



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT

I, Alex Younger, will say as follows:

1. I am the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). I was appointed to this post in November 2014, having been in the Service since 1991. I am the only serving member of the Service who is officially named in public, and am SIS's Accounting Officer. I am also responsible for SIS operations and the ongoing efficiency of the Service.
2. I confirm that I have no personal knowledge of matters relating to, or connected with, the Kincora Boys Home. Given the passage of time, any SIS account of the period in question is reliant on our corporate written record.
3. I confirm that I have delegated authority to the Service's Deputy Director responsible for compliance to assist the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) with its investigation into Kincora. I have directed him and his team to provide the Inquiry with the Service's full cooperation; to answer all their questions as accurately and fully as possible; to conduct searches based on the terms provided to us by the Inquiry and show to them all material identified as potentially relevant from the results of those searches; and to make available to the Inquiry all material deemed relevant for public disclosure by the Inquiry in a form that will allow that to happen.
4. I am assured by him, and therefore believe, that all this has been done. I know that SIS officers have, in doing so, also made the Inquiry aware of the capabilities, nature and operation of our file management systems.
5. I have seen the detailed SIS statement based on the material deemed relevant and am content that it is an accurate and full representation of the Service's position in respect of Kincora. I have directed the Deputy Director to speak to that statement if this is considered necessary by the Inquiry and can confirm that he can speak with authority in respect of historic matters relating to Kincora on behalf of the Service. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families. He will instead sign that statement with a cypher – details of his identity will be provided to the Inquiry at a higher classification.

6. SIS takes seriously its obligations to cooperate with inquiries and investigations. I confirm that SIS remains committed to ensuring that the HIA Inquiry can conduct a full and complete inquiry, and will continue to assist it in any way possible.

Signed



Alex Younger, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service

Date

27 May 2016.



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than C, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. SIS has received requests for disclosure from the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry. SIS takes its disclosure obligations seriously and I am satisfied that the searches carried out by officers in our compliance team constitute a reasonable and proportionate search for relevant material on the SIS corporate record. These officers, and SIS legal advisers, specialise in disclosure matters and regularly conduct searches of this type; they also consulted the SIS records management team to ensure a sufficiently broad search was conducted. I know that SIS officers have made the Inquiry aware of the capabilities, nature and operation of our file management systems.
4. The search terms used to conduct searches include those listed in Annex B of the letter from Sir Jonathan Stephens, Permanent Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office, to Whitehall colleagues, dated 18 November 2014. Further search terms identified from open source research were also added. A full list of search terms used are:

Bawnmore
Bernados
Ravelstone Parade

Palmerstone
Rathgael
Raymond Semple

"Boys Home" and abuse	Rubane
Brian Gemmell	TARA
"Child abuse" and "Northern Ireland"	Valetta
Colin Wallace	William McGrath
Hughes inquiry	Williamson House
Institutional abuse	William McGrath
James McGuigan	Williamson House
Joseph Mains	Manor House, Lisburn
Richard Kerr	Roy Garland
Kincora	James Miller
Mike Taylor	John McKeague
Nazareth Lodge	

5. We are committed to ensuring that the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry can conduct a full and complete inquiry and have made potentially relevant sensitive intelligence material available for review by the Inquiry.
6. Where the public disclosure of information would be prejudicial to national security and/or the safety of individuals concerned, it has been redacted with the agreement of the HIA Inquiry, but with the aim, as requested by the Inquiry, of making as much information publicly available as possible. Where redactions have been made a gist of the redacted material has been included in the witness statement. The Inquiry has nevertheless been able to review the complete versions of those documents. Should any further relevant material be identified, it will be made available to the Inquiry.

Signed

SIS Officer A

SIS Officer A

Date

27 MAY 2016



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. The Secret Intelligence Service, often referred to as MI6, was established in 1909 as the Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau. Until 1994, SIS did not have a statutory basis and its existence was not publicly confirmed. In 1992, SIS was formally avowed in 1992 and was put on a statutory basis with the Intelligence Services Act 1994.
4. The role of SIS, as set out in the Intelligence Services Act 1994, is to provide Her Majesty's Government with a global covert capability that facilitates the collection of secret intelligence and mount operations overseas to promote and defend the national security and economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, and to prevent and detect serious crime.
5. Following the increase in the threat of Republican terrorism in early 1972, the Irish Joint Section (IJS) was established in response to a request for more information from the province by the Permanent Secretary in the newly established Northern Ireland Office (NIO), Sir William Nield. The IJS was established by the Security Service (MI5) and SIS, with jointly staffed offices in Belfast and London.

SIS DISCLOSURE EXERCISE

6. On 18 November 2014, Sir Jonathan Stephens (Permanent Secretary, Northern Ireland Office), in a letter copied to many Government departments, requested that the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) undertake disclosure searches for material that may be relevant to the Inquiry Into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (HIA Inquiry) underway in Northern Ireland under the chairmanship of Sir Anthony Hart. The Inquiry was set up to *'examine if there were systemic failings by institutions or the state in their duties towards those children in their care between the years of 1922-1995'*.
7. SIS has received requests for disclosure from the Inquiry. SIS takes its disclosure obligations seriously and I am satisfied that the searches carried out by officers in our compliance team constitute a reasonable and proportionate search for relevant material on the SIS corporate record. These officers, and SIS legal advisers, specialise in disclosure matters and regularly conduct searches of this type; they also consulted the SIS records management team to ensure a sufficiently broad search was conducted. I know that SIS officers have made the Inquiry aware of the capabilities, nature and operation of our file management systems. Given the passage of time, any SIS account of the period in question is reliant on our written record.
8. All material identified by SIS as potentially relevant to the HIA Inquiry has been made available in unredacted form for the purpose of undertaking its relevance review. SIS has also provided answers to all questions asked by the HIA Inquiry to their full satisfaction in relation to SIS activities in Northern Ireland and persons of interest to the Inquiry. This has resulted in requests to SIS to disclose material relating to these events. That material is disclosed in this witness statement. It primarily consists of open source material, as well as correspondence between MI5 and SIS, and MoD material. SIS has consulted MI5 and MoD prior to releasing material that originated from those departments.
9. Where the public disclosure of information would be prejudicial to national security and/or the safety of individuals concerned, it has been redacted with the agreement of the HIA Inquiry, but with the aim, as requested by the Inquiry, of making as much information publicly available as possible. Where redactions have been made, a gist of the redacted material has been included in the witness statement. The Inquiry has nevertheless been able to review the complete versions of those documents.
10. Certain redactions or gists relate to the use of cyphers or similar devices. SIS uses cyphers, codewords and nicknames for the protection of identities of people who are in some way involved with or of interest to the Service. They are used to distinguish a person but conceal the individual's identity. These may include, but are not restricted to, SIS officers, agents and contacts. These terms become part of SIS's permanent record – their use is generally classified as SECRET or above. We have sought to provide the individuals' real names in place of the original cyphers.
11. Where possible, full copies of the original documents have been made available to the HIA Inquiry. These documents are referred to in the text of the SIS witness statement as "Exhibit x" and can be found in the document Appendix. Where it has not been appropriate to release original documents, relevant extracts have been included in the text of the SIS witness statement with the full agreement of the HIA Inquiry. These documents are referred to as "Article x". Should any further relevant material be identified, it will be made available to the Inquiry.


12. It is a longstanding principle of successive UK Governments that we 'Neither Confirm Nor Deny' assertions, allegations or speculation in relation to the security and intelligence agencies, or other parts of Government. This is known as the 'NCND principle'. This means that, as a general rule, the Government will adopt a position of NCND when responding to questions about whether the agencies are carrying out, or have carried out, an operation or investigation into a particular person or group; have a relationship with a particular person; hold particular information on a person; or have shared information about that person with any other agencies, whether within the UK or elsewhere. This principle exists for a variety of reasons, including the protection of those who work for and with the agencies, and the willingness to do so of those that may consider doing so in the future.
13. The current threat to the UK from international terrorism is severe, meaning that an attack is highly likely. The threat to Great Britain from Northern Ireland-related terrorism was raised on 11 May 2016 to substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong possibility; the threat to Northern Ireland is assessed to be severe. These levels are set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and the Security Service (MI5).
14. The protection of secret intelligence and operational intelligence activities is essential to enable SIS to continue to carry out its statutory national security functions, including but not limited to protecting the UK from the terrorist threat referred to above. There is a high degree of risk that SIS's current and future capability to operate secretly around the world would be impaired if information is publicly disclosed which is prejudicial to national security and/or the safety of individuals.

WILLIAM McGRATH AND TARA

15. William McGrath was a prominent member of the protestant community in Northern Ireland in the 1960-70s and founder of the Tara organisation. Along with Raymond Semple and Joseph Mains, he was convicted in 1981 for offences relating to the systematic sexual abuse of children at the Kincora Boys Home in Belfast. He died in 1992.
16. McGrath's name appears in SIS documents primarily in relation to his prominence as a leading figure in Tara. Tara was a Protestant organisation founded by William McGrath in the 1960s. In October 1976, the security and intelligence agencies were considering the possibility of developing a source of reporting on the organisation. The SIS record on Tara includes documents obtained by Brian Gemmell from his Army records, newspaper articles, and correspondence between SIS and MI5.
17. In the course of the HIA Inquiry, SIS was made aware by MI5 of extracts from documents marked with SIS file references that relate to McGrath. SIS has conducted searches to identify the original documents and to make such material available to the HIA Inquiry for review.
18. The extracts begin with a document dated 18 April 1973 from Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland which describes McGrath as "*Leader of the refurbished form of the TARA Brigade*". A subsequent document reference (again from Intelligence staff in NI) dated 13 November 1973 reads "*Subject 'gets them young and preaches religion to them' which means that he preaches bigotry and anti-Catholic sermons*". The final document reference on the MI5 list is

dated 11 February 1977. There are no records to indicate that SIS was aware of McGrath's involvement in child sex abuse at Kincora prior to his conviction in 1981.

19. On 19 October 1976, an SIS officer based in London wrote a letter to MI5 on the subject of William McGrath attaching a copy of a letter originating from HQ 3 Infantry Brigade based in Lurgan (**Article 1**). In his letter, the SIS officer does not state how the document was acquired by SIS other than to say that it was obtained unofficially. MI5 was asked to ensure that no action is taken without reference to SIS.



Article 1

20. The 4 page MoD letter that was enclosed is dated 28 January 1976 and also includes two newspaper articles published in the Belfast Telegraph and the Hibernia in October 1975 (**Exhibit 1**). The title of the letter is "EXTREMIST PROTESTANTS SECRET ORGANISATION - TARA" and contains sections on William McGrath, Tara, Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303 and Ian Paisley.
21. On the same day (19 October 1976), a UK-based SIS officer initiated a Minute (**Article 2**) for distribution within SIS Headquarters in London. The subject of the Minute is Tara and is a cover document for attached papers handed to SIS by Brian Gemmell on 15 October 1976. Gemmell is a former Captain in the Intelligence Corps who claims that he passed on information relating to William McGrath's involvement in sexual abuse at Kincora to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.

Subject	
TARA	
1. We attach copies of papers handed to [REDACTED] by GEMMELL on 15 October, which he obtained from his Army files. He made the following comments on these papers:-	SIS FILE REFERENCE
a. TARA - Not to File 3350/18 Vol II - This paper was written by GEMMELL and is based on the contents of his file on TARA.	
b. Notes on interview with Roy GARLAND. These were made by GEMMELL and an NCO after a "one off" debrief sanctioned by Ian CAMERON.	
c. Proclamation - [REDACTED]	MATERIAL NOT RELEVANT TO HIAI

Article 2

22. The SIS officer comments that the papers attached to his Minute were obtained by Gemmell from his Army files and comprise a document entitled "Tara" – dated 14 October 1976 (**Exhibit 2**); notes on an interview with Roy Garland, made by Gemmell and an unnamed Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) following a "one off" meeting with Ian Cameron – undated (**Exhibit 3**); a media article entitled "The Paradox that is Tara" (**Exhibit 4**); and a copy of the Tara proclamation (**Exhibit 5**).
23. Three months later, on 31 January 1977, an officer from a UK-based SIS team initiated a telegram addressed to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland and copied to SIS London and MI5 (**Article 3**). The subject of the telegram was "William McGrath and Tara" and refers to various papers handed to SIS by Brian Gemmell in October 1976; in particular to the letter originating from HQ 3 Infantry Brigade, Lurgan dated 28 January 1976.
24. In his telegram the SIS officer confirms that a copy of the letter had been shared with MI5 who had asked if the source mentioned in the letter could be retasked for further information. The letter continues with the SIS officer saying that they had spoken to Gemmell who raised no objection to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland discussing the letter with the Army.

CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]
IN SNUFFBOX [REDACTED]
WILLIAM MCGATH AND TARA [REDACTED]
CLASSIFICATION & MI5 DESIGNATOR

FILE REFERENCES
1. IN OCTOBER 1976 BRIAN GEMMELL GAVE US VARIOUS PAPERS ON THE ABOVE WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM HIS ARMY FILES. ONE OF THESE WAS A COPY OF A LETTER FROM HQ 3 INFANTRY BGDE LURGAN. (REF 13912/2 DATED 28 JANUARY 1976) SIGNED BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] GEMMELL'S COPY WAS ADDRESSED TO G INT HQ 39 INF BGDE. **NAME OF ARMY OFFICER**

2. WE GAVE A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO SNUFFBOX WHO HAVE NOW ASKED IF THE SOURCE MENTIONED IN THE LETTER COULD BE RETASKED FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.

Article 3 (Page 1)

3. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO GEMMELL WHO HAS CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO [REDACTED] DISCUSSING THIS LETTER WITH THE ARMY. **SIS DESIGNATOR**


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


INTELLIGENCE RELATED MATERIAL HIA INQUIRY CONSIDERS NOT RELEVANT TO ITS WORK

Article 3 (Page 2)



Article 3 (Page 3)

25. On 15 February 1977, an officer in SIS London initiated a telegram addressed to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland and to MI5 on the subject of Tara (**Article 4**). Referring to a message initiated on the 11 February, the SIS officer begins by congratulating a member of the Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland for "*flushing out*" a source on Tara. The message continues with SIS London expressing interest in learning more about the organisation and whether Tara's recruitment campaign could offer a potential opportunity for the Irish Joint Section (IJS) to develop access into the organisation, if it was considered a worthwhile target.



Article 4

26. MI5 responded on 16 February 1977 to confirm that they considered Tara to be a worthwhile target and supported recruitment to penetrate the organisation (**Article 5**).

██████████	CLASSIFICATION
FROM ██████████	MI5 DESIGNATOR
<input type="radio"/> TARA	INTELLIGENCE STAFF NI
<input type="radio"/> REFERENCE LONDON'S ADDRESSED ██████████	37 OF 15.2.77.
1. WE CONSIDER TARA A WORTHWHILE TARGET, AND SUPPORT RECRUITMENT TO PENETRATE.	

Article 5

27. On 17 February 1977, Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland responded by telegram to SIS London's question on whether the Tara recruitment campaign could be exploited by the IJS (**Article 6**). Paragraph 1B of their telegram indicates that Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland knew very little about Tara's recruiting campaign beyond knowing that one existed and were therefore not yet in a position to identify any opportunities for the IJS to exploit. However, they share MI5's view that Tara is a worthwhile target and that individuals had briefed to *"find traces on this elusive organisation"*.

