 - *Other people in police feel same*
 - *Social worker in Rathgael feels same*
 - *Discipline*

Social Services – Richard KERR and Stephen WARING, Kincora Resident

- **c. October 1977-** [REDACTED] **RG 241** (Social Worker for Stephen WARING) became aware that Richard KERR, while on remand for burglary offences in Rathgael, was giving strong hints that “*something irregular had been taking place at Kincora Hostel at the same time requesting visits from Joe MAINS*”.⁵⁴

Social Services – [REDACTED] **R 18**, Kincora Resident

- **12th October 1977** – Case Conference held to discuss [REDACTED] **R 18** and the allegations he had previously made, concerning McGRATH. In a follow-up report HIGHAM noted that what had happened between [REDACTED] **R 18** and McGRATH was “*questionable*” and concluded that “*nothing of a sexual nature had happened at any time*”. A decision was therefore taken that “*nothing should be said to Mr McGRATH*”⁵⁵.
- **20th October 1977** – SCoulAR wrote to HIGHAM commenting on the two differing reports in relation to [REDACTED] **R 18** allegations against McGRATH, as prepared by HYLAND and MAINS. SCoulAR added that “*the situation is further complicated by Mr MAINS’ reticence about freely discussing what goes on in Kincora with you [HIGHAM]*”⁵⁶.

Social Services

- **1st November 1977** – SCoulAR organised a meeting with Lorna McGRATH and HIGHAM to discuss his concerns about Kincora⁵⁷.
- **9th November 1977** – follow-on meeting from 1st November where it was decided that SCoulAR would raise the matter with Robert BUNTING, Assistant Director of EHSSB⁵⁸.

⁵² Statement of David MORROW, 13/02/1980

⁵³ Exhibit SGH6, part of GC1

⁵⁴ Statement of [REDACTED] **RG 241**, 15/02/1980

⁵⁵ Exhibit SGH1, part of GC1

⁵⁶ Exhibit SGH4, part of GC1

⁵⁷ Statement of Clive SCoulAR, 30/04/1980

⁵⁸ Statement of Clive SCoulAR, 30/04/1980

- **14th November 1977**
 - Meeting between SCoulAR, Lorna McGRATH, HIGHAM, **RG 241** (Rathgael Social Worker) and David MORROW. At this meeting the decision was taken to introduce a weekly monitoring system at Kincora to highlight only “*untoward daily events*”⁵⁹.
 - HIGHAM and SCoulAR went to Strandtown Police Station to meet with Sgt SILLERY, Juvenile Liaison Officer to discuss complaints re: Kincora.

Social Services – Richard KERR, Kincora Resident

- **25th November 1977** – After David MORROW had visited Richard KERR in Rathgael; he rang HIGHAM to relate his discussions with KERR. KERR told MORROW he’d been approached sexually by William McGRATH but had never had any sexual dealings with MAINS or SEMPLE⁶⁰.
- **5th December 1977** – meeting between D/Con SCULLY, D/Sgt SILLERY and Clive SCoulAR at SCoulAR’s office. At this meeting SCULLY outlined his suspicion re: the relationship between Richard KERR and MAINS⁶¹.

Social Services – **R 18**, Kincora Resident

- **6th January 1978** – **R 18** made an allegation to his social worker (Anna HYLAND) that MAINS had returned to the hostel quite drunk (which was a common occurrence at weekends). He then woke **R 18** up to ask him if he liked Kincora and was there anything wrong. HYLAND passed this information on to Gordon HIGHAM who agreed to speak to MAINS⁶².
- **Late 1978** – Judith HERRIOTT (Student Social Worker at QUB) read the Kincora file held at Purdysburn in which she noted that “*there were allegations of a homosexual nature against Mr McGRATH*”. Having previously been involved in **R 18** case, HERRIOTT spoke to Gordon HIGHAM re: this and was assured “*the matter had been thoroughly investigated and persons involved had been rigidly interviewed*”⁶³.

Social Services – Richard KERR, Kincora Resident

- **14th March 1979**- A report by Judith KENNEDY, Social Worker for Richard KERR re: finding KERR suitable accommodation on his release from Millisle Borstal was prepared. It noted that Kincora had been ruled out for KERR as it was “*apparently under investigation because of the warden’s alleged involvement with a homosexual circle*”. KENNEDY went on to say that the investigation had been going on for several years but that Kincora was still admitting boys⁶⁴.
- **c. 1979**- A Principal Social Worker, with responsibility for the Westwinds Children’s Home in Newtownards, Alan MORRIS, recalls being told by Gordon HIGHAM and David MORROW that Joseph MAINS was a homosexual and was believed to be having a homosexual relationship with one of the Kincora residents. Alan MORRIS ruled out Westwinds as a potential home for the Kincora resident, as “*the warden of Westwinds Hostel, Mr Trevor HILL, was regularly in touch by*

⁵⁹ Statement of Clive SCoulAR, 30/04/1980

⁶⁰ Exhibit SGH7, part of GC1

⁶¹ Statement of Clive SCoulAR, 30/04/1980

⁶² Exhibit GC35a, part of GC1

⁶³ Statement of Judith HERRIOTT, 06/02/1980

⁶⁴ Exhibit GC15, part of GC10

telephone with MAINS...I could not guarantee that the suspicions relating to MAINS would not be passed on to him [MAINS]⁶⁵".

- **December 1979-** Judith KENNEDY and Helen GOGARTY met socially but discussed their mutual interest in the Richard KERR case (both had been his social workers). Both were concerned about the homosexual activity Kincora between MAINS and some of the boys and decided to find a reliable journalist to investigate the matter.

Media Exposure

- **24th January 1980-** Peter McKENNA publishes article in the Irish Independent which began the public interest in Kincora⁶⁶.

Action by Social Services⁶⁷

- **4th March 1980** – MAINS, SEMPLE and McGRATH received precautionary suspension notices; served on them by Clive SCOULAR.

⁶⁵ Statement of William Alan MORRIS, 23/09/1982

⁶⁶ Article entitled "*Sex Racket at Children's Home*", Irish Independent, 24/01/1980

⁶⁷ Statement of Edward GILLILAND, dated 15/05/1980

RESTRICTED

Kincora – Exhibit GC3

Person Profile – Joseph MAINS

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

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1.0 Introduction

This profile on Joseph MAINS is part of a wider strategic review of all Kincora-related material held by the PSNI. Similar profiles on the two other convicted Kincora staff have also been prepared.

2.0 Background

Joseph MAINS was the Warden of Kincora Boys' Hostel from 1958 until he was suspended from duty in March 1980. At his trial in December 1981, MAINS pleaded guilty to six charges of homosexual abuse (buggery x2, gross indecency x3 and indecent assault x1) against four Kincora residents and was sentenced to six years imprisonment. During sentencing, the Judge, Lord Chief Justice LOWRY, justified the length of MAINS' sentence by stating that he had had a *“very responsible position where the welfare including the moral welfare of these boys was entrusted to him”*¹.

Joseph MAINS served half his sentence and was released from prison in December 1984.

3.0 Methodology and Information Sources

This profile has been prepared using a variety of sources of information, including the material contained in the RUC investigations into Kincora (1980 & 1982), the Sussex Police Review and associated police files². Open source research was also undertaken and is referenced accordingly.

This profile has been written with an assumed knowledge on the part of the reader in relation to 'Kincora' and some of the key individuals involved.

4.0 Key Findings

- Joseph MAINS abused boys for more than 20 years; the earliest known allegation against MAINS dates back to the mid-1950s, prior to his employment in Kincora.
- MAINS abused boys in his care both physically and sexually.
- Joseph MAINS knew that both Raymond SEMPLE and William McGRATH were abusing Kincora residents, but failed to take any action against either man.
- MAINS referred to himself as bi-sexual; he had long term relationships with both men and women during his adult life.
- Allegations of abuse against MAINS were made by Kincora residents to Social Services from 1967; no disciplinary action was ever taken against MAINS.
- There is no evidence, in the material viewed by the authors, to support the allegation that MAINS had facilitated prominent figures in Northern Ireland by operating a vice ring centred on Kincora.
- Joseph MAINS continued long-term homosexual relationships with, at least, three former Kincora residents.

5.0 Personal Details

Name: Joseph MAINS

Date of Birth: 31st July 1929

¹ Sentence of the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Lowry), Belfast Crown Court, 16th December 1981

² RUC Crime files C64/2/80 & C64/2/80 (1982)



Date of Death: 19th January 2003

Last Known Address: [REDACTED]

Employment history:

Ironturner (location and dates unknown)

Purdysburn Fever Hospital (dates unknown)

Custody Photo: Joseph MAINS

Park Lodge Boys' Home, Assistant to Housemother (01/01/1956 – early 1957)

Williamson House, Antrim Road (Employed for one week in late 1950s)

Abbeydene Old People's Home, Attendant (18/02/1957 – January 1958)

Kincora Boys' Hostel, Officer in Charge (January 1958 – suspension on 04/03/1980)

Interests/ Hobbies:

Joseph MAINS was a member of the **St John's Ambulance** for a number of years and knew Raymond SEMPLE through their mutual association with this organisation. MAINS collected boys from Williamson House [and possibly other children's homes] to attend St John's Ambulance Brigade meetings³.

Joseph MAINS was known to frequent a number of different bars and hotels, particularly in the vicinity of Kincora, including the **Harland and Wolff Social Club**. He and Raymond SEMPLE were honorary members of the H&W Social Club due to "*their work with children*"⁴.

6.0 [REDACTED] BAR 1

6.1 [REDACTED] BAR 1 and Joseph MAINS

[REDACTED] BAR 1 first met Joseph MAINS when she was 26 (c.1961) at a (Belfast Welfare) Summer Camp in Portstewart. [REDACTED] BAR 1 was at the camp to accompany Bawnmore residents⁵.

[REDACTED] BAR 1 described MAINS as her "*steady boyfriend*"⁶; the couple got engaged in the late 1970s.

[REDACTED] BAR 1 suggested, to police, that their relationship amounted to no more than social outings at weekends, however it appears that their relationship was more serious. [REDACTED] BAR 1 and MAINS shared a house together and had planned to marry.

[REDACTED] BAR 1 and MAINS' social circle appears to have been largely centred around MAINS' family- his siblings and their spouses. [REDACTED] BAR 1 also mentions that she accompanied MAINS to functions with Raymond SEMPLE and [REDACTED] R 2.

³ Statement of Sgt D ELLIOTT 19/08/82 re interview of MAINS 31/04/1982

⁴ Statement of [REDACTED] 02/02/1983

⁵ Information provided by [REDACTED] BAR 1 during interview 23/06/2000

⁶ Statement of [REDACTED] BAR 1 01/04/1982

Joseph MAINS was the only Kincora staff member to work there from its opening in 1958 until 1980 when the Kincora case broke in the media. All 309 boys who entered Kincora would have done so when Joseph MAINS was the Warden in Charge.

7.2 'Father figure'

A number of Kincora residents, in their police statements, referred positively to MAINS, viewing him as a 'father figure' to them, or someone they could confide in¹⁴.

8.0 Abuse by MAINS in Kincora

8.1 Sexual Abuse

Research confirms that MAINS began his abuse of Kincora residents almost as soon as the Hostel opened. His earliest known victims had been residents in Kincora in the late 1950s and early 1960s. MAINS' abuse of boys in his care continued until 1980.

At his 1981 trial, Joseph MAINS was convicted of six charges of indecent assault, gross indecency and buggery against four Kincora residents- [R 7], [R 2], [KIN 380] and [R 9]. MAINS was not convicted for offences against a further three former Kincora residents - [R 1], [KIN 1] and [R 5]. A number of other former Kincora residents made complaints against Joseph MAINS, for which charges were never brought before Court.

MAINS used a number of MOs in his sexual abuse of boys in his care, these included:

- Indecently assaulting victims during trips in his own car
- Ordering victims to massage his back
- Bringing victims to his own home (in the pretext of getting them to do manual work for him)
- Taking victims to bars/hotels and getting them drunk before returning to Kincora and sexually assaulting them
- Threatened victims with physical violence if they did not comply with MAINS' sexual demands
- Consoling victims who were emotionally vulnerable before sexually abusing them.

8.2 Long term 'relationships' with Kincora Residents

- [R 2]

[R 2] and Joseph MAINS had a 20 year homosexual relationship, which began when [R 2] was a resident in Kincora and continued until just before MAINS' arrest in 1980. It appears

¹⁴ Richard KERR, [R 4], [KIN 20] and [KIN 59]

that the relationship between **R 2** and MAINS was widely known amongst many Kincora residents, some of whom recalled seeing **R 2** visit MAINS in Kincora and remember him staying overnight in MAINS' accommodation in the hostel.

MAINS brought **R 2** on social outings, at times, together with MAINS' girlfriend and family.

- **Hugh QUINN**

Hugh QUINN and Joseph MAINS had a 20 year relationship, which began when QUINN was a resident in Kincora and lasted until just before MAINS' arrest in 1980. Their relationship continued after QUINN left Kincora, and Northern Ireland, to live in London. QUINN returned to stay in Kincora on his visits to Belfast and MAINS travelled to London to stay with QUINN.

- **R 4**

R 4 and MAINS continued to have sex after **R 4** left Kincora in 1966 until late 1979. **R 4** made a number of return visits to Kincora to visit MAINS.

8.3 Corporal Punishment

The official guidelines regarding Children in Residential Care, was that corporal punishment was not allowed as a form of punishment, discipline was to be achieved through *“personal relationships, by way of example, and when necessary, by withdrawing privileges”*.¹⁵

A number of former residents told police that MAINS had physically abused them during their time in Kincora. MAINS admitted that he had used a cane as physical punishment, including on **R 5** after he had gone to complain about MAINS to the Welfare.¹⁶

9.0 The Mason File

Three Kincora residents made separate complaints to Social Services between 1967 and 1971 against Joseph MAINS. MAINS was interviewed on several occasions by staff from the Belfast Welfare Authority and, following the completion of enquiries, a consolidated file was compiled by Henry MASON, City Welfare Officer and presented to the Town Solicitor (John YOUNG) in August 1971. Despite the file having a recommendation that the matter be passed to the RUC, there is no evidence that police were made aware of the nature of the complaints against MAINS at this time. Indeed, it is believed that the Mason File was not handed to the RUC until 1976.

10.0 Richard KERR

Richard KERR was a Kincora resident between 1975 and 1977. KERR features prominently in the Kincora 'story' as there were concerns over KERR's 'relationship' with MAINS that prompted his social workers to contact Peter McKENNA of the Irish Independent in late 1979. McKENNA went on to publish the article in his newspaper in January 1980 which exposed the Kincora scandal. A number of other individuals,¹⁷ who knew KERR through their professional involvement in his care,

¹⁵ Statement of Robert BUNTING, 13/05/1980

¹⁶ Statement of D/I McClure 20/08/1980 re interview of J MAINS 01/04/1980

¹⁷ See statements of D/Con J SCULLY, Sgt G SILLERY, H GOGARTY, R CONWAY, J SWANN, R MOORE, W MORRIS

welfare and criminal apprehension, mention in their police statements concerns over what they suspected to be an inappropriate relationship between KERR and Joe MAINS.

KERR had been arrested in October 1977 for a series of burglaries. Whilst in police custody his demands to have MAINS come and visit him raised concerns amongst officers involved in the case. KERR became “*livid with rage*” after MAINS refused to visit him and he threatened to “*tell all*” if MAINS did not appear. Whilst in Rathgael, KERR continued to ask for MAINS to visit him [which he did on two occasions]¹⁸.

In his statement, William MORRIS, a former social worker¹⁹ clearly spells out the suspicions highlighted above, “... *it was suspected that Joseph MAINS, the Warden of Kincora, was homosexual and believed to be having a homosexual relationship with the boy [KERR] and for the latter’s protection it was necessary that alternative accommodation be found*”.

11.0 MAINS’ homosexuality

MAINS’ 1981 psychiatric assessment noted that he was a long-standing homosexual who had had “*a considerable number of homosexual partners*”²⁰. MAINS’ medical examination²¹, following his arrest in April 1980, confirmed that he had been involved in homosexual activity.

As well as the homosexual relationships he had with former Kincora residents, MAINS had a homosexual encounter with [REDACTED] S 1, a Welfare Officer attached to Bawnmore. [REDACTED] S 1 was the subject of a police investigation into alleged abuse at Bawnmore Children’s Home²².

Although no other homosexual partners have been identified, it is possible that MAINS had others during his adult life. According to Hugh QUINN²³, MAINS often frequented known homosexual establishments in Belfast.

12.0 MAINS’ Alcohol Abuse

Several²⁴ of the boys noted in their police statements that MAINS frequently smelt of alcohol and commented that he was drunk on duty on numerous occasions. He was known to regularly frequent pubs and bars, particularly in the Ballyhackamore area of East Belfast.

When interviewed by the RUC, MAINS claimed that his drinking was caused by the long hours, lack of assistance and no holidays during the first few years he worked in Kincora. MAINS further rationalised his homosexuality, claiming that “*when I had drink taken I realised that I had a bi-sexual problem*”²⁵. During questioning by police²⁶, MAINS repeatedly legitimised his homosexual abuse, claiming that sexual intercourse only occurred after he had consumed quantities of alcohol.

¹⁸ Two letters sent to Mr MAINS from R KERR dated 28/12/1977 and 09/01/1978

¹⁹ Statement of William MORRIS, 23/09/1982

²⁰ Psychiatric Report on Mr Joseph MAINS, 45 Comber Road, Belfast on 26th November 1981

²¹ Statement of Dr IRWIN, 17/07/1980

²² See RUC Crime File C64/41/1982

²³ Statement of H QUINN, 26/03/82, [REDACTED], 27/03/1980

²⁴ Statement of [REDACTED], 27/03/1980

²⁵ Statement of J MAINS, 01/04/1980

²⁶ Statement of D/S MIDDLEMISS, 13/05/1980

13.0 Knowledge of abuse in Kincora by other staff

Contemporaneously to it occurring, MAINS knew that both Raymond SEMPLE and William McGRATH were sexually abusing Kincora residents.

14.0 Relationship with Raymond SEMPLE

Raymond SEMPLE and Joseph MAINS appear to have had a long standing friendship for many years prior to becoming work colleagues in Kincora, and are believed to have met through their voluntary work with the St. John's Ambulance.

Having previously volunteered in Kincora with MAINS, SEMPLE successfully applied for the post of Deputy Warden in 1964; indeed MAINS' influence ensured SEMPLE's reappointment in 1969.

Outside of work, the two men often socialised together in various bars and hostelrys in East Belfast and beyond. They were both honorary members of the Harland & Wolff Social Club due to "their work with children"²⁷. Raymond SEMPLE was also known to socialise with members of the wider MAINS family, including **BAR 1**.

On two consecutive Easter holidays in the early 1960s, Raymond SEMPLE and Joseph MAINS went on a tour of Ireland together, accompanied by [former] Kincora residents Hugh QUINN and **R 2**. It is unclear if **R 2** and QUINN were residents or had left Kincora at the time of these trips. **OV 7** (friend of MAINS²⁸) also went on these trips.

Both MAINS and SEMPLE were asked by police if they had had a homosexual relationship with each other at any stage; both men denied this.

15.0 Relationship with William McGRATH

Joseph MAINS did not know William McGRATH prior to him starting work in Kincora in 1971. Their relationship appears to have been formal and cold, "he [McGRATH] wasn't the sort of man you could mix with, he kept himself aloof from the staff"²⁹. MAINS also described McGRATH as being "a family man devoted to his wife, a Christian man who attended Church every Sunday"³⁰. MAINS also knew of McGRATH's involvement in unionist politics, notably TARA and the Orange Order³¹.

Shortly after McGRATH had started working in Kincora, MAINS raised concerns over McGRATH's work during an Inspection visit by the Welfare Department³². Subsequently, MAINS knew of the two anonymous calls to both the police and Social Services about McGRATH (in May 1973 and January 1974), and many of the complaints made against McGRATH by some Kincora residents.

Joseph MAINS appears to have had known of the bitter feud between Roy GARLAND and William McGRATH, from the early 1970s.

²⁷ Statement of **OV 7**, 02/02/1983

²⁸ Statement of H QUINN, 26/03/1982

²⁹ Statement of D/S J MIDDLEMISS, 13/05/80 re interview with J MAINS 01/04/1980

³⁰ Statement of D/I McClURE, 20/05/80 re interview with J MAINS 01/04/1980

³¹ Statement of D/S J MIDDLEMISS, 13/05/80 re interview with J MAINS 01/04/1980

³² Exhibit MJW1, part of C64/2/80

16.0 MAINS' links to the RUC

Joseph MAINS served for 2 periods in the Ulster Special Constabulary ('B Specials'):

- 12/1/1948-2/5/1949 stationed at Willowfield
- 2/10/1957- 14/9/1958 stationed at Glenravel Street.

MAINS resigned from the USC shortly after he took up the role of Warden in Kincora, citing "*existing conditions of employment*³³" as preventing him from performing specified duties as required.

17.0 MAINS' mental state post arrest on 1st April 1980

Following MAINS' arrest on 1st April 1980, his custody record stated that he had required constant supervision as he had suicidal tendencies. MAINS' medical record on arrest also showed that he was on medication for 'nerves' and anxiety.

In the Psychiatric assessment of MAINS carried out in November 1981³⁴, he was noted as being suicidal and in a depressive and very anxious state. MAINS had been receiving treatment for his anxiety but therapy had not been successful.

³³ Exhibit 21, Sussex Review 20/09/1958

³⁴ Psychiatric Report on Joseph MAINS, 26/11/1981, prepared by E.C. O'GORMAN, Dept. of Mental Health, EHSSB

RESTRICTED

Kincora – Exhibit GC4

Person Profile – William McGRATH

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

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1.0 Introduction

This profile on William McGRATH is part of a wider strategic review of all Kincora-related material held by the PSNI. Similar profiles on the two other convicted Kincora staff have also been prepared. This profile should be considered in conjunction with a number of other key analytical reports, including the Person Profiles on Valerie SHAW and Roy GARLAND.

2.0 Background

William McGRATH was arrested on 1st April 1980 for alleged homosexual activities at Kincora Boys' Hostel where he had been employed as a Housefather since June 1973. During his police interview, McGRATH vehemently denied all accusations put to him by the RUC relating to his involvement in homosexuality and abuse.

Prior to the trial of the three Kincora staff on the 16/12/1981, McGRATH changed his plea to guilty and was convicted of 15 counts of buggery, gross indecency and indecent assault (on 11 Kincora residents). He was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment but served only half of his sentence.

3.0 Methodology and Sources of Information

This profile has been prepared using a variety of sources of information, though most notably has relied on the material contained in the RUC investigations into Kincora (1980 & 1982), the Sussex Police Review and associated police files¹. Open source research was also undertaken and is referenced where appropriate in this report.

This profile has been written with an assumed knowledge, on the part of the reader, in relation to 'Kincora' and some of the key individuals involved.

4.0 Key Points

- William McGRATH was a long-standing homosexual.
- Although a married man, McGRATH had extra- marital, exploitative, sexual 'relationships' with others (male and female); most of whom were usually significantly younger than McGRATH.
- McGRATH formed a number of organisations, including Faith House, TARA and Ireland's Heritage Lodge from which he selected young men who would become victims of his political, sexual and financial exploitation. None of these victims have ever made a formal complaint against McGRATH to police.
- McGRATH first came to the notice of the RUC in 1966 through his involvement in rallies and demonstrations organised by Rev. Ian PAISLEY.
- McGRATH began abusing boys in Kincora soon after he began working there.
- As it was happening, Kincora staff and social workers were told directly by some of the victims of McGRATH's sexual abuse in Kincora.
- The RUC were aware of McGRATH's homosexuality and employment in May 1973.

¹ RUC Crime files C64/2/80, C64/2/80 (1982), C64/5/83 and C64/22/85

5.0 Personal Details

Name: William 'Billy' Worthington McGRATH

Date of Birth: 11th December 1916

Date of Death: 12th December 1991

Last Address: [REDACTED]

Previous Addresses:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Employment history: Kincora Boys' Hostel, Housefather
(22/6/1971-March 1980)

Clerk, Estate Agents (1970/1971)

Carpet importer, 'Carpets Beautiful'

Additional Information: Founder of TARA, Lay Preacher, Young Peoples Christian Fellowship, Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade (Gen. Secretary); close connections with British Israelites.²


6.0 The McGRATH Family

6.1 William McGRATH

William McGRATH was born in 1916 and was brought up in the York Road area of Belfast, although his family originally came from Bleary, Co. Armagh. McGRATH was a married man with three children.

William McGRATH had no known formal educational qualifications; he had previously trained as a hairdresser/masseur pre Second World War.

Following McGRATH's medical examination in April 1980, the Doctor concluded that *"this man [McGRATH] had engaged in homosexual activity probably for some considerable time...The particular tremor observed in the right leg and the apparent sexual stimulation when handling his penis would indicate a high degree of homosexual activity..."*³



Custody Photo: William McGRATH

² The British Israelite Movement believe they are descended from the original Israelites and see themselves as the chosen people of Christ. William McGRATH was believed to be the Irish representative of the British Israelites.

³ Report by Dr. R.B. IRWIN following his medical examination of William McGRATH, on the 02/04/1980

7.0 Exploitation and Sexual Abuse by McGrath of Individuals pre Kincora

7.1 Faith House

The McGRATH home in Finaghy was a large mansion, named 'Faith House'. The McGRATH's provided accommodation for individuals to stay with them and their family, often for prolonged periods of time. There are suggestions that William McGRATH may have sexually and/or psychologically abused some of those who lodged with the McGRATH family. The Rev. Martin SMYTH told police⁴ that he had heard rumours of McGRATH's homosexuality dating back to the 1950s when he lived in Faith House, Finaghy.

William McGRATH was never charged with any offences outside Kincora and no known complaints were ever made to police by McGRATH'S lodgers, however research for this profile suggests that McGRATH may have abused other individuals at Faith House.

8.0 Ireland's Heritage Lodge LOL 1303

McGRATH was a longstanding member of the Orange Order, holding prominent roles, including acting as chaplain in the private member's lodge, the Fernhill Orange Lodge. Following a split in the Orange Order in the late 1960s, William McGRATH, along with others (including his son, Worthington) formed a new private lodge, 'Oidhreacht Eireann' (Ireland's Heritage) LOL 1303 who argued that the Irish language and Gaelic culture were not the exclusive property of Catholics or republicans. Apart from the McGRATHs, notable members included Clifford SMYTH, Roy GARLAND, Frank MILLAR and John McKEAGUE.

During the RUC investigations into Kincora, William McGRATH remained an important figure in his Orange Lodge and in October 1981 was re-elected as Secretary.

From his prison cell in January 1982, McGrath wrote to the Secretary of Ireland's Heritage Lodge (LOL 1303) tendering his resignation; this was rejected and instead a motion of expulsion was passed. Worthington McGrath was present at this meeting. The Lodge was disbanded the following month, with the membership deciding that its name was too tainted by its association with McGrath to continue. Following his release from prison in December 1983, McGRATH attempted to regain his membership of the Orange Order but was vetoed consistently in his attempts. h was one of three former

9.0 Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade (CFCIEC)

William McGRATH founded the above in 1941, which operated out of Faith House. It was described as a pro-Loyalist organisation which warned of the onslaught threatening Ulster Protestantism. It appears that when McGRATH first became of interest to the RUC in 1966, he was listed as the Secretary of the Christian Fellowship and Irish Emancipation Crusade.

McGRATH'S Christian Fellowship later transformed into the quasi -paramilitary organisation TARA.

⁴ Statement of Rev. M SMYTH, 03/06/1982

10.0 TARA

TARA (named after the ancient seat of the high kings of Ireland) was formed in the late 1960s by a breakaway group of Young Unionists and senior Orangemen, led by William McGRATH. McGRATH chose the name 'TARA' to reflect his belief in Irish heritage; the movement was virulently anti-Catholic and supported the ethos of the British Israelites. Members considered themselves to be the elite of all Protestant organisations. TARA's strapline was 'The Hard Core of Protestant Resistance-Resistance with Responsibility'.

Potential members were carefully selected and underwent a vetting process before being allowed to join. There is also information to suggest that McGRATH and other TARA members may have travelled to Amsterdam to secure financial support and gain access to weapons.

When the Troubles began, TARA became much more militant in its outlook and began discussing the possibility of procuring arms, developed a more formal approach, in terms of leadership, structure and financial income. There was also a short-lived alliance with the UVF.

TARA appeared to diminish in terms of its presence and numbers by the mid to late 1970s, although they continued to maintain a profile in parts of Northern Ireland by the time McGRATH was released from prison in 1983.

Information gleaned from several of the police statements from previous Kincora investigations⁵ suggests that William McGRATH may have tried to involve, or worse, recruit, some of the Kincora residents under his care, into TARA. In 1974, a Kincora resident, [REDACTED] KIN 301, was arrested and a subsequent search of his locker in the Home uncovered documents relating to TARA.

[REDACTED] KIN 301 refused to say where he had obtained these documents, although one was noted as having been written by William McGRATH⁶. Joseph MAINS told police⁷ that McGRATH used to hand out TARA leaflets in Kincora.

11.0 Employment in Kincora

On the 22nd June 1971, aged 54, William McGRATH began working in Kincora as Housefather. Joseph MAINS was the Warden and Raymond SEMPLE Assistant Warden. William McGRATH had had no previous experience working in a children's home and had no formal relevant qualifications to lend himself to the post. In his application for the post, McGRATH referred to a "*lifetime involvement in Church/Social work*".⁸

11.1 McGRATH's Relationship with other Kincora Staff

Prior to William McGRATH starting work in Kincora in 1971, neither Joseph MAINS nor Raymond SEMPLE appear to have known him; SEMPLE described McGRATH as being "*a complete stranger*".⁹

⁵ Statements from [REDACTED] KIN 176, [REDACTED] KIN 301 and [REDACTED]

⁶ RUC Report "Brief Outline of the organisation known as TARA and some of its principle members, for the information of C1(A)", dated 04/02/1980.

⁷ Statement of D/S J MIDDLEMISS, 13/05/1980 re interview with J MAINS 01/04/1980

⁸ Paragraph 3.19, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Children's Homes and Hostels

⁹ Statement of D/Sgt WA GRAHAM, 20/05/1980 re interview with R SEMPLE on 01/04/1980

The relationship between the Kincora Warden, MAINS and McGRATH seems to have been formal and cold, “*he [McGRATH] wasn’t the sort of man you could mix with, he kept himself aloof from the staff¹⁰*”. MAINS also described McGRATH as being “*a family man devoted to his wife, a Christian man who attended Church every Sunday¹¹*”.

Shortly after McGRATH had started working in Kincora, MAINS raised concerns over McGRATH’s work during an Inspection visit by the Welfare Department¹².

Both MAINS and SEMPLE had suspicions about McGRATH and when questioned by police on their arrest in April 1980, both men admitted to having direct knowledge of McGRATH’s abuse of some Kincora residents. However, both MAINS and SEMPLE confirmed that neither confronted McGRATH in person about the abuse allegations (see below).

12.0 Reports of Abuse against William McGRATH whilst working in Kincora

An anonymous call to the RUC in **May 1973** (later claimed by Roy GARLAND) was the first report to Authorities that McGRATH was a homosexual and an abuser of young boys. The contents of the call were investigated by the RUC and written off as a malicious call.

On the **24th January 1974** Social Services staff in the Hollywood Road office received an anonymous phonecall (again later claimed by GARLAND) during which it was claimed, amongst other things, that McGRATH had made ‘*improper suggestions*’ to Kincora boys and that he had gone to work there for that purpose. Senior Social Workers investigated the contents of the call, including speaking to McGRATH and MAINS, and concluded that there was no truth in the allegations.

In **March 1974**, D/Con James CULLEN, RUC, met Roy GARLAND who told him that William McGRATH was a homosexual who exploited young men (including GARLAND) and was working in Kincora. CULLEN immediately reported what he had been told to ACC MEHARG.

In **May 1974**, a Kincora resident, **R 15**, complained to his **social worker** that he had been indecently assaulted by William McGRATH. The social worker discussed the complaint with MAINS and her superior; no action was taken against McGRATH.

In **June 1974** D/Supt. John GRAHAM (then Head of RUC CID in Belfast) was told by Valerie SHAW that William McGRATH was a homosexual, who had previously tried to sexually exploit young boys and that he was working in Kincora.

A second complaint by **R 15**, against William McGRATH, was made to his **social worker** in **September 1974**. Following investigations by Social Services, including speaking to MAINS, both **R 15** and his brother were released from Kincora and returned home.

In **August 1977**, a Kincora resident, **R 18**, complained to his **social worker**, that he had been indecently assaulted by William McGRATH. Social Services concluded that **R 18** allegations were ‘questionable’; McGRATH was not spoken to and no action taken.

¹⁰ Statement of D/S J MIDDLEMISS, 13/05/1980 re interview with J MAINS 01/04/1980

¹¹ Statement of D/I McCLURE, 20/05/1980 re interview with J MAINS 01/04/1980

¹² Exhibit MJW1, part of C64/2/80

Whilst on remand in Rathgael in **November 1977**, Kincora resident Richard KERR told a **social worker** that he had been indecently assaulted by William McGRATH during his time in Kincora. No further action was taken following KERR's allegation.

13.0 McGRATH's MO in abuse of Kincora residents

At his trial in 1981, McGRATH was found guilty of 15 counts of buggery, gross indecency and indecent assault against 11 former Kincora residents.

The most common MO used by McGRATH was to indecently assault Kincora residents by touching them under their bedclothes as he woke them in the morning.

McGRATH also 'operated' by instilling a sense of fear amongst his victims, some of whom described being "*scared stiff*"¹³ of him. McGRATH was disliked by most of the Kincora residents who spoke to police.

In many instances of abuse, McGRATH isolated his victim from other residents, usually waiting until the Hostel was empty before committing the sexual abuse.

McGRATH was also accused of abusing two of the Kincora residents together¹⁴.

14.0 William McGRATH and Roy GARLAND

Aged 15, Roy GARLAND first met William McGRATH in 1955 when McGRATH was addressing a religious meeting in north Belfast. GARLAND was subsequently invited to attend a meeting in Faith House, Finaghy (McGRATH'S home) in December 1955. There followed a 'relationship' between the two men which lasted almost 20 years. GARLAND was one of a small number of young men who were intrinsically linked to most aspects of McGRATH's life (in GARLAND's case from 1955 until the early 1970s). Unlike some of the other young men, GARLAND did not lodge with the McGRATH family but he was a regular visitor to the McGRATH home, holidayed with them on more than one occasion, was a senior officer in TARA and had a number of sexual encounters with William McGRATH.

GARLAND told Jim McCORMICK¹⁵ (an Evangelical missionary known to both GARLAND and McGRATH) that he had introduced at least 20 other boys to McGRATH during the 1960s and who may have also been 'exploited' by him [McGRATH].

From 1971, Roy GARLAND began a concerted 'campaign' to expose William McGRATH as a homosexual who had exploited and manipulated GARLAND and a number of individuals (mostly young men) sexually, politically and financially¹⁶.

¹³ Statement of R GRAHAM, 05/03/1980

¹⁴ Statement of **R 17**, 05/03/1980

¹⁵ Statement of WJMCK McCORMICK, 10/03/1982

¹⁶ In May 1973, GARLAND made a phonecall to the RUC in which he made a number of allegations against William McGRATH, including the fact that he exploited boys sexually, politically and financially.

15.0 McGRATH and Revd Dr Ian PAISLEY

William McGRATH and Ian PAISLEY had [largely political] connections dating back to the mid 1960s; McGRATH appeared on the platform at one of PAISLEY's Ulster Hall rallies in 1966.

Although William McGRATH was not a member of PAISLEY's DUP or a member of his Martyr's Memorial Congregation, some of those most closely linked to McGRATH during the 1960s and 70s were also strongly aligned to PAISLEY; these individuals included Clifford SMYTH, James HEYBURN and David BROWNE. Two of William McGRATH's children, were married by PAISLEY in Martyr's Memorial Church. William McGRATH used the halls attached to Martyr's Memorial for meetings of his Orange Lodge.

A former associate of McGRATH, [REDACTED] UDR Captain N, told police that he had gone to PAISLEY in the late 1960s with his concerns over McGRATH's homosexuality and the appropriateness of his relationship with two of PAISLEY's close allies, Clifford SMYTH and David BROWNE. PAISLEY did not confirm [REDACTED] UDR Captain N account.

Valerie SHAW, a former employee of the Martyr's Memorial Church, claims that she approached PAISLEY in October 1973 to tell him of the allegations being levelled against William McGRATH by Roy GARLAND. PAISLEY met GARLAND in person in January 1974 and was again told of McGRATH's homosexuality and attempts to corrupt GARLAND. PAISLEY is alleged to have asked GARLAND to confront McGRATH about his accusations; GARLAND refused to do so.

SHAW claims that between October 1973 and the summer of 1974 she made repeated efforts to raise McGRATH with PAISLEY but became exacerbated with his inaction and resigned from the Church in June 1975.

Valerie SHAW asked Rev. Martin SMYTH to speak to PAISLEY and for both men to "*discipline*"¹⁸ William McGRATH. SMYTH claims he spoke with PAISLEY on the matter but that no further action took place against McGRATH. PAISLEY denies this.

Rev. PAISLEY told police that Valerie SHAW had approached him about McGRATH and that he did meet with him but that he could not put SHAW's allegations to him as "*she had no proof to offer*"¹⁹.

Despite being made aware of McGRATH's homosexuality and exploitation of young men from a number of sources, from the late 1960s, PAISLEY did not act on the corroborated information he had.

16.0 McGRATH post-conviction

William McGRATH served half of his four-year sentence and was released from prison in December 1983 to an address in Ballyhalbert. He lived there with his wife [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] until his death on the 12th January 1991 from liver and pancreatic cancer.


There is information to suggest that post-conviction he continued to be involved in TARA.

¹⁷ Statements of [REDACTED] UDR Captain N, 30/07/1980, 06/04/1982 and 19/05/1982

¹⁸ Statement of Rev Martin SMYTH, 16/04/1980

¹⁹ Statement of Rev. PAISLEY, 07/06/1980

Appendix A – William McGRATH Chart



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Kincora – Exhibit GC5

Person Profile – William Robert GARLAND

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

1. Introduction

This Person Profile is part of the ongoing strategic analysis of the Kincora related material, held by the PSNI.

2. Sources of Information/Methodology

A number of documents (statements and exhibits) contained within the Kincora-related material held by police were used to prepare this report and are referenced accordingly. Open source research was also undertaken and the results are also referenced within this report.

There is assumed knowledge, on the part of the reader, as to other individuals and key events which are referred to in this Profile relating to both Roy GARLAND and Kincora, in more general terms.

3. Background

William Robert 'Roy' GARLAND was born in the Shankill Road area of Belfast in 1940. He was raised in a working-class family who had strongly-held evangelical values and close ties to unionist politics and the Orange Order.

From an early age, GARLAND's life was centred on his Christian beliefs and associations with various religious groups. He met his future wife, [REDACTED], through a Christian fellowship organisation.

Roy GARLAND attended Bible College in Maidenhead in the early 1960s and went on to graduate as a Mature Student from Queen's University, Belfast in the 1970s. He became a teacher and lecturer. In 2016, Roy GARLAND is a journalist, author, political commentator and businessman¹.

4. Roy GARLAND and Kincora

Roy GARLAND is a key individual into the protracted history of abuse in Kincora. **GARLAND was never a resident in Kincora and there are no records to suggest he ever visited the Hostel.**

In the 1970s, prior to the 'scandal' being exposed publically (via the article in the Irish Independent in January 1980), GARLAND made repeated attempts to reveal McGRATH as a homosexual abuser of young boys to, amongst others, the RUC, British Army, Social Services, church ministers and politicians. GARLAND did not make any allegations of homosexuality or abuse against the other Kincora staff (MAINS and SEMPLE); his knowledge of McGRATH pre dated his employment in Kincora. In the mid 1970s, many of the accusations and rumours circulating about McGRATH and Kincora originated from the account of Roy GARLAND. See Section 6 below.

5. Roy GARLAND and William McGRATH

Aged 15, Roy GARLAND first met William McGRATH in 1955 when McGRATH was addressing a religious meeting in north Belfast. GARLAND was subsequently invited to attend a meeting in Faith House, Finaghy (McGRATH'S home) in December 1955. There followed a 'relationship' between the two men which lasted almost 20 years.

GARLAND was one of a small number of young men who were intrinsically linked to most aspects of McGRATH's life (in GARLAND's case from 1955 until the early 1970s). Unlike some of the other

¹ Information obtained from open source research

young men, GARLAND did not lodge with the McGRATH family but he was a regular visitor to the McGRATH home, holidayed with them on more than one occasion, was a senior officer in TARA and had a number of sexual encounters with William McGRATH.

GARLAND told Jim McCORMICK² (an Evangelical missionary known to both GARLAND and McGRATH) that he had introduced at least 20 other boys to McGRATH during the 1960s and who may have also been 'exploited' by him [McGRATH].

From 1971, Roy GARLAND began a concerted 'campaign' to expose McGRATH as a homosexual, who had exploited and manipulated GARLAND and others (mostly young men) sexually, politically and financially³.

Sexual Exploitation

GARLAND makes a number of allegations against William McGRATH of a sexual nature; however, he has never made a formal criminal complaint. There exists a number of letters from McGRATH to GARLAND which have clear homosexual overtones. These were shared by GARLAND with a number of people, including Revd Dr Ian PAISLEY (see Exhibit GC7 – 2016).

Political Exploitation

- McGRATH invited a number of young men (including GARLAND) to meetings to discuss the leadership and direction of the Orange Order and for McGRATH to put forward his alternative.

As a result, McGRATH formed TARA which, according to GARLAND, could be classed as "*a paramilitary organisation.*"

- GARLAND told Jim McCORMICK that McGRATH "*used young people to infiltrate such organisations as PAISLEY's Church and the Young Unionists. GARLAND was also concerned at the way in which McGRATH could influence important events within political organisations*"⁴.
- GARLAND claimed that McGRATH invited young males (including GARLAND) from TARA to his home to talk of the need for strong Loyalist leadership; McGRATH would "*proceed to indoctrinate the vulnerable, impressionable and idealistic young persons with the idea that they were potential leaders*"⁵.
- GARLAND further alleged that McGRATH claimed that he was reporting on GARLAND's 'progress' to superiors⁶.

Financial Exploitation

- GARLAND and McGRATH purchased a small business together in 1964 after McGRATH had "*by very subtle pressures managed to go into partnership on an equal basis stating that he*

² Statement of WJMck McCORMICK, 10/03/1982

³ As contained in the 1973 robophone call to the RUC.

⁴ Statement of WJMck McCORMICK, 10/03/82

⁵ Exhibit JC1, part of C64/2/80

⁶ See exhibit JC6, part of C64/2/80

would pay half the purchase price[to GARLAND] which he never did⁷". GARLAND later took McGRATH to Court in February 1972 to recoup the £1280.40⁸.

6 Analysis of GARLAND's accusations against William McGRATH⁹

The table below shows that from the early 1970s and following an acrimonious dispute over a £1200 loan, Roy GARLAND made a number of allegations against William McGRATH to numerous individuals/ organisations. These include individuals within the RUC, British Army, Social Services, Orange Order and a number of religious bodies. In the five year period between 1971 and 1976, GARLAND made repeated attempts to expose McGRATH's homosexuality and his exploitation of others. GARLAND's 'campaign' against McGRATH appears to have ceased in 1976.

The most detailed accounts of GARLAND's accusations against McGRATH were made to James McCORMICK and D/Con James CULLEN. There are indications that Roy GARLAND told close family members, including his father and wife, of his accusations against McGRATH. The main allegations levelled against McGRATH by GARLAND were:

- McGRATH was a homosexual
- He had indecently assaulted GARLAND
- He was involved in a homosexual/ vice ring
- He had abused other boys he had met through religious or political circles, as well as lodgers to the McGRATH family home
- He was employed in a Boys' Home [Kincora]
- GARLAND also alleged that McGRATH may have sexually abused women.

Whilst many individuals confirm that GARLAND had told them of McGRATH's employment at Kincora, there is only one reference to him abusing Kincora boys in the table below (see anonymous call to Social Services, January 1974). GARLAND told a number of people of his allegations against McGRATH; the key individuals are listed in the table below.

Individual	Date	Details of GARLAND's accusations re: McGRATH	GARLAND's motivation for exposing McGRATH
Jim McCORMICK ¹⁰	c. 1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • McGRATH had made a homosexual approach to GARLAND in the 1960s • McGRATH was employed in Kincora • McGRATH used him [GARLAND] as a 'facilitator' in arranging for boys to be brought to McGRATH for treatment for emotional blocks • McGRATH's method of treating the boys involved inducing them into homosexual acts [with McGRATH] • GARLAND claimed he had brought 20 boys to McGRATH in the 1960s • McGRATH used similar techniques to abuse women¹¹ 	GARLAND had sued McGRATH for over £2000.

⁷ See Exhibit DBE16, part of C64/2/80

⁸ The Gazette 21/2/72 published a record showing McGRATH was required to pay off a debt of £1280.40 to GARLAND

⁹ Statements of D/S ELLIOTT, 29/07/1980; WR GARLAND, 30/03/1982 and D/Supt CASKEY, 23/04/1982

¹⁰ Statements of J McCORMICK, 30/04/1980 and 10/03/1982

Individual	Date	Details of GARLAND's accusations re: McGRATH	GARLAND's motivation for exposing McGRATH
RUC ¹² - anonymous call	May 1973	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There was a vice ring centred around McGRATH McGRATH worked in Kincora McGRATH was a practising homosexual McGRATH exploited boys sexually, politically and financially. 	GARLAND claims he made an anonymous call to the RUC in order to provoke some police action.
D/Con James CULLEN ^{13 14}	1973 - 1976	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> McGRATH was employed at Kincora GARLAND was convinced that McGRATH was a homosexual and unsuitable for this type of employment McGRATH had sexually interfered with GARLAND [touched his privates in an attempt to overcome an emotional block] when he was a teenager, after developing a relationship through religious and political associations Various forms of sexual abuse by McGRATH took place. McGRATH used nude or porn photographs to 'excite' his subjects McGRATH had made similar approaches to other men, including UDR Captain N. 	GARLAND claims his motivation in telling CULLEN about McGRATH was to "try to get something done about Kincora and McGRATH's employment there". CULLEN stated that GARLAND had also made him aware of the financial dispute between GARLAND and McGRATH.
Valerie SHAW ¹⁵	1973	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There was "a homosexual ring and McGRATH was the King pin" Clifford SMYTH was a transvestite. McGRATH had helped SMYTH to overcome this through homosexuality McGRATH was employed at Kincora GARLAND also told SHAW that MAINS was a homosexual. 	SHAW claims GARLAND went to her in order to use her influence with Rev PAISLEY to get Clifford SMYTH to expose McGRATH's activities. "The whole purpose was to get McGRATH removed from Kincora where he was employed ¹⁶ ".
UDR Major H [REDACTED] ¹⁷	1973	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> William McGRATH was a homosexual McGRATH was employed in a Boys' Home. 	[REDACTED] claims that GARLAND did not specifically mention Kincora or that McGRATH had previously committed any offences.
Rev Ian PAISLEY MP ¹⁸	Jan 1974	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GARLAND accused McGRATH of being a homosexual 	

¹¹ Letter from Miss J CAMPBELL to Roy & [REDACTED] GARLAND, Thurs 13th '72

¹² See Exhibit SEC18, RUC Kincora Investigation Phase II

¹³ Statements of D/Con J CULLEN, 30/04/1980, 19/06/80 and 17/08/1982; C/Insp FLENLEY, 12/03/1982

¹⁴ Exhibit JC8, part of C64/2/80

¹⁵ Statements of Valerie SHAW, 02/03/1980 and 29/03/1982

¹⁶ Statements of Valerie SHAW, 02/03/1980

¹⁷ Statement of UDR Major H, 28/09/1972

¹⁸ Statements of DS ELLIOTT, 07/06/1980 and D/Supt HARRISON, 27/05/1982

Individual	Date	Details of GARLAND's accusations re: McGRATH	GARLAND's motivation for exposing McGRATH
Social Services – anonymous call	Jan 1974	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> McGRATH had “improper” suggestions to some Kincora boys McGRATH had also written a note to one of the boys [in Kincora] making “improper suggestions”. 	
Brian GEMMELL ¹⁹	c. 1975/1976	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GARLAND was afraid of McGRATH McGRATH had recruited young boys into his “circle of influence ... masturbation being the main theme”. McGRATH made homosexual advances towards GARLAND, before and after he was married. McGRATH was in charge of a boys’ home on the Newtownards Road. 	GARLAND was outraged that McGRATH was in charge of a boys’ home.
Corporal Q	Summer 1975	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GARLAND claimed McGRATH once tried to get him “to go with a dog” McGRATH was a housefather at a boys’ home. 	
UDR Captain N ²¹	Not clear	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GARLAND and UDR Captain N discussed their similar experiences of homosexual approaches made by McGRATH. 	
Rev Martin SMYTH ²²	Not clear	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GARLAND claims he went to see SMYTH about McGRATH. SMYTH does not mention this visit in his statements to police. 	

It would appear that GARLAND is the source for much of the information about Kincora given the range of people to whom he had made allegations.

7.0 Individuals who were made aware of GARLAND's accusations against McGRATH

7.1 Overview

Appendix A shows the extent to which the allegations being made by GARLAND against McGRATH were circulated between 1971 and 1980. GARLAND made his allegations about McGRATH known to a number of individuals; some of whom went on to relay GARLAND's account to others. Most of the individuals on the chart in Appendix A were connected either directly or indirectly to William McGRATH personally and professionally and was known to them. They reflect different aspects of McGRATH's life including the Orange Order, Unionist politics and evangelical/ religious affiliations.

¹⁹ Statement of B GEMMELL, 16/07/1982

²⁰ Statement of Corporal Q, 22/07/1982 and 23/12/1982

²¹ Statements of UDR Captain N, 30/07/1980, 06/04/1982 and 19/05/1982

²² Statements of Rev WM SMYTH, 16/04/1980 and 03/06/1982

7.2 Key Individuals

- **James McCORMICK**

Little is known about James McCORMICK. His profession was a veterinary surgeon, though he described himself as an Evangelist. He was in a position to introduce GARLAND to individuals in the RUC, British Army and Martyr's Memorial Church through his contacts in Evangelical circles.

GARLAND first approached McCORMICK in the early 1970s "*seeking counsel*"²³ on learning that McGRATH was working at Kincora Boys' Hostel. GARLAND told McCORMICK that McGRATH was a homosexual who had made advances to him in the 1960s. GARLAND also confessed to McCORMICK that he had facilitated McGRATH in his abuse of, up to 20, boys. This admission led to McCORMICK introducing GARLAND to D/Con James CULLEN in early 1974 (who McCORMICK had known previously).

McCORMICK also facilitated GARLAND meeting Valerie SHAW, who had learned about McGRATH through a fellow member of Martyr's Memorial Church – Emma GREENWOOD (who was being 'counselled' by McCORMICK). GARLAND subsequently relayed his accusations against McGRATH to Valerie SHAW (see below re: SHAW). Again, through Evangelical circles, McCORMICK was able to put GARLAND in touch with an Intelligence Officer within the British Army – Brian GEMMELL.

- **D/Con James CULLEN**

Roy GARLAND first met D/Con CULLEN in March 1974, though he had known of GARLAND's accusations from McCORMICK in late 1973. GARLAND told CULLEN that William McGRATH had sexually interfered with him as a teenager i.e. touched his privates, after their relationship had developed through religious and political affiliations. He also told CULLEN that McGRATH worked in Kincora Boys' Hostel but made no suggestion, at any time, that McGRATH was interfering with the boys in his care. GARLAND and CULLEN continued to meet on a number of occasions between 1974 and 1976 to discuss GARLAND's allegations.

UDR Captain N met with D/Con CULLEN in the early 1970s, at GARLAND's request, and told him what he knew about McGRATH; although CULLEN does not refer to this meeting in his statements to police. GARLAND also claims that he introduced a 20 year old unnamed male friend of his to CULLEN, who recounted how McGRATH had tried to sexually interfere with him. Again CULLEN makes no reference to this.

Following his initial conversation with GARLAND, CULLEN immediately reported what he had been told to ACC MEHARG, bypassing all his intermediary line management. There is no evidence that any extensive investigation was conducted by the RUC on receipt of the information obtained from Roy GARLAND between 1974 and 1980.

²³ Statement of James McCORMICK, 10/03/1982

- **Valerie SHAW**

In October 1973 Valerie SHAW first met Roy GARLAND through Jim McCORMICK after learning about William McGRATH's homosexuality and exploitation of young men including members of the Free Presbyterian Church. GARLAND agreed to speak with SHAW as she was closely associated with the Rev Ian PAISLEY and employed by Martyr's Memorial Church.

On meeting GARLAND, SHAW was told that McGRATH was a homosexual who was employed in Kincora. GARLAND also provided evidence of McGRATH's homosexuality by sharing intimate letters he had been sent by McGRATH with SHAW. Shortly after their meeting, SHAW approached PAISLEY and told him of her concerns about McGRATH. She also provided him with copies of the letters from McGRATH to GARLAND. PAISLEY subsequently met with McGRATH but failed to address SHAW's concerns with him i.e. homosexuality.

SHAW claims that between October 1973 and the summer of 1974 she made repeated efforts to raise McGRATH with PAISLEY but became exacerbated with his inaction and resigned from the church in June 1975.

Having failed in her efforts to get PAISLEY to confront McGRATH, SHAW began to 'campaign' to expose McGRATH's homosexuality and abuse to others, including the RUC (Supt John GRAHAM, Head of Belfast CID) and the Rev Martin SMYTH.

In 1980 SHAW had a conversation with Gerry FITT, MP and reiterated what she knew about McGRATH. FITT said this assisted him in publically corroborating Peter McKENNA's article which appeared in the Irish Independent on 24/01/80.

- **Rev Ian PAISLEY**

In the early 1970s [UDR Captain N] went to PAISLEY with his concerns over McGRATH's homosexuality and the appropriateness of his relationships with Clifford SMYTH, David BROWNE and Roy GARLAND (SMYTH and BROWNE being closely associated with PAISLEY politically). There is no evidence to suggest that PAISLEY did anything with the information given to him by [UDR Captain N] at this time or subsequently. Indeed there is nothing to suggest that when SHAW raised McGRATH as an issue to him in 1973, PAISLEY recalled his earlier conversations with [UDR Captain N] to her.

PAISLEY met GARLAND in January 1974 and was again told of McGRATH's homosexuality and attempts to corrupt GARLAND. PAISLEY is alleged to have asked GARLAND to confront McGRATH about his accusations; GARLAND refused to do so. Rev Martin SMYTH claims he also spoke to PAISLEY about McGRATH; PAISLEY denied this.

- **Rev Martin SMYTH**

In the late 1960s, [UDR Captain N] told SMYTH about a homosexual approach towards him by McGRATH. SMYTH had previously heard similar rumours about McGRATH, dating back to the 1950s²⁴. SMYTH claims that his response was to "keep alert within the Orange Order"²⁵.

²⁴ Statement of Rev Martin SMYTH, 03/06/1982

SMYTH spoke to Frank MILLAR jnr in the early 1970s about MILLAR's association with the McGRATH family and in particular, McGRATH's homosexuality and the accusations by GARLAND. MILLAR reiterated what SMYTH had told him to McGRATH, who dismissed it; MILLAR and SMYTH subsequently terminated their friendship²⁶.

In August/ September 1975, Valerie SHAW also approached SMYTH about the activities of McGRATH and mentioned that she had raised the issue with PAISLEY. SHAW asked SMYTH to speak to PAISLEY and for both men to "*discipline*"²⁷ him. SMYTH claims he spoke with PAISLEY on the matter but that no further action took place against McGRATH.

SMYTH claims that in 1976 on learning that McGRATH was employed at a boys' hostel, he contacted a Mr JACKSON of the EHSSB to draw his attention to the allegations about McGRATH and suggested that JACKSON should contact police. Despite efforts²⁸, the RUC were unable to positively identify Mr JACKSON. Four 'Mr JACKSONS'²⁹ were interviewed by police but all denied having had a conversation with Rev. SMYTH re Kincora.

- **Brian GEMMELL**

Introduced to GARLAND through McCORMICK and was told of McGRATH's involvement in TARA, homosexuality, abuse of boys and employment in a boys' home. This led GEMMELL to look for the home on the Newtownards Road. GARLAND, however, told police that GEMMELL was not interested in the homosexual aspect of McGRATH, solely TARA, which "*annoyed*"³⁰ GARLAND.

On receipt of GARLAND's information, and following their second meeting, GEMMELL claims he wrote a 4 page MISOR detailing information on McGRATH; no copy of this MISOR has yet been located. GEMMELL was subsequently debriefed by Ian CAMERON who told him to 'drop' GARLAND as a source because homosexuality was not within the Army's remit. From the information available this appears to have been GEMMELL's last involvement with GARLAND.

²⁵ *ibid.*

²⁶ Statement of F MILLAR, 27/07/1982


²⁷ Statement of Rev Martin SMYTH, 16/04/1980

²⁸ See action 361&362 , C64/2/80 (1980 RUC Investigation)

²⁹ Statements of DD JACKSON, 07/07/1980, FIJ JACKSON, 11/06/1980, J JACKSON, 14/05/1980 and WF JACKSON, 02/06/1980

³⁰ Statement of D/Supt G CASKEY, 23/04/1982

APPENDIX A – Knowledge of GARLAND’s allegations against William McGRATH 1971-1980



RESTRICTED

Kincora – Exhibit GC6

Person Profile – James McCORMICK

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

1.0 Introduction and Background

This profile on James McCORMICK is part of a wider strategic review of all Kincora-related material held by the PSNI. It should be read in conjunction with other Kincora related analytical reports, including the profiles on Roy GARLAND, Valerie SHAW and Brian GEMMELL.

Little is known about James McCORMICK. He was a veterinary surgeon, though described himself as an Evangelist. He first met William McGRATH in the mid-1960s when he had been invited to speak to a youth group at McGRATH's home at Wellington Park, Belfast. By the early 1970s, McCORMICK had been made aware of Roy GARLAND's accusations about McGRATH's involvement in homosexuality and abuse of young boys.

Jim McCORMICK subsequently facilitated Roy GARLAND's introduction to a number of key individuals linked to the Kincora story – D/Con James CULLEN, Valerie SHAW and Brian GEMMELL.

2.0 Methodology and Information Sources

Various information sources, both internal police files and open source research material have been used to inform the findings used in this profile. These include relevant statements, reports, exhibits and documents contained in the RUC Crime Files¹ prepared in 1980 and 1983 and the Sussex Police Investigation.

3.0 Personal Details

Name: William James 'Jim' McKendrick McCORMICK

Last Known Address: [REDACTED]

Occupation: Veterinary Surgeon

Other Interests: 1963 – 1966 – Superintendent of Emmanuel Mission, Wellwood Street, Belfast

McCORMICK was also involved in Home Missionary Work, telling police that he "*provided counselling for a number of people of all ages who have come to me for advice on a wide variety of matters*"².

4.0 McCORMICK's Timeline of Knowledge of McGRATH's Homosexual Abuse

- **1972** - Roy GARLAND first met Jim McCORMICK, having gone to him "*seeking counsel*"³. GARLAND told McCORMICK that:
 - McGRATH had made a homosexual approach towards GARLAND in the 1960s.
 - McGRATH was a homosexual who would 'treat' young boys for emotional blocks by sexually exploiting them.
 - McGRATH used GARLAND as a 'facilitator' in arranging for boys to be brought to McGRATH for treatment for emotional blocks; having arranged for 20 boys to be brought to McGRATH in the 1960s.
 - McGRATH was involved in TARA and used young people to infiltrate organisations including the Young Unionists and Martyr's Memorial Church.

¹ C64/2/80 and C64/5/83

² Statement of WJ McK McCORMICK, 10/03/1982

³ *ibid.*

- **Late September 1973** - Jim McCORMICK was 'counselling' Emma GREENWOOD (a friend of Valerie SHAW) and told GREENWOOD about a man "*in the Orange Order in Christian circles and in political circles, who was a homosexual and had used his position to corrupt or attempt to corrupt young men and boys into homosexual practices*".⁴ GREENWOOD relayed this information to SHAW, who subsequently contacted McCORMICK to find out who he was referring to and what could be done about it.
- **October 1973** - Jim McCORMICK told Valerie SHAW about William McGRATH and his involvement in homosexual practices, corruption of young boys and his association with the Free Presbyterian Church. McCORMICK had been told this by Roy GARLAND. SHAW subsequently met GARLAND who confirmed these allegations and also told her that McGRATH was working in Kincora Boy's Home.
- **Early 1974** – McCORMICK introduced GARLAND to D/Con James CULLEN. McCORMICK had first met CULLEN through CULLEN's work with Drug Squad⁵. CULLEN asked McCORMICK if it would be possible to meet with the man who was making accusations against McGRATH, McCORMICK therefore facilitated the meeting between CULLEN and GARLAND.
- **1975** – Captain Brian GEMMELL (British Army Intelligence Corps) met James McCORMICK through their mutual interest in evangelism. At one meeting the two men discussed the subject of TARA; McCORMICK told GEMMELL that its leader was William McGRATH and described McGRATH as a "homosexual pervert"⁶. McCORMICK suggested that GEMMELL should speak with Roy GARLAND as he was "*ex TARA and GARLAND was trying to expose TARA and McGRATH.*"⁷ The first meeting between GEMMELL and GARLAND took place at McCORMICK's home.

⁴ Statement of Valerie SHAW 29/03/1982

⁵ Exhibit No 7, Sussex Police Review

⁶ Statement of Brian GEMMELL, 16/07/1982

⁷ *ibid.*

RESTRICTED

Kincora – Exhibit GC7

Person Profile - Valerie SHAW

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

1. Background

Valerie SHAW was both a long-standing member (1952-75) and an employee of the Free Presbyterian Church (Martyr's Memorial Church). She also considered herself to be a friend of the PAISLEY family. When she resigned from his Church in 1975, she claims she did so, largely because, Revd Dr Ian PAISLEY had not dealt with her concerns over William McGRATH's homosexuality and abuse.

Describing her occupation as a missionary, for three years between 1973 and 1976 Valerie SHAW claims that she made repeated attempts to expose McGRATH's homosexual abuse and employment at Kincora to [leading] individuals connected to the Free Presbyterian Church, DUP, Orange Order, Social Services and RUC.

Valerie SHAW gave statements to the RUC in 1980 and 1982; she also provided a statement for the Sussex police in 1982.

2. Timeline of Valerie SHAW receiving and sharing knowledge on McGRATH's abuse

The following timeline, based on her statements to police provides an overview of when and to whom, Valerie SHAW spoke, in order to *"get McGRATH removed from Kincora Boys' Hostel... "*.¹

- **Late September 1973**- An acquaintance of Valerie SHAW, Emma GREENWOOD, approached her to say that she had heard from Jim McCORMICK of a man *"in the Orange Order, in Christian circles and in political circles, who was a homosexual and had used his position to corrupt or attempt to corrupt young men and boys into homosexual practices"*.²
- **October 1973** - Jim McCORMICK told Valerie SHAW about McGRATH and his involvement in homosexual sexual practices, corruption of young boys and his association with the Free Presbyterian Church. McCORMICK had been told this by Roy GARLAND. SHAW subsequently met GARLAND who confirmed these allegations and also told her that McGRATH was working in Kincora Boy's Home.
- **29th October 1973** – Valerie SHAW contacted Revd Dr Ian PAISLEY on learning of McGRATH's employment in Kincora and his homosexual corruption of Christian boys from their church. GARLAND told her of intimate letters he had received from McGRATH, which were still in his possession.
- **30th October 1973** – SHAW again contacted PAISLEY on learning that *"Brother McGRATH"* was to be involved in a commemoration service in a Free Presbyterian Church. PAISLEY said that he would *"deal with it"*.
- **1st November 1973** – SHAW obtained the original letters from GARLAND, written by McGRATH to him, as proof of homosexual behaviour.

¹ Statement of Valerie SHAW 02/03/1980

² Statement of Valerie SHAW 29/3/1982

- **2nd November 1973** – SHAW copied the letters and offered them to PAISLEY prior to his meeting with McGRATH. PAISLEY did not look at the letters. PAISLEY and James HEYBURN (financial director of Martyr’s Memorial Church) met McGRATH but they did not put the homosexual allegations to him and the meeting appeared to end cordially.
- **5th November 1973** – PAISLEY asked SHAW for the letters between GARLAND and McGRATH to read. He later agreed they were “horrible”³.
- **January 1974** – SHAW “caused PAISLEY to meet Mr GARLAND”⁴.
- **June 1974**- Having been unable to persuade PAISLEY to take any action, SHAW began to disclose the allegations re McGRATH to a number of other contacts.
- **C. June 1974**- SHAW contacted two Free Presbyterian Ministers - Rev. Ivan FOSTER and Rev. Alan CAIRNS. Despite initially agreeing to support SHAW, after having spoken to PAISLEY, they both later retracted offers to assist.
- **June 1974**- Valerie SHAW contacted D/Supt John GRAHAM, Head of Belfast CID. She made him aware of McGRATH’s employment at Kincora. As D/Supt GRAHAM was approaching retirement (he retired 30/06/74), he suggested that he would pass on the information to allow a police investigation to be carried out.
- **June 1975**- SHAW left the Free Presbyterian Church, “mainly over this matter”⁵.
- **August/September 1975**- Valerie SHAW spoke to the Rev Martin SMYTH re the homosexual activities of McGRATH. SMYTH subsequently spoke to Rev PAISLEY on the matter. In 1976 SMYTH says that he contacted a ‘Mr JACKSON’ at EHSSB on learning that McGRATH was employed in a Boys’ hostel.
- **Mid 1976**- SHAW told Pastor MULLAN of Lurgan Baptist Church.
- **October 1976**- [R 36]’s wife [R 36] had had a homosexual relationship with McGRATH in the 1950s) approached Valerie SHAW and made her aware of [R 36] ‘breakdown’ and attempted suicide due to his homosexual associations with a number of males, including “one in charge of a boys’ home”⁶.

3. Analysis

To be read in conjunction with Appendix A - Valerie SHAW association chart.

Valerie SHAW claims that she was first made aware of McGRATH’s homosexual abuse and employment in Kincora in October 1973. SHAW claims that she was told of the allegations, so that

³ Statement of Valerie SHAW, 29/03/1982

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ Statement of Valerie SHAW 29/03/1982

⁶ Statement of Rita JOHNSTON 21/03/1980


she could use "her influence over PAISLEY to get Clifford SMYTH to expose the activities of McGRATH".⁷

From October 1973 until June 1974, Valerie SHAW states that she repeatedly tried to get Revd PAISLEY to act on her information on McGRATH. At PAISLEY's reluctance to take action, in June 1974 Valerie SHAW began to raise her concerns about McGRATH with others. These included other ministers in the Free Presbyterian Church, an RUC Superintendent and the Head of the Orange Order.

Between 1973 and 1976, SHAW told individuals in the Free Presbyterian Church, the Orange Order, Social Services and the RUC about McGRATH's homosexual abuse of young men and of his employment in Kincora.

Appendix A

Valerie SHAW Association Chart based on information contained within statements provided to the RUC or Sussex Police.



⁷ Statement of Valerie SHAW 02/03/1980

RESTRICTED

Kincora – Exhibit GC8

Person Profile – Richard KERR

MK and SM
Higher Police Analyst (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

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5.0 Statements provided to police by Richard KERR 5

6.0 Conclusion..... 6

1.0 Background

This profile on Richard KERR is part of a wider strategic review of all Kincora-related material held by the PSNI. This profile has been prepared using a variety of sources of information, though most notably has relied on the material contained in the RUC investigation into Kincora, the Sussex Police Review and associated police files¹. Whilst it is acknowledged that during the last two years Richard KERR has made numerous additional allegations to the media, only those made to police have been included in this report.

This profile has been written with an assumed knowledge, on the part of the reader, in relation to Kincora and some of the key individuals involved.

2.0 Overview

Richard KERR is a key individual with regards to allegations of child abuse at Kincora. It was his social workers (Helen GOGARTY and Judith KENNEDY) who first highlighted the 'goings-on' at Kincora to a journalist, Peter McKENNA of the Irish Independent. The subsequent article which appeared in that newspaper in January 1980, largely focussing on the KERR case, started the public exposure of what became known as the 'Kincora abuse scandal'.

When first interviewed by the RUC in April 1980, KERR made no complaints of [sexual] abuse against any members of staff at Kincora or any of the care institutions he had been resident in. KERR stated *"...during the time I was in homes and other institutions, I did not make any complaints about indecent behaviour, about anyone to any members of the welfare. There were no complaints to make"*².

By 1982, KERR's account³ had altered. He admitted to Sussex police that his initial statements in 1980 were *"true up to [the] point"*; however, he made a number of further disclosures to the Sussex police team, including admitting to having had consensual sex with William EDMONDS and being in a consensual homosexual relationship with [REDACTED] (with whom he was living with in Preston). KERR also alleged for the first time, that he had been abused whilst in care, in Williamson House [c.1979] by Eric WITCHELL, the person in charge.

At the time of his statement in 1982 KERR confirmed that he had had a number of casual homosexual relationships in London and considered himself to be bi-sexual.

3.0 Personal Details

Name: Richard KERR

Date of Birth: [REDACTED]

Previous Family Addresses: [REDACTED]

Residential care:

1966 – Williamson House

June 1975 – Kincora Boys' Hostel

¹ RUC Crime files C64/2/80 & C64/2/80 (1982)

² Statement of Richard KERR, 25/02/1980

³ Statement of Richard KERR, 26/10/1982

4.0 Overview of Richard KERR's allegations to police

KERR was admitted to Kincora on the 27th June 1975 and remained a resident there until his arrest, following his involvement in a series of burglaries, in October 1977; KERR was subsequently remanded in custody to Rathgael. It was following this arrest that D/Constable SCULLY⁴ became concerned about KERR's behaviour, when he [KERR] became "*livid with rage*" after MAINS refused to visit him in police custody. KERR threatened to "*tell all*" if MAINS did not appear. Amongst the issues D/Constable SCULLY had about Richard KERR and Kincora, was the apparent "*lack of discipline*"⁵ in the Home. SCULLY believed there was more substance to KERR's 'veiled threats' and discussed this with a number of social workers, though he had no evidence to substantiate his concerns. David MORROW, Senior Social Worker, appears to have agreed with SCULLY'S assessment, noting that KERR had an "*abnormal attachment*" to MAINS⁶.

During his time in Kincora, KERR told police he looked on Joe MAINS as "*a father*" and would sit in MAINS' flat within Kincora, discussing his future; at times this involved alcohol consumption. KERR stated that MAINS never touched him or said anything to him of a homosexual manner⁷.

KERR told police, however that William McGRATH was known as a homosexual in Kincora, as KERR had been told by other residents that McGRATH had 'tried it on' with them. KERR told police in 1980 that McGRATH "*used to play around*" with him and McGRATH enjoyed it "*in a homosexual way*".

Whilst in Rathgael, KERR continued to ask for MAINS to visit him⁸. Given that hostel staff had no responsibility to former residents once they move into new accommodation, it has been said this was an 'unusual' rather than regular occurrence.

KERR has never made a complaint to police of abuse by Joseph MAINS.

At his trial in December 1977, KERR was sentenced to Borstal training and transferred to Millisle. During his time in Millisle, KERR met William 'Billy' EDMONDS (a Medical Orderly). Initially in 1980, KERR told police that when in Woburn House [Millisle] he became friendly with EDMONDS who "*treated him differently and gave him things*". In 1982 KERR admitted to Sussex police that EDMONDS "*didn't do anything*" to him whilst at Millisle, but after he left there, EDMONDS committed buggery with KERR at EDMONDS' house. KERR also alleged that EDMONDS gave KERR a radio as a gift, following sexual relations. KERR alleged that on two further occasions, EDMONDS attempted to have sex with him, but KERR says he refused. KERR said he didn't tell the RUC in 1980 about EDMONDS bugging him because he was "*embarrassed*" and thought they [RUC] were "*only interested in Kincora*". EDMONDS provided a statement to the RUC in 1980 admitting to having had sexual contact with Richard KERR whilst he was in Millisle Borstal, placing the abuse in Millisle⁹.

There was difficulty in finding suitable accommodation for KERR on his release from Millisle Borstal in February 1979. Kincora had allegedly been ruled out by social workers over concerns about possible homosexual activity there¹⁰. In his statement, William MORRIS, a former social worker¹¹ highlighted that, "*... it was suspected that Joseph MAINS, the Warden of Kincora, was homosexual*

⁴ Statement of D/CON SCULLY, 28/01/1980

⁵ Statement of Clive SCOLAR, 30/04/1980

⁶ Statement of David Patrick MORROW, 13/02/1980

⁷ Statement of Richard KERR, 25/02/1980

⁸ Two letters sent to Mr MAINS from R KERR dated 28/12/1977 and 09/01/1978

⁹ Statement of William EDMONDS, 10/04/1980

¹⁰ Statement of J KENNEDY, 21/04/1982

¹¹ Statement of William MORRIS, 23/09/1982

and believed to be having a homosexual relationship with the boy [KERR] and for the latter's protection it was necessary that alternative accommodation be found".

In 1979, on release from borstal, KERR was placed in Williamson House for a period of 6 weeks. KERR told Sussex police in 1982, it was during this stay in Williamson House when he was abused by Eric WITCHELL. KERR told police that he had sex with Brother Eric WITCHELL. KERR had left Millisle and been placed in Williamson House for a period of 6 weeks [c. February/ March 1979], during that time WITCHELL buggered KERR about 3 or 4 times and that alcohol was involved. KERR stated *"he was the first man to start me off on homosexuality"*.

5.0 Statements provided to police by Richard KERR

Richard KERR provided two statements to the initial RUC investigation in February 1980 and a further statement to the Sussex police team in October 1982. The following sections are a résumé of the most pertinent points made in each of his three statements to police.

5.1 Key Points from Statement of 25th February 1980

KERR stated that whilst a resident in Williamson House he met **KIN 340**. They formed a friendship which continued when KERR moved to Kincora, **KIN 340** together with another male, **KIN 341**, collected KERR from Kincora and frequented a number of hostels in the Belfast and Larne areas. KERR stated that he only went with these men as friends and had visited **KIN 341** home where they would have drinks.

In his statement, KERR admitted that he had gone to the Highways Hotel, Larne on 14th October 1977 with **KIN 341** and **KIN 340**. KERR was arrested for theft from the hotel on this date.

During his time in Kincora, KERR looked on Joe MAINS as *"a father"*; MAINS knew about [some of] KERR's criminality (i.e. break-ins). He would sit in MAINS' flat in Kincora, discussing his future; at times this involved alcohol consumption. KERR stated that MAINS never touched him or said anything to him of a homosexual manner.

KERR stated that he was told by a number of other Kincora residents that McGRATH was a known homosexual and that MAINS knew of William McGRATH touching boys who were resident in Kincora. KERR told police that McGRATH had *"played around with me by pulling my jumper and wrestling with me. He would pull me close to him, his front to my back, and press his belly up against me ... I knew he was enjoying it in a homosexual way"*.

KERR clarified to police that what he had meant by his threat to *"tell all"* after MAINS failed to turn up for his court case in October 1977. This threat related to their drinking together and that MAINS knew about KERR's criminality and had knowledge of McGRATH's *"behaviour"*.

Whilst in Kincora, KERR met Stephen WARING (Kincora resident) and they became involved in criminality with **KIN 274** (Kincora resident) who KERR claimed orchestrated these crimes. KERR stated that he and WARING had a suicide pact, should they be caught for their crimes. KERR said that since hearing the news of WARING's death [November 1977] he had tried to commit suicide by slashing his wrists on several occasions.

KERR told police that when in Woburn House [Millisle] he became friendly with William EDMONDS. When he was released from Millisle, KERR said that EDMONDS visited him in the Park Avenue Hotel and Bishops Court Hotel where he [KERR] was residing and they had drinks together.

Also whilst in Millisle borstal, KERR mentioned that he was visited by Eric MITCHAM [WITCHELL] who was dressed as a church minister but that he [KERR] hadn't asked for this visit.

When KERR moved to live with his aunt in Preston in 1979, he met a [REDACTED], who KERR later shared a house with. [REDACTED] received rent from KERR of £15 per week. KERR stated that he had received the gift of a watch from [REDACTED] for Christmas 1979. KERR told police "*there is nothing going on between him and I*".

KERR stated that he "*did not make any complaints about indecent behaviour by anyone to any members of the welfare. There were no complaints to make*".

5.2 Key Points from Statement of 26th February 1980

KERR also told police that two residents, [REDACTED] R 9 and [REDACTED] KIN 46, moved in with a retired social worker [REDACTED] KIN 342 when they left Kincora in July 1977. KERR claimed that there were rumours that [REDACTED] KIN 342 was homosexual.

KERR stated that MAINS had asked him to give him a massage one night, whilst in Kincora; this was witnessed by Stephen WARING. KERR refused. KERR was asked by MAINS if [REDACTED] KIN 46 ever masturbated and KERR wondered why MAINS had asked this.

5.3 Key Points from Statement of 26th October 1982

KERR told the Sussex team that his first statement in 1980 was true up to the point he talked about his friendship with Billy EDMONDS (see Section 4 above).

In his statement in 1982 KERR also told police that he had sex with Eric WITCHELL in Williamson House.

6.0 Conclusion

It is known to the author that Richard KERR has made numerous allegations to the media; however the details of these have not been included in this report. Only allegations contained within statements provided to the RUC and Sussex Review team have been considered.

RESTRICTED

Kincora – Exhibit GC9

Person Profile – Raymond SEMPLE

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

1.0 Introduction

This profile on Raymond SEMPLE is part of a wider strategic review of all Kincora-related material held by the PSNI. Similar profiles on the two other convicted Kincora staff have also been prepared.

2.0 Background

Raymond SEMPLE was arrested on 1st April 1980 for alleged homosexual activities at Kincora Boys' Hostel. At his trial in 1981, SEMPLE pleaded guilty to 4 counts of homosexual abuse against 2 Kincora residents (buggery x2 and gross indecency x2) and was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment. SEMPLE's sentence was longer than that of McGRATH's (4 years imprisonment following conviction for 15 charges) as it was felt that his sentence should be reflective of the position of responsibility that SEMPLE held at the hostel. SEMPLE was released from HMP Maze on 08/06/1984.

3.0 Methodology and Information Sources

This profile has been prepared using a variety of sources of information, though most notably has relied on the material contained in the RUC investigations into Kincora (1980 & 1982), the Sussex Police Review and associated police files¹. Open source research was also undertaken and is referenced where appropriate in this report.

This profile has been written with an assumed knowledge, on the part of the reader, in relation to 'Kincora' and some of the key individuals involved.

4.0 Key Findings

- Little is known about Raymond SEMPLE, particularly in relation to his life outside Kincora.
- Unlike his fellow convicted Kincora staff members, Raymond SEMPLE, openly admitted to police that he was a homosexual. This was confirmed in a medical examination.
- His 'friendship' with MAINS facilitated his employment at Kincora, on 2 separate occasions.
- Unlike his fellow Kincora convicted staff members, prior to the RUC investigation in 1980, there were no complaints or allegations to police or social services, made against SEMPLE by Kincora residents.
- Raymond SEMPLE's sentence of 5 years imprisonment was reflective of his position as second-in-charge within the Hostel, as opposed to the number of charges and victims, particularly when compared with William McGRATH's case.
- There is no evidence that SEMPLE committed sexual abuse on any other Kincora resident, other than the two he was convicted of abusing.

¹ RUC Crime files C64/2/80 & C64/2/80 (1982)

5.0 Personal Details

Name: Raymond SEMPLE

Date of Birth: 6th January 1922

Date of Death: 7th December 2010


Last Known Address: [REDACTED] Belfast

Employment history:

Shorts- Fitter's Helper (1938 – c. 1945)

Harland and Wolff- Fitter's Helper (c. 1947 – 1964)

Kincora Boys' Hostel-Deputy Officer in Charge (08/09/1964 – 28/02/1966) and (10/06/1969 – suspension on 04/03/1980)



Custody Photo: Raymond SEMPLE

6.0 SEMPLE's Private Life

Prior to his employment at Kincora, Raymond SEMPLE is known to have worked as a Fitter's Helper from the age of 16. He had volunteered with the St John's Ambulance Service for 25 years and was an Officer in the 13th Belfast Brigade of the Boys' Brigade. He also appears to have had an interest in football; he was a Steward for Glentoran FC.

When SEMPLE was interviewed by the RUC in 1980, he freely admitted to be a long practising homosexual. His admission was later confirmed in a medical examination carried out on SEMPLE in April 1980². During his interview, SEMPLE admitted to police that he would regularly frequent Botanic Gardens in Belfast to meet strangers for homosexual sex.

No further details are known about Raymond SEMPLE's private life. He did not have a known long term partner and police do not appear to have identified or spoken to any men with whom SEMPLE had a homosexual relationship outside of Kincora.

7.0 SEMPLE's Employment in Kincora

Raymond SEMPLE had two periods of employment as Deputy Warden in Charge of Kincora Boys Hostel, which included 'living-in'. His first period of employment began in September 1964 when he was aged 42. He had applied for the post at the suggestion of Joseph MAINS, whom SEMPLE knew from their time together with the St John's Ambulance Service. SEMPLE had no formal qualifications relevant to this post, but did, however, work on a voluntary basis in Kincora for a number of years prior to his employment³. Joseph MAINS also provided SEMPLE with a favourable reference which assisted him in successfully obtaining the position.

² Statement of Robert B IRWIN, 17/07/1980

³ Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Children's Homes and Hostels, 1985, para 3.15 & Kincora Visitors Book

In February 1966, SEMPLE resigned from his position in Kincora Hostel, claiming that he left due to his mother's ill health. It is believed that SEMPLE resigned at the suggestion of MAINS following his discovery of SEMPLE's homosexual relationship with [R 1], a Kincora resident. After he left Kincora, Raymond SEMPLE worked in Harland and Wolff and Cyril Lord's Carpets, before returning to the Hostel three years later⁴.

In 1969 Raymond SEMPLE was again appointed as Deputy Warden in Kincora, having again applied for the post with the backing of MAINS. He remained in post until he was suspended on 4th March 1980, following the exposure of the Kincora 'scandal' by the media in January 1980.

8.0 Abusive 'Relationships' with Kincora Residents

Raymond SEMPLE admitted to sexually abusing two Kincora residents in the early 1960s – [R 1] and [R 7]. [R 1] and [R 7] were both also sexually abused by Joseph MAINS as well as Raymond SEMPLE when they were resident in Kincora. It is also of note that the 'relationship' between SEMPLE and [R 1] continued for some time after [R 1] had left Kincora.

8.1 [R 1]

[R 1] told police that after he left Kincora, he remained friendly with SEMPLE and continued to have sex with him⁵. SEMPLE and [R 1] were both stewards at the Oval. According to [R 1], the two men travelled to football matches together and had sex in the toilets of the train. SEMPLE would also visit [R 1] in his flat where they would have sex. [R 1] claims their relationship continued until c. 1974.

8.2 [R 7]

When interviewed by the RUC in 1980, SEMPLE admitted to police that he had sexually assaulted [R 7] when he was resident in Kincora. [R 7] confirmed the abuse.

8.3 Further Allegations

No further allegations of abuse were made to police against SEMPLE by Kincora residents to either the 1980 RUC investigation or 1982 Sussex Review. It is of note that [KIN 26] (ex-resident) in his statement to police claimed that he knew that [KIN 14] was a favourite of SEMPLE's with whom he regularly stayed at weekends [at SEMPLE's home]⁶.

Although no allegations of sexual abuse were made, [KIN 46], former Kincora resident, told police in 1980 that he had gone drinking with SEMPLE on a number of occasions to the Glentoran and Crusaders Clubs⁷.

⁴ Statement of D/Con William McGLADDERY, 06/07/1980

⁵ Statement of [R 1], 12/05/1980

⁶ Statement of [KIN 26], /04/1980

⁷ Statement of [KIN 46], 12/07/1982

9.0 Knowledge of SEMPLE's Abuse of Kincora Residents

Unlike Joseph MAINS and William McGRATH, prior to the 1980 RUC investigation, Raymond SEMPLE had not been the subject of any previous police or social services 'investigations' into sexual abuse allegations.

Joseph MAINS was aware that Raymond SEMPLE had sexually abused [R 1] in Kincora and, allegedly, had told him to stop. MAINS also sexually abused [R 1]. SEMPLE claims that he left [R 1] alone for approximately a week after being reprimanded by MAINS, before recommencing the abuse. Again, MAINS spoke to SEMPLE, this time "*MAINS was serious about it*"⁸. In February 1966 at MAINS' suggestion⁹, SEMPLE resigned from his position.

10.0 SEMPLE's Knowledge of Abuse in Kincora

10.1 Abuse by Joseph MAINS

SEMPLE told police that some of the boys in Kincora had complained to him that "*MAINS was having intercourse with them*"¹⁰ but claims he didn't remember the complainants' names.

10.2 Abuse by William McGRATH

Raymond SEMPLE claimed that he discussed the residents' complaints of abuse against William McGRATH with Joseph MAINS and that they both "*tried to watch McGRATH*"¹¹ to prevent further abuse. SEMPLE alleged that he "*felt embarrassed about the complaints because MAINS had to tell him off about unlawful sexual intercourse with the boys during his first period of employment in Kincora*"¹².

10.3 Co-resident Abuse

Raymond SEMPLE was made aware of some homosexual activity between residents in Kincora. There is no evidence that SEMPLE did anything about these complaints.

11.0 SEMPLE's Association with William McGRATH

Prior to William McGRATH starting work in Kincora in 1971, Raymond SEMPLE did not know him, describing him as "*a complete stranger*".¹³ There is no evidence that the two men were ever anything more than work colleagues.

⁸ Statement of D/Con W McGLADDERY, 06/07/1980

⁹ Statement of D/S J MIDDLEMISS, 13/5/1980

¹⁰ Statement of D/Con William McGLADDERY, 06/07/1980

¹¹ Statement of D/Con J SHORT, 14/04/1980

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ Statement of D/Sgt WA GRAHAM, 20/05/1980 re interview with R SEMPLE on 01/04/1980

12.0 SEMPLE's Association with Joseph MAINS

Raymond SEMPLE and Joseph MAINS appear to have had a long standing 'friendship' for many years prior to becoming work colleagues in Kincora, having met through their voluntary work with the St. John's Ambulance. MAINS told police that he'd also known Raymond SEMPLE through [REDACTED] **BAR 1** (MAINS' fiancée)¹⁴.

Having previously volunteered in Kincora with MAINS, SEMPLE successfully applied for the post of Deputy Warden in 1964; indeed MAINS' influence ensured SEMPLE's reappointment in 1969.

Outside of work, the two men often socialised together in various bars and hostelries in East Belfast and beyond. They were both honorary members of the Harland & Wolff Social Club due to "their work with children"¹⁵. Raymond SEMPLE was also known to frequently socialise with members of the wider MAINS family, including **BAR 1**.

On two consecutive Easter holidays, Raymond SEMPLE and Joseph MAINS went on a tour of Ireland together in the early 1960s, accompanied by Kincora residents Hugh QUINN and **R 2**. **OV 7** also went on these trips.

Both MAINS and SEMPLE were asked by police if they had had a homosexual relationship at any stage; both men denied this.

¹⁴ Statement of D/Sgt J MIDDLEMISS, 13/05/1980 re: interview with Joseph MAINS

¹⁵ Statement of [REDACTED], 02/02/1983



RESTRICTED

Exhibit GC10- Kincora Strategic Overview

Person Profile

John Colin WALLACE

MK & SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

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1. Overview

John Colin WALLACE is a former member of the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) Information Policy Unit attached to HQNI between May 1968 and January 1975. He resigned from the MoD in December 1975, as an alternative to dismissal, following his admission of passing a restricted document to a journalist.

WALLACE was convicted of the manslaughter of Jonathan LEWIS in March 1981 and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. His conviction was later quashed in 1996.

This analytical report has been produced as part of the ongoing strategic analytical overview of Kincora-related material held by the Police Service of Northern Ireland. It should be read in conjunction with other Kincora related analysis.

2. Reference Material

Various information sources, both internal police files and open source research material have been used to inform the findings used in this profile. These include relevant statements, reports, exhibits and documents contained in RUC Crime Files.

Open source research on Colin WALLACE was also undertaken and the results are referenced accordingly throughout the profile.

3. Personal Details

Full name: John Colin WALLACE

Address: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED]

Spouse: [REDACTED]

Education: Ballymena Academy and Belfast Tech.

Employment (pre MoD):

- Nov 1959 – Apprentice Chemist with JA Woodside & Co, Ballymena
- July 1962 – Sales Rep. Kuros Ltd, Ballymena
- (October 1962 – joined Royal Ulster Rifles (TA) as Lieutenant)
- July 1964 – Company Director, Photopress, Press Agency, Antrim
- (1966 – 1968 – member of 'B' Specials)
- 01/05/68 – commenced employment with MoD at HQNI

4. WALLACE and Kincora

On the 11th September 1984, Frederick HOLROYD handed over three Scrapbooks to Essex Police Special Branch; HOLROYD refused to tell police where had got the Scrapbooks from. These scrapbooks contained copies of correspondence between Colin WALLACE (who was then in prison) and a number of individuals including HOLROYD, legal representatives and MoD officials. Copies of press cuttings and a number of documents purportedly written by WALLACE whilst in prison are also included.

Within Scrapbook 6 (Exhibit GC85) there is 17 page report entitled "*Political and Security Implications regarding the Disclosure of Security Classified Information to assist in the Investigation of the Allegations relating to the Kincora Boys' Hostel, Belfast*", dated March 1982. This document is believed to have been written by Colin WALLACE but has not been verified. Seven pages of this report are exhibited as GC94¹.

Colin WALLACE claims that he was first made aware of 'the situation in Kincora'² in 1972, when an unnamed female social worker contacted him alleging that a boy in Kincora had told her that he was being sexually abused by the staff in the Home. WALLACE asserts that this social worker told him that similar accusations had been made by other Kincora residents and the matter had been reported to the RUC, although no action had been taken. The social worker, according to WALLACE, also voiced her concerns that William McGRATH was a homosexual.

Writing in March 1982, WALLACE alleges that he immediately reported the key points from his conversation with the female social worker to a member of the 'Intelligence staff'³ at Lisburn and asked him to raise the matter with the RUC.

Colin WALLACE claims that he had no further knowledge of Kincora until late 1973/early 1974, when he was asked by an MI5 officer to take part in a project "*designed to cause major dissention within the Loyalist leadership..., code named Clockwork Orange 2*"⁴. WALLACE says that he saw a report "*which allegedly came from the RUC*"⁵, which showed that a number of individuals with close links to the Rev. PAISLEY were involved in or aware of the Kincora situation. WALLACE also refers to another RUC report he had sight of in 1973/4, which was a lengthy report on allegations made by a Kincora resident.

¹ It is unclear who redacted the 17 page report, "*Political and Security Implications regarding the Disclosure of Security Classified Information to assist in the Investigation of the Allegations relating to the Kincora Boys' Hostel, Belfast*" and made it a 7 page exhibit.

² Exhibit GC94, File Ref: C64/22/85, dated March 1982

³ *ibid.*

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ *ibid*

According to WALLACE's own account⁶ from late 1973 he tried to 'leak' stories to the press about Kincora, in an effort to expose the ongoing abuse. There is evidence that in 1973 WALLACE briefed journalists about TARA, McGRATH and McGRATH's homosexuality. WALLACE claims to have briefed four journalists on Kincora between 1973 and 1976 – David McKITTRICK (Irish Times), Kevin DOWLING (Sunday Mirror), Conor O'CLEERY (Irish Times) and David BLUNDY (Sunday Times). All of these journalists acknowledge that they were briefed by WALLACE during this period, but none remembered having ever been briefed on Kincora⁷.

Colin WALLACE was named in the House of Commons⁸ by Gerry FITT, MP, as a witness in the Kincora affair because "he gave an interview to journalists in 1975 and made them aware of all aspects of Kincora⁹".

Despite this claim by Gerry FITT in the House of Commons, as well as WALLACE's own, repeated accounts of what he knew about Kincora, he has consistently refused to cooperate with any police or state-sponsored inquiry into Kincora. See section 13 below.

5. Time line of key events in John Colin WALLACE's [military] career until 1980

Date	Key Events	Further Information
01/05/1968	Started work as an (unestablished) Assistant Information Officer (IO) at HQNI.	
02/03/1970	Promoted to Acting Unestablished Information Officer, HQNI.	At his Promotion Board WALLACE was assessed as "putting up a very good performance" ¹⁰
14/12/1971	Promoted to 'Established' Information Officer, HQNI.	In his reference for this promotion WALLACE's work was described as outstanding and he was assessed as having the ability 'to rise two or more grades'. ¹¹
Jan. 1972	WALLACE was acting Captain in the UDR	
28/02/1973	Successfully completed the probationary period as Information Officer.	In his probation report, WALLACE was described as "loyal, conscientious and hardworking and deserving of promotion to SIO" ¹²
July 1974	Temporary promotion to Senior Information Officer (SIO).	This promotion coincided with the creation of the PSYOPS Unit and WALLACE's prominent role therein. WALLACE maintained his 'official' duties whilst being part of the Army's 'black' propaganda unit.
27/09/1974	WALLACE became a substantive SIO.	The Board recommended unanimously that WALLACE be made substantive and that "his good board performance was backed up by very good ACR's covering the four years since he was promoted to IO" ¹³

⁶ Exhibit GC94, File Ref: C64/22/85, dated March 1982

⁷ Statement of David McKITTRICK, 25/02/1982 and Exhibit DMck1, (part of RUC File C64/5/83), Statement of DS ELLIOTT re: interview of David BLUNDY, 16/12/1982, statement of Conor O'CLERY 27/09/1985 and Statement of Kevin DOWLING, 30/03/1982

⁸ House of Commons debate 18/2/1982- Gerry FITT MP

⁹ <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1982/feb/18/kincora-childrens-home>

¹⁰ Report from MoD Annex A Mr JC WALLACE Senior Information Officer Age 32 (02/07/75), part of Defence Secretariat Division 6c to Captain **Captain L** re: Colin John WALLACE

¹¹ Report from MoD Annex A Mr JC WALLACE Senior Information Officer Age 32 (02/07/75), part of Defence Secretariat Division 6c to Captain **Captain L** re: Colin John WALLACE

¹² Report from MoD Annex A Mr JC WALLACE Senior Information Officer Age 32 (02/07/75), part of Defence Secretariat Division 6c to Captain **Captain L** re: Colin John WALLACE

¹³ Report from MoD Annex A Mr JC WALLACE Senior Information Officer Age 32 (02/07/75), part of Defence Secretariat Division 6c to Captain **Captain L** re: Colin John WALLACE

Date	Key Events	Further Information
October 1974	WALLACE claims he was identified by certain journalists as being involved in black propaganda activities against the paramilitary organisations.	In late 1974, WALLACE's authorities found that as WALLACE had made " <i>unauthorised disclosures to journalists ... it was decided that, in view of the high standards required among PR staff in the exceptional political and military situation in Northern Ireland, Mr WALLACE could no longer be employed there</i> ¹⁴ ". The decision was taken to transfer WALLACE to HQ North West District. It is also alleged that the Security Service had carried out an investigation into certain suspected leaks to the Press in 1974 (involving WALLACE).
31/01/1975	Official farewell party for WALLACE at HQNI.	WALLACE claims this was organised to " <i>demonstrate that I was leaving Headquarters Northern Ireland on the best possible terms</i> ¹⁵ ".
04/02/1975	WALLACE delivered a RESTRICTED document to the home of Robert FISK, a journalist with the Times.	See section 6 below.
05/02/1975	Transferred from HQNI to HQ North West District, Preston as SIO.	
11/02/1975	WALLACE was interviewed by John GROVES, Chief of Public Relations, MoD in London on an " <i>administrative matter</i> ¹⁶ ". WALLACE was suspended without pay from the MoD until his case was heard by a Civil Service Disciplinary Board.	The 'administrative matter' referred to by GROVES was a conversation which involved WALLACE's admission to him that he had passed a classified document to a journalist. GROVE, in his 1975, statement claimed he had instructed WALLACE to tell police the whole truth [re WALLACE's role at HQNI].
25/06/1975	WALLACE was informed that he would be dismissed from the Civil Service for unauthorised passing of information. ¹⁷	
17/10/1975	WALLACE appealed to the Civil Service Appeal Board (CSAB); the hearing concluded that WALLACE could offer his resignation as an alternative to dismissal.	The CSAB concluded that there was justification for the MoD's decision to dismiss WALLACE. " <i>but having regard for his previous good record of service, if Mr WALLACE wished to offer his resignation the Dept. should accept this as an alternative to dismissal</i> ". ¹⁸ See Section 9 below re Calcutt Inquiry.
14/11/1975	WALLACE resigned from UDR.	
31/12/1975	WALLACE resigned from the MoD as an alternative to dismissal.	
Sept/ Oct 1976	WALLACE took up the post of Information Officer with Arun and District Council, Sussex.	
05/08/1980	Murder of Jonathan LEWIS (a Brighton-based Antiques dealer) - his body was found on the banks of the River Arun.	WALLACE was accused of murdering LEWIS (WALLACE had allegedly been having an affair with LEWIS' wife, Jane). The two men were due to attend a dinner party together on the night the murder took place.
18/09/1980	Sussex Police charged John Colin WALLACE with the murder of Jonathan LEWIS.	

¹⁴ Report from MoD Annex B to D/DS6/7/44/18 dated 10/08/82, Part 4 of C64/5/83

¹⁵ Statement after Caution of John Colin WALLACE 12/2/1975 part of C298/4/75

¹⁶ Statement of John GROVES, 07/06/1982, part of C64/5/83

¹⁷ Information obtained from an NIO response to a Parliamentary question December 1989- enclosed as part of correspondence between the Permanent Under Secretary at the NIO and the Deputy Chief Constable RUC

¹⁸ *ibid.*

Date	Key Events	Further Information
20/03/1981	WALLACE pleaded not guilty to murder but was found guilty of manslaughter and imprisoned for 10 years.	
12/02/1982	WALLACE was refused leave to appeal at the Royal Courts of Justice, London.	
December 1986	WALLACE was released on parole from prison.	
Sept 1990	WALLACE was awarded compensation for wrongful dismissal from the MoD following the publication of the CALCUTT Inquiry.	£30,000 awarded to WALLACE. See Section 9 below re Calcutt Inquiry.
09/10/1996	WALLACE'S conviction for manslaughter was quashed and the Court of Appeal ruled that WALLACE should not face a retrial.	In a reserved judgment, Lord Bingham, the Lord Chief Justice, and two other judges ruled the conviction unsafe and cleared Mr Wallace after new medical evidence led to the case being referred by the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, for review.

6. Alleged Passing of Classified Documents to Unauthorised Persons in 1975

On the 4th February 1975, a restricted document was delivered to an address in Hillsborough occupied by a journalist from the Times newspaper, Robert FISK. A subsequent police and military investigation concluded that the document had been delivered by John Colin WALLACE.

When WALLACE was initially interviewed by the RUC¹⁹ he denied passing the restricted document in question to FISK. Instead, WALLACE told police that he had left FISK 6 photographs in an envelope for the journalist to use in a forthcoming book he was publishing about the Ulster Worker's Strike. By the time WALLACE was re interviewed by RUC officers on the 12th February²⁰, he admitted to having passed classified documents to FISK on the 4th February 1975. During this police interview, WALLACE also admitted that he had previously passed and/or 'leaked' other classified documents and sensitive military information to FISK and other journalists, as part of his role in PSYOPS.

In his statement of the 12th February 1975, WALLACE claimed that in October 1974 he had been identified by a number of journalists as being involved in "*black propaganda against the paramilitary organisations*". WALLACE's authorities believed that continued press interest in his role would expose the work of PSYOPS and so "*for reasons of personal safety I was posted to HQ North West District*"²¹. WALLACE told police during interview, that Peter BRODERICK, a former Chief Information Officer at HQNI (and WALLACE's immediate superior) could verify WALLACE's account (particularly in relation to his work in PSYOPS). Mr BRODERICK was not interviewed. Two other senior MoD officials²² (Chief Information Officer David McDINE and Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy RAILTON) who had been named by WALLACE as having direct knowledge of his work in PSYOPS, were interviewed by the RUC, but did not make mention of the existence/ work of PSYOPS in their statements.

¹⁹ Statement of Colin WALLACE 06/02/1975

²⁰ Statement of Colin WALLACE 12/02/1975

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Statements of David McDINE 28/02/1975 and Lt Col RAILTON 04/03/1975

A file was prepared by the RUC and sent to the DPP in March 1975 on the alleged passing of a classified document to an unauthorised person. The DPP recommended 'No Prosecution' as "*the public interest might better be served by disciplinary proceedings than by a prosecution*"²³.

7. Disciplinary Action by the MoD against WALLACE and the Civil Service Appeals Board 1975

Disciplinary procedures were taken against WALLACE by the MoD and he appeared at a hearing of the Civil Services Appeal Board in June 1975.

The case against WALLACE in 1975 comprised of 4 charges:

1. He retained a classified document from his time in Ireland without authorisation
2. That he passed it on to someone unauthorised to receive it
3. That he prevaricated when asked about this document by police
4. That he continued to answer press queries about Northern Ireland affairs after being posted to Preston even though he had been explicitly instructed not to do so.

The case against WALLACE concluded with Charges 1 and 2 proven whilst 3 and 4 were disregarded. It was decided that, despite his previous good record, he could no longer be employed in a position of trust or responsibility and should therefore be dismissed. On the 25th June 1975, WALLACE was informed that he would be dismissed from the Civil Service.

Colin WALLACE appealed this decision and his appeal was heard on the 17th October 1975 at the Civil Services Appeal Board (CSAB). At the hearing, Peter BRODERICK provided evidence²⁴ on WALLACE's behalf, which confirmed WALLACE's version that he had been employed as an "*unattributable briefer for top journalists, the person who feeds psychological warfare lines to the ears of the press. He [WALLACE] is required to prepare his own material after liaising with intelligence, to meet top journalists face to face and to make individual and on the spot decisions on matters of national security during such interviews*"²⁵. The MoD did not contest BRODERICK's account.

The Appeal hearing found that the previous decision of dismissal was justified; however, "*having regard to his [WALLACE's] previous good record of service, they recommended that, if WALLACE wished to offer his resignation, the Department should accept this as an alternative to dismissal*"²⁶. WALLACE subsequently offered his resignation, which was accepted with effect from 31 December 1975.

8. Murder of Jonathon LEWIS

On the 5th August 1980, Jonathon LEWIS was found dead in the River Arun; LEWIS was a friend of Colin WALLACE and there were suspicions that WALLACE had been having an affair with LEWIS' wife, Jane.

²³ Barry SHAW, Director of Public Prosecutions NI, 19/05/1975

²⁴ GC86 (C64/22/85)

²⁵ quoted in Annex A, correspondence between NIO and RUC 1/12/1989

²⁶ Report from MoD Annex B to D/DS6/7/44/18 dated 10/08/1982, Part 4 of C64/2/80

On the 18th September 1980, WALLACE was charged with the murder of Mr LEWIS. At his trial in March 1981, WALLACE pleaded 'not guilty' to murder but was subsequently found 'guilty' of manslaughter and received a 10 year jail sentence.

During his time in prison, WALLACE began his 'campaign' to profess his innocence in the murder of LEWIS, claiming he had been 'set-up' by the Intelligence Services over his knowledge of the use of psychological warfare in Northern Ireland by the MoD/Intelligence Services, particularly in relation to the *Clockwork Orange* project and the Kincora Boys' Home. WALLACE wrote to, amongst others, his Legal Advisors, MPs, Government Ministers, the Prime Minister and journalists in an attempt to get his manslaughter conviction overturned. On three occasions he petitioned the Home Office "*over the inadequate Sussex police force investigation and the disturbing conduct of the police during his trial*"²⁷. In December 1986, WALLACE was released from HMP Lewes on parole.

WALLACE's conviction was quashed on the 9th October 1996 in light of new forensic and other evidence. Lord BINGHAM, the Lord Chief Justice, ruled the conviction was 'unsafe', however he also commented that "*there could be no doubt that Mr WALLACE's dishonest and deceptive course of conduct raised a formidable case against him*"²⁸.

9. CALCUTT Inquiry 1990

On the 30th January 1990, the Minister of State for Defence, Archie HAMILTON MP, told the House of Commons that a re-examination of departmental records had uncovered a number of previously unseen documents relating to Mr WALLACE's case. These documents raised questions over "*the presentation of Mr WALLACE's case to the Civil Service Appeal Board*"²⁹; confirmed the existence of, and WALLACE's involvement in, the project known as 'Clockwork Orange'³⁰.

Information from the papers that were uncovered indicated that "*when the case was made to establish Mr WALLACE's post, it was proposed that its duties should include responsibilities for providing unattributable covert briefings to the press; and it was stated that the incumbent would be required to make on the spot decisions on matters of National Security*"³¹. Mr HAMILTON MP went on to tell the House of Commons that it appeared that the responsibilities in WALLACE's job description were made orally rather than in writing to those who approved the establishment of the SIO post. He continued that WALLACE had in fact been involved in unattributable briefings prior to the establishment of the post for some time, which may have included "*disinformation*"³². Mr HAMILTON advised Parliament, that in light of the discovery of this new documentation, "*it would be right to consider again the handling of Mr WALLACE's appeal to the CSAB*" and as such advised that David CALCUTT QC had been appointed to make an investigation of the papers on these matters. CALCUTT's terms of reference were as follows:

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ In the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) The Lord Chief Justice of England at the Royal Courts of Justice (Lord Bingham), Mr Justice OWEN and Mr Justice CONNELL.

²⁹ House of Commons Hansard Debate 30/01/1990 vol. 166

³⁰ A project which involved placing disinformation stories in the press as part of a psychological warfare operation by British Intelligence Services.

³¹ House of Commons Hansard Debate 30/01/1990 vol. 166

³² House of Commons Hansard Debate 30/01/1990 vol. 166

“to consider, and to advise the Secretary of State for Defence, whether an injustice was done to Mr Colin WALLACE as a result of the manner in which his case was presented to the Civil Service Appeal Board when on 17th October 1975 it considered the decision of the MoD to terminate his employment on disciplinary grounds; and, if so, to recommend whether compensation should be paid to him³³”.

The Government subsequently accepted the findings of the CALCUTT Inquiry, which was published on 13th September 1990, and WALLACE was awarded £30,000 in compensation.

Investigations by the CALCUTT Inquiry did not find any evidence that WALLACE’s dismissal in 1975 had anything to do with his alleged knowledge of abuse in Kincora. *“The Inquiry cast no new light on Mr WALLACE’s wider allegations that there was ... a cover-up by the security forces of information about homosexual abuse of boys at Kincora³⁴”.*

10. WALLACE’s association with John Frederick HOLROYD

Frederick John HOLROYD is a former Captain in Military Intelligence in the British Army who was stationed in Northern Ireland in the 1970’s. HOLROYD resigned from the Army in August 1976 after having been removed from his position in Northern Ireland in May 1975³⁵ following concerns over his mental health. HOLROYD claims he first met Colin WALLACE, briefly, at HQNI in 1973; but only *“learnt of his [WALLACE’s] misfortunes in early 1984³⁶”.*

In April and May 1984 a number of articles written by an investigative journalist, Duncan CAMPBELL (in collaboration with HOLROYD) were published in the New Statesman journal, which exposed many of HOLROYD’s claims of RUC/Army ‘dirty tricks’. HOLROYD also made a number of TV appearances at this time, during which he exalted his long-held allegations. As a result of this media exposure, WALLACE subsequently wrote to CAMPBELL from prison, and offered *“to help him [HOLROYD] in any way possible”.*³⁷ Thereafter, WALLACE and HOLROYD began writing frequently to each other and HOLROYD became a regular visitor to WALLACE in prison.

In September 1984, HOLROYD handed over 3 Scrapbooks³⁸ to Essex Police Special Branch. These scrapbooks contained copies of letters from WALLACE to HOLROYD and other documents pertinent to WALLACE’s ‘case’. HOLROYD handed over 3 further scrapbooks³⁹ and documents in November 1984, including the document known as ‘GC80’ and ‘GC95’. HOLROYD refused to confirm the sources for all the documents that he handed over to Essex Police, but it can be deduced that many of them originated from Colin WALLACE. The RUC subsequently investigated the contents of the documents handed to police by HOLROYD, including a protracted review of GC80 and submitted a file⁴⁰ to the DPP recommending that no further action be taken. The DPP accepted this recommendation.

HOLROYD claimed that WALLACE told him that he had leaked details of abuse of Kincora residents by politicians and others to the press.

³³ *ibid.*

³⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵ Statement of Frederick J HOLROYD, 19/09/82 (Part of RUC File C64/5/83)

³⁶ Exhibit GC92 – Letter from HOLROYD to PM Margaret THATCHER, 01/11/84 (C64/22/85)

³⁷ Letter from Colin WALLACE c/o HMP Lewes 2/5/1984, ‘Dear Duncan...’

³⁸ hereafter referred to as Exhibits GC85, GC81 and GC86 (part of C64/22/85)

³⁹ hereafter referred to as Exhibits GC87, GC88 and GC89 (part of C64/22/85)

⁴⁰ C64/22/85

After an initial ‘flurry’ of correspondence and liaison between HOLROYD and WALLACE in summer 1984 (both directly and through third parties), contact between the two appears to have dissipated once WALLACE’s ‘case’ was taken up by journalists and politicians.

11. WALLACE’s association with Security Services

WALLACE is not believed to have been an employee of MI5, however, his role within role within PSYOPS put him in close contact with the Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland, and wider afield. Colin WALLACE makes a number of references to an MI5 officer, ‘Officer A’⁴¹, who he claims ‘tasked’ him in relation to his ‘Clockwork Orange’ work at HQNI. Ken LIVINGSTONE, MP, claimed in Parliament⁴² that Colin WALLACE was an agent of MI5.

12. [REDACTED]

Colin WALLACE married his wife, [REDACTED] in 1975. It is not believed that they have any children. Research for this profile suggests that the couple met through their work.

Following Colin WALLACE’s resignation from the MoD in December 1975, [REDACTED] was allegedly forced to resign “because of the possibility of adverse publicity relating to my [CW] case”⁴³. The couple moved to Arundel, Sussex in 1976. When WALLACE was charged with the manslaughter of Jonathon LEWIS in 1981, the Duke had offered to give him bail⁴⁴.

13. Detailed overview of attempts to persuade WALLACE to cooperate with investigations into abuse at Kincora

The table below sets out a detailed catalogue of attempts by various official bodies (including police and MoD) to elicit from WALLACE the information he purports to have in relation to abuse at Kincora.

Date	Events	Overview
11/03/1982	MORGAN-HARRIS wrote to Sir George TERRY on behalf of WALLACE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WALLACE⁴⁵ refused D/Supt HARRISON’s request to interview him at HMP Wormwood Scrubs following the request from Sussex Police to interview WALLACE.
15/03/1982	Sir George TERRY wrote to MORGAN-HARRIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sir George wrote that he assumed from the letter of 11th March that “it amounts to a refusal by you client [WALLACE] to provide evidence to my thorough and impartial investigation”⁴⁶. Sir George concludes the letter by stating that the RUC may request to see WALLACE in the future as part of their continuing enquiries into the Kincora affair and “any such visit to your client by the RUC will not include any officer from my enquiry team”⁴⁷.
18/03/1982	MORGAN-HARRIS wrote to Sir George TERRY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MORGAN-HARRIS wrote in response to the letter of 15th March 1982 noting WALLACE’s intention not to hamper or withhold information from the Sussex Investigation. He further states that WALLACE is concerned that by divulging sensitive information he may be in breach of the OSA.

⁴¹ see Exhibit GC95 (C64/22/85)

⁴² Hansard 27/06/1989

⁴³ Exhibit GC87, c64/22/85

⁴⁴ The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1995 and the Search for Peace by Tim Pat COOGAN

⁴⁵ Exhibit GC62, part of C64/5/83

⁴⁶ Exhibit 12, part of Sussex Review

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

Date	Events	Overview
25/03/1982	D/Supt CASKEY and D/Sgt ELLIOTT saw WALLACE in HMP Wormwood Scrubs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WALLACE declined to make a written statement⁴⁸. CASKEY showed WALLACE two documents – ‘TARA’ (written by David McKITTRICK) allegedly based on a briefing by WALLACE. The second document was entitled ‘the Folio Document’ relating to homosexual activities within the DUP. Neither of these documents mentioned Kincora. • WALLACE outlined the assurances he required before he would assist officers in their investigations – legal aid, clearance to break the OSA, protection for his family and his manslaughter case. • WALLACE told RUC that his “<i>direct knowledge [children at risk in Northern Ireland Children’s Homes] stopped in 1974</i>”. Later in the interview he contradicts himself by saying “<i>my direct knowledge [children at risk in Northern Ireland Children’s Homes] stopped in January 1975</i>”. • WALLACE claimed that his knowledge [of children at risk in Northern Ireland Children’s Homes] was wider than Kincora; he refused to name the other children’s homes involved.
28/04/1982	D/I MACK and D/Sgt ELLIOTT interviewed WALLACE again at HMP Lewes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WALLACE declined to make a written statement⁴⁹. • WALLACE agreed to the interview but reiterated that his four concerns had not changed since March 1982. • WALLACE told police he had made a number of people (journalists and others) aware of Kincora and homosexuality in the 1970s, including McKITTRICK. • WALLACE confirmed that he had not informed any police officer directly about Kincora. • WALLACE stated that files existed in Lisburn (HQNI) re: Kincora at the time he was in Northern Ireland. • WALLACE told police that he worked on Kincora and TARA for a period of 6 months in 1974, having come to notice from an informant. He claimed that he wanted something done about Kincora in 1974 and it upset him that “<i>things</i>” were going on. This is at odds with WALLACE’s assertion in Exhibit GC94⁵⁰, that he became ‘involved’ in Kincora in 1972 when a social worker informed him of abuse in the Home. • He further stated that his information (in relation to Kincora) was not in relation to the “<i>cover-up aspect</i>”⁵¹.
14/06/1982	Sir Frank COOPER wrote to Mr STEPHENS re: WALLACE’s immunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COOPER commented that he had discussed with Mr WOODFIELD WALLACE’s immunity from prosecution and agreed that the RUC should seek directions from the Attorney General. COOPER also suggested that “<i>a letter or a visit [to WALLACE] from someone in MoD might also be needed</i>” and recommended D Sy Army (then Major General GARRETT).
10/07/1982	Letter from Barry SHAW, to the RUC Chief Constable granting WALLACE immunity from prosecution under the OSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SHAW confirmed that WALLACE “<i>would not be prosecuted for any breach of the OSA in respect of any communication by him to ... the RUC of information relating to homosexual offences in Northern Ireland. Mr WALLACE may be so informed</i>”⁵².

⁴⁸ Statement of D/Sgt ELLIOTT re: interview of John Colin WALLACE, dated 23/04/82.

⁴⁹ Statement of D/Sgt ELLIOTT re: interview of John Colin WALLACE, dated 05/05/82.

⁵⁰ Exhibit GC94, part of File C64/22/85

⁵¹ Paragraph 178 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁵² Letter from Barry SHAW to Chief Constable, dated 10/07/82

Date	Events	Overview
16/07/1982	WOODFIELD's Private Secretary advised COOPER re: immunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirmed that the Attorney General agreed that a "limited immunity should be granted covering information which Mr WALLACE provided about homosexual activity in NI"⁵³.
27/07/1982	D/Supt CASKEY and DI COOKE interviewed WALLACE at HMP Lewes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WALLACE declined to make a written statement⁵⁴. CASKEY read a letter from the DPP to Colin WALLACE⁵⁵ and details of answers to his [WALLACE'S] other three conditions. WALLACE considered that he had still not got sufficient clearance to disclose the information he had. He told CASKEY that the only authority he would accept was a written consent from the MoD (Sir Frank COOPER).
16/08/1982	WOODFIELD again wrote to COOPER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WOODFIELD asked if the MoD could give WALLACE the further immunity he required⁵⁶.
01/09/1982	COOPER replied to WOODFIELD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> COOPER replied following legal advice from a Mr SHELDON. COOPER expressed caution stating that he was "concerned about the breadth of some of the questions put to Mr WALLACE by the RUC and of the immunity given by the DPP"⁵⁷.
21/09/1982	Meeting between RUC, DPP (NI), MoD and Security Service(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At this meeting the RUC "made it quite plain that they were most anxious that there should be no valid grounds for suggesting that there had been any sort of cover-up in connection with their current investigation"⁵⁸. Mr MILLER expressed concern that WALLACE's testimony might say something which would prejudice the sources or methods employed. RUC undertook to ensure "that anything which Mr WALLACE said touching on those fields would be kept separate from the remainder of his evidence and recorded in a classified report". The MoD representatives accepted these arrangements. It was agreed by all attendees that WALLACE be given some form of authorisation "so that he could not reasonably plead that MoD had prevented him from giving evidence"⁵⁹.
25/10/1982	GARRETT wrote to ACC WHITESIDE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This letter contained a sealed envelope with another letter granting partial release from provisions of the OSA to be handed to WALLACE by D/Supt CASKEY. The letter addressed to WALLACE stated "you may disclose to Supt G CASKEY and Insp SE COOKE ... the information that is in your possession which is directly relevant to the investigation – including, where necessary, information which you gained in the course of your employment with the MoD and which is security classified"⁶⁰.
28/10/1982	Mr WIGGIN wrote to Mr Michael MARSHALL MP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This letter was to advise MARSHALL of the developments of the 25th October⁶¹ (see above).

⁵³ Paragraph 180 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁵⁴ Interview notes re: interview of WALLACE by CASKEY and COOKE, 27/07/82.

⁵⁵ Letter from Barry SHAW, Director of Public Prosecutions NI to Chief Constable re: the Kincora Enquiry – military intelligence and john Colin WALLACE, dated 10/07/82.

⁵⁶ Paragraph 184 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁵⁷ Paragraph 185 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁵⁸ Paragraph 186 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁰ Paragraph 188 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁶¹ *ibid.*

Date	Events	Overview
11/11/1982	D/Supt CASKEY and DI COOKE again met with WALLACE at HMP Lewes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> D/Supt. CASKEY handed WALLACE a sealed envelope containing a letter from the MoD (see above). Having read the letter, WALLACE told the RUC officers that <i>"I am unable to provide any information whatsoever relating to this investigation"</i>.⁶² CASKEY commented that <i>"WALLACE had been surprised at the favourable reaction of the Ministry of Defence and that his 'bluff' had been called"</i>.⁶³
13/11/1982	WALLACE wrote to GARRETT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The letter stated that the authority given to him [WALLACE] was not enough for him to give the RUC information and required a <i>"precise definition of the term directly relevant"</i>.⁶⁴
26/11/1982	GARRETT wrote to MILLER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GARRETT suggested that he <i>"should offer to arrange for an Army rep. to be available at the time of Mr WALLACE's interview by the RUC to advise him on his responses to specific questions"</i>.⁶⁵
07/12/1982	MILLER replies to GARRETT re: letter of 26/11/82	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MILLER did not concur with GARRETT's suggestion as he felt that it <i>"could place the [Army] individual in a very difficult position as it might appear as an attempt to influence the evidence of Mr WALLACE to the RUC"</i>.⁶⁶
13/12/1982	GARRETT wrote again to WALLACE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GARRETT repeated that the MoD has given WALLACE authorisation (as per the letter of the 25/10/82) to <i>"disclose to two named RUC Officers any relevant information, even if this involves your divulge certain items of classified information, to enable the RUC to investigate fully allegations of criminal offences involving homosexual conduct in, or connected with the Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast"</i>.
13/12/1982	Mr MARSHALL MP wrote to the Prime Minister, Margaret THATCHER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MARSHALL wrote to the PM after speaking with WALLACE's wife. The letter reiterated WALLACE's concerns about <i>"giving evidence which could lead to possible charges against him or reduce his prospects of winning his appeal, gaining remission or finding employment after leaving prison"</i>.⁶⁷
16/12/1982	Mr MARSHALL MP's letter was forwarded by Sir Robert ARMSTRONG to the Mr NURSAW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ARMSTRONG sought comments from COOPER and WOODFIELD.⁶⁸
22/12/1982	NURSAW replied to ARMSTRONG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NURSAW proposed that the RUC prepare a list of questions they wished to put to WALLACE; WOODFIELD did not favour this idea.
27/12/1982	Second letter from WALLACE to GARRETT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WALLACE stated in this letter that he could not decide what was relevant unless he knew the precise ToR of the RUC investigation. WALLACE asked whether he could <i>"disclose information about Homes other than Kincora, the death of Brian McDERMOTT, disinformation material based on Kincora used for other projects, the sources of his Kincora material and how this material was used"</i>.⁶⁹

⁶² Statement of D/Supt CASKEY 14/1/1983 re interview of WALLACE in HMP Lewes 11/11/82

⁶³ Minute from D/Supt CASKEY to ACC 'Crime' 2/11/1983

⁶⁴ Paragraph 189 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Paragraph 192 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁶⁸ Paragraph 193 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁶⁹ Paragraph 194 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

Date	Events	Overview
27/01/1983	PM replied to Mr MARSHALL MP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mrs THATCHER repeated the earlier assurances given to WALLACE, commenting <i>"it seems to me that Mr WALLACE has been given all the assurances he could expect or need to enable him to make available to the police any relevant information he may have, without fear that it will subsequently be used against him"</i>⁷⁰.
14/02/1983	WALLACE wrote to Mr MORGAN-HARRIS re: PM's letter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WALLACE felt that the response had gone a long way <i>"towards resolving one of the two outstanding difficulties. (The other was legal aid)"</i>. WALLACE suggested that the PM should allow him to produce a statement of all the information he considered relevant⁷¹. MORGAN-HARRIS forwarded this letter to Mr MARSHALL MP who subsequently sent it to the PM.
09/03/1983	WALLACE's letter was passed to the Lord HAILSHAM, by the PM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This letter dealt with the legal aid point raised by WALLACE.
13/04/1983	HAILSHAM wrote to Mr MARSHALL MP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This letter stated that legal aid would be paid to WALLACE, subject to certain conditions.
07/06/1983	HAILSHAM wrote to WALLACE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HAILSHAM's letter stated that as <i>"the DPP had recently announced that this inquiries into the Kincora affair are complete and that no further criminal proceedings will be instituted. In this situation it is difficult to see how you can qualify for legal aid"</i>.
20/08/1983	WALLACE wrote to the Right Honourable HM Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In this letter WALLACE asked for various matters relating to possible links between his case and the circumstances surrounding Kincora, investigated⁷².
01/09/1984	WALLACE wrote to Mr MARSHALL MP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WALLACE wrote this letter in response to correspondence from (see above). WALLACE again repeated that he was <i>"conscious of the fact that the disclosure of my information relating to Kincora could be very embarrassing for the present government"</i>⁷³.
01/11/1984	HOLROYD wrote, on behalf of WALLACE, to PM Margaret THATCHER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This correspondence contained a dossier of documents relating to WALLACE⁷⁴. A copy was also sent to MORGAN-HARRIS.
30/03/1985	Letter from WALLACE to Sir John HERMAN, RUC CC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WALLACE refuses CASKEY's request to interview him at HMP Lewes
04/04/1985	MORGAN-HARRIS wrote to RUC via D/Supt FLENLEY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintaining WALLACE's position that pre-requisites had not been met ahead of WALLACE discussing his knowledge of Kincora with the RUC⁷⁵.

⁷⁰ Paragraph 196 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁷¹ Paragraph 197 Extracts from MoD Report provided to RUC on 29/12/89

⁷² Exhibit GC93, part of C64/22/85

⁷³ Exhibit GC84, part of C64/22/85

⁷⁴ Exhibit GC98, part of C64/22/85

⁷⁵ Part 4, C64/22/85

Date	Events	Overview
04/04/1985	Letter from Sec. to the Hughes Inquiry to Mr MORGAN-HARRIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Placing on record that the Inquiry wished to interview WALLACE in relation to 9 specific allegations made in material purportedly written by WALLACE which had been passed to the Inquiry.
21/04/1985	Letter from WALLACE to Mr MORGAN HARRIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WALLACE asked for a copy of this letter to be forwarded to the Hughes Inquiry WALLACE makes a number of points as to why he is not in a position to be interviewed by the Inquiry, notably, the requirement to have: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> legal costs paid <i>"clear, unambiguous, written authority to disclose classified information which I consider relevant to the Inquiry"</i> <i>an acceptance of the fact that I would not be prepared to disclose the identity of any of my sources or members of the Intelligence services".</i>⁷⁶
24/04/1985	Letter from Sec. to the Hughes Inquiry to Mr MORGAN-HARRIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Letter addresses 2 specific points raised by WALLACE in his letter of 2/4/85: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>"Reasonable legal costs... will be met out of public funds"</i> <i>Your client's anxiety about being in contempt is groundless. The Committee has no powers of contempt".</i>⁷⁷
25/04/1985	Letter from MORGAN HARRIS to Sec. of the Hughes Inquiry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Correspondence over WALLACE's position and his attendance for interview with the Hughes Inquiry.
30/04/1985	Letter from NIO to Sec. of Hughes Inquiry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advising the Hughes Inquiry that a copy of the file sent to the PM on 1/11/84 by HOLROYD was not copied and therefore not available to share with the Inquiry.
03/05/1985	Letter from the Sec. of the Hughes Inquiry to Mr MORGAN HARRIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides a detailed breakdown of the Committee of Inquiry's Terms of Reference and asks for their client to consider whether he has information relevant to the Committee's ToRs.
03/05/1985	Letter from Sec. of the Hughes Inquiry to Mjr LOFTUS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seeking authorisation from the MoD to disclose certain documents disclosed by HOLROYD to WALLACE Raised the issue of WALLACE's position re the Official Secrets Act.
03/05/1985	Letter from Sec. of Hughes Inquiry to ACC MELLOR (RUC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>"You are aware of the efforts which the Committee has been making to establish whether JC WALLACE can assist the Inquiry".</i> Asks for a copy of the Forensic Report re Exhibit GC80⁷⁸.
11/05/1985	Letter from WALLACE to his solicitor Mr MORGAN-HARRIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Response to letter from the Hughes Inquiry to his solicitor of the 3/5/85 <i>"...it would appear that there are no major points of conflict between myself and the Committee and I hope that we can now press ahead as quickly as possible to have the matter brought to a successful conclusion- subject of course to a positive response from the PM's office".</i>

⁷⁶ Part 4, C64/22/85

⁷⁷ Part 4, C64/22/85

⁷⁸ Exhibit GC80 part of File C64/22/85

Date	Events	Overview
13/05/1985	Letter from ACC MELLOR to Sec. of the Hughes Inquiry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reply to request (see above) RUC unable to provide the Inquiry with copy of WALLACE's material or the Forensics Report.
23/05/1985	Letter from Sec. of Hughes Inquiry to Mjr LOFTUS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seeking an urgent response to the letter of 03/05/85.
11/06/1985	MORGAN-HARRIS wrote to Sir John HERMAN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enclosed was a copy of a letter from WALLACE dated 04/04/85 confirming he would be willing to cooperate with the RUC subject to his solicitor being present at the interview and <i>"of course, the necessary clearance being made available"</i>⁷⁹.
05/07/1985	Letter from Sec. of Hughes Inquiry to Mr MAINWOOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seeking clarification re WALLACE's authority to disclose classified information to the Inquiry and seeking an extremely urgent response.
11/07/1985	Supt WJ THOMPSON wrote to MORGAN-HARRIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This letter acknowledges WALLACE's refusal to speak to RUC officers but offers him the opportunity, should he change his mind, to make contact with the RUC, at a later date.
19/07/1985	MORGAN-HARRIS responds to RUC letter dated 11/07/85	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A strongly worded letter refuting that WALLACE was withholding information and was willing to cooperate if his pre-requisites were met.
06/08/1985	Letter from Sec. to the Hughes Inquiry to Mr MORGAN HARRIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enclosed was an envelope containing an authorisation (dated 16/7/85) from the MoD for Mr WALLACE to disclose relevant information to the Hughes Inquiry Requested a copy of the file sent to the PM on the 1/11/84 from WALLACE himself as the file had been returned to HOLROYD on the 21/11/84. Concluded <i>"I suggest that the way is now clear for your client to be interviewed on behalf of the Committee"</i>.
21/08/1985	Supt WJ THOMPSON responds to letter dated 19/07/85 from MORGAN-HARRIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This letter again offered WALLACE the opportunity to have an interview with RUC officers at some date in the future.