INTELLIGENCE STAFF NI	B. BEYOND KNOWING THAT THERE IS A RECRUITING CAMPAIGN IN TARA, WE KNOW LITTLE ABOUT IT, SO ARE NOT SURE WHETHER WE ARE YET IN A POSITION TO DISCOVER A LOOPHOLE THAT COULD BE EXPLOITED BY IJS. WE DO NOT KNOW, FOR INSTANCE, WHERE TARA SEEKS ITS RECRUITS, APART FROM QUOTE OTHER ORGANISATIONS UNQUOTE. ██████████ CERTAINLY CONSIDERS TARA TO BE A WORTHWHILE TARGET. BOTH ██████████ AND ██████████ HAVE BEEN BRIEFED TO FIND TRACES OF THIS ELUSIVE ORGANISATION.
	OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTORS

Article 6

28. On 30 May 1977, an MI5 officer wrote to SIS in London to request information on the subscriber of an international telephone number, who is believed to be a contact of William McGrath (**Article 7**). A name provided by the source of the information produced no trace in MI5 records. This is the final piece of material in the SIS record on Tara.

FROM SNUFFBOX LONDON

ROUTINE

SIS INTERNAL MARKINGS

CLASSIFICATION

10372

NUMBER MIS REFERENCE

GRATEFUL FOR DETAILS OF SUBSCRIBER TO FOLLOWING TELEPHONE NUMBER:

SUBSCRIBER NUMBER

2. A SECRET AND DELICATE SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT THE ABOVE NUMBER BELONGS TO A CONTACT OF WILLIAM M C G R A T H (OUR REFERENCE), AN ULSTER PROTESTANT EXTREMIST. ACCORDING TO SOURCE THE CONTACT'S NAME IS (NO TRACE IN OUR RECORDS).

MIS REFERENCE NAME

Article 7

COLIN WALLACE

29. SIS records indicate that Colin Wallace was employed by the Ministry of Defence as a civilian information officer at the British Military's Headquarters in Northern Ireland (HQNI) from 1968 to 1975. In August 1974, he was investigated by the MoD on suspicion of leaking classified information to The Times correspondent Robert Fisk. This resulted in Wallace's resignation with effect from 31 December 1975.
30. In 1981, Wallace was jailed for manslaughter, serving 6 years in prison before being released in December 1986 after his conviction was quashed. Wallace has been the subject of a book written by Paul Foot entitled "Who framed Colin Wallace" and up to present day, has spoken publicly about his knowledge of events in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, particularly with regard to allegations relating to abuse at the Kincora Boys Home.
31. SIS records relating to Colin Wallace begin in 1975 with the article published by Robert Fisk in The Times newspaper. The material comprises press cuttings, extracts from Hansard, information relating to Paul Foot's book and correspondence between Whitehall departments. The subjects covered relate to Wallace's resignation from the MOD, his appeal hearing by the Civil Service Appeal Board, his trial for manslaughter and his fight to clear his name.
32. On 30 September 1980, an SIS officer initiated a Minute to record his comments on papers he had been asked to review, which were found during a search of Wallace's offices following his arrest by police on manslaughter charges (**Article 8**). The papers were passed to SIS to check for any information relating to the work of the Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland and/or indication of any contact Wallace may have had with Intelligence staff based at HQNI. This was to enable SIS to create an accurate assessment of the overall

risk to Intelligence staff, agents and potential damage to operational work in Northern Ireland through information Wallace may have been exposed to whilst working with the Army at HQNI that he may then choose to disclose publicly.

CYPHER FOR COLIN WALLACE	
	SIS DESIGNATOR
	1. [REDACTED] asked me to have a look at the papers on this case.
INTELLIGENCE STAFF NI	2. I can find no evidence in our file that in his job as Information Officer at the AIS, HQNI; [REDACTED] had any access to or knowledge of IJS Operations in Northern Ireland. In the one recorded case (the "Bill FULLER story") in which [REDACTED] contributed the background brief for Army PSYOPS, the brief was shown to [REDACTED] by an officer of G(ENT) HQNI without, we believe, any mention of involvement by a civilian intelligence agency. This is not to say that [REDACTED] did not know of the existence, as distinct from the functions, of [REDACTED]. We can assume he did.
	WALLACE
	WALLACE
INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE	3. In the six years that have elapsed since his dismissal from his job as Information Officer, [REDACTED] has demonstrated [REDACTED] and in dealings with his local MP) that he is mindful of the provisions of the OSA and has not in fact publicised his knowledge of the Army's intelligence activities in Northern Ireland in the way we had feared he might. This state of affairs could obviously change under the pressures of a murder charge and the need he could feel to grasp at any straw which conceivably might mitigate the consequences of his criminal act.
	WALLACE
INTELLIGENCE RELATED MATERIAL HIA INQUIRY CONSIDERS NOT RELEVANT TO ITS WORK.	4. [REDACTED]

Article 8 (Page 1)

33. The paragraph two the SIS officer begins by saying that there is no evidence in SIS records that in his job as Information Officer at the Army Information Service (AIS), HQNI, Wallace "had any access to or knowledge of IJS Operations in Northern Ireland." (The officer records that, in one case, SIS/MI5 contributed a background brief for a military operation which was later shown to Wallace by an Army officer based at HQNI. However, he believed that there was no mention by the Army officer of agency involvement.)
34. The Minute continues with the SIS officer commenting that in the six years that have elapsed since he left his job as Information Officer, Wallace had demonstrated "that he is mindful of the provisions of the OSA [Official Secrets Act] and has not in fact publicised his knowledge of the Army's intelligence activities in Northern Ireland in the way that we feared he might. This state of affairs could obviously change under the pressures of a murder charge and the need

he could feel to grasp at any straw which conceivably might mitigate the consequences of his criminal act."

[REDACTED]

SIS DESIGNATOR

WALLACE

5. On 2 Oct, at the [REDACTED]'s suggestion, I examined two unclassified HMSO note books found by the police when they searched [REDACTED]'s office after his arrest in September for murder. It was apparent that both note books dealt with events in Northern Ireland up to 1976 but not, it appeared, beyond. I would guess that [REDACTED] compiled and used them for reference during his time in Northern Ireland.

INTELLIGENCE RELATED MATERIAL

WALLACE

6. One note book contained lists of IRA personalities, the other insecure but generally brief references to a wide range of intelligence matters including, inter alia, the names of the (then) Head of Security Service and SIS, the fact that the [REDACTED] was located in Chelsea Barracks; notes on Arab terrorist organisations and the Japanese Red Army; the names of two members of the SAS, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (in connection with the [REDACTED] affair), the name of the Head of GCHQ (Leslie HOOPER) and the following note (which appears twice in one of the note books) on the functions of GCHQ "monitors and decodes all radio, telex and telegram communications in and out of Britain, foreign embassies, finance and industrial companies. GCHQ also codes and decodes Government communications."

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE

NAMES OF MOD OFFICERS & OPERATION

WALLACE

7. [REDACTED]'s hand writing is neat and legible. Apart from two or three pages of short-hand which I could not read, I read everything there was. I have asked the [REDACTED]'s secretary to see if she can make sense of the short-hand. I am glad to say that apart from the one reference to Maurice OLDFIELD as Head of the Service, I could find no reference to SIS or SIS personnel. We are therefore in the clear so far as these two note books are concerned. However, it is possible [REDACTED] may have kept other sensitive material at home and his home does not appear to have been searched. In the absence of the [REDACTED] I mentioned this discrepancy to [REDACTED]. Presumably thought will now need to be given to searching [REDACTED]'s home, an action which I imagine could probably be justified by the discovery of the two indiscreet notebooks which he kept in his office.

SIS DESIGNATOR

WALLACE

8. Subject to the discovery of any further documents in [REDACTED]'s possession, I do not think this case is likely to cause SIS much difficulty. If [REDACTED] decides to spill the beans it will be the Army which will attract most if not all of the flak.

SIS DESIGNATOR

WALLACE

30 Sept 80.

SIS DESIGNATOR & INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE

1. Agree with [REDACTED] conclusions.

2. In view of his attitude towards security, it is perhaps more likely that he would have kept any SIS-related papers in his office than in his home.

3/10.

SIGNATURE

Article 8 (Page 2)

35. In paragraph 5 of the Minute the SIS officer refers to two note books that he was asked to examine, found by police when they searched Wallace's office after his arrest in September for murder. He writes "It was apparent that both note books dealt with events in Northern Ireland up to 1976 but not, it appeared, beyond." It was assessed that that Wallace compiled and used the note books as a reference during his time in Northern Ireland.
36. Continuing his description of the notebooks, the SIS officer wrote: "One note book contained lists of IRA personalities, the other insecure but generally brief references to a wide range of intelligence matters including, inter alia, the names of the (then) Head of Security Service, and SIS." Further references include "notes on Arab terrorist organisations and the Japanese Red Army; the names of two members of the SAS" and "the name of the Head of GCHQ

(Leslie Hooper)." Wallace also made notes in both notebooks about the functions of GCHQ and that it codes and decodes Government communications.

37. Drawing a conclusion to the relevance of the notebooks to SIS, the officer writes that *"apart from the one reference to Maurice OLDFIELD as Head of the Service, I could find no reference to SIS or SIS personnel. We are therefore in the clear so far as these note books are concerned"*. He adds that subject to the discovery of any further documents in Wallace's possession *"I do not think this case is likely to cause SIS much difficulty"*.
38. One month later, on 9 October 1980, an officer in the Ministry of Defence wrote to various Government departments with a more detailed description of the notebooks recovered by police during a search of Wallace's offices (**Exhibit 6**). The officer comments that much of the information in the notebooks could have been gleaned from a careful reading of newspapers and from conversations with journalists in Belfast in the early seventies.
39. Wallace's reasons for keeping notes are far from clear but the MoD officer surmises that he (Wallace) *"may either have wanted to pass it on to other pressmen - perhaps Fisk - or may even have planned some sort of book on terrorism for which there are the rough notes"*. Neither officer from SIS or MoD, tasked with reviewing the notebooks, has made any reference to Wallace making notes relating to abuse at the Kincora Boys' Home.
40. On Kincora, the first document in SIS records where Colin Wallace's name appears is an article published in the News of the World on 21 March 1982. The title of the article is *"I'll expose top men's vice ring says killer"* (**Exhibit 7**). In the article, Wallace, who at the time was serving a ten year sentence for manslaughter, is described as holding *"the key to a growing sex scandal involving top members of the Establishment"*.
41. On 12 October 1989, an SIS officer drafted a Minute to record details of a meeting with an MI5 officer to discuss MI5/SIS input into questions on Colin Wallace which Cabinet Office had requested be answered (**Article 9**). The questions related to Wallace's duties in Northern Ireland, his transfer to HQNW District in 1975, his resignation from the Civil Service and proceedings at the Civil Service Appeals Service, his conviction for manslaughter in 1981 and Wallace's allegations on Kincora and that he was prevented from providing information which he possessed to official investigations and inquiries into Kincora. When addressing questions relating to Kincora, the SIS officer commented that this is one area in which SIS needed to conduct further research. In paragraph 5 of the minute, the officer commented: *"We certainly ran at least one agent who was aware of sexual malpractice at the home and who may have mentioned this to his SIS or Security Service Case officer. Such matters were of no operational interest and were not pursued."*
42. No material has been identified on the SIS record that provides any information relating to the material reviewed by the SIS officer in October 1989 on which his comments in paragraph 5 of his Minute are based. Extensive searches conducted by SIS for the HIA Inquiry has failed to identify any material that enables SIS to identify the agent or the time period to which the SIS officer is referring.

COLIN WALLACE

SIS DESIGNATOR MIS OFFICER

MIS FILE REFERENCE 1. [REDACTED] and I met [REDACTED] in Gower Street on 11 October to discuss the points raised in his letter of 28 September. He broke to us the news that he had just been advised to go into hospital in 10 days' time (nothing serious) and would then be away for three weeks. He had already covered some of the ground; but the remainder, mostly concerning Kincora, would have to be dealt with by somebody else. He will ring us to let us know who will take over the work as soon as that has been decided.

2. [REDACTED]

IRRELEVANT MATERIAL

3. [REDACTED]

MIS OFFICER 4. [REDACTED] will circulate any draft findings to us for comment or ammendation before he goes into print. He accepts [REDACTED] assurance that we have no original papers, and were never involved with WALLACE.

SIS DESIGNATORS 5. There is one area which needs further research in HO. This concerns the various allegations surrounding the Kincora Boys Home. We certainly ran at least one agent who was aware of sexual malpractice at the Home, and who may have mentioned this to his SIS or Security Service Case Officer. Such matters were of no operational interest and were not pursued. [REDACTED] made the point that in any answers we give, particularly in the narrative requested in question 2(i), we must avoid framing them in such a way as to expose the identity of the Agent either directly, or through follow-up enquiries based on our answers. This is an angle which [REDACTED] will carefully consider at the time.

MIS OFFICER 6. I am copying this Minute to [REDACTED] and to [REDACTED]

SIS DESIGNATORS

12 October 1989

Article 9

JAMES MILLER

43. On 6 August 2014, an article was published in the Belfast Telegraph reporting that Brian Gemmell had received information about child sex abuse at Kincora from three people (**Exhibit 8**). The names of the individuals were James Miller, Roy Garland and Jim McCormick.
44. Searches conducted by SIS on the three names mentioned in the 2014 Belfast Telegraph story identified a newspaper article dated 29 March 1987, in which Barry Penrose of The Sunday Times stated that: "[James] Miller claims that the Intelligence services had known

about the activities at Kincora for a number of years and believes the boy's home was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information." (Exhibit 9).

45. Following publication by the Sunday Times, Miller was interviewed by two government officials on 2 April 1987. During that interview, he explained that he had contacted Penrose because of his concerns *"about the degree of publicity Colin Wallace was receiving."* Notes of the interview, containing Miller's account of his dealings with Penrose and Liam Clarke of the Sunday Times was found in SIS records (Article 10).

2. Miller, who was in a contrite mood, gave a full account of his dealings with Barry Penrose and Liam Clarke of the Sunday Times. In brief, in February this year Miller became concerned about the degree of publicity Colin Wallace was receiving. He was particularly incensed at a Penrose story in the Sunday Times which he felt supported Wallace's allegations that the Security Service had "framed him". Miller contacted Penrose by telephone early in February and during that month they had a number of telephone conversations. Miller, who is a talkative and gullible individual, thought that he was refuting Wallace's statements, but it is clear now that Penrose was simply drawing him out on other subjects, namely:-

- a. The 1974 Loyalist Worker Strike.
- b. Allegations that Harold Wilson had been a communist agent.
- c. The 1974 Dublin bombing.
- d. The 1973 killing of Tommy Heron, the UDA E Belfast Commander.
- e. Allegations regarding the Kincora Boys Home.

3. Penrose contacted Miller on Friday 20 March to say that he proposed to publish a piece on Sunday 22 March about Wallace, and wanted to include a small amount of what Miller had to say on the subject. He also wanted Miller to speak to Liam Clarke, the Sunday Times "Irish expert", which he did later that day. Miller became concerned that he might have said too much and asked for the article to be read out to him over the telephone before publication. This was not done and after several calls on Saturday 21 March, having received the assurances that his comments would be a very small part of a larger article, he agreed to its publication.

4. Miller was genuinely shocked when he read the story produced by the Sunday Times and phoned Penrose on Sunday 22 March to remonstrate: this cut little ice with Penrose. Miller has not spoken to Penrose or Clarke since but his family

Article 10 (Page 1)

46. Miller was particularly "incensed" at a Penrose story in the Sunday Times which he felt supported Wallace's allegations that the Security Service had *"framed him"*. He had subsequently contacted Penrose by telephone and they had a number of conversations in February 1987 in which Miller thought he was refuting Wallace's statements.
47. During his interview with the government officials, Miller said *"that although he admitted to Penrose that he had had a brief acquaintance with McGrath from days in the TARA brigade and, and had heard rumours that the man was homosexual, he had "no knowledge*

whatsoever of the Kincora home and the entrapment story, which he learnt about after his departure from Ulster."

have received a number of further calls from Clarke attempting to elicit further details. Clarke has also implied that unless the family co-operate there would be "a number of journalists on their doorstep". On 3 April Miller received a letter from Penrose, the text of which is attached. Miller has firmly stated to us his intentions not to speak to the press again but would like to take some action to counter what has been reported. He has talked of asking his solicitor to take the matter up with the Sunday Times and it is possible that he could sue for libel. We have however instructed him to do nothing until we have considered this matter further.