Between 1982 and 1985 WALLACE was involved in correspondence with Sussex Police, the RUC, the MoD, the Prime Minister's Office, the Lord Chancellor's Office, the Northern Ireland Office, his MP and the Hughes Inquiry about his 'ability' to provide what information he had, in relation to Kincora.

The key findings from the above table are noted as:

- WALLACE's initial refusal to cooperate with the Sussex Investigation in March 1982 was because he felt their investigation was not impartial and concern over his potential breach of the Official Secrets Act.
- In March 1982 WALLACE declined to make a written statement to the RUC and outlined the four assurances he required before he would assist officers in their investigations:
 - Legal aid
 - Clearance to break Official Secrets Act

⁷⁹ *ibid.*

- Protection for his family
 - Review of his manslaughter case
- By June 1982 the issue of WALLACE's immunity from prosecution was being discussed between senior government officials (MoD).
- In July 1982 WALLACE was granted immunity from prosecution by the DPP (NI); WALLACE did not consider this authority to be sufficient to disclose the information he had.
- WALLACE was granted written, partial release from the provisions of the OSA by the MoD in October 1982. WALLACE rejected this offer in November.
- The MoD provided a second letter of reassurance to WALLACE in December 1982.
- In January 1983, the Prime Minister, Margaret THATCHER, reiterated the earlier assurances given to WALLACE by the MoD.
- By February 1983 WALLACE's refusal to cooperate appear to be limited to the lack of legal aid afforded to him. In April 1983, the Lord Chancellor told WALLACE that legal aid would be available to him (subject to certain conditions)⁸⁰.
- In August 1983 WALLACE linked Kincora to his own manslaughter case and asked for the matter to be investigated by the Home Secretary.
- After a flurry of correspondence between WALLACE and others in 1982 and 1983, there was a distinct decline in activity in 1984.
- Again, in 1985, the RUC made a number of attempts to interview WALLACE in prison. All attempts were refused with WALLACE reiterating that all his pre-requisites had not been met. The last attempt by the RUC to interview WALLACE was in August 1985.
- Repeated efforts by the Hughes Inquiry to interview WALLACE were also made in 1985, in relation to the documents handed to Essex Police by HOLROYD and which were reportedly written by WALLACE.
- Despite repeated assurances from the MoD that WALLACE could disclose relevant information to the Inquiry, WALLACE has never provided any evidence to this Inquiry or police investigation.
- There is no material available to the authors of this report to determine if WALLACE had any further contact with police, MoD or others after August 1985.
- WALLACE was released from prison in December 1986 and has continued to profess to have sensitive information on Kincora and to claim that intelligence agencies knew of abuse at Kincora but let it happen for political blackmail purposes.

⁸⁰ This offer of legal aid was subsequently withdrawn following the conclusion of the DPP's enquiries into Kincora.

RESTRICTED

Kincora - Exhibit GC11

Analysis of Exhibit GC80

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

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1. Introduction

This report provides a detailed assessment of a four page document entitled "**TARA – reports regarding criminal offences associated with the homosexual community in Belfast**". It was purportedly written by John Colin WALLACE in November 1974. WALLACE is a former member of the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) Information Policy Unit attached to HQNI. This document will hereafter be referred to as GC80, the exhibit number it was given by the RUC in 1984 (the 'GC' in this instance referring to D/Supt George CASKEY).¹

This document suggests that both the RUC and Military had knowledge of William McGRATH's homosexuality but failed to investigate any allegations of homosexual assaults on residents of Kincora Hostel. This report further claims that similar allegations had been made concerning other residential children's homes in Northern Ireland. It should be noted, however, that the document does not contain any specific complaints by alleged victims, or any details of victims or offences which would have assisted a [police] investigation.

This analytical report has been produced as part of the ongoing strategic analytical overview of Kincora- related material held by the Police Service of Northern Ireland. It should be read in conjunction with other Kincora related analysis.

2. Executive Summary

- Questions over the style, contents and accuracy of the document, as well as a total repudiation by military personnel over its production in 1974 casts doubt over the authenticity of the information contained within GC80.
- There is no evidence that the RUC were aware of the existence of the document, now known as GC80, prior to August 1984. On that date a copy of the document was given to Essex Police by Fred HOLROYD; it was later shared with the RUC.
- Research for this report has identified that the RUC knew that their copy of GC80 was a re-typed version of the original document; the original has never been traced.
- RUC forensic examination of GC80 suggests that page one of the document had been interfered with.
- Certain details contained within GC80 are unlikely to have been known by WALLACE in 1974. For example, allegations are made about Raymond SEMPLE, yet there were no complaints made to anyone about SEMPLE before 1980.
- There is no evidence, as viewed by the authors, to substantiate a number of claims made by WALLACE in GC80.
- There is evidence that WALLACE briefed journalists in 1973 about TARA, McGRATH and his homosexuality; none of the journalists recollect Kincora or his employment at a boys' home having ever been mentioned at these briefings.
- WALLACE claims to have been so concerned with the ongoing abuse in Kincora and "*stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels*"; it therefore seems inexplicable that he did not mention to journalists all that he already knew about Kincora.
- WALLACE has repeatedly refused to cooperate with police investigations and therefore questions relating to GC80 have not been answered by him.

¹ Exhibit GC80, part of RUC File C64/22/85

- WALLACE has never authenticated the document.
- If the document is genuine however, it indicates that the RUC and Military knew about abuse at Kincora in 1974 and that neither took action to stop it.

3. Background

The document GC80 appears to have been brought to the attention of the police for the first time on the 7th August 1984²; Fred HOLROYD produced a four page document to Essex Police, which he told them had been written by WALLACE and “sent to an MI5 officer at HQNI”.³ The details of the classification, the person the report was written to and the department it was to be shared with were blanked out on the document shown to the Essex police. HOLROYD claimed he knew the identity of the MI5 officer but would not disclose it to the police officers. The RUC (D/Supt G CASKEY) was subsequently informed of HOLROYD’s meeting with the ESSEX police, where the report allegedly written by WALLACE was discussed; however it is not clear if the actual report (GC80) was copied and shared with the RUC at this time. Subsequent internal RUC communication from September 1984 shows that the RUC dismissed HOLROYD’s information, “there is nothing new that require any further investigation”.⁴

On the 21st November 1984 HOLROYD again met with Essex Police and handed over a quantity of documents, most of which related to correspondence between himself and WALLACE (who was, at that stage, writing from prison). Amongst the material was the four page document (GC80) which HOLROYD had referred to in the previous meeting with them in August 1984. Following the disclosure of this material, Essex Police “notified the appropriate authorities” of its existence⁵ and provided copies of same. The copy handed to Essex police by HOLROYD, had, included in handwriting, the addressee and requester of the report noted at the top of the first page - ██████████ Colonel M ██████████? On 21st February 1985 D/Con ROBERTS, Essex Police, informed the RUC that “with ref to GC80 ... HOLROYD had produced a photocopy stating that this had been retyped from the original document and photocopied. Various things had been crossed out by HOLROYD to protect the source⁶”. It is unknown if the ‘original’ document was ever located. This confirms that the document received by the RUC had been altered prior to it being handed to Essex Police.

On 21st January 1985 RUC ACC CUSHLEY wrote to the Secretary of the Hughes Inquiry to disclose the existence of the GC80. CUSHLEY noted that “if this document is genuine it is relevant to the Hughes Inquiry. RUC are doubtful if it could be genuine and an investigation into its authenticity is being pursued by a team of detectives under the direction of Detective Superintendent CASKEY⁷”. Despite protracted correspondence⁸ between WALLACE (through his solicitor) and the Secretary to the Hughes Inquiry between in 1985, WALLACE did not cooperate with the Judge-led Inquiry; despite having received authorisation from the MoD that he could disclose “relevant information to the Committee of Inquiry.”

² Report from DC ROBERTS, Essex Police SB to DCI DOUGLAS, 08/08/1984

³ Report from DC ROBERTS, Essex Police SB to DCI DOUGLAS, 08/08/1984

⁴ RUC 51/1 from D/Supt. G CASKEY to ACC Crime 7/9/1984 re “Operation BUSH’- Documents forwarded by Essex Police on 14/08/1984

⁵ Statement of George William ROBERTS, 10/04/85 (C64/22/85)

⁶ Action 4 – “Contact D/Con B ROBERTS, Essex Police re: HOLROYD’s motives for handing over documents”, dated 21/02/1985

⁷ C64/22/85 – Part 4 – Letter to Hughes Committee of Inquiry from ACC CUSHLEY, 21/01/1985

⁸ Part IV RUC File C64/22/85

On the 4th April 1985 D/Supt CASKEY and DI COOKE interviewed HOLROYD at Rayleigh Police Station, Essex; HOLROYD was “uncooperative⁹” with the RUC officers who questioned about his knowledge of the documents he had handed over to Essex Police. **HOLROYD refused to confirm who had given him a copy of GC80.**

Repeated efforts were made by the RUC to speak with Colin WALLACE, then in HMP Lewes, between April and August 1985, without success. WALLACE stated in a letter to the Chief Constable RUC that “no useful purpose would be served by such an interview¹⁰”. To date, WALLACE has refused to cooperate with any police/statutory investigation into the allegations he proffers in relation to Kincora.

The Hughes Inquiry concluded that WALLACE has never “authenticated or repudiated the papers which we have seen [GC80 included] ... Even if Mr WALLACE was prepared to authenticate them, they would in themselves be of very limited use to the Inquiry since they consist of bald or generalised allegations without supporting detail or confirmation. It would have required his testimony to remedy this and this was not forthcoming¹¹”.

4. Relationship between John Colin WALLACE and Frederick John HOLROYD

John Colin WALLACE was employed by the MOD at HQNI as a [Senior] Information Officer in the Information Policy Department between 1968 and 1975. Officially his role was Head of Production Services and additionally provided briefing sessions on Northern Ireland to journalists¹²; WALLACE was also involved in “counter propaganda” on behalf of the Military¹³. On 31st December 1975 WALLACE resigned from the MOD as an alternative to dismissal following his unauthorised passing of information to a journalist – Robert FISK. The document entitled ‘IP/PR Presentation for CLF’s Study Day- 31 Jan 75’ had been prepared for an army study day. The document given to FISK is the presentation notes for the day, which emphasise the use of counter propaganda by the Army against the IRA. WALLACE may have provided an input to the document but was not the sole author.

In 1981 WALLACE was found guilty of manslaughter following the death of Jonathan LEWIS (husband of WALLACE’s mistress) in August 1980 and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

Frederick John HOLROYD is a former Captain in Military Intelligence in the British Army who was stationed in Northern Ireland in the 1970’s. HOLROYD resigned from the Army in August 1976 after having been removed from his position in Northern Ireland in May 1975¹⁴ following concerns over his mental health. HOLROYD claims he first met Colin WALLACE, briefly, at HQNI in 1973; but only “learnt of his [WALLACE’s] misfortunes in early 1984¹⁵”.

In April and May 1984 a number of articles written by Duncan CAMPBELL (in collaboration with HOLROYD) were published in the New Statesman journal which exposed many of HOLROYD’s claims of RUC/Army ‘dirty tricks’. HOLROYD also made a number of TV appearances, during which he exalted his long-held allegations. As a result of this media exposure, WALLACE subsequently

⁹ Report from D/Supt CASKEY to ACC Crime, 28/08/85 (part of RUC File C64/22/85)

¹⁰ Report from D/Supt CASKEY to ACC Crime, 28/08/85 (part of RUC File C64/22/85)

¹¹ Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Children’s Homes and Hostels, Para 4.87, dated 31 December 1985.

¹² Statement of Peter BRODERICK, 29/05/1985

¹³ Statement of Colonel F 16/07/1985

¹⁴ Statement of Frederick J HOLROYD, 19/09/82 (Part of RUC File C64/5/83)

¹⁵ Exhibit GC92 – Letter from HOLROYD to PM Margaret THATCHER, 01/11/84 (C64/22/85)

approached CAMPBELL and offered “to help him [HOLROYD] in any way possible”.¹⁶ Thereafter, WALLACE and HOLROYD began writing directly to each other, frequently, and HOLROYD became a regular visitor to WALLACE in prison.

5. Assessment of the contents of ‘GC80’

5.1. Overview

This is a four page document entitled “TARA – Reports regarding criminal offences associated with the homosexual community in Belfast”, dated 8th November 1974 and signed by JC WALLACE, Senior Information Officer. Handwriting on the document states it was “addressed to Jeremy RAILTON, GSC1 in response to a request from Gen Peter LENG, CLF [the most senior British Army commander in NI and Director of Military Operations] or Colonel M [Head of Army Intelligence in NI]”¹⁷.

GC80 appears to have been based on information contained in two RUC Reference documents (Reference A and B) in response to Reference C:

Reference A – attached RUC background paper on TARA

Reference B – attached RUC report on the death of Brian McDERMOTT

Reference C – your request for a press investigation into the matters referred to above

The documents A-C have not been located in any documents held by PSNI.

The report consists of 10 bullet points followed by a section entitled ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’. There are a number of references to ‘flags’ throughout the document, as additional information to the points WALLACE is making. These ‘flags’ have not been attached to the document; they start at the letter C, with some letters omitted and are not in alphabetical order.

A number of handwritten comments appear on the copy of GC80 available to the authors of this report; these are believed to have been made by Fred HOLROYD.¹⁸

5.2. Analysis of the Contents of GC80

Point 1:

- WALLACE questions the quality and validity of intelligence from the RUC in their background paper on TARA (Reference A). “Difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor Intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption”.

Point 2:

- Discusses the use of the press to expose and prevent “further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels”. Kincora is not named at this point; nor does WALLACE name the other hostels where he alleged abuse was taking place. It is impossible to comment further.

¹⁶ Letter from Colin WALLACE c/o HMP Lewes 2/5/1984, ‘Dear Duncan...’

¹⁷ In November 1974, RAILTON was Lt-Col Information Branch - General Staff Officer Grade 1, LENG was Commander of Land Forces, NI and Colonel M was Head of Army Intelligence.

¹⁸ Report from D/Supt CASKEY to ACC Crime, 28/08/1985 (part of RUC File C64/22/85) para 17.

- WALLACE claims he tried to develop press interest “*in this matter*” the previous year [c 1973] but had no success. If ‘this matter’ refers to abuse at Kincora by McGRATH, there is evidence that in 1973 WALLACE briefed journalists about TARA, McGRATH and his homosexuality. WALLACE (in GC94) claims to have briefed four journalists on Kincora between 1973 and 1976 – David McKITTRICK (Irish Times), Kevin DOWLING (Sunday Mirror), Conor O’CLEERY (Irish Times) and David BLUNDY (Sunday Times). All acknowledge they were briefed by WALLACE but none remembered having ever been briefed on Kincora¹⁹.
- It is noted that this is “*purely a police and political matter*” and therefore difficult to justify “*our*” [Military] involvement. This would indicate that WALLACE acknowledges that criminal matters would fall outside the Military’s remit and does not explain WALLACE’s and/or military involvement in the matter.
- WALLACE opines that “*TARA is no longer of any security interest*”. If true, this would mean that by November 1974, the Military no longer had an interest in gathering intelligence in relation to TARA. WALLACE’s assertion is at odds with Brian GEMMELL’s account of Military interest in TARA and McGRATH. GEMMELL continued to gather information on TARA and McGRATH in 1975.²⁰

Point 3:

- Provides an overview of WALLACE’s assessment of the failure of TARA as a credible concept, largely because of “*William McGRATH’s rather strange political views ... other organisations which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the loyalist community at that time sprang up*”.

Point 4:

- WALLACE claims that a number of details in Reference A are ‘*inaccurate*’.
- WALLACE also makes reference to MAINS and SEMPLE as being known homosexuals and claims that various allegations of homosexual assaults on Kincora inmates had been investigated in 1967 by ‘*Mr. H MASON*’ and were highlighted in flag ‘N’. The Belfast City Welfare’s Children’s Officer, Henry MASON’s investigation into allegations against Joseph MAINS was submitted to the Town Solicitor, John YOUNG, in August 1971. The MASON file does not contain to any allegations or complaints against Raymond SEMPLE, complaints were only against MAINS.

The document fails to acknowledge that MASON carried out a further investigation in 1971 which was the ‘trigger’ for the file being submitted; the document is therefore incomplete in knowledge.

Documents held by PSNI do not contain any evidence that anyone, outside Social Services, had knowledge of this investigation until early 1976, when a copy of the Mason File was handed to the RUC (D/Con CULLEN). From the evidence available, the RUC had no knowledge of the Mason

¹⁹ Statement of David McKITTRICK, 25/02/1982 and Exhibit DMck1, (part of RUC File C64/5/83), Statement of DS ELLIOTT re: interview of David BLUNDY, 16/12/1982, statement of Conor O’CLERY, 27/09/1985 and Statement of Kevin DOWLING, 30/03/1982

²⁰ Statement of Brian GEMMELL dated 16/07/1982, part of C64/5/83

File in 1974 and therefore could not have included it in Reference 'A'. There is no evidence to suggest that a copy of the Mason File was ever made available or shared with the Military.

Flag 'N' which relates to notes on the Mason Report is not attached to the main document. It is therefore unclear what the contents of Flag 'N' are and where it originated from.

Point 5:

- WALLACE challenges Reference 'A', which allegedly states that the assaults on Kincora residents began shortly after McGRATH's appointment. WALLACE states there is evidence of abuse in Kincora as early as 1959. WALLACE is correct in his assessment that the abuse at Kincora had started long before McGRATH was employed there. In November 1974, however, documents held by PSNI show there was no knowledge of abuse, by either the RUC or Welfare Authorities, prior to 1967. The only known allegations of sexual abuse in Kincora refer to R 2 who MAINS was convicted of sexually abusing (c. 1959) at his public trial in 1981; which did not emerge until the police investigation in 1980.

If WALLACE was aware of the abuse in Kincora and that it pre-dated McGRATH's employment there, it appears unusual that he did not brief journalists in 1973 accordingly. None of the journalists were aware of McGRATH's employment at Kincora or of MAINS' involvements in abuse there until the 'scandal' was exposed in the Irish Independent Article in January 1980.

Point 6:

- WALLACE claims to have had sight of correspondence between McGRATH and GARLAND (Flag 'M'). Personal correspondence between McGRATH and GARLAND from the 1960's reveals an intimate relationship between the two men. It is unclear how WALLACE would have obtained sight of this correspondence in 1974. Research reveals that from 1973, GARLAND shared copies of his correspondence with McGRATH with Valerie SHAW and D/Con CULLEN but there is no evidence to suggest that GARLAND or anyone else passed this material to WALLACE.
- WALLACE also refers to "*GARLAND's own version of events (Flag O)*" as being "*very enlightening*". The contents of Flag O are unknown.
- There is reference to many of the RUC source reports "*on this matter*" from 1971 having originated from GARLAND. From the documents reviewed, GARLAND did not provide any information to the RUC re: McGRATH, TARA or Kincora until 1973/74²¹.

Point 7:

- Reference is made to an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation Welfare Department in 1972/73 into allegations of homosexual assaults on Kincora inmates by McGRATH. There is no reference in documents held by PSNI that an investigation into McGRATH was held in 1972/73.
- WALLACE states that one of the Military sources confirmed in 1972 that complaints had been made against McGRATH and passed to both senior welfare staff and the RUC. From the material viewed, the first time an allegation against McGRATH was received by the RUC, was in an

²¹ Statement of Roy GARLAND, 30/03/1982

anonymous phone call (made by GARLAND) in May 1973. Social Services received the first allegation about McGRATH in January 1974, again in an anonymous phone call (believed to be by GARLAND). The first official complaint against McGRATH was believed to have been made in May 1974 to Social Services by [REDACTED] R 15, Kincora resident.

- WALLACE refers to [REDACTED] NL 210 [REDACTED] NL 210) as having confirmed that complaints had been made in 1972 in 'Flag R'. [REDACTED] NL 210 was a Senior Social Worker in the EHSSB. [REDACTED] NL 210 was first made aware of complaints against McGRATH in May 1974, when he was told by his staff of the complaint against McGRATH by the [REDACTED] family. [REDACTED] NL 210 denied having ever had contact with police or military, in relation to Kincora, prior to 1980²².
- Reference is made by WALLACE to "similar allegations" at other children's homes including Bawnmore, West Winds and Burnside, etc. WALLACE says this is at odds with Reference A which stated that the allegations were confined to Kincora. D/Supt CASKEY's confirms the first RUC knowledge of similar allegations in other children's homes would not have been until 1975 (in the case of West Winds) and 1980 onwards (Bawnmore and Burnside)²³.

Point 8:

- WALLACE claims that a female source told him that key individuals in the Welfare Department were homosexual and only appointed homosexuals to key posts and covered up the offences that took place. There are two deletions in the document GC80. The name of the source has been 'blacked out' in the copies of GC80, held by PSNI. In CASKEY's 1985 File a press article from the Irish Times²⁴. The allegations against this named person by the unidentified female source are considered to be of "great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved." This named individual did have connections to the Welfare Authority but no allegations of abuse were ever made against this person.

Point 9:

- WALLACE states that the only link between McDERMOTT's murder and homosexuality is via John McKEAGUE; McKEAGUE's police statements are listed as 'Flag S' and forensic reports re: the McDERMOTT murder as 'Flag T'. It is unclear why WALLACE would have had access to or indeed why he would have referred to police statements and forensic reports in GC80 relating to the McDERMOTT murder.
- WALLACE told police in 2004 that he had made this link with the McDERMOTT murder and John McKEAGUE "not based on any evidence ... only supposition on my [WALLACE's] part based on intelligence at hand being evaluated and linked". WALLACE also acknowledged that he "had no knowledge that would have linked anyone from the Kincora investigation to the murder of Brian McDERMOTT murder".
- A prosecution file re: the McDERMOTT murder had been prepared by the RUC in 1983 and sent to the DPP; the DPP directed that the evidence was not sufficient to charge any person with an offence connected with the death of Brian McDERMOTT.

²² Statement of D/Supt G CASKEY re interview of [REDACTED] NL 210, 21/08/1985

²³ Report by D/Supt CASKEY to ACC Crime 28/08/1985, part of C64/22/85- paragraph 31

²⁴ Part 4 of RUC File C64/22/15 – Irish Times article "Document claims RUC, army knew about Kincora in 1974," dated 25/06/1985.

- In GC80 WALLACE dismisses the RUC's theory that there was a connection between the murder of Brian McDERMOTT and "*witchcraft or other satanic rites*". In 1973 the RUC investigation team had looked into allegations of a connection between the murder and 'Black Magic' and were "*able to disprove this theory and as a result the press/ public interest diminished*²⁵"; therefore it is difficult to accept WALLACE's contention that there was ever an RUC theory connecting the McDERMOTT murder and witchcraft.

Point 10:

- WALLACE comments on the claims made in Reference A that key individuals in the political arena in Northern Ireland are aware of the Kincora situation and in particular, of McGRATH's background. It is not known who WALLACE was referring to as Reference A was not attached.
- Refers to PAISLEY's knowledge of McGRATH and Kincora but claims that he failed to do anything due to '*fear of blackmail*'. To partially support this claim WALLACE refers to statements by Valerie SHAW and Tom McNEILLY ('Flag F'). This point is addressed in Exhibit GC7 – 2016, however, PAISLEY was interviewed by CASKEY and stated that he was never aware of allegations of child abuse against McGRATH but in his opinion, dealt with allegations of homosexuality.
- WALLACE refers to various public and political figures who are homosexual, protecting each other from prosecution. It is unclear who these people are. Two names appear handwritten at the left hand side of the page, one being 'Supt MEHARG'. If this refers to ACC William MEHARG it should be noted that on 01/04/1967 MEHARG was a County Inspector at RUC HQ. On 01/06/1970 he was made a Chief Superintendent, as part of the HUNT report restructuring. William MEHARG was appointed ACC in 1971. MEHARG had in fact never served as a Superintendent in the RUC as prior to the restructuring of the RUC under the Hunt report in 1969, no such rank existed.

Conclusions and Recommendations

- WALLACE is highly critical of, as he calls them, 'unexplained' failures of the RUC and NIO to take action against allegations of serious sexual abuse at children's homes. The RUC were the only authority to deal with criminality in Northern Ireland; it is unclear what action WALLACE felt the NIO should have taken. It is noticeable by its omission, that he makes no reference of the Welfare Authorities.
- WALLACE's explanation on the RUC's failure to take action was that they had received policy direction which could "*only have come from a very high political or police level ... if this is the case then we [Military] should be even more vary about getting involved.*" WALLACE provides no evidence to substantiate this serious allegation against the RUC. It is unclear why the Military would have considered becoming involved in criminal investigations when such matters (homosexuality and sexual abuse) were outside their remit and required a police led investigation. Again it is worth noting WALLACE does not mention the inaction of Welfare Authorities.
- WALLACE makes four recommendations:

²⁵ Report "Murder of Brian Douglas McDERMOTT" by Insp DH CUDMORE, dated 10/05/1982

- *“(a) we make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter or at least discuss the matter with RUCLO [RUCLO may refer to RUC Liaison Officer]”. This would suggest that the Military had previously attempted to raise the allegations with the RUC. There is no evidence of the Military having shared information or intelligence which indicated homosexual abuse of residents in Kincora (or other children’s homes).*
- *“(b) we obtain very clear and unambiguous authority from London to proceed with a press disclosure”.*
- *“(c) we approach a responsible journalist whom we are confident will make a thorough investigation of the matter and not simply write a sensational type story purely on the information he is given”.* These are curious comments given that at Point 2 WALLACE says “I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without success”. It is known that in 1974 WALLACE, on the account of journalists, was disclosing a range of material.
- *“(d) we continue to look for additional information on this matter to ensure that we are not just being used as part of some political disinformation scheme”.* This statement is hard to interpret as WALLACE’s role in 1974 was to disseminate disinformation.

6. Challenges to the Authenticity of GC80

6.1. Key points from the Statements of Military Personnel provided to the RUC

Individual	Military Role in 1974	Knowledge of GC80	Knowledge of information contained in GC80	Additional Information
Jeremy RAILTON ²⁶	Lt-Col Information Branch - General Staff Officer Grade 1	Handwritten note on GC80 states report was addressed to RAILTON. Denied ever seeing GC80 or of any request for it to be written.	Emphatically denied knowledge of homosexual activities at Kincora.	No knowledge of the reference documents referred to in GC80. RAILTON claims RUC documents as per Reference A and B are unlikely to have been distributed to the department where both he and WALLACE worked.
Gen Sir Peter LENG ²⁷	Commander Land Forces NI	Handwritten note states GC80 was requested by LENG. LENG denied having ever seen GC80 before.	Denied having knowledge of abuse highlighted within GC80. Knew of TARA but couldn’t remember the personalities involved.	LENG was aware of concern about St Patrick’s Remand Home (W Belfast) because of the number of young boys absconding and becoming re-involved in terrorist activity but had no knowledge of the three Children’s Homes mentioned in GC80.
Maj-Gen Henry GARRETT ²⁸	Chief of Staff (Brigadier)	Denied having ever seen GC80 before.	Denied knowledge of abuse as highlighted in GC80.	Knew WALLACE who was part of his HQNI staff team. Felt that if WALLACE had been in possession of such information “at the time” he would have brought it to GARRETT’s attention either directly or through his immediate supervisor.

²⁶ Statement of Jeremy RAILTON, 03/07/1985

²⁷ Statement of General Sir Peter LENG, 02/07/1985

²⁸ Major General Henry GARRETT, 16/07/1985

Individual	Military Role in 1974	Knowledge of GC80	Knowledge of information contained in GC80	Additional Information
Colonel F	Col G S (Intelligence)- Responsible for handling all intelligence on behalf of GOC HQNI	Denied having ever seen GC80 before.	Did not recall any allegations or complaints of homosexuality in boys' homes in NI. Recalled TARA but couldn't recall any specific details.	Confirms GC80 was in the style of WALLACE but alleges WALLACE would not have been given access to either RUC or Military intelligence documents; RUC documents would not have been passed to the Information Policy Department where WALLACE worked. <i>"If this was a genuine document and had been produced at the time it would have been brought personally to the Head of Intelligence who would have had the document researched and vetted."</i>
Lt-Col Adrian PECK (rtd) ³⁰	General Staff Officer Grade 1	Denied having ever seen GC80 before.	Had knowledge of TARA but not of any link to homosexuality.	Predecessor of RAILTON, he was not serving at HQNI in November 1974.
Peter BRODERICK ³¹	Chief Information Officer, HQNI (Jul 73 – Sept 74)	Denied knowledge of GC80.		WALLACE had been a member of BRODERICK's staff. BRODERICK knew WALLACE well both professionally and personally. BRODERICK was not serving at HQNI in November 1974.
David McDINE ³²	Chief Information Officer, HQNI (Sept 74 – Oct 75) McDINE would have been WALLACE's immediate supervisor in November 1974	Denied having ever seen GC80 before.		McDINE states <i>"I have strong suspicions about the authenticity of the document"</i> . McDINE felt that WALLACE would not have produced such a detailed and well researched report (in November 1974) as the situation in NI was too busy as to allow. McDINE was WALLACE's immediate boss and GC80 should have been put through him, but wasn't. McDINE alleges there are a number of inaccuracies in the style and presentation of GC80, from what was expected at that time and would not have been forwarded to such senior people in such an apparent draft form without coming through him.
Mjr (TA) Major I ³³	Captain at HQNI at Army Press Desk	Denied having ever seen GC80 before.	Had knowledge of TARA but not of any link to homosexuality.	States WALLACE may have received intelligence briefings but is unlikely to have been given access to intelligence documents.

²⁹ Colonel F, 16/07/1985

³⁰ Adrian PECK, 03/07/1985

³¹ Peter BRODERICK, 29/05/1985

³² David McDINE, 04/06/1985

³³ Major Major I, 19/07/1985

Individual	Military Role in 1974	Knowledge of GC80	Knowledge of information contained in GC80	Additional Information
Roy PACE	Chief Clerk of Public Relations Branch, HQNI	Denied having ever seen GC80 before.		<p>PACE's role included maintaining the classified documents register and accounting for classified documents. Also responsible for ensuring a corporate style to the writing of classified documents. Acknowledges the style of writing was similar to WALLACE's. PACE challenges the authenticity of GC80 due to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the security marking is not top and bottom of every page as it should be • individual page numbers are not necessary for a confidential document • the word 'reference' would only appear once and A, B and C would appear under it • the references not being dated • the word 'continued' appearing at the bottom of every page (it shouldn't as it clearly states the number of pages at the start of the report) • the flagging system being unusual and incorrect (flags not in alphabetical order and use of 'O') • flag documents not listed as enclosed at end of document • GC80 was not registered in the classified documents register, stamped or given a serial number. Even if it was a 'draft' it would have still been given a serial number and stamped • GC80 is incorrectly laid out and would not have been accepted by a military office • a draft would never have been presented to a senior military officer in such form

A number of key points, challenging the authenticity of 'GC80', are evident from the statements of a number of WALLACE's colleagues and Senior Officers who were stationed at HQNI in November 1974.

- None of those spoken to by the RUC could **recall seeing 'GC80'** prior to police showing it to them in 1985. Several commented that if WALLACE had been in possession of the

information contained within GC80 in November 1974, he should have brought it to the immediate attention of senior officers³⁴.

- Several of those spoken to³⁵ have commented that GC80 appeared to be a **draft document** and as such would never have been sent to senior military personnel (notably the Commander of Land Forces in NI) in such a form.
- GC80 is not in the **corporate style** of classified military documents and is challenged due a number of inaccuracies, including:
 - security markings
 - inclusion of page numbers
 - reference material incorrectly set out
 - use of the word 'continued'
 - unusual and incorrect use of the 'flagging' system.
- GC80 was not registered as a classified document, given a serial number or stamped as military documents should be.

6.2. RUC Forensic Examination of GC80³⁶

The RUC knew this document was not an original and had been re-typed and photocopied with various 'things' being crossed out. As this confirms that the document received by the RUC had been altered prior to be handing into Essex Police, it is unclear what evidence would be obtained through a forensic examination of a known copy³⁷.

The document marked GC80 was forwarded by the RUC to the Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory and examined by Mr Donald BUDD, Forensic Scientist. GC80 was examined, along with GC82-84, 'for comparison'.

GC82 is a one page document, dated 22/09/76, typed on official headed paper (Department of the Environment). It is entitled "JOHN COLIN WALLACE" and appears to be a character reference for WALLACE, signed by Peter BRODERICK (WALLACE's former boss and one-time personal friend). When interviewed by the RUC in 1985 re his knowledge of GC82, BRODERICK stated "*I have no perfect recollection of this document. My signature appears arrange bottom of this document which I believed to be a response to a request for a job reference*"³⁸. (HOLROYD would not state where he got it from when questioned by the RUC³⁹).

GC83 is a one page typed document, undated and unsigned (HOLROYD told police he got it from WALLACE through the post⁴⁰). It is entitled "*SUSSEX POLICE ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS INTO MY CASE*". Given the subject matter and title, it seems likely that WALLACE was the author and it was written post December 1980.

³⁴ Major-General Henry GARRETT and **Colonel F**

³⁵ David McDINE and Roy PACE

³⁶ Statement of Donald BUDD, Forensic Scientist, 14/02/1985, part of C64/22/85

³⁷ Action 4 – "Contact D/Con B ROBERTS, Essex Police re: HOLROYD's motives for handing over documents", dated 21/02/1985

³⁸ Statement of Peter BRODERICK 29/05/1985

³⁹ Statement of DI COOKE 08/08/85 part of C64/22/85

⁴⁰ Statement of DI COOKE 08/08/85 part of C64/22/85

GC84 is a two page typed letter, dated 01/09/84, addressed to Michael MARSHALL MP and signed by Colin WALLACE. (HOLROYD told the RUC that he “*probably got this from London*”⁴¹).

The above three documents were chosen for comparison as they were “*considered to have possibly been typed on the same typewriter as GC80*”⁴².

BUDD’s report concluded that “*the presence of a portion of horizontal line almost 3 inches from the top edge of the left hand side of the first page of the four page document (GC80), just above the heading, could indicate the addition of a piece of paper to the top of this document possibly to cover other information at the time of photocopying*”. BUDD continues that “*the apparent difference of the shape of the tail of the numeral ‘9’ in the date ‘8th November 1974’ from that of the ‘9’s’ in the remainder of this document would appear to lend some weight to this possibility*”. BUDD also notes that “*the shape of the 9 of the date on the first page of document 1 (GC80) would appear to relate this part of document 1 to the typescript of document 4 (GC84) dated 1984 rather than that of document 2 dated 1976. Whereas the ‘9’s’ in the remainder of document 1 would appear to favour document 2 (GC82).*” Mr BUDD concludes “*the absence of ‘confidential’ from the bottom of page 1 of document (GC80), yet present though obliterated at the top and bottom of the remaining three pages of this document, could be further of interference of page 1*”.

As GC80 was not an original document, as acknowledged by HOLROYD to Essex Police, it is unclear when it was retyped and by whom. There is no evidence that attempts were made by either Essex Police or the RUC to locate the original.

Following the forensic examination of GC80, BUDD appears to come to the conclusion that page one of GC80 had been interfered with but cannot provide a definitive answer as to when the document was written or on what typewriter.

6.3. RUC Action 4 (21/2/1985) - “Establish HOLROYD’s motives for handing over documents”

Research for this report has uncovered a miscellaneous folder containing 27 actions, relating to further RUC enquiries on the material handed to police by Fred HOLROYD (the majority of actions refer specifically to GC80). The result of most of the actions are not listed on the copy in the folder, however action 4 was resulted on the 21/2/1985 by D/I COOKE with the following comment, based on a telephone conversation he had had with D/Con ROBERTS, Essex Police:

“...with ref to GC80, he [HOLROYD] had produced a photocopy stating that this had been retyped from the original document and photocopied. Various things had been crossed out by HOLROYD to protect the source. HOLROYD stated that he got the document from a ‘very high up well-placed source’. D/C ROBERTS believes that WALLACE indicated to HOLROYD where this document could be obtained”.

Despite the revelations made by D/Con ROBERTS to the RUC, there is no evidence that any additional action was taken to further the claims made about the origin of GC80.

⁴¹ Statement of DI COOKE 08/08/1985 part of C64/22/85

⁴² Report by D/Supt CASKEY, 28/08/1985 to ACC Crime, File Ref C64/22/85

6.4. Additional Challenges to Authenticity of GC80

- A search of two military intelligence files ('Kincora' and 'TARA') held by G2 Branch (Intelligence and Security) at HQNI did not locate the document GC80 or References A and B. Major LOFTUS, who conducted the search, found that the *"examination of the folio of each file clearly accounts for each document ... including those which were destroyed in accordance with Military Regulations. The subject matter of the destroyed documents are clearly legible ... and none of them relate to the matters under investigation"*.⁴³
- RUC Special Branch conducted a search of their records and could not find the documents referred to under Reference A and B in GC80⁴⁴ or confirm their existence.
- With regard to Reference A, WALLACE refers to a report with a similar title *"RUC background brief on TARA"* in a list of documents which he sent, through HOLROYD, on WALLACE's behalf, to the Prime Minister on 1st November 1984⁴⁵.
- In his correspondence with HOLROYD, WALLACE confirms that his *"secretary has been very busy with a major typing project during the past week and Maggie's [THATCHER] file is now ready. I have had the 'Bunny' piece done again to tidy it up a little and to correct various typing errors, etc"*. This would suggest that Colin WALLACE had pieces of material retyped from their original versions; this may support the findings from the forensic analysis that GC80 could have been altered.
- Ex-Chief Information Officer, Peter BRODERICK, was sceptical of authenticity of GC80. He considered it unlikely that *"the CLF would have asked for such a brief as ... there was no military objective to be achieved with the production of GC80"*⁴⁶.

6.5. GC80 shared with the press after 1984

From 1984, copies of GC80 were distributed to journalists – Paul FOOT, Ed MOLONEY and Andrew POLLAK and printed in the Irish Times on 25/06/85 and appeared in FOOT's book 'Who Framed Colin Wallace?' (published in 1989).

WALLACE has repeatedly maintained that he attempted to expose the abuse at Kincora through press exposure, from the early 1970s. It is unclear why WALLACE did not pass copies of GC80 to his journalist contacts in 1974, as it is the only document, allegedly written by WALLACE, which exposes abuse at Kincora. The evidence suggests that he waited almost a decade before making anyone aware of its existence.

WALLACE was investigated for, and admitted, passing classified documents to a journalist (Robert FISK) in 1975⁴⁷. This document related to the Army's use of information policy/ 'black propaganda'. This demonstrates that WALLACE was prepared to 'leak' classified military information in 1975. WALLACE was questioned, at length, by the RUC on two separate occasions in February 1975⁴⁸ over the passing of the document to FISK. On neither occasion, despite appearing to speak candidly to the

⁴³ Statement by Major Robert LOFTUS of RMP, 01/08/1985

⁴⁴ Statement of D/Supt James McCLURE, 24/07/1985

⁴⁵ Exhibit GC91, C64/22/85.

⁴⁶ Investigation notes re: Peter BRODERICK, 13/05/1985

⁴⁷ 19/05/1975 the DPP directed no prosecution; WALLACE was required to resign as an alternative to dismissal in December 1975.

⁴⁸ Statements from Colin WALLACE dated 06/02/1975 and 12/02/1975

RUC about his roles in the Information Policy Unit, WALLACE did not mention Kincora, abuse or homosexuality to police. In other words in February 1975, only three months after allegedly writing GC80, and expressing his frustration over the RUC's inaction re: Kincora, WALLACE did not take the opportunity to mention the abuse in Kincora to RUC detectives.

Given all of the above, and WALLACE's expressed concerns made in a document alleged created in 1974, it remains unclear as to why WALLACE did not release any of this information until 1984.

6.5.1. Irish Times Articles 25 June 1985 (Appendix A)

The articles, written over 3 consecutive days in June 1985 and which appeared in the Irish Times, all focused on the document GC80; a copy of which had been provided to the journalists by an unnamed source. The version of GC80 that was published in the newspaper, under the headline 'Document claims RUC, army knew about Kincora in 1974', is largely the same as that held by the RUC⁴⁹ (with the exception of a small number of redactions). It is claimed in the article, that other 'senior' military sources confirmed that there was "*an intensive [military] investigation*" into TARA and McGRATH in the mid 1970's. As a result of these investigations, information about sexual assaults in Kincora was uncovered.

The article also refers to other RUC sources who confirmed the existence of RUC reports on TARA. When questioned, the journalists refused to identify their sources of information⁵⁰.

6.5.2. 'Who Framed Colin Wallace?' by Paul Foot (Appendix B)

The copy of GC80 published in FOOT's book is identical to that in the possession of the RUC, with the notable exception of not containing details of the addressee. FOOT stated that "*he [WALLACE] is not clear today (because he only has a copy) for whom the memo was intended, but it would certainly have gone to his superior officer Jeremy RAILTON, Head of Information Policy, and almost certainly also to Army Intelligence and the Army's RUC Liaison Officer at Police Headquarters.*" This is a 'strange' comment to make given that WALLACE is clear on all other aspects of the document. The copy of GC80, held by the RUC, had a handwritten note that the document was addressed to RAILTON, LENG and Colonel M (see above) in response to Reference C. Reference C in the RUC copy of GC80 is a "*request for a press investigation into the matters referred to above*"; whereas FOOT refers to Reference C as "*the Army's earlier request for a press briefing on TARA*". The differences between a press investigation and briefing are obvious.

The copy of GC80 shared by WALLACE with FOOT is a 'copy'; the original has never been located.

FOOT clarifies that WALLACE does not have copies of References A-C and therefore it can be assumed that FOOT did not have sight of these documents when writing his book.

FOOT concludes his chapter on Kincora stating that "*within six weeks of his issuing his Kincora document, he [WALLACE] was banished from the province*". This explanation for WALLACE's removal from Northern Ireland in 1975 is at odds with WALLACE's own version of events. He told police, that

⁴⁹ File C64/22/85

⁵⁰ Statement of Ed MOLONEY, dated 16/08/1985

in October 1974, he had been identified by journalists as *“being involved in black propaganda activities amongst the paramilitary organisations. It was believed that continued press interest in my activities would expose the army’s information policy campaign. For reasons of personal safety I was posted to Headquarters North West District⁵¹”*.

The ‘official’ explanation for WALLACE’s move from Northern Ireland was that as WALLACE had made *“unauthorised disclosures to journalists ... it was decided that, in view of the high standards required among PR staff in the exceptional political and military situation in Northern Ireland, Mr WALLACE could no longer be employed there⁵²”*. The decision was taken in late 1974 to transfer WALLACE to HQ North West District.

⁵¹ Statement of John Colin WALLACE, dated 12/02/1975, part of C298/4/75

⁵² Report from MoD Annex B to D/DS6/7/44/18 dated 10/08/82, Part 4 of C64/2/80

APPENDIX A - Irish Times Articles 25 June 1985

scandal came to light in 1980. ED MOLONEY and ANDY POLLAK report.

Document claims RUC, army knew about Kincora in 1974

THE DOCUMENT referred to, a copy of which is in the possession of *The Irish Times*, sharply contradicts every British Government assurance that there was no cover-up of the affair nor any knowledge of it in British military circles.

The document is dated November 8th, 1974, and carries the initialled signature of Colin Wallace, a senior British Army information officer at the time. It was apparently written in response to a request from a high-ranking officer for a press inquiry into homosexual offences associated with the Loyalist paramilitary group, Tara, in order to stop "further assaults on youngsters in these hotels".

The leader and founder of Tara, William McGrath, was housefather at Kincora and in December, 1981, after a two-year RUC investigation, he and two other Kincora employees, Raymond Sengle and Joseph Mains, were convicted of sexual assaults against Kincora boys dating back 20 years. Their conviction, and subsequent media disclosures, led to two further police inquiries and two British Government inquiries into

containing similar information were in the files of the Information Policy Unit at this time.

These sources, who had knowledge of many top secret intelligence and psychological operations mounted from British Army headquarters, have no current connections with Wallace. They have told *The Irish Times* that there was an intensive investigation of Tara and McGrath in the early and mid-1970s by military and political intelligence agencies which revealed information about sexual assaults at Kincora.

Another military source, a high-ranking officer based at British Army headquarters during this period, has also confirmed that the Information Policy Unit was asked by military commanders in 1972 to investigate "anomalous" offences involving members of Tara. "We were investigating everything at that particular time to see if there were implications for the security side," he said. However, the source, who asked not to be quoted by name, declined to comment further in the light of the new RUC investigation.

The 1974 Information Policy Unit document, four pages long and classified "confidential", refers to and quotes from an RUC

including "one final attempt" to get the RUC to investigate Kincora or discuss it with the British Army's police liaison officer, a senior figure in military intelligence. It also suggests that the army brief a responsible journalist on the matter or get disclose it to the media.

Following allegations of a cover up of Kincora in 1982, the British Government ordered the Sussex

police to investigate and their report, prepared by the Chief Constable, Sir George Terry, cleared the authorities and said there was no evidence of knowledge on the part of the military authorities. Wallace, who was prosecuted by the Sussex police, is due out of Lewes Prison in two years time and still denies the charge of manslaughter.

(More tomorrow)



The Kincora boys home in east Belfast.

Report that led to new investigation

THE following is an edited text of the document which has caused the RUC to reopen its inquiries

CONFIDENTIAL.

To: (---) November 8th, 1974
"TARA" - Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated with the Homosexual Community in Belfast.

Reference A: Attached RUC background paper on "TARA".
Reference B: Attached RUC report on the death of Brian

keeping with the needs of the loyalist community at that time, sprung up during the period.

4. Reference A deals with McGrath's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincora hostel in Newtownards in 1959 under the control and administration of Belfast Corporation welfare department. He does not, as the paper claims, "run the hostel" - he is employed as a "housefather". The warden of Kincora is Joseph Mains and the

cause of the antagonism between them. It would also appear many of the RUC source reports on this matter after 1971 originated from ---
7. McGrath was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation welfare department in 1972-73, following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints had been received about his behaviour and that although the complaints had been

Our own investigations of instances of alleged witchcraft or other sinister rites in the province would tend to dismiss the RUC's theory that Brian McDermott's murder could be part of these "magic" practices, etc. have been mainly confined to groups operating from republican areas, with the possible exception of three cases in Co Antrim. I think, however, that from a press point of view we would be very foolish to give any credence to such claims without the most convincing

account. It would be interesting to check, however, the number of charges brought against people involved in homosexual activities in the greater Belfast area in the last 5 years. I also think that RUC report on drug abuse in this connection merits close examination because this is a natural area of fund raising for terrorists. There is, of course, the obvious problem of security with the possible blackmailing of civil servants, politicians etc.

Conclusions and recommendations

Government inquiries into Kinora

Wallace, who is now serving a 10-year prison sentence for the manslaughter of an antiques dealer in Arundel, Sussex, in 1980, also distributed two British Army intelligence briefs on McGrath dealing with his homosexuality and links with Tara to Belfast-based journalists in the mid-1970s.

He did this while serving with the British Army's Information Policy Unit, a black propaganda and psychological warfare agency attached to the press desk at Antrim. The document which has reopened RUC inquiries was allegedly an internal Information Policy Unit document.

A copy of the document was handed over to the RUC by the Essex police in March this year. They had obtained it from a former British military intelligence officer who had served in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. The UC in turn passed the document to the inquiry into Kinora led by Judge William Hughes, which was appointed by the former Northern Ireland Secretary, James Price, in 1984.

The inquiry has written to Wallace asking to interview him at the document, but has asked its questions to him in all - to social welfare etc. of Kinora allegedly used in the document. Wallace refused to co-operate with the Y, or with the RUC, who also tried to question him, he receives assurances that it not be prosecuted under 'Official Secrets Act.

say they are sceptical the document's authenticity it will be three or four before their inquiry is committed former military ministry sources contacted by Times, while unable to use this document, say at three other documents

and classified "confidential" refers to and quotes from an RUC report on Tara which in turn refers to allegations of assaults on Kinora inmates involving McGrath dating back to 1971. The RUC paper also refers to a claim that key loyalist political figures were "aware" of the Kinora situation.

Other RUC sources have told background paper on Tara was indeed prepared by detectives in 1973/74, about a year before the Information Policy Unit document was allegedly written. The sources say that the description of this background paper in the document is generally accurate.

The Irish Times has submitted the Information Policy Unit document for a forensic report together with recent photocopied examples of typewritten material originating from Wallace and with material emanating from British Army headquarters and the Information Policy Unit in 1974 to see if there were any similarities. The test proved "inconclusive" because the documents were photocopies not originals.

The document complains of police inactivity over Kinora and speculates that this might have been due to a policy direction from "a very high political or police level". The document also complains about the unexplained failure of the Northern Ireland Office to take on the task of exposing Kinora.

The document also refers to an RUC report on the murder of Brian McDermott, an 11-year-old child whose dismembered and partially burned body was discovered in the River Lagan in September, 1973. The document says that the only link between this and Tara leader, John McKeague, a known paedophile, who was shot dead by the INLA in 1982.

The document concludes by making four recommendations.

Reference D: Attached RUC report on the death of Brian McDermott.

Reference C: Your request for a press investigation into the matters referred to above.

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to "TARA". Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2. If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify our interest in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, "TARA" is no longer of any security interest.

3. In theory, "TARA" was basically a credible concept from a loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body could, no doubt, have made good use of the Orange Order's normal screening and "vetting" system for potential recruits, and it would have had ready-made facilities for clandestine training by making use of the Orange halls throughout the province. The idea failed for a number of reasons: mainly because of William McKeague's rather strange political views which are more akin to Irish Nationalism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations which appeared to be more in

protest - he is employed as a "housefather". The warden of Kinora is Joseph Mairs and the deputy warden is Raymond Semple. Mairs was appointed in 1959. Mains was appointed in men and Semple in 1964. Both Indeed various allegations of homosexual assaults on inmates of the hostel were investigated by senior - in 1967 but no action was taken against any one (see notes of a report by Mr - at flag "N").

5. It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kinora "began shortly after his appointment". As I have pointed out in para 4 above, allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after Mairs was appointed.

6. Reference A claims that McGrath "is a known homosexual" but it avoids any mention of his links with other key figures in the local homosexual community, other than to insinuate that a number of well known political personalities with whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of reference A, it is claimed that McGrath left his previous employment - whereas

our information would tend to indicate that - is well known in unionist party circles (see also - and was for some time - (see flag "M") - and McGrath, - and - has been actively engaged in trying to have McGrath removed from Kinora. -'s own version of events (see Flag "O") is, of course, very enlightening, but I would suggest that it should be treated with caution until it can be substantiated by

of complaints had been received about his behaviour and that although the complaints had been passed to - and to the RUC, no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be confirmed, to some extent, by Mr - (see Flag "R") in 1973. There were of course similar allegations relating to other hostels during this period (see Bannmore, Westwinds, Durnside etc.) and this conflicts with reference A's assertion that referrals were confined to Kinora.

8. It should be remembered that the 1967 sexual offences act does NOT apply to Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors is a criminal offence. The apparent welfare authorities and the RUC are quite remarkable. Furthermore the claim made by Mrs - (see flag "Q") that key individuals in the were themselves homosexual and thus, -

also covered up the offences that took place and protected the offenders, requires, very serious examination. In particular, I view Cardwell with great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.

9. Reference B which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of Brian McDermott last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between the murder and the homosexual community is via John McKeague. McKeague's own statements (see flag "S") raise more questions than they answer. Certainly his best that he will not be prosecuted because "he knows too much about some people" merits serious investigation, but I suspect that he will not be prepared in talk until he is released. It is also rather remarkable that no charges have been preferred against him, at least during the past 3-4 years.

of view we would be very foolish to give any credence to such claims without the most convincing evidence. The forensic reports on the McDermott murder (see flag "T") would tend to indicate that someone tried to dispose of the body by cutting it into pieces and burning them. The insinuation made in the document regarding the boy's disappearance and the proximity of - is dangerous nonsense.

10. Reference A claims that a number of key personalities in the political arena are aware of the Kinora situation and, in particular, of McGrath's background. It does not however, explain the extent of their awareness nor of each individual's involvement with McGrath. In summary, it would appear that the document is claiming that:

(a) - of the Grand Orange Lodge are aware of the situation because of the discussions and correspondence relating to McGrath within the Orange Order. It is further alleged that - and - have blocked any action against McGrath.

(b) - is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because of possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with McGrath. - and John McKeague. On the face of it, the statements made by - (see flag "F") would tend to support the only part of such a claim. There are also a number of inconsistencies: McGrath would appear to be strongly anti-communist and anti-LVFF and this view on links with the document's Heron, Ernie "Duke" Elliot, "The Ulster Citizens Army" etc. Various public and political figures who hold positions of power and who are also homosexuals protect each other from prosecution. The claims of a prostitution ring involving juveniles is not really substantiated, other than by -'s own personal

Conclusions and recommendations

I am far from happy with the quality of the information on this matter, and I am even more unhappy because of the, as yet unexplained, failure of the RUC or the NIO to take on this task. I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless that had specifically received some form of political direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level. If that is the case then we should be even more wary about getting involved.

On the other hand, if the allegations are true then we should do everything possible to ensure that the situation is not allowed to continue. The youngsters in these hostels almost certainly come from problem families, and it is clear that no one will fight their case unless we do. Those responsible for the murder of Brian McDermott must be brought to trial before another child is killed, and if it can be proved that there is a connection with this homosexual group, then the RUC must be forced to take action irrespective of who is involved. I would therefore recommend that:

(a) We make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter or at least discuss the matter with RUCLO.
(b) We obtain very clear and unambiguous authority from London to proceed with a press disclosure.
(c) We approach a responsible journalist whom we are confident will make a thorough investigation of the matter and not simply write a sensational type story purely on the information he is given.
(d) We continue to look for additional information on this matter to ensure that we are not just being used as part of some political disinformation scheme.

J. C. Wallace,
Senior Information Officer.

APPENDIX B - 'Who Framed Colin Wallace?' by Paul Foot

138 Who Framed Colin Wallace?

Clockwork Orange drew his attention to the Red Hand Commandoes, an extreme Protestant group whose members were trained to kill Catholics, and whose leader was a brutal assassin called John McKeague. McKeague was known as a homosexual and the information which Colin collected about him brought him back in a circle to William McGrath and TARA. McGrath and McKeague had both organized independent groups on the far right of Protestant politics and shared political and sexual inclinations, until they had fallen out and split. While Colin was preparing this line of information for Clockwork Orange, Army Intelligence approached him and asked him to have another go at exposing TARA in the press. He became puzzled and a little frustrated by the conflicting instructions: from MI5 and Clockwork Orange to keep all this sexual gossip secret; from Army Intelligence to try to get the same gossip published.

The conflict grew during the year (1974), but after he broke with Clockwork Orange at the end of September, Colin made an attempt to resolve it, and to bring the Kincora business to a head.

He could not understand why, when so much was known to Intelligence and to the police about McGrath and where he worked, no action was taken over it. He suspected that the same political motives which inspired so much of the information he was getting under the heading of Clockwork Orange might be obstructing action on the scandal at Kincora.

His suspicions were well founded. TARA often intervened in such a way as to upset the unity of Protestant extremists. More than once, for instance, it issued a 'proclamation' calling on Protestants not to resort to violence - usually at times when violence was being advocated by most Protestant leaders. Such proclamations often upset the other paramilitary organisations, and helped to create an atmosphere of disarray where none in fact existed. A furious controversy was waged between TARA and the UVF

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in the pages of the *Sunday News* and the Belfast newsletter. TARA accused the UVF of 'left-wing' views, and the UVF lambasted TARA for extremism and sectarianism.

Colin wondered whether McGrath and his colleagues at Kincora were being 'held in place' to assist with such secret intelligence initiatives. If so, if the boys at Kincora were being sacrificed to the machinations of Intelligence, the process had gone too far. As with Clockwork Orange, the time had come to call a halt.

On 8 November 1974, Colin wrote a memorandum. He is not clear today (because he only has a copy) for whom the memo was intended, but it would certainly have gone to his superior officer Jeremy Railton, Head of Information Policy, and almost certainly also to Army Intelligence and the Army's RUC Liaison Officer at Police Headquarters in Belfast.

The memo was headed: "'TARA" - Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated With the Homosexual Community in Belfast'.

To the memo were attached three documents, none of which Colin managed to keep: an RUC paper on TARA (Reference A); a forensic report on the murder in 1973 of a ten-year-old boy called Brian McDermott (Reference B); and the Army's earlier request for a press briefing on TARA.

1 Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to 'TARA'. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor intelligence or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.

2 If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop

press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify our involvement in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, 'TARA' is no longer of any security interest.

3 In theory, 'TARA' was basically a credible concept from a Loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body could, no doubt, have made good use of the Orange Order's normal selection and 'vetting' system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had ready-made facilities for clandestine training by making use of the Orange Halls throughout the Province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, mainly because of WILLIAM McGRATH's rather strange political views which are more akin to Irish Nationalism or Republicanism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the Loyalist community at that time sprang up during the period.

4 Reference A deals with McGRATH's background in considerable detail but it is inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincora hostel in Newtownards Road where he works was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of Belfast Corporation Welfare Department. He does not, as the paper claims, 'run the hostel' - he is employed as a 'housefather'. The Warden of Kincora is JOSEPH MAINS and the Deputy Warden is RAYMOND SEMPLE. MAINS was appointed in 1959 and SEMPLE in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals. Indeed, various allegations of homosexual assaults on inmates of the hostel were investigated by senior Welfare Department staff in 1967 but no action was taken against anyone (see notes of a report by Mr H. Mason at flag 'N').

5 It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kincora 'began shortly after his appointment'. As I have pointed out in para 4 above, allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after MAINS was appointed.

6 Reference A claims that McGRATH 'is a known homosexual' but it avoids any mention of his links with various other key figures in the local homosexual community, other than to

insinuate that a number of well-known political personalities with whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of reference A, it is claimed that McGRATH left his previous employment 'as a result of a lovers' quarrel' with his employer, whereas our information would tend to indicate that he left following a row over an outstanding debt. His former employer, ROY GARLAND, is well known in Unionist Party circles (see also CLIFFORD SMITH) and was for sometime 2 i/c of 'TARA'. Admittedly, some of the personal correspondence between the two men during this period cannot be regarded as normal between employer and employee (see flag 'M'). Whatever the real reason for the row between GARLAND and McGRATH, there is certainly considerable animosity between them at present, and GARLAND has been actively engaged in trying to have McGRATH removed from his post at Kincora. GARLAND's own version of events (see flag 'O') is, of course, very enlightening, but I would suggest that it should be treated with caution until it can be substantiated because of the antagonism between them. It would also appear that many of the RUC source reports on this matter after 1971 originated from GARLAND.

7 McGRATH was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation Welfare Department in 1972/73, following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints has been received about his behaviour and that, although the complaints had been passed to senior welfare staff and to the RUC no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be confirmed, to some extent, by Mr ORR (see flag 'R') in 1973. There were, of course, similar allegations relating to other hostels during this period (see Bawnmore, Westwinds, Burnside etc.) and this conflicts with reference A's assertion that the allegations were confined to Kincora.

8 It should be remembered that the 1967 Sexual Offences Act does NOT apply to Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors is a criminal offence. The apparent lack of interest, therefore, by the Welfare Authorities and the RUC is quite remarkable. Furthermore, the claim made by (see flag 'Q') that key individuals in the Welfare Department were

themselves homosexuals and thus, not only appointed homosexuals to such posts but also covered up the offences that took place and protected the offenders, requires very serious examination. In particular, I view her allegations about with great concern because it illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.

9 Reference R which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of BRIAN McDERMOTT last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between the murder and the homosexual community is via JOHN McKEAGUE. McKEAGUE's own statements (see flag 'S') raise more questions than they answer. Certainly, his boast that he will not be prosecuted because 'he knows too much about some people' merits serious investigation, but I suspect that he will no [sic] be prepared to talk until he is released. [McKeague had been arrested and detained in 1973.] It is also rather remarkable that no charges have been [sic] preferred against him, at least during the past 3-4 years. Our own investigations of instances of alleged witchcraft or other satanic rites in the Province would tend to dismiss the RUC's theory that BRIAN McDERMOTT's murder could be part of these activities. In the past, 'Black Magic' practices etc have been mainly confined to groups operating from Republican areas, with the possible exception of three cases in Co Antrim. I think, however, that from a press point of view, we would be very foolish to give any credence to such claims without the most convincing evidence. The forensic reports on the McDERMOTT murder (see flag 'T') would tend to indicate that someone tried to dispose of the body by cutting it into pieces and burning them. It would also appear that when this failed, the pieces were dumped in the river. The insinuation made in the document regarding the boy's disappearance and the proximity of the Rev PAISLEY's church is dangerous nonsense.

10 Reference A claims that a number of key personalities in the political arena 'are aware of' the Kincora situation and, in particular, of McGRATH's background. It does not, however, explain the extent of their awareness nor of each individual's involvement with McGRATH. In summary, it would appear that the document is claiming that:-

(a) Senior members of the Grand Orange Lodge are aware of the situation because of the discussions and correspondence relating to McGRATH within the Orange Order (see flag 'C'). It is further alleged that THOMAS PASSMORE and the Rev MARTIN SMYTH have blocked any action against McGRATH.

(b) The Rev PAISLEY is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because of possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with McGRATH, DAVID BROWN and JOHN McKEAGUE. On the face of it, the statements made by VALERIE SHAW and TOM McNEILLY (see flag 'F') would tend to support only part of such a claim. There are also a number of inconsistencies: McGRATH would appear to be strongly anti-communist and anti-U.V.F. and this conflicts with the document's views on links with TOMMY HERRON, ERNIE 'DUKE' ELLIOTT, 'The Ulster Citizens Army' etc.

(c) Various public and political figures who hold positions of power and who are also homosexual protect each other from prosecution. The claims of a prostitution ring involving juveniles and centred on Bangor is not really substantiated, other than by GARLAND's own personal account. It would be interesting to check, however, the number of charges brought against people involved in homosexual activities in the greater Belfast area in the last 5 years. I also think that the RUC report on drug abuse in this connection merits close examination because this is a natural area of fund raising for terrorists. There is, of course, the obvious problem of security with the possible blackmailing of civil servants, politicians etc.

Conclusions and recommendations

I am far from happy with the quality of the information available on this matter, and I am even more unhappy because of the, as yet unexplained, failure of the RUC or the NIO [Northern Ireland Office] to take on this task.

I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless they had specifically received some form of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level. If that is the case then we should be even more wary about getting involved.

On the other hand, if the allegations are true then we should

do everything possible to ensure that the situation is not allowed to continue. The youngsters in these hostels almost certainly come from problem families, and it is clear that no one will fight their case unless we do. Those responsible for the murder of BRIAN McDERMOTT must be brought to trial before another child is killed, and if it can be proved that there is a connection with this homosexual group, then the RUC must be forced to take action irrespective of who is involved.

I would recommend therefore that:-

- (a) We make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter or at least discuss the matter with RUC.
- (b) We obtain very clear and unambiguous authority from London to proceed with a press disclosure.
- (c) We approach a responsible journalist whom we are confident will make a thorough investigation of the matter and not simply write a sensational type story purely on the information he is given.
- (d) We continue to look for additional information on this matter to ensure that we are not just being used as part of some political disinformation scheme.

Various attempts throughout the years have been made to cast doubts on this document. The *Irish Times*, which published the document in full on 25 June 1985, eleven years after it was dated, submitted the four pages to forensic scientists together with other material which was written in Lisburn barracks in 1974. The tests were inconclusive because the memorandum had been photocopied. However, other checks on the document by the *Irish Times*, including the reference to the RUC background report on TARA and other documents referred to in the memo, indicated that the document was genuine.

The suggestion that the document has been forged, which was later repeated in an official report, is entirely groundless. The chief argument for its authenticity is that it fits closely with the press briefing documents which are confirmed by journalists who received them. Clearly, Colin Wallace knew about McGrath and TARA as early as 1973. In that context, the 1974 memorandum is wholly credible.

The section on the murder of Brian McDermott is probably, as the memo suggests, not strictly relevant to the Kincora scandal. McDermott's murder may well have been a one-off crime by a sexual sadist not necessarily connected to the Kincora gang. Certainly there is no direct evidence to point to Kincora, and the issue is mentioned only because of the suspicion of a connection with John McKeague.

The section on witchcraft throws some interesting light into the activities of Information Policy at the time. Colin's memo is anxious to cast some doubt on the suggestion in the RUC reports that there may have been some connection between the Protestant extremists operating at Kincora and the outbreak of witchcraft and demonology which had fascinated the media in Northern Ireland for several months in 1974, and terrified whole sections of both communities.

Colin's scepticism on this point was well founded. He himself, as he wryly admits, was instrumental in setting off the witchcraft hysteria. Information Policy, with the generous help of one or two selected serving officers, had set up 'magic circles' in derelict houses in the Republican areas. Colin bought bundles of black candles for the purpose. Out in the country the Army's own 'covens' were even more realistic. Colin and his colleagues managed to get hold of some genuine chicken blood and feathers. They made crosses which they hung upside down on bushes leading to the 'satanic sites'. He still has his notebook in which he has meticulously drawn up instructions on how to construct witches' circles. He read several learned books on the subject and became an expert on the order of satanic service.

The results were devastating. The popular press, delighted at some diversion from the 'troubles', fell headlong for the witchcraft allegations. The *Sunday World* in Dublin published a whole supplement on witchcraft ceremonies in an old castle near Newry, all of which had been instigated by Colin Wallace and his merry witches. The effect of the publicity on the population was instant. A naturally religious

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Kincora – Exhibit GC12

Person Profile – Brian GEMMELL

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

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1. Overview

This analytical report has been produced as part of the ongoing strategic analytical overview of Kincora-related material held by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).

2. Reference Material

Various information sources, including internal police files and open source research material, have been used to inform the findings used in this profile. These include relevant statements, reports, exhibits and documents contained in the RUC Crime Files¹ prepared in 1982 and 1983 and the Sussex Police Inquiry. Results from open source research are referenced accordingly.

3. Introduction and Background

Brian GEMMELL is a former Captain in the British Army. He was posted to Northern Ireland in December 1974 as Officer Commanding 123 Section, 39th Infantry Brigade. GEMMELL later became Staff Officer, Grade 3, Brigade HQ Staff. He remained in Northern Ireland until December 1976.

GEMMELL had been brought up in an evangelical Christian family and he continued to maintain these values and beliefs during his military career.

During his tour of duty in Northern Ireland, GEMMELL's main responsibility was to collate and disseminate intelligence on Protestant paramilitary groups; this led him to become interested in the activities of TARA (a quasi-paramilitary organisation) and its leader, William McGRATH. Through GEMMELL's personal friendship with James McCORMICK, he was introduced to Roy GARLAND in 1975. GARLAND provided GEMMELL with one of his sources of information on TARA and McGRATH.

Brian GEMMELL gave a statement to the RUC in July 1982²; this is the only statement he made to any police investigation into Kincora.

4. Key Findings

- Brian GEMMELL had at least two sources of information reporting on TARA and William McGRATH, one of whom was Roy GARLAND.
- There is no evidence to suggest that GEMMELL was ever directly approached by a Kincora resident and made aware of the abuse in the Home.
- The written report GEMMELL claims he wrote following his meetings with Roy GARLAND in 1975 was not found during an army search of their records in the 1980s; there is no record of it ever having been shared with the RUC.
- GEMMELL's allegations that he was strongly rebutted by an MI5 officer for becoming involved in the reporting homosexuality linked to Kincora were never been confirmed because of the refusal of MI5 to allow CAMERON to be interviewed by the RUC.

¹ C64/2/80 (1982) and C64/5/83

² Statement of B GEMMELL, 16/07/1982, part of RUC File C64/5/83

5. Personal Details

Full name: Brian Stuart GEMMELL

Address³: York

DOB: [REDACTED]

Army Career (NI) December 1974 - December 1976:

- Officer Commanding 123 Section, 39th Infantry Brigade
- Staff Officer, Grade3, Brigade HQ Intelligence Staff
- Resigned Army Commission June 1977

Current Employment: Self-appointed Christian Teacher and Preacher⁴

6. Synopsis of Brian GEMMELL's statement to the RUC⁵

Date	Main Points
c.1975	Sometime into his tour of duty in Northern Ireland, GEMMELL met James McCORMICK and the subject of TARA was raised (by McCORMICK).
c.1975	McCORMICK suggested that GEMMELL should speak with Roy GARLAND as he was " <i>ex TARA and GARLAND was trying to expose TARA and McGRATH.</i> "
Summer 1975	The first meeting between GEMMELL and GARLAND took place at McCORMICK's home. GARLAND told GEMMELL how he was afraid of McGRATH and that he owed him (and others) money. GARLAND also told GEMMELL that McGRATH recruited young boys into his " <i>circle of influence and it was partly religious and partly sexual</i> ". McGRATH's activities dated back to the 1960s; GARLAND himself was one of the boys 'recruited'. GEMMELL told police that he believed GARLAND had been involved homosexually with McGRATH.
Late Summer/Autumn 1975	Meeting between GARLAND and GEMMELL at 39 Brigade HQ. GARLAND again spoke about TARA, including the key personalities involved in the group and about McGRATH's homosexuality. GEMMELL describes going to the Newtownards Road in Belfast " <i>I remember seeing a large detached house which I thought it [Kincora] was</i> ". GARLAND left GEMMELL to believe that the Rev. PAISLEY was aware of McGRATH's activities.
Late Summer/Autumn 1975	Following this second meeting with Roy GARLAND, GEMMELL claims that he made a written report of what he had been told by GARLAND. GEMMELL describes this as a four-sided MISR.
Late Summer/Autumn 1975	GEMMELL claims that he verbally debriefed his meeting(s) with Roy GARLAND to Ian CAMERON, 'Assistant Secretary, Political' at HQNI. (CAMERON was one of the main MI5 officials in Northern Ireland- see section 7 below). GEMMELL claims that Ian CAMERON reacted " <i>very strongly</i> " to GEMMELL's inclusion

³ Information obtained from open source research

⁴ see www.briangemmell.blogspot.co.uk

⁵ Statement of B GEMMELL, 16/07/1982, part of RUC File C64/5/83

Date	Main Points
	<p>of homosexuality in his debrief on the GARLAND meetings. According to GEMMELL, he was told by CAMERON, <i>“we did not want to be involved in this type of thing. He [CAMERON] was abrupt to the point of being rude”</i>. CAMERON told GEMMELL to terminate his enquiries on TARA and to <i>“get rid of”</i> GARLAND as a source. CAMERON subsequently relinquished his stance and allowed GEMMELL to continue working on TARA but only through a second, unnamed source.</p>

7. Brian GEMMELL and Ian CAMERON

Brian GEMMELL told the RUC in 1982 that he verbally briefed Ian CAMERON about matters he had been made aware of following his two meetings with Roy GARLAND and after he had submitted his written 4-sided MISR. According to GEMMELL, the meeting with CAMERON ended acrimoniously and CAMERON ordered GEMMELL to drop GARLAND as a source of information in TARA and McGRATH.

As part of the RUC investigations into Military Intelligence and Kincora⁶, attempts were made to interview Ian CAMERON; *“it is considered that CAMERON has an explanation to offer for his reasons for allegedly ordering Captain GEMMELL to discontinue his intelligence gathering in relation to homosexuality and which included GARLAND’s fears of McGRATH’s activity in a Boys’ Home”*⁷.

A pre-prepared list of 30 questions to be put to Ian CAMERON were drafted by D/Supt. CASKEY⁸ and submitted, in writing, to the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) on 11th October 1982. On the 16th November 1982, ACC WHITESIDE (RUC) was informed that CAMERON would not be made available for interview and that there were no replies to the 30 questions⁹. Subsequent high level discussions between the RUC (at Chief Constable level) and senior officials in the NIO, in early 1983, failed to secure either an interview with Ian CAMERON, or a response to CASKEY’s questions.

A report prepared by the MoD and NIO in 1989¹⁰, puts a slightly different slant on things. This reports states that from July 1982, the Security Service had been requested to make Ian CAMERON available for interview by the RUC. A series of meetings involving the Attorney General, his Legal Secretary, DPP (NI) and a Mr SHELDON (Security Service Legal Advisor) *“had sought agreement that it was unnecessary to call Mr CAMERON, whose preliminary answers to questions had already been forwarded to the RUC”*¹¹.

According to the same NIO/MoD report, the written questions prepared by CASKEY were put to Ian CAMERON by Mr SHELDON on the 1st November 1982. It is claimed that the then RUC Chief Constable, Sir John HERMON, was verbally told of CAMERON’s responses and agreed with Mr SHELDON’s view, *“that Mr CAMERON’s answers were in no way specific as to criminal activity”*.

⁶ ‘Military Intelligence and John Colin WALLACE’ C64/5/83

⁷ Paragraph 210 of the covering report by D/Supt. G CASKEY, 16/03/1983 to C64/5/83

⁸ included in Part IV of C64/5/83

⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰ Untitled and undated, but believed to have been written c. 1989 by official in Whitehall, attached to the MoD and NIO. See section of report *“RUC Wish to Interview Military Intelligence and Security Service Personnel”*.

¹¹ Paragraph 201(s) Untitled and undated, but believed to have been written c. 1989 by official in Whitehall, attached to the MoD and NIO. See section of report *“RUC Wish to Interview Military Intelligence and Security Service Personnel”*.

Perhaps the most critical statement in the MoD/NIO report is the following, *“It is understood that Mr CAMERON’s answers to D/Superintendent CASKEY’s written questions were eventually sent to Northern Ireland. But there is no record that they were communicated to the RUC...¹²”*.

There is no record of the RUC ever having received a response from Ian CAMERON.

8. Sussex Police Inquiry

In his statement to Sussex Police, Clifford SMYTH refers to a conversation he had about William McGRATH with Brian GEMMELL, who he describes as *“a member of the security forces¹³”*. According to SMYTH, GEMMELL advised him not to trust McGRATH as he was a *“homosexual and a liar”¹⁴*.

Sussex Police did not make any attempt to further this potential line of enquiry into McGRATH’s activity and/or to try and locate and interview GEMMELL.

¹² Paragraph 204(s) Untitled and undated, but believed to have been written c. 1989 by official in Whitehall, attached to the MoD and NIO. See section of report *“RUC Wish to Interview Military Intelligence and Security Service Personnel”*.

¹³ Statement of AC SMYTH 27/05/1982

¹⁴ *ibid.*

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Kincora - Exhibit GC13

Analysis of Kincora Register

MK and SM
Higher Police Analysts (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

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1. Introduction and Background

This report has been written to provide a detailed analysis of all individuals who resided in Kincora between 1958 and 1980.

The reference document used to prepare this report is the Kincora Hostel Register of Residents, Exhibit PJM3 (RUC File C64/2/80).

The Kincora Register of Residents is a hardback book and is a hand written record of admissions and discharges from Kincora Boys' Home, covering a period from 1958 to 1980. The register records the name of resident, their previous address, date of birth, religion, address of next of kin, date of arrival and departure and address on departure from Kincora. In general, the Register appears to have been well maintained by Kincora staff. Most of the entries are believed to have been made by Joseph MAINS, the Kincora Warden. A duplicate version of the Register appears to have been maintained contemporaneously by Kincora staff until 1972.

The contents of the Kincora Register were inputted onto a spreadsheet, for ease of manipulation and analysis of data.

2. Aims

The key aims of this document are to provide an assessment of:

- the total number of individuals who resided in Kincora
- the number of individuals who have been traced as part of any previous police investigation
- the number of Kincora residents who made allegations of sexual abuse against Kincora staff
- the number of unidentified suspects in the sexual abuse of residents in Kincora
- the number of named abusers of Kincora residents (other than Kincora staff)
- the number of Kincora residents who witnessed abuse by Kincora staff on fellow residents
- the number of Kincora residents who alleges they had suffered from physical abuse during their time in Kincora.

There remains [media] speculation that William McGRATH's abuse of Kincora residents was known about and not dealt with by any person in Authority because he was being 'protected' as a British Intelligence Source. This report will consider the number of Kincora residents traced by police both prior to and after McGRATH started work in Kincora in June 1971 to determine if there was a potential 'cover-up' of victims and witnesses.

3. Methodology

The original Kincora Register was transcribed onto an Excel Spreadsheet to make research and analysis easier. It was used as the starting point in determining that all former residents were captured.

A record of all those who had provided statements to the RUC or Sussex investigations in the 1980s was also established and this was cross referenced with the Register. This revealed that a former resident was not included on the original register but had provided a statement to the RUC in 1980¹.

¹ KIN 57 provided a statement to the RUC on 26/03/1980 in which he stated that he had been in Kincora "approximately one year ago... I stayed in the Hostel over one weekend". His name does not appear on the Kincora Register.

He was subsequently added to the list of residents. There is no evidence that any other names are missing from the Register, at this stage.

The actions issued by the RUC investigation teams in 1980 and 1982 were reviewed to assist to gain an understating of why certain residents were/were not traced as part of previous police enquiries.

Analysis of co-resident sexual activity and/or abuse in Kincora has not been included in this report and has been the subject of separate analysis.

4. Key Findings

- Almost 2/3rds of former Kincora residents have never been traced by police; there may be more witnesses and victims of abuse in Kincora who have never been spoken to by police. A number of former residents have come forward to police post 1982.
- An analysis of the documents held by the PSNI, does not however identify any person, not traced by the police, who was witnessed to be a victim of abuse by anyone by who was interviewed by police. Nor are there any persons not traced who are identified in any statement as being witness to the abuse of another resident.
- It is unclear as to the rationale behind the RUC decision to use 1963 as a 'cut-off date' for tracing former Kincora residents; this restricted the RUC's pool of potential victims and witnesses given that the Hostel opened in 1958.
- Substantially more former Kincora residents who were admitted to Kincora post June 1971 (McGRATH's start date) have been traced by police, compared to those admitted pre June 1971.
- 40% of residents traced by police make allegations of sexual abuse during their time in Kincora.
- Apart from the 3 convicted Kincora staff, allegations of sexual abuse on Kincora residents have been made against 3 named individuals. 2 of these named abusers² were former Kincora residents who allegedly abused victims when returning to Kincora to visit Joseph MAINS.
- 6 Kincora residents have made allegations that they were sexually abused whilst resident in Kincora by unnamed/unidentified males; only 2 of these allegations were known to police in 1980.
- Allegations of corporal punishment against MAINS have been made by 9 Kincora residents.

5. 1980 'analysis' of the Kincora Register

In his covering report, DCI George CASKEY stated that, *"a total of 186 boys resided there [Kincora] at various times between 1963 and January 1980. Of this number 104 boys have been traced and interviewed by police"*. This would have meant that the RUC would have traced 56% of former residents in their accepted time period.

² Former residents who allegedly abused victims in Kincora on return visits to see Joseph MAINS are Hugh QUINN and R 4.

From the analysis of the Kincora Register for this report (with an understanding that it is the original and same as that referred to by CASKEY) the total of 186 boys in Kincora between 1963 and 80 is wrong. An analysis of the Kincora Register in 2016 shows that there were **245** individuals in Kincora between 1963 and 1980; **59** more than the 1980 total. This alters CASKEY's assessment that he had traced over half of the boys in Kincora between 1963 and 80; he traced 42% of Kincora residents.

The figures from the Kincora Register used by the RUC in 1980 were accepted unchallenged by the Sussex Review team in 1982. The Sussex Team do not appear to have checked whether the RUC interpretation of the Register was accurate and make no comment on the 1963 'cut-off' date.

6. Analysis

Analysis of the Kincora Register provides the following information:

a. Total Number of Kincora Residents

A total of **309** individuals resided in Kincora between 1958 and 1980.

b. Number of Kincora residents who have been traced as part of any previous police investigation

- **115** (37%) former Kincora residents have been traced by police
- **194** (63%) former Kincora residents have never been traced by police




Chart 1: Tracing of Kincora residents

- Reflecting the 1980 RUC decision to treat 1963 as a cut-off point for tracing former residents, only 4 individuals who were admitted to Kincora prior to 1963 have ever been traced by police. Of these, 3 make allegations of abuse against MAINS.

c. Allegations of sexual abuse in Kincora

- **46** former Kincora residents made allegations to police of sexual abuse in Kincora; 3rd party allegations of sexual abuse relating to **3** former residents have also been made.
- **6** Kincora residents make allegations (or by 3rd party report) that they were sexually abused by a **named abuser** (other than MAINS, SEMPLE and/or McGRATH)
 - A 3rd party referral from the Met Police in 2014, alleging "Sadistic sodomy, which involved the stubbing out of cigarettes on the victim's back" was sent to PSNI. The victim, [REDACTED] **KIN 377**, was deceased, as was the alleged abuser. There is no other evidence to connect the alleged abuser to the offence and **KIN 377** had been interviewed by the RUC during which he made allegations of abuse against MAINS, but not the named abuser in the 2014 allegation. PSNI closed the case on 04/08/2015.

- **KIN 1** (resident in Kincora on 3 occasions between 1963 and 1964). **KIN 1** told police that he had been forced to masturbate Hugh QUINN (former resident) on one of QUINN's return visits to Kincora.
- **KIN 2** (resident in Kincora on 3 occasions between 1961 and 1965). 3rd party report. During police interview in 1980, Joseph MAINS³ told RUC officers that HUGH QUINN 'interfered' with Kincora residents **KIN 1** and **KIN 2** on his return visits to Kincora.
- **R 9** (resident in Kincora on 1 occasion between 1974 and 1977). **R 9** alleges that he had oral sex with **R 4** (former resident) during **R 4** return visits to Kincora.
- **R 17** (resident in Kincora on 2 occasions between 1974 and 1976). 3rd party report. **R 4** told police that he had masturbated **R 17** on one of his return visits to Kincora.
- **R 18** (resident in Kincora on 1 occasion between 1977 and 1980). 3rd party report. **R 4** claims that he had a sexual encounter with **R 18** in Kincora on a return visit.

No charges were ever brought in any of the cases highlighted above.

d. Allegations of sexual abuse in Kincora by former residents against unidentified abusers

- **6** former Kincora residents make allegations of sexual abuse against unnamed and unidentified suspects. 3 of these 6 former residents were in Kincora in the 1960s, i.e. pre McGRATH.
 - **R 1**, Kincora resident on 2 occasions between 1965 and 1966, told police in that he was abused in Kincora by an **unknown male**. **R 1** believed this man to be "*an ex Kincora boy ... 5' 10" tall, ginger or fair hair, about 30 years old*", who regularly visited MAINS in Kincora. **R 1** also told police that this male claimed "MAINS had sent him" to him and that they had masturbated each other on several occasions. The identity of this offender has never been established.
 - **KIN 179**, a Kincora resident on 3 occasions between 1966 and 1968 told police in 1980 that he was approached by a male staff member in Kincora in the bathroom. This male was naked and began masturbating himself in the bathroom and asked **KIN 179** to masturbate him. This male was described as a "*student working at the Hostel when Joe MAINS was on leave*". This individual remains unidentified, although an individual was questioned about the allegation. No charges were ever brought.
 - Garry HOY, a Kincora resident between 1972 and 1978 told police in 2013 that Raymond SEMPLE had taken him by bus to SEMPLE's home in the Fortwilliam area of Belfast where an older man sexually abused him. HOY also claimed that he had been abused by another man; this man remains unidentified, despite a police investigation in 2015. HOY had provided a statement to the RUC in 1980 but did not mention any abuse at this time.

³ Statement of D/Con GIRVEN 16/07/1980 re interview of J MAINS 29/05/80

- **KIN 135**, a Kincora resident from 1964 claimed in 2012 that he was abused/ raped by 2 unknown males in Kincora. He provided brief descriptions of both males during his ABE interview with GMP. **KIN 135** had not been traced by either the RUC or Sussex police as part of their earlier investigations.
- **KIN 279** was resident in Kincora from 1975; he claimed in 2015 that he was buggered by an unidentified male in Kincora, with McGRATH. In his statements to the RUC and Sussex, he made no reference to having been abused when in Kincora.
- **KIN 238**, who was a Kincora resident in 1977 came forward in 1998 to RUC to report abuse and provided a statement in 2003. He claimed that an unidentified male in police uniform had allegedly abused him, whilst in the company of MAINS and another member of Kincora staff.

e. Number of Kincora residents who witnessed abuse by Kincora staff on fellow residents

- 2⁴ former Kincora residents refer to having witnessed or been told by other residents of sexual abuse by Kincora staff.

f. Number of Kincora residents who allege physical abuse by staff in Kincora

Corporal punishment was not allowed as a form of punishment for children in residential care. Discipline was to be achieved through *“personal relationships, by way of example, and when necessary, by withdrawing privileges.”*⁵ Despite this guidance, 9 former Kincora residents made allegations of physical abuse during their time in Kincora- all against Joseph MAINS. MAINS was never charged with any offence relating to corporal punishment.

⁴ See statements of **KIN 327** and **KIN 5**

⁵ Statement of Robert BUNTING, 13/05/1980 – Assistant Director EHSSB



Kincora – Exhibit GC14

Homosexuality amongst residents in Kincora Boys' Hostel

MK
Higher Police Analyst (Strategic Analysis)
May 2016

This report should be read in conjunction with the statement of D/C/Superintendent Clarke provided to the HIAI and should not be further disseminated.

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1. Introduction

This report should be considered as part of the strategic analytical review of Kincora related material held by the PSNI.

In addition to the evidence against the three former Kincora staff, during the initial 1980 RUC investigation it emerged that several residents had engaged in homosexual activities with each other whilst in Kincora. No prosecution was recommended in all of the cases as *“the evidence is just an averment in a boy’s statement against and about other boys and is too vague to be the basis of a prosecution and the evidence is accordingly insufficient. The evidence on their own admissions would be sufficient to prosecute R 9, R 17 and R 18 but (1) they are witnesses with immunities against the accused (2) R 9 and R 17 were probably corrupted by the accused... and (3) their activities were probably little more culpable than takes place in any boys’ boarding school at that age”*.¹

Research for this report has highlighted that there may be additional cases of homosexual activity (consensual and non-consensual) amongst Kincora residents, not previously referred to or considered by the DPP in 1981.

2. Summary of Homosexual Activity amongst Peers in Kincora Hostel

Homosexual activity amongst Kincora Residents	Kincora Staff made aware/Action taken	Additional Information	Sources of Information
<p>R 9 and R 17</p> <p>Both admitted to having a consensual homosexual relationship which started in Kincora (where they shared a bedroom) and continued for some time after both had left.</p> <p>R 17 and R 9, whilst Kincora residents, were abused together, and separately, by William McGRATH.</p> <p>A number of other Kincora residents recall either finding R 9 and R 17 together intimately, or hearing the general talk at the time that the two were <i>‘fruity boys’</i>. Both were resident together in Kincora in 1974.</p>	<p>Joseph MAINS – made aware by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIN 300, Kincora resident Richard KERR, Kincora resident <p>Response by MAINS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MAINS told R 9’s social worker, [redacted] who took no further action <p>Raymond SEMPLE - made aware by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIN 300 who ‘got the impression’ that SEMPLE did not believe him. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sex in Kincora – both admitted to having consensual sex in Kincora. This was after McGRATH had sexually assaulted them both, at the same time, and individually Sex tape involving R 17 and R 9 is mentioned in the statements of several other Kincora residents Sex outside of Kincora – R 17 and R 9 also had sex in a shed at the bottom of the garden and also at the back of a disused house near the Hostel. This continued after R 17 left Kincora Salvation Army Hostel- R 9 and R 17 continued to have regular sex whilst both lived in the Salvation Army hostel. 	<p>-Statement R 9 05/3/80</p> <p>- Statement R 17 05/03/80</p> <p>- Statement KIN 313 29/2/80</p> <p>- Statements KIN 300 27/02/80 & 10/06/82</p> <p>- Statement KIN 54 04/03/80</p> <p>- Statement Richard KERR 26/02/80</p> <p>- Statement KIN 210 11/03/80</p> <p>-Statement [redacted] 24/04/80 & Exhibit MJR1(part of C64/2/80)</p>

¹ Report by GL McLoughlin, Senior Assistant Director DPP, June 1981 Reference 1675/80. Appears to be internal DPP correspondence. Report is contained amongst DPP papers retained by the PSNI

Homosexual activity amongst Kincora Residents	Kincora Staff made aware/Action taken	Additional Information	Sources of Information
<p>KIN 284 and KIN 282</p> <p>Non-consensual: KIN 284 claims that KIN 282 masturbated him and he reciprocated on KIN 282, out of fear of "getting a kicking".</p> <p>KIN 282 has never been traced by police. Both were resident together between September and October 1971.</p>	<p>No evidence that any of the Kincora staff were made aware.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sexual contact- KIN 284 claims he was sexually assaulted by KIN 282 in his bed in Kincora. 	<p>-Statement KIN 284 13/03/80</p> <p>-RUC Investigation 1980 Action 199</p>
<p>KIN 12 and KIN 11 [believed to refer to KIN 11]</p> <p>3rd Party Witness: Sexual contact witnessed by a fellow Kincora resident</p> <p>Neither KIN 12 nor KIN 11 mention any sexual contact between each other in their statements.</p> <p>The Kincora Register confirms both were resident at the same time between July and October 1966.</p>	<p>No evidence that any of the Kincora staff were made aware.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sexual contact in Kincora – mutual masturbation in Kincora witnessed by KIN 5. KIN 5 claims that he was bribed with cigarettes by KIN 12 and KIN 11 to keep quiet. 	<p>-Statement KIN 5 27/03/80</p>
<p>R 34 and KIN 43</p> <p>Not consensual: KIN 43 claims that R 34 masturbated him, against his will, when they shared an attic room in Kincora. KIN 43 claims he woke another resident and told him what had happened.</p> <p>The Kincora Register confirms both were resident at the same time between 1969 and 70.</p>	<p>Joseph MAINS – made aware by :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIN 43 <p>Response by MAINS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> He laughed and treated it as a joke but KIN 43 was moved to another room 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sexual contact in Kincora – KIN 43 alleges that R 34 tried to touch him sexually. 	<p>-Statement KIN 43 20/03/80</p> <p>-RUC Investigation 1980 Action 21</p>

Homosexual activity amongst Kincora Residents	Kincora Staff made aware/Action taken	Additional Information	Sources of Information
<p>R 34 and KIN 67</p> <p>3rd Party Witness: Sexual contact witnessed by fellow Kincora residents</p> <p>Neither R 34 nor KIN 67 were traced by police. R 34 and KIN 67 were room -mates in Kincora, together R 8.</p> <p>The Kincora Register confirms both were resident at the same time between 1967 and 1968.</p>	<p>Joseph MAINS – made aware by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> R 8 KIN 67 <p>Response by MAINS</p> <p><i>“He laughed and said he’ll grow out of it, don’t worry he doesn’t mean any harm”.</i> Moved KIN 67 from the room he had shared with R 34 and R 8.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sexual contact in Kincora – R 8 says KIN 67 told him that R 34 had tried to touch him sexually. 	<p>-Letter from R 8 (Exhibit GC19, part of GC3)</p> <p>- RUC Investigation 1980 Action 20</p>
<p>R 34 and R 8</p> <p>Not consensual</p> <p>R 8 wrote a letter [to the Welfare Authority] in which he made a number of allegations against Joseph MAINS and R 34. This formed part of the Mason File. R 8 alleged that R 34 had propositioned him one night in their room in Kincora. Kincora register confirms that both were resident in Kincora at the same time. Two other boys also made allegations against R 34; R 34 was never traced by police.</p>	<p>Joseph MAINS – made aware by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> R 8 KIN 67 <p>Response by MAINS</p> <p><i>“He laughed and said he’ll grow out of it, don’t worry he doesn’t mean any harm”</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sexual contact in Kincora – R 8 alleges that R 34 tried to touch him sexually. 	<p>-Letter from R 8 (Exhibit GC19, part of GC3)</p>

3. Summary of Abuse and Homosexual Activity between Kincora Residents and Former Residents²

Homosexual activity by former residents on 'current' residents	Staff made aware/Action taken	Additional Information	Source of Information
<p>R 17 and R 9 (see above table)</p>			
<p>R 4 and R 9</p> <p>Consensual: Conflict in version of events Happened after R 4 had left Kincora. Homosexual activity took place within Kincora- in the boys' toilet and in the garden (as well as in R 4 flat on the Beersbridge Road). R 9 denies that the two ever had full sexual intercourse but did admit to having oral sex. R 4 would have been 25-30yrs old; R 9 16-18 years old.</p>	<p>No evidence that any of the Kincora staff were made aware</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sexual contact in Kincora- R 9 admitted to masturbating R 4. • Oral sex - R 4 and R 9 both admitted oral sex on R 4 return visit to Kincora. • Sex in Kincora - R 4 claims he and R 9 had anal sex twice in Kincora during return visits by R 4. R 9 denies having had sexual intercourse with R 4. 	<p>-Statement R 4 03/04/80</p> <p>-Statement R 9 05/03/80</p> <p>- Statement R 9 11/05/82</p> <p>-Statement D/Sgt MIDDLEMISS 30/06/80 re: interview of R 4 03/04/80</p>
<p>R 4 and R 17</p> <p>Conflict in version of events R 4 claims that he and R 17 had homosexual contact with each other in/in the grounds of Kincora on a return visit to Kincora. This is disputed by R 17</p>	<p>No evidence that any of the Kincora staff were made aware</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sexual contact in Kincora - R 4 claims they consensually masturbated each other on his return visit to Kincora. This is at variance with R 17 account who claims he never had any sexual contact with R 4 (though R 17 claims R 4 did expose himself to him). 	<p>-Statement R 4 03/04/80</p> <p>-Statement R 17 05/03/80</p>

² Former, returning Kincora residents are highlighted in bold font

Homosexual activity by former residents on 'current' residents	Staff made aware/Action taken	Additional Information	Source of Information
<p>R 4 and R 18</p> <p>Conflict in version of events R 4 alleges that the sexual contact was initiated by R 18 in the Kincora living room (while other residents were in the Hostel, McGRATH was in the kitchen and the curtains were open). R 4 had returned to Kincora to visit Joseph MAINS. R 18 makes no mention of this 'incident' in any of his police statements.</p>	<p>No evidence that any of the Kincora staff were made aware</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sexual contact in Kincora R 4 alleges consensual masturbation on a return visit to Kincora. R 18 does not mention any sexual encounter(s) with R 4 in his statement. 	<p>-Statement R 4 03/04/80</p>
<p>Hugh QUINN and KIN 1</p> <p>Non-consensual: KIN 1 claims the abuse by QUINN started during his second week of being in Kincora. QUINN allegedly tried to get KIN 1 to masturbate him.</p> <p>On at least 2 occasions KIN 1 claims he told MAINS and SEMPLE about QUINN's indecent behaviour towards him.</p> <p>KIN 1 claims he also witnessed QUINN interfering with other boys in Kincora.</p> <p>MAINS admitted to police that QUINN "<i>interfered with the boys in the hostel when he visited</i>".</p> <p>KIN 1 thought QUINN was a visitor when he had tried to abuse him; MAINS said he was a resident. The Kincora register confirms these incidents are most likely to have taken place when QUINN returned to the Hostel as a visitor.</p>	<p>Joseph MAINS – made aware by :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIN 1 <p>Response by MAINS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "I'll look into it" Moved KIN 1 into a new bedroom <p>Raymond SEMPLE – made aware by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIN 1 (denied by SEMPLE during interview) MAINS and SEMPLE both appeared "<i>dry and did not seem to care</i>" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indecent assault – KIN 1 claims he was abused by QUINN on numerous occasions Witness to abuse – KIN 1 claims he witnessed QUINN interfering with other boys in his bedroom but does not name them 	<p>-Statement KIN 1 03/04/80</p> <p>-Statement of D/Con GIRVEN 16/07/80 re interview of J MAINS 29/05/80</p>

Homosexual activity by former residents on 'current' residents	Staff made aware/Action taken	Additional Information	Source of Information
<p>Hugh QUINN and KIN 2 Non-consensual:3rd Party report During police interview, Joseph MAINS was asked if QUINN had ever interfered with Kincora residents; he replied and said yes- with KIN 1 and KIN 2.</p> <p>KIN 2 was never traced by police and the relevant action to locate him appears to have been written off on 23/5/1980 with the comment "there are no allegations of this boy being assaulted while in the home."</p>	<p>MAINS had knowledge</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sexual contact in Kincora – MAINS alleges that QUINN tried to masturbate KIN 2 	<p>-Statement of D/Con GIRVEN 16/07/80 re interview of J MAINS 29/05/80</p> <p>- RUC Investigation 1980 Action 329</p>

4. Knowledge of Homosexual Activity amongst Kincora residents- Kincora Staff and Social Workers

It is evident from the above table that Kincora staff, Social workers and other Kincora residents had knowledge of, at least, some of the homosexual activity between residents. The 'relationship' between **R 17** and **R 9** appears to have been an 'open secret' amongst staff and residents in Kincora. Further, **R 9**'s social worker confirmed that she had been told by MAINS of an 'incident' involving **R 9** and another Kincora resident, "there was some question of the two being interrupted while having some degree of physical contact with each other"³. No further action was taken by the social worker as "...I considered **R 9** was educationally sub normal and emotionally very immature and therefore not knowledgeable about sexual matters"⁴

There are at least three allegations that **R 34** had made unwanted homosexual advances to other residents who, at different times, shared a bedroom with **R 34** in Kincora. It is obvious that MAINS⁵, at least, was aware of **R 34** behaviour. Although it is not clear if he spoke to **R 34** about the allegations, he moved two of **R 34**'s 'victims' after they had complained to different bedrooms.

Joseph MAINS told police that he knew that Hugh QUINN had abused, at least, two Kincora residents. MAINS told police that he had taken action by moving the boys in question to different bedrooms, away from QUINN. When asked by police if he reported the incidents to the authorities, MAINS replied that he couldn't remember.

³ Statement of H NEILL 20/4/1980

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ Statement of D/Sgt J MIDDLEMISS 13/5/1980 re interview of Joseph MAINS on 1/4/1980

5. Summary of Kincora Residents involved in acts of homosexuality amongst residents/former residents

- [REDACTED] **R 9** DOB [REDACTED], Kincora resident between 21/10/1974 and 29/04/1977.

Both Joseph MAINS and William McGRATH were convicted at their trial in 1981 of offences of gross indecency against [REDACTED] **R 9** . [REDACTED] **R 9** two siblings [REDACTED] **KIN 43** and [REDACTED] **KIN 274** also resided in Kincora, though all three were never resident at the same time. [REDACTED] **KIN 43** was granted immunity by the DPP in relation to homosexual actions he may have been involved in with fellow Kincora residents, as he was a Prosecution Witness against MAINS and McGRATH. The extracts below from [REDACTED] **R 9** statement to the RUC⁷ provide an insight into the abuse he was subjected to by McGRATH as well as the homosexual acts he did with other Kincora residents:

-“Mr McGRATH and me fucked that many times I can’t remember all the times”.

*-“I did it with [REDACTED] **R 17**] three or four times. It was him that started it”.*

*-“..this boy called [REDACTED] **R 4** [sic]...came up one day to Kincora... he came into the toilet and locked the door...and told me to wank him off. Then after that he told me to suck him...while I was sucking him he put his hands on my neck to hold my head down... I hit him in the face with my elbow”.*

- [REDACTED] **R 17** DOB [REDACTED], Kincora resident on two separate occasions: 6/10/1974-8/03/1976 and 23/05/1976-28/08/1976.

William McGRATH was convicted of gross indecency against [REDACTED] **R 17** at his trial in 1981. [REDACTED] **R 17** was granted immunity by the DPP in relation to homosexual actions he may have been involved in with fellow Kincora residents as he was a Prosecution Witness against McGRATH. When [REDACTED] **R 17** left Kincora after his second time he went to the Salvation Army Hostel where he had a number of other homosexual ‘relationships’.

*-“McGRATH was sitting in a chair between [REDACTED] **R 9** and I. McGRATH opened the zips of both our trousers and took out our cocks. He started to rub the both of us”.*

-“Up until I left Kincora..., I had sex with McGRATH at least 3 times a week. This always took place in the Hostel in either the cloakroom on the ground floor, the sitting room or in my bedroom”.

*-“About a fortnight after [REDACTED] **R 9** came into Kincora... [REDACTED] **R 9** and I started to ride each other.... This went on between [REDACTED] **R 9** and I for a long time until I went to live at Beersbridge Road. It happened about 5 nights a week... It nearly always happened in the Hostel in the bedroom and on a few occasions in the wee shed at the bottom of the garden. It also happened on a few occasions at the back of the disused house which was just a few doors up from the Hostel.”*

*[REDACTED] **R 9** used to visit me at my flat (Beersbridge Rd) about 3 times a week. We had sex each time he called to see me”.*

⁶ Provided a statement to RUC on 5/3/1980 and to Sussex Police on 11/5/1982

⁷ Statement [REDACTED] **R 9** 05/03/1980

⁸ Provided a statement to the RUC on 5/3/1980

- [REDACTED] **KIN 284** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident 1/09/1971-7/10/1971.
[REDACTED] **KIN 284** spent his entire childhood in care (Brefne House, Bawnmore, Williamson House, Kincora, Muckamore Abbey). [REDACTED] **KIN 284** told police¹⁰ that he had been forced to masturbate a fellow Kincora resident, [REDACTED] **KIN 282**. [REDACTED] **KIN 282** was never traced by police and it does not appear that any charges were considered being brought against him by police. In a subsequent statement to police¹¹, [REDACTED] **KIN 284** also claimed that he had been abused by Joseph MAINS in Kincora; no charges were brought against MAINS who was, at that stage, already in prison.
- [REDACTED] **KIN 282** **DOB** [REDACTED] -Kincora resident 13/03/1970-9/03/1972.
[REDACTED] **KIN 282** was never traced by police¹² (appears to have been fairly limited attempt to locate him) and no statement was ever obtained from him.
- [REDACTED] **KIN 12** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident 01/07/1966-15/03/1967.
Makes reference in his statement that MAINS attempted to indecently assault him in Kincora. [REDACTED] **KIN 12** makes no reference in his statement that he had been involved, in a homosexual way, with any other Kincora resident.
- [REDACTED] **KIN 11** [REDACTED] **KIN 11** **DOB** [REDACTED] -Kincora resident on 3 separate occasions: 30/6/1966-2/9/1966, 5/9/1966-1/10/1966 and 17/4/1967-23/4/1967.
Provided statements to the RUC and Sussex police¹³ but made no mention of being involved in any homosexual activity /abuse in Kincora. [REDACTED] **KIN 5**, a fellow Kincora resident made reference to the homosexual activity between [REDACTED] **KIN 11** and [REDACTED] **KIN 12** in his statement to police.
- [REDACTED] **KIN 43** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident on 3 separate occasions: 20/12/1969-18/02/1970, 22/8/1972-3/9/1972 & 21/5/1973-16/1/1974.
Describes in his statement to the RUC in 1980¹⁴ of how his room-mate, [REDACTED] **R 34**, touched him intimately, against his will, as he lay in bed. [REDACTED] **KIN 43** also made allegation of indecent assault against William McGRATH; no charges were directed against McGRATH by the DPP.
- [REDACTED] **R 34** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident on two separate occasions: 21/8/1967-21/7/1968 & 27/7/1968-21/5/1970.
As part of the initial RUC investigation, an action was raised "to interview [REDACTED] **R 34**"¹⁵; limited attempts were made to trace [REDACTED] **R 34** unsuccessfully. A total of 3 Kincora residents made identical allegations that when they were roommates of [REDACTED] **R 34** he made homosexual approaches to them.

⁹ Provided a statement to the RUC on 13/3/1980 and on 13/02/1982

¹⁰ Statement [REDACTED] **KIN 284** 13/03/1980

¹¹ Statement [REDACTED] **KIN 284** 13/02/1982

¹² See RUC Phase 1 Investigation, Action 199.

¹³ Statements [REDACTED] **KIN 11** 11/4/1980 and 24/6/1982

¹⁴ Statement [REDACTED] **KIN 43** 20/3/1980

¹⁵ See RUC Phase 1 investigation, Action 20A

- **KIN 67** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident 3/8/1967-27/3/1968
KIN 67 was never traced by the police; the allegation that **R 34** propositioned him was made by **R 8** and became part of the Mason File.
- **R 8** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident 29/4/1968-2/8/1971
R 8 wrote a letter to the Social Services¹⁶ outlining a number of allegations of indecent behaviour against Joseph MAINS; in the same letter he also referred to an occasion where he had been propositioned by **R 34** and his knowledge of **R 34** attempts to 'come on' to other boys in Kincora.
- **R 4** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident 02/08/1965-4/11/1966
R 4 is alleged to have been homosexually involved with at least three Kincora residents during visits he made the Kincora AFTER he had been a resident there. There is no evidence from any of the three residents (**R 9**, **R 17** or **R 18**) to suggest that this homosexual activity was non-consensual. **R 4** alleged that he was sexually abused by Joseph MAINS during the time he was a resident in Kincora; the RUC recommended a charge of gross indecency against MAINS in relation to **R 4** allegations; no charges were brought at trial. **R 4** was convicted of the indecent assault of an 8 year old boy, Ernest SHARPE, at trial in October 1981.
- **R 18** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident 12/5/1977- 1980
R 4 claims that he and **R 18** masturbated each other in Kincora. **R 18** makes no mention of any sexual contact with **R 4** in any of his police statements. At the 1981 trial, McGRATH was convicted of gross indecency against **R 18**.
- **Hugh QUINN** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident on three occasions 22/2/1960-6/6/1961, 19/6/1961-8/7/1962 & 22/12/1965-2/1/1966.
During police interview, Joseph MAINS told police that Hugh QUINN "*interfered with the boys in the hostel when he visited*".¹⁷
- **KIN 1** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident on three occasions 6/7/1963-7/11/1964, 20/7/1963-25/7/1963 & u/k 7/11/1964.
KIN 1 told the RUC¹⁸ that Hugh QUINN had indecently assaulted him on a number of occasions in Kincora, in his bedroom and also in the study.
- **KIN 2** **DOB** [REDACTED] - Kincora resident on three separate occasions 25/7/1961-2/2/1963, 17/9/1963-15/1/1965, 17/8/1963-u/k.
During police interview MAINS told the RUC that Hugh QUINN had 'interfered' with **KIN 2**. Police made limited attempts to trace **KIN 2** without success. It is perhaps of note that the action was closed on the 23/5/1980 with the following comment: "*there are no allegations of this boy being assaulted while in the home*" when this is quite possibly not the case.

¹⁶ Exhibit GC19, part of GC3- RUC File C64/2/80

¹⁷ Statement of D/Con GIRVEN 16/7/1980 re his interview of Joseph MAINS on 29/5/1980

¹⁸ Statement of **KIN 1** 3/4/1980



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT

I, Alex Younger, will say as follows:

1. I am the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). I was appointed to this post in November 2014, having been in the Service since 1991. I am the only serving member of the Service who is officially named in public, and am SIS's Accounting Officer. I am also responsible for SIS operations and the ongoing efficiency of the Service.
2. I confirm that I have no personal knowledge of matters relating to, or connected with, the Kincora Boys Home. Given the passage of time, any SIS account of the period in question is reliant on our corporate written record.
3. I confirm that I have delegated authority to the Service's Deputy Director responsible for compliance to assist the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) with its investigation into Kincora. I have directed him and his team to provide the Inquiry with the Service's full cooperation; to answer all their questions as accurately and fully as possible; to conduct searches based on the terms provided to us by the Inquiry and show to them all material identified as potentially relevant from the results of those searches; and to make available to the Inquiry all material deemed relevant for public disclosure by the Inquiry in a form that will allow that to happen.
4. I am assured by him, and therefore believe, that all this has been done. I know that SIS officers have, in doing so, also made the Inquiry aware of the capabilities, nature and operation of our file management systems.
5. I have seen the detailed SIS statement based on the material deemed relevant and am content that it is an accurate and full representation of the Service's position in respect of Kincora. I have directed the Deputy Director to speak to that statement if this is considered necessary by the Inquiry and can confirm that he can speak with authority in respect of historic matters relating to Kincora on behalf of the Service. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families. He will instead sign that statement with a cypher – details of his identity will be provided to the Inquiry at a higher classification.

6. SIS takes seriously its obligations to cooperate with inquiries and investigations. I confirm that SIS remains committed to ensuring that the HIA Inquiry can conduct a full and complete inquiry, and will continue to assist it in any way possible.

Signed



Alex Younger, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service

Date

27 May 2016.



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than C, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. SIS has received requests for disclosure from the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry. SIS takes its disclosure obligations seriously and I am satisfied that the searches carried out by officers in our compliance team constitute a reasonable and proportionate search for relevant material on the SIS corporate record. These officers, and SIS legal advisers, specialise in disclosure matters and regularly conduct searches of this type; they also consulted the SIS records management team to ensure a sufficiently broad search was conducted. I know that SIS officers have made the Inquiry aware of the capabilities, nature and operation of our file management systems.
4. The search terms used to conduct searches include those listed in Annex B of the letter from Sir Jonathan Stephens, Permanent Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office, to Whitehall colleagues, dated 18 November 2014. Further search terms identified from open source research were also added. A full list of search terms used are:

Bawnmore
Bernados
Ravelstone Parade

Palmerstone
Rathgael
Raymond Semple

"Boys Home" and abuse	Rubane
Brian Gemmell	TARA
"Child abuse" and "Northern Ireland"	Valetta
Colin Wallace	William McGrath
Hughes inquiry	Williamson House
Institutional abuse	William McGrath
James McGuigan	Williamson House
Joseph Mains	Manor House, Lisburn
Richard Kerr	Roy Garland
Kincora	James Miller
Mike Taylor	John McKeague
Nazareth Lodge	

5. We are committed to ensuring that the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry can conduct a full and complete inquiry and have made potentially relevant sensitive intelligence material available for review by the Inquiry.

6. Where the public disclosure of information would be prejudicial to national security and/or the safety of individuals concerned, it has been redacted with the agreement of the HIA Inquiry, but with the aim, as requested by the Inquiry, of making as much information publicly available as possible. Where redactions have been made a gist of the redacted material has been included in the witness statement. The Inquiry has nevertheless been able to review the complete versions of those documents. Should any further relevant material be identified, it will be made available to the Inquiry.

Signed



SIS Officer A

Date

27 MAY 2016



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. The Secret Intelligence Service, often referred to as MI6, was established in 1909 as the Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau. Until 1994, SIS did not have a statutory basis and its existence was not publicly confirmed. In 1992, SIS was formally avowed in 1992 and was put on a statutory basis with the Intelligence Services Act 1994.
4. The role of SIS, as set out in the Intelligence Services Act 1994, is to provide Her Majesty's Government with a global covert capability that facilitates the collection of secret intelligence and mount operations overseas to promote and defend the national security and economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, and to prevent and detect serious crime.
5. Following the increase in the threat of Republican terrorism in early 1972, the Irish Joint Section (IJS) was established in response to a request for more information from the province by the Permanent Secretary in the newly established Northern Ireland Office (NIO), Sir William Nield. The IJS was established by the Security Service (MI5) and SIS, with jointly staffed offices in Belfast and London.

SIS DISCLOSURE EXERCISE

6. On 18 November 2014, Sir Jonathan Stephens (Permanent Secretary, Northern Ireland Office), in a letter copied to many Government departments, requested that the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) undertake disclosure searches for material that may be relevant to the Inquiry Into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (HIA Inquiry) underway in Northern Ireland under the chairmanship of Sir Anthony Hart. The Inquiry was set up to *'examine if there were systemic failings by institutions or the state in their duties towards those children in their care between the years of 1922-1995'*.
7. SIS has received requests for disclosure from the Inquiry. SIS takes its disclosure obligations seriously and I am satisfied that the searches carried out by officers in our compliance team constitute a reasonable and proportionate search for relevant material on the SIS corporate record. These officers, and SIS legal advisers, specialise in disclosure matters and regularly conduct searches of this type; they also consulted the SIS records management team to ensure a sufficiently broad search was conducted. I know that SIS officers have made the Inquiry aware of the capabilities, nature and operation of our file management systems. Given the passage of time, any SIS account of the period in question is reliant on our written record.
8. All material identified by SIS as potentially relevant to the HIA Inquiry has been made available in unredacted form for the purpose of undertaking its relevance review. SIS has also provided answers to all questions asked by the HIA Inquiry to their full satisfaction in relation to SIS activities in Northern Ireland and persons of interest to the Inquiry. This has resulted in requests to SIS to disclose material relating to these events. That material is disclosed in this witness statement. It primarily consists of open source material, as well as correspondence between MI5 and SIS, and MoD material. SIS has consulted MI5 and MoD prior to releasing material that originated from those departments.
9. Where the public disclosure of information would be prejudicial to national security and/or the safety of individuals concerned, it has been redacted with the agreement of the HIA Inquiry, but with the aim, as requested by the Inquiry, of making as much information publicly available as possible. Where redactions have been made, a gist of the redacted material has been included in the witness statement. The Inquiry has nevertheless been able to review the complete versions of those documents.
10. Certain redactions or gists relate to the use of cyphers or similar devices. SIS uses cyphers, codewords and nicknames for the protection of identities of people who are in some way involved with or of interest to the Service. They are used to distinguish a person but conceal the individual's identity. These may include, but are not restricted to, SIS officers, agents and contacts. These terms become part of SIS's permanent record – their use is generally classified as SECRET or above. We have sought to provide the individuals' real names in place of the original cyphers.
11. Where possible, full copies of the original documents have been made available to the HIA Inquiry. These documents are referred to in the text of the SIS witness statement as "*Exhibit x*" and can be found in the document Appendix. Where it has not been appropriate to release original documents, relevant extracts have been included in the text of the SIS witness statement with the full agreement of the HIA Inquiry. These documents are referred to as "*Article x*". Should any further relevant material be identified, it will be made available to the Inquiry.


12. It is a longstanding principle of successive UK Governments that we 'Neither Confirm Nor Deny' assertions, allegations or speculation in relation to the security and intelligence agencies, or other parts of Government. This is known as the 'NCND principle'. This means that, as a general rule, the Government will adopt a position of NCND when responding to questions about whether the agencies are carrying out, or have carried out, an operation or investigation into a particular person or group; have a relationship with a particular person; hold particular information on a person; or have shared information about that person with any other agencies, whether within the UK or elsewhere. This principle exists for a variety of reasons, including the protection of those who work for and with the agencies, and the willingness to do so of those that may consider doing so in the future.
13. The current threat to the UK from international terrorism is severe, meaning that an attack is highly likely. The threat to Great Britain from Northern Ireland-related terrorism was raised on 11 May 2016 to substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong possibility; the threat to Northern Ireland is assessed to be severe. These levels are set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and the Security Service (MI5).
14. The protection of secret intelligence and operational intelligence activities is essential to enable SIS to continue to carry out its statutory national security functions, including but not limited to protecting the UK from the terrorist threat referred to above. There is a high degree of risk that SIS's current and future capability to operate secretly around the world would be impaired if information is publicly disclosed which is prejudicial to national security and/or the safety of individuals.

WILLIAM McGRATH AND TARA

15. William McGrath was a prominent member of the protestant community in Northern Ireland in the 1960-70s and founder of the Tara organisation. Along with Raymond Semple and Joseph Mains, he was convicted in 1981 for offences relating to the systematic sexual abuse of children at the Kincora Boys Home in Belfast. He died in 1992.
16. McGrath's name appears in SIS documents primarily in relation to his prominence as a leading figure in Tara. Tara was a Protestant organisation founded by William McGrath in the 1960s. In October 1976, the security and intelligence agencies were considering the possibility of developing a source of reporting on the organisation. The SIS record on Tara includes documents obtained by Brian Gemmell from his Army records, newspaper articles, and correspondence between SIS and MI5.
17. In the course of the HIA Inquiry, SIS was made aware by MI5 of extracts from documents marked with SIS file references that relate to McGrath. SIS has conducted searches to identify the original documents and to make such material available to the HIA Inquiry for review.
18. The extracts begin with a document dated 18 April 1973 from Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland which describes McGrath as "*Leader of the refurbished form of the TARA Brigade*". A subsequent document reference (again from Intelligence staff in NI) dated 13 November 1973 reads "*Subject "gets them young and preaches religion to them" which means that he preaches bigotry and anti-Catholic sermons*". The final document reference on the MI5 list is

dated 11 February 1977. There are no records to indicate that SIS was aware of McGrath's involvement in child sex abuse at Kincora prior to his conviction in 1981.

19. On 19 October 1976, an SIS officer based in London wrote a letter to MI5 on the subject of William McGrath attaching a copy of a letter originating from HQ 3 Infantry Brigade based in Lurgan (**Article 1**). In his letter, the SIS officer does not state how the document was acquired by SIS other than to say that it was obtained unofficially. MI5 was asked to ensure that no action is taken without reference to SIS.



Article 1

20. The 4 page MoD letter that was enclosed is dated 28 January 1976 and also includes two newspaper articles published in the Belfast Telegraph and the Hibernia in October 1975 (**Exhibit 1**). The title of the letter is "EXTREMIST PROTESTANTS SECRET ORGANISATION - TARA" and contains sections on William McGrath, Tara, Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303 and Ian Paisley.
21. On the same day (19 October 1976), a UK-based SIS officer initiated a Minute (**Article 2**) for distribution within SIS Headquarters in London. The subject of the Minute is Tara and is a cover document for attached papers handed to SIS by Brian Gemmell on 15 October 1976. Gemmell is a former Captain in the Intelligence Corps who claims that he passed on information relating to William McGrath's involvement in sexual abuse at Kincora to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.

Subject	[REDACTED]
TARA	SIS FILE REFERENCE
<p>1. We attach copies of papers handed to [REDACTED] by GEMMELL on 15 October, which he obtained from his Army files. He made the following comments on these papers:-</p>	
a.	TARA - Not to File 3350/18 Vol II - This paper was written by GEMMELL and is based on the contents of his file on TARA.
b.	Notes on interview with Roy GARLAND. These were made by GEMMELL and an NCO after a "one off" debrief sanctioned by Ian CAMERON.
c.	Proclamation - [REDACTED]
	MATERIAL NOT RELEVANT TO HIAI

Article 2

22. The SIS officer comments that the papers attached to his Minute were obtained by Gemmell from his Army files and comprise a document entitled "Tara" – dated 14 October 1976 (**Exhibit 2**); notes on an interview with Roy Garland, made by Gemmell and an unnamed Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) following a "one off" meeting with Ian Cameron – undated (**Exhibit 3**); a media article entitled "The Paradox that is Tara" (**Exhibit 4**); and a copy of the Tara proclamation (**Exhibit 5**).
23. Three months later, on 31 January 1977, an officer from a UK-based SIS team initiated a telegram addressed to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland and copied to SIS London and MI5 (**Article 3**). The subject of the telegram was "William McGrath and Tara" and refers to various papers handed to SIS by Brian Gemmell in October 1976; in particular to the letter originating from HQ 3 Infantry Brigade, Lurgan dated 28 January 1976.
24. In his telegram the SIS officer confirms that a copy of the letter had been shared with MI5 who had asked if the source mentioned in the letter could be retasked for further information. The letter continues with the SIS officer saying that they had spoken to Gemmell who raised no objection to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland discussing the letter with the Army.

CLASSIFICATION
 [REDACTED]
 IN SNUFFBOX [REDACTED] *CLASSIFICATION & MI5 DESIGNATOR*
 WILLIAM MCGATH AND TARA
 [REDACTED]

1. IN OCTOBER 1976 BRIAN GEMMELL GAVE US VARIOUS PAPERS ON THE ABOVE WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM HIS ARMY FILES. ONE OF THESE WAS A COPY OF A LETTER FROM HQ 3 INFANTRY BGDE LURGAN. (REF 13912/2 DATED 28 JANUARY 1976) SIGNED BY [REDACTED] GEMMELL'S COPY WAS ADDRESSED TO G INT HQ 39 INF BGDE. *NAME OF ARMY OFFICER*

2. WE GAVE A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO SNUFFBOX WHO HAVE NOW ASKED IF THE SOURCE MENTIONED IN THE LETTER COULD BE RETASKED FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.

FILE REFERENCES

Article 3 (Page 1)

3. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO GEMMELL WHO HAS CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO [REDACTED] DISCUSSING THIS LETTER WITH THE ARMY. *SIS DESIGNATOR*


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


INTELLIGENCE RELATED MATERIAL HIA INQUIRY CONSIDERS NOT RELEVANT TO ITS WORK

Article 3 (Page 2)




Article 3 (Page 3)

25. On 15 February 1977, an officer in SIS London initiated a telegram addressed to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland and to MI5 on the subject of Tara (**Article 4**). Referring to a message initiated on the 11 February, the SIS officer begins by congratulating a member of the Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland for "flushing out" a source on Tara. The message continues with SIS London expressing interest in learning more about the organisation and whether Tara's recruitment campaign could offer a potential opportunity for the Irish Joint Section (IJS) to develop access into the organisation, if it was considered a worthwhile target.




Article 4

26. MI5 responded on 16 February 1977 to confirm that they considered Tara to be a worthwhile target and supported recruitment to penetrate the organisation (**Article 5**).



Article 5

27. On 17 February 1977, Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland responded by telegram to SIS London's question on whether the Tara recruitment campaign could be exploited by the IJS (**Article 6**). Paragraph 1B of their telegram indicates that Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland knew very little about Tara's recruiting campaign beyond knowing that one existed and were therefore not yet in a position to identify any opportunities for the IJS to exploit. However, they share MI5's view that Tara is a worthwhile target and that individuals had briefed to "find traces on this elusive organisation".



Article 6

28. On 30 May 1977, an MI5 officer wrote to SIS in London to request information on the subscriber of an international telephone number, who is believed to be a contact of William McGrath (**Article 7**). A name provided by the source of the information produced no trace in MI5 records. This is the final piece of material in the SIS record on Tara.

FROM SNUFFBOX LONDON

ROUTINE

SIS INTERNAL MARKINGS

CLASSIFICATION

10372

NUMBER MIS REFERENCE

GRATEFUL FOR DETAILS OF SUBSCRIBER TO FOLLOWING TELEPHONE NUMBER:

SUBSCRIBER NUMBER

2. A SECRET AND DELICATE SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT THE ABOVE NUMBER BELONGS TO A CONTACT OF WILLIAM M C G R A T H (OUR REFERENCE [REDACTED]), AN ULSTER PROTESTANT EXTREMIST. ACCORDING TO SOURCE THE CONTACT'S NAME IS [REDACTED] (NO TRACE IN OUR RECORDS).

MIS REFERENCE NAME

Article 7

COLIN WALLACE

29. SIS records indicate that Colin Wallace was employed by the Ministry of Defence as a civilian information officer at the British Military's Headquarters in Northern Ireland (HQNI) from 1968 to 1975. In August 1974, he was investigated by the MoD on suspicion of leaking classified information to The Times correspondent Robert Fisk. This resulted in Wallace's resignation with effect from 31 December 1975.
30. In 1981, Wallace was jailed for manslaughter, serving 6 years in prison before being released in December 1986 after his conviction was quashed. Wallace has been the subject of a book written by Paul Foot entitled "Who framed Colin Wallace" and up to present day, has spoken publicly about his knowledge of events in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, particularly with regard to allegations relating to abuse at the Kincora Boys Home.
31. SIS records relating to Colin Wallace begin in 1975 with the article published by Robert Fisk in The Times newspaper. The material comprises press cuttings, extracts from Hansard, information relating to Paul Foot's book and correspondence between Whitehall departments. The subjects covered relate to Wallace's resignation from the MOD, his appeal hearing by the Civil Service Appeal Board, his trial for manslaughter and his fight to clear his name.
32. On 30 September 1980, an SIS officer initiated a Minute to record his comments on papers he had been asked to review, which were found during a search of Wallace's offices following his arrest by police on manslaughter charges (**Article 8**). The papers were passed to SIS to check for any information relating to the work of the Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland and/or indication of any contact Wallace may have had with Intelligence staff based at HQNI. This was to enable SIS to create an accurate assessment of the overall

he could feel to grasp at any straw which conceivably might mitigate the consequences of his criminal act."

SIS DESIGNATOR

5. On 2 Oct, at the [REDACTED]'s suggestion, I examined two unclassified HMSO note books found by the police when they searched [REDACTED]'s office after his arrest in September for murder. It was apparent that both note books dealt with events in Northern Ireland up to 1976 but not, it appeared, beyond. I would guess that [REDACTED] compiled and used them for reference during his time in Northern Ireland.

INTELLIGENCE RELATED MATERIAL

WALLACE

6. One note book contained lists of IRA personalities, the other insecure but generally brief references to a wide range of intelligence matters including, inter alia, the names of the (then) Head of Security Service and SIS, the fact that the [REDACTED] was located in Chelsea Barracks; notes on Arab terrorist organisations and the Japanese Red Army; the names of two members of the SAS, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (in connection with the [REDACTED] affair), the name of the Head of GCHQ (Leslie HOOPER) and the following note (which appears twice in one of the note books) on the functions of GCHQ "monitors and decodes all radio, telex and telegram communications in and out of Britain, foreign embassies, finance and industrial companies. GCHQ also codes and decodes Government communications."