5. According to Miller, he did not make the two principal allegations in the Sunday Times article of 22 March. His comments were taken out of context and twisted to suit the theories being postulated by Penrose and his associates. He also maintains that the article published on 29 March in the Sunday Times is untrue and he did not speak again to Penrose as was stated. Miller has never met Penrose or Clarke and has received no payment whatsoever.

6. Miller said that although he admitted to Penrose that he had had a brief acquaintance with McGrath from days in the TARA Brigade, and had heard rumours that the man was homosexual, he had no knowledge whatsoever of the Kincora home and the entrapment story, which he learned about after his departure from Ulster. These remarks he said were the sum total of what he told Penrose about McGrath and the home.

Article 10 (Page 2)

JOHN McKEAGUE

48. John McKeague was a prominent Ulster loyalist and one of the founding members of paramilitary group, the Red Hand Commando. Information published on-line links McKeague's name to William McGrath and Tara, and to his involvement in the Kincora Boys Home scandal. McKeague died from gunshot wounds on 29 January 1982.
49. Searches carried out by SIS identified a report initiated by the Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland to SIS London dated 13 February 1980 (**Article 11**). The report begins by referring to individual named McGrath (first name unknown) as the leader of TARA and to his alleged involvement in the scandal at a Belfast Boys Home. The report states that there are demands for a public inquiry and that SIS London may be interested in details of information held on William McGrath.
50. Information provided by Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland from their records confirms that, in 1976, McGrath *"was reported to be warden of the Kincora Boys Hostel"* and *"our records suggest he is or may have been known to an agency based here or in London"*. The document continues with McGrath's reported activities and individuals with whom he is associated. One of the activities that McGrath is said to be responsible for is creating *"posters reading 'Nice Boy McKeague' which appeared all over Belfast"*. No date is given for this incident.

Article 11

Page 16 of 21

in which he claimed that MI5 were planning the recruitment of an agent using threats of exposure as a homosexuality. The correspondence includes a covering Minute, a note by the MI5 officer and a verbatim transcript from the BBC programme.

52. On 16 October 1990, an officer in MI5 sent a letter to SIS London relating to Brian Gemmell and claims he had made during a BBC Public Eye programme broadcast on 1 June 1990 (**Article 12**). Attached to the MI5 letter was a note containing comments made by the MI5 officer, entitled "Brian Smart Gemmell and MI5" and verbatim extracts from the Public Eye programme.
53. In the opening paragraph of his covering Minute, the MI5 officer refers to assistance provided by SIS to track down papers which *"might corroborate Brian Gemmell's claim in a television programme that MI5 were planning the recruitment of a Loyalist agent using threats of exposure as a homosexual."* The officer then provides a short background summary on Gemmell, who was thought to be employed by British Rail at York at that time (in 1990).

Dear [REDACTED] — **NAME**

BRI

Some time ago you helped me to track down papers which might corroborate Brian GEMMELL's claim in a television programme that MI5 were planning the recruitment of a Loyalist agent using threats of exposure as a homosexual. It has taken me too long to put all this finally on paper, but I now enclose a copy of a verbatim transcript which I had made, and of a note setting out my comments: Both have gone to [REDACTED] here, in case he should have to field questions, of which, so far, there have been none to my knowledge.

MI5 DESIGNATOR

2. Brian Smart GEMMELL, born on [REDACTED], now employed (we believe) by British Rail at York, was a graduate of Strathclyde University, and in 1974-76, commissioned in the Intelligence Corps, was OC 123 Int Sec, HQ 39 Brigade. The attached note omits, in your copy, details of other Security Service officers whom he could have identified.

[REDACTED]

3. The potential target of 1976 in para 1 was [REDACTED] under which reference I think you still have papers.

IRRELEVANT MATERIAL **INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE**

Yours ever,

SIGNATURE — [REDACTED]

Article 12

54. The note attached to the covering letter (**Article 13**) begins with the MI5 officer saying that Gemmell was seen twice in London by UK based SIS officers, who introduced themselves as members of the Security Service. Both meetings took place in 1976; the first in May and the second in September.
55. The note continues with the MI5 officer commenting that *"the television interview itself highlights the dealings with Ian Cameron and then brings in the statement by GEMMELL that MI5 was prepared to use homosexual blackmail to effect the recruitment of a named agent in Loyalist circles"*. The officer indicates that it has not been possible to discover all the papers hoped for before lists his understanding of the sequence and tenor of events, which refer to John McKeague.

<u>Note</u>		
	SIS DESIGNATORS	OPERATIONAL REFERENCES, NAMES & DESIGNATORS OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
Brian Smart GEMELL and MI5		
1.	<p>GEMMEL was twice seen in London : first on 10 May 1976, and he accepted an invitation to lunch on 7 September 1976 (after which he was to see [redacted] about his possible recruitment to the Security Service).</p>	
	Indiscretions	IRRELEVANT MATERIAL
2.	<p>The television interview itself highlights the dealings with Ian Cameron and then brings in the statement by GEMMELL that MI5 was prepared to use homosexual blackmail to effect the recruitment of a named agent in Loyalist circles.</p>	
	Comment	MI5 FILE REFERENCE
3.	<p>Although it has not been possible to discover all the papers hoped for, the sequence and tenor of events seem to my mind clear enough, as follows, the references being to McKEAGUE's [redacted]</p>	
28.1.76:	Consideration being given to recruitment of McKEAGUE, [redacted]	IRRELEVANT MATERIAL
March 1976:	Various approaches considered, but no references to homosexuality (112a, 113a).	
3 May 1976:	[redacted] provide at 114a full traces of McKEAGUE for interested parties, including one brief mention suggesting homosexuality (Comment: not in any event unusual in McKEAGUE's circles, and not singled out for attention by [redacted])	
SIS DESIGNATOR		SIS DESIGNATOR
CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]	/...

Article 13 (Page 1)

56. When referring to the events dated 23 November 1976 and 9 December 1976, the MI5 officer comments that consideration was given to the suggested recruitment of McKeague, using the threat of exposure of his homosexual activities in London. However, various objections to the proposal were voiced and doubts expressed whether management would accept it. The officer reinforces this in paragraph 4 by saying *"There is no further mention of this particular recruitment proposal, and doubtless it was dropped. GEMMELL is therefore presumed correct in saying that MI5 was considering a homosexual compromise approach to McKEAGUE, but of course he was not to know that it was not pursued."*

10 May 1976:	GEMMELL seen by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as in para 4 above.	INTELLIGENCE DESIGNATOR & OPERATIONAL REFERENCES
11-13 June 1976:	McKEAGUE was under [REDACTED] surveillance during a visit to London, and observed in unmistakably making homosexual contacts. Photographs were taken by [REDACTED]. It later emerged that McKEAGUE suspected that he had been under surveillance, but nothing came of this.	
No report of the [REDACTED] meeting with GEMMELL on 7 September 1976 (see para 4) has been found in either our or SIS files, but		
23.11.76:	[REDACTED] suggests recruitment of McKEAGUE be considered, using the [REDACTED] photos and the threat of exposure of his homosexual activities in London as a lever. [REDACTED] "marked lack of enthusiasm" for this ploy was reported in the telegram.	INTELLIGENCE DESIGNATORS & OPERATIONAL REFERENCES
9.12.76:	Various objections to the proposal were voiced including quotation of [REDACTED] doubts whether management would accept it.	
<p>4. There is no further mention of this particular recruitment proposal, and doubtless it was dropped. GEMMELL is therefore presumed correct in saying that MI5 was considering a homosexual compromise approach to McKEAGUE, but of course he was not to know that it was not pursued. Since he mentions hearing from MI5 about "compromising film of a homosexual nature" this must have been at a time after the [REDACTED] surveillance of 11-13 June and therefore also after the occasion on 10 May 1976 when he met two MI5 officers. It leaves the projected lunch with [REDACTED] on 7 September 1976 as the probable occasion on which the subject was discussed. The actual proposal for a homosexual recruitment was not made formally until 23 November 1976, and it seems likely that the lunch meeting on 7 September consisted partly of preliminary informal discussion, as between two intelligence officer colleagues, of the practicalities of agent recruitment; it presumably included asking GEMMELL for his opinion of McKEAGUE, about whom GEMMELL would have been assumed to know at least something.</p>		INTELLIGENCE DESIGNATOR & OPERATIONAL REFERENCE
<p>5. GEMMELL's statements during the television interview were clearly about matters which were classified at least SECRET when they were current in 1974-76, and which he must have known as such. A note on file written in 1982 guesses that GEMMELL would be loyal to the OSA unless his christian principles were involved.</p>		
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 30px; width: 150px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 80px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 80px;"></div>		NAME, DESIGNATOR & SIGNATURE OF MI5 OFFICER
16 October 1990		

Article 13 (Page 2)

57. The MI5 officer observes that the probable occasion at which the recruitment proposal may have been discussed with Gemmell was the meeting on the 7 September 1976. Searches conducted by SIS to identify a write up of the meeting with Gemmell has reached the same findings as the MI5 officer in October 1990: that no record of the meeting appears to exist.
58. The final document in this sequence of correspondence from MI5 is the verbatim transcript of the interview with Brian Gemmell on the BBC Public Eye programme broadcast on 1 June 1990. For the purpose of the broadcast, Gemmell is referred to as "James" or "J" and the interview begins with questions relating to Kincora (**Exhibit 10**).

SIR MAURICE OLDFIELD

59. Sir Maurice Oldfield, GCMG, CBE, served as Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service from 1973 until retirement on 31 January 1978. He was born in Derbyshire on 16 November 1915, spending his formative years in Bakewell before attending Manchester University, where he gained a First in History in 1937 and an MA in 1938 for research into the position of the clergy in Parliament in the later Middle Ages. In the same year, he was elected to a Fellowship at Manchester University. In 1940 he enlisted in the Army, serving as a Sergeant in Field Security in Egypt, Palestine and Syria before being commissioned in 1943. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1945 and continued to serve in the Military until March 1947. On leaving the Army, Oldfield embarked on a career in the Foreign Service, occupying a succession of posts in London, the Far East and Washington. In 1973, Oldfield was appointed Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), a position he held until retirement on 31 January 1978.
60. On retiring from SIS, Oldfield accepted a Visiting Fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford, where he continued his early work on the medieval clergy. The following year, he was offered the role of Security Coordinator in Northern Ireland; an appointment announced by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 2 October 1979. Oldfield's role was to assist the Government by improving the coordination and effectiveness of the fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland.
61. Shortly after his appointment as Security Coordinator, HMG received information to suggest that Sir Maurice may be homosexual. Rules on Positive Vetting (PV) at that time meant that homosexuality was considered a factor that would compromise someone's security status. This led to a review by MI5 of Sir Maurice's vetting clearance in March 1980, at which he admitted that he had engaged in homosexual activities throughout his career. As a result, his security clearance was withdrawn and he was replaced as Security Coordinator in June 1980. After a long illness, Sir Maurice Oldfield died in London on 11 March 1981.
62. SIS is aware that, after his PV was withdrawn, MI5 conducted an investigation into Oldfield's involvement in homosexual activities during his career in government service. This was in order to assess whether Sir Maurice may have been compromised in his role in a way that would be damaging to national security. SIS was not involved in the MI5 investigation and holds no record on the work carried out by MI5 investigators. However, SIS is aware that MI5 investigators concluded *"that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that national security had been compromised."*
63. On 19 January 1982, the Sunday Telegraph published the first of two articles by columnist Auberon Waugh including references linking inquiries into the alleged Belfast homosexual

prostitution scandal with an "*immensely distinguished public servant, now dead*" (**Articles 11 & 12**). In the second article, published on 29 January 1982, WAUGH was more specific and mentioned Sir Maurice Oldfield, a former Chief of SIS, by name. SIS has reviewed all the material it holds on its former Chief and has identified no material to indicate that Sir Maurice Oldfield had visited Northern Ireland during his SIS career or to associate him with the Kincora Boys' Home, other than articles published in the media. Both the Sunday Telegraph articles have been made available to the HIA Inquiry.

64. On 23 April 1987, in a written statement to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that the Security Service (MI5) had conducted a lengthy and thorough investigation into Sir Maurice Oldfield's homosexual activity to examine whether there was any reason to suppose that national security may have been compromised. The conclusion was that, though Sir Maurice Oldfield's conduct had been a potential risk to security, there was no evidence or reason to suggest that security had ever been compromised. I understand that MI5's statement to the HIA Inquiry provides details of the security investigations into Sir Maurice Oldfield carried out by investigating officers from that agency.
65. On 12 February 2016, whilst reviewing MI5 material, the HIA Inquiry made SIS aware of a second hand account from 1983, which reported that a former member of SIS had told another individual that Sir Maurice Oldfield's removal from Northern Ireland related to events at Kincora. Searches conducted by SIS established that the former member of SIS who made the allegation had retired in April 1970, 13 years before the comment was made. Further searches conducted by SIS into the officer's allegation or the circumstances in which it was made found no material on the SIS record. It is my understanding that MI5 concluded that it was a senseless allegation. The officer concerned died in March 1985.

CONCLUSION

66. This statement is a full and accurate disclosure of the SIS material deemed relevant by the HIA Inquiry. I have seen nothing to indicate any involvement on the part of SIS officers in abuse at the Kincora Boys' Home, or in any attempts to cover it up.
67. SIS does not exploit children or vulnerable adults for operational purposes, nor tolerate their abuse either by their staff, or those that work on their behalf or in their support including SIS agents. In dealing with cases of child abuse or exploitation, our guiding principle is, as is set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and in the Children Act, that the best interests of the child should always prevail.

Signed

SIS Officer A

SIS Officer A

Date

27 MAY 2016

REPRO
DATE
OF
DATE

CLASSIFICATION

Headquarters
3 Infantry Brigade
British Forces Post Office 801

Lurgan 3691 EXT

28 January 1976

EXTREMIST PROTESTANTS
SECRET ORGANISATION - TARA

4. Your letter SF/704/INT dated 6 Jul 74.

3. Your letter SF/712/INT dated 5 Jun 75.

GENERAL

1. Very little is known about TARA, but some useful information has come through which may be of value to you. The following points will be covered:

a. Personality of William MacBRATH

a. Personality of William McGRATH.

b. TARA.

c. "Ireland's Heritage 1911 1303."

d. Involvement of PAISLEY.

2. This information comes from three contacts. Our assessment is that it might be graded F3 and in parts F2.

WILLIAM McGRATH +

WILLIAM McGRATH

3. William McGRATH, 118 Upper Newtownards Rd, BELFAST, is the leader of TARA. He used to live at 5 Greenwood Ave, Upper Newtownards Rd, BELFAST and prior to that, at 75 Wellington Pk, BELFAST. He originally came from Earl St where his father had a Barber Shop. He had little formal education and worked as a young man in his uncle Joe's Barber Shop.
4. In 1941 when McGRATH

4. In 1941 when McGRATH was still in his mid-twenties, he formed a group called the Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade. He then embarked on an evangelical preaching career around churches and mission halls. He operated from a large mansion at 25 Orpen Pk, BELFAST, but this is now Faith House, a Brethren Old Peoples Home. He had an office in DUBLIN thought to be connected with the organisation. Mention has been made of two politico/religious visitors whom it is believed had contact with McGRATH prior to 1969:

INFORMATION
CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT BY
THE HIAI

Page 1 of 6

CLASSIFICATION

EXHIBIT 1 (Page 2)

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

INFORMATION
CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT
BY THE HIAI

5. McGRATH joined the Orange Order around 1964 and widened his audiences by [REDACTED]

6. McGRATH is a homosexual and makes a practice of seducing promising young men. They include David BROWNE, Deputy Editor of the Protestant Telegraph and Clifford SMYTHE, who at one time lived in McGRATH's house and is now secretary of the RUC and DUP Convention Member for North ANTRIM.