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE

NAMES OF MOD OFFICERS & OPERATION

WALLACE

7. [REDACTED]'s hand writing is neat and legible. Apart from two or three pages of short-hand which I could not read, I read everything there was. I have asked the [REDACTED]'s secretary to see if she can make sense of the short-hand. I am glad to say that apart from the one reference to Maurice OLDFIELD as Head of the Service, I could find no reference to SIS or SIS personnel. We are therefore in the clear so far as these two note books are concerned. However, it is possible [REDACTED] may have kept other sensitive material at home and his home does not appear to have been searched. In the absence of the [REDACTED] I mentioned this discrepancy to [REDACTED]. Presumably thought will now need to be given to searching [REDACTED]'s home, an action which I imagine could probably be justified by the discovery of the two indiscreet notebooks which he kept in his office.

SIS DESIGNATOR

WALLACE

8. Subject to the discovery of any further documents in [REDACTED]'s possession, I do not think this case is likely to cause SIS much difficulty. If [REDACTED] decides to spill the beans it will be the Army which will attract most if not all of the flak.

SIS DESIGNATOR

[REDACTED] — SIS DESIGNATOR

WALLACE

30 Sept 80.

SIS DESIGNATOR & INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE

1. Agree with [REDACTED] conclusions.

2. In view of his attitude towards security, it is perhaps more likely that he would have kept any SIS-related papers in his office than in his home. [REDACTED] 3/10.

SIGNATURE

Article 8 (Page 2)

35. In paragraph 5 of the Minute the SIS officer refers to two note books that he was asked to examine, found by police when they searched Wallace's office after his arrest in September for murder. He writes "It was apparent that both note books dealt with events in Northern Ireland up to 1976 but not, it appeared, beyond." It was assessed that that Wallace compiled and used the note books as a reference during his time in Northern Ireland.

36. Continuing his description of the notebooks, the SIS officer wrote: "One note book contained lists of IRA personalities, the other insecure but generally brief references to a wide range of intelligence matters including, inter alia, the names of the (then) Head of Security Service, and SIS." Further references include "notes on Arab terrorist organisations and the Japanese Red Army; the names of two members of the SAS" and "the name of the Head of GCHQ

(Leslie Hooper)." Wallace also made notes in both notebooks about the functions of GCHQ and that it codes and decodes Government communications.

37. Drawing a conclusion to the relevance of the notebooks to SIS, the officer writes that *"apart from the one reference to Maurice OLDFIELD as Head of the Service, I could find no reference to SIS or SIS personnel. We are therefore in the clear so far as these note books are concerned"*. He adds that subject to the discovery of any further documents in Wallace's possession *"I do not think this case is likely to cause SIS much difficulty"*.
38. One month later, on 9 October 1980, an officer in the Ministry of Defence wrote to various Government departments with a more detailed description of the notebooks recovered by police during a search of Wallace's offices (**Exhibit 6**). The officer comments that much of the information in the notebooks could have been gleaned from a careful reading of newspapers and from conversations with journalists in Belfast in the early seventies.
39. Wallace's reasons for keeping notes are far from clear but the MoD officer surmises that he (Wallace) *"may either have wanted to pass it on to other pressmen - perhaps Fisk - or may even have planned some sort of book on terrorism for which there are the rough notes"*. Neither officer from SIS or MoD, tasked with reviewing the notebooks, has made any reference to Wallace making notes relating to abuse at the Kincora Boys' Home.
40. On Kincora, the first document in SIS records where Colin Wallace's name appears is an article published in the News of the World on 21 March 1982. The title of the article is *"I'll expose top men's vice ring says killer"* (**Exhibit 7**). In the article, Wallace, who at the time was serving a ten year sentence for manslaughter, is described as holding *"the key to a growing sex scandal involving top members of the Establishment"*.
41. On 12 October 1989, an SIS officer drafted a Minute to record details of a meeting with an MI5 officer to discuss MI5/SIS input into questions on Colin Wallace which Cabinet Office had requested be answered (**Article 9**). The questions related to Wallace's duties in Northern Ireland, his transfer to HQNW District in 1975, his resignation from the Civil Service and proceedings at the Civil Service Appeals Service, his conviction for manslaughter in 1981 and Wallace's allegations on Kincora and that he was prevented from providing information which he possessed to official investigations and inquiries into Kincora. When addressing questions relating to Kincora, the SIS officer commented that this is one area in which SIS needed to conduct further research. In paragraph 5 of the minute, the officer commented: *"We certainly ran at least one agent who was aware of sexual malpractice at the home and who may have mentioned this to his SIS or Security Service Case officer. Such matters were of no operational interest and were not pursued."*
42. No material has been identified on the SIS record that provides any information relating to the material reviewed by the SIS officer in October 1989 on which his comments in paragraph 5 of his Minute are based. Extensive searches conducted by SIS for the HIA Inquiry has failed to identify any material that enables SIS to identify the agent or the time period to which the SIS officer is referring.

COLIN WALLACE
SIS DESIGNATOR MIS OFFICER

MIS FILE REFERENCE 1. [REDACTED] and I met [REDACTED] in Gower Street on 11 October to discuss the points raised in his letter [REDACTED] of 28 September. He broke to us the news that he had just been advised to go into hospital in 10 days' time (nothing serious) and would then be away for three weeks. He had already covered some of the ground; but the remainder, mostly concerning Kincora, would have to be dealt with by somebody else. He will ring us to let us know who will take over the work as soon as that has been decided.

2. [REDACTED]

IRRELEVANT MATERIAL

3. [REDACTED]

MIS OFFICER

4. [REDACTED] will circulate any draft findings to us for comment or ammendation before he goes into print. He accepts [REDACTED] assurance that we have no original papers, and were never involved with WALLACE.

SIS DESIGNATORS

5. There is one area which needs further research in HO. This concerns the various allegations surrounding the Kincora Boys Home. We certainly ran at least one agent who was aware of sexual malpractice at the Home, and who may have mentioned this to his SIS or Security Service Case Officer. Such matters were of no operational interest and were not pursued. [REDACTED] made the point that in any answers we give, particularly in the narrative requested in question 2(i), we must avoid framing them in such a way as to expose the identity of the Agent either directly, or through follow-up enquiries based on our answers. This is an angle which [REDACTED] will carefully consider at the time.

MIS OFFICER

6. I am copying this Minute to [REDACTED] and to [REDACTED]

SIS DESIGNATORS

12 October 1989

Article 9

JAMES MILLER

43. On 6 August 2014, an article was published in the Belfast Telegraph reporting that Brian Gemmell had received information about child sex abuse at Kincora from three people (**Exhibit 8**). The names of the individuals were James Miller, Roy Garland and Jim McCormick.
44. Searches conducted by SIS on the three names mentioned in the 2014 Belfast Telegraph story identified a newspaper article dated 29 March 1987, in which Barry Penrose of The Sunday Times stated that: "[James] Miller claims that the Intelligence services had known

about the activities at Kincora for a number of years and believes the boy's home was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information." (Exhibit 9).

45. Following publication by the Sunday Times, Miller was interviewed by two government officials on 2 April 1987. During that interview, he explained that he had contacted Penrose because of his concerns *"about the degree of publicity Colin Wallace was receiving."* Notes of the interview, containing Miller's account of his dealings with Penrose and Liam Clarke of the Sunday Times was found in SIS records (**Article 10**).

2. Miller, who was in a contrite mood, gave a full account of his dealings with Barry Penrose and Liam Clarke of the Sunday Times. In brief, in February this year Miller became concerned about the degree of publicity Colin Wallace was receiving. He was particularly incensed at a Penrose story in the Sunday Times which he felt supported Wallace's allegations that the Security Service had "framed him". Miller contacted Penrose by telephone early in February and during that month they had a number of telephone conversations. Miller, who is a talkative and gullible individual, thought that he was refuting Wallace's statements, but it is clear now that Penrose was simply drawing him out on other subjects, namely:-

- a. The 1974 Loyalist Worker Strike.
- b. Allegations that Harold Wilson had been a communist agent.
- c. The 1974 Dublin bombing.
- d. The 1973 killing of Tommy Heron, the UDA E Belfast Commander.
- e. Allegations regarding the Kincora Boys Home.

3. Penrose contacted Miller on Friday 20 March to say that he proposed to publish a piece on Sunday 22 March about Wallace, and wanted to include a small amount of what Miller had to say on the subject. He also wanted Miller to speak to Liam Clarke, the Sunday Times "Irish expert", which he did later that day. Miller became concerned that he might have said too much and asked for the article to be read out to him over the telephone before publication. This was not done and after several calls on Saturday 21 March, having received the assurances that his comments would be a very small part of a larger article, he agreed to its publication.

4. Miller was genuinely shocked when he read the story produced by the Sunday Times and phoned Penrose on Sunday 22 March to remonstrate: this cut little ice with Penrose. Miller has not spoken to Penrose or Clarke since but his family

Article 10 (Page 1)

46. Miller was particularly "incensed" at a Penrose story in the Sunday Times which he felt supported Wallace's allegations that the Security Service had *"framed him"*. He had subsequently contacted Penrose by telephone and they had a number of conversations in February 1987 in which Miller thought he was refuting Wallace's statements.
47. During his interview with the government officials, Miller said *"that although he admitted to Penrose that he had had a brief acquaintance with McGrath from days in the TARA brigade and, and had heard rumours that the man was homosexual, he had "no knowledge*

whatsoever of the Kincora home and the entrapment story, which he learnt about after his departure from Ulster."

have received a number of further calls from Clarke attempting to elicit further details. Clarke has also implied that unless the family co-operate there would be "a number of journalists on their doorstep". On 3 April Miller received a letter from Penrose, the text of which is attached. Miller has firmly stated to us his intentions not to speak to the press again but would like to take some action to counter what has been reported. He has talked of asking his solicitor to take the matter up with the Sunday Times and it is possible that he could sue for libel. We have however instructed him to do nothing until we have considered this matter further.

5. According to Miller, he did not make the two principal allegations in the Sunday Times article of 22 March. His comments were taken out of context and twisted to suit the theories being postulated by Penrose and his associates. He also maintains that the article published on 29 March in the Sunday Times is untrue and he did not speak again to Penrose as was stated. Miller has never met Penrose or Clarke and has received no payment whatsoever.

6. Miller said that although he admitted to Penrose that he had had a brief acquaintance with McGrath from days in the TARA Brigade, and had heard rumours that the man was homosexual, he had no knowledge whatsoever of the Kincora home and the entrapment story, which he learned about after his departure from Ulster. These remarks he said were the sum total of what he told Penrose about McGrath and the home.

Article 10 (Page 2)

JOHN MCKEAGUE

48. John McKeague was a prominent Ulster loyalist and one of the founding members of paramilitary group, the Red Hand Commando. Information published on-line links McKeague's name to William McGrath and Tara, and to his involvement in the Kincora Boys Home scandal. McKeague died from gunshot wounds on 29 January 1982.
49. Searches carried out by SIS identified a report initiated by the Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland to SIS London dated 13 February 1980 (**Article 11**). The report begins by referring to individual named McGrath (first name unknown) as the leader of TARA and to his alleged involvement in the scandal at a Belfast Boys Home. The report states that there are demands for a public inquiry and that SIS London may be interested in details of information held on William McGrath.
50. Information provided by Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland from their records confirms that, in 1976, McGrath "*was reported to be warden of the Kincora Boys Hostel*" and "*our records suggest he is or may have been known to an agency based here or in London*". The document continues with McGrath's reported activities and individuals with whom he is associated. One of the activities that McGrath is said to be responsible for is creating "*posters reading 'Nice Boy McKeague' which appeared all over Belfast*". No date is given for this incident.

in which he claimed that MI5 were planning the recruitment of an agent using threats of exposure as a homosexuality. The correspondence includes a covering Minute, a note by the MI5 officer and a verbatim transcript from the BBC programme.

52. On 16 October 1990, an officer in MI5 sent a letter to SIS London relating to Brian Gemmell and claims he had made during a BBC Public Eye programme broadcast on 1 June 1990 (**Article 12**). Attached to the MI5 letter was a note containing comments made by the MI5 officer, entitled "Brian Smart Gemmell and MI5" and verbatim extracts from the Public Eye programme.
53. In the opening paragraph of his covering Minute, the MI5 officer refers to assistance provided by SIS to track down papers which "might corroborate Brian Gemmell's claim in a television programme that MI5 were planning the recruitment of a Loyalist agent using threats of exposure as a homosexual." The officer then provides a short background summary on Gemmell, who was thought to be employed by British Rail at York at that time (in 1990).

Dear [REDACTED] — **NAME**

BRI

Some time ago you helped me to track down papers which might corroborate Brian GEMMELL's claim in a television programme that MI5 were planning the recruitment of a Loyalist agent using threats of exposure as a homosexual. It has taken me too long to put all this finally on paper, but I now enclose a copy of a verbatim transcript which I had made, and of a note setting out my comments: Both have gone to [REDACTED] here, in case he should have to field questions, of which, so far, there have been none to my knowledge.

MI5 DESIGANATOR

2. Brian Smart GEMMELL, born on 18 August 1950, now employed (we believe) by British Rail at York, was a graduate of Strathclyde University, and in 1974-76, commissioned in the Intelligence Corps, was OC 123 Int Sec, HQ 39 Brigade. The attached note omits, in your copy, details of other Security Service officers whom he could have identified.

[REDACTED]

3. The potential target of 1976 in para 1 was [REDACTED] under which reference I think you still have papers.

IRRELEVANT MATERIAL **INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE**

Yours ever,

SIGNATURE — [REDACTED]

Article 12

- 54. The note attached to the covering letter (**Article 13**) begins with the MI5 officer saying that Gemmell was seen twice in London by UK based SIS officers, who introduced themselves as members of the Security Service. Both meetings took place in 1976; the first in May and the second in September.
- 55. The note continues with the MI5 officer commenting that *"the television interview itself highlights the dealings with Ian Cameron and then brings in the statement by GEMMELL that MI5 was prepared to use homosexual blackmail to effect the recruitment of a named agent in Loyalist circles"*. The officer indicates that it has not been possible to discover all the papers hoped for before lists his understanding of the sequence and tenor of events, which refer to John McKeague.

Note

SIS DESIGNATORS

OPERATIONAL REFERENCES, NAMES & DESIGNATORS OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

Brian Smart GEMELL and MI5

1. [REDACTED] GEMMEL was twice seen in London [REDACTED]: first on 10 May 1976, [REDACTED] and he accepted an invitation to lunch [REDACTED] on 7 September 1976 (after which he was to see [REDACTED] about his possible recruitment to the Security Service).

IRRELEVANT MATERIAL

Indiscretions

2. [REDACTED]

The television interview itself highlights the dealings with Ian Cameron and then brings in the statement by GEMMELL that MI5 was prepared to use homosexual blackmail to effect the recruitment of a named agent in Loyalist circles.

Comment

MIS FILE REFERENCE

3. Although it has not been possible to discover all the papers hoped for, the sequence and tenor of events seem to my mind clear enough, as follows, the references being to McKEAGUE's [REDACTED]

28.1.76: Consideration being given to recruitment of McKEAGUE, [REDACTED]

IRRELEVANT MATERIAL

March 1976: Various approaches considered, but no references to homosexuality (112a, 113a).

3 May 1976: [REDACTED] provide at 114a full traces of McKEAGUE for interested parties, including one brief mention suggesting homosexuality (Comment: not in any event unusual in McKEAGUE's circles, and not singled out for attention by [REDACTED])

SIS DESIGNATOR

SIS DESIGNATOR

CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED] /...

56. When referring to the events dated 23 November 1976 and 9 December 1976, the MI5 officer comments that consideration was given to the suggested recruitment of McKeague, using the threat of exposure of his homosexual activities in London. However, various objections to the proposal were voiced and doubts expressed whether management would accept it. The officer reinforces this in paragraph 4 by saying "There is no further mention of this particular recruitment proposal, and doubtless it was dropped. GEMMELL is therefore presumed correct in saying that MI5 was considering a homosexual compromise approach to McKEAGUE, but of course he was not to know that it was not pursued."

INTELLIGENCE DESIGNATOR & OPERATIONAL REFERENCES

10 May 1976: GEMMELL seen by [redacted] and [redacted] as in para 4 above.

11-13 June 1976: McKEAGUE was under [redacted] surveillance during a visit to London, and observed in unmistakably making homosexual contacts. Photographs were taken by [redacted]. It later emerged that McKEAGUE suspected that he had been under surveillance, but nothing came of this.

No report of the [redacted] meeting with GEMMELL on 7 September 1976 (see para 4) has been found in either our or SIS files, but

23.11.76: [redacted] suggests recruitment of McKEAGUE be considered, using the [redacted] photos and the threat of exposure of his homosexual activities in London as a lever. [redacted] "marked lack of enthusiasm" for this ploy was reported in the telegram.

9.12.76: Various objections to the proposal were voiced including quotation of [redacted] doubts whether management would accept it.

4. There is no further mention of this particular recruitment proposal, and doubtless it was dropped. GEMMELL is therefore presumed correct in saying that MI5 was considering a homosexual compromise approach to McKEAGUE, but of course he was not to know that it was not pursued. Since he mentions hearing from MI5 about "compromising film of a homosexual nature" this must have been at a time after the [redacted] surveillance of 11-13 June and therefore also after the occasion on 10 May 1976 when he met two MI5 officers. It leaves the projected lunch with [redacted] on 7 September 1976 as the probable occasion on which the subject was discussed. The actual proposal for a homosexual recruitment was not made formally until 23 November 1976, and it seems likely that the lunch meeting on 7 September consisted partly of preliminary informal discussion, as between two intelligence officer colleagues, of the practicalities of agent recruitment; it presumably included asking GEMMELL for his opinion of McKEAGUE, about whom GEMMELL would have been assumed to know at least something.

5. GEMMELL's statements during the television interview were clearly about matters which were classified at least SECRET when they were current in 1974-76, and which he must have known as such. A note on file written in 1982 guesses that GEMMELL would be loyal to the OSA unless his christian principles were involved.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

NAME, DESIGNATOR & SIGNATURE OF MI5 OFFICER

16 October 1990

INTELLIGENCE DESIGNATOR & OPERATIONAL REFERENCE

57. The MI5 officer observes that the probable occasion at which the recruitment proposal may have been discussed with Gemmell was the meeting on the 7 September 1976. Searches conducted by SIS to identify a write up of the meeting with Gemmell has reached the same findings as the MI5 officer in October 1990: that no record of the meeting appears to exist.
58. The final document in this sequence of correspondence from MI5 is the verbatim transcript of the interview with Brian Gemmell on the BBC Public Eye programme broadcast on 1 June 1990. For the purpose of the broadcast, Gemmell is referred to as "James" or "J" and the interview begins with questions relating to Kincora (**Exhibit 10**).

SIR MAURICE OLDFIELD

59. Sir Maurice Oldfield, GCMG, CBE, served as Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service from 1973 until retirement on 31 January 1978. He was born in Derbyshire on 16 November 1915, spending his formative years in Bakewell before attending Manchester University, where he gained a First in History in 1937 and an MA in 1938 for research into the position of the clergy in Parliament in the later Middle Ages. In the same year, he was elected to a Fellowship at Manchester University. In 1940 he enlisted in the Army, serving as a Sergeant in Field Security in Egypt, Palestine and Syria before being commissioned in 1943. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1945 and continued to serve in the Military until March 1947. On leaving the Army, Oldfield embarked on a career in the Foreign Service, occupying a succession of posts in London, the Far East and Washington. In 1973, Oldfield was appointed Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), a position he held until retirement on 31 January 1978.
60. On retiring from SIS, Oldfield accepted a Visiting Fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford, where he continued his early work on the medieval clergy. The following year, he was offered the role of Security Coordinator in Northern Ireland; an appointment announced by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 2 October 1979. Oldfield's role was to assist the Government by improving the coordination and effectiveness of the fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland.
61. Shortly after his appointment as Security Coordinator, HMG received information to suggest that Sir Maurice may be homosexual. Rules on Positive Vetting (PV) at that time meant that homosexuality was considered a factor that would compromise someone's security status. This led to a review by MI5 of Sir Maurice's vetting clearance in March 1980, at which he admitted that he had engaged in homosexual activities throughout his career. As a result, his security clearance was withdrawn and he was replaced as Security Coordinator in June 1980. After a long illness, Sir Maurice Oldfield died in London on 11 March 1981.
62. SIS is aware that, after his PV was withdrawn, MI5 conducted an investigation into Oldfield's involvement in homosexual activities during his career in government service. This was in order to assess whether Sir Maurice may have been compromised in his role in a way that would be damaging to national security. SIS was not involved in the MI5 investigation and holds no record on the work carried out by MI5 investigators. However, SIS is aware that MI5 investigators concluded *"that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that national security had been compromised."*
63. On 19 January 1982, the Sunday Telegraph published the first of two articles by columnist Auberon Waugh including references linking inquiries into the alleged Belfast homosexual

prostitution scandal with an "*immensely distinguished public servant, now dead*" (**Articles 11 & 12**). In the second article, published on 29 January 1982, WAUGH was more specific and mentioned Sir Maurice Oldfield, a former Chief of SIS, by name. SIS has reviewed all the material it holds on its former Chief and has identified no material to indicate that Sir Maurice Oldfield had visited Northern Ireland during his SIS career or to associate him with the Kincora Boys' Home, other than articles published in the media. Both the Sunday Telegraph articles have been made available to the HIA Inquiry.

64. On 23 April 1987, in a written statement to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that the Security Service (MI5) had conducted a lengthy and thorough investigation into Sir Maurice Oldfield's homosexual activity to examine whether there was any reason to suppose that national security may have been compromised. The conclusion was that, though Sir Maurice Oldfield's conduct had been a potential risk to security, there was no evidence or reason to suggest that security had ever been compromised. I understand that MI5's statement to the HIA Inquiry provides details of the security investigations into Sir Maurice Oldfield carried out by investigating officers from that agency.
65. On 12 February 2016, whilst reviewing MI5 material, the HIA Inquiry made SIS aware of a second hand account from 1983, which reported that a former member of SIS had told another individual that Sir Maurice Oldfield's removal from Northern Ireland related to events at Kincora. Searches conducted by SIS established that the former member of SIS who made the allegation had retired in April 1970, 13 years before the comment was made. Further searches conducted by SIS into the officer's allegation or the circumstances in which it was made found no material on the SIS record. It is my understanding that MI5 concluded that it was a senseless allegation. The officer concerned died in March 1985.

CONCLUSION

66. This statement is a full and accurate disclosure of the SIS material deemed relevant by the HIA Inquiry. I have seen nothing to indicate any involvement on the part of SIS officers in abuse at the Kincora Boys' Home, or in any attempts to cover it up.
67. SIS does not exploit children or vulnerable adults for operational purposes, nor tolerate their abuse either by their staff, or those that work on their behalf or in their support including SIS agents. In dealing with cases of child abuse or exploitation, our guiding principle is, as is set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and in the Children Act, that the best interests of the child should always prevail.

Signed

SIS Officer A

SIS Officer A

Date

27 MAY 2016

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

INFORMATION
CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT
BY THE HIAI

5. McGRATH joined the Orange Order around 1964 and widened his audiences by [REDACTED]

6. McGRATH is a homosexual and makes a practice of seducing promising young men. They include David BROWNE, Deputy Editor of the Protestant Telegraph and Clifford SMYTHE, who at one time lived in McGRATH's house and is now secretary of the OMO and DUP Convention Member for North ANTRIM.

7. Two of the contacts gave distinct impressions that McGRATH was somehow associated with Communism. McGRATH is said to have attended a Revolutionaries Conference in DUBLIN in the mid-sixties at which 3 representatives from Eastern Bloc countries were present. This association may account for his financial position. Details are very obscure, but he managed to live in sizeable mansions in BELFAST even though his only visible means of support was the sale of second-hand carpets from his house! McGRATH is currently described from the 1975 BELFAST Street Director as a Welfare Officer. He is thought to be running some form of boys' home.

TARA

8. One of the contacts stated that in about 1964, TARA first began to be mentioned in the context of a "ginger group" within the Orange Order, but it never really got off the ground until 1969 (presumably with the advent of the troubles), when a room in Clifton St Orange Hall was obtained. This was ostensibly for meetings of an "Orange Discussion Group," but was in reality to organise and train TARA.

9. One of the contacts felt that TARA might have had some weapons but it only ever saw one. McGRATH's policy was that officers did not handle weapons and should remain "clean." At one stage it talked about men having been in action.

10. The following have been named as TARA members:

FILE ANNOTATION

CLASSIFICATION

INFORMATION
CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT BY
THE HIAI

11. At Annex A is an article by David PARKER which makes mention of TARA.

IRELAND'S HERITAGE LOL 1303

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

12. McGRATH has been instrumental in the formation of a new Orange Lodge, "Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303," the members of which number 39 and are currently learning Gaelic. The Lodge's banner depicts a Celtic cross and its title in Gaelic, "Oidhunacht na hEireann."

13. Clifford SMYTHE and Frank MILLAR Jnr are members and there is clearly a number of cases of dual membership with TARA. When at Queen's University, BELFAST around 1970, Clifford SMYTHE, David LYLE and Frank MILLAR Jnr were instrumental in forming the "Ulster Protestant Information Bureau" which was to counter IRA propaganda. They also formed the "Williamites and Glorious Revolution Society" which, for example, brought Orange flute bands to perform in the Students Union.

16. At Annex B is an article on the "Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303."

INVOLVEMENT OF IAN PAISLEY

FILE ANNOTATION

15. PAISLEY appears to fear McGRATH, who is a member of his Martyr's Memorial Church and has on occasion used threats to make PAISLEY give him permission to speak in his halls. One of the contacts made the interesting point that William CRAIG had stated that PAISLEY did an about turn on the voluntary coalition issue after a meeting in the Martyr's Memorial Church. It hazarded a guess that pressure had been brought to bear on PAISLEY by McGRATH. Contacts view certainly has an element of truth in it. For example, in [redacted] 18 Oct 75, it is independantly reported that PAISLEY was pressured in this way.

SOURCE PROTECTION

16. It would appear that PAISLEY himself is not a member of TARA but he is clearly surrounded by many men who are. It would seem that the following credentials are useful, if not mandatory, for membership:

- a. Membership of the Orange Order.
- b. Membership of DUP.
- c. Membership of PAISLEY's Martyr's Memorial Church.

FILE ANNOTATION

CONCLUSION

17. The picture is confused. You are in a better position to assess the information than we are. Perhaps the most interesting aspect is the many contradictions around the central figure, McGRATH.

CLASSIFICATION

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION

[REDACTED]

a. McGRATH would appear to have had little formal education and yet his views, though militant, are sophisticated enough to interest bright young men.

b. McGRATH's message is designed to appeal to staunch Protestantism. Roman Catholicism, its enemy, is closely linked with leftish ideas and Communist involvement with Communism. It would be fair to ask whether McGRATH is a "sleeper" with the brief to keep the pot boiling whilst others organise. He certainly uses the classic communist tactics of the cell system, infiltration of an organisation, ie the Orange Order, and the introduction of divisive elements.

c. There is no obvious indication of where McGRATH's income stems from, but he appears to be comfortable financially.

d. One might ask why the apparently all powerful PAISLEY can be influenced by a McGRATH-sponsored pressure group from within his own church. PAISLEY himself is probably not a member, but many of his supporters are.

e. There is an apparent contradiction between the aspirations of the "Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303," eg learning Gaelic, and its opposition to Roman Catholicism. This may be reconciled by the view held by many members of the Church of Ireland that certain churches, as direct descendants of the ancient Celtic Church predate their Roman Catholic rivals in Ireland and are therefore more authentic.

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

18. There is very little indication of TARA in the 3 Inf Bde Area, although it has been reported to exist in LURGAN, PORTADOWN and BANBRIDGE. It clearly also has sympathisers in North DOWN. The most interesting figure is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

19. There is only one recorded occasion when the SF came into contact with TARA in the 3 Inf Bde Area. This occurred on 12 Mar 75, when [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] were stopped at the K7 border crossing. They had been in the Republic collecting information on the Irish Army and Garda. More recently, propaganda leaflets from TARA were received by IRS and QDG. They had been posted in BELFAST.

REMARKS

20. Contacts are retaskable. We would be grateful for any direction that addressees might be able to give. It is hoped that this short paper will be the basis upon which future MISRs will be written.

Distribution:

- G Int HQ NI
- G Int HQ 39 Inf Bde
- Research Office
- File

Copy No

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4

SEND TO

Major [REDACTED]
For Commander

NAME & SIGNATURE OF ARMY OFFICER

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION

Note to file [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

14 October 1976

TARAHISTORY

1. TARA first came to notice in 1964 as a ginger group, within the Orange Order, who campaigned for greater political action against Republicanism. A base for the organisation was established in 1969 when a room in Clifton St Orange Hall, Belfast, was obtained. This was ostensibly for meetings of an "Orange Discussion Group" but was in reality to organise and train TARA members. When the organisation was first set up it had support from the County Grand Lodge of Belfast and the Grand Orange Loyal Institution.
2. The organisation was formed out of a small but militant fundamentalist Protestant movement devoted to political and religious opposition to Roman Catholicism. Its members argue the ascendancy of the Protestant faith over Catholicism and claim it to be the national religion.
3. It first came to recent public notice in Jan 1972 with the issue to the press of an unsigned proclamation of intent. It was about this time that William McGRATH formed TARA on its present day lines. The choice of name is strange as it is the name of a seat of ancient kings of Ireland, but it does symbolise the belief of TARA members that the whole of Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom - under a Protestant leadership.

MEMBERS OF TARA

4. Sources indicate that the TARA membership is small, possibly 300 Province wide and about 70 activists in Belfast. There is evidence that a number of the members are sexually deviant; William McGRATH the past OC almost certainly is bisexual and there were homosexuals in his immediate circle of TARA associates. The organisation has always relied on tight security and information regarding its members was closely guarded. Some members have been identified and it is believed that the organisation has members and contacts in positions of influence throughout the Province in local politics, the Orange Order and commercial life. A number of members are known to be in the TAVR, RUCR and UDR.
5. One ex-member of TARA, [REDACTED] claimed that membership had been falling drastically and the organisation went public to create a myth about their size. (In 1973 a split had occurred within TARA and a lot of members who were opposed to the low-key profile left and joined the UVF). A senior member of TARA, [REDACTED], recently claimed that, although not a large organisation, it was able to operate through "pulling strings." This is believed to be factual.
6. In 1975 it was reported that many of the older members of the UDA were anxious to join TARA. Some had been in TARA prior to the formation of the UDA but left to join the new organisation. They later considered TARA to be the more respectable of the two organisations, with a much stricter vetting procedure than the UDA and stronger ties with the Orange Order.

CONDITIONS OF ENTRY

7. Conditions for entry to TARA includes:
 - A. Applicants must have no criminal record.
 - B. They must be members of the Orange Order.
 - C. They must be proposed by someone who is already a member. Applicants are carefully vetted and the time lapse between application and acceptance can be up to six months while the applicants background is negotiated.

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

D. They must be of sober character and stable background.

E. Ownership of a personal weapon is desirable.

ROLE AND AIMS

8. In a civil war situation it is probably TARA leaders who would come to the fore and find their way into a Provisional Government, for no other reason than the calibre of personnel involved. One source has indicated that one of its aims is planning and preparation for Doomsday and its aftermath.

9. In 1973 they were believed to be bringing arms and ammunition into Ulster for purchase by the UVF. The influential businessmen of TARA were able to use their commercial contacts and expertise in bringing the arms in, although they were not interested in using them themselves. It is possible that TARA has a procurement role for members of the UUAC (possibly from Europe).

10. TARA, unlike the other Protestant organisations does not issue many statements in the press but more recently they have been publicly supporting direct rule. They have stated that "As Unionists, we completely reject the suggestion that continued government by the Parliament of the United Kingdom is in any way unacceptable and we will oppose any attempt to render continued direct rule unworkable".

TARA is described as the "hard core of Protestant resistance". It is a defence and planning organisation for use only in a doomsday situation.

12. It is believed that the TARA current active role is that of intelligence gathering. They are known to operate contacts in the loyalist political parties, the Eire Defence Ministry, possibly Provisional Sinn Fein, Ulster Defence Association, Ulster Volunteer Force, Red Hand Commandoes, Ulster Defence Regiment and the RUC. Intelligence is collated to assess the invasion potential of the Eire Army, the Protestant and Catholic paramilitaries strengths and intention and left wing involvement in Ulster. The organisation is believed to have a records system of sorts, probably located [REDACTED]

WEAPONS

13. TARA members probably have access to a large quantity of personal legally held weapons and may have a sealed dump somewhere in the Province. It is believed they were considering an arms purchase in 1975 and members have discussed the possibility of obtaining arms from Israel and South Africa.

STRUCTURE

14. In addition to the units in Belfast, TARA has units in the following areas:-

Armagh
Lurgan
Portadown
South Derry
and to a lesser degree Fermanagh and Coleraine.

The units sourced as operating in Belfast are platoons in Newtonabbey, Finaghy and East Belfast.

15. It was reported that the group was formed into platoons of approximately 20 men. Each platoon was believed to have an OC, a sergeant, a Quartermaster and an IO, but it is now thought that the organisation is run on a looser command structure. Dues of 50p per month (1974) were collected; one half of the dues go to a central fund and the other

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[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]

half to the platoon. If the platoons require stores they draw from the central fund. Due to inflation the 50p was probably increased.

MAJOR PERSONALITIES

16. OC - William McGRATH, 5 Greenwood Ave. May be stood down due to ill health

OC

IO

Admin Offr

Secretary

Military intelligence and RUC Special Branch records have about 30 names of members or former members of the organisation in the Belfast area.

17. The 'raison d' entre' of TARA seems to be the establishment and defence of a Protestant Ulster with the complete exclusion of the Roman Catholic Church. Their policy has always been based on the idea of the supremacy and purity of the Protestant faith and a change of direction is unlikely. Although Unionist, the greatest TARA driving force is Protestantism.

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]

Notes of an interview with Roy Garland ex UDR member left 1972
 - MCGAM (loc. 10)

Garland introduced to McG when he was approx 15 (20 years ago) McG at the time Christian/
 Evangelical crusader. Held meetings at McGs attended also by C.S. UDR Captain N
 They first formed groups called "cell" however McG thought this sounded rather red and
 they decided on TARA (this was about 1965-6?)

They held meetings between themselves and McG would single them out after meetings. McG
 attempted to seduce them by claiming to show them emotional freedom, to this end he made
 them feel guilty by admitting to masturbation, therefore showing up their guilt complex.
 This is important to emphasise as it is the very beginning of McGs hold on them.

Garland Smith & Leckey members of Young Unionist (YU). At one (YU) meeting addressed
 by McG, attended by McIlroy merchant banker gave card to R.G. 'INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
 CORPORATION'. R.G. believes McIlroy helps TARA with finance.

Also with finance Clarence Hogg, Capt Hogg (UDR) TARA one time treasurer arranged finance
 for printing machine. Current involvement of McIlroy & Hogg not known.

McG suggested to C.S., R.G., UDR Captain N, that they should join LOLs. R.G. joined Irish Heritage
 Lodge & became master (it had very few members). The idea was to put motions to the
 various lodges which would gain momentum when they reached the Grand Lodge. One such
 motion put by R.G., framed by McG, was that Ulster should prepare a Provisional Govt now "IRISH"
 flavour to lodge

The idea that TARA when it was first formed (early 70) was an elite is laughable according
 to R.G. who claims to have been 2IC to McG. Recruits were accepted by personal recommen-
 dation, there was no vetting as such. Wpn training etc was talked about, but, R.G. never
 saw any weapons. Many people became disillusioned after joining either with McGs
 unsavoury reputation, or with all the talk and no action. The Christian overtones did
 not go down well with % of recruits.

Thomas Clarke (FNK) is supposed to have carried out surveillance on McG for several months
 and concluded that he was a communist.

Amongst persons attended early meetings of TARA R.G. mentioned elderly man named Dickworth.
 (Presumably John Dilworth)

* Frank Pootsie Millar is amongst persons currently involved with TARA and is reported as
 being engaged to McG's daughter. (now married)

Worthington McG is still on TARA scene and is now also Sec of Irish Heritage Lodge.
 Robert MacFarland, Monkstown previously of Premier Dve is currently an official in TARA
 & claims to have been given info regarding IRA/PIRA from SF at a meeting in Russell Court
 Hotel early this year. He is thought to own a business on the N'Ards Rd, and was an asso-
 ciate of J.W. McKeague.

R.G. claims that McG was responsible for spreading rumours of J.D. McKeagues homosexual
 activities, having posters posted around Belfast "NICE BOY McKeague". According to R.G.,
 McK knows that McG was responsible for this.

R.G. believes that current aims of TARA will have moderated, as CS is close to McG also
 David Brown, but nevertheless, their basic aim remains to keep RCs down by force if necessary

R.G. believes that although I.P. knows of McG nefarious activities he would be better to
 take action because the expose would also effect CS therefore doing DUP no good. He
 further believes that McG has knowledge of Paisleys involvement with the UVF in early 70.

The present para militaries still regard TARA with degree of respect as they still have
 members like CS whose standing in society makes them privy to such info which would not
 ordinarily reach the para mils.

As IO of TARA CS seeks info on various aspects of mil Int i.e. Southern Irish Army. The
 does found on Bate & Simpson were destined for CS. Among Names & Nos listed on

Base on are Worthington, McG, T Passmore, Jean Coulter.

CS currently IO TARA, wife Scots therefore has connections in Scotland believed to have TARA members in Scotland. Visits England and meets Phylis Raffern (Nat Front). R.G. states that CS is a transvestite who has ~~had~~^{had} assistance from McG regarding afore problem.

PROCLAMATION

BEING CONVINCED that darker days than we have yet known still lie ahead for the people of Northern Ireland, we address ourselves to those who wish to preserve for ALL THE PEOPLES OF IRELAND, that heritage of faith and freedom that has been almost extinguished in a large part of our land and which is now threatened with extinction in this North-West corner of Ulster.

The aim of the enemy is the destruction of our Protestant faith. This they hope to achieve by creating a total war situation in which the Eire Army will cross the border to unite with the provisional and Regular I.R.A. who are already in our midst. Plans are in existence for this purpose. What has happened in our Province during the past few years is not just a series of local riot situations, but rather the beginning of the final chapter of an age-long campaign to subjugate and subdue the Protestant people of Ireland. This is an essential preparation for the campaign against the Protestant character of the British Throne. This situation will continue to grow in intensity until the final battle which will affect the life of every man and woman, boy and girl in our land. For such a conflict our Protestant people are ill-prepared. In preparation for the day of battle certain things are essential NOW.

- (1) Our Protestant districts must be brought back to normality in the shortest possible time. Damage must be repaired. The whole place cleaned up. Every home, shop, office, factory and street must be bright and shining, showing to the world that Protestantism stands for at least, cleanliness and order and industrious living.
- (2) Our children must be sent to Sunday School and Church. If your Minister is not a true Protestant get him moved and put a man of God in his place. Those men are paid to preach the Protestant faith in its purity. Don't let them take their money under false pretences. It is not sufficient that your children have been born Protestant they must be taught the fundamentals of their faith. There are many good Mission Halls which should be supported by you and your family. Learn to raise your heart in prayer to God through Christ, at your Bench, Desk or in the Bus, the Car or the Home. The people that pray are an invincible people.
- (3) Law and Order, must prevail. Hi-jacking, Robbery, Illegal Drinking Clubs and an utter disregard for other people's property are no part of the Protestant way of life. People who indulge in these activities must be exposed for the criminals that they are.
- (4) Victimization and intimidation must stop. It serves no cause to burn a man's home or destroy his place of work. Each person must be allowed to live and work in peace and security in keeping with the dignity of man.
- (5) Assassination must stop. Many of the victims have not been politically active. Their death had no political significance or effect. Capital punishment must be the penalty for murder.
- (6) If the spirit of rebellion arises in an individual or a community, all the strength of the Lawful Authorities must be used to crush it without mercy.

-2-

(7) Maximum co-operation and support must at all times be given to the Army and Police. If wrong political directions are given to the Security Forces resulting in unacceptable action by them, we must do everything possible to cool the situation. The only line we would oppose the Security Forces would be in the event of their forcing us into a United Ireland. If we act now and act right this situation will never arise. It is our task to educate the Forces as to the nature of the conflict and the rightness of our cause, so that in the final battle the Army and police will be fighting side by side with us against a common foe, namely Romanism and Communism.

(8) We must campaign now for integrated education. All Roman Catholic centres of education must be closed. Religious education must be provided only by Evangelical Protestants.

(9) The Roman Catholic Church must be declared an illegal organisation. History proves that it is a conspiracy against the fortunes and liberties of mankind. For generations this evil thing has blighted our land. It must be destroyed, so that our fellow countrymen who have been deceived by it, will have an opportunity of entering into an eternal relationship with God through Christ and of discovering their common identity with us. The indivisible oneness of the Irish people will then become a reality.

(10) Conflict is inevitable. We would not choose this path but the forces of Romanism and Communism will. It is imperative therefore that every Protestant should be prepared to bear arms so that all our resources may be in a state of readiness to be placed under the command of the proper Authorities in the hour of need. We are not looking for trigger-happy Gammen but we are anxious to meet responsible men who are prepared to defend their hearth and home and the glorious liberty that has come to us in the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.

A basic knowledge of Guns and Ballistics, of Fieldcraft and Strategy can be acquired quite legally in the privacy of one's home from books available in Public Libraries or which can be legally bought. This basic knowledge will make it possible for the great mass of law-abiding Protestants to be quickly absorbed into Her Majesty's Forces as the crisis develops. Many of our people can of course find a place now in the U.D.R. or Police Reserve.

We need men of conviction, men of high principle, men of courage and of faith who are prepared to resist to the death if necessary, every attempt from whatever source, to unfurl the banner of the evil one over this fair Province of ours. If you think you measure up to these demands we will be glad to hear from you.

The situation is dark. The enemy is strong. Great and grievous difficulties will have to be faced, but all is not lost! Ulster is God's anvil on which is being forged the future not only of Ireland, but of all the British people of which we are proud to form a part. Knowing this we throw down the challenge to a desperate foe - hammer away, ye hostile bands, your hammers break, God's anvil stands!

Issued by the TARA - THE HARD CORE OF PROTESTANT RESISTANCE!
RESISTANCE WITH RESPONSIBILITY!

WE HOLD ULSTER

THAT IRELAND MIGHT BE SAVED AND THAT BRITAIN BE REBORN!

...../3

X

-3-

FIVE OF YOU SHALL CHASE AN HUNDRED AND AN HUNDRED OF YOU SHALL PUT TEN THOUSAND TO FLIGHT: AND YOUR ENEMIES SHALL FALL BEFORE YOU BY THE SWORD. FOR I WILL ESTABLISH MY COVENANT WITH YOU.....AND I WILL CUT OFF THE NAMES OF THE IDOLS OUT OF THE LAND AND THEY SHALL NO MORE BE REMEMBERED.....FOR THE MOUTH OF THE LORD HATH SPOKEN IT.

10 = 9 OCT 1980



CLASSIFICATION

D/DS6/7/44/18

PS/PUS

Copy to:

PS/DUS (Army)

PS/DUS (CM)


MA/VCGS

AUS(GS)

✓ NIO - Mr Mayne

CPR

HANDWRITTEN ANNOTATIONS



J C WALLACE

As you suggested in your letter of 3 October (DRK/80/1170), Mr Sheldon's secretary rang me earlier today to arrange for me to look over the notebooks the police took from Wallace's office after his arrest.

2. There are two, both HMSO issue, one a large notebook; the other a shorthand book.

3. The large notebook relates just to Northern Ireland. It contains a number of lists: the names of 50 or so top PIRA and OIRA operators in 1973; 35 top UDA and UVF men; 40 other leading protestants. There is also a collection of addresses of Republican front organisations and of others more or less sympathetic to the IRA cause; together with lists of Republican and Protestant newspapers and propaganda sheets and of other examples of the underground press. Finally, it contains a brief account of [redacted], who seems to have joined the WRAC in 1971 and then become involved with the Provisionals in 1972. The rest of the book is empty.

IRRELEVANT NAME

4. The shorthand note book contains nothing about Northern Ireland but is densely packed with information about international terrorism and government plans and organisations aimed at countering it. It contains quite detailed accounts of actual terrorist incidents around the world - mainly Arab hijackings as well as the Munich Olympics attack on the Israeli team, and the Hans Martin Schleyer kidnapping. There are lists of Arab terrorist groups and an account of what each stands for together with a note on the Japanese Red Army. There is an outline of HMG procedures for using troops in civil contingencies - the CCU is mentioned - and in support of the police. There is a discussion of the State of Emergency measures adopted by the Heath Government and of the Committee under Lord Jellicoe and later Lord Carrington which oversaw them. The JIC and GCHQ are mentioned and then heads of MI5 and MI6 and the DGI are all named, as is intelligence co-ordinator at No 10. Addresses of MI5 and MI6 buildings in London are listed. There are also some names of members of the Israeli Intelligence agencies. Police computers in GB are listed and their locations given. Finally there are two mentions of the SAS: that they were stood by in the [redacted] and they helped [redacted] in the [redacted]. The names of the two SAS soldiers concerned are given, as is that of the head of [redacted].

NAME OF INCIDENT

NAME OF INCIDENT

INTELLIGENCE DESIGNATOR

5. Much of this could have been gleaned from a careful reading of newspapers and from conversation with the journalists who came to Belfast in the early seventies - the books seem to date mainly from about 1972-3 though they continue at least until 1977 (Schleyer was murdered in October 1977; the two SAS incidents were in [redacted] and [redacted]) ie, until well after he left Government service. Why Wallace wrote it all up in this way is far from clear. He may either have wanted to

DATES



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EXHIBIT 6 (Page 2)


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pass it on to other pressmen - perhaps Fisk - or may even have planned some sort of book of his own on terrorism for which these are the rough notes. While none of it is particularly helpful, it is largely the sort of thing which does leak out from time to time in the pages of 'Time Out' or the 'New Statesman'. There is no reference in either book to any "dirty tricks" in Northern Ireland.

6. I understand from Mr Sheldon's secretary that he plans to hang on to the books and that a number of people from other Government Departments will be looking them over. I certainly see no reason why we should return them to Wallace but, equally, I do not think there is anything in them that journalists specialising in these subjects would not already know.

NAME & SIGNATURE
OF ARMY OFFICER


DS6c
MB Ext 2237

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CLASSIFICATION

Publication **NEWS OF THE WORLD**

Date **21 MAR 1982**

** To include filing / indexing instructions as necessary*

11/77

I'll expose top men's vice ring says killer

A CONVICTED killer holds the key to a growing sex scandal involving top members of the Establishment.

Colin Wallace, serving ten years for manslaughter, is threatening to expose the guilty men. He says he knows the names of MPs, lawyers, civil servants, councillors and policemen involved.

Wallace has told friends of a secret list of 60 men in the homosexual vice ring centred on Kincora House, a school for deprived children in Belfast.

The ring was smashed at the end of last year when three staff members were jailed for offences against boys. Now the Government has ordered an inquiry into why it operated undetected for 20 years.

Wallace had access to the secret file when he served with the Army Information Service in Ulster.

Now Belfast Independent MP Gerry Fitz has demanded that the list should be made public. He also wants Wallace to be allowed to give evidence to the inquiry.

The killer has, I understand, refused to give evidence to a preliminary police probe. He wants guarantees that he will be able to give a full account of what happened, the people involved and refer to secret papers.

Then, he says, he is prepared to "blow the lid" off the whole Kincora affair.

Wallace has told friends that he saw the list at Army HQ in Lisburn. The names were on three fool-cap sheets.

The file is said to be made up of pen portraits of people involved and details of roles they played.

Burned

The list includes names of MPs who visited Ulster before the scandal was first exposed two years ago.

Senior civil servants seconded from London to Belfast are also named, plus local politicians who used the vice ring or know about it and took part in the cover-up.

And detectives have reopened inquiries into the death, nine years ago, of 10-year old Brian McDermott whose burned and horribly mutilated body was found in a Belfast river.

WALLACE was jailed for 10 years last March for killing his assistant's husband in the It's a Knock-out case.

NEWS OF THE WORLD


Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing ...

EXHIBIT 8 (Page 1)

Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing was done to stop the child sex abuse

By Liam Clarke

Published 06/08/2014



Kincora Boys' Home in the 1970s

The Belfast Telegraph can name three people who gave information about child sex abuse in Kincora to British military intelligence only to see any investigation blocked for years by MI5.

Last night Brian Gemmell, a former captain in military intelligence, confirmed that he had passed on information from three men - James Miller, Roy Garland and Jim McCormick - to a senior MI5 officer named Ian Cameron. All three information sources were completely opposed to the abuse and wanted it ended.

Mr Gemmell, an officer in military intelligence at the time, was trying to gain an entrée to Tara, a secretive Protestant paramilitary group headed by William McGrath. Until late 1971 McGrath's second-in-command in Tara was Mr Garland.

Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing ...

EXHIBIT 8 (PAGE 2)

"I had been aware that McGrath was a child abuser since the 1940s," Mr Garland said.

He first became aware of it when McGrath, a born-again Christian, was carrying out a mission in Faith House. The premises in Belfast's Orpen Park has now been converted to an old people's home and has no connection with its role in McGrath's day.

A second source of information on McGrath was Mr Miller, an Englishman and former soldier who had settled in Northern Ireland.

He worked as a military intelligence and MI5 agent. In 1971 Mr Miller, who is now dead, was infiltrating Tara for the intelligence services and had reported his suspicions to his handlers.

He was told to drop the issue, and shortly afterwards he was expelled from Tara.

"I can tell you exactly what happened," Mr Garland said. "A number of UVF men were attending the meeting and they said that Miller was working for British intelligence. McGrath said: 'Tell him to go', so I went over and told him: 'I am sorry, you have to go,' and showed him out."

Mr Miller went on to join the UDA at his handler's request.



The third source was Mr McCormick, an evangelical Christian, who set up a meeting between Mr Garland and Mr Gemmell in 1974. Mr McCormick said at the meeting that there were three child abusers working at Kincora.

"I had been trying to bring this out for some time," Mr Garland said. "I had already given an account to police in Strandtown and the UVF had warned me that I was under threat of death as a result."

He and Mr Gemmell remain friends to this day, but at the time Mr Gemmell had his own agenda.

Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing ...

EXHIBIT 8 (Page 3)



His first move was to report it to Cameron, an MI5 veteran who was working under the cover of a political adviser in the Northern Ireland Office.

"Ian Cameron was very much a father figure to me at the time," Mr Gemmell said.

"I was in my mid-20s and he was in his early 60s. He was normally a very nice chap, but he reacted very strongly.

"He told me that MI5 did not concern itself with what homosexuals did and he ordered me to stop using an agent I had within Tara, who we had codenamed Royal Flush."

However, Mr Gemmell was aware of efforts to recruit John McKeague, a loyalist paramilitary and abuser of teenage boys, as an informant, so he knew Cameron was lying.

The refusal to investigate Kincora led to Mr Gemmell severing his relations with the intelligence services when he left the Army two years later.

"It was a profession in which lies and cover-up were tools of the trade. As a Christian, I could not make that separation between private and professional morality," he said.

Two previous Government inquiries, the Terry Inquiry and the Hughes Inquiry, concluded that there was no military intelligence knowledge of child abuse at Kincora. Mr Gemmell was not interviewed by either of them.

Background

The First Minister Peter Robinson, Amnesty International and politicians across the board have called for the possible role of the intelligence services in covering up child abuse at Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast to be investigated as part of a UK-wide inquiry. On April 3, 1980, three members of staff at the home - William McGrath, Raymond Semple and Joseph Mains - were jailed for the systematic sexual abuse of children in their care going back to the early 1970s. Rumours have persisted that the abuse ring went further and included prominent people, both here and in the UK. It has been claimed that the security services were prepared to blackmail key figures as a means of controlling elements within loyalism and unionism as the Troubles flared.

MI5: new claims of political interference

Rees calls for inquiry into 'dirty tricks'

MERLYN REES, the former home secretary, called last night for a royal commission or similar judicial inquiry into allegations that MI5 attempted to destabilise the Wilson government in the mid-1970s.

Last week James Callaghan, the former prime minister, and Rees increased pressure on Mrs Thatcher to investigate alleged "dirty tricks" operations. Callaghan's surprise intervention followed a Sunday Times report about James Miller, a former MI5 agent who claimed that the security service helped to promote the Ulster workers' strike in 1974 in a plot to discredit and undermine the Wilson government.

Callaghan said The Sunday Times report broke new ground, outside the scope of the limited inquiry into MI5 activities he had instituted in 1977. Rees told The Sunday Times: "In view of the allegations that are being made there is a need now for an urgent royal commission-style inquiry."

New claims by Miller this week are likely to add further weight to demands for an inquiry. Miller, an Englishman recruited by the security service in Northern Ireland in 1970, casts doubt on the conclusions of an official inquiry into the sexual abuse of inmates at the Kincora boys' home in Belfast.

The inquiry, chaired by Sir George Terry in 1983, who at the time was chief constable of Sussex, concluded "there is no evidence that army intelligence had knowledge of homosexual abuse at Kincora".

Rumours that Kincora was a sex "honeytrap" used by MI5 to compromise intelligence targets, including Loyalist politicians and paramilitary figures, have appeared since the early 1980s. The stories have always been dismissed by the authorities.

However, Miller claims that the intelligence services had known about the activ-

by Barrie Penrose

ities at Kincora for a number of years, and believes the boys' home was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information.

Miller has revealed that his first task for the intelligence services was to spy on William McGrath, a former housefather at the Kincora home.

McGrath, who was jailed for his part in the abuse of 13 children in his care between 1973 and 1979, once headed the Tara Loyalist paramilitary organisation. Miller says that McGrath's sexual tendencies were common knowledge inside Tara.

Miller said: "My MI5 case officer later told me to leave McGrath to them and I understand they used the information to recruit him as an informer." Last night McGrath confirmed that he knew Miller but would not comment on any other aspect.

Miller's claims are borne out by an official army briefing paper signed by Colin Wallace, a former army intelligence officer who was attached to MI5 operations in Ulster during the 1970s. The document is dated November 8, 1974, a period when McGrath was employed as housefather in Kincora.

The paper makes clear that



Rees: seeking royal commission

army intelligence had inside knowledge of young boys being sexually exploited at the home seven years before the Kincora scandal broke publicly. Wallace's detailed four-page report was seen by several senior officers at army headquarters.

Headed "Tara - Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated with the Homosexual Community in Belfast", the report was requested by Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Dixon, then chief of army intelligence who worked closely with MI5 at the Royal Ulster Constabulary headquarters at Knock in west Belfast.

According to the document, "allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959". It concludes: "I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC has consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless they had specifically received some form of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level."

Despite Miller's and Wallace's specific warnings, McGrath was still employed as a housefather at Kincora between 1971 and 1979. And it was not until 1981 that he was jailed for four years on 18 counts of abusing boys.

In Ireland, Wallace has claimed he was eventually instructed to use the Kincora information as part of a black propaganda operation against prominent Loyalist politicians under the codename "Clockwork Orange 2". It was this operation, says Wallace, which was widened to include smear tactics against national politicians in all three political parties.

Last night, Rees, who was the Northern Ireland secretary in the mid-1970s, said he had no first-hand knowledge of Kincora. "But it does tie in with conversations I heard at the time. This whole affair must be investigated."

MI5: a success as travelling agent is jailed

CONFIDENTIALNOTE FOR FILEADDRESS LIST & FILE
MARKINGPUBLIC EYE : Kincora - The MI5 ConnectionBBC2 1 June 1990 (Verbatim extracts)

This programme is summarised at 37a. The following is a more detailed account of the contribution made by "James", an Army intelligence officer, identified positively by us as Brian GEMMELL. Mike Taylor the interviewer is referred to below as 'T' and GEMMELL as 'J'. The text which is not within quotation marks is that of the narration, and the extracts begin with the question why nothing was done to pass on to the RUC the information said to have been available about homosexual goings-on at Kincora.

Verbatim (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. Why was nothing done? To answer that question it is vital to trace what happened to the information provided by Roy Garland to Army intelligence. We are able to do this because we have located the more senior of the two Army officers who met him. This officer claims that the information was passed on to MI5 with, he believes, disturbing consequences For reasons of personal security we have concealed the identity of the Army intelligence officer. We shall call him "James". James agreed to speak to us because Kincora has worried him ever since the day he met Roy Garland. He is a born again Christian and the affair still troubled his conscience.
2. James went to Northern Ireland at the end of 1974. He found that the new priority was to gather intelligence on Loyalist paramilitaries and politicians as well as on the traditional enemy, the IRA. To improve Loyalist intelligence we can confirm from James' evidence that TARA was targeted by British Intelligence and that James was one of those who did the targeting. He developed one particular source who was on the inside track of the Loyalist political leadership. This source was not William McGrath. A bond developed; they were both Christians. and the relationship proved fruitful. In this particular case, because of the nature of the intelligence, James says that he reported directly to a senior MI5 officer who was stationed in the Province.

/...

CONFIDENTIAL

T "What do you get?"

J "I got blown out of his office. He was rude to me, he tells me that the kind of information I have submitted is not proper intelligence, that we as intelligence officers do not dabble in homosexual affairs. These moral matters are nothing to do with us. He vilifies my report and tells me to cut off the contact. I can remember him saying to me words to the effect of "get rid of him, break the contact, just get rid". I am surprised because we had a pretty good relationship going up until then. He blows me out of the office."

T "So he tells you to forget the homosexuality and to forget all the sexual business. It has got nothing to do with you, it is not the kind of thing that intelligence services deal in, forget it completely?"

J "To be perfectly honest I find the whole thing surprising. It was a strong line to me. Lay off any matter of sexuality, put aside these contacts, do not continue to dig up this kind of material in future. It is very clear, finito."

T "Perhaps he was right; after all, all you were bringing him were allegations, gossip and rumour; there was no evidence."

J "Yes but that is our job. The only way you can start to find out what real intelligence is, is to start with gossip and rumour and try and get the information that corroborates it."

5. What heightened James' bewilderment was a meeting he says he had in London with MI5 about the Loyalist para-military leader John McKEAGUE. McKEAGUE was shot dead by the INLA in January 1982. It was this encounter that made him even more sceptical about the moral outrage he claims was expressed by the senior MI5 officer. McKEAGUE was an alleged homosexual who was said to have founded a loyalist assassination gang called the Red Hand Commandos. James says he met the two MI5 officers in London. They wanted to explore with him as an expert on Loyalist intelligence the chances of turning McKEAGUE into an informant using his suspected homosexuality as a lever.

J "According to them they have some compromising film of a homosexual nature of John McKEAGUE which they wonder could it be used to make Mr McKEAGUE cooperative as an informant."

T "Are you sure they are suggesting or asking your advice on using Mr McKEAGUE's alleged homosexuality as a way of blackmailing him into cooperating with the Security Service?"

J "I don't think that the word blackmail was actually ever used in our discussions. Enticing, encouraging, putting pressure on; I'm quite certain about that."

T "Does it surprise you when you are asked that kind of question involving the alleged homosexuality of a person?"

J "Not really, I am more surprised at the protestations that intelligence forces do not deal with a thing like that."

T "What particular intelligence was he looking for from you, from your source?"

J "Intelligence largely of a political nature on the Protestant side, I think was where his largest interest lay, but of course you couldn't be picky. When I went back to him with information I gave him everything that I could remember and everything, apart from trivia, that I thought relevant. We got to know one another. He was a considerably older man than me. He treated me in a friendly way, in a fatherly way. He gave me encouragement."

3. James was already cultivating his TARA source when he heard through Christian contacts that someone else wanted to talk to him about the organisation. That someone was Roy GARLAND.

J "...However there are sexual overtones to all this: when Mr GARLAND begins to accuse Mr McGRATH of a selection of sexual perversions."

T "Does Roy GARLAND mention KINCORA?"

J "Yes he tells me that at that stage McGRATH has a position in KINCORA and that KINCORA is a boys' home, he's very concerned about that."

T "Does he mention KINCORA by name or does he just say boys' home?"

J "I believe it's by name, I can't remember exactly but I believe it's by name. He doesn't know exactly what is going on but we are, putting 2 and 2 together and making 4 when history shows that we should have made 6."

T "Does he say that he believes that boys or young people are being abused in the boys' home?"

J "I think he says he believes it but he doesn't know it to be true."

T "No evidence?"

J "I do not think he has been into the boys' home, put it that way."

T "Are you concerned at the allegation?"

J "I am concerned at the allegation. Yes."

T "Did you believe him?"

J "I believed that Mr GARLAND believes he is telling me the truth. It obviously has to be investigated and enquired into."

4. James wrote a report of his meeting and sent it up to his army superiors as a matter of routine. He says it was then passed to MI5 who shared the same building at Army Head Quarters. Next thing he knew James was summoned to see the senior MI5 officer.

J "I can't honestly say I was expecting 3 gold stars but I went up feeling fairly positive, expecting a normal meeting."

T "What is your reaction when you hear that William McGRATH and two other men had been found guilty of abusing young people at KINCORA?

J "Horrified. Horrified more at myself and at the whole security system. I feel guilty to a degree that I did not actually stand up and say that something ought to be done about this now, but as I said to you earlier that is the kind of thing where an investigation should begin. But I didn't."

.....
(Here follow the sections (para 4-11) of the summary at 37a dealing with the RUC, the enquiries etc).
.....

6. But the most profound doubts are still held by the person most directly involved in the events we have unravelled this evening: the army intelligence officer who set them in train: James. "Why are you speaking now, publicly, about this matter?"

J "We are not talking here about great national secrets, we are talking about covering up a matter concerning a moral issue of the gravest importance: the abuse of young men, and of officials knowing about it and of officialdom apparently, for some reason, doing nothing. That's something that not only shocks and horrifies me - that's something that will shock and horrify in every part of our society. And I believe that this issue - and this is the only issue that I am talking to you about - this issue has to be brought out into the open. And we have to say these three most difficult words in the English language: "We were wrong", either because it was bungled, or because there is a more sinister or more conspiratorial reason for covering it up, and I don't know what was the reason but I do know that it was covered up, because I put the information in and nobody did anything about it".



SIGNATURE & DESIGNATOR
OF MIS OFFICER

Ext 87515
19 July 1990

Extract from the Sunday Telegraph dated 17.1.1982

Auberon Waugh's Column

TWENTY YEARS ago it started to be fashionable to say that Britain was being throttled by its old public school ties. Professor Richard Hoggart, that doughty champion of working-class literacy, has been saying it again, bless his old soul. Let us examine how things have gone since people started listening to him.

Since October 16, 1964, there have been five Prime Ministers. Not one of them went to a Headmasters' Conference School. Nor, until Sir Geoffrey Howe came along, had any of our Chancellors of the Exchequer since that time, unless one counts the tragically brief service of Iain Macleod. Yet if anyone had to put a finger on the date when things started to go seriously wrong for this country, I should have thought that Harold Wilson's arrival on October 16, 1964, was as good as any.

Public schools were once open to the criticism that they created a secret, often homosexual network—although if inquiries into the Belfast homosexual prostitutions scandal lead, as I rather fear they may do, to an immensely distinguished public servant, now dead, it may be noticed that he was not a public schoolboy, either.

In any case, it is now proposed to inculcate a "positive" attitude to homosexuality in the State curriculum. All in all, I should judge it a good time to draw the old school tie a little tighter.

Huberon Waugh's Diary

SUNDAY

PETER WALKER, the horrible former protégé of Grocer Heath who still hangs around in the Conservative government as Minister of Agriculture, takes a half page in *The Observer* to explain his determination to go on gassing badgers.

Where cows are suffering from bovine tuberculosis, he says, badgers are often found to be similarly affected. But even Lord Zuckermann acknowledged in his notorious report that nobody knew whether cows catch it from badgers or the other way round. Walker does not mention this point.

Zuckermann's possible motive for urging on the destruction of the British badger population is often discussed. There are no badgers in South Africa, where he was born, unless one counts the African Honey badger or Ratel, which is really a sort of weasel. To get its honey it farts the bees nest until all the bees are senseless. Perhaps his parents wiped out the true badgers in South Africa when the little Solly arrived.

Or perhaps there is a more sinister explanation. There can be no doubt that Zuckermann is frequently mistaken for a badger as he wanders around London zoo and this may account for his hatred of them. Peter Walker's motives, I imagine, are more complicated. He feels that the more badger's sets left empty, the better his chance of using one as a bunker or bolt-hole for small, lower-class conservative parties when the nation eventually comes to its senses and sweeps me to power.

body's doing it. Even Mark Boxer has had a baby, although that probably has nothing to do with the latest craze. There is a move afoot to allow any female to have any male imprisoned for life on her own unsupported information to the police. Thank god for the Thames Valley Constabulary.


It is hard to know what to suggest for these unhappy women apart from a change of diet. Professor Malcolm Lader, a leading authority on psychiatric drugs, writes in *MIND* that convenience foods can lead to epilepsy, schizophrenia and many other forms of madness.

But while so many women insist on eating nothing but fish fingers and frozen peas, I feel we might encourage the move by GLC teachers to insist that there should be lessons on the "positive" aspects of homosexuality in every school curriculum. It may not be so much fun, but anything else would be too dangerous.

TUESDAY

A MORE gallant officer and gentleman than Major Charles Vuron Coleville Booth-Jones never drew breath. He was my Squadron Leader in the Blues in Cyprus. Shoulder to shoulder we faced the screaming hordes of Gypsoes, fuzzy-wuzzies and slant-eyed fanatics demonstrating against British rule but Charles for one never flinched.

Now I learn that this same Major has been beaten up by the Wiltshire police at Wylde Horse Trials. Three policemen



It won't work. I shall appoint Lord Zuckermann my Minister of Agriculture and instruct him to go round farting into all badger sets which seem unoccupied. Walker shall not escape.

MONDAY

AN EXCELLENT BBC television programme on *The Police* restores my confidence in this admirable body of men. At no sooner is it over than we have to catch a ghastly female from Women Against Rape with hysterical, stony eyes denouncing them all over again.

Rape seems to be the "in" thing. Every-

pinned him to the muddy ground for fifteen minutes with his wrists handcuffed and his legs tied together. His crime was to have suggested a more intelligent way of organising the traffic.

After two witnesses of good character had testified that they saw a policeman approach him from behind and punch him in the back, he was fined £100 by Salisbury magistrates for assaulting the police. The prosecution also claimed he had said the police inserted a pill into his mouth in order to dehydrate him, although he denied saying this.

I would not be in the least surprised. The Wiltshire police, unlike their

colleagues in Bedfordshire and Somerset, have also struck me as utter sods. No doubt the modern policeman needs these pills for the war on left-wing schoolteachers, supporters of Mrs Shirley Williams, Women Against Rape and Lesbians in Publishing.

But if they start using them against a lone Major at Horse Trials, we may have to take the law into our own hands and travel around everywhere with our own stock of dehydrating pills and handcuffs. I for one find the idea most distasteful.

WEDNESDAY

WHEN MAURICE Oldfield died last year it was officially announced that he had died for health reasons—the same, in fact, as caused him to resign from being head of security in Ulster a few months earlier. At the time, I expressed my doubts about this and said that I thought the old boy had probably been murdered by members of the Secret Intelligence Service, which he headed for several years before his retirement in 1977.

Normally when SIS officers murder each other it is the result of some poofish quarrel or lover's tiff inside the Service. On this occasion it may have been a misguided desire to protect the good name of the Old Firm. I gather that members of the rival—and slightly more respectable—Home Security Service had been breathing down the necks of their glamorous colleagues in the SIS about various wild allegations being made in Belfast.

If these had received a thorough airing and Maurice's name had been dragged through the mud, it would have been a poetic revenge for what the SIS poofstahs had done to the reputation of my old chief Roger Hollis.

Today Jim Prior makes an official announcement that nobody in the Northern Ireland office, no policemen and no politicians are involved in inquiries about a homosexual ring of Belfast youths taken into care. Just the same, he has decided that the inquiry will be conducted in private. So perhaps we shall never know the guilty men.

THURSDAY


ONE MILLION five hundred and eight thousand and forty six morons now buy the *Daily Star*. Perhaps nearly half of that number even "read" some of it. It has a higher percentage of young "readers" than any other national newspaper except, I suppose, *Beano*.

The good news is that it is losing buckets of money. Lord Maffews has to scatter millions and millions of pounds in bingo money among its ignorant yobbo "readership" before they will consent to take it to their sheds at the end of the garden.

The bad news is that all the newspapers now face ruin as a result of this half-witted competition for "readers". If the leadership of the National Union of Journalists were more than a collection of creepy lower-class power maniacs and left-wing fanatics—it would organise nationwide pressure to stop any newspaper offering any prizes whatever to its loathsome "readers". They have done nothing whatever to deserve it. Then journalists might be able to undertake urgently needed refurbishment of their stately homes, repair their works of art etc.

1. I, Andrew Parker, am the Director General of the Security Service, otherwise known as MI5.
2. I confirm that I have no personal knowledge of matters relating to, or connected with, Kincora Boys Hostel (Kincora).
3. I confirm that I have appointed a nominated officer from within the Security Service to assist the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) with its investigation into Kincora.
4. I have also directed relevant staff within the Security Service to provide the HIA Inquiry with the Security Service's full co-operation.
5. I confirm that I have directed that all relevant material that touches on Kincora identified by the detailed searches conducted by the Security Service must be shown to the HIA Inquiry. I understand from my staff this has been done.
6. I confirm that I also directed that such of that material as the HIA Inquiry considered necessary to be put in the public domain in order for the HIA Inquiry to properly complete its work has been made available to the HIA Inquiry in a form that will allow that to happen. I understand from my staff that the documents so far requested by the HIA Inquiry have been made available for publication. I further understand that the HIA may make further requests, the Security Service will use its best endeavours to assist.
7. I confirm that I have also directed my nominated officer to provide to the HIA Inquiry with a detailed narrative statement setting out what the Security Service can say about allegations involving it relating to Kincora. I understand from my staff that this has been done.
8. I have directed that my nominated officer will attend the HIA Inquiry to speak to that statement as the HIA Inquiry considers necessary.
9. For operational reasons it is not possible for me to publicly name the nominated officer, however, I have provided the HIA Inquiry with a closed witness statement signed by me which sets out the full identity of the individual. I confirm that the individual is a senior manager within the Security Service with responsibility for investigations in Northern Ireland, who will give evidence on behalf of the Security Service in respect of matters relating to Kincora.
10. I confirm on behalf of the Security Service that it will continue to assist the HIA Inquiry to the best of its ability.

Signed.....



Dated.....

27 May 2016

HIAI (Hart) Inquiry – Security Service Witness Statement

Signed by:

9004

Date:

30 May 2016

Introduction

1. It is impossible in a single document to address the gamut of allegations surrounding the abuse at Kincora Boys' Home. Books have been written which have failed to encompass all of the related issues. This note aims to give a summary of what MI5 files record regarding the main claims relating to MI5's alleged involvement with Kincora; particularly those of **Brian GEMMELL**, a former Army intelligence officer.

2. The first MI5 knew of the allegations about child sexual exploitation at Kincora was when the stories emerged in the media in 1980 and the RUC investigation which led to the conviction of **William McGRATH**, the Kincora housefather, and two others (**Joseph MAINS** and **Raymond SEMPLE**). MI5 research undertaken at the time and subsequently has failed to find any papers to indicate that we had earlier knowledge of such abuse.

William McGRATH and MI5's investigation of Tara

3. It is clear from our examination of internal MI5 correspondence that when the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) investigation into Kincora began in 1980, MI5 had concerns about the security of some of its agents and covert operations, though these matters were unrelated to activities at Kincora itself. Such concerns were legitimate and understandable in the light of the organisation's national security responsibilities. However, MI5 documents also made clear that were police investigations to uncover criminality by any agent being run by MI5, the Service was perfectly content for the law to take its course.

4. Naturally, documents held by MI5 relating to **William McGRATH** have been carefully scrutinised. There is nothing amongst them to indicate that MI5 was aware of, or suspected, his involvement in child sexual exploitation at Kincora or that such abuse was permitted, condoned or encouraged in order to further any MI5 plan.

5. In June 1971, an MI5 Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) reported on a meeting he had attended earlier that month along with a large number of other loyalists. They had all been personally recommended by sponsors to join the Tara Brigade, a putative Loyalist paramilitary organisation. The CHIS reported that the assembly had been addressed by "*a man called McGRATH*" who explained the aims

of the organisation were the "*preparation of an effective defence force against the day when it would be required*". McGRATH "*emphasised that those joining would not be required to undertake offensive action but would be required to carry out drill and a certain amount of intelligence work*". (See MI5 CHIS Report, June 1971.)

6. An MI5 officer filed this intelligence report on a new file created for "The Tara Brigade". The officer also sent a copy of the report to MI5's Director of Intelligence (D of I) and stated that he would pass a copy to an RUC Assistant Chief Constable who was Head of Special Branch. At this point, MI5 did not know Mr McGRATH's first name, nor did they have any report about his alleged homosexuality. In April 1972, MI5 did receive information which stated that Mr McGRATH had been accused of 'assaulting small boys'. MI5 was still unaware at that point of any reporting on McGRATH's homosexuality, although we are very conscious that homosexuality did not – and does not – equate to paedophilia. We cover this accusation below. (See section on **James MILLER – McGRATH, Kincora and media misrepresentation**).

7. In November 1973, the RUC notified MI5 that they had received information that McGRATH was intending to visit Amsterdam at some future date for unknown reasons. The RUC letter included McGRATH's full name and occupation as a Social Worker at Kincora Hostel. Annotations on the RUC letter indicate that MI5 did not hold a file on McGRATH at the time. (See RUC Letter to MI5, June 1973.)

8. A Daily Intelligence Summary issued by the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence in January 1976 included a Comment about McGRATH which mentioned reporting from March 1975 having given his employment as warden of the Kincora Boys' Home. (See DCI Daily Intelligence Summary of 17 January 1976 - Extract.)

DCI Daily Intelligence Summary of 17 January 1976 - Extract

[Note: A crop from the original document will be placed here & the full redacted document in Annex B.]

WILLIAM MCGRATH WAS REPORTED IN MARCH 1975 TO BE WARDEN OF THE KINCORA BOYS HOSTEL. HE HAS PREVIOUS TARA TRACES AND IS SAID ***** TO BE A HOMOSEXUAL. ANOTHER REGULAR AND RELIABLE SOURCE HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT THE UDA, AND ALSO WILLIAM CRAIG, MAY BE AWARE OF THIS TARA / UVF ACTIVITY IN THE ARMS FIELD.

9. In April 1975, MI5 obtained *via* the Army a summary of allegations made to the RUC on an unknown date by Miss Valerie Shaw (PA to Dr Ian Paisley) during an RUC officer's investigation of Tara. Miss Shaw's information included details of

McGRATH and Tara. (See Report received by MI5 in April 1975 – originated 22 March 1975.)

10. In May 1975, MI5 received intelligence from a Merseyside Police Special Branch CHIS about efforts to establish a Tara presence there during 1970-71. Although McGRATH is not named in the report, it is likely that he was the person described as the 'instigator' of the Liverpool company of Tara who was 'strongly suspected' of being a homosexual. (See Merseyside SB Report to MI5 – March 1975.)

11. In April 1976, Robert Fisk published an article mentioning Tara in the *New Statesman*. Fisk claimed that an account of Tara's activity had been "*collated by an intelligence officer at Lisburn*". MI5 ASP Ian Cameron wrote to other MI5 officers about the Tara component of the article which he believed was almost certainly a draft on Tara held in the Army Information Service (AIS) records at HQNI. (See MI5 ASP Letter of 22 April 1976.)

12. Cameron felt that the AIS summary had undoubtedly been drawn from Army intelligence files. ASP noted that Colin WALLACE would have had access to the AIS file and he had little doubt that Wallace had been Fisk's source for the article. ASP attached the relevant AIS record for comparison with Fisk's article.

13. It is likely that Cameron had been able to recognise the similarity because in 1974 the NIO had sought assistance from MI5 in identifying the source of unauthorised disclosures of classified information. These inquiries had encompassed both Colin WALLACE and Robert FISK (see below for Colin WALLACE.).

14. A comparison of the Army Information Service record and the relevant extract of Fisk's article shows a strong resemblance, supporting Cameron's judgement that the latter derived from the former. (See AIS and Fisk extracts below.) A copy of Fisk's full article is provided as **Attachment A.**)

15. In January 1977, MI5 continued to seek information about McGRATH and Tara, enquiring about whether a source who had been able to report on McGRATH in early 1976 would still be able to do so.

16. It was only in May 1977 that MI5 created a permanent file on William McGRATH. Security Service policy requires two criteria to be met before a file may be opened on an individual. First, the individual must be fully identified. Secondly, the individual must meet an official Recording Category which, in the case of William

McGRATH, was on the basis that between 1971 and 1977 he had been an Irish Protestant extremist.

17. Inside MI5's file on McGRATH there is an envelope containing two index cards that at one time would have been used as a working aid to record brief notes about him. The earliest note is based on a report dated 18 April 1973, recording McGRATH as the leader of a 'refurbished' form of the Tara Brigade.

18. Another entry, based on a report dated 13 November 1973, gives his occupation as Boys Hostel warder (*sic*) at Kincora Boys Hostel and also states that he is reported to be homosexual. McGRATH's date of birth is shown citing a report dated 20 January 1976. An entry citing a report dated 13 February 1976 states that he "*has long made a practice of exploiting other peoples sexual deviations*". There is no entry reflecting the April 1972 report about Mr McGRATH having being accused of 'assaulting small boys'. (See Index Card Working Aid Cards 1 & 2 on William McGRATH.)

Brian GEMMELL – MI5 ASP and the Kincora investigation

19. Brian GEMMELL, a former Army intelligence officer, was interviewed by the RUC in relation to the allegations about Kincora. The RUC's intention to interview him was known to the Security Service. (See MI5 Loose Minute 29 June 1982.)

20. It is evident from MI5 documents that the Service was not conducting any intelligence operations linked to Kincora and had no concerns about the police investigations into the abuse at Kincora *per se*. Indeed, one MI5 document made the point that it was important to understand from RUC Special Branch "*how best [Caskey's] attention can be focussed on matters strictly relevant to Kincora...*". (See MI5 Telex of 01 July 1982 – Extracts.)

21. In this section, we consider how RUC Det Supt Caskey became aware of and dealt with MI5 ASP Ian Cameron, and how MI5 tried to reconcile providing what assistance it could to the Kincora investigation while protecting the security of its sensitive intelligence operations in NI.

22. MI5 documents do reveal that MI5 had security concerns that the investigation into Kincora might result in the public exposure of its legitimate intelligence operations in NI. In its efforts to highlight and deal with these concerns, MI5 met a number of key individuals associated in various ways with the Kincora

investigation. These included the RUC Head of Special Branch (HSB) and his Deputy (DHSB); lead Kincora investigators Det Supt George Caskey and Army Special Investigation Branch (SIB) investigator Capt B; the Attorney General (AG) and Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (DPPNI) as well as Sir George Terry himself.

23. We have seen nothing in the MI5 documents (or any other official record) to suggest that MI5 tried to impede or limit the Kincora investigation. MI5's actions to protect its operations whilst providing what assistance it could to the investigation are described below. These include MI5's former ASP, Ian Cameron, providing answers to a set of questions posed by Det Supt Caskey.

24. MI5's security concerns arose in connection with police interviews of Brian GEMMELL, which MI5 feared could stray into areas unrelated to Kincora and might thus place sensitive intelligence operations at risk. In this context, we note that the RUC Deputy Head of Special Branch (DHSB) told MI5 in July 1982 that there would almost certainly be a public inquiry during 1983, adding that Caskey's report would form the basis for the inquiry and might be made available to interested parties. (See MI5 Telex of 02 July 1982 – extracts.)

25. As we shall see later, MI5 discussed these concerns with the Attorney General (AG) and Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (DPPNI).

26. Accordingly, after broaching the subject with HSB and DHSB, some senior MI5 officers in NI met Det Supt Caskey at RUC HQ on 02 July 1982. They briefed Caskey on the existence of MI5's covert agent-running operation in NI, MI5's relationship with GEMMELL and an individual that GEMMELL claimed to have run as an agent. They also informed Caskey of GEMMELL's application to join MI5. (See section **Brian GEMMELL – applications to join the Security Service (MI5)** below).

27. The MI5 officers emphasised to Caskey that their sole concern was to ensure that interviews stayed focused on Kincora and not on any unrelated intelligence matters. Caskey told MI5 that he could do what was required "*without bending any rules*". MI5 emphasised, in turn, that their sole concern was to ensure that intelligence matters were not aired in public. (See MI5 Telex of 02 July 1982 – extracts.)

28. GEMMELL was interviewed by Caskey and Army Capt. B on 16 July 1982.

29. On 19 July 1982, Capt B described the GEMMELL interview to MI5, pointing out that at the start of the interview, Caskey had explained to GEMMELL that he was

primarily interested in GEMMELL's interview with Roy GARLAND in 1975, what he (GEMMELL) had learned and what he did with this information. When making arrangements for the interview, B had advised GEMMELL that he should restrict his comments and answers to Caskey's current investigation (ie Kincora). For the avoidance of doubt, it is clear that there that there was no impediment to GEMMELL speaking about paedophilia either in Kincora or elsewhere or involving others.

30. MI5 documents show that on 20 July 1982, Caskey met with MI5 officers at RUC HQ and read out extracts from GEMMELL's statement. Caskey expressed his intention to obtain the Military Intelligence Source Report (MISR) that GEMMELL said he had written (but which nobody had been able to find) and would want to interview MI5 officer Ian Cameron. MI5 therefore set in motion efforts to discover from Cameron what he did with GEMMELL's information and the MISR.

31. An MI5 lawyer was able to make telephone contact with Cameron, who was about to go abroad, and Cameron's initial responses were passed to an MI5 officer in NI to relay to Caskey. (See MI5 Telex of 23 July 1982)

32. We can see from Cameron's answer to Caskey's Question 9 (see **Attachment C**) that by "*line of enquiry*", Cameron means the allegation that McGRATH was a homosexual.

33. Cameron's recollections were passed to Caskey at a meeting on 04 August 1982. In response, Caskey said that they tied in with what GEMMELL had said, and went on to make a number of other points. These included that he (Caskey) would be prepared to meet MI5's Legal Adviser (LA) and provide a set of questions for Cameron to answer. Caskey said he would accept a written statement drawn up by the LA and Cameron. Caskey also made the "*obvious point*" that it was important to be honest with the DPP. He also made it clear that he had to have a statement from Cameron to complete his enquiry. (See MI5 Telex of 05 August 1982 – Extracts.)

34. Caskey went on to pose 30 questions for Cameron to answer which were set out in an attachment to a letter to the NIO dated 11 October 1982. A copy of Caskey's questions is provided as **Attachment B**.

35. MI5's LA managed to put Caskey's 30 questions to Cameron and recorded his (Cameron) answers in a note dated 03 November 1982. The text of the LA's note is provided as **Attachment C**. For security reasons, Cameron did not answer Caskey's first 5 questions because they related to his sensitive intelligence role and duties in NI and were unrelated to Kincora.

36. MI5's LA sent Cameron's answers to the DCI in NI as an attachment to a letter dated 03 November 1982. We have been unable to determine from our documents whether or not this set of answers was passed to Caskey. It is possible that they were not, perhaps for reasons associated with discussions that MI5's LA had already held with the AG and DPPNI, and the AG's view that Cameron's information would be "*hearsay upon hearsay*". (See below.)

37. Before receiving Caskey's 30 questions, MI5's LA had met with the Attorney General (AG) and the Director of Public Prosecutions for NI (DPPNI) and discussed with them various aspects of the Kincora investigation; in particular, MI5's concerns to protect its legitimate intelligence operations in NI. A copy of the LA's record of this meeting dated 01 October 1982 is provided as **Attachment D**.

38. It is evident from the LA's note that MI5 were not trying to impede the investigation into Kincora, about which it had no information, but were seeking a way to protect its quite proper intelligence operations.

39. The Inquiry may consider it significant that the AG expressed the view any information that Cameron could give would appear to be "*hearsay upon hearsay*". A few days after the MI5 LA's meeting with the AG and DPPNI, the AG's Legal Secretary (AGLS) contacted MI5's LA. The AGLS informed the MI5 LA that the DPPNI's view was that [Caskey's] questions "*did not properly arise on any investigation*", adding that the DPPNI himself had no knowledge of the questions and was not behind them. The DPPNI gave the AGLS to understand that he would not be concerned one way or another whether they were answered. A copy of the MI5 LA's note dated 03 November 1982 recording this conversation is provided as **Attachment E**.

40. MI5's views on this issue, and those of the AG, were also explained to the RUC Chief Constable Sir John Hermon on 11 November 1982 by a senior MI5 officer. The Chief Constable accepted that MI5 were seriously concerned that the intelligence effort could be impaired. He therefore agreed to look into stopping further inquiries into Cameron, while making it clear that his primary concern was to ensure that the RUC handled the inquiry "*in an entirely professional and competent way*". A copy of MI5 Note of 17 November 1982 recording this meeting is provided as **Attachment F**.

41. MI5's security concerns increased when they became aware that Caskey was interviewing Army intelligence officers overseas. It was judged that these posed further potential dangers to MI5 intelligence activities that were entirely unrelated to Kincora. This led to a meeting on 27 January 1983 between MI5's LA, Sir George

Terry and the latter's Staff Officer, DCI Flenley. The MI5 LA's record of their discussion dated 03 February 1983 is provided as **Attachment G**.

42. The LA described to Sir George Terry in detail the background to the Service's dealings with RUC Det Supt Caskey around Brian GEMMELL's claims; Caskey's attempts to interview ASP/Ian Cameron; MI5's security concerns and their meetings with the RUC Chief Constable, DPPNI and AG.

43. The note records that Sir George Terry expressed amazement that none of this had been reported to him by the RUC CC. DCI Flenley remarked that Caskey had been influenced by the fact that the prosecution of William McGRATH *et al* had been stimulated by press allegations, and now the press had made similar allegations about the involvement of civil servants and an Army cover-up. Caskey, he said, did not wish to appear before any judicial enquiry without having conducted a full investigation. Caskey had been informed by press sources that Colin WALLACE had told them years ago about "*homosexual goings on*" at Kincora. Apart from this, said Flenley, there was no actual evidence to establish the involvement of civil servants or any Army cover-up.

44. We are aware of criticism that Cameron was never subjected to a formal police interview and never answered questions to which Caskey wanted answers. It is clear from MI5's papers that Caskey was given Cameron's initial reply and he (Cameron) later responded to the detailed questions. And our records show that such an interview would have been of little value in any event given multiple hearsay, as well as presenting a risk to MI5's legitimate operations in NI.

Brian GEMMELL – confusion / conflation of cases

45. Cameron told an MI5 lawyer that he could not recall telling GEMMELL to break off contact [with GARLAND]. (See MI5 Telex of 23 July 1982.) This issue also seems to arise in Caskey's Questions 9 and 10 in November 1982, where Caskey cited GEMMELL's assertion that Cameron had told him to terminate his (GEMMELL) enquires concerning Tara (presumably relating to GARLAND) and later reversed this decision. In his response, Cameron expressed uncertainty about what the police were getting at. (See Attachment B: MI5/Cameron's Answers to Caskey.)

46. It is clear that GEMMELL had confused and conflated two individuals and the circumstances of each. We explain further below how MI5 records show that in April 1975 Cameron had indeed told GEMMELL that he should not pursue the issue of sexual deviancy when he conducting his interview with GARLAND. (See MI5 Telex of 19/20 July 1982 – extract in Brian GEMMELL - the 'missing' MISR below.)

47. However, in June 1975, Cameron did advise GEMMELL to restrict his contact with a different individual – not GARLAND. This advice was given purely on security grounds and was totally unrelated to Kincora. (See MI5/Cameron Note for File of 9 June 1975.)

Extract of MI5/Cameron Note for File of 9 June 1975

[Note: A crop from the original document will be placed here & the full redacted document in an Annex.]

I saw Capt Gemmell on the morning of 9 June in connection with his contacts with [REDACTED]. Gemmel will be sending us a complete report. From what he told me I concluded that we could be running into troubled waters. [REDACTED] while giving little if any real account away on his side is now beginning to ask Gemmel awkward questions. Moreover it is clear that there is a deal of gossip about Army contacts going on within Loyalist circles, [REDACTED]. I told Gemmel that he should try to get the contact gradually on to a purely social basis and when he could decently do so – to back off altogether. He expressed himself as being relieved [REDACTED].

48. MI5 records also show that later in 1975 GEMMELL told Cameron that this individual (not GARLAND) had obtained some valuable intelligence, whereupon Cameron approved renewed contact.

Brian GEMMELL – applications to join the Security Service (MI5)

49. Security Service records show that Brian GEMMELL unsuccessfully sought employment with the Service on two occasions. The first was in 1971 whilst still a student at Strathclyde University. On that occasion, he was advised that the Service preferred its officers first to have gained some experience in another form of employment. (See MI5 Note For File 25 February 1971.)

50. GEMMELL re-applied to join the Security Service in 1976 after leaving the Army but was rejected. (See MI5 Note for File for 26 November 1976.)

Brian GEMMELL – the ‘missing’ MISR

51. This section focuses on Brian GEMMELL’s allegation that, in his role as an Army Intelligence Officer, he had run CHIS who reported to him on McGRATH’s abuse of the boys at Kincora. GEMMELL publicly named his sources as **William McCORMICK, Roy GARLAND and James MILLER**. Despite extensive searches of

MI5's records, we have been unable to confirm GEMMELL's claims that he (GEMMELL) reported these allegations to MI5 ASP Ian Cameron.

52. In July 1982 an MI5 officer conducting research to assist with police inquiries into Kincora, reported finding in an Northern Ireland file a record of GEMMELL's interview with McCORMICK on 25 March 1975. The same MI5 officer wrote that GEMMELL and an Army colleague had been told on 04 April 1975 by ASP/Cameron and another MI5 officer that they could interview GARLAND on the strict understanding that it was to obtain information on Tara. The two MI5 officers emphasised that the Army had no interest in the investigation of "*deviant sexual activities or religious aspects of the group*" which was a matter for the RUC. Cameron had directed that their discussion with GARLAND should be steered away from this type of issue, by which we presume he meant homosexuality. (See MI5 Telex of 19/20 July 1982 - extract.)

53. We have confirmed that the NI local file seen by the MI5 officer which had contained GEMMELL's McCORMICK interview report has since been destroyed on an unknown date. The file in question did not relate to McCORMICK who, as far as we can tell, was never the subject of an MI5 file. GEMMELL's interview report has not been found elsewhere during any of the subsequent searches of MI5's records.

MI5 Telex of 19/20 July 1982 – extract
[VCSP: Will be crop of original in final version.]

GEMMELL's INTERVIEW WITH MCCORMICK ON 25 MARCH 1975 (WHICH INCLUDED A REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO APPROACH GARLAND) IS FILED ON [REDACTED] PF. RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST [REDACTED] WROTE A NOTE FOR FILE RECORDING THAT GEMMELL AND [REDACTED] WERE TOLD ON 4 APRIL 1975 BY ASP AND [REDACTED] THAT QUOTE IT WAS IN ORDER FOR GARLAND TO BE INTERVIEWED ON THE STRICT UNDSANDING THAT THE OVERT AND CLEARLY EXPRESSED REASON WAS A REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION ON TARA. IT WAS EMPHASISED THAT THE ARMY HAD NO INTEREST IN INVESTIGATION OF DEVIANT SEXUAL ACTIVITIES OR RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE GROUP WHICH WAS SOLELY THE FUNCTION OF A SPECIALIST SECTION OF THE RUC. THEREFORE THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD BE STEERED AWAY FROM THIS TYPE OF ISSUE.

54. Although GEMMELL claimed subsequently to have written a MISR (Military Intelligence Source Report) on this topic, we have been unable to find one in MI5's records during extensive searches conducted for the HIAI. Earlier efforts have also been unsuccessful, including those conducted by an MI5 officer in 1982. However, MI5 records do contain an Army letter written in January 1976 not by Captain GEMMELL, but by Army Major A, which we judge to be of some relevance and

discuss further below. A copy of Maj A's Letter Ref: 13912/2 is provided as **Attachment H**.

55. According to an MI5 officer's telex dated 31 January 1977, the Major's letter was amongst a number of papers that GEMMELL had given to him (the MI5 officer) on 15 October 1976. (See MI5 Telex of 31 January 1977: 'William McGATH (sic) and TARA'.)

56. According to a letter written by the same MI5 officer on 19 October 1976, GEMMELL also gave him two other documents. The first was described as "notes on an interview with Roy GARLAND which had been made by GEMMELL and an NCO after a "one off" debrief sanctioned by Ian CAMERON. A copy of the GARLAND interview notes is provided as Attachment H-2.

57. The GEMMELL/NCO debriefing notes on GARLAND open with the latter stating that he had been introduced to McGRATH twenty years earlier at the 'approximate' age of 15, in the context of a Christian evangelical crusade, and how at McGRATH's instigation, they formed "groups called cell". In the next paragraph, GARLAND – having now moved on to discussing Tara - described how McGRATH would single them out after meetings and attempt to seduce them and make them feel guilty by admitting to masturbation and showing up their guilt complex. GARLAND said this was important to emphasise as this was "*the very beginning of [McGRATH's] hold on them*".

58. The second document GEMMELL handed to the MI5 officer was a Note to File about Tara dated 14 October 1976 and notes on an interview. GEMMELL's Note to File made no mention of Kincora or paedophilia. (See MI5 Letter of 19 October 1976: 'TARA'.) A copy of GEMMELL's Note to File on TARA is provided as **Attachment I**.

59. The Note to File on Tara is unsigned, but according to the MI5 covering letter, it had been written by GEMMELL himself and was based on the contents of his (GEMMELL) file on Tara. (See MI5 Letter of 19 October 1976: 'TARA'.) We have seen nothing to cause us to doubt the veracity of this statement.

60. The references in the opening two paragraphs of the GARLAND debriefing note to him a) being aged approximately 15 when he was introduced to McGRATH, and b) McGRATH attempting to 'seduce' youngsters, may appear significant in hindsight. But it is unlikely that the MI5 officers at the time would have attributed

much significance to them at the time. We should bear a number of factors in mind, not least that in reality, 10 years were to pass between these two events.

61. The background references on GARLAND was marginal to the matter then under discussion between MI5 and the Army – which was in the context of a different case entirely unrelated to GARLAND and Kincora. But in relation to the 'seduction' issue, we note that Paragraph 6 of Maj A's letter of 28 January 1976 states that McGRATH "[made] a practice of seducing promising young men". However, unlike GEMMELL's interview note, the A letter goes on to identify two of those who were seduced. It would be inappropriate to name them here, but both of them were clearly adults.

62. This is consistent with what Mr GARLAND later wrote in the *Irish Times* on 13 April 1982. GARLAND explained how in 1965 McGRATH invited him to join 'cell', at which point GARLAND would have been about 25 years old. GARLAND described 'cell' as "a private ginger group of Orangemen chaired by a Church of Ireland minister". He further explains that "members of District, County and Grand Orange Lodges took part". He makes no reference to any involvement of young boys. A copy of GARLAND's *Irish Times* article is provided as **Attachment I-2**].

63. Although this level of detail is not provided in the GARLAND debriefing note written by GEMMELL and the NCO, if their note had been consistent with GARLAND's later public account, and had it been related to MI5, it is unlikely that they would have drawn any inference of paedophilia or child sexual exploitation from it.

64. In addition, GEMMELL's letter of 12 February 1976 had described the smears and propaganda of the time involving allegations of homosexuality. Separately, MI5 had already been informed in March 1975, via the Army, that GARLAND's complaints about McGRATH's behaviour to Valerie Shaw had been relayed by her to the RUC, although the letter itself lacked detail about the nature of the behaviour.

65. We are also aware that the *Irish Times* published an article about Kincora on 03 November 1983 in which they reported what they had been told by a man "well known in Belfast Protestant evangelical circles". This unidentified man was clearly Mr McCORMICK. He reportedly told the newspaper that he first heard about McGRATH and his job at Kincora in the early 1970s from Roy GARLAND, whom he described as "a former associate of McGrath's who was attempting to expose his homosexual activities". McCORMICK also said that he (McCORMICK) had first put GARLAND in touch with an RUC constable whom he knew as a devout Christian in

1972 or 1973. A copy of the *Irish Times* article of 3 November 1983 is provided as **Attachment I-3**.

66. If what McCORMICK told the *Irish Times* had been known to MI5, whether from GEMMELL's note of his debriefing of McCORMICK (which we have not been able to find) or through discussion with GEMMELL himself, MI5 might reasonably have assumed that any allegations by either McCORMICK or GARLAND against McGRATH were not just dated but were already known to the RUC. However, such allegations may still have constituted part of a smear exercise.

67. The only part of GEMMELL's Note to File of 14 October 1976 on Tara which touches on the issue of McGRATH's sexual proclivities comes in his Paragraph 4 where he wrote that a number members of Tara were 'sexually deviant', McGRATH was almost certainly bisexual and had homosexuals amongst his immediate circle of Tara associates. (See GEMMELL Note to File of 14 October 1976: 'TARA'.)

68. Major A's letter was found by an MI5 officer in 1989 whilst reviewing some Army records at the request of the MOD. The Major's letter reported information from three unnamed contacts about Tara and its membership. It stated *inter alia* that McGRATH was "a homosexual" and "made a practice of seducing promising young men". It added that he was described in the 'Belfast Street Directory' as a Welfare Officer and was "thought to be running some form of boys' home".

69. The MI5 officer who found the letter noted that in April 1975 GEMMELL had been given clearance by the Army to interview Roy GARLAND. And while the MI5 officer said that it was not clear exactly what information had been derived from the GARLAND interview, he judged it reasonable to suppose that the Major's letter from January 1976 was in part based upon it. We would agree with that judgement.

70. Although no copy of GEMMELL's alleged MISR has been found, it is likely that its essential content would have been the same as that found in the Major A's letter, perhaps combined with the information in GEMMELL's later Note to File of 14 October 1976. (See **Attachment I**.) We should also bear in mind that any decision on issuing a MISR, based on the content of the Major's letter at least, would have taken into account the 'F' grading given at his Paragraph 2, which indicates that the reliability of the source(s) of the intelligence was unknown.

71. Whether GEMMELL ever did produce a MISR or not, it is notable that his October 1976 Note, based on his Tara file and written at the end of his Army career, made no mention of McGRATH's involvement in paedophilia or his employment at Kincora Boys' Home.

Brian GEMMELL – allegations about MI5 blackmail

72. There have been a number of allegations about MI5 having blackmailed McGRATH or others involved in a paedophile ring involving Kincora. We have seen absolutely nothing in the Security Service records to support any of these allegations.

73. We are also aware of a separate allegation by Brian GEMMELL that during a visit to London in 1976, an MI5 officer told him that MI5 had film of John McKEAGUE, a well-known Loyalist paramilitary figure, involved in homosexual activities and asked for his (GEMMELL) views on how susceptible McKEAGUE would be to blackmail.

74. We have examined this allegation and established that MI5 had no compromising film of McKEAGUE and never made any attempt to blackmail him. However, one MI5 officer did put forward an operational proposal (which was never endorsed) which involved using McKEAGUE's homosexual activities in London in an attempt to recruit him. We describe the chronology of events below.

75. The MI5 records confirm that GEMMELL met two MI5 officers in London on 10 May 1976 in connection with the handling of an agent unrelated to McKEAGUE.

76. In June 1976 McKEAGUE visited London as part of a UVF arms procurement operation. At various times during his trip, he was under surveillance by MI5 who suspected the UVF's plans. The MI5 officers conducting surveillance of McKEAGUE did take some photographs of him in Central London. However, the photographs were not compromising or sexual in nature. All of them were taken in public areas, but some showed him in the company of young men.

77. It was apparent to those conducting surveillance that McKEAGUE's contact with these young men was to establish homosexual assignations rather than part of the Loyalist arms procurement operation.

78. On 07 September 1976 GEMMELL had lunch in London with an MI5 officer, following which he (GEMMELL) was to attend a formal meeting with another MI5 officer as part of his application to join MI5. No formal record of the lunchtime meeting exists. It is clear from MI5 records, however, that the meeting was held at the request of the MI5 officer who, having become aware of GEMMELL's intention to visit to London, wished to seize the opportunity to discuss with him how to move forward an existing CHIS case of which GEMMELL was aware, but which was unrelated to McKEAGUE.

79. It was not until November 1976 that this same MI5 officer suggested, in light of McKEAGUE's involvement in arms procurement, that "*serious consideration should be given to using [his] homosexual tendencies in an attempt to recruit him*". The MI5 officer accepted that McKEAGUE's colleagues already knew him to be a homosexual, but he doubted that they were aware of how McKEAGUE spent his time when visiting London. The MI5 officer also judged that McKEAGUE's conduct after returning to Belfast in June 1976 following his arms procurement visit to GB had all the indications of someone who was anxious to conceal his homosexual activities in London.

80. The MI5 officer's proposal was considered by other members of the Service including management. This ploy was, however, opposed for a variety of reasons and it was pointed out that MI5's Legal Adviser doubted that MI5's management would accept such a proposal.

81. Based on MI5's contemporaneous papers, the officer's intention would probably have been to exploit what McKEAGUE - as well as his terrorist associates - would have regarded as insecure conduct in London: picking up young men whilst engaged in a covert arms procurement operation. It is clear that MI5 knew that McKEAGUE's homosexuality was recognised by his associates in NI, and he was therefore not susceptible to pressure on that account. In other words, any pressure felt by McKEAGUE would not have been in relation to his homosexuality *per se* but to his lax tradecraft and consequential threat to the success of their arms procurement operation and those involved. As we have already indicated, MI5 neither took nor possessed any compromising photographs.

James MILLER – McGRATH, Kincora and media misrepresentation

82. There have been a number of claims that James MILLER was a CHIS and that he reported to his handlers on Kincora. Brian GEMMELL has claimed to have been one of MILLER's handlers.

83. Arguably, the most public of the allegations about MILLER came to light in March 1987. On 22 March 1987 the *Sunday Times* reported a number of MILLER's claims about work he had undertaken for MI5. These mostly related to the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike. However, on 23 March 1987 the *Irish Times* reported that the Army had asked MILLER to infiltrate Tara and compile information on William McGRATH; which he allegedly did in 1970, a year before McGRATH became warden at Kincora. The article also stated that MILLER would not say if the information he compiled related to McGRATH's "*homosexual or paedophilic activities*". The *Sunday Times* published a more detailed article about MILLER on 29 March 1987;

including the claim that the intelligence services had known about the activities at Kincora for a number of years. Copies of these articles are provided as **Attachments J, K and L.**

84. As a matter of government policy, MI5 can neither confirm nor deny publicly whether a particular individual was a CHIS. However, we are able to make a number of assertions about MILLER with confidence.

85. Following the publication of the *Sunday Times* articles in March 1987, an aggrieved MILLER made contact with government officials to make a number of claims. A note of his phone call was passed to the Cabinet Office at the time. (See Note to Cabinet Office of 30 March 1987.)

86. As a consequence, two officials interviewed MILLER about his various concerns in early April 1987. The record of this meeting states that MILLER said his only motive in talking to the Press had been to "*set the record straight about Colin WALLACE, whom he believed had betrayed British secrets to the UDA*". MILLER added that the journalists had ignored his information about WALLACE, instead they used his (MILLER) name to lend weight to their own inventions about MI5. He said the statements attributed to him that were published in the two *Sunday Times* articles were "*a mixture of pure fiction and gross distortion*".

87. We provide a number of relevant extracts from the interviewers' Official Minute which we judge to be significant. (See Extracts A-D from Official Minute of 06 April 1987 re interview with MILLER.) These touch on MILLER's claim of false representation in the *Sunday Times* articles and, significantly, his specific comments about what he is alleged to have told the journalists about Kincora (**Extract D** refers).

88. It seems clear from what MILLER told the officials that he had no information of any abuse being carried out at Kincora, no knowledge of McGRATH's paedophilia and no knowledge of his employment at Kincora Boys' Home. The account provided privately to officials by MILLER differs dramatically from what was published by journalists Clarke and Penrose.

89. Despite extensive searches of papers we have been able to find only a single document which provides any support to the allegation published in *the Sunday Times* article of 29 March 1987.

90. We located a letter written by Mr MILLER dated 07 April 1972 in which he reported having been told by an associate that the Tara Commanding Officer, whose

name was given as McGRATH, "*had been accused of assaulting small boys*". (See Mr MILLER's Letter of 07 April 1972 – Extracts.)

91. However, Mr MILLER did not provide McGRATH's first name. He did not indicate anything about McGRATH's sexuality or employment, and he did not expand on what was meant by 'assaulting'. Part of Mr MILLER's letter was reproduced almost verbatim in an MI5 report about 'Extreme Protestants'. The author of the MI5 document included the comment that reliability of the person who told MILLER about the accusation was "*open to doubt*". (See MI5 Report of 11 April 1972.)

92. We believe the MI5 officer would have taken into account a number of factors when assessing the information in Mr MILLER's letter at the time. These would probably have included, for example: when had the accusations had been made; by whom were the accusations made (by victims, police or others); against whom were the allegations had been made (the leader of Tara Mr McGRATH was not yet fully unidentified); when had the alleged assaults taken place (recently or in the past) and what kind of 'assault' had been carried out: physical (eg slap/punch) or sexual (or even 'verbal'). And at this point there had been no allegation about Mr McGRATH's homosexuality, although had there been any, the MI5 officer would have recognised that homosexuality did not – and does not – equate to paedophilia.

93. At the time that Mr MILLER's letter was passed to MI5 in April 1972, the Service was still uncertain about the identity of the Mr McGRATH who was the CO of Tara. Even his forename was in doubt. It was an RUC letter of 22 November 1973 that provided McGRATH's full name, Date of Birth and gave his occupation as 'Social Worker' at Kincora Hostel.

94. Also, we ought not to assume that 'assault' would have been interpreted at the time by the MI5 officer who read Mr MILLER's letter, or by anyone who read it, as being of a sexual type. McGRATH was, after all, running a paramilitary organisation, and physical abuse or rough handling of young recruits might have been anticipated. For example, MI5 CHIS reporting about the UDA prior to 08 July 1972 stated that there was "*a very bullying attitude by the leadership towards the rank and file*" which was not well received. In this context, we should also bear in mind that Loyalist paramilitaries, like their Republican counterparts, used youngsters in their cause.

95. The MI5 officer who drafted the April 1972 report did not give their reason for assessing the sub-source's reliability as "*open to doubt*". It may be that the officer based his judgement on information obtained from elsewhere, including discussions with others (eg Army intelligence and RUC SB officers). However, we do know that in October 1971 MI5 had reporting that there was some 'discord' within Tara, some of

whose members appear to have been defaming or insulting each other and McGRATH.

96. We should note too that the MI5 officers' focus in NI at that time would have been to obtain strategic intelligence on paramilitary capabilities, activities and intentions. The accusations against an as-yet unidentified McGRATH as reported in the 1972 letter would not have been passed to the police not just due to the factors we referred to above, and also because it could be judged to fall below the intelligence threshold. It was a generalised assertion and insufficiently robust. The MI5 judgement on Mr MILLER's letter would have been made at a particularly challenging time for the Security Forces. Terrorists had killed 180 people during 1971, and in 1972 up to the date of this letter they had already killed some 50 people. Therefore an accusation of dubious provenance about an unidentified person and ambiguous interpretation may well have been considered simply not to meet the threshold for dissemination.

97. MI5 did pass some of its reports, in whole or in part, to RUC HSB. However, this was somewhat discretionary and it is not possible to tell from MI5's 'Extreme Protestants' report whether or not RUC HSB was told about the accusation against McGRATH. Nor can we tell whether or not the RUC had received a copy of Mr MILLER's letter, which would have enabled them to form their own judgement.

98. So while the accusation made against the McGRATH cited in Mr MILLER's letter may be judged to be of some significance in hindsight, we are satisfied that it was not actionable.

99. We are also aware that MILLER's claim of misrepresentation by the journalists may appear to be undermined by a 15 July 2014 article by Liam CLARKE. CLARKE recalls his 1987 interview with MILLER and alleges that MI5 had paid-off MILLER so that he would stay silent about what he (and thus, allegedly, MI5) knew about Kincora. MILLER had reportedly spoken to CLARKE before his handlers made his financial problems 'disappear' to shut him up. MILLER allegedly told CLARKE that: he was to penetrate Tara for MI5; gave MI5 a dossier on Tara/McGRATH and was promptly told to leave Tara and "*leave McGRATH to us*", which MILLER assumed meant that his information on McGRATH's sexuality was used to recruit him. A copy of Liam CLARKE's article is provided as **Attachment M**.

100. MI5's records do not substantiate Liam CLARKE's allegation of MI5 paying off MILLER or anyone else to remain silent about Kincora or child abuse. There is nothing at all in MI5's records to suggest that MILLER ever had any knowledge of Kincora or child sexual exploitation that might have been taking place there.

Colin WALLACE – allegations by

101. Colin WALLACE has made many allegations about Kincora. We do not propose to address them in detail in this Witness Statement. We have seen nothing during the extensive searches of MI5's records to indicate that WALLACE had any involvement with or knowledge of any MI5 operation in Northern Ireland or elsewhere.

102. We are satisfied that at no time did WALLACE have any formal relationship, with MI5 or its staff. We cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that he may have encountered members of MI5 in their cover roles, on social occasions, for example.

103. The HIA Inquiry has been provided with a copy of the December 1989 Rucker Report on the WALLACE Case and its supplementary of March 1990. The Rucker Report includes MI5's responses to the wide-ranging issues raised by WALLACE.

Sir Maurice Oldfield

104. Sir Maurice Oldfield has been the subject of a number of serious allegations. These issues would have been of considerable significance during the inquiries conducted as part of his vetting. We have seen nothing amongst MI5 or MI6 papers to support these allegations.

105. Sir Maurice OLDFIELD was born in 1915. He served in the British Army between 1940 and 1947 and then joined the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). OLDFIELD was appointed Chief of SIS in 1973. He retired from SIS on 31 January 1978, taking up a Visiting Fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford, for the academic year 1978-79. OLDFIELD was appointed by the Northern Ireland Office as Northern Ireland Security Co-ordinator (NISC), based in Belfast, on 2 October 1979.

106. In early 1980, the Cabinet Office became aware of allegations that OLDFIELD might be homosexual. Homosexuality was viewed as a security vulnerability at the time, and consequently in March 1980 the Cabinet Office informed MI5 of the allegations and asked MI5 to review OLDFIELD's Positive Vetting. During the course of this review OLDFIELD admitted that he had engaged in homosexual activity over a number of years and that he had failed to declare this during

previous vetting interviews. As a result, MI5 concluded that OLDFIELD was unfit to hold Positive Vetting. OLDFIELD formally left the NISC post in June 1980.

107. Following the vetting review, MI5 undertook a thorough investigation in order to ascertain whether OLDFIELD's homosexuality may have been used to compromise him in a way which damaged national security at any point during his career. This investigation included several exhaustive interviews with OLDFIELD and with various contacts of OLDFIELD. The investigation concluded in February 1981 that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that national security had been compromised, and indeed that OLDFIELD had contributed notably to a number of security and intelligence successes which would not have been achieved had there been a breach of security. (Several years later, on 23 April 1987, the Prime Minister made a public statement to this effect, following the publication of a book revealing OLDFIELD's homosexuality.)
108. This vetting review and the subsequent investigation had no relation whatsoever to Kincora Boys Home. No mention of Kincora arose at any point during this process.
109. OLDFIELD died in London on 11 March 1981.
110. In January 1982 (after the above investigation had concluded and after OLDFIELD died) MI5 became aware of allegations by journalists linking OLDFIELD to alleged child abuse at Kincora Boys Home. The relevant media reports did not provide any basis for the allegations.
111. MI5 and the Cabinet Office concluded that the allegations were inherently unlikely because SIS records indicated that OLDFIELD had never travelled to Northern Ireland during his time at SIS (i.e. before October 1979) and because OLDFIELD was accompanied at all times by a police protection officer during his trips as NISC and would not have been left alone for any appreciable time.
112. In March 1982, MI5 became aware of an allegation in an Irish newspaper that OLDFIELD had conducted an investigation into allegations of child abuse at Kincora but had decided to take no further action. Again no basis was provided for this allegation. MI5 concluded that this was undoubtedly incorrect.
113. In February 1983, SIS was informed that a former SIS officer had claimed to an associate that the reason for the termination of OLDFIELD's position as NISC

was that there was evidence of OLDFIELD having engaged in homosexual activity with children during his time in Northern Ireland. This former officer had retired from SIS in the early 1970s and had no current access to SIS or Cabinet Office information. Furthermore, the specific claim was known to be false: MI5 recommended that OLDFIELD's Positive Vetting be revoked due to his homosexuality.

114. MI5 and the Cabinet Office concluded that the allegations linking OLDFIELD to Kincora were entirely unsubstantiated.

Personal Details

115. I am a Deputy Director of MI5. I have been a member of MI5 for 24 years, and have spent the majority of my career in investigative and agent running roles concerned with counter-terrorism. I worked as a London-based desk officer for Northern Irish-related terrorism investigations between 1994 and 1997, before moving into an agent running role concerned with international counter-terrorism. Following the July 2005 bombings I worked in international counter-terrorism roles until 2013. Since late 2014 I have been posted to the Service's Northern Ireland HQ in Palace Barracks as the officer in charge of MI5's Northern Irish-related counter-terrorist investigations and assessments work.

116. I have signed this statement with the personal identification number 9004. This is a unique number issued to me by MI5 for the purposes of identifying myself without disclosing my full identity. This is a necessary practice for security reasons, and the only publicly named individual within MI5 is the Director General. Records held by MI5 link my true identity to my personal identification number.

Some Background on MI5 in Northern Ireland

117. Since 2007, MI5 has had lead responsibility for counter-terrorist intelligence work in Northern Ireland, in close co-operation with PSNI. However, during the 1970s MI5's presence was much smaller. MI5 had a single liaison officer attached to the RUC in 1969. Following the imposition of Direct Rule in 1972 the post of 'Director and Coordinator of Intelligence' (DCI) was created within the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) at Stormont. Whilst the first incumbent of the DCI post was not from MI5, every subsequent post-holder was seconded from MI5 to

the NIO. DCIs never directed intelligence operations in Northern Ireland, but acted as the Secretary of State's main advisor on intelligence matters, and sought to provide strategic coordination of the intelligence effort. DCI also established an analytical staff comprised of seconded MI5 personnel who were responsible for the production of strategic intelligence summaries and assessments.

118. DCI also had senior liaison officers at RUC HQ and Army HQ Lisburn. This latter post was known as the Assistant Secretary (Political), or ASP. In the early 1970s, one of the functions of the ASP post was to provide some guidance for the Army's nascent efforts in gathering intelligence from human sources in a civil conflict. This was prior to the establishment of the Forces Research Unit (FRU) in 1982, after which the ASP role became less hands on and more advisory in nature.
119. Another related unit set up in 1972, although not under the direct control of DCI, was the Irish Joint Section comprising a small number of Security Service and SIS agent running officers focused on obtaining strategic and political intelligence about the plans and intentions of paramilitary organisations.

Annex A - Disclosure process

1. The preparation of this witness statement has followed a painstaking disclosure process conducted by MI5, the detail of which is set out below.

2. In November 2014 MI5 received a letter from the Northern Ireland Office containing a list of search terms provided by the Historical and Institutional Abuse inquiry. Those search terms were:

Bawnmore	Palmerstone
Bernados	Rathgael
Ravelstone Parade	Raymond Semple
"Boys Home" and abuse	Rubane
Brian Gemmell	TARA
"Child abuse" and "Northern Ireland"	Valetta
Colin Wallace	William McGrath
Hughes inquiry	Williamson House
Institutional abuse	Manor House, Lisburn
James McGuigan	Roy Garland
Joseph Mains	James Miller
Richard Kerr	John McKeague
Kincora	
Mike Taylor	

3. In addition, and with the agreement of the HIAI, MI5 conducted further targeted searches for information known to be of potential relevance. The product from these searches has been provided in a file list provided separately to the HIAI.

4. I confirm that to the best of my knowledge and belief that the file list is an accurate record of the documents produced as a result of these searches and revealed to the HIAI. I cannot provide further detail of the content of the files in this statement because of the damage that disclosure would cause to MI5's ability to protect the public from threats to national security.

5. The searches outlined at paragraphs 2 and 3 above produced many thousands of documents. The detail of these results has been supplied separately to the Inquiry and is not part of this statement as disclosure of the information would damage MI5's ability to protect the public from threats to national security. MI5 agreed with the HIAI that the HIAI would review the documents for relevance prior to their disclosure to the HIAI. The HIAI conducted this task and identified documents of relevance to its Inquiry.

6. MI5 then reviewed the documents identified as relevant by the HIAI and considered whether they contained information which, if disclosed, would damage the MI5's ability to protect the public from threats to national security. MI5 then removed from the documents information assessed to be damaging to national security.

7. The documents identified as being relevant are attached to this witness statement.

8. I am satisfied that the disclosure exercise conducted by experienced MI5 disclosure officers, researchers and lawyers has been conducted thoroughly, and to the best of my knowledge and belief all potentially relevant information was provided

to the inquiry for the purpose of the review it conducted which is described at paragraph 4.

THE HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE INQUIRY

WITNESS STATEMENT OF JONATHAN DUKE-EVANS

My name is Jonathan Duke-Evans and I hold the post of Head of Public Inquiries, Claims, and Judicial Reviews in the Ministry of Defence. I have held this post for about eight years although its title and responsibilities have changed over that period. In this witness statement I set out the information available to me on a number of matters which I know to be germane to the work of the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry as it relates to events at the Kincora Boys' Home. I believe all statements made in this deposition to be true.

2. I am aware of no person now serving in the Ministry of Defence who has first-hand knowledge of the events in question. In or about 1989 the Ministry of Defence attempted to assess the truth of the allegations made by Colin Wallace relating to Kincora and other matters by commissioning a report by a civil servant, Mr A G Rucker, who had the benefit of access to the findings of four police investigations into these allegations. His report was completed in December 1989 and was followed by a supplementary report written by him in March 1990, both of which have been made available to the Inquiry. The "Rucker Report" must be taken as representing the Department's current view as to the matters which it covers.

3. Mr Rucker summarised Mr Wallace's allegations about Kincora at paragraph 2 and again at paragraph 336 of his report. In brief, Mr Wallace claimed that in 1972 he had been told that there had been sexual assaults against boys at Kincora, and that the activities of Mr William McGrath, an influential Unionist who was also a homosexual, gave particular cause for concern; that his recommendation to military colleagues that this information had been passed to the police had not been acted upon; and that these allegations against Mr McGrath featured prominently in a secret publicity initiative in 1974 known as "Clockwork Orange 2", involving publication of a mixture of true and untrue information designed to denigrate leaders of extremist organisations in Northern Ireland and others.

4. It is accepted by the Ministry of Defence, on the basis of Mr Rucker's findings and the documentation identified by him, that members of the Armed Forces in Northern Ireland knew in 1972 that Mr McGrath was homosexual. Having carried out extensive reviews of the material the Ministry of Defence has found no evidence that any member of the Armed Forces (or indeed any other person employed by the Ministry of Defence) was aware of allegations that Mr McGrath had abused or been responsible for abuse of inmates at Kincora, and it follows from this that it is not accepted that any such person withheld any such information from the police or sought to use it in any propaganda operation. .

5. Against this background I have been asked to address a number of specific issues by the Inquiry. First, I am asked how the Ministry of Defence accounts for the absence from its archives of a memorandum which Mr Wallace claimed to have written on 8 November 1974 about the failure by the RUC and the Belfast Corporation Welfare Department to take any action on the Kincora allegations. It is the Ministry of Defence's view, expressed in a letter from Lord Trefgarne, the then Minister of State, to the Rt Hon Peter Archer of 15 April 1986, that the document is not authentic and that no such memorandum was filed. Lord Trefgarne cites in support of this view an RUC investigation of its authenticity following the publication of a transcript in the *Irish Times* in 1985, and in particular "some forensic evidence that suggested that at least one page had been tampered with".

6. Second, I am asked whether the Ministry of Defence accepts Mr Wallace's allegation that he was removed from his job in Northern Ireland as part of an effort to cover up his allegations relating to Kincora and the failure to act upon them. The Ministry of Defence considers the allegations disproved by the conclusions of the Civil Service Appeals Board on 31 October 1975 that Mr Wallace had been properly removed from his job because he had been responsible for the mishandling of sensitive official information. This process is extensively documented in Parts IV and V of the main Rucker Report.

7. Third, I am asked what view the Ministry of Defence takes of the five documents originating from Captain Brian Gemmell indicating that he had been told by Roy Garland that William McGrath was a homosexual and worked in Kincora

Boys Home. As I have already indicated, the Department accepts that members of its staff knew this. The Ministry of Defence can however find no evidence that any member of its staff knew that Mr McGrath was responsible for sexual assaults upon the inmates of the Boys' Home.

8. Fourth, I am asked what significance the Ministry of Defence attaches to the document written by a named officer on 26 February 1975, which implies he had met with Mr McGrath and that the possibility of asking him to act as an agent had been considered, in the light of the fact that the officer concerned subsequently stated to the police that he had never met Mr McGrath. The Ministry of Defence is not in a position to take a firm view on this matter, but suggests that it is possible that the officer's memory may have been at fault when he spoke to the police.

9. Fifth, I am asked what the Ministry of Defence did to investigate the allegations made by Mr Wallace. It is of course clear that the responsibility for investigating his allegations of criminality lay with the civil police. The Ministry of Defence was and is however responsible for ensuring that its staff conduct their duties with probity. It sought to discharge this responsibility by commissioning the reports by Mr Rucker to which I have referred earlier. It is on the basis of these reports that I have been able to make the statements as to the Department's position set out in paragraph 4 above.

10. Sixth, I am asked what efforts the Ministry of Defence has made to trace five potentially key witnesses whose importance is attested in the available documents: a civilian who worked with Wallace during the period in question; the Captain who interviewed Captain Brian Gemmell; the Corporal who was present at that interview with Captain Gemmell; the officer who wrote the 1975 document to which I referred in paragraph 8 above; and an officer who was reported to have been working with the Royal Ulster Constabulary and in that capacity to have had access to notes of the interview between Gemmell and Garland referred to in paragraph 7 above.

11. As regards the civilian on the list, I understand that the custodians of the relevant records at the Ministry of Defence are concerned that disclosure of his

address could be contrary to the Data Protection Act. I and my colleagues are urgently seeking a solution to this problem.

12. As regards the military personnel the last known addresses for each have been obtained from military records. In the case of one of the officers this last known address has been verified as being apparently his current address by other recent checks. In the cases of two others, the checks now carried out have not verified the addresses we hold as being current. We have nevertheless written to the last known address for each individual, and in the case of one of them further information has emerged from enquiries with his former Regiment which we hope will make it possible to contact the individual in the near future. As the officer working with the Royal Ulster Constabulary was identified as a person whom the Inquiry wished us to trace at a later stage than the others it has not yet been possible to find a last known address in military records from the limited biographical information available, but continuing efforts to find such an address are being made.

13. By way of conclusion, the Ministry of Defence is aware of no evidence for the suggestion that any of its staff knew of and failed to report sexual crimes against children at the Kincora Boys Home, or sought to blackmail people on the basis of their homosexuality, as has been alleged. It welcomes the scrutiny of these allegations by the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry. It has endeavoured to provide the Inquiry with all assistance and will continue to do so.

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true

SIGNED.....

John Duke-Evans

DATED.....

26 May 2016.

DELICATE SOURCE SECRETD/Sec(NATO/UK)(C)Box 2THE WALLACE CASE

Report by Mr A G Rucker to Sir Michael Quinlan,
Permanent Under Secretary Ministry of Defence

FINAL COMPLETE VERSION

NOTE: This Version contains references to Labour Ministers and comments by the author of this paper.

I. INTRODUCTIONBackground

1(U). Between 1968 and 1975 Mr John Colin Wallace served as an Assistant Information Officer, an Information Officer and finally as a Senior Information Officer at Headquarters Northern Ireland Command (HQNI). His duties embraced both normal Public Relations (PR) work and what was referred to at the time as "Information Policy (IP)". The extent to which IP involved Mr Wallace and his colleagues at HQNI in arranging unattributable press briefings on sensitive matters and in such further functions as "psychological operations (psyops)", "black propaganda", "dirty tricks" or "disinformation" has become a matter of contention. This issue is examined in this paper, as is the organisation in which Mr Wallace worked, his reporting chain and the extent of his discretion. (C) In late 1974 Mr Wallace was suspected of having been responsible for a series of unauthorised leaks to the media and especially to Mr Robert Fisk, the Times correspondent in Northern Ireland; and he was consequently transferred to Headquarters North West District at Preston, although some time he was given a different explanation for his posting.

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(U) Before he left Northern Ireland Mr Wallace was found to have left a RESTRICTED document about Information Policy at Mr Fisk's house, without any authority to do so. After the Attorney-General had decided that he should not be prosecuted, he was informed that he would be dismissed. He appealed to the Civil Service Appeal Board (CSAB), which rejected his appeal but concluded that he should be allowed to resign instead of being dismissed. After his resignation in 1975, he at first had difficulty in finding alternative employment; but in 1976 he was employed by Arun District Council as an Information and Liaison Officer. Mr Wallace married Miss [REDACTED] in August 1975: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (U) In 1980 Mr Wallace was charged with the murder of Mr Jonathan Lewis, with whose wife he had formed a sexual relationship; he was convicted of manslaughter in 1981 and served a 10 year prison sentence, from which he was released on parole in 1986.

2(U). Mr Wallace has made a number of allegations, the most serious of which may be summarised as follows:-

(a) Mr Wallace contends that he was unfairly required to resign and that his appeal was conducted unfairly, especially because MOD failed to disclose important information about the nature of his duties at HQNI.

(b) Whilst employed at HQNI, Mr Wallace claims to have been involved in a project known as "Clockwork Orange", which

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entailed the collection and unattributable publication of sensitive and in some respects untrue information designed to denigrate leaders of extremist organisations in Northern Ireland, certain Northern Ireland politicians and also certain British politicians.

(c) He alleges that the Security authorities, especially the Security Service and the RUC, deliberately failed, over a long period, to use information in their possession to stop homosexual assaults on children at the Kincora Boys' Home, Belfast; and that they subsequently covered up their failure to do so.

(d) Mr Wallace claims that he was unable to give information in his possession to the various Inquiries into the Kincora scandal, because MOD refused to give him any adequate assurance that he would not be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act if he disclosed security classified information.

(e) Mr Wallace maintains that he was wrongfully convicted for manslaughter and claims that he may have been framed.

These and other allegations have been the subject of lengthy correspondence between Ministers (including the Prime Minister) and Mr Wallace, Captain Holroyd (a former Intelligence Officer who has a long and no less controversial case history of his own) and with a number of Members of Parliament (including Mr Michael Marshall,

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Mr Teddy Taylor, Mr Ken Livingstone and Mr Tam Dalyell). Mr Wallace's and Captain Holroyd's allegations have also been the subject of a book by Mr Paul Foot ("Who Framed Colin Wallace?", published by Macmillan in 1989).