7. Two of the contacts gave distinct impressions that McGRATH was somehow associated with Communism. McGRATH is said to have attended a Revolutionaries Conference in DUBLIN in the mid-sixties at which 3 representatives from Eastern Bloc countries were present. This association may account for his financial position. Details are very obscure, but he managed to live in sizeable mansions in BELFAST even though his only visible means of support was the sale of second-hand carpets from his house. McGRATH is currently described from the 1975 BELFAST Street Director as a Welfare Officer. He is thought to be running some form of boys' home.

TARA

8. One of the contacts stated that in about 1964, TARA first began to be mentioned in the context of a "ginger group" within the Orange Order, but it never really got off the ground until 1969 (presumably with the advent of the troubles), when a room in Clifton St Orange Hall was obtained. This was ostensibly for meetings of an "Orange Discussion Group," but was in reality to organise and train TARA.

9. One of the contacts felt that TARA might have had some weapons but it only ever saw one. McGRATH's policy was that officers did not handle weapons and should remain "clean." At one stage it talked about men having been in action.

10. The following have been named as TARA members:

FILE ANNOTATION

EXHIBIT 1 (Page 3)

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

INFORMATION
CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT BY
THE HIAI

11. At Annex A is an article by David PARKER which makes mention of TARA.

IRELAND'S HERITAGE LOL 1303

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

12. McGRATH has been instrumental in the formation of a new Orange Lodge, "Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303," the members of which number 39 and are currently learning Gaelic. The Lodge's banner depicts a Celtic cross and its title in Gaelic, "Oidhunacht na hEireann."

13. Clifford SMYTHE and Frank MILLAR Jnr are members and there is clearly a number of cases of dual membership with TARA. When at Queen's University, BELFAST around 1970, Clifford SMYTHE, David LYLE and Frank MILLAR Jnr were instrumental in forming the "Ulster Protestant Information Bureau" which was to counter IRA propaganda. They also formed the "Williamites and Glorious Revolution Society" which, for example, brought Orange flute bands to perform in the Students Union.

14. At Annex B is an article on the "Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303."

INVOLVEMENT OF IAN PAISLEY

FILE ANNOTATION

15. PAISLEY appears to fear McGRATH, who is a member of his Martyr's Memorial Church and has on occasion used threats to make PAISLEY give him permission to speak in his halls. One of the contacts made the interesting point that William CRAIG had stated that PAISLEY did an about turn on the voluntary coalition issue after a meeting in the Martyr's Memorial Church. It hazarded a guess that pressure had been brought to bear on PAISLEY by McGRATH. Contacts view certainly has an element of truth in it. For example, in [REDACTED] 18 Oct 75, it is independently reported that PAISLEY was pressured in this way.

SOURCE PROTECTION

16. It would appear that PAISLEY himself is not a member of TARA but he is clearly surrounded by many men who are. It would seem that the following credentials are useful, if not mandatory, for membership:

- a. Membership of the Orange Order.
- b. Membership of DUP.
- c. Membership of PAISLEY's Martyr's Memorial Church.

FILE ANNOTATION

CONCLUSION

17. The picture is confused. You are in a better position to assess the information than we are. Perhaps the most interesting aspect is the many contradictions around the central figure, McGRATH.

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

EXHIBIT 1 (Page 4)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

a. McGRATH would appear to have had little formal education and yet his views, though militant, are sophisticated enough to interest bright young men.

b. McGRATH's message is designed to appeal to staunch Protestantism. Roman Catholicism, its enemy, is closely linked with leftish ideas and Communist involvement with Communism. It is not fair to ask whether McGRATH is a "sleeper" with the brief to keep the pot boiling whilst others organise. He certainly uses the classic communist tactics of the cell system, infiltration of an organisation, ie the Orange Order, and the introduction of divisive elements.

c. There is no obvious indication of where McGRATH's income stems from, but he appears to be comfortable financially.

d. One might ask why the apparently all powerful PAISLEY can be influenced by a McGRATH-sponsored pressure group from within his own church. PAISLEY himself is probably not a member, but many of his supporters are.

e. There is an apparent contradiction between the aspirations of the "Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303," eg learning Gaelic, and its opposition to Roman Catholicism. This may be reconciled by the view held by many members of the Church of Ireland that certain churches, as direct descendants of the ancient Celtic Church predate their Roman Catholic rivals in Ireland and are therefore more authentic.

18. There is very little indication of TARA in the 3 Inf Bde Area, although it has been reported to exist in LURGAN, PORTADOWN and BANBRIDGE. It clearly also has sympathisers in North DOW. The most interesting figure is [REDACTED]

PROTECTION OF
IDENTITY

19. There is only one recorded occasion when the SF came into contact with TARA in the 3 Inf Bde Area. This occurred on 12 Mar 75, when [REDACTED] were stopped at the K7 border crossing. They had been in the Republic collecting information on the Irish Army and Garda. More recently, propaganda leaflets from TARA were received by IRS and QDG. They had been posted in BELFAST.

RETASKING

20. Contacts are retaskable. We would be grateful for any direction that addressees might be able to give. It is hoped that this short paper will be the basis upon which future MISRs will be written.

Distribution:

G Int HQ HI
G Int HQ 39 Inf Bde
Research Office
File

Copy No

1
2
3
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SEND TO

Major

for Commander

NAME & SIGNATURE OF
ARMY OFFICER

Page 4 of 6

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

EXHIBIT 2 (Page 1)

Note to file [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION

TARA

14 October 1976

HISTORY

1. TARA first came to notice in 1964 as a ginger group, within the Orange Order, who campaigned for greater political action against Republicanism. A base for the organisation was established in 1969 when a room in Clifton St Orange Hall, Belfast, was obtained. This was ostensibly for meetings of an "Orange Discussion Group" but was in reality to organise and train TARA members. When the organisation was first set up it had support from the County Grand Lodge of Belfast and the Grand Orange Loyal Institution.
2. The organisation was formed out of a small but militant fundamentalist Protestant movement devoted to political and religious opposition to Roman Catholicism. Its members argue the ascendancy of the Protestant faith over Catholicism and claim it to be the national religion.
3. It first came to recent public notice in Jan 1972 with the issue to the press of an unsigned proclamation of intent. It was about this time that William McGRATH formed TARA on its present day lines. The choice of name is strange as it is the name of a seat of ancient kings of Ireland, but it does symbolise the belief of TARA members that the whole of Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom - under a Protestant leadership.

MEMBERS OF TARA

4. Sources indicate that the TARA membership is small, possibly 300 Province wide and about 70 activists in Belfast. There is evidence that a number of the members are sexually deviant; William McGRATH the past OC almost certainly is bisexual and there were homosexuals in his immediate circle of TARA associates. The organisation has always relied on tight security and information regarding its members was closely guarded. Some members have been identified and it is believed that the organisation has members and contacts in positions of influence throughout the Province in local politics, the Orange Order and commercial life. A number of members are known to be in the TAVR, RUCR and UDR.
5. One ex-member of TARA, [REDACTED] claimed that membership had been falling drastically and the organisation went public to create a myth about their size. (In 1973 a split had occurred within TARA and a lot of members who were opposed to the low-key profile left and joined the UVF). A senior member of TARA, [REDACTED], recently claimed that, although not a large organisation, it was able to operate through pulling strings. This is believed to be factual.
6. In 1975 it was reported that many of the older members of the UDA were anxious to join TARA. Some had been in TARA prior to the formation of the UDA but left to join the new organisation. They later considered TARA to be the more respectable of the two organisations, with a much stricter vetting procedure than the UDA and stronger ties with the Orange Order.

CONDITIONS OF ENTRY

7. Conditions for entry to TARA includes:
 - A. Applicants must have no criminal record.
 - B. They must be members of the Orange Order.
 - C. They must be proposed by someone who is already a member. Applicants are carefully vetted and the time lapse between application and acceptance can be up to six months while the applicants background is negotiated.

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CLASSIFICATION

EXHIBIT 2 (Page 2)

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

D. They must be of sober character and stable background.

E. Ownership of a personal weapon is desirable.

ROLE AND AIMS

8. In a civil war situation it is probably TARA leaders who would come to the fore and find their way into a Provisional Government, for no other reason than the calibre of personnel involved. One source has indicated that one of its aims is planning and preparation for Doomsday and its aftermath.

9. In 1973 they were believed to be bringing arms and ammunition into Ulster for purchase by the UVF. The influential businessmen of TARA were able to use their commercial contacts and expertise in bringing the arms in, although they were not interested in using them themselves. It is possible that TARA has a procurement role for members of the UUAC (possibly from Europe).

10. TARA, unlike the other Protestant organisations does not issue many statements in the press but more recently they have been publicly supporting direct rule. They have stated that "As Unionists, we completely reject the suggestion that continued government by the Parliament of the United Kingdom is in any way unacceptable and we will oppose any attempt to render continued direct rule unworkable".

TARA is described as the "hard core of Protestant resistance". It is a defence and planning organisation for use only in a doomsday situation.

12. It is believed that the TARA current active role is that of intelligence gathering. They are known to operate contacts in the loyalist political parties, the Ulster Defence Ministry, possibly Provisional Sinn Féin, Ulster Defence Association, Ulster Volunteer Force, Red Hand Commandoes, Ulster Defence Regiment and the RUC. Intelligence is collated to assess the invasion potential of the Ulster Army, the Protestant and Catholic paramilitaries strengths and intention and left wing involvement in Ulster. The organisation is believed to have a records system of sorts, probably located [REDACTED]

WEAPONS

13. TARA members probably have access to a large quantity of personal legally held weapons and may have a sealed dump somewhere in the Province. It is believed they were considering an arms purchase in 1975 and members have discussed the possibility of obtaining arms from Israel and South Africa.

STRUCTURE

14. In addition to the units in Belfast, TARA has units in the following areas:-

Armagh
Lurgan
Portadown
South Derry
and to a lesser degree Fermanagh and Coleraine.

The units sourced as operating in Belfast are platoons in Newtonabbey, Finaghy and East Belfast.

15. It was reported that the group was formed into platoons of approximately 20 men. Each platoon was believed to have an OC, a sergeant, a Quartermaster and an IO, but it is now thought that the organisation is run on a looser command structure. Dues of 50p per month (1974) were collected; one half of the dues go to a central fund and the other

Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION

EXHIBIT 2 (Page 3)

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]

half to the platoon. If the platoons require stores they draw from the central fund. Due to inflation the 50p was probably increased.

MAJOR PERSONALITIES

16. OC - William McGRATH, 5 Greenwood Ave. May be stood down due to ill health

OC

IO

Admin Offr

Secretary

Military intelligence and RUC Special Branch records have about 30 names of members or former members of the organisation in the Belfast area.

17. The 'raison d' entre' of TARA seems to be the establishment and defence of a Protestant Ulster with the complete exclusion of the Roman Catholic Church. Their policy has always been based on the idea of the supremacy and purity of the Protestant faith and a change of direction is unlikely. Although Unionist, the greatest TARA driving force is Protestantism.

Page 3 of 3

[REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]

Notes of an interview with Roy Garland ex TARA member left 1972
 718 - MCGARLAND (loc. 100)

Garland introduced to McG when he was approx 15 (20 years ago) McG at the time Christian/ Evangelical crusader. Held meetings at McG's attended also by C.S. UDR Captain N McG proposed they should form a group as these youngsters all had makings of becoming P.M.s etc. They first formed groups called "cell" however McG thought this sounded rather red and they decided on TARA (this was about 1965-6?)

They held meetings between themselves and McG would single them out after meetings. McG attempted to seduce them by claiming to show them emotional freedom, to this end he made them feel guilty by admitting to masturbation, therefore showing up their guilt complex. This is important to emphasise as it is the very beginning of McG's hold on them.

Garland Smith & UDR Captain N members of Young Unionist (YU). At one (YU) meeting addressed by McG, attended by McIlroy merchant banker gave card to R.G. 'INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION'. R.G. believes McIlroy helps TARA with finance.

Also with finance Clarence Hogg, Capt Hogg (UDR) TARA one time treasurer arranged finance for printing machine. Current involvement of McIlroy & Hogg not known.

McG suggested to C.S., R.G., UDR Captain N, that they should join LOLs. R.G. joined Irish Heritage Lodge & became master (it had very few members). The idea was to put motions to the various lodges which would gain momentum when they reached the Grand Lodge. One such motion put by R.G., framed by McG, was that Ulster should prepare a Provisional Govt now "IRISH" flavour to lodge.

The idea that TARA when it was first formed (early 70) was an elite, is laughable according to R.G. who claims to have been 2IC to McG. Recruits were accepted by personal recommendation, there was no vetting as such. Wpn training etc was talked about, but, R.G. never saw any weapons. Many people became disillusioned after joining either with McG's unsavoury reputation, or with all the talk and no action. The Christian overtones did not go down well with % of recruits.

Thomas Clarke (PINK) is supposed to have carried out surveillance on McG for several months and concluded that he was a communist.

Amongst persons attended early meetings of TARA R.G. mentioned elderly man named Dickworth. (Presumably John Dilworth)

* Frank Pootsie Millar is amongst persons currently involved with TARA and is reported as being engaged to McG's daughter. (now married)

Worthington McG is still on TARA scene and is now also Sec of Irish Heritage Lodge. Robert MacFarland, previously of [redacted] is currently an official in TARA & claims to have been given info regarding IRA/PIRA from SF at a meeting in Russell Court Hotel early this year. He is thought to own a business on the N'Ards Rd, and was an associate of J.W. McKeague.

R.G. claims that McG was responsible for spreading rumours of J.D. McKeague's homosexual activities, having posters posted around Belfast "NICE BOY McKeague". According to R.G., McK knows that McG was responsible for this.

R.G. believes that current aims of TARA will have moderated, as CS is close to McG also David Brown, but nevertheless, their basic aim remains to keep RCs down by force if necessary.

R.G. believes that although I.P. knows of McG's nefarious activities he would be better to take action because the expose would also effect CS therefore doing DUP no good. He further believes that McG has knowledge of Paisley's involvement with the UVF in early 70.

The present para militaries still regard TARA with degree of respect as they still have members like CS whose standing in society makes them privy to such info which would not ordinarily reach the para mils.

As IO of TARA CS seeks info on various aspects of mil Int i.e. Southern Irish Army. The docs found on Bate & Simpson were destined for CS. Among Names & tel Nos listed on

EXHIBIT 3 (Page 2)

Base on are Worthington, McG, T Passmore, Jean Coulter.

CS currently IO TARA, wife Scots therefore has connections in Scotland believed to have TARA members in Scotland. Visits England and meets Phyllis Raffern (Nat Front). R.G. states that CS is a transvestite who has ~~had~~ assistance from McG regarding afore problem.

EXHIBIT 4

HANDWRITTEN FILE ANNOTATIONS

The paradox that is Tar-

The Northern Ireland situation has thrown up some strange, if not quite new, arguments for the past years, but one Protestant group is in a class of its own. With a base of 20,000 in the north of the island, it believes in integrated education, as he came to see it. It is not a religious group, but a social one, and it claims the right to sit up with the Protestants and Catholics in the same way. It is not a Protestant group, but a Catholic one, and it thinks the same. It is not a Protestant group, but a Catholic one, and it thinks the same. It is not a Protestant group, but a Catholic one, and it thinks the same.

*
*
*[illegible][illegible]

permeant therefore that every persistent should be prepared to bear arms with all our republicans may be in the state of command of the proper authorities in the hour of need." (Liberty)

The single action which that I never adopt "Communism" will be necessary to the rank, but I am prepared to find their brethren and the glorious history that has come to us in the concept of our land "Jews' lives."