3(S). On 14 September 1989 the Cabinet Secretary held a meeting with senior representatives of the MOD, NIO, Home Office and Security Service to consider Mr Wallace's case. The meeting noted that it had recently come to light that MOD's advice to Ministers in 1987 and 1988 had not taken account of certain material originating in 1975. As a result a letter from the Prime Minister to the Chairman of the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee (TCSC) in 1987 had been inaccurate in certain respects. It was agreed that the Defence Secretary should be advised to minute the Prime Minister with the background, proposing that a public statement should be made correcting the inaccuracies contained in previous Ministerial statements; and that this statement should be made as soon as the Government could be confident that all new material relevant to the case had been uncovered. The proposed statement should indicate that the Government had passed all relevant new material to the Civil Service Appeal Board (CSAB) with a request that it should consider whether it would have affected Mr Wallace's appeal against dismissal without compensation in 1975. Meanwhile, officials in each of the Departments represented should now examine in detail all their files relating to the case; with a view to uncovering any documentation casting doubt on the accuracy of the Prime Minister's letter to the Chairman of the TCSC, or of other Ministerial statements on the Wallace case, or on the evidence put by the Government to the CSAB in

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1975. This exercise was to be coordinated by MOD. The Defence Secretary minuted the Prime Minister accordingly on 25 September 1989. The Prime Minister noted his minute and commented that it would be better if the Government took no responsibility in things done under previous administrations.

Aim

4(C). The aim of this paper is to provide a narrative record of those events in the Wallace case which concerned MOD, NIO and the Security Agencies. It is based on a study of the relevant files which are still available; but it is not (at this stage) based on interviews with persons involved with the case at the relevant periods. It is not the aim of this paper to make any judgements about any future action that might be taken over this case. Nor does this paper seek to discuss Captain Holroyd's allegations, except where they are directly related to the Wallace case.

Structure and Methodology

5(U). This paper is in eleven parts, as follows:-

I Introduction (paragraphs 1-9);

II Mr Wallace's appointment, promotion and duties at HQNI (paragraphs 10-40);

(C) III Mr Wallace's posting from HQNI following leaks to the

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Press (Paragraphs 41-62);

(U) IV The decision to dismiss Mr Wallace (paragraphs 63-96);

V Mr Wallace's appeal to the CSAB and his resignation in lieu of dismissal (paragraphs 97-128);

VI Subsequent events concerning Mr Wallace between 1976 and 1980 (paragraphs 129-147);

VII The control and demise of "IP" in 1975 and 1976 (paragraphs 148-164);

VIII The Terry Investigation on Kincora (paragraphs 165-229);

IX The Hughes Inquiry on Kincora (paragraphs 230-302);

X Allegations made by Mr Wallace from 1980 onwards (including his allegations about the "Clockwork Orange" project and the Kincora scandal) (paragraphs 303-358);

XI Ministerial statements about the Defence aspects of the Wallace case (paragraphs 359-399).

In accordance with the author's terms of reference, there are no Conclusions or Recommendations. Each part of the paper comprises a Narrative which is intended to be a factual record of the sequence of

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events as shown by documents found on MOD Files; and Comments, which represent the views of the author only but which hopefully may be helpful to the reader. Each paragraph is classified separately, the classification being the author's view of the sensitivity of the contents today rather than at the period referred to.

6(U). All the documents to which reference is made are listed in footnotes: where the same document appears on several files, only one reference is given. This is normally a MOD file, but sometimes another Department's file reference is quoted. The Narrative is intended to give a sufficiently full summary of the most important documents to save the reader from having to refer to them directly: but a small number of documents, which it is believed that the reader would wish to study in full, are attached as Annexes. It should be noted that many of the relevant MOD files have been destroyed, so that the available documentation is quite limited: but, in the short time allowed for this study, it has proved impossible to be certain that every relevant file has been identified and others could well come to notice subsequently. Because many of the events described took place up to twenty years ago, some of the people involved were subsequently promoted or given honours. It is felt that it could be confusing to the reader to give them their later ranks and titles; and the convention has therefore been adopted of referring to them by the ranks and titles which they held at the time of the events being described.

7(U). This paper is based mainly on papers found on MOD and HQNI files. It does, however, take account of separate reports made by

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the NIO¹ and the Security Service². The Home Office have considered separately³ Mr Wallace's trial, his conviction for manslaughter and his petitions for his case to be reviewed. They have taken account of the re-examination of Departmental files described in this paper. As they have found no evidence of any connection between his conviction and his work at HQNI or the Kincora affair, this paper does not cover Mr Wallace's allegations about his trial.

8(U). References are made to Labour Ministers (other than the Attorney General) in the following paragraphs:-

Paragraphs 19, 26, 31, 36, 44(Footnote), 52, 57, 76, 77, 78, 133, 134 139, 140, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 162, 163.

9. Spare.

1.NIO letters dated 31 October and 16 November 1989 and Narrative Summary of NIO Files dated 10 November 1989 (MOD File D/Sec(NATO/UK)(C)/Box 2).

2.Security Service letters reference PF 608951/KIOR/1 dated 20 October 1989 and reference PF 608951/LA dated 6 November, 10 November and 17 November 1989 (MOD File D/Sec(NATO/UK)(C)/Box 2).

3.Home Office letter reference SPL/89/4/3/7 dated 4 December 1989 (MOD File D/Sec(NATO/UK)(C)/Box 2 Part B, Enclosure 52).

HIA REF: [to be put on]

NAME: Simon Marsh

DATE: 26 May 2016

THE INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

Witness Statement of the Northern Ireland Office

I, Simon Marsh, will say as follows: -

This statement responds to the letter from the Inquiry dated 5 May and addresses the issues raised by the HIAI in that document. Given the passage of time it is constructed from NIO records.

Background

2. The Northern Ireland Office ('NIO') was established in March 1972 on the imposition of direct rule, and at that time it was envisaged as a temporary solution to the immediate problems posed by the 'Troubles'. The primary function of the NIO was to search for a political solution to the instability in Northern Ireland. Although the NIO had responsibility for the overall management of the security situation in Northern Ireland, it was not responsible for its operational management. Rather, the Army, and later the RUC, were responsible for operations on the ground. At that time the Government's key objective was to restore law and order and re-establish devolved government in Northern Ireland.

3. The NIO also took over the functions of the Ministry of Home Affairs ('MHA'). The MHA had existed under the previous Stormont based government of Northern Ireland and had responsibility for a range of domestic matters, including police and prisons. When it was established in 1972 the NIO took on the MHA files as well as the Home Office files on Northern Ireland. The MHA was not fully integrated into the NIO until after the Sunningdale agreement in 1973.

4. Following the imposition of direct rule, other Northern Ireland departments continued to operate much as they had before, albeit under the supervision of NIO junior ministers and subject to the overall political supervision of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

5. These arrangements remained in place until the 1998 Belfast Agreement paved the way for the establishment of the Northern Ireland Executive. After several false starts, the Northern Ireland Executive was established in 2007, and from that point onwards all responsibility for devolved institutions in Northern Ireland was constituted under the Northern Ireland Act 1998. The Northern Ireland Executive assumed responsibility for policing and justice in 2010.

6. In 1972 the newly formed Northern Ireland Office established the post of Director and Coordinator of Intelligence (DCI) which came to be filled by senior secondments from MI5. The DCI had no powers to direct the intelligence work of other agencies and in 1976 the RUC was given primacy over all aspects of counter-intelligence work in Northern Ireland. The main function of the DCI was to provide strategic intelligence assessments and advice to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and to Whitehall, in order to inform Government policy. The DCI was supported in his/her role by a small staff producing strategic intelligence assessments to inform Government policy, and by liaison officers in both RUC and Army headquarters. Assistant Secretary (Political) ("ASP") was one such liaison officer, whose role was to support the DCI, based at Army Headquarters. He/she was an MI5 officer. MI5 also had a small number of staff performing various specialist intelligence roles in pursuit of MI5's national security function.

7. In late 1979 Sir Maurice Oldfield was appointed by the Prime Minister in a senior intelligence co-ordination role between the RUC and the Army.

8. The situation in Northern Ireland a generation ago was very different from that which exists today. In the 1970s and 1980s terrorism was at its height, and there were periods

when Northern Ireland was far from stable. In each of the years 1974-1976 there were between 250 and 300 deaths in Northern Ireland arising from the security situation. As well as pursuing and prosecuting normal crime, a major focus of the RUC and the authorities more generally was keeping the population safe from terrorist organisations on both sides of the community.

Kincora Boys Hostel

9. It appears that before 1973 the Kincora Boys Hostel, as a children's home, was the responsibility of Belfast City Council Welfare Department. After that date responsibility for Kincora was transferred to the Department for Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland (DHSS(NI)). The DHSS(NI) retained a separate existence, albeit under the overall guidance of an NIO Minister. Operationally the Hostel was run by the Eastern Health and Social Services Board. Accordingly, the NIO never had a role in the operation of Kincora, nor in oversight or welfare issues.

10. Given the passage of time the NIO now has no effective corporate memory of the events at Kincora which may be material to this Inquiry. Consequently the NIO's role has been reconstructed from the files. We have found nothing on NIO files to indicate that the NIO was aware of the allegations of child abuse at Kincora before a report in the Irish Independent dated 24 January 1980.

11. I have seen nothing to indicate that NIO officials condoned or were involved in any sexual abuse of minors at Kincora at any time although the names of four then present or former NIO officials were mentioned in a list of questions to be put to a former Assistant Secretary (Political) in 1983¹.

12. Once the NIO had become aware, in January 1980, of allegations of child abuse in Kincora and allegations that Government servants might have been involved in this

¹ Letter of 24 February 1983 from ACC Whiteside RUC to John Bourn NIO, disclosed to HIAI.

abuse the NIO was fully supportive in ensuring that the material events were investigated and that any perpetrators brought to justice.

Information provided in Parliament

13. On 22 February 1980 Peter Robinson MP was told by the then NIO Minister of State in that the RUC had only become aware of allegations of child prostitution at Kincora on 24 January 1980. The same date was given in response to a similar question on homosexuality. By 1982 it had become clear that this information had been incorrect and that in fact police had been aware of suggestions of homosexuality some years beforehand; it seemed likely that the misunderstanding had arisen from vague terms used in telephone conversations prior to drafting the reply.

14. The earliest document we have found on NIO files relating to Kincora is dated 6 March 1980; papers relating to the Parliamentary reply referred to in the previous paragraph are assumed to have been destroyed in accordance with normal procedures.

The McGonagle Inquiry

15. On 15 January 1982, following the convictions in December 1981 of three members of staff at Kincora as well as convictions in relation to two other children's homes, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced the McGonagle Inquiry. This was established by DHSS(NI) under Article 54 of the Health and Personal Social Services (NI) Order 1972 and its terms of reference were as follows:

“To hold an inquiry into the administration of personal social services at children's homes and young persons' hostels in which criminal offences leading to recent convictions were committed, and in particular:

“To investigate the reasons for the failure to identify malpractice at an earlier stage;

“To examine and assess the adequacy and effectiveness of present policies, procedures and practices for:

“(i) the recruitment and supervision of staff employed in such establishments;

“(ii) the supervision and protection of children and young persons in such establishments, with particular reference to the roles and responsibilities of residential staff and filed social workers;

“(iii) the management of such establishments, including arrangements for the admission and discharge of children and young persons and for the promotion of their welfare while resident;

“And to make recommendations and necessary with a view to preventing any future malpractice.”

16. In his statement the Secretary of State noted with concern allegations that there had been a cover-up to protect other guilty men from prosecution (There had by that time been three prosecutions of Kincora staff members and a number of further convictions in relation to two other homes). The Secretary of State said that there had been a thorough police investigation into the criminal aspects of incidents at Kincora and other homes in the course of which some 700 persons had been interviewed. He said that no evidence of any involvement of a criminal nature by Northern Ireland Office officials, police officers, legal figures or leading businessmen had been produced to the police, or disclosed by the investigation. He said that he did not consider there to be any case for a public judicial inquiry, but there was an urgent need to draw out and apply the lessons in the field of residential child care, and in particular the adequacy of present management policies, procedures and practices. These were matters, he said, that fell within the responsibility of the DHSS(NI) and other social services bodies. He announced that the independent Inquiry would be chaired by Stephen McGonagle, formerly the Northern Ireland Ombudsman: it would conduct its inquiries in private but its report would be made publicly available.

17. The McGonagle Inquiry did not, in fact produce a report; it wound up on 5 February 1982 before it was able to commence work. This was principally because three members of the Inquiry felt they had received insufficient assurance from the RUC that there were no further offences to be investigated arising out of Kincora and other associated cases. (They did however indicate they would be glad to serve after that.)

18. On 16 February 1982 the then NIO Permanent Secretary held a meeting with the Chief Constable of the RUC. A record of that meeting reveals the Chief Constable told the NIO that a new police investigation had commenced, by context into allegations around Kincora. It was based on information provided to the RUC by journalists on 10 February 1982. The record shows that the Chief Constable advised the NIO that he had asked Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to provide a Chief Officer from another force who would be asked: to look at allegations that the results of police enquiries had been suppressed in 1975/76 and that there had been some form of cover-up; to look at allegations of maladministration on the part of the RUC; and to take an oversight of the current enquiries. The note suggests that the Permanent Secretary said that the Secretary of State would wish to make a statement to Parliament, making clear that there would be an inquiry with a judicial figure as a chairman after the police investigations and any criminal proceedings had been finalised.

19. The Secretary of State made a further statement to Parliament on 18 February 1982. He announced that he did not intend to reconstitute the McGonagle Inquiry, noting that the conclusions of the report by a Chief Officer of another police force would be made public, and said that once the police investigations and any consequent criminal proceedings were complete he would appoint a Committee with a High Court judge as chairman which would sit in public. Its terms of reference and the powers it might need could not be determined until after the results of the present investigations had become known. The Secretary of State went on to note that he would consider whether this further Inquiry should be constituted under the Tribunals and Inquiries (Evidence) Act 1921 which would confer powers of compellability. He added that because of its wider ranging inquisitorial powers the House had traditionally been wary of approving the appointment of such a tribunal.

The Investigation by Sir George Terry

20. Sir George Terry, then Chief Constable of Sussex Constabulary, was the Chief Officer provided to the RUC by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. He was given his terms of reference via the Home Office in March 1982. They were summarised as "to investigate allegations about the way in which the police have conducted their inquiries and in addition to have general oversight into the continuing investigations". This being an investigation reporting to the RUC his progress was not followed in detail by officials in the NIO but NIO officials were concerned that Sir George's investigation was taking too long and, on a number of occasions, the records show that Sir George was asked about likely completion dates.

21. By May 1983 it was apparent that Sir George had decided to divide his report into three parts: a summary report, and two further detailed reports under the names of two investigating officers who had assisted him. The summary report was shown to the NIO in June/July 1983 and officials expressed concerns about its style and presentation, although there is no indication that the factual content or conclusions were questioned. It appears that that the additional reports, one into the criminal investigation aspects and the other into the allegations made by the press, were not seen by the NIO, certainly at this time. If this is so, it is likely to be because they were the property of the RUC and it was felt inappropriate for the NIO to see them.

22. The conclusions, recommendations and "final comment" of the summary Report were published by the RUC on 28 October 1983. Among other things the Report concluded that there was no evidence of a homosexual prostitution ring ("what I can only describe as the fictional allegations about a homosexual prostitution ring") and no justification for the allegation that "British officials in the Northern Ireland Office" were involved in either a ring or a cover-up. He also said that the media had given a degree of prominence to "the fact that some Military circles were aware of homosexual mispractice in the Kincora Boys' Hostel", that the "military sources had been very frank and perfectly open" and that on this last he had "sought evidence from all sources including the media with negative result".

23. There was a comment made in a Northern Ireland Assembly debate that the report read as if it had been ghost-written by the NIO. The NIO records reveal that this allegation is completely without any basis.

From Terry to Hughes

24. While the Terry investigation was continuing NIO officials and others had been considering the form the subsequent inquiry into Kincora should take². In July 1983 advice³ was put to the Secretary of State. It noted that nobody had come forward with prima facie evidence to support the allegations that homosexual offenders (in either the public or the private sector) had not been prosecuted, or that people in positions or responsibility had deliberately taken no action over these offences to shield associates or to blackmail offenders for information. It canvassed three options for the promised inquiry: a 1921 Act inquiry; a non-statutory inquiry without formal powers; and an Article 54 inquiry. Arguments against a 1921 Act inquiry included the 1966 Salmon principles against light or idle use of the 1921 Act; the insubstantial nature of the allegations circulating in Northern Ireland and cost. The advice also noted the possibility that a 1921 Act inquiry could lead to witnesses revealing the structure and the activities of the intelligence services without disclosing anything improper about the conduct of members.

25. Given that the conclusion of the Terry investigation that “there is absolutely no evidence that residents of any children’s home were involved in anything remotely resembling homosexual “rings” as asserted by the media or the latter’s contentions that this so-called ‘ring’ involved police officers, civil servants, military personnel, Justices of the Peace or legal people” and that “there was no cover-up or concealment of evidence or disciplinary breaches by the RUC personnel”, the Secretary of State considered an Article 54 inquiry to be the proper approach and accordingly established an Article 54 inquiry to be chaired by a Northern Ireland High Court Judge. His Honour Judge Hughes was appointed chair in January 1984.

² See internal NIO minute of 30 June 1983, disclosed to HIAI.

³ NIO submission of 20 July 1983, disclosed to HIAI.

26. The Lord Chief Justice for Northern Ireland was consulted on the question of an Inquiry⁴. Terms of reference for the Inquiry were agreed. These were:

“Following:

“(i) the completion of the investigations of the Royal Ulster Constabulary into possible homosexual offences relating to children’s homes and young persons’ hostels in Northern Ireland;

“(ii) the investigation by the former Chief Constable of Sussex, Sir George Terry CBE QPM DL and the publication of his conclusions and recommendations; and

“(iii) the report of the team of child-care experts made available by the Secretary of State for Social Services to consider the ways in which the Department of Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland carries out its role in relation to the supervision and management of homes and hostels for children and young persons;

“[DHSS(NI) appoints . . . to]

“a) inquire into the administration of children’s homes and young persons’ hostels whose residents were subjected to homosexual offences which led to convictions by the courts or where homosexual misconduct led to disciplinary action against members of staff, and into the extent to which the bodies responsible for the provision of residential care for children and young persons could have prevented the commission of such acts or detected their occurrence at an earlier stage;

“b) consider the implications for present procedures and practices within the system of residential care, including in particular the adequacy and effectiveness of arrangements for the supervision and protection of young persons in residential care; and

⁴ Correspondence PUS-LCJ of 27 October 1983 and LCJ-PUS of 2 November 1983, both disclosed to HIAI .

“c) make recommendations with a view to promoting the welfare of such children and young persons and preventing any further malpractice;

“And to report thereon to the Department of Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland.”

27. It was decided that witnesses would enjoy qualified privilege and benefit from limited immunity from prosecution.

The Hughes Inquiry

28. The Hughes Inquiry was announced in Parliament on 18 January 1984. The Secretary of State described Sir George Terry’s investigation as “thorough” and his conclusions, as they bore on some of the wider allegations, as “clear”. He stated that the extensive investigations had produced no evidence that would justify a 1921 Act Tribunal. In his statement to Parliament the Secretary of State asserted that the Hughes Inquiry would be able to consider what more should be done in relation to the administration of children’s homes in Northern Ireland. It was for the Hughes inquiry to determine its mode of operations and from whom it would seek evidence. The Secretary of State further indicated that he believed that it would be within the Hughes Inquiry’s terms of reference to examine why no investigation had been instigated before 1980.

29. At paragraphs 60 and 61 of HHJ Hughes’ opening statement⁵ he makes clear that, although his Inquiry would not engage in hypothetical discussion of allegations of on an “establishment” cover-up of homosexual activities involving boys in care, or that British military intelligence were aware that homosexual offences were being committed by a member of staff at Kincora Boys’ Hostel, the Inquiry would take account of any evidence or information which was relevant to the administration of children’s homes or hostels or which showed that the administration of those homes or hostels was “adversely affected”.

30. On 29 February 1984 HHJ Hughes asked the Chief Constable of the RUC for sight of Sir George Terry’s papers and those relating to earlier police investigations. No

⁵ Letter from the Secretary to Hughes Inquiry of 3 May 1984, disclosed to HIAI.

answer rests on NIO files, but the NIO understands that the RUC did in fact grant access. The NIO also provided information to the Hughes Inquiry.

Mr Colin Wallace

31. Mr Colin Wallace was a Ministry of Defence information officer at Headquarters Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1975. Following disciplinary proceedings for leaking classified information he was informed that he would be dismissed, but having regard to his previous record of service he was in the event allowed to resign from the civil service with effect from 31 December 1975. He subsequently claimed that this was part of a cover-up and that giving information to journalists was an unacknowledged part of his duties. There is nothing to substantiate allegations that the NIO connived in Colin Wallace's dismissal from the Ministry of Defence as part of any attempted cover-up in relation to the events at Kincora. The NIO's interest was to stop any leaking of classified material, given that the leaking of information could have wider security implications.

32. The NIO files contain piecemeal papers about the strenuous attempts made by HHJ Hughes to get Mr Colin Wallace to provide direct evidence to the Hughes Inquiry. The papers suggest that Mr Wallace asked whether the Inquiry had access to a file he said he had submitted to the Prime Minister on 1 November 1984, presumably because he felt it contained relevant material; the NIO reply was that the file had been returned to Mr Wallace on 21 November 1984 by the Prime Minister's office, and that no complete copy of its contents had been made. Mr Wallace also asked the MoD about freedom from prosecution under the Official Secrets Act. On 29 August 1985 the Hughes Inquiry wrote to Mr Wallace indicating that he must agree to be interviewed by 13 September 1985 on the basis of the then existing assurances or be held to be not prepared to assist the Inquiry. Mr Wallace replied on 6 September 1985 laying stress on the need for the Government to release the 1 November 1984 file. On 27 September 1985 the MoD sent the NIO nine documents, three of which had been marked as extracts from the file: these latter were shown to the Inquiry.

33. NIO records indicate that Mr Wallace met the Hughes Inquiry on 13 December 1985.

34. In the meantime a summary note on Kincora was prepared by NIO officials at the request of the Secretary of State⁶. It described the 1970s allegations of abuse and the involvement of public servants as “very strong rumours” “apparently known to some of the social services staff but not reported to the police”. It summarised the history of the investigations and inquiries and the involvement of Mr Wallace. Its conclusion was that “Our line on this must be that we have nothing to hide and that if Wallace (or for that matter Holroyd [an acquaintance of Mr Wallace who had worked in the intelligence field]) has any evidence which they wish to put before the current inquiry then they must feel free to do so. It is not for us to judge or comment upon unsubstantiated allegations or documents of uncertain provenance”.

35. On 24 January 1986 the MoD instituted a fresh inter-departmental search for the 1 November 1984 papers that Mr Wallace said he had sent the Prime Minister: as part of this the NIO conducted its own search and failed to locate any papers from the file.

36. The Hughes Inquiry report was published on 4 February 1986. The Hughes Inquiry had focused on the running of Kincora and eight other homes. In the course of the Inquiry 66 individuals had given oral evidence and 26 submitted written evidence. The Secretary of State said in Parliament that he was confident that close study of the report would reassure the public that the various complaints and allegations which had circulated regarding abuse in the childcare system had been investigated, and that a door had been closed on the past. HHJ Hughes himself had said *‘The conduct of the police, or elected representatives, or clergymen, or military intelligence or any other persons who may have been in receipt of allegations, information or rumours relating to Kincora or any other home, was not under scrutiny in this Inquiry’*. There is little more on NIO files as the Inquiry’s recommendations largely concerned the Department of Health and Social Services (NI).

⁶ Internal NIO submission of 1 July 1985, disclosed at the request of the HIAI.

Post-Hughes

37. In or about 1989 it became apparent that that the claim by Mr Wallace that he had been involved in covert activities including the provision of disinformation in the 1970s was correct. Having consulted other Departments the MoD decided to correct the record and also invited Mr David Calcutt QC to consider whether the 1975 disciplinary proceedings had been unfair to Mr Wallace. This was announced in Parliament by means of a written answer by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces on 30 January 1990 and an oral statement by the Defence Secretary on 1 February 1990. It was made clear that no information had been found to substantiate Mr Wallace's allegations relating to a cover-up relating to the Kincora Boys' Hostel or to call into question the thoroughness of the major inquiries already made, including those of Sir George Terry or Judge Hughes. The written answer also said that if Mr Wallace had allegations that he wished to press about criminal activity or other wrong doing in Northern Ireland, the best way for him to do so would be to give any information in his possession to the RUC in the first instance, and that if this information was classified he should first consult the Director of Army Security⁷.

38. There is nothing to indicate that Mr Wallace has ever provided the information which he has repeatedly indicated that he has and which he contends is relevant to the issues of child abuse at Kincora.

Sir Maurice Oldfield

39. The HIAI has asked the NIO to address the role of Sir Maurice Oldfield, the Security Co-ordinator in 1979-80. I have seen nothing to indicate that Sir Maurice was in any way involved in child abuse at Kincora (or for that matter that he ever visited the hostel).

Conclusion


40. In summary, there is nothing to suggest any involvement on the part of NIO officials, either in the abuse itself or in any attempts to cover it up.

⁷ Papers on the NIO record relating to this are a Cabinet Secretary note of 14 September 1989; an NIO submission of 19 September 1989; and an NIO submission of 14 December 1989, all disclosed to HIAI.

41. The Northern Ireland Office regards child abuse as utterly abhorrent. It desires that this Inquiry establish the facts of what occurred in Kincora. The NIO has given the HIA all the assistance it can and will continue to do so.

Statement of Truth

42. I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed  _____

Dated 26 May 2016


REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO CHILDREN'S HOMES AND HOSTELS

Dr M N Hayes
Permanent Secretary
Department of Health and Social
Services for Northern Ireland

31 December 1986

In accordance with your Warrant of Appointment dated 21 March 1984, we hereby submit our report. All findings and recommendations contained therein represent the unanimous view of the Committee.


We sign this report but behind us are the team who have enabled us to bring it to a conclusion and whose skill, patience, humour and companionship supported us throughout the Inquiry: Mr Stephen Quinn our Secretary, Mrs Catherine Cavanagh, Miss Heather Chartres and staff, and Mr David Mercier, Solicitor to the Inquiry.



W H HUGHES



W J PATTERSON



H WHALLEY

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KINCORA BOYS HOSTEL 1958 to 1964

1. Kincora Boys Hostel was opened in January 1958 by the Belfast City Council Welfare Department. It was established for working boys aged 15-18 years and continued to be used for this age group throughout its existence, although on occasions younger boys were accommodated for very short periods when accommodation in appropriate childrens homes was unavailable.

2. The hostel building located at 236 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast, was a detached house comprising a ground floor with an entrance hall, television room, dining room, kitchen, wash room and office, with a door leading through the office to a one bedroom flat with separate bathroom and a private hallway giving access to a side entrance. This flat was occupied by the officer in charge, Joseph MAINS from 1964 until 1980 when Kincora closed.

3. The first floor of the building comprised three bedrooms each large enough to accommodate three single beds with a fourth bedroom reserved for use primarily by a member of the residential staff. The remaining facilities on this floor provided three bathrooms, a toilet and an ironing room. A two room attic was used occasionally as a make-shift bedroom for one person but was basically intended for use as a store room and a play room.

4. Joseph MAINS, b. 31.7.29, was appointed as the person in charge of the hostel in January 1958 when Kincora opened. At the time of MAINS' appointment prospective employees were interviewed by the

HIA REF: []

NAME: [**HSCB**]

DATE: [23th May 2016]

THE INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

Witness Statement of Health & Social Care Board

I, Fionnuala McAndrew, Director of Social Care and Children's Services, Health and Social Care Board ("the Board"), will say as follows: -

1. By correspondence of 5 February 2016, the Inquiry has requested the Board to provide a Rule 9 Statement in relation to **Kincora Boys Hostel**. This Home was opened and operated by Belfast Welfare Authority until reorganisation when it transferred into the East Belfast & Castlereagh District of the Eastern Health and Social Services Board.
2. The Board has already filed a statement dated 29th April 2016 detailing a chronology of complaints and issues arising in respect of Kincora. This statement has been prepared to address additional matters with reference solely to the available documentation that identifies the facts and issues that were relevant during the period of operation of the Home. I have no personal knowledge and had no personal involvement at the relevant time.
3. The Board has prepared this statement with reference to the questions posed of the Statutory Homes considered in Module 5 and relies on the analysis and conclusions of the Hughes Inquiry where relevant.

The opening of the Hostel and the date it ceased operation

4. Kincora Boys Hostel was opened by Belfast Welfare Authority on 6th May 1958. See **Exhibit 1**. The register of residents suggests that the first admission to the Hostel was on 10th May 1958. **KIN 11912**.
5. It was agreed by the Personal Social Services Committee on 10th July 1980 that the use of Kincora Boys' Hostel should be phased out, see **Exhibit 2**. All existing residents had been found alternative accommodation by 1st October 1980 which brought the use of the Hostel to an end, see **Exhibit 3**.

The remit of the Hostel

6. An undated report by an unknown author offers a summary of events at the hostel over its period of operation. It describes Kincora has having been established "*for working boys aged 15 – 18 years who were in care but could be used to accommodate boys up to 21 years of age. Occasionally younger boys were accommodated for short periods in the hostel if an older brother was there or there were no vacancies in other Children's Homes*". A copy of that report, together with details of the expectations placed on residents of Kincora upon its opening in 1958 are at **Exhibit 4**.
7. A document has been located by the HSCB which suggests an analysis was undertaken of the age of residents admitted to Kincora between February 1974 and October 1977. It is not known who prepared this, but it shows that out of 43 admissions:
 - a. 2 boys admitted aged 18;
 - b. 4 boys admitted aged 17;
 - c. 12 boys admitted aged 16;
 - d. 7 boys admitted aged 15;
 - e. 7 boys admitted aged 14;
 - f. 2 boys admitted aged 13;
 - g. 1 boy admitted aged 12;
 - h. 2 boys admitted aged 11;

- i. 4 boys admitted aged 9;
- j. 1 boy admitted aged 8;
- k. 1 boy admitted aged 7.

See **Exhibit 5**.

8. In respect of the 7 year old admitted, the HSCB notes this admission is recorded at **KIN 12022**, which indicates that he was admitted with two brothers, both aged 9. At **KIN 12023** it is detailed that having been admitted to Kincora on 16th December 1974, they were discharged on 25th December 1974 and therefore stayed for only 9 days.
9. It is also noted that the Terry Report, at paragraph 3, describes Kincora as “a *hostel for working boys aged 15-18 years*”. This was the stated remit of the Hostel throughout its period of operation, however it is known that on occasion younger boys were admitted. The Board notes that the Terry Report records that this was for “*very short periods when space in more appropriate children’s homes was unavailable*”, see **KIN 40002**

The number of children cared for in the Hostel over its period of operation

10. A report dated 29 August 1979 by Mr O’Kane, Social Work Advisory Group, identified that the hostel at that time had a maximum capacity of “9 boys. *The Hostel formerly accommodated 11 residents, but with the discontinued use of the attic accommodation the number was reduced to 9*”, see **Exhibit 6**.
11. The admission book for Kincora is at **KIN 11909** to **KIN 12044**. That details that there were a total of 580 young persons admitted to Kincora over its period of operation from May 1958 to October 1980.
12. The Inquiry will be aware that there were significant complaints and criminal convictions in respect of the experiences of some residents of Kincora. The HSCB condemns all acts of abuse. This was not, however, the experience of every resident of Kincora. In this respect the HSCB would highlight paragraph 4.213 of the Hughes Report wherein they stated: “... *we believe*

that only by establishing the facts of Kincora can the stigma which has come to attach to every former resident, the great majority of whom passed through the hostel unscathed, be removed". [HIA 842]

The staff that were employed

The qualifications required of staff

13. Recruitment procedures for staff under arrangements used by Belfast Welfare Authority were considered by the Hughes Inquiry, wherein it was noted that the *"only statutory provision relating to the recruitment of residential child care staff at the material times was Article 13 of the 1952 SR and O, under which the Ministry of Home Affairs was required to approve the appointment, salaries, qualifications and training of staff in a home". [HIA 688, para 3.6]*

14. At paragraph 3.7 the Hughes Report details the procedures used by Belfast Welfare Authority in the 1960's thus:
 - a. *"public advertisement of the post;*
 - b. *submission of a standard application form including details of qualifications and experience, present and previous employment and references;*
 - c. *interview by the Belfast Welfare Committee and Chief Welfare Officer;*
 - d. *medical examination;*
 - e. *submission of application form and references of selected candidate to Ministry of Home Affairs for approval of appointment'*

It is then noted that the interviewing function was delegated to the Children's Officer, or Assistant Children's Officer, during the late 1960's. Their recommendation was then passed through the City Welfare Officer to the Welfare Committee for approval before submission to the MOHA. [HIA 688-689, paras.3.7 and 3.8]

15. The HSCB notes that at paragraph 3.9 the Hughes Inquiry considered these procedures *"to be adequate given the standards prevailing at the time". [HIA 689]* They went on, however, to note that within England and Wales a register of persons *"deemed to be potentially unsuitable for employment in the child care field"* was maintained from 1952. [HIA 689, para 3.10] No such

register was held in Northern Ireland at the material time. The Inquiry found: “.. *the Ministry of Home Affairs should have made similar arrangements for Northern Ireland so as to provide even the limited protection which the register afforded*”. [HIA 689, para 3.12]

16. Kincora was staffed by a Warden (later known as Officer-in-Charge), a Deputy Warden (later Deputy Officer-in-Charge); houseparent and domestic staff including a cook. By January 1980, the three caring staff employed in the home were Mr Mains, Mr Semple and Mr McGrath. They were each placed on precautionary suspension on 4 March 1980, see **Exhibit 7**. Thereafter Mr McGrath left his post under a job release scheme in December 1980, while Messrs Mains and Semple were dismissed following their conviction, in December 1981, for offences against boys resident in the hostel.
17. The appointment of each of these staff members was considered by the Hughes Inquiry.
18. In respect of Mr Mains, it was noted that he was appointed as Warden of Kincora Boys’ Hostel in March 1958, having had previous experience as Warden of another boys’ home operated by Belfast Welfare Authority until its closure in February 1957. The report finds that “*Candidates for the post were required to have had “suitable working knowledge of the running of a children’s home”*”. It also records that favourable references were received, and “*the Ministry of Home Affairs Inspector, who knew him from his earlier child care work, was complimentary in recommending that his appointment to Kincora be approved by the Ministry*”. [HIA 690, paras 3.13 and 3.14]
19. At **Exhibit 8** contemporaneous documents in respect of Mr Mains’ appointment and employment include:
 - a. Confirmation that he was appointed as Warden to the Hostel on 26th November 1957, taking up duty on 1st March 1958;
 - b. The written application by Mr Mains for employment as Warden in Kincora Boys’ Hostel;

- c. Reference dated 4th November 1957 from a colleague in the St John's Ambulance Brigade;
 - d. Details of the shortlisted candidates for the position, and the conditions of appointment;
 - e. Letter of 6th November 1957 seeking the approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs to Mr Mains' appointment;
 - f. Medical Certificate dated 10th December 1957 certifying Mr Mains medically fit for employment as a salaried officer;
 - g. Letter of 24th December 1957 confirming the approval of Mr Mains' appointment;
 - h. References provided for Mr Mains in 1962 and 1963 upon applications by him for alternative employment in England;
 - i. Letter dated 9th January 1964 to Mr Mains following his absence from the home during the evening of Monday 6th January 1964;
 - j. Further reference provided for Mr Mains in 1965;
 - k. Report dated 21st May 1968 detailing the work undertaken by Mr Mains in the absence of an Assistant Warden recommending the payment of an honorarium of £100 to him, and approval of the Ministry to such a payment dated 26th July 1968 together with correspondence relating to the same issue in 1969;
 - l. Letter dated 4th March 1980 placing Mr Mains on precautionary suspension;
 - m. Letter dated 14th December 1981 dismissing Mr Mains.
20. When Mr Mains was appointed Warden, the position required him to be resident in the Hostel. This was changed with effect from 1 July 1979, at which time his contract was amended. See **Exhibit 9**.
21. The creation of a post of Assistant Warden was approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs by letter dated 15th December 1961. Mr W A Robinson was approved as the first appointment to that post from 1st March 1962. See **Exhibit 10**.

22. Mr Semple was employed as Assistant Warden from September 1964 until February 1966 “*when he resigned for domestic reasons*”. The Hughes Report notes that the job specification gave “*preference to applicants who have a working knowledge of the running of a children’s home*” before noting that Mr Semple had no such experience, nor did he have a social work qualification. He had however been working in Kincora on a voluntary basis for three years. One of his referees for the appointment was Mr Mains. While the Ministry of Home Affairs Inspector noted that she did not know Mr Semple, she “*assumed that Belfast Welfare knew enough about him after three years’ voluntary work*”. [**HIA 690**, para 3.15]
23. After Mr Semple’s resignation the post remained vacant for significant periods. Between 1st June 1964 and 26th April 1968 it was recorded that Mr Mains had been “*without the help of an Assistant Warden for a total of approximately 20 months*”, see **Exhibit 11**. Difficulties continued throughout 1968. The post was advertised on five occasions during 1968. While the fifth process which commenced in November 1968, did identify a candidate suitable for appointment, later failed to pass the medical examination in December 1968 and failed to engage with the authority during January 1969 and February 1969, see **Exhibit 12**.
24. The post was re-advertised in April 1969, at which time Mr Semple successfully applied for reappointment as Assistant Warden. He was appointed from June 1969. At that time preference continued to be given to candidates with relevant experience, with a salary supplement also offered to those with a Certificate in Child Care or similar qualification. Mr Semple satisfied the experience requirement, but remained unqualified. The Hughes Inquiry noted that at this time his previous work was known to both Belfast Welfare Authority and the Ministry of Home Affairs Inspector who “*in recommending approval, was complimentary about Mr Semple’s previous spell at Kincora*”. While, in December 1981, Mr Semple was convicted of offences that predated 1969, the Hughes Inquiry accepted that there was no

evidence of any complaint against him being brought to the attention of the responsible authority at the time. [HIA 691-692, paras 3.17 and 3.18]

25. At **Exhibit 13** contemporaneous documents in respect of Mr Semple's appointment, re-appointment and employment include:
 - a. The written application by Mr Semple for employment as Assistant Warden in Kincora Boys' Hostel in 1964;
 - b. The conditions of appointment of Assistant Warden;
 - c. References dated 7th September 1964, one of which was provided by Mr Mains;
 - d. Letter of 1st September 1964 seeking the approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs to Mr Semple's appointment;
 - e. Letter of 14th September 1964 confirming the approval of Mr Semple's appointment;
 - f. Medical Certificate dated 16th September 1964 certifying Mr Semple medically fit for employment as Assistant Warden;
 - g. Letter of resignation dated 31st January 1966;
 - h. Second application for appointment as Assistant Warden in 1969;
 - i. Conditions of appointment of Male Assistant Warden in 1969;
 - j. References dated 8th June 1969 and 21st June 1969;
 - k. Letter dated 12th June 1969 seeking the approval of the Ministry to the appointment of Mr Semple;
 - l. Medical Certificate dated 16th June 1969 certifying Mr Semple medically fit for employment as Assistant Warden
 - m. Letter of 25th June 1969 confirming the approval of Mr Semple's appointment;
 - n. Letter dated 4th March 1980 placing Mr Semple on precautionary suspension;
 - o. Letter dated 14th December 1981 dismissing Mr Semple.

26. Mr McGrath took up employment as Housefather at Kincora in August 1971. *"The job specification indicated that preference would be given to candidates with a working knowledge of the running of a children's home and a salary*

supplement was offered to those with a Certificate in Child Care or similar qualification. Mr McGrath had neither....". He was in receipt of favourable references from two Ministers of religion, which the Hughes Inquiry considered were *"of limited value in determining his suitability for work in residential child care"*. [HIA 692, para 3.19]

27. At **Exhibit 14** contemporaneous documents in respect of Mr McGrath's appointment, re-appointment and employment include:
- a. The written application for Mr McGrath as Housefather Grade II Kincora dated 24th May 1971;
 - b. Conditions of appointment to Housefather Grade II;
 - c. References dated 12th and 17th June 1971;
 - d. Letter dated 22nd June 1971 seeking the approval of the Ministry to the appointment of Mr McGrath;
 - e. Medical certificate dated 2nd July 1971 certifying him fit for appointment as Housefather Grade II;
 - f. Letter dated 7th July 1971 confirming the Ministry's approval to Mr McGrath's appointment;
 - g. Letter dated 8th February 1980 from Mr McGrath advising of his intention to take advantage of the job release scheme from his 64th birthday, 11th December 1980;
 - h. Letter dated 4th March 1980 placing Mr McGrath on precautionary suspension;
 - i. Letter dated 5th March 1980 from Mr McGrath advising that whatever the outcome of investigations, he still wished to avail of the job release scheme;
 - j. Letter dated 2nd December 1980 confirming Mr McGrath's application for job release had been approved. His name was therefore removed from payroll on 11th December 1980.
28. The final conclusion of the Hughes Inquiry in relation to these appointments included: *"Their lack of social work training and qualification is to be regretted, but was typical of the pattern which prevailed in residential child care at the time and we make no criticism on that score. As to the statutory*

role of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the approval of their appointments, we found that it was conscientiously discharged but that it consisted of little more than a confirmation of the assessment of the Welfare Authority unreinforced by a selection interview". [HIA 693, para 3.22]

29. Kincora also had female staff, Mrs McCullough and Mrs Smith, who undertook the cooking, laundry and cleaning. Undated notes written by an unknown author describe that Mrs McCullough commenced employment in the Hostel on 13 July 1958 and Mrs Smyth on 15 November 1966. See **Exhibit 15**.
30. It therefore appears that all staff in Kincora were appointed by Belfast Welfare Authority, transferring to the Eastern Health and Social Services Board upon re-organisation.
31. It is also known that arrangements were made by Belfast Welfare Authority to have other members of staff assist in the Hostel for periods when it was particularly under strain due to the absence of an Assistant Warden after Mr Semple's resignation in 1966. The Hughes Inquiry heard evidence from James Michael Maybin in this respect. He started as a Welfare Assistant on 2 November 1964. He ultimately obtained social work qualification, rising to Assistant Principal Social worker upon reorganisation in October 1973. From May to September 1966 he assisted in Kincora by way of overtime at a level of around 20 hours per week at evenings and weekends in addition to his fieldwork duties because of chronic short-staffing. He described that at that time there were only two other members of staff, "*Joe Mains, who was the warden, and a cook*". [KIN 71437 – 71439]
32. Finally, upon the suspension of all three caring staff in Kincora on 4th March 1980, swift arrangements had to be made to appoint alternative staff to Kincora. Relevant memos detailing this are at **Exhibit 16**.

Training programmes provided for staff

33. While Belfast Welfare Authority and the Eastern Board had arrangements for staff to secure professional qualification, the opportunity to do so was not taken by any of the three key staff members at Kincora. They remained unqualified throughout their tenure in Kincora and until their precautionary suspension in March 1980.
34. Within the available documentation, however, the following training opportunities are noted for staff in Kincora:
 - a. On 14th December 1976, a talk at Kincora Hostel was given by Mr R Browne, DWO. The topic of his presentation is not known;
 - b. Mr Mains' attendance at "Planning for Children", a staff development course in Scotland between 10th and 12th February 1977 was approved;See **Exhibit 17**

Staffing ratios

35. The HSCB does not currently have access to any documentation that analyses the staff ratios in Kincora. It is however known that:
 - a. When the hostel first opened in 1958, Mr Mains described in his police statement dated 1 April 1980, that it was only he and a cook staffing the Hostel;
 - b. While the post of Assistant Warden was created, with Mr Semple being appointed in 1964, following his resignation in February 1966 there were significant problems in filling this post until June 1969 when Mr Semple was re-appointed. This has been detailed above at paragraphs 25. The steps taken to have other staff assist is outlined at paragraph 23.
 - c. By January 1980, Kincora was staffed by five people: the Officer-in-Charge, the Deputy Officer-in-Charge, one housefather and two domestic staff.
36. During its period of operation Kincora offered accommodation for between 9 and 11 boys.

Disciplinary Investigations in respect of staff

Complaints made against staff

37. The HSCB has addressed, in chronological order, all complaints and information that led to any investigation in respect of staff at Kincora in the statement already filed and dated 29th April 2016. The HSCB respectfully refers the Inquiry to that statement for detail of all contemporaneous complaints and investigations undertaken in respect of Kincora, from the first known complaint in 1967 through to 1980.
38. It is also noted that the Chief Welfare Officer wrote to Mr Mains on 9th January 1964 in relation to his absence from the Hostel on the evening of the 6th of the same month. The only documentation available to the HSCB in respect of that issue is the letter contained in **Exhibit 8**.
39. The Inquiry will already know that after the media attention in January 1980 a full police investigation was commenced into activities at Kincora. Full co-operation was given to the police by the Eastern Board to assist with their inquiries, with a list detailing that 104 staff provided police statements, see **Exhibit 18**.
40. This police inquiry resulted in a significant number of complaints against Messrs Mains, Semple and McGrath. All three men were convicted in December 1981 of homosexual offences. Other complaints were made, but did not result in prosecution, or prosecutions were not pursued.
41. In December 1981 Mr Mains was convicted in respect of offences as follows:

<u>Injured Party</u>	<u>Period of Offences</u>	<u>Offences (Counts)</u>
R 2	16 June 1961 – 3 December 1979	Buggery (1) Gross Indecency (1)
R 7	16 August 1964 – 17 December 1965 3 March 1966 – 17 September 1966	Buggery (1) Gross Indecency (1)

Hugh Quinn	22 February 1960 – 8 September 1962	Indecent Assault (1)
R 9	29 April 1977 – 31 August 1979	Gross Indecency (1)

He was sentenced to a total of six years' imprisonment. **KIN 40010**

42. In December 1981 Mr Semple was convicted in respect of offences as follows:

<u>Injured Party</u>	<u>Period of Offences</u>	<u>Offences (Counts)</u>
B3/R1	10 February 1965 – 14 May 1966	Buggery (2) Gross Indecency (1)
R 7	16 August 1964 – 17 December 1965 3 March 1966 – 17 September 1966	Gross Indecency (1)

He was sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment. **KIN 40010**

43. In December 1981 Mr McGrath was convicted in respect of offences as follows:

<u>Injured Party</u>	<u>Period of Offences</u>	<u>Offences (Counts)</u>
Clinton Lee Massey	23 March 1973 – 24 October 1973	
R 12	4 May 1973 – 11 January 1974	
R 15	3 November 1973 – 20 September 1974	Indecent Assault (1)
R 17	6 October 1974 – 8 March 1976	
R 10	21 October 1974 – 20 April 1977	
Ronald Graham	2 December 1974 – 10 June 1975	Buggery (1) Gross Indecency (1) Indecent Assault (1)
R 9	29 April 1977 – 31 August 1979	
R 18	12 May 1977 – 24 January 1980	Gross Indecency (1)
James Anthony Miller	19 October 1977 – 20 June 1978	
R 21	6 April 1978 – 1 August 1979	

R 22

20 April 1979 – 24 January 1980

While the individual offences are not known in full for Mr McGrath on analysis of the information available, it is known that he was convicted in total of 8 counts of Indecent Assault, 5 counts of Gross Indecency and 2 counts of Buggery, **KIN 114017**. He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. **KIN 40010**

44. All of the above offences relate, at least in part, to periods then the boys were resident in Kincora and under 18 years, save for:
- a. **R 2** was born on **[REDACTED]**. While the period of offences includes a period of residence in Kincora from 16 June 1961 – 16 September 1961, he was aged over 18 at that time. Offences for which Mr Mains was convicted, continued thereafter during his adult life;
 - b. **R 9** was resident in Kincora between 21 October 1974 and 29 April 1977. The offences against him in relation to Mr Mains and Mr McGrath related to a period after his discharge from Kincora;
 - c. Mr Semple was convicted of 2 counts of buggery in respect of **B3/R1** **[REDACTED]**, and 1 count of gross indecency. One count of buggery related to an offence after his discharge from Kincora;

The layout of the Hostel

45. Kincora was a detached house situated at 236 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast. The Board has not located any plans for the Hostel.
46. The report dated 29th August 1979 by J L O'Kane, Social Work Advisory Group at **Exhibit 6** described the outside of the Hostel thus:

“The Hostel... is a pleasant, large detached home situate on the corner of the junction between Upper Newtownards Road and North Road. Apart from a small, inconspicuous sign at the front door indicating it is a Board property there is no other indication that it is a young persons' facility. An annexe

containing a double bedroom, bathroom and toilet for the use of the Officer-in-Charge was built in 1967.

There is a reasonable sized garden on three sides of the Hostel with mature trees and flower beds. Maintenance and planting of the garden is undertaken by the Parks and Cemeteries Department of the City Council'.

47. The SWAG report does not give a detailed description of the internal layout of the home. It is however noted that the Terry Report, at paragraph 3, describes the layout of the home thus

"The building was a detached house with on the ground floor an entrance hall, television room, dining room, kitchen, wash room and an office, with a door from the latter to a one bedroom flat with a separate bathroom and a private hallway which gave access to a side entrance.... The first floor of the building was consisted of three bedrooms, each large enough to accommodate three single beds, and a fourth bedroom primarily reserved for a member of the residential staff. Also on that floor were three bathrooms, a toilet and an ironing room. Above that a two roomed attic was used occasionally as a make-shift bedroom for one person but primarily was intended as a store room and play room." **KIN 40002**

48. As regards the layout of the accommodation, it is noted that SWAG commented in August 1979, in the report at **Exhibit 6** regarding the sleeping accommodation: *"this arrangement does not provide the extra privacy which older children should have"*. The report also noted that the Hostel formerly accommodated 11 residents, but records that the use of the attic described in the Terry report had been discontinued, with the number of residents reduced to 9.

How the Hostel was funded

The average cost of accommodating a young person in Kincora

49. Between 1958 and 1973 Kincora would have been funded through the Belfast Welfare Authority.

50 During this period the average cost per child per week is documented as:

a. 14th December 1959 - £5.0.6;

b. 1964 / 65 - £8:11:8;


See Exhibit 19.

51. From 1 October 1973, it was funded through monies allocated to the Eastern Health and Social Services Board by the Department of Health and Social Services. At the time of filing this statement, the HSCB has not seen any documentation which analyses the costs during this period.

The Board's management arrangements for the Hostel

52. Kincora Boys' Hostel operated between 1958 and 1980. The management structures therefore changed at the point of re-organisation.

53 From January 1958 to 30 September 1973 Kincora was operated by Belfast Welfare Authority. Within that structure the arrangements for management of the home were:



(Mrs Wilson was Boarding Out and Homes Officer from 1960 - 1965,
then appointed Assistant Children's Officer in 1968;



Head of the Home
(Warden: Mr Mains)

54. From 1 October 1973 to October 1980, when the home closed, it was managed within the East Belfast & Castlereagh District of the Eastern Health and Social Services Board under the following structure:

Director of Social Services
(Mr E Gilliland)



District Social Services Officer
(Mr C Scoular)



Principal Social Worker (Residential and Day Care)
(Mrs Wilson, October 1973 – Mid 1975)
(Ms McGrath, January 1976 – closure of Kincora)



Assistant Principal Social Worker (Residential and Day Care)
[From creation of this post in July 1976]
(Mr Higham – July 1976 – December 1978)



Head of the Home
(Officer-in Charge – Mr Joseph Mains)

55. Job descriptions for the posts of Director of Social Services, Assistant Director of Social Services and District Social Services Officer, which were likely prepared to assist the Hughes Inquiry, are at **Exhibit 20**.

The Board's quality assurance arrangements for the Hostel

56. Between 1952 and 30 September 1973, visiting was undertaken to the Home as required by members of the Welfare Committee and by the Children's Officer to comply with the 1952 Regulations. It is noted that these activities were considered by the Hughes Inquiry.
57. In respect of visits by the Welfare Committee, the Hughes Inquiry found, through scrutiny of the Welfare Committee minutes:
- "... the visiting requirement was largely met in the years 1960 – 1965, with some omissions. The frequency of visits tended to decline thereafter and during 1967 and 1968 there were three month periods when no statutory visits were minuted. A significant further decline in visits began in 1971 and only two statutory visits were minuted for the period January 1972 to September 1973" [HIA 698, para 3.33]*
58. The Hughes Inquiry noted that some caution must however be exercised. They had interpreted minutes that recorded visits taking place. It was recognised that there may have been visits that were not reported and recorded in the minutes *"if the visiting member did not attend the next Welfare committee meeting following his visit"*. The Hughes Inquiry noted that there was some evidence of this, with a global entry in the minutes for May 1970 that simply referred to 15 members having visited the various homes. A second reason for caution was noted as resulting from the fact that as verbal reports were given they could have been omitted from minutes. Finally the Hughes Inquiry noted that there was evidence that Welfare Committee members had visited Kincora and signed the record book, but no corresponding report was minuted. **[ibid]**
59. Available examples of contemporaneous reports of visits by Welfare Committee members to Kincora are at **Exhibit 21**. These detail visits in June 1958, November 1958, February 1959, June 1959 and January 1960. No issues or problems with the Hostel were identified in any of these reports.

60. The Hughes Inquiry also considered the records available in relation to visits to Kincora by the Children's Officer. They "*revealed that the monthly inspection and reporting requirements do not appear to have been strictly observed in the years 1960-1962, when the late Mrs Brown was Children's Officer, during which period only about 50% of the required inspection reports were minuted. In February 1963 Mrs Wilson, the Homes Officer, was formally nominated to undertake the inspection function on a delegated basis due to an increase in the duties of the Children's Officer. Mrs Wilson discharged this function fully except for minor omissions, which may have been attributable to illness or holidays, until her departure on training in September 1965 when Miss Brown once again took on this duty. The statutory requirements from September 1965 to the end of 1967 were met by either Miss Brown or Mr Moore, again with occasional omissions.... Mrs Wilson resumed the inspection function from January 1968 on her appointment as Assistant Children's Officer, serving under Mr Moore who by then had become Children's Officer. Mrs Wilson's record from early 1968 to September 1973, when the Belfast Welfare Authority ceased to exist, demonstrated almost full compliance with the statutory requirement save for very occasional gaps in the summer holiday periods...*" [HIA 694, para 3.26]
61. Contemporaneous records of these visits from September 1967 are contained in **Exhibit 22** (which also continues the visits in early 1974).
62. The Board notes that the 1950 Regulations required these visits to be undertaken by the Children's Officer, but within Belfast Welfare Authority this function was delegated, initially to the Homes Officer, and later to the Assistant Children's Officer. This was considered by the Hughes Inquiry, who concluded: "*We are satisfied... that the delegated arrangement was motivated by a desire to improve the management of homes, rather than a sign that this function was being downgraded in importance.*" [HIA 696, para 3.30]
63. The Hughes Inquiry considered that "*a 50% compliance with a specific statutory requirement in the 1960-1962 period was not satisfactory*" although

no direct causal relationship between this and the abuse that took place in the Hostel was suggested. [HIA 696, para 3.29] It also concluded *“that these inspections were unlikely to detect cases of homosexual misconduct unless some sign of distress in a resident became apparent or a complaint was made. They could and doubtless did, however, contribute to the well-being of the boys in terms of the physical conditions and amenities of the hostel. In these circumstances, we find no basis for serious criticism of the statutory inspections by officials insofar as they relate to the period 1963 to 1973. The occasional gaps in the inspection record for that period constitute a non-observance of a specific statutory requirement, but we do not believe that these marginal omissions had any material effect on the non-detection of homosexual offences.”* [HIA 679, para 3.31]

64. It was also noted that in addition to the above statutory requirements, Belfast Welfare Authority required the Officer-in-Charge of each home to submit a weekly report to the Assistant Children’s Officer and Children’s Officer. These reports were not available in sufficient number to allow any assessment by the Hughes Inquiry as to the general value of them. [HIA 697, para 3.32]
65. Following re-organisation on 1 October 1973, the following visits were required to be undertaken to the Home:
- c. By a member of the Personal Social Services Committee (Direction 3(2) of The Conduct of Children’s Homes Direction (Northern Ireland) 1975);
 - d. By a designated Social Worker (Direction 3(3) of The Conduct of Children’s Homes Direction (Northern Ireland) 1975).
66. The Hughes Inquiry considered that, prior to the 1975 Direction, the PSSC *“inherited the monthly visiting and reporting duties placed on the Belfast Welfare Committee by the 1952 SR&O”*. They considered minutes of the PSSC from October 1973 to December 1975 and found that visits were not recorded as beginning until mid 1974. *“The minutes revealed that there was a considerable time lag following re-organisation before PSSC members received detailed guidance on the extent and nature of their statutory duties under the 1952 S&RO”*. It was noted that from May 1974 visiting was regular,

save that no visit was reported for the period October – December 1975.
[HIA 756, para 4.13]

- 67 Following the 1975 Direction, which required quarterly visits to the home by a PSSC member, the Hughes Inquiry found that: “*The PSSC’s record on its quarterly visiting duty from 1 January 1976, as reported in the minutes, was of full compliance until the third quarter of 1977 for which no visit was minuted*”. It was noted that the PSSC was being reconstituted at this time. They also reported that only one visit was recorded in 1978, and two in 1979. While the same notes of caution were noted as detailed in respect of the Welfare Committee, namely visits may not have been minuted, the Inquiry concluded: “*.. the pattern is of less than full compliance with the statutory requirements*”.
[HIA 756, para 4.13]
68. As regards the value of these reports, it was noted that some reports were quite detailed. From the minutes they noted that “*there were references which demonstrated the points arising from the reports were followed up and this, allied to the quality of some of the reports, suggests that visiting was regarded as more than a purely formal exercise*”. [HIA 757, para 4.14] Examples of these reports from December 1974, June 1976 and August 1976 are at **Exhibit 23**.
- 69 To address the issues arising, although the development post-dated the closure of Kincora, the Eastern Board introduced Paper No PSSC/ 1/ 85 in 1985 which provided “*Guidelines for members of the Health & Personal Social Services Committee visiting children’s residential child care facilities in accordance with the Conduct of Children’s Homes Direction (Northern Ireland) 1975*”. These guidelines included arrangements for the same member to visit the same home(s) for at least one year “*to ensure continuity and the development of relationships between the Committee member and the staff and children*”. The opportunity was also given for the Committee member to be accompanied by the Principal Social Worker, or Assistant Principal Social Worker, should they choose to do so. Matters to which attention should be specifically directed were detailed which included: “*Talk to the children and*

obtain their views on the care they are receiving". The guidelines also set forth the matters that should be addressed in the report of the visit, and provided a form to assist members. See **Exhibit 24**.

70. The second statutory inspection that had previously been undertaken by the Children's Officer was noted by the Hughes Inquiry to have been "*allocated to R&DC management from October 1973*". Residential and Day Care management continued to exercise the function of visiting social worker following the 1975 Direction, paragraph 3(3) of which "*merely brought the statutory provisions into conformity with the new structure*". [HIA 753, para 4.5]
71. Scrutiny of records demonstrated that this statutory requirement was carried out in full by the responsible staff, with the inspections being carried out by:
- e. Mrs Wilson, Principal Social Worker (Residential and Day Care) from October 1973 until mid 1975, when she retired;
 - f. Mr Scoular, District Social Services Officer, from Mrs Wilson's retirement until the appointment of her successor;
 - g. Mrs McGrath, Principal Social Worker (Residential and Day Care) from January 1976 until July 1976;
 - h. Mr Higham, Assistant Principal Social Worker (Residential and Day Care) from August 1976, after his appointment, to December 1978;
 - i. Mr Kenneth Robertson from December 1978.

It was noted that from Mr Higham's appointment "*the frequency of visits to Kincora... increased and it was not unusual for three or four visits to be recorded for a single month*". [HIA 753, para 4.6] A table compiled of the number of visits to Kincora from 1 October 1973 to October 1979 is at **Exhibit 25**. It is not known by whom or when this was compiled, but it is likely to have been in connection with the Hughes Inquiry. The analysis undertaken by the Hughes Inquiry team that led to the findings detailed above is at **Exhibit 26**

72. While the frequency of visits therefore was not subject of criticism, it was noted that the quality of the reports "*varied from short and stereotyped to reasonably detailed. We noted that there was a tendency to report late and*

en bloc". [HIA 754, para 4.7] As already detailed by the Board in paragraph 120 of the statement dated 29th April 2016, it is clear that these reports did not alert the Area Board to the full situation as regards the Hostel in late 1977. Examples of these reports located by the HSCB from 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1977 are at **Exhibit 27**.

73. In addition to the statutory monitoring, the Hughes Inquiry noted that the arrangement for weekly reports to be submitted by the Officer-in-Charge remained in place after re-organisation, with them now to be submitted to District Management. In respect of Kincora, this was increased to a daily report (submitted weekly) from January 1978. [HIA 755, para 4.11]
74. The Hughes Inquiry finally drew attention to the monitoring function of the Assistant Director (Family and Child Care) at the Area Board. In the Eastern Board this post was held by Mr Bunting throughout the period relevant to Kincora. While he was not in executive line management nor did he have executive authority to monitor residential care, it was noted by the Hughes Report that the Assistant Director had a monitoring function. The job description contained at **Exhibit 20** indicates one of the major responsibilities of this post was "*Assists in evaluating and monitoring the effectiveness of programmes of care*". The Hughes Report detailed: "*He gave evidence that he had not been able to undertake this monitoring role on a regular and systematic basis. Mr Bunting's monitoring role was non-statutory and was not defined in measurable terms. We accept his frank admission that this aspect of the Board's monitoring activities was not highly developed. More active monitoring by the Assistant Director might have highlighted some of the deficiencies in monitoring and supervision by other sections of the Board... it could not have been expected to uncover homosexual offences*". [HIA 756, para 4.12]
75. Other non-statutory visiting was undertaken to Kincora which does not receive analysis in the Hughes Report. The first of these was visiting by the District Social Services Officer, which is also evidenced on the documentation available to the HSCB. A list of dates on which Mr Scoular visited Kincora is

at **Exhibit 28**. Further information is also detailed as to the particular purpose of visits during 1976 and 1977. If there had been observable problems or difficulties in Kincora, these should have been evident during these visits.

76. The second is visits by the District Committee. It is known, for example, that the District Committee were to visit Kincora on 16th March 1977. It is known that following their visit the committee members raised queries around the care and follow-up of residents. See **Exhibit 29**.

Problems identified by the Board and how they were dealt with

77. The most significant problem identified by the Board related to the actions of Messrs Mains, Semple and McGrath. The details of the complaints and information that came to the Board's attention, together with the action taken and the HSCB's view in respect of same is detailed in the statement dated 29th April 2016.
78. Documentation reviewed to date has not highlighted any other problems particularly encountered in respect of the staff in Kincora, save the inability to appoint a suitable Deputy to assist Mr Mains which is addressed in the section relating to staffing herein above.
79. Visits by Board staff did however identify a need to have the kitchen refurbished, difficulties with laundry and a suggestion that the boys should have the use of nearby playing fields. **Exhibit 30** contains memos from 1976 detailing that action was being taken in respect of each of these.

Arrangements for regular independent visits to be made to the Hostel

80. At **Exhibit 31** are two reports, from 1974 and 1979, that record visits to Kincora by the Fire Authority for Northern Ireland to inspect the premises.