I have no shrinking on impulse for such men, as I have knowledge of them, and I have

...of political and economic theory, he is not quite so deeply involved in the private as he is in the public life of the country. In his books, available at Public Libraries, we find a more serious and thoughtful analysis of which we may be proud. "The issue we ought to judge it possible for the great mass of law-abiding, intelligent Americans to be quickly absorbed into the developments," the proclamation continues.

"Many of our people can, of course, find a place now in the work of Public Research." The organization is

[illegible]

for reduction. It was not surprising, then, that in 1978, the 15,000 men left Tata, taking much of the country's men with them. The toughest and brightest element in the steel group now found its way to the London stock exchange. The notion that the pits would close at that time has been discredited some in the form of a new steel plant and another at sea. Along with the fragmented world of locally parliamentary rule.

tively suited in its treatment of what is regarded as the "bully-
 than all other" attitude of T. A. 2.
 The recognition of occasional
 condonation of the other
 groups for forgiveness and ven-
 eration is of less little to endur-
 e in the others. The attempt
 to make of it different with
 the others is due for every

Some of its members objected to the IWA's trip to London in 1953. Not because of the party's objectives, but in the fear of losing for that venture, the party's independence. The party is independent of all other political relations, but in the future it may be in contact with foreign parties, who will not be able to influence the party's decisions.

And the words of the Lord
came unto me saying,
Son of man, set thy face
toward Zion, say thou thus,
The Lord saith, I will turn thee back.

1. I put coals into the jaws, and
 2. being like earth, and all
 3. above, horses and horses
 4. all of them clothed with
 5. of armour even a great
 6. ally with bucklers and
 7. all of them handling
 8. Persia, Ethiopia, and Libya
 9. them: all of them with
 10. and helmets:

According to the T'ara interpretation of this, when we are engaged into Armageddon, these countries will be in it with Gog and Magog as well as representing a new as representing a new China, thus the USA along in the face of the signs of Scripture.

One of its members believe, the Rev. Robert Bradford,

[illegible]

...the truth is that the
...into the top

elections of Loyalist notables. In the Old Sumner Assembly, the late James Craig (D.U.P.) was elected in another member. Today the Tara seat and the command in the British office in the Congo, did not seem to be a reward for Loyalist members, infinitely loyal and obedient and the blue flag.

The relationship between Tard and the other Jewish financiers has not improved since the 1920s, he believes. The men who at that time, including

the fact of staff, are suspended
deliberate infiltration, the
a source professing that the
a kind of (Vig) plot, carried
with particular success in
France, Belgium, probably
most extensive to the
the present paramilitary. The
is to act as a military
one with any equipment
and men who can be

the other perambulates. In this, at least, is a "poly-
morphic" quality that involves the
recognition of risk in other organi-
sms with which Tara works as com-
munity health center volunteer. "I
may see one or two instances
of risk in large senior citizens
Tara in the hope that they
bring families back to the

However, the truth lies, Tara numbers less than six members centering in North and West streets and Co. Anthony with 200 in Ballymena and Larne. A typical member is a lower middle-class, respectable (strange) who holds extreme Evangelical Protestant beliefs, and is someone interested in new advertisements.

...than in military action, ... who left for the Liverpool ... speaking, lower ... had few political ... and were impatient ... the excessively religious ... of the leaders; the ... was partly on class lines, ... pre-war make-up of Tara ... reflected in the fact that it

the time he told

Tata is subjected to writing
like letters to the newspapers,
the authors of which give as
authoritatively discussed the
information they present to their
own interpretations of murder
and execution and the
other -- typical like murder and

[illegible]

Following a minor split last summer between two factions, the party's leadership has undergone a revolution, but this will not probably alter the organization's objectives or aims. With the support of some prominent local persons, the party has been formed, and a few signs of this alliance

...the only military-type actions
...in any way in the

the burning of Catholic
religions and schools. This low-
level, limited policy will con-
tribute to the absence of a poli-
tically motivated, in which Tur-
kish leaders can participate as part
of the localist party, the or-
ganization's activities are likely to
be little expressing as long as
reasonable level of civil
ity prevails.

... from letter-writing and
... of clandestine activities, and
... of its "mysteries!" —
... of the Orange, and
... particularly in those of the
Black Preceptory — which
... for outside eyes in any
the public of media are ex-

...a more prominent
...ary groups, it will
...e just the same.

Parental Issues

Inv. Desk.

735

14

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL

1. *Phragmites* (common)

PROCLAMATION

BEING CONVINCED that darker days than we have yet known still lie ahead for the people of Northern Ireland, we address ourselves to those who wish to preserve for ALL THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND, that heritage of faith and freedom that has been almost extinguished in a large part of our land and which is now threatened with extinction in this North-West corner of Ulster.

The aim of the enemy is the destruction of our Protestant faith. This they hope to achieve by creating a total war situation in which the Eire Army will cross the border to unite with the provisional and Regular I.R.A. who are already in our midst. Plans are in existence for this purpose. What has happened in our Province during the past few years is not just a series of local riot situations, but rather the beginning of the final chapter of an age-long campaign to subjugate and subdue the Protestant people of Ireland. This is an essential preparation for the campaign against the Protestant character of the British Throne. This situation will continue to grow in intensity until the final battle which will affect the life of every man and woman, boy and girl in our land. For such a conflict our Protestant people are ill-prepared. In preparation for the day of battle certain things are essential NOW.

- (1) Our Protestant districts must be brought back to normality in the shortest possible time. Damage must be repaired. The whole place cleaned up. Every home, shop, office, factory and street must be bright and shining, showing to the world that Protestantism stands for at least, cleanliness and order and industrious living.
- (2) Our children must be sent to Sunday School and Church. If your Minister is not a true Protestant get him moved and put a man of God in his place. Those men are paid to preach the Protestant faith in its purity. Don't let them take their money under false pretences. It is not sufficient that your children have been born Protestant they must be taught the fundamentals of their faith. There are many good Mission Halls which should be supported by you and your family. Learn to raise your heart in prayer to God through Christ, at your Bench, Desk or in the Bus, the Car or the Home. The people that pray are an invincible people.
- (3) Law and Order, must prevail. Hi-jacking, Robbery, Illegal Drinking Clubs and an utter disregard for other people's property are no part of the Protestant way of life. People who indulge in these activities must be exposed for the criminals that they are.
- (4) Victimization and intimidation must stop. It serves no cause to burn a man's home or destroy his place of work. Each person must be allowed to live and work in peace and security in keeping with the dignity of man.
- (5) Assassination must stop. Many of the victims have not been politically active. Their death had no political significance or effect. Capital punishment must be the penalty for murder.
- (6) If the spirit of rebellion arises in an individual or a community, all the strength of the Lawful Authorities must be used to crush it without mercy.

-2-

(7) Maximum co-operation and support must at all times be given to the Army and Police. If wrong political directions are given to the Security Forces resulting in unacceptable action by them, we must do everything possible to cool the situation. The only line we would oppose the Security Forces would be in the event of them forcing us into a United Ireland. If we act now and act right this situation will never arise. It is our task to educate the Forces as to the nature of the conflict and the rightness of our cause, so that in the final battle the Army and police will be fighting side by side with us against a common foe, namely Romanism and Communism.

(8) We must campaign now for integrated education. All Roman Catholic centres of education must be closed. Religious education must be provided only by Evangelical Protestants.

(9) The Roman Catholic Church must be declared an illegal organisation. History proves that it is a conspiracy against the fortunes and liberties of mankind. For generations this evil thing has blighted our land. It must be destroyed, so that our fellow countrymen who have been deceived by it, will have an opportunity of entering into an eternal relationship with God through Christ and of discovering their common identity with us. The indivisible oneness of the Irish people will then become a reality.

(10) Conflict is inevitable. We would not choose this path but the forces of Romanism and Communism will. It is imperative therefore that every Protestant should be prepared to bear arms so that all our resources may be in a state of readiness to be placed under the command of the proper Authorities in the hour of need. We are not looking for trigger-happy Gunmen but we are anxious to meet responsible men who are prepared to defend their hearth and home and the glorious liberty that has come to us in the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.

A basic knowledge of Guns and Ballistics, of Fieldcraft and Strategy can be acquired quite legally in the privacy of one's home from books available in Public Libraries or which can be legally bought. This basic knowledge will make it possible for the great mass of law-abiding Protestants to be quickly absorbed into Her Majesty's Forces as the crisis develops. Many of our people can of course find a place now in the U.D.R. or Police Reserve.

We need men of conviction, men of high principle, men of courage and of faith who are prepared to resist to the death if necessary, every attempt from whatever source, to unfurl the banner of the evil one over this fair Province of ours. If you think you measure up to these demands we will be glad to hear from you.

The situation is dark. The enemy is strong. Great and grievous difficulties will have to be faced, but all is not lost! Ulster is God's anvil on which is being forged the future not only of Ireland, but of all the British people of which we are proud to form a part. Knowing this we throw down the challenge to a desperate foe - hammer away, ye hostile bands, your hammers break, God's anvil stands!

Issued by the TARA - THE HARD CORE OF PROTESTANT RESISTANCE!
RESISTANCE WITH RESPONSIBILITY!

WE HOLD ULSTER

THAT IRELAND MIGHT BE SAVED AND THAT BRITAIN BE REBORN!

...../3

-3-

FIVE OF YOU SHALL CHASE AN HUNDRED AND AN HUNDRED OF YOU SHALL PUT TEN THOUSAND TO FLIGHT: AND YOUR ENEMIES SHALL FALL BEFORE YOU BY THE SWORD. FOR I WILL ESTABLISH MY COVENANT WITH YOU.....AND I WILL CUT OFF THE NAMES OF THE IDOLS OUT OF THE LAND AND THEY SHALL NO MORE BE REMEMBERED.....FOR THE MOUTH OF THE LORD HATH SPOKEN IT.

EXHIBIT 6 (Page 1)

10 29 OCT 1980

CLASSIFICATION

D/DS6/7/44/18

PS/PUS

Copy to:

PS/DUS (Army)

PS/DUS (CM)

MA/VCGS

AUS(GS)

✓ NIO - Mr Mayne
CPR

HANDWRITTEN ANNOTATIONS

J C WALLACE

As you suggested in your letter of 3 October (DRK/80/1170), Mr Sheldon's secretary rang me earlier today to arrange for me to look over the notebooks the police took from Wallace's office after his arrest.

2. There are two, both HMSO issue, one a large notebook; the other a shorthand book.

3. The large notebook relates just to Northern Ireland. It contains a number of lists: the names of 50 or so top PIRA and OIRA operators in 1973; 35 top UDA and UVF men; 40 other leading protestants. There is also a collection of addresses of Republican front organisations and of others more or less sympathetic to the IRA cause; together with lists of Republican and Protestant newspapers and propaganda sheets and of other examples of the underground press. Finally, it contains a brief account of [REDACTED], who seems to have joined the WRAC in 1971 and then become involved with the Provisionals in 1972. The rest of the book is empty.

IRRELEVANT NAME

4. The shorthand note book contains nothing about Northern Ireland but is densely packed with information about international terrorism and government plans and organisations aimed at countering it. It contains quite detailed accounts of actual terrorist incidents around the world - mainly Arab hijackings as well as the Munich Olympics attack on the Israeli team, and the Hans Martin Schleyer kidnapping. There are lists of Arab terrorist groups and an account of what each stands for together with a note on the Japanese Red Army. There is an outline of HMG procedures for using troops in civil contingencies - the CCU is mentioned - and in support of the police. There is a discussion of the State of Emergency measures adopted by the Heath Government and of the Committee under Lord Jellicoe and later Lord Carrington which oversaw them. The JIC and GCHQ are mentioned and then heads of MI5 and MI6 and the DGI are all named, as is intelligence co-ordinator at No 10. Addresses of MI5 and MI6 buildings in London are listed. There are also some names of members of the Israeli Intelligence agencies. Police computers in GB are listed and their locations given. Finally there are two mentions of the SAS: that they were stood by in the [REDACTED] and they helped [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED]. The names of the two SAS soldiers concerned are given, as is that of the head of [REDACTED].

NAME OF
INCIDENTNAME OF
INCIDENT

INTELLIGENCE DESIGNATOR

5. Much of this could have been gleamed from a careful reading of newspapers and from conversation with the journalists who came to Belfast in the early seventies - the books seem to date mainly from about 1972-3 though they continue at least until 1977 (Schleyer was murdered in October 1977; the two SAS incidents were in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]) ie, until well after he left Government service. Why Wallace wrote it all up in this way is far from clear. He may either have wanted to

DATES

1 of 2

CLASSIFICATION


EXHIBIT 6 (Page 2)


CLASSIFICATION

pass it on to other pressmen - perhaps Fisk - or may even have planned some sort of book of his own on terrorism for which these are the rough notes. While none of it is particularly helpful, it is largely the sort of thing which does leak out from time to time in the pages of 'Time Out' or the 'New Statesman'. There is no reference in either book to any "dirty tricks" in Northern Ireland.

6. I understand from Mr Sheldon's secretary that he plans to hang on to the books and that a number of people from other Government Departments will be looking them over. I certainly see no reason why we should return them to Wallace but, equally, I do not think there is anything in them that journalists specialising in these subjects would not already know.

NAME & SIGNATURE
OF ARMY OFFICER



DS6c
MB Ext 2237

2 of 2


CLASSIFICATION

EXHIBIT 7 (Page 1)

Publication **NEWS OF THE WORLD**Date **21 MAR 1982**** To include filing / indexing instructions as necessary*

11/77

I'll expose top men's vice ring says killer

A CONVICTED killer holds the key to a growing sex scandal involving top members of the Establishment.

Colin Wallace, serving ten years for manslaughter, is threatening to expose the guilty men. He says he knows the names of MPs, lawyers, civil servants, councillors and policemen involved.

Wallace has told friends of a secret list of 60 men in the homosexual vice ring centred on Kinvara House, a school for deprived children in Belfast.

The ring was smashed at the end of last year when three staff members were jailed for offences against boys. Now the Government has ordered an inquiry into why it operated undetected for 20 years.

Wallace had access to the secret file when he served with the Army Information Service in Ulster.

Now Belfast Independent MP Gerry Fitz has demanded that the list should be made public. He also wants Wallace to be allowed to give evidence to the inquiry.

The killer has, I understand, refused to give evidence to a preliminary police probe. He wants guarantees that he will be able to give a full account of what happened, the people involved and refer to secret papers.

Then, he says, he is prepared to "blow the lid" off the whole Kinvara affair.

Wallace has told friends that he saw the list at Army HQ in Lisburn. The names were on three foolscap sheets.

The file is said to be made up of pen portraits of people involved and details of roles they played.

Burned

The list includes names of MPs who visited Ulster before the scandal was first exposed two years ago.

Senior civil servants seconded from London to Belfast are also named, plus local politicians who used the vice ring or knew about it and took part in the cover-up.

And detectives have reopened inquiries into the death, nine years ago, of 10-year old Brian McDermott whose burned and horribly mutilated body was found in a Belfast river.

WALLACE was jailed for 10 years last March for killing his assistant's husband in the It's a Knock-out case.

NEWS OF THE WORLD

Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing ...

EXHIBIT 8 (Page 1)

Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing was done to stop the child sex abuse

By Liam Clarke

Published 06/08/2014



Kincora Boys' Home in the 1970s

The Belfast Telegraph can name three people who gave information about child sex abuse in Kincora to British military intelligence only to see any investigation blocked for years by MI5.

Last night Brian Gemmell, a former captain in military intelligence, confirmed that he had passed on information from three men - James Miller, Roy Garland and Jim McCormick - to a senior MI5 officer named Ian Cameron. All three information sources were completely opposed to the abuse and wanted it ended.

Mr Gemmell, an officer in military intelligence at the time, was trying to gain an entrée to Tara, a secretive Protestant paramilitary group headed by William McGrath. Until late 1971 McGrath's second-in-command in Tara was Mr Garland.

Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing ...

EXHIBIT 8 (PAGE 2)

"I had been aware that McGrath was a child abuser since the 1940s," Mr Garland said.

He first became aware of it when McGrath, a born-again Christian, was carrying out a mission in Faith House. The premises in Belfast's Orpen Park has now been converted to an old people's home and has no connection with its role in McGrath's day.

A second source of information on McGrath was Mr Miller, an Englishman and former soldier who had settled in Northern Ireland.

He worked as a military intelligence and MI5 agent. In 1971 Mr Miller, who is now dead, was infiltrating Tara for the intelligence services and had reported his suspicions to his handlers.

He was told to drop the issue, and shortly afterwards he was expelled from Tara.

"I can tell you exactly what happened," Mr Garland said. "A number of UVF men were attending the meeting and they said that Miller was working for British intelligence. McGrath said: 'Tell him to go', so I went over and told him: 'I am sorry, you have to go,' and showed him out."

Mr Miller went on to join the UDA at his handler's request.



The third source was Mr McCormick, an evangelical Christian, who set up a meeting between Mr Garland and Mr Gemmell in 1974. Mr McCormick said at the meeting that there were three child abusers working at Kincora.

"I had been trying to bring this out for some time," Mr Garland said. "I had already given an account to police in Strandtown and the UVF had warned me that I was under threat of death as a result."

He and Mr Gemmell remain friends to this day, but at the time Mr Gemmell had his own agenda.

Kincora: How three men alerted MI5 officers to home's dark secret... and still nothing ...

EXHIBIT 8 (Page 3)



His first move was to report it to Cameron, an MI5 veteran who was working under the cover of a political adviser in the Northern Ireland Office.

"Ian Cameron was very much a father figure to me at the time," Mr Gemmell said.

"I was in my mid-20s and he was in his early 60s. He was normally a very nice chap, but he reacted very strongly.

"He told me that MI5 did not concern itself with what homosexuals did and he ordered me to stop using an agent I had within Tara, who we had codenamed Royal Flush."

However, Mr Gemmell was aware of efforts to recruit John McKeague, a loyalist paramilitary and abuser of teenage boys, as an informant, so he knew Cameron was lying.

The refusal to investigate Kincora led to Mr Gemmell severing his relations with the intelligence services when he left the Army two years later.

"It was a profession in which lies and cover-up were tools of the trade. As a Christian, I could not make that separation between private and professional morality," he said.

Two previous Government inquiries, the Terry Inquiry and the Hughes Inquiry, concluded that there was no military intelligence knowledge of child abuse at Kincora. Mr Gemmell was not interviewed by either of them.

Background

The First Minister Peter Robinson, Amnesty International and politicians across the board have called for the possible role of the intelligence services in covering up child abuse at Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast to be investigated as part of a UK-wide inquiry. On April 3, 1980, three members of staff at the home - William McGrath, Raymond Semple and Joseph Mains - were jailed for the systematic sexual abuse of children in their care going back to the early 1970s. Rumours have persisted that the abuse ring went further and included prominent people, both here and in the UK. It has been claimed that the security services were prepared to blackmail key figures as a means of controlling elements within loyalism and unionism as the Troubles flared.

MI5: new claims of political interference

Rees calls for inquiry into 'dirty tricks'

MERLYN REES, the former home secretary, called last night for a royal commission or similar judicial inquiry into allegations that MI5 attempted to destabilise the Wilson government in the mid-1970s.

Last week James Callaghan, the former prime minister, and Rees increased pressure on Mrs Thatcher to investigate alleged "dirty tricks" operations. Callaghan's surprise intervention followed a Sunday Times report about James Miller, a former MI5 agent who claimed that the security service helped to promote the Ulster workers' strike in 1974 in a plot to discredit and undermine the Wilson government.

Callaghan said The Sunday Times report broke new ground, outside the scope of the limited inquiry into MI5 activities he had instituted in 1977. Rees told The Sunday Times: "In view of the allegations that are being made there is a need now for an urgent royal commission-style inquiry."

New claims by Miller this week are likely to add further weight to demands for an inquiry. Miller, an Englishman recruited by the security service in Northern Ireland in 1970, casts doubt on the conclusions of an official inquiry into the sexual abuse of inmates at the Kincora boys' home in Belfast.

The inquiry, chaired by Sir George Terry in 1983, who at the time was chief constable of Sussex, concluded "there is no evidence that army intelligence had knowledge of homosexual abuse at Kincora".

Rumours that Kincora was a sex "honeytrap" used by MI5 to compromise intelligence targets, including Loyalist politicians and paramilitary figures, have appeared since the early 1980s. The stories have always been dismissed by the authorities.

However, Miller claims that the intelligence services had known about the activ-

by Barrie Penrose

ities at Kincora for a number of years, and believes the boys' home was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information.

Miller has revealed that his first task for the intelligence services was to spy on William McGrath, a former housefather at the Kincora home.

McGrath, who was jailed for his part in the abuse of 13 children in his care between 1973 and 1979, once headed the Tara Loyalist paramilitary organisation. Miller says that McGrath's sexual tendencies were common knowledge inside Tara.

Miller said: "My MI5 case officer later told me to leave McGrath to them and I understand they used the information to recruit him as an informer." Last night McGrath confirmed that he knew Miller but would not comment on any other aspect.

Miller's claims are borne out by an official army briefing paper signed by Colin Wallace, a former army intelligence officer who was attached to MI5 operations in Ulster during the 1970s. The document is dated November 8, 1974, a period when McGrath was employed as housefather in Kincora.

The paper makes clear that

army intelligence had inside knowledge of young boys being sexually exploited at the home seven years before the Kincora scandal broke publicly. Wallace's detailed four-page report was seen by several senior officers at army headquarters.


Headed "Tara - Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated with the Homosexual Community in Belfast", the report was requested by Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Dixon, then chief of army intelligence who worked closely with MI5 at the Royal Ulster Constabulary headquarters at Knock in west Belfast.

According to the document, "allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that assaults may have taken place as early as 1959". It concludes: "I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC has consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless they had specifically received some form of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level."

Despite Miller's and Wallace's specific warnings, McGrath was still employed as a housefather at Kincora between 1971 and 1979. And it was not until 1981 that he was jailed for four years on 18 counts of abusing boys.

In Ireland, Wallace has claimed he was eventually instructed to use the Kincora information as part of a black propaganda operation against prominent Loyalist politicians under the codename "Clockwork Orange 2". It was this operation, says Wallace, which was widened to include smear tactics against national politicians in all three political parties.

Last night, Rees, who was the Northern Ireland secretary in the mid-1970s, said he had no first-hand knowledge of Kincora. "But it does tie in with conversations I heard at the time. This whole affair must be investigated."



Rees: seeking royal commission

MI5: a success as travelling agent is jailed

EXHIBIT 10 (Page 1)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR FILE ADDRESS LIST & FILE
MARKINGPUBLIC EYE : Kincora - The MI5 ConnectionBBC2 1 June 1990 (Verbatim extracts)

This programme is summarised at 37a. The following is a more detailed account of the contribution made by "James", an Army intelligence officer, identified positively by us as Brian GEMMELL. Mike Taylor the interviewer is referred to below as 'T' and GEMMELL as 'J'. The text which is not within quotation marks is that of the narration, and the extracts begin with the question why nothing was done to pass on to the RUC the information said to have been available about homosexual goings-on at Kincora.

Verbatim (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. Why was nothing done? To answer that question it is vital to trace what happened to the information provided by Roy Garland to Army intelligence. We are able to do this because we have located the more senior of the two Army officers who met him. This officer claims that the information was passed on to MI5 with, he believes, disturbing consequences For reasons of personal security we have concealed the identity of the Army intelligence officer. We shall call him "James". James agreed to speak to us because Kincora has worried him ever since the day he met Roy Garland. He is a born again Christian and the affair still troubled his conscience.

2. James went to Northern Ireland at the end of 1974. He found that the new priority was to gather intelligence on Loyalist paramilitaries and politicians as well as on the traditional enemy, the IRA. To improve Loyalist intelligence we can confirm from James' evidence that TARA was targeted by British Intelligence and that James was one of those who did the targeting. He developed one particular source who was on the inside track of the Loyalist political leadership. This source was not William McGrath. A bond developed; they were both Christians. and the relationship proved fruitful. In this particular case, because of the nature of the intelligence, James says that he reported directly to a senior MI5 officer who was stationed in the Province.

/...

CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBIT 10 (Page 2)

3.

T "What do you get?"

J "I got blown out of his office. He was rude to me, he tells me that the kind of information I have submitted is not proper intelligence, that we as intelligence officers do not dabble in homosexual affairs. These moral matters are nothing to do with us. He vilifies my report and tells me to cut off the contact. I can remember him saying to me words to the effect of "get rid of him, break the contact, just get rid". I am surprised because we had a pretty good relationship going up until then. He blows me out of the office."

T "So he tells you to forget the homosexuality and to forget all the sexual business. It has got nothing to do with you, it is not the kind of thing that intelligence services deal in, forget it completely?"

J "To be perfectly honest I find the whole thing surprising. It was a strong line to me. Lay off any matter of sexuality, put aside these contacts, do not continue to dig up this kind of material in future. It is very clear, finito."

T "Perhaps he was right; after all, all you were bringing him were allegations, gossip and rumour; there was no evidence."

J "Yes but that is our job. The only way you can start to find out what real intelligence is, is to start with gossip and rumour and try and get the information that corroborates it."

5. What heightened James' bewilderment was a meeting he says he had in London with MI5 about the Loyalist para-military leader John McKEAGUE. McKEAGUE was shot dead by the INLA in January 1982. It was this encounter that made him even more sceptical about the moral outrage he claims was expressed by the senior MI5 officer. McKEAGUE was an alleged homosexual who was said to have founded a loyalist assassination gang called the Red Hand Commandos. James says he met the two MI5 officers in London. They wanted to explore with him as an expert on Loyalist intelligence the chances of turning McKEAGUE into an informant using his suspected homosexuality as a lever.

J "According to them they have some compromising film of a homosexual nature of John McKEAGUE which they wonder could it be used to make Mr McKEAGUE cooperative as an informant."

T "Are you sure they are suggesting or asking your advice on using Mr McKEAGUE's alleged homosexuality as a way of blackmailing him into cooperating with the Security Service?"

J "I don't think that the word blackmail was actually ever used in our discussions. Enticing, encouraging, putting pressure on; I'm quite certain about that."

T "Does it surprise you when you are asked that kind of question involving the alleged homosexuality of a person?"

J "Not really, I am more surprised at the protestations that intelligence forces do not deal with a thing like that."

/...

EXTRACT 10 (Page 3)

2

T "What particular intelligence was he looking for from you, from your source?"

J "Intelligence largely of a political nature on the Protestant side, I think was where his largest interest lay, but of course you couldn't be picky. When I went back to him with information I gave him everything that I could remember and everything, apart from trivia, that I thought relevant. We got to know one another. He was a considerably older man than me. He treated me in a friendly way, in a fatherly way. He gave me encouragement."

3. James was already cultivating his TARA source when he heard through Christian contacts that someone else wanted to talk to him about the organisation. That someone was Roy GARLAND.

J "...However there are sexual overtones to all this: when Mr GARLAND begins to accuse Mr McGRATH of a selection of sexual perversions."

T "Does Roy GARLAND mention KINCORA?"

J "Yes he tells me that at that stage McGRATH has a position in KINCORA and that KINCORA is a boys' home, he's very concerned about that."

T "Does he mention KINCORA by name or does he just say boys' home?"

J "I believe it's by name, I can't remember exactly but I believe it's by name. He doesn't know exactly what is going on but we are putting 2 and 2 together and making 4 when history shows that we should have made 6."

T "Does he say that he believes that boys or young people are being abused in the boys' home?"

J "I think he says he believes it but he doesn't know it to be true."

T "No evidence?"

J "I do not think he has been into the boys' home, put it that way."

T "Are you concerned at the allegation?"

J "I am concerned at the allegation. Yes."

T "Did you believe him?"

J "I believed that Mr GARLAND believes he is telling me the truth. It obviously has to be investigated and enquired into."

4. James wrote a report of his meeting and sent it up to his army superiors as a matter of routine. He says it was then passed to MI5 who shared the same building at Army Head Quarters. Next thing he knew James was summoned to see the senior MI5 officer.

J "I can't honestly say I was expecting 3 gold stars but I went up feeling fairly positive, expecting a normal meeting."

/...

EXTRACT 10 (Page 4)

T "What is your reaction when you hear that William McGRATH and two other men had been found guilty of abusing young people at KINCORA?

J "Horrorified. Horrorified more at myself and at the whole security system. I feel guilty to a degree that I did not actually stand up and say that something ought to be done about this now, but as I said to you earlier that is the kind of thing where an investigation should begin. But I didn't."

.....

(Here follow the sections (para 4-11) of the summary at 37a dealing with the RUC, the enquiries etc).

.....

6. But the most profound doubts are still held by the person most directly involved in the events we have unravelled this evening: the army intelligence officer who set them in train: James. "Why are you speaking now, publicly, about this matter?"

J "We are not talking here about great national secrets, we are talking about covering up a matter concerning a moral issue of the gravest importance: the abuse of young men, and of officials knowing about it and of officialdom apparently, for some reason, doing nothing. That's something that not only shocks and horrifies me - that's something that will shock and horrify in every part of our society. And I believe that this issue - and this is the only issue that I am talking to you about - this issue has to be brought out into the open. And we have to say these three most difficult words in the English language: "We were wrong", either because it was bungled, or because there is a more sinister or more conspiratorial reason for covering it up, and I don't know what was the reason but I do know that it was covered up, because I put the information in and nobody did anything about it".

SIGNATURE & DESIGNATOR
OF MIS OFFICER

Ext 87515
19 July 1990

Extract from the Sunday Telegraph dated 17.1.1982
Auberon Waugh's Column

TWENTY YEARS ago it started to be fashionable to say that Britain was being throttled by its old public school ties. Professor Richard Hoggart, that doughty champion of working-class literacy, has been saying it again, bless his old soul. Let us examine how things have gone since people started listening to him.

Since October 16, 1964, there have been five Prime Ministers. Not one of them went to a Headmasters' Conference School. Nor, until Sir Geoffrey Howe came along, had any of our Chancellors of the Exchequer since that time, unless one counts the tragically brief service of Iain Macleod. Yet if anyone had to put a finger on the date when things started to go seriously wrong for this country, I should have thought that Harold Wilson's arrival on October 16, 1964, was as good as any.

Public schools were once open to the criticism that they created a secret, often homosexual network—although if inquiries into the Belfast homosexual prostitutions scandal lead, as I rather fear they may do, to an immensely distinguished public servant, now dead, it may be noticed that he was not a public schoolboy, either.

In any case, it is now proposed to inculcate a "positive" attitude to homosexuality in the State curriculum. All in all, I should judge it a good time to draw the old school tie a little tighter.

Huberon Waugh's Diary


SUNDAY

PETER WALKER, the horrible former protégé of Grocer Heath who still hangs around in the Conservative government as Minister of Agriculture, takes a half page in *The Observer* to explain his determination to go on gassing badgers.

Where cows are suffering from bovine tuberculosis, he says, badgers are often found to be similarly affected. But even Lord Zuckermann acknowledged in his notorious report that nobody knew whether cows catch it from badgers or the other way round. Walker does not mention this point.

Zuckermann's possible motive for urging on the destruction of the British badger population is often discussed. There are no badgers in South Africa, where he was born, unless one counts the African Honey badger or Ratel, which is really a sort of weasel. To get its honey it farts into the bees nest until all the bees are senseless. Perhaps his parents wiped out the true badgers in South Africa before the little Solly arrived.