Inspections of the Hostel by the Department, recommendations made and how they were implemented

81. Between 1958 and 1 October 1973 Inspections of Kincora were undertaken by the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is known from the Hughes Report that records available revealed only two reports on inspections of Kincora between 1960 and 1973. They were dated October 1965 and April 1972, and are at **Exhibit 32**. Each of these reports was written by Miss Mabel Hill and were described by the Hughes Inquiry as being “*generally favourable*” [HIA 699, para 3.38].
82. The Hughes Report also saw evidence in the Kincora record book that the Ministry’s inspectors visited Kincora on twelve occasions other than those which resulted in the reports referred to above. They found “*This is consistent with other evidence which we heard relating to less formal contacts between the Ministry’s Inspectors and Belfast Welfare Authority*”. [ibid]
83. After reorganisation on 1 October 1973, the Department of Health and Social Services was established from 1 January 1974. The Hughes Inquiry found only one inspection report from the Social Work Advisory Group of DHSS, made on 29 August 1979 by Mr John O’Kane. [HIA 757, para 4.16] A copy of that report is at **Exhibit 6**. While this report is now available to the HSCB, it is not believed that it was available to the Eastern Board upon conclusion of the inspection, which took place on 20 June 1979. It is known that as regards the period 1973 – 1980 the Hughes Report found:

“*During the 1973 – 1980 period reports on SWAG inspections were confidential to the Department, that is to say their contents were known only to SWAG itself and the Child Care Branch of the Department to which the reports were copied. The reports were not made available to the Boards or to Management Committees of voluntary homes, although aspects of them were discussed and taken up with these authorities where it was considered appropriate.*” [HIA 758, para 4.18]

It is however noted the report itself discloses an intention on the part of Mr O'Kane to meet with the District Social Services Officer, Mr Scoular, following completion of his visits to all three facilities in the District that provided residential care for adolescents. To date the HSCB has not found any records relating to such a meeting.

84. The report identified issues in relation to: the lack of privacy provided by the sleeping accommodation which required three boys to share; the absence of personal possessions / "pin-ups" in the bedrooms; doubts of Mr O'Kane in relation to an systematic instruction of the residents in relation to independence skills. Within 5 months of this report being written the serious issues relating to Kincora were publicised through the media. The HSCB has not seen contemporaneous evidence to understand what steps had been taken in the interim to address the points arising.

Other Information:

- 85 **Holidays:** Within the documentation held by the HSCB, it is clear that as a Hostel for older children, there were still efforts made to provide holiday opportunities for the boys. In 1962 the boys attended a YMCA Summer Camp in Newcastle; in 1977 an 8-berth caravan was rented in Portrush; in 1979 there was a proposal to consider Butlins in Ayr, although it appears that a Northern Ireland location was recommended instead. See **Exhibit 33**.
86. **Civil Claims:** The Board is aware of claims for compensation by the following individuals in respect of care provided at Kincora:
- j. **R 2** – this claim was settled in the amount of £10,000 plus costs in March 1989, see **Exhibit 34**;
 - k. **R 7** – this claim was settled in the amount of £6,000 plus costs in September 1989. The Board has also located a Notice for Further and Better Particulars dated 20 March 1986, see **Exhibit 35**;
 - l. **HIA 532/B1/R13**;
 - m. **HIA 534/R4** – Notice for Further and Better Particulars dated 20 March 1986 at **Exhibit 36**;

- n. [REDACTED] R 24 ;
- o. [REDACTED] R 17 ;
- p. [REDACTED] R 25 ;
- q. [REDACTED] B3/R1 – this claim was settled in the amount of £5,000 plus costs in March 1988, see **Exhibit 37**;
- r. [REDACTED] R 8 ;
- s. [REDACTED] ;
- t. Clinton Massey – on 6 November 1991, £8,759 was paid in damages, see **Exhibit 38**;
- u. Ronald Hugh Graham;
- v. Hugh Quinn – this claim was settled in the amount of £7,500 plus costs in August 1989, see **Exhibit 39**;

The litigation files held by the Board's solicitor in respect of each of these civil claims were destroyed in January 2009. The only source documents, or details of outcomes that can be provided to the Inquiry at this time are as noted as detailed and exhibited above.

Further the Board has also received letters of claim from the Individuals listed below, no proceedings have yet been served:-

- i. James Miller
- ii. [REDACTED] KIN 279
- iii. [REDACTED] KIN 133
- iv. [REDACTED] KIN 1
- v. Clinton Massey

Details of these will be provided under separate cover

87 Reports/Consultations after the closure of Kincora:

- a. In June 1982, the Department of Health obtained "the Sheridan Report", a report on Homes and Hostels for Children and Young People, whose terms of reference were: "*To consider the ways in which the Department carries out its role in relation to the supervision and management of homes and hostels for children and young people and to offer advice*". This was based on discussions held with the

Department in Belfast from 24 – 26 February 1982. An advance copy was provided to the Board under cover of letter dated 17 November 1982, with the report to be issued on 22 November 1982. A Circular HSS (CC) 5/82 was also issued in November 1982. This was discussed at the Personal Social Services Committee on the 13 January 1983. On 27th January 1983, Paper No PSSC 10/83 was discussed at the Board, and was subsequently forwarded to the Department under cover of letter dated 9th February 1983. Relevant documents are in **Exhibit 40**; however it is unclear whether this version of the PSSC paper is the “revised” paper that was submitted to the Department or the original version;

- b. On 21 October 1983, the Department issued a “Consultative Paper on a Complaints Procedure for Children in Residential Care and Their Parents”. On 31st January 1984, being the closing date for responses, the Eastern Board submitted a full response. These documents are in **Exhibit 41**. It is also believed that the other Boards responded to this consultation;
- c. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Children’s Homes and Hostels was published on 4th February 1986. On 4th April 1986 the Department of Health wrote to the Board, dividing the recommendations into two categories: those it endorsed, and those upon which it was yet to form a view. The Board responded on the 1st October 1986 with a paper setting out the views of the Board, and on the extent to which action had been taken. Copies of the correspondence, together with a report which appears to the HSCB to be the paper referred to in the correspondence of October 1986 are at **Exhibit 42**. Further, in September 1986, meetings considered action in relation to Recommendation 47 of the Hughes Report, which resulted in an agreed joint statement between the Directors of Social Services and the RUC, see **Exhibit 43**.

88 [REDACTED] **BM 1** : The Board has not seen any documentation that would confirm that [REDACTED] **BM 1** was a member of staff at Kincora. [REDACTED] **BM 1** , and information in respect of him, has been addressed in the HSCB's statement dated 6th May 2016 and a supplemental statement, each addressing Bawnmore Children's Home. In reviewing documentation, however, the Board has noted reference to a [REDACTED] **BM 1** on a Duty Rota stamped "Kincora" dated 1978. It is known that [REDACTED] **BM 1** was, at that time, employed at Palmerston Reception and Assessment Centre, which was situated in the same District as Kincora. The HSCB suggests that this is likely to reflect an arrangement whereby staff within the residential field would assist with other units from time to time where the need arose. See **Exhibit 44**.

Systems Failures

89 Having reviewed the available evidence as detailed in this statement and the statement dated 29th April 2016, the HSCB accepts the following failings:

90 At times record keeping was not good enough. The following occasions are noted:

- a. There was a failure by the Chief Welfare Officer to record the outcome of the investigation of complaints in 1971 and the reason for that decision.
- b. In early 1976 there was a failure to make any written record regarding information reported to the Hollywood Road sub-office, and passed to Residential and Daycare Management at District Headquarters. The absence of such a record likely influenced the subsequent failure to investigate the information in any way, see paragraphs 86 and 88 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
- c. There ought to have been a formal record of the Board's engagement with police after March 1976, see paragraph 102 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;

- d. Monthly reports completed by the visiting Social Worker pursuant to the 1975 Direction were completed en bloc and on occasions were submitted late, see paragraph 72 of this statement above. They also did not contain relevant information to allow the Eastern Board to be fully appraised of developments occurring with the hostel in late 1977, see paragraph 120 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
91. At times there was no communication to ensure the relevant personnel had access to full and proper information regarding the Hostel and issues arising in relation thereto. The following occasions are noted:
- a. Upon taking up post as Children's Officer in 1971, with a statutory responsibility to visit Kincora, Mr Bunting was not provided with "the Mason File" and was not, therefore, fully appraised of the two complaints that had been investigated in 1967 and 1971. The retention of the file by Mr Mason resulted in a breakdown in the dissemination of information about complaints against Mr Mains to staff with a direct role in management and monitoring the Hostel. It was 'regrettable that [Mr Mason] does not appear to have made Mr Bunting [Children's Officer] and Mrs Wilson [Assistant Children's Officer] fully acquainted with the complaints known to him by referring the "Mason file" formally to them in writing in view of their management responsibility for the hostel". See paragraph 45 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
 - b. The information received by way of anonymous telephone call on 23 January 1974 ought to have been shared as follows:
 - i. with the police, see paragraphs 57 and 59 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
 - ii. with the Board, see paragraph 58 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
 - c. In March 1974, there was a failure by police to share relevant information about allegations against a member of staff with the

Eastern Board. This was however outwith the control of the HSCB's predecessor;

- d. In May and September 1974 there was a failure to share information about a complaint by fieldwork staff in the North and West Belfast District with Residential and Daycare Management in the East Belfast and Castlereagh District, who had line management responsibility for Kincora, see paragraphs 69 and 71 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
- e. In 1975 there was a failure to report rumours heard about staff at the hostel to Residential and Daycare Management in the East Belfast and Castlereagh District, who had line management responsibility for Kincora. This in itself would have been unlikely to prevent or detect abuse, but knowledge of it might have influenced their response to future information. See paragraphs 83 and 84 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
- f. In early 1976 Ms McGrath failed to pass information that she had received from the Holywood Road sub-office to the District Social Services Officer, see paragraph 88 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
- g. Between October 1973 and 1976 there was a lack of information shared from the District to the Eastern Board as to serious allegations made against a member of residential staff. This was particularly the case in March 1976 when despite information being received by the District from the Board, there was not a flow of information from the District to allow the Board to be fully informed, see paragraphs 97, 99 and 100 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
- h. The information provided to the Director of Social Services by police in March 1976 ought to have been communicated confidentially to the Chairman of the Personal Social Services Committee and the Board.

Given the seriousness of the matter the information ought also to have been shared with the Department of Health. See paragraph 103 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;

- i. The manner of recording of the monthly social work visitor reports in late 1977 hindered communication of matters arising with the Hostel from the District to the Board. Further no other form of communication was undertaken to advise the Eastern Board of the issues arising at that time in relation to R18 and R20. See paragraphs 120 and 132 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;

92. Systems to implement statutory monitoring of the Hostel were underdeveloped, specifically:

- a. The role of the visiting Social Worker under the 1975 Direction and the information that ought to be contained within reports provided, see paragraph 120 of the statement dated 29th April 2016;
- b. There was a “considerable time-lag” between October 1973 and mid 1974 before the members of the Personal Social Services Committee were given guidance on their statutory duties under the 1952 SR&O, see paragraph 66 of this statement above;

In identifying the specific failings detailed above, the HSCB considers that in and of themselves many would not have been capable of preventing or detecting the homosexual abuse that occurred in Kincora Hostel. Detailed analysis of this issue was undertaken during the Hughes Inquiry, whose findings are detailed in the HSCB's statement dated 29th April 2016. The exceptions to this are the two occasions, in 1967 and 1974, where a referral to police ought to have been made. However even in this respect, and as found by the Hughes Inquiry, whether that would have resulted in a full investigation, or an uncovering of the abuse that was occurring in Kincora, would be a matter of conjecture. See HIA 729, para 3.119 (1967), HIA 769, para 4.47 (1974).

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed

A handwritten signature in purple ink, appearing to read 'Lyn Adams', is written over the 'Signed' label.

Dated 23 May 2016

WITNESS NAME: HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE BOARD

DATE: 23 May 2016


The Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1955

Fionnuala McAndrew

Rule 9 – KINCORA

Exhibit 1

Belfast News-Letter 7th May, 1958.



Kincora, Upper Newtownards Road, which was opened yesterday as a working boys' hostel.



The Lady Mayoress (third from left), who opened the boys' home, receiving a bouquet from Councillor Dorothy Williamson. Also in the picture are—Councillor A. T. Hull (right) and Councillor J. Dixon (left). Behind are Mr. J. K. Magee (right), Welfare Officer, and Mr. J. Mains (warden).

First home for working youths opened

The first residential hostel in Northern Ireland to be established by a statutory body for working youths who have no homes of their own and find difficulty in securing lodgings was opened yesterday by the Lady Mayoress of Belfast (Mrs. Cecil M'Kee) on behalf of Belfast Corporation Welfare Committee.

The home—"Kincora"—situated at 236, Upper Newtownards Road, is the fifth home which the committee have opened for young people. The boys who stay there will be encouraged to attend further education and night classes and to take part in the running of the home.

Mrs. M'Kee said that when young people came into the city to work or train, they often got into the wrong places and subsequently fell into bad habits. Homes such as that would give them an opportunity to take the first major step in their lives in decent conditions and with the knowledge that there would be someone at home who was interested in their problems and always available for friendly guidance.

She knew that the only reward that Councillor Fair and his committee sought was that those who used the hostel would by their character and achievements bring honour and renown to Kincora.

Lasting influence

"I hope," Mrs. M'Kee concluded, "that Kincora will be to the residents a true home in every sense and that its influence on their lives will be a lasting one for good."

The deputy chairman of the Welfare Committee, Councillor James Dixon, presided at the ceremony in place of Councillor Fair, who was indisposed. The dedicatory prayer was said by the Rev. Eric J. Mason, and a vote of thanks was proposed by Councillor Arthur Hull. Councillor Dorothy Williamson presented a bouquet to the Lady Mayoress.

The hostel, which was purchased at a cost of £3,200 and renovated at a cost of a further £2,000, has accommodation for nine residents at a time. There is a sitting room for general use, and an additional reading and study room. The garage and out-houses will be used eventually for handicrafts. It is hoped that the residents will eventually find suitable lodgings of their own and lead a normal life in the community.

While in the home they will contribute from their wages to help with the upkeep. The minimum age will be 15, and the boys will be under the care of a warden. It is hoped that if the experiment is successful additional hostels will be opened.

WITNESS NAME: HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE BOARD

DATE: 23 May 2016

The Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1955

Fionnuala McAndrew

Rule 9 – KINCORA

Exhibit 2

EASTERN HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES BOARDCONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM

From: The Director of Social Services.....

To: The District Social Services Officer.....
(East Belfast and Castlereagh District.)

Ref. ESG/KL

Ref.
Copy: Miss L.M. McGrath, P.S.W.21st July, 1980. *Sub*Kincora Boys' Hostel

The Personal Social Services Committee agreed at the meeting on 10th July, 1980 to recommend to the Board the phasing out of Kincora Boys' Hostel and to receive at the next meeting of the Committee proposals in relation to alternative use of the premises.

In the meantime I should be glad if you could now let me have the detailed arrangements for the phasing out of the use of this facility and a full submission on the proposed alternative use.

Mr. Bunting will be available to discuss any proposals following his return from annual leave on 11th August, 1980.

Your memo of 9th July, 1980 refers.

A. Sheil
Director of Social Services

WITNESS NAME: HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE BOARD

DATE: 23 May 2016

The Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1955

Fionnuala McAndrew

Rule 9 – KINCORA

Exhibit 3

PERSONAL

Mr. C.W. Scoular,
District Social Services Officer.
9/E.1.
CWS/MR.

1st October, 1980.

Copy:

Mr. E.S. Gilliland,
Director of Social Services.

-

Mr. P. Gibson, S.S.W.
Miss L.M. McGrath, P.S.W.
*Mr. R.J. Pitt, D.A.O.

Kincora Boys' Hostel

I wish to inform you that all the boys who were recently resident in Kincora have now found alternative accommodation and the Hostel has been emptied.

Arrangements have been made for the domestic and catering staff to be redeployed and my temporary staff will now proceed to their new posts.

I should be glad if you would inform the Chairman and the Area Executive Team accordingly.

DISTRICT SOCIAL SERVICES OFFICER

* Mr. Pitt - Please inform Miss J. Cameron and Miss S.P. McMurray and ask them to redeploy the ladies as quickly as possible. Miss McMurray has already done this I think but Miss Cameron would need now to move more quickly than she originally thought.

WITNESS NAME: HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE BOARD

DATE: 23 May 2016

The Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1955

Fionnuala McAndrew

Rule 9 – KINCORA

Exhibit 4

CONFIDENTIAL

Opened by Belfast Welfare Authority on 6th May, 1958. It was established for working boys aged 15 - 18 years who were in care but could be used to accommodate boys up to 21 years of age. Occasionally younger boys were accommodated for short periods in the hostel if an older brother was there or there were no vacancies in other Children's Homes.

STAFF

Mr. Mains was Officer in Charge of the Hostel from it opened until he was suspended from duty in 1980.

Mr. Semple - Deputy from 1964 - 1966 and from 1969 until he was suspended in 1980.

Mr. McGrath - Housefather from June 1971 until he was suspended in 1980.

Mrs. McCullough - was domestic at the Hostel from 13th July 1958 until it closed in 1980.

Mrs. Smith - was domestic at the Hostel from 15th November 1966 until it closed in 1980.

None of these staff ever made any complaints against other staff members.

For a few years in the 1960's (possibly 1967, 1968) Mr. Mains was the only care staff member due to the difficulties of recruiting residential staff.

Kincora was brought to the public attention on 24th January, 1980 by a reporter, Mr. McKenna for the Irish Independent newspaper.

R.U.C. began an intensive investigation following this newspaper report - Investigation covered the period 1963 - 1980.

186 boys accommodated in Kincora during this period

104 traced and interviewed

33 complained to R.U.C. that they had been sexually molested while at Kincora.

21 charges brought against Mr. Mains

24 charges against Mr. McGrath

4 charges against Mr. Semple

These charges related to 18 boys.

1 boy 14 at the time of the offence

5 boys 15 at the time of the offence

7 boys 16 at the time of the offence

2 boys 17 at the time of the offence

2 boys 18 at the time of the offence

2 boys 19 at the time of the offence

First complaint re. Mr. Mains by two boys in September, 1967. Mr. Mains put his hand down a boy's pants. Supervised a boy bathing. Mr. Mains got drunk a weekends. Investigated by Mr. Mason, City Welfare Officer and Mr. Moore, Children's Officer. Information forwarded to Town Clerk. Mrs. Wilson, Homes Officer and then Assistant Children's Officer made aware of these complaints.

Second complaint in August, 1971 re. Mr. Mains by a boy aged 18½. Letter sent to Mr. Moore, Children's Officer and to Mrs. Robinson, boy's Social Worker in West Belfast Division, who forwarded it through her Senior Social Worker, Miss Nicholl, to Mr. Mason, City Welfare Officer.

(Mr. Moore had left Belfast Welfare Authority in May/June 1971 to take up the position of Deputy County Welfare Officer with Down County Welfare Department.)

Alleged that Mr. Mains had asked him to rub his back with some cream. He went to Mr. Mains bedroom to do this. He was concerned about the sexual behaviour of another boy he was sharing a room with. Mr. Mains suggested that he sleep with him. He got into Mr. Mains' bed. Didn't remove his pants. Mr. Mains made improper suggestions to him. He got out of bed and went to his own bedroom. This incident happened in 1969

The boy had continued to reside in the hostel following it and had no further complaints during this period. He was making the complaint on leaving the hostel.

Mr. Bunting was Divisional Welfare Officer for West Belfast and was told about the letter by Mrs. Robinson and Miss Nicholl when he arrived back from holidays.

Mrs. Wilson, Assistant Children's Officer, is of the opinion that she was on holiday when the complaint was received. The complaint was investigated by Mr. Mason, City Welfare Officer, Mr. McCaffrey, Assistant Children's Officer and Mr. Johnston, Deputy Town Clerk.

Mr. Mason sent a memo to the Town Solicitor on 25th August, 1971 indicating that there seemed to be sufficient grounds to consider referring the matter to the R.U.C.

Mr. Bunting took up post as Children's Officer for Belfast Welfare Authority in October, 1971 and was given to understand that the matter had been satisfactorily dealt with by the City Welfare Officer. Mrs. Wilson continued to supervise the hostel and was aware of the complaints.

This complaint arrived at the time of internment in August, 1971 and Welfare staff were involved in dealing with the aftermath of civil unrest arising from internment.

Around June, 1973, Mr. Mason retired from the service and gave Mr. Bunting two files which he had been holding personally. These files contained information on complaints dealt with by Mr. Mason in regard to Kincora Hostel and Ettaville Hostel for Girls. Mr. Mason was clearing his desk at this time. These files were regarded as dead files.

Mr. Bunting was appointed to an Assistant Director of Social Services post with the Eastern Health and Social Services Board and brought these files with him.

Mrs. Wilson was appointed to a Principal Social Worker post for the residential and day care services in East Belfast and Castlereagh District and continued to supervise Kincora Hostel.

In January 1974, there was an anonymous telephone call to Mr. McKay, Senior Social Worker in the Holywood Road Sub-District Office of East Belfast and Castlereagh District alleging that Mr. McGrath was a homosexual. Mr. McKay 'phoned the District H/Q and spoke to Mr. Todd, Assistant Principal Social Worker. Mr. Todd informed Mrs. Wilson, Principal Social Worker, who investigated. The allegation was put to Mr. McGrath, who denied it and explained that some people were trying to make trouble for him because of his involvement in politics. This was the time of the upsurge of U.D.A. activities.

The local R.U.C. had received a similar allegation at this time about Mr. McGrath. Mrs. Wilson reported this allegation and investigation to Mr. Scoular - but it was not reported to Mr. Bunting or Mr. Gilliland.

In May 1974, there was a complaint from the mother of a 14 year old boy, called **R 15**, who was accommodated in the hostel for a short period with an older brother, that Mr. McGrath had groped him on two occasions. This boy had been placed in the hostel by Social Workers ~~xx~~ ^{from} North and West Belfast District. The mother complained to the Social Worker, Mrs. Grey, in the Shankill Office, West Belfast. Mrs. Grey discussed the complaint with Mr. Mains and was assured that the complaint was unfounded.

In September 1974, [REDACTED] complained again. Complaint discussed with Mrs. Grey and her Senior Social Worker, Mr. Orr.

It was decided to discharge the boy from the hostel.

These complaints were not reported to senior management in North and West Belfast District or East Belfast and Castlereagh District or to Mr. Bunting or Mr. Gilliland.

In February 1976, Detective Constable Cullen called to see Mr. Bunting. He said that he was investigating allegations that Mr. McGrath was involved in para military activities and homosexual activities. This was a confidential investigation which could involve prominent people in the community and he was reporting directly to Assistant Chief Constable Meharg.

His informant wished to remain anonymous and was an ex-Queen's student who knew Mr. McGrath. He asked if there had been any complaints about Mr. McGrath.

Mr. Bunting indicated that there were no complaints regarding Mr. McGrath to his knowledge but that he would have to check this.

D.C. Cullen then asked if there were complaints about other staff in the hostel and mentioned Mr. Mains. Mr. Bunting recalled the Mason file and made D.C. Cullen aware of it. D.C. Cullen asked if he could have a copy and Mr. Bunting indicated that this would probably be alright but he would have to discuss it with Mr. Gilliland, Director

of Social Services. D.C. Cullen also requested a list of boys who had been discharged from the hostel since Mr. McGrath's appointment to ascertain whether Mr. McGrath was keeping in contact with these boys or involving them in his activities.

Mr. Bunting stressed to D.C. Cullen the need for the Board to take action should he have any evidence that Mr. McGrath's activities involved boys in the hostel. He was assured by D.C. Cullen that there was no information or evidence on which to act at that point in time.

Mr. Bunting informed Mr. Gilliland of the Mason file and the discussion with D.C. Cullen. It was agreed that a copy of the file would be given to D.C. Cullen and that the investigation would be discussed with Mr. Scoular and a list of boys obtained from him.

Mr. Bunting subsequently arranged a meeting with Mr. Scoular and informed him of the investigation and the Mason file and gave him the file. Mr. Scoular confirmed that there had been no complaints about Mr. McGrath.

A copy of the file had been taken to give to D.C. Cullen and Mr. Scoular supplied a list of boys.

Mr. Gilliland and Mr. Bunting subsequently met D.C. Cullen in Mr. Gilliland's office in March 1976 and handed him the file and list of boys.

Both Mr. Gilliland and Mr. Bunting stressed the need to be informed immediately if any information or evidence came to light regarding Mr. McGrath's activities which would enable action to be taken.

From 1976 on, Mr. Bunting kept in contact with D.C. Cullen by telephone. D.C. Cullen continued his investigations and was off ill for a period which delayed this. Eventually in 1978, Mr. Bunting was informed by D.C. Cullen that he had reported to Mr. Meharg, Assistant Chief Constable, but that his informant was not able to substantiate his information and there was no evidence on which to take action.

During this time, Mr. Bunting kept Mr. Scoular and Mr. Gilliland informed and on a number of occasions, Mr. Scoular contacted Mr. Bunting to find out how the Cullen investigation was proceeding.

In October 1977, a 15½ year old boy, **R 18**, alleged to his Social Worker, Mrs. Hyland (Down District) that Mr. McGrath had embraced him and engaged in long discussions about sex. This boy was thought to have been involved in homosexual activities before admission to the hostel.

Mrs. Hyland discussed this allegation with Mr. Mains and was not satisfied with his response. She then discussed it with Mr. Chard, Principal Social Worker (Fieldwork Services), Down District, and a report was forwarded to Mr. Higham, Assistant Principal Social Worker (Residential and Day Care), East Belfast and Castlereagh District, who was responsible for supervising the hostel at that time.

This allegation was reported to Mr. Scoular who discussed it with his management staff. It was not reported to Mr. Bunting or Mr. Gilliland.

In December 1977, Chief Inspector Sillery, Strandtown R.U.C. and Mr. Conway, Senior Social Worker, Rathgael Training School, expressed concern about Ritchie Kerr, 16 years old, who had been admitted to Training School from the hostel. Their concern centred on Ritchie's relationship with Mr. Mains. However, Ritchie would not admit that there was anything improper in their relationship.

They discussed their suspicions with Mr. Scoular. Miss Gogarty, Social Worker (North and West Belfast District) and Mr. Morrow, Senior Social Worker (North and West Belfast District) who were responsible for visiting Ritchie were also suspicious of the relationship and discussed it with Mr. Higham, Assistant Principal Social Worker, Miss McGrath, Principal Social Worker, and Mr. Scoular, the responsible management staff. Miss Gogarty and Mr. Morrow were told not to pursue it as an investigation was being carried out into Kincora. This was not reported to Mr. Bunting or Mr. Gilliland.

In March 1979, Mrs. Kennedy, a Senior Social Worker in North and West Belfast District wrote in a report for record purposes that Kincora could not be considered for the placement of a boy as there was a query whether the staff were involved in a circle of homosexuals. Mr. Blair, Principal Social Worker, (Fieldwork Services), North and West Belfast District, instructed Mrs. Kennedy to remove this from the report as there was no evidence on which to make such a statement. He discussed this with Mr. Sharpe, District Social Services Officer, (North and West Belfast District), who agreed that this statement should not be on record because of the lack of evidence to substantiate it. This was not reported to Mr. Bunting or Mr. Gilliland.

There were no other complaints or allegations made to staff of which we are aware and there were never any complaints made against Mr. Semple, the Deputy at Kincora Hostel.

On 24th January 1980, a report appeared in the Irish Independent newspaper alleging that the staff of Kincora were involved in homosexual activities and that there was a vice ring involving prominent people.

An investigation was undertaken by the R.U.C. involving a team of detectives headed by Chief Inspector Caskey. This investigation took almost two years to complete and covered the period 1963 - 1980.

The Sir George Terry enquiry into the handling by the R.U.C. of the investigation covered the same ground as the R.U.C.

BELFAST.

28th February, 1958.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Working Boys' Hostel.
236, Upper Newtownards Road.

The hostel will be used to provide accommodation for boys over compulsory school age, and particularly those whom it has not been possible to board out, i.e. those who may have a parent who wishes to visit, and any who are rather difficult socially.

These boys would normally pass out of care on attaining the age of 18 years, but it may be necessary to permit some to remain in the hostel until they are 21. In these circumstances the necessary approval will be sought from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

On admission a resident will be given a copy of the rules which will be as undernoted :-

- (a) All the boys will be expected to co-operate with the warden in the successful running of the hostel.
- (b) They will be expected to assist in the day to day running of the hostel in bed-making, dish-washing and in an evening rota system of domestic duties which from time to time arise.
- (c) They will be encouraged to attend evening classes in respect of further education and in particular those in connection with their apprenticeships.
- (d) They will be encouraged to attend religious service in accordance with their own faith.
- (e) They will bath weekly or more regularly if their trade or occupation so demands, and the highest standard of cleanliness will only be acceptable in the hostel.
- (f) They will require to be in the hostel at 10.45.p.m. except when permitted to be later with the warden's permission and knowledge of their whereabouts on such an occasion.
- (g) They will be encouraged to save and provide clothing for personal needs.
- (h) Efforts will be made to find suitable employment on behalf of the residents.
- (i) No alcohol or spirits will be permitted on the premises and anyone found with such, or under the influence, severe disciplinary action will be taken.
- (j) A reading cum study room will be provided on the second floor, and the garages utilised as handicraft rooms.
- (k) All pay packets will be given to the warden and each resident will contribute $\frac{3}{5}$ ths of his income towards his maintenance and the balance will be equally divided between pocket money and a clothing account, but a minimum of 5/- pocket money will be paid. If a resident urgently requires clothing on admission then this should be provided. If a person is not receiving any statutory benefit or is unemployed then they will receive pocket money at the rate of 5/- per week.

- (m) The boys will be encouraged to bring their friends to visit them in their hostel.

I am, Mr. Chairman, Ladies & Gentlemen,
Your obedient Servant,

Arul Raju
Welfare Officer.

WITNESS NAME: HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE BOARD

DATE: 23 May 2016

The Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1955

Fionnuala McAndrew

Rule 9 – KINCORA

Exhibit 5

Eastern Health and Social Services Board



East Belfast and Castlereagh District

Purdysburn Hospital, Saintfield Road,
Belfast BT8 8BH
Tel.: Belfast 649191

District Social Services Officer:
Clive W. Scouler, Cert.S.W.

our ref:

your ref:

KINGCORA

DATE OF BIRTH

DATE ADMITTED

23-10-56 -18
 26-10-59 -15
 16-1-61 -13
 17-7-57 -17
 21-4-60 -14
 6-1-60 -14
 1-6-58 -18
 21-1-58 -16
 5-10-57 -17
 26-6-60 -14
 26-6-60 -14
 21-2-58 -16
 20-1-60 -14
 22-7-58 -16
 24-8-58 -16
 23-6-58 -16
 3-1-65 -9
 25-11-65 -9
 -3-67 -7
 4-8-67 -8
 16-12-58 -16
 22-7-64 -11
 12-5-66 -9
 12-5-66 -9
 12-6-81 -14
 13-1-59 -16
 28-5-59 -16
 14-1-59 -16
 10-6-60 -15
 29-3-59 -17
 23-9-60 -16
 30-8-61 -15
 11-5-62 -15
 18-5-62 -15
 28-7-63 -14
 29-8-61 -16
 14-10-61 -16
 3-5-61 -16
 13-6-65 -12
 5-10-66 -11
 3-6-64 -13
 16-12-62 -15
 19-4-62 -15

15-2-74 -A
 21-2-74 -A
 2-5-74
 17-6-74
 17-6-74
 6-7-74
 6-7-74
 24-7-74
 13-8-74
 15-8-74
 15-8-74
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 19-5-77
 3-10-77
 26-7-77
 15-8-77
 6-10-77
 6-10-77
 6-10-77
 16-10-77
 19-10-77

Age 16 & over -16 . Age 13 - Under 16 -14
 Age 15 & Under 16 -7 Under 13 -9 TOTAL 43

23
 16
 39

WITNESS NAME: HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE BOARD

DATE: 23 May 2016

The Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1955

Fionnuala McAndrew

Rule 9 – KINCORA

Exhibit 6

Seen 26/9
26/9/79

KIN-1134
The file is returned to Mr. [unclear]
Eastern Board/Adapted
(East Belfast & Castlereagh Dist)

Report on: Kincora Boys' Hostel
236 Upper Newtownards Road
Belfast BT4 3EU
Telephone: Belfast 657838

Client Group: Boys, normally of working age, who are in the care of the Board.

Date of visit: 20 June 1979.

1. General Design Features

1.1 Outside

Siting: The Hostel, opened in 1958, is a pleasant, large detached house situated on the corner of the junction between Upper Newtownards Road and North Road. Apart from a small, inconspicuous sign at the front door indicating it is Board property there is no other indication that it is a young persons' facility. An annexe containing a double bedroom, bathroom and toilet for the use of the Officer-in-Charge was built in 1967.

Size: There is a reasonably sized garden on three sides of the Hostel with mature trees and flower beds. Maintenance and planting of the garden is undertaken by the Parks and Cemeteries Department of the City Council!

General Appearance

1.2 Inside: The accommodation is very well maintained, pleasant; clean, comfortable, with carpeted floors.

1.3 Areas: Sleeping accommodation is provided in three large bedrooms on the first floor with three modern low divans in each room. This arrangement does not provide the extra privacy which older children should have.

2. -

3. Maximum Capacity: 9 boys. The Hostel formerly accommodated 11 residents, but with the discontinued use of the attic accommodation the number was reduced to 9.

4. Number of places occupied on date of visit: 9

5. Age range for admission: 16-18 years

6. Age range of residents on day of visit: 15-17½ years

7. Aim and regime of the Hostel: To prepare adolescent boys who are shortly to leave the care of the Board for independent living and to offer them, as far as possible, a way of life similar to that in a normal, flexible, well supervised home.

8. Meals:

Breakfast: 7.00 am - 9.30 am
This meal is served by staff up to 8.00 am
After 8.00 am residents prepare their own breakfast.
Lunch: 12.30 pm - 1.00 pm
Dinner: 6.00 pm
Supper: Up to 11.00 pm

9. Arrangements for Health Service: The appointed Medical Officer is Dr Hamilton, Hollywood Road, with whom the residents are registered. Residents choose their own dentists.
10. Arrangements for storage and administration of medicines and first aid equipment: Medicines and first aid equipment are kept in a cupboard in a locked food store. First aid needs are available from the Ulster Hospital, Dundonald.
11. Arrangements for the supply of aids and appliances: -
12. Other Services: -
13. Transport arrangements: Public transport is convenient. The Hostel has a supply of bus tickets.

A Board minibus can be made available from time to time for outings.
14. Incentives and Payments: -
15. Personal allowances/Pocket Money: In the absence of the officer-in-charge the information given by the member of staff whom I met, Mr W McGrath, was somewhat vague. Boys contribute about £8 to £9 per week on a sliding scale towards their maintenance and retain the remainder of their wages. They are encouraged to have a bank saving account. Those residents who are attending school appear to receive a pocket money allowance similar to that included in boarding-out allowances.
16. Personal clothing: Order forms are used and residents have to make their purchases at one supplier currently located in Finaghy and are accompanied by a member of staff. Laundering is done by hostel staff.
17. Residents' activities: Mainly watching television; some interest in chess and monopoly. Mr McGrath said that while residents formerly stayed in and made rugs or were involved in woodworking, they are now more likely to spend their evenings outside the hostel at discos etc. He likened the hostel to a comfortable hotel.
18. Community services provided from the hostel: -
19. Day care arrangements: -
20. Arrangements for social work support: Boys are visited regularly by their social workers. Reviews are held, on average, every three months. There is regular contact between the officer in charge and Mr G Higham, AFSW, at District Headquarters, usually by telephone.
21. Statutory records: I found the register of admissions and discharges satisfactorily kept.
22. Arrangements for visitors: Visitors are welcomed but there is no overnight accommodation available. There appears to be few boys who contact the hostel after they leave and Mr McGrath referred to the marked lack of interest in and contact by the boys with their families.
23. Voluntary helpers: -
24. Fire precaution arrangements: Mr McGrath said that there had been a fire drill within the past two months. The Fire Authority supervised a fire drill carried out in November 1978 when all fire appliances were inspected.

25. Administration and staffing: Mr J Maina, officer-in-charge, has been in post since the hostel opened 21 years ago. He lives in. He has two assistants:-

Mr W McGrath in post for 8 years

Mr R Semple in post for 9 years

In addition, there are two domestic assistants on a shift system to cope with cooking and cleaning.

None of the caring staff has had appropriate training.

26. Additional information: I was struck by the absence of evidence of hard usage of the premises and the presence of personal possessions/pin ups in the bedrooms.

The teaching of independence skills and acquiring a general capacity to cope with issues in daily living is most important in such a setting. I doubt that there is any systematic instruction in 'Kincora'. If all or nearly all the domestic and social needs of the adolescent are being met by the adults around him, he is actually being taught to be dependent.

Three of the residents are soon to leave the hostel. It is encouraging to learn that finding employment for the boys is not a problem.

Boys are required to be in by 11.00 p.m. unless they have obtained a late pass.

27. Items drawn to the attention of:

(a) Unit supervisor

(b) District Social Services Officer - I plan to discuss District policy on preparation of young people for independent living in the Hostel with Mr Scoular following my visits to all three facilities in the District which provide residential care for adolescents.

J L O'Kane

J L O'Kane
Social Work Advisory Group

29 August, 1979.

WITNESS NAME: HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE BOARD

DATE: 23 May 2016

The Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1955

Fionnuala McAndrew

Rule 9 – KINCORA

Exhibit 7

EASTERN HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES BOARDMEMORANDUMFrom: ...The Director of Social Services.....To: ...The District Social Services Officer....
EAST BELFAST & CASTLEREAGH DISTRICT.

Ref. ESG/PK.

Ref.

CONFIDENTIAL.

4th March, 1980.


Kincora Boy's Hostel.

As agreed at our meeting this morning, I would ask you to take action in accordance with the Social Work Staffs Joint Council Terms and Conditions of Service, Page 120, para.6, headed "Precautionary Suspension pending a decision" which reads as follows:-

" In special circumstances, precautionary suspension may be imposed immediately by the Disciplinary Authority pending formal investigation of the alleged offence or pending the outcome of an appeal. In all such cases the officer should continue to receive his full normal remuneration even though in some cases suspension may necessarily be for a period which cannot be determined in advance."

This action is necessary as the Police enquiries now involve allegations made against members of staff of the Hostel, and it is considered that the action to institute precautionary suspension of the 3 senior staff is in the best interests of the staff themselves, the young persons in the Hostel, and the Board.

Please make the necessary arrangements for the on-going day to day running of the Hostel, and let me have details of these arrangements.


Director of Social Services.

WITNESS NAME: HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE BOARD

DATE: 23 May 2016

The Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1955

Fionnuala McAndrew

Rule 9 – KINCORA

Exhibit 8

9/11
c/d. 1/3/58. *ew salary*

HISTORY SHEET

KIN-1140

Date	REPORT	Initials of Officer
29.11.55	Appointment of Mr. J. Mains recommended as Warden at Park Lodge, subject to Ministry approval.	<u>151</u>
9.1.56	Commenced duty 1 st Jan. 1956.	
9.1.56	W.O. reported that Mr. J. Mains had taken up duty on 1 st instant	
26.6.56	Special leave without pay granted for a period of one week to allow Mr. J. Mains to attend the Royal Review of the St. John Ambulance Brigade at Southsea, Hants.	
21-8-56	Re retention of services.	
	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
19-2-57	The W.O. reported that Mr. J. Mains had been given unpaid leave from 10 th till 17 th Feb 1957, and, subsequent to the closing down of Park Lodge, had been transferred on 18 th Feb. 1957 as male attendant at Abbeydore.	
26.11.57.	Appointed <u>Warden, Bay's Hostel</u> subject to various conditions	138
4.3.58	Letter to min 26.11.57 - J. Mains took up duty on 1 st March 58. Recommended emols be valued provisionally for super at £100 pa. also that he be paid 15/- per week whilst providing own food.	
10.6.58.	Letter to minute 4/3/58. J. Mains ceased providing own food as from 10 th May 1958.	
3.8.60.	Approved payment of travelling expenses to Burham-on-Sea.	
25.10.60.	Recommended to attend Refresh Course at Keeley Ryfle College, Manchester from 16 th till 27 th January 1961.	
25.6.68	L/P. C/mttee agreed to Honorarium of £100 subject to approval of Min of Home Affairs	363
29.4.69	Recommended honorarium £125 in lieu of 147 days leave. <i>P 12.5.69.</i>	376

Adv. 47/11/57.

KIN-1141

Form G3

BELFAST COUNTY BOROUGH WELFARE COMMITTEE

2.

APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT

as



WARDEN - WORKING BOYS' HOSTEL.

Application of

Name *Joseph Wainor*

Address  *Belfast*

This form, filled up by the Candidate, must be returned to the
Town Clerk, City Hall, Belfast, not later than

..... 11th November, 1957

Name in full

Joseph Haines KIN-1142

Present Address



Age at 1st December, 1957.
(Birth Certificate to be furnished
on Appointment)

Years 28. Months 5.

Single or married

Single

Nationality

British

Qualifications, with dates

*Warden. Park Lodge Boys' Home
from 1st Jan., 56 to Feb. 57.
Cadet Superintendent St. John
Ambulance Brigade. (Appointed 2nd Aug 49)
Male Nurse. Trenchyburn Hospital 7 years.*

Experience in the running of a
Children's Home and the care of
boys in the age group 14 - 21 yrs.

*Appointed as Resident Warden to
Park Lodge Boys Home (14 months).*

Present position, with length of
service, salary, etc.

*Male Attendant - Abbeydene, Old
Peoples Home. (nine months)
Weekly pay £8.7.9*

Previous appointments with salary
(if any)

Male Nurse

If you are a resident in the area
within which the Corporation are,
for the time being, Authorised to
supply Gas or Electricity, state how
long you have resided in this area.
(Date and Years)

28th from 31/7/29

Have you been rejected on medical grounds for Life Insurance, or for service in the Armed Forces, or for appointment to Civil Service or Local Government service

No.

Give particulars (if any) of Service with H.M. Forces

None

Are you a relative of any member of the Belfast Corporation?

No.

Testimonials attached from (These should be copies only as they will not be returned)

*Belfast Ropework Co., Ltd.
Park Parade School
Turdysburn Hospital
St. John Ambulance Brigade.*

Date on which candidate, if appointed, could enter upon the duties of the office

Within 7 days. (Welfare Employee)

Give any additional information which the candidate may wish to give in support of his application

Signed

J. H. Cairns

Date



Commissioner
Brigadier T. W. DAVIDSON, M.B.
Deputy Commissioner
Brigadier R. J. C. BROADHURST
District Surgeon
GEO. GREGG, M.D., F.R.C.P.,
D.PH. MED.

The Grand Priory in the British Realm
of the

Venerable Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem.

AMBULANCE DEPARTMENT

The St. John Ambulance Brigade

NORTHERN IRELAND DISTRICT.

AMBULANCE CADETS

District Officer Ambulance Cadets - Mr. C. MURRAY, 92 Orangefield Crescent, Belfast.

Deputy District Officer Ambulance Cadets - Mr. A. C. THOMAS, "Kilima," Currowreagh
Dundonald.

Area Cadet Officer - Mr. T. Slavin, 22 Egeria Street, Belfast.

4/11/57.

To whom it may concern

Mr. J. Mains is well known to be one of our most efficient members, having been in the Brigade about 13 years, and for the past 5 years has proved himself a most courteous, dependable, and highly respected Officer of our Youth Branch.

His long service has equipped him with the experience necessary for the discipline and training of youth, and his interests in their welfare, and further education, employment etc., has been most marked. Mr. Mains has not only ability to

inspire confidence but a deep religious, and moral sense of responsibility. It is with pleasure that I recommend him for the post he now seeks, and trust that he may have a successful candidature.

Chas. Murray
(District Officer Amb. Cadets.)

APPLICANTS FOR THE POSITION OF WARDEN WORKING BOYS' HOSTEL.

(Salary £350. x £20. - £450. p. annum plus emoluments).

Name.	Age.	M/S.	Experience in the control and management of a hostel and with working boys.	Present Employment.
[REDACTED]	59 8/12.	S.	None.	None.
[REDACTED]	32.	M.	None.	None.
Mains, Joseph, [REDACTED]	28 5/12.	S.	Warden in Park Lodge January 1956/February 1957, and that gained with voluntary organisations.	Male attendant, Abbeydene, £8.7.9. per week.
BM 3 [REDACTED]	31 2/12.	S.	Housemaster Macedon, Whitehouse 4 8/12 years. Youth Leader 3 years.	Housemaster, Dr. Barnardo's, £290, per annum.

BELFAST COUNTY BOROUGH WELFARE COMMITTEE

Conditions of Appointment of Warden at Working Boy's Hostel, Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast.

(accommodating approximately 9 boys)

1. APPOINTMENT

The appointment will be made by the Welfare Committee, subject to the approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

2. QUALIFICATIONS

Applicants must have had suitable working knowledge of the running of a children's home and preference will be given to a person having had experience in the care of boys in the age group 14 - 21 years.

3. SALARY

The salary attached to the office is £350 per annum rising by annual increments of £20 to a maximum of £450 per annum. The commencing salary within the scale will be determined according to the experience of the person appointed.

4. EMOLUMENTS

The position is a residential one with full board, lodging and laundry provided free of charge.

5. ANNUAL LEAVE

The person appointed will be entitled to annual leave of 21 days including statutory holidays. New entrants to the service are entitled to annual leave proportionate to the completed months of service up till 31st January following the date of entry, provided that no leave shall be taken until the officer has completed six months service.

6. SERVICE

The position is a full-time one and the person appointed shall devote his entire time to the duties of the office. The hours of duty will be a 96 hour fortnight (exclusive of meal times).

7. CONDITIONS AND TENURE OF OFFICE

The appointment will be terminable by either party giving one calendar month's notice expiring on the first day of any month. The conditions of service as prescribed from time to time by the Council for its Officers shall apply to the appointment.

8. DUTIES

- (a) To be responsible for the control and management of the hostel.
- (b) To attend to the general welfare of the boys living in the hostel.
- (c) To make contacts with reputable industrial firms which afford opportunities for apprenticeships.
- (d) To encourage the boys to have savings accounts.

- (e) To encourage the boys to attend evening classes pertaining to their trades.
- (f) To encourage the boys to develop any handicraft abilities in their leisure time.
- (g) To carry out any other duties which may from time to time be required of him.

9. GENERAL

The person appointed shall, if called upon, enter into an agreement setting out the terms of the appointment, and prior to taking up duty shall:-

- (a) Produce Birth Certificate,
- (b) Produce National Insurance Card,
- (c) Pass satisfactorily a medical examination by the Corporation's Industrial Medical Officer.
- (d) Make a Declaration of Allegiance to H.M. the Queen and the Government of Northern Ireland.

10. RETIREMENT

The retiring age under the Corporation's Grading Scheme for Officers is 65 years.

11. SAFEGUARDING OF EMPLOYMENT ACT (N.I.) 1947.

See attached.

12. SUPERANNUATION

The person appointed shall contribute to the Belfast Corporation Superannuation Scheme (in the case of a new entrant to the service, at the rate of approximately 6% of his remuneration).

The Corporation is empowered to enter into reciprocal arrangements with certain other authorities whose Superannuation Schemes are substantially similar to that of the Corporation, whereby service with those Authorities may be taken into account by the Corporation for superannuation purposes. Such arrangements have been made in respect of service with Local Authorities (both in Northern Ireland and Great Britain) and employment in the Northern Ireland Civil Service, and no doubt further similar arrangements with other Authorities will be made in due course.

13. CANVASSING

Canvassing in any form, oral or written, direct or indirect, will, if proved to the satisfaction of the appointing authority, disqualify a candidate for appointment, provided however, that the sending of copies of a candidate's application and testimonials to members of the Committee shall not of itself disqualify such candidate.

14. EX-SERVICE CANDIDATES:

Preference will be given to ex-Service candidates possessing the required qualifications, provided that the Committee is satisfied that such candidates can, or within a reasonable time will be able to, perform the duties of the post efficiently.

NOTE:

No accommodation can be provided for the children of applicants.

1211/-

6th December, 1957.

Sir,

I have to request the approval of the Ministry to the appointment by the Welfare Committee on 26th November, 1957. of Mr. Joseph Mains, "Allan" Comber Road, Belfast. to the position of Garden - Working Boy's Hostel, 236 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast, at a commencing salary of £350 per annum plus emoluments, on the scale of £350 per annum rising by annual increments of £20 to a maximum of £450 per annum plus emoluments.

I enclose Mr. Mains' Application Form, etc. for the perusal of the Ministry and shall be glad to have these returned in due course.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

The Secretary,
The Ministry of Home Affairs,
Stormont,
BELFAST.

TAW/RC

Telephone: Belfast 63210.
Telegrams: "Homaff." Belfast.

Any reply to this communication should
be addressed to

"THE SECRETARY"

and the following reference quoted:

T.524

Your ref: 1211/-



MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, **KIN-1149**
STORMONT,
BELFAST,
Northern Ireland.

24th December, 1957.

Sir,

I am directed by the Minister of Home Affairs to refer to your letter and enclosures of 6th December, 1957, and to convey the Ministry's approval to the appointment by the Welfare Committee of Mr. Joseph Mains, 'Ailsa', Comber Road, Belfast, to the position of Warden (resident) - Working Boys' Hostel, 236 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast, at a commencing salary of £350 per annum, plus emoluments, on the scale of £350 per annum rising by annual increments of £20 to a maximum of £450 per annum, plus emoluments.

The Ministry should be informed in due course of the date on which Mr. Mains takes up duty.

... Mr. Mains's Application Form, etc., which were enclosed with your letter for the perusal of the Ministry, are returned herewith.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

J. Miller
for Secretary

MINUTE 26.11.57

The Welfare Officer,
Belfast County Borough Welfare Authority,
16 College Street,
BELFAST.

KIN-1150

BELFAST CORPORATION INDUSTRIAL HEALTH SERVICE



To.....The Welfare Officer,.....

.....Welfare Department,.....

.....16 College Street, Belfast.

I have to report that the undermentioned has been medically examined with the result as shown:-

NAME.....Mr. J. Mains,.....

ADDRESS.....[REDACTED].....

DEPARTMENT.....Welfare.....

1. Fit for employment as.....Salaried Officer.....

2. Further investigation is required. Result will be notified at a later date.

. Unfit for employment as.....

REMARKS.....

Date.....10th December 1957.....

J. M. Mains
Industrial Medical Officer.

1st June, 1962.

Dear Sir,

I write in reply to your enquiry dated 24th May and have to state that Mr. Joseph Mains has been in the employment of this Department since January, 1956 when he was appointed as non-resident assistant to the Housemother of a small Home catering for 12 boys of school age. On the closing of this home in 1957 he was transferred to a home for old people as male attendant and was later in the same year appointed as Warden in charge of a newly-opened Hostel for 12 boys from 14 - 18 years of age, a post he is still holding.

His duties include the daily care and supervision of the boys in his charge, supervising their school work, finding them suitable employment, keeping their accounts and those of the Hostel and generally seeing to the running of the Hostel. He has an Assistant Warden and a housekeeper, both non-resident.

During Mr. Mains' time in this Department I have always found him a reliable and conscientious Officer, patient and understanding with the boys and pleasant to work with.

His interests I think lie mainly with the younger age group and he should be well able to cope with difficult boys as it is chiefly this type of lad who is accommodated at Kincora.

/-

1st June, 1962.

- 2 -

He has for some years run very successfully a group of St. John's Ambulance Cadets and has also taught the boys rug making and other handicrafts, (but he has no experience of academic teaching).

Apart from this I would think he would be quite suitable for the post for which he is applying.

Yours faithfully,

He has not a great deal of experience on the administrative side, having run Kinross single-handed with the help of the daily householders to put the domestic into post a few weeks ago when he let his house assistant down. He might experience some difficulty in administering a large unit with more staff.

Welfare Officer.

gjb

R. Jones, Esq., B.Com.,
Children's Officer,
1, Priory Road,
Dudley,
WORCS.

EEEDB/BJ.

26th September, 1963.

Dear Sir,

I write in reply to your enquiry dated 20th September and have to state that Mr. Joseph Mains has been in the employment of this Department since January, 1956 when he was appointed as non-resident assistant to the Housemother of a small Home catering for 12 boys of school age. On the closing of this home in 1957 he was transferred to a home for old people as male attendant and was later in the same year appointed as Warden in charge of a newly-opened Hostel for 12 boys from 14 - 18 years of age, a post he is still holding.

His duties include the daily care and supervision of the boys in his charge, supervising their school work, finding them suitable employment, keeping their accounts and those of the Hostel and generally seeing to the running of the Hostel. He has an Assistant Warden and a daily housekeeper.

During Mr. Mains' time in this Department I have always found him a reliable and conscientious Officer, patient and understanding with the boys and pleasant to work with.

His interests I think lie mainly with the younger age group and he should be well able to cope with difficult boys as it is chiefly this type of lad who is accommodated at Kincora.

/-

He has for some years run very successfully a group of St. John's Ambulance Cadets and has also taught the boys rug making and other handicrafts.

He has not a great deal of experience in the administrative side, having run Kincora single-handed with the help of a daily housekeeper and a part-time domestic, until a few months ago when he got his resident Assistant Warden. He might experience some difficulty at first in administering a larger unit with more staff.

Apart from this I would think he would be quite suitable for the post for which he is applying.

Yours faithfully,

Welfare Officer.

29/5

Mrs. B.J. Kahan, M.A. (Cantab.),
Children's Officer,
Oxfordshire County Council,
103, Banbury Road,
OXFORD.

EEEDB/BMcC.

9th January, 1964

Dear Mr. Mains,

I have now considered your absence from Kincora during the evening of Monday 6th, and the most unsatisfactory way in which my enquiries were answered, and having taken everything into consideration, have decided that I will not make a report to the Welfare Committee of the circumstances, provided I am not given cause for future concern about the administration of the Home.

Yours faithfully,

Mr. J. Mains,
"Kincora",
236, Upper Newtownards Road,
Belfast, 4.

HM/JW.

ADM/BD.

CONFIDENTIAL

23rd April, 1965.

Dear Madam,

Warden - Frobisher House

I have to state, in reply to your enquiry of 14th April, that Mr. Joseph Mains has been Warden of Kincora, our hostel for working boys, since it was opened in January 1956 and although lacking in previous experience of this kind of work has proved himself a thoroughly reliable and conscientious officer and a good friend to the boys. The hostel accommodates 12 boys and after the first few months has always been filled to capacity. It caters mainly for boys who are too young or too disturbed for placement in lodgings, but from time to time we have to accommodate short-stay boys who are temporarily homeless or destitute.

In addition to managing the hostel with full time daily domestic help Mr. Mains has been responsible for the day to day care of the boys, for co-operating with the Youth Advisory Service in seeing that they are placed in suitable employment and generally helping them to become independent. On occasions he has also been successful in placing quite a number in lodgings. He has a happy relationship with his boys and without being in any way a disciplinarian the boys respect him and usually keep in touch with him after their discharge.

There is one point on which his ability might not meet with your requirements and that is writing of reports which leaves a good deal to be desired, but there is no reason why he should not improve with experience as it is mainly academic ability that he lacks.

/...

Mr. Mains has had some experience with younger boys as well as with adolescents but seems to be most successful with small groups of the 12 - 16 age group.

I am confident that he would put his best into any position he was appointed to.

Yours faithfully,

Children's Officer

Miss B. E. Drake, Children's Officer,
London Borough of Tower Hamlets,
Children's Department,
Gem House,
Backchurch Lane,
LONDON E.1.

EEEDB/WMcQ.

WARDEN - KINCORA.*During*

From 1st June 1964 until 26th April 1968 Mr.Mains has been without the help of an Assistant Warden for a total of approximately 20 months (this does not include periods of sickness, for example, the last Assistant Warden was on sick leave from 11th December 1967 until he resigned on 19th January 1968).

Had an Assistant Warden been in post for this period, the cost to the Department, assuming that the holder of the post would have been paid no more than the minimum of the scale, would have been *approx* £873.

In the absence of an Assistant Warden, Mr.Mains, as the sole member of staff immediately responsible for the welfare of the boys resident in the Hostel, has had to be available on duty each day for the whole of 20 months. Consequently, he has not only been working under a considerable strain but has had to give service considerably in excess of what would normally be expected.

In the circumstances, I feel it would be appropriate to express appreciation of Mr.Mains' services by way of an honorarium and that this honorarium should be fixed at £100.

*Subject to GP's approval.**John Jones*

Children's Officer.

21st May, 1968.

WELFARE DEPT.	
CWO..... <i>sh</i>	DCWO.....
AO.....	SDWO(W).....
CO.....	DWO(N).....
DWO(S).....	DWO(E).....
23 MAY 1968	
TRG.O.....	HHD.....
Su & A/cs.....	Est.....
A & R.....	Rec.....
Copy to	
File No.....	Filed by

*See memo
Person*

Est/1211/TAW

22nd July, 1968.

Dear Sir,

re: Honorarium - Mr. J. Mains,
Warden - Kincora.

The Welfare Committee on 25th June agreed that an honorarium of £100 be paid to Mr. J. Mains in view of the additional responsibility and additional hours worked as he has been without an Assistant for approximately 20 months in the period from June 1964 until June 1968.

The approval of the Ministry is requested to this proposal which is subject to adoption by the Council in September through the General Purposes Committee in August.

Yours faithfully,

GP. MINUTE 12/8/68

Deputy City Welfare Officer.

The Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs,
Children's Branch,
Stormont,
BELFAST,
BT4 3SU

TAW/PP.

KIN-1160

363



Government of Northern Ireland
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

Stormont, BELFAST, BT4 3SU

Telegrams: Homaff, Belfast

Telephone: Belfast 63210

Any reply should be
addressed to:

THE SECRETARY

Our reference: EST/1211/TAW

26th July, 1968.

Your reference: T.C.751

Dear Sir,

I write with reference to your letter of 22nd July, 1968, and convey approval to the payment of an honorarium of £100 to Mr. J. Mains, Warden of Kincora Hostel. The Ministry hopes that the Welfare Authority will succeed in their efforts to fill the vacant Assistant Warden post.

Yours faithfully,

L. S. McCartney

MINUTE 25-6-68

GP. MINUTE 12.8.68

The City Welfare Officer,
16 College Street,
Belfast.
BT1 6BT

WELFARE DEPT	
AWO.....	DCWO.....
AC.....	SDWO(W).....
CO.....	DWO(N).....
DW.....	DWO(E).....
29 JUL 1968	
IRG.O.....	HHO.....
Su & A/cs.....	Est.....
A & R.....	Rec.....
Copy to	TE. CT. P.O. LGA H1
File No.....	Filed by.....

J.S.I./7/68
P.D.

ESTABLISHMENT
SECTION

5

WELFARE DEPT.

16 COLLEGE STREET

From City Welfare Officer

Ref. CH/ERM

To Establishment Officer

Date 4.4.69.

re Mr. J. Mains, Warden, Kincora

In May last year it was reported that Mr. Mains had been without the help of an Assistant Warden for 20 months during the period 1st June 1964 until 26th April, 1968. On 25th June 1968 the Welfare Committee agreed that the Council, through the General Purposes Committee, be advised to pay Mr. Mains an honorarium of £100. This was subsequently approved by the Council and the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Since April 1968 it has not been possible to appoint an Assistant Warden (see report appended). Apart from the period 11th August/2nd October, 1968, when an unqualified and inexperienced 'relief' was in post, Mr. Mains continued to cope unaided. He has been unable to take leave amounting to 47 days (including 26 days carried over from the previous leave year) in the leave year ended 31st March 1969 and it is unlikely that he will be able to take 68 days in the current leave year, were the 47 days to be carried over.

It is suggested that some recompense be made to Mr. Mains in part for foregoing 47 days leave and in part as recognition of his services during the period 27th April 1968 until the present time.

Payment in lieu of 47 days leave would amount to £123.12.4. (including £21.17.10. for emoluments). In considering an honorarium, account should be taken of the saving to the Committee of approximately £4.00 arising from the non-payment of an Assistant Warden's salary.

I shall be glad to have your views on this matter.

City Welfare Officer.



Our ref: Est/1211/TAW

9th May, 1969.

Dear Sir,

re: Honorarium - Mr. J. Mains
Warden - Kincora.

The Welfare Committee on 29th April recommended the Council through the General Purposes (Staffs) Sub-Committee to approve payment of an honorarium of £125 to Mr. J. Mains in lieu of 4.7 days' leave accrued and carried over to leave year ended 31st March, 1969, owing to the post of Assistant Warden being vacant the greater part of the past few years.

The enclosures indicate the position and the approval of the Ministry to the payment is requested.

Yours faithfully,

City Welfare Officer.

The Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs,
Children's Branch,
STORMONT,
BT4 3SU

TAW/PP.

Memo 4/4/69
to file
+ report



Government of Northern Ireland
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

Stormont, BELFAST, BT4 3SU
Telegrams: *Homaff, Belfast*
Telephone: *Belfast 63210, ext.*

Any reply should be
addressed to:

THE SECRETARY

Our reference: T.C.751

Your reference: EST/1211/TAW

1
21st May, 1969.

Dear Sir,

I write with reference to your letter of 9th May, 1969, and convey approval to the payment of an honorarium of £125 to Mr. J. Mains, Warden of Kincora Hostel. I hope that the present advertisements for the post of Assistant Warden prove successful and that you find a suitable person to fill this long-outstanding position.

Yours faithfully,

L. S. McCartney

MINUTE 29-4-69.

for Secretary

GR. MINUTE 12-5-69

The City Welfare Officer,
16 College Street,
Belfast.
BT1 6BT

WELFARE DEPT	
CWO..... <i>Ur</i>	DCWO..... <i>[Signature]</i>
PSWO.....	CO.....
PCSO.....	AA.....
DWO(N).....	DWO(S).....
22 MAY 1969	
DWO(C).....	DWO(S).....
Su &.....	<i>[Signature]</i>
A. & R.....	Typists.....
Copies to T.C. C.T. E.O. LGA 1 1	

East Belfast and Castlerough District

To: Mr. J. Mains, Mr. R. Semple,
Mr. W. McGrath,
Kincora Boys' Hostel

Purdysburn Hospital, Saintfield Road,
Belfast BT8 8BH
Tel: Belfast 643191

District Social Services Officer:
Clive W. Scouler, Cert.S.W.
our ref: CWS/IR.

your ref: -

4th March, 1980.

Dear Sir,

I refer to my interview with you today and am writing to confirm to you the decision which was conveyed to you.

The Disciplinary Authority has been made aware of serious allegations affecting the young persons residing in the Home in which you are employed as a Senior Officer.

The Disciplinary Authority has given very serious consideration to this situation and has decided in the circumstances that you should be subject to precautionary suspension in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Disciplinary Procedure, a copy of which is enclosed. During the period of suspension you will continue to receive full normal remuneration.

At present it is not possible to give an indication of the period of your suspension and, in view of this, it will be necessary for me to write to you again to indicate further action to be taken.

The effective date of this precautionary suspension is the 4th March 1980.

Yours faithfully,

DISTRICT SOCIAL SERVICES OFFICER

Mr. J. Mains



CWS/YR

14th December 1981

Dear Sir,

I refer to my letter suspending you from duty from 4th March 1980.

The Disciplinary Authority has information that you have admitted to a number of serious offences against residents of Kincora Boys Hostel whilst employed there as a senior officer. In view of this fact it has been decided that you be summarily dismissed from the District's employment with immediate effect.

You have already received a copy of the Board's Disciplinary Code of Procedure and, in accordance with this Procedure, I have to inform you of your right of appeal to the Board, stating the grounds of your appeal, within seven days.

Yours faithfully,

DISTRICT SOCIAL SERVICES OFFICER