Or perhaps there is a more sinister explanation. There can be no doubt that Zuckermann is frequently mistaken for a badger as he wanders around London zoo and this may account for his hatred of them. Peter Walker's motives, I imagine, are more complicated. He feels that the more badger's sets left empty, the better his chance of using one as a bunker or bolt-hole for small, lower-class conservative parties when the nation eventually comes to its senses and sweeps me to power.



It won't work. I shall appoint Lord Zuckermann my Minister of Agriculture and instruct him to go round farting into badger sets which seem unoccupied. Walker shall not escape.

MONDAY

N EXCELLENT BBC television programme on *The Police* restores my confidence in this admirable body of men. At no sooner is it over than we have to catch a ghastly female from Women Against Rape with hysterical, stony eyes denouncing them all over again.

Rape seems to be the "in" thing. Every-

body's doing it. Even Mark Boxer has had a baby, although that probably has nothing to do with the latest craze. There is a move afoot to allow any female to have any male imprisoned for life on her own unsupported information to the police. Thank god for the Thames Valley Constabulary.

It is hard to know what to suggest for these unhappy women apart from a change of diet. Professor Malcolm Lader, a leading authority on psychiatric drugs, writes in *MIND* that convenience foods can lead to epilepsy, schizophrenia and many other forms of madness.

But while so many women insist on eating nothing but fish fingers and frozen peas, I feel we might encourage the move by GLC teachers to insist that there should be lessons on the "positive" aspects of homosexuality in every school curriculum. It may not be so much fun, but anything else would be too dangerous.

TUESDAY

A MORE gallant officer and gentleman than Major Charles Vuron Coleville Booth-Jones never drew breath. He was my Squadron Leader in the Blues in Cyprus. Shoulder to shoulder we faced the screaming hordes of Gypsies, fuzzy-wuzzies and slant-eyed fanatics demonstrating against British rule but Charles for one never flinched.

Now I learn that this same Major has been beaten up by the Wiltshire police at Wyllye Horse Trials. Three policemen

pinned him to the muddy ground for fifteen minutes with his wrists handcuffed and his legs tied together. His crime was to have suggested a more intelligent way of organising the traffic.

After two witnesses of good character had testified that they saw a policeman approach him from behind and punch him in the back, he was fined £100 by Salisbury magistrates for assaulting the police. The prosecution also claimed he had said the police inserted a pill into his mouth in order to dehydrate him, although he denied saying this.

I would not be in the least surprised. The Wiltshire police, unlike their

colleagues in Bedfordshire and Somerset, have always struck me as utter sods. No doubt the modern policeman needs these pills for the war on left-wing schoolteachers, supporters of Mrs Shirley Williams, Women Against Rape and Lesbians in Publishing.

But if they start using them against a lone Major at Horse Trials, we may have to take the law into our own hands and travel around everywhere with our own stock of dehydrating pills and handcuffs. I for one find the idea most distasteful.

WEDNESDAY

WHEN MAURICE Oldfield died last year it was officially announced that he had died for health reasons—the same, in fact, as caused him to resign from being head of security in Ulster a few months earlier. At the time, I expressed my doubts about this and said that I thought the old boy had probably been murdered by members of the Secret Intelligence Service, which he headed for several years before his retirement in 1977.

Normally when SIS officers murder each other it is the result of some poofish quarrel or lover's tiff inside the Service. On this occasion it may have been a misguided desire to protect the good name of the Old Firm. I gather that members of the rival—and slightly more respectable—Home Security Service had been breathing down the necks of their glamorous colleagues in the SIS about various wild allegations being made in Belfast.

If these had received a thorough airing and Maurice's name had been dragged through the mud, it would have been a poetic revenge for what the SIS poofstahs had done to the reputation of my old chief Roger Hollis.

Today Jim Prior makes an official announcement that nobody in the Northern Ireland office, no policeman and no politicians are involved in inquiries about a homosexual ring of Belfast youths taken into care. Just the same, he has decided that the inquiry will be conducted in private. So perhaps we shall never know the guilty men.

THURSDAY

ONE MILLION five hundred and eight thousand and forty six morons now buy the *Daily Star*. Perhaps nearly half of that number even "read" some of it. It has a higher percentage of young "readers" than any other national newspaper except, I suppose, *Beano*.

The good news is that it is losing buckets of money. Lord Maffews has to scatter millions and millions of pounds in bingo money among its ignorant yobbo "readership" before they will consent to take it to their sheds at the end of the garden.

The bad news is that all the newspapers now face ruin as a result of this half-witted competition for "readers". If the leadership of the National Union of Journalists were more than a collection of creepy lower-class power maniacs and left-wing fanatics—it would organise nationwide pressure to stop any newspaper offering any prizes whatever to its loathsome "readers". They have done nothing whatever to deserve it. Then journalists might be able to undertake urgently needed refurbishment of their stately homes, repair their works of art etc.



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT – SUPPLEMENTARY

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. This statement is supplemental to the SIS Witness Statement handed to the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) on 27 May 2016. It is provided to support a request received from the HIA Inquiry on 20 June 2016 for additional material identified by SIS in relation to William McGrath.
4. The material relates to documents and file references that were identified by MI5 on index cards, which were used by officers of the intelligence agencies as a working aid to record brief notes on McGrath. The index cards were identified by MI5 during searches for the HIA Inquiry and made available to SIS. The earliest note dates from 18 April 1973, recording that William McGrath is "*Leader of the refurbished form of the TARA Brigade*". These cards are referred to in paragraphs 17 and 18 of SIS's witness statement of 27 May 2016. Copies of the index cards appear in MI5's detailed witness statement.
5. This statement is a full and accurate disclosure of the material held in SIS's corporate record, deemed relevant to the HIA Inquiry's request of 20 June. SIS's disclosure process, undertaken to identify these documents, is consistent with that described in paragraphs 6 to 14 of our earlier statement. We have identified 8 of the 11 documents referred on the index cards identified by MI5 from their files. Searches relating to the 3 outstanding documents

listed on the index cards have not located them within SIS's corporate record; they may be held by MI5.

6. A summary of the documents identified by SIS is listed in the table below and redacted copies of the documents are annexed to this statement.

Reference	Date	Summary
Document 1	18/04/1973	Telegram from Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland - Daily Intelligence summary. Index card describes McGrath as Leader of the refurbished form of the Tara Brigade.
Document 2	13/11/1973	Letter from Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland to SIS London attaching a copy of a 25 page interrogation report. The MI5 index card records information extracted from the report that states McGrath runs the Christian Fellowship Centre and, <i>"subject 'gets them young and preaches religion to them', which mean that he preaches bigotry and anti-Catholic sermons"</i> . Possibly also a member of the UVF.
Document 3	31/03/1975	Letter from Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland attaching a copy of MoD letter from LINCO/CONCO East Belfast to G Int 39 Brigade. The letter provides a summary of information on Tara and personalities that include McGrath.
Document 4	03/10/1975	A copy of an article from the HIBERNIA which states that McGrath is a member of Paisley's Martyr's Memorial Church and that his in no longer leader of Tara.
Document 5	20/01/1976	Telegram from MI5 (SNUFFBOX) to Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland, copied to SIS London. The document contains a summary of information held on McGrath.
Document 6	02/02/1976	Telegram from Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland, copied to SIS London and MI5. Card index records extracts from the message that states McGrath is strongly anti-communist and believed to be secretary of Orange Lodge (LOL) 1303.
Document 7	13/02/1976	Telegram from Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland, copied to SIS London and MI5. Final paragraph of the message refers to Tara and describes McGrath as having <i>"long made a practise of exploiting other people's sexual deviations and Tara is vulnerable on this account"</i> .
Document 8	11/02/1977	Telegram from Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland to SIS London, copied to MI5. The subject of the message is Tara and records that McGrath had promised the E Belfast group a consignment of weapons that never materialised.

7. The documents yet to be identified are listed in the table below:

Reference	Date	Summary
	19/11/1973	Document initiated by Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland. The index card records that McGrath was a contact of [REDACTED] and was believed to be involved in shipping arms to Ireland.
	28/02/1975	Document initiated by Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland. The index card records that McGrath's occupations as Boys Hostel Warden at Kincora Boys Hostel, Belfast. He runs the Irish Emancipation Crusade in Belfast that sent threatening letters to firms in Birmingham. Reported to be homosexual.
	19/10/1976	Letter from SIS London. Text of index card reads "See ref. for write up on subject [McGrath] & The Tara Brigade."

SIS Officer A

Signed

SIS Officer A

Date

24/6/16

ANNEXED DOCUMENTS

Document 1 - 18 April 1973

11. Political

B. New Protestant Organisation: TARA

(CF Daily Intelligence Summary [REDACTED] INFORMATION CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI
(10 April), para 11A.)

A delicate and reliable source has provided further information on TARA, the new Protestant Organisation about which there have been recent press reports. According to source, quoting [REDACTED] of the UDA, TARA originated in 1968 from within the Orange Debating Society. In its refurbished form, the leader is WILLIAM MCGRATH, a Paisleyite, and his son WORTHINGTON is secretary. Another prominent member is CLIFFORD SMYTH (a leading member of PAISLEY's Democratic Unionist Party).

Comment: It seems likely from this later information that our guess about [REDACTED]'s involvement was probably wrong.

Although we think it unlikely that TARA has, or will develop, much influence, it seems clear from indications we have had of fears in UDA circles about its posing a possible threat to UDA that its existence will add further to the divisions and jealousies among extremist Protestants.

Passed as instructed.

INFORMATION CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI

1026Z

19 April 1973

Document 2 (Page 1) - 13 November 1973

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<div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div> <i>INTERROGATION</i>	<i>NAMES CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI</i>
<p>We attach copies of an interrogation report on <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div> a member of Vanguard Service Corps (VSC), carried out at <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div> Police Station <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div>. In addition we attach a set of comments on personalities mentioned which has been compiled by our Research Section.</p>	
<i>DATES</i>	
<div style="background-color: black; width: 100%; height: 60px;"></div>	
<div style="background-color: black; width: 100%; height: 20px;"></div>	
<p>4. This letter has also been sent to <div style="background-color: black; width: 20px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div>.</p>	<i>INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI</i>
<i>MI5 DESIGNATION</i>	

Document 2 (Page 2) - 13 November 1973

INFORMATION CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI

434

Subject then stated that he had knowledge of another organisation called TARA. Subject explained that TARA is a splinter group formed from U V P. Subject stated that TARA is run by McGrath from his house on the Hollywood Road. Subject explained that McGrath got them young and preached religion to them. Subject appeared to mean that McGrath preached bigotry and anti-Catholic sermons. Subject stated that TARA were responsible for the wrecking of the Chapel on Creght(?) Road and further stated that he had been told that this organisation had 500 Thompson Machine Guns. Subject stated that TARA was "very secret" and was not generally talked about or known to exist. Subject went on to say that he thought McGrath may also be part of UFF. Subject was sure that McGrath's associate called [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was a member. Subject stated that he was given this information by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] told subject that he had been told by [REDACTED] that UFF always take a souvenir from their victims and that [REDACTED] would show [REDACTED] the cheque book of Councillor [REDACTED] as proof of his UFF membership.

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI

Document 3 (Page 1) - 31 March 1975

Subject	
DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY	MoD DESIGNATOR
INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI	1. AS you are aware, we are at present seeking means of gathering intelligence on the Democratic Unionist Party.
	2. In this context, [REDACTED] passed us a copy of the attached letter from LLMCO/COH30 East Belfast to G Int 39 Brigade,
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
FILE ANNOTATIONS	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI	

Document 3 (Page 2) - 31 March 1975

H/2
58

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION

One of two Copies

LINGCO/CONCO East Belfast
2 RMP Tnc
BFPO 801
Belfast Civil 51146

NAME OF ARMY OFFICER

Personal for : [REDACTED] (2 copies)
HQ 39 Inf Bde

11 March 75

TALENT SPOTTING - Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

ARMY OFFICER R

ARMY OFFICER D

1/ Over the past six months [REDACTED] (LINGCO) and [REDACTED] (CONCO) have developed a good personal relationship with [REDACTED] (RUC [REDACTED]). As a result of this relationship [REDACTED] has passed over useful information.

NAME, RANK & ROLE OF RUC OFFICER

2. Since November 1974 [REDACTED] has been working on a project concerning the organisation known as TARA. [REDACTED] has given [REDACTED] background information on TARA. [REDACTED] Miss V SHAW, who is employed as B A to the Rev Ian PAISLEY.

ARMY OFFICER D

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCES

The following is a summary of information passed [REDACTED] by Miss SHAW on Tara and personalities so far :

NAME OF RUC OFFICER

Mr Ian McGRATH : 188 Upper Newtonards Road - Warden of Kincora Boys Hostel. He used to live in 'Faith House', 25, Orper Park, Finaghy. This was the house he lived in before the "scandal broke". He then moved to 5, Greenwood Park, where Clifford SMYTH stayed with him until SMYTH got married.

There was a Scottish matron type that worked in Faith House, who became disenchanted with McGRATH's habits and packed up and went home. Source said she would know alot about his early activities.

He is the Master of the Ireland Heritage Lodge, which meets in the John Knox Memorial Hall, 150, Cliftonpark Avenue, of which there is a suggestion that PAISLEY has some sort of control of.

It was over the use of this hall that McGRATH and PAISLEY had a disagreement. McGRATH wanted to use the hall for a meeting, to which PAISLEY agreed. Source, on learning this, went to PAISLEY with a set of letters and papers, written to

Document 3 (Page 3) - 31 March 1975

(2)

by McGRATH when they were having an affair, to show PAISLEY what sort of man he was dealing with. PAISLEY then tried to prevent McGRATH using the hall, to which McGRATH replied by threatening to publicise PAISLEY's 'undemocratic usage of Orange Halls', and to organise a protest march, using the members of his Lodge, outside PAISLEY's church. 38
59

In the late '60's early '70's, McGRATH was collecting funds, reason not known. GARLAND had donated £5000 in good heart. Somewhere along the line McGRATH went crooked, used the money for his own ends, and GARLAND found out and demanded his money back. When McGRATH refused GARLAND sued him, the outcome of which McGRATH had to sell Faith House to pay off the debt.

PERSONAL INFORMATION

See PARANT : [REDACTED] He owns his own business, something to do with cosmetics. He is the man who was, in source's words, influenced by McGRATH, and who kept the letters and papers exchanged between themselves whilst the affair lasted. He is now married and, source thinks, has two children.

**FILE
ANNOTATION**CLIFFORD SMITH

For the last Convention the DUP party machinery was asked to support SMITH as one of its candidates. When PAISLEY read the letters and saw that SMITH was involved it was too late to prevent SMITH standing without raising publicity that would have damaged the DUP. So he was allowed to stand. Sometime after SMITH was elected he was confronted by a DUP party committee and asked if he was a member. SMITH said he was connected with McGRATH. He denied this, and as they gave evidence against him.

INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI

** The poor quality of page 2 of the document reflects the way the original was scanned into records.

Document 3 (Page 4) - 31 March 1975

(3)

[REDACTED]

60
INFORMATION
CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT BY
THE HIAI

Miss SHAW has a grievance to settle with McGRATH, whom she dislikes intently for moral reasons. [REDACTED]

RUC OFFICER

ARMY OFFICER D

[REDACTED] for his part is prepared to pass on this information to the military through [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. It is doubtful if [REDACTED] will object to passing information direct to HQMI providing a suitable handler is found. [REDACTED] is adamant however, that he does not want the RUC or SB involved.

RUC OFFICER

At present the following background is known on Miss SHAW :

She is a deeply religious person, a member of the Barbican Mission for the Jews, and generally involved with missionary work. She is a spinster and employed as PA to the Rev Ian PAISLEY.

ARMY OFFICER R

Document 4 - 3 October 1975

Politicians Or Para-militaries?

By David Parker

LISTENING to some of the North's Loyalist politicians, it is easy to come away with the impression that many of them are men under pressure. The politicians would be more reasonable, they say, if it wasn't for the guns of the paramilitaries pressing in their backs. That sounds reasonable, given the timidity of many of the politicians and the ferocity of the paramilitaries, but like most things in Northern Ireland it isn't just as simple as that, as a dip into the Loyalist underworld reveals. For a start, the distinction between politicians and paramilitary is, in many cases, so unclear as to be almost meaningless. Many of the forty-odd Loyalist Convention members are either closely involved with, or actually members of, paramilitary organisations: in some cases the links are known, in others they are kept secret.

Colonel Peter Bruce (Official Unionist, S. Down) for example, the 73-year-old first world warhorse, publicly acknowledges his leadership of the Down Orange War-tare militia; but **Herbie O'Reilly** (also Unionist, S. Down) is more reticent about the fact that he is the Colonel's second-in-command. Coincidentally, it was this unlikely pair who proposed and seconded Enoch Powell's nomination for the South Down seat at Westminster.

Over in the Vanguard Unionist Party, Glenn Barr has more hairs than most, being not just Vanguard member for Derry but the UDA's political spokesman and chairman of the mainly paramilitary Ulster Loyalist Central Co-ordinating Committee. George Green (Vanguard, N. Down) cheerfully admits to leadership of the Ulster Special Constabulary Association.

Three of the other Vanguard members are, however, less open about their association with the shadowy Ulster Volunteer Service Corps: they are George Morrison (S. Antrim), and **Thomas Carson** and **Alastair Black** (Armagh).

Before Vanguard went political back in 1973, the **UVSC** was called the Vanguard Service Corps; its members formed Bill Craig's personal guard at the series of rallies throughout the North where he inspected men drawn up in ranks. Very little is known about the UVSC these days, but it must be noted that it seems to be the professional man's paramilitary grouping—Carson is a doctor and Black a headmaster. (Black, it will be recalled, was the target of a boobytrap bomb left in the desk of his office in Lurgan, which killed an R.U.C. detective).

The UVF, more than the other groups, has been generally dismissive of the value of political representation, preferring instead to use the heavy hand on politicians it wishes to influence. It relies mainly on **Hugh Smyth** (Independent Unionist, West Belfast) to state its often-changing views in the convention. **Ken Gibson**, of course was once a branch chairman in the Rev. Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party, but left it a long time ago and has now also dropped out of the upper echelons of the UVF.

The Rev. Ian himself, whose early political career is studded with allegations of unsavoury paramilitary connections, is now one of the sternest public critics of the more violent paramilitary groups, but he still knows better than to shun them priv-

ately: he often meets the UVF, the most recent encounter taking place at Stormont last month. Generally speaking, though, Paisley has kept away from the two main groupings—the UVF and the Ulster Army Council, which includes the UDA — and he refuses to send a DUP representative to the ULCCC because the Red Hand (clad of course, by his former bodyguard and now enemy, John McKeague) are members and they're illegal.

Even when a secret committee — since dismantled — was set up last January to directly link the politicians and the paramilitaries, Paisley could only bring himself to allow DUP participation on the basis that party members described themselves as representatives of the UVOC, not the DUP. But a layer or two beneath all of this lies an even murkier area where members of the DUP, if not the big man himself, form the backbone of another and quite separate underground organisation. This is the oddly-named **Tara**, which quite seriously advocates driving all Catholics from the North and eventually hopes to see a takeover of the South and the eradication of the Catholic religion from this island. Tara prides itself on its secrecy and names of its members very rarely appear in print. Its leader, until a recent illness, was **William McGrath** of East Belfast. Its administrative officer is **David Brown** of Bangor; its intelligence officer is **Clifford Smyth**. Also in its ranks is **Loughs Hutchinson**.

The connections are clear: Smyth is DUP convention member for North Antrim, Hutchinson for Armagh, McGrath is a member of Paisley's Martyr's Memorial Church; Brown is deputy editor of his Protestant Telegraph. Another Tara member was **James Craig**, the DUP assembly member for North Antrim, who died of a heart attack last year. There is no evidence to connect Paisley himself with Tara, but as is obvious, its men are all around him.

FILE
ANNOTATIONS

Document 5 - 20 January 1976

UVF/TARA CO-OPERATION

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCES

SIS

1. WE REFER TO [REDACTED] TO SNUFFBOX AND [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] DATED 16 JANUARY 1976 [REDACTED]. WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING [REDACTED] WHICH ARE PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH FNU MCGRATH:-

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCES

+ WILLIAM WORTHINGTON MCGRATH +

BORN [REDACTED]

199 UPPER NEWTOWNARDS ROAD

BELFAST

MCGRATH FIRST CAME TO NOTICE AS ORGANISER OF THE CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP CENTRE AND IRISH EMANCIPATION CRUSADE AT 15 WELLINGTON PARK, BELFAST. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THIS GROUP IS QUOTE ULSTER HAS BEEN ATTACKED IN ORDER THAT IRELAND MAY BECOME THE BASE FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST ENGLAND UNQUOTE. AT THIS TIME MCGRATH WAS EMPLOYED AS A /... SOCIAL

SOCIAL WORKER AT KINCORA BOYS HOSTEL BELFAST.

1963 - TARA BRIGADE FORMED FROM WITHIN THE ORANGE DEBATING SOCIETY AND ITS FOUNDER AND COMMANDING OFFICER WAS WILLIAM MCGRATH.

INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI

1970 - MCGRATH PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE MAN WHO SET UP A TARA BRIGADE IN LIVERPOOL, THE FORE RUNNER OF THE UVF THERE. THIS PERSON TRAVELLED OVER FROM BELFAST. HE WAS FROM THE UPPER NEWTOWNARDS AREA, WAS AFFLUENT, SUSPECTED OF BEING A HOMOSEXUAL, AND WAS A FRIEND OF FRANK MILLAR. ON HIS RETURN TO BELFAST THIS MAN WAS INVESTIGATED BY LOYALIST WHO DECIDED THAT HE CONSTITUTED A SECURITY RISK BECAUSE OF HIS HOMOSEXUAL TENDENCIES. LIVERPOOL TARA BRIGADE WAS THEN TRANSFORMED INTO A UVF GROUP EARLY IN 1971.

INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI

1975 - [REDACTED] REPORTED TO BE THE SECRETARY OF AN ORANGE LODGE WITH THE GAELIC NAME O'DREACHT NAH'-EIREALL (IRELAND'S HERITAGE) LOL 1303.

2. THE MCGRATHS ARE APPARENTLY REGARDED AS SOMEWHAT ECCENTRIC AND UNSTABLE. THERE IS NO TRACE OF WILLIAM MCGRATH BEING A SENIOR NORTHERN IRELAND CIVIL SERVANT.

Document 6 - 2 February 1976

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FILE ANNOTATIONS

YOUR TEL ADDSD [REDACTED] OF 16 JANUARY.

SIS

YOUR PARA 1 AND SOURCE COMMENT 1: MCGRATH (FNU) OF 188 UPPER NEWTOWNARDS RD IS WILLIAM MCGRATH, BORN 11 DEC 1916 WARDEN OF KINCORA BOYS HOSTEL AT THAT ADDRESS. HE IS WELL - DOCUMENTED AS A HOMOSEXUAL AND LEADING LIGHT IN TARA.

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCES

2. DISCREET [REDACTED] WITH RUC SHOWS THE FOLLOWING RECENT [REDACTED] 6.6.75 [REDACTED] QV OF THE RHC HAS A CONTRACT OUT ON SUBJECT WHICH RESULTED IN A WARNING BOMB BEING PLACED AS SUBJECT IS STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND HAS ACCUSED THE PHC OF HAVING COMMUNIST

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE

TENDENCIES. (C3)

FILE
ANNOTATIONS

1975 BELIEVED TO BE SECRETARY OF ORANGE LODGE (LOL) 1303 NAMED "IRELAND'S HERITAGE" TRANSLATED INTO GAELIC. LOOKING FOR GAELIC TEACHER FOR LODGE.

15.1.76 LETTER FROM SUBJECT PUBLISHED IN THE NEWSLETTER [REDACTED] ATTACKING THE IRA, CATHOLICISM AND THE EIRE GOVERNMENT AS ALL TRYING TO END PROTESTANT FAITH IN IRELAND.

3. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT MCGRATH IS OR EVER WAS A CIVIL SERVANT.

Document 7 (Page 1) - 13 February 1976

CLASSIFICATION	INTELLIGENCE STAFF NO	NAMES OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
FOLLOWING ALSO IN	FOR	FROM
IN SHUFFBOX FOR		FILE ANNOTATIONS
MIS TEAM		
[REDACTED]		
INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI		
2. SOURCE REPORTED GREAT INTEREST BEING SHOWN IN THE LOYALIST LEADERSHIP ABOUT APPARENT LEAKAGES OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND SOURCE WAS ANXIOUS TO ENSURE THAT THE ARMY REALISED THE EXTENT TO WHICH LOYALISTS WERE TRYING TO PENETRATE THE SECURITY FORCES FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES AND THAT THE UDA AND UVF LEADERSHIPS' ULTIMATE		
/AM		

Document 7 (Page 2) - 13 February 1976

AIM WAS LEFT-WING REVOLUTION IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE ALLIED WITH OIRA.

3. THE SUNDAY WORLD ARTICLE OF 1 FEBRUARY ABOUT SEANUS O'BRIEN AND "THE THREAT TO KILL PAISLEY" HAD BROUGHT THIS INTEREST TO A HEAD. PAISLEY DISCOUNTS THE ALLEGED THREAT AS REPUBLICAN PROPAGANDA BUT ERNEST BAIRD IS WORRIED ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN LEAKED TO THE SF ABOUT UDA AFFAIRS.

INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

6. PAISLEY HAS TOLD SOURCE THAT HE HAS KNOWN FOR SOME TIME OF HMG'S PLAN FOR "BLACK PROPAGANDA" BUT HE HAS NOT WANTED TO USE HIS KNOWLEDGE BEFORE BECAUSE HE COULD NOT BACK IT UP. [REDACTED]

JAMES MOLYNEUX

HAS ALSO TOLD SOURCE THAT HE HAD THE FACTS KNOWN TO PAISLEY AND SOURCE BELIEVES THAT, BECAUSE PAISLEY MADE HIS ALLEGATIONS JUST AFTER HE AND MOLYNEUX RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO WESTMINSTER, THEIR SOURCE WAS SEEN IN LONDON. [REDACTED]

7. ...

Document 7 (Page 3) - 13 February 1976

7. PAISLEY CONJECTURES THAT HMG WANTS TO LACK [REDACTED] BUT IS CONCERNED AT HIS LACK OF SUPPORT. HE FEARS THAT "BLACK PROPAGANDA" MAY BE USED TO DISCREDIT HIMSELF AND HIS ASSOCIATES AND HE SEEMS TO ANTICIPATE A SNEAR CAMPAIGN AGAINST TARA. HE HAS ADVISED AT LEAST ONE ASSOCIATE TO GET OUT OF TARA AT ONCE AND ADVISES THAT ANY LOYALIST POLITICIAN WHO FEELS THAT HE MUST BELONG TO A PARAMILITARY ORGANISATION SHOULD JOIN THE RUC ASSOCIATION.

FILE ANNOTATIONS

NAMES CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT BY THE HIAI

8. PAISLEY'S SUSPICIONS WERE INCREASED WHEN, HE SAYS, ON 7 FEBRUARY TWO UDA MEMBERS CALLED ON HIM WITH 8 ENVELOPES FULL OF INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS WHICH APPEARED TO BE COPIES OF ARMY OR POLICE PAPERS. ONE PAPER HE QUOTED SAID "[REDACTED] IS AN INTERESTING CONTACT WHO COULD PROVIDE INTERESTING INFORMATION ON TARA". PAISLEY SAID AFTER THIS MEETING THAT THE UDA WERE ABOUT TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT MOVE TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL AND HE COMMENTED THAT THE UDA HAS PLENTY OF MANPOWER BUT NOT ENOUGH WEAPONS. (SOURCE COMMENTED THAT THE DOCUMENTS COULD HAVE BEEN A FRAUDULENT MEANS BY WHICH THE UDA WERE ATTEMPTING TO MANIPULATE PAISLEY).

FILE ANNOTATIONS

9. SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT TARA HAD BEEN DESTROYED IN 1972 BY A SNEAR CAMPAIGN, THEY HAD THEN BEEN 300 STRONG AND INCLUDED A NUMBER OF UVF MEMBERS. NOW THEY WERE MUCH SMALLER AND OF HIGHER CALIBRE AND WERE UVF'S MAIN RIVALS. ROY GARLAND WHO WAS FORMERLY IN TARA BUT NOW UVF IS A BISEXUAL WHO ONCE HAD AN AFFAIR WITH WILLIAM MCGRATH THE TARA LEADER. MCGRATH (ACCORDING TO SOURCE) HAS LONG MADE A PRACTICE OF EXPLOITING OTHER PEOPLE'S SEXUAL DEVIATIONS AND TARA IS VULNERABLE ON THIS ACCOUNT. PAISLEY HAS EXPRESSED STRONG ANIMOSITY TOWARDS MCGRATH.

Document 8 - 11 February 1977

[REDACTED] IRRELEVANT TEXT

[REDACTED] DOCUMENT REFERENCE & CLASSIFICATION

TARA

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

1. DURING A RECENT PRIVATE CONVERSATION, THE TARA COMMANDER IN EAST BELFAST SAID THAT TARA WAS PERFECTLY HAPPY TO HAVE [REDACTED] AS A PROMINENT MEMBER OF THE ORGANISATION. [REDACTED]

2. THE COMMANDER SAID THAT THERE WAS A CAMPAIGN TO RECRUIT NEW MEMBERS TO TARA, AND HE ADDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME SUCCESS IN ATTRACTING PEOPLE QUOTE FROM OTHER ORGANISATIONS UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT THE AMOUNT OF RECRUITING IN BELFAST WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT. HIS OWN GROUP HAS TWENTY FIVE MEMBERS SEMICOLON HE ALSO MENTIONED. ANOTHER SMALL GROUP THAT EXISTED IN THE [REDACTED], BELFAST.

3. TALKING ABOUT ARMS, THE COMMANDER SAID THAT WILLIAM MCGRATH, ANOTHER PROMINENT FIGURE IN TARA, HAD PROMISED THE EAST BELFAST GROUP A CONSIGNMENT OF THOMSON MACHINE GUNS AS LONG AGO AS 1969. THIS CONSIGNMENT HAD NEVER MATERIALISED. HE ADDED THAT HE KNEW THAT MCGRATH STILL OWED £2,000 FOR THE PURCHASE OF WEAPONS NOW IN THE POSSESSION OF THE COMMANDER.

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE

INFORMATION CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT TO THE HIAI

[REDACTED] COMMENT

IN THE PAST THERE HAVE BEEN FEW INDICATIONS OF THE TARA QUOTE ORBAT UNQUOTE SEMICOLON THE EXISTENCE OF A COMMANDER IN EAST BELFAST IS, IN ITSELF, OF INTEREST. [REDACTED]

INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT TO THE HIAI



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT – SUPPLEMENTARY #2

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. This is a second supplementary statement to the SIS Witness Statement handed to the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) on 27 May 2016. It is provided to support a request from the HIA Inquiry on 2 July 2016 for additional material in relation to an assertion made by an SIS officer in paragraph 5 of a Minute dated 12 October 1989: that *"We ran at least one agent who was aware of sexual malpractice at the Home, and who may have mentioned this to his SIS or Security Service case officer."* The Minute is referred to in paragraphs 41-42 and Article 9 of the SIS witness statement dated 27 May 2016.
4. The author of the Minute was a former SIS officer who, in October 1989, had direct responsibility for managing matters relating to SIS external communications and disclosure. This role is analogous to similar posts that currently sit within the area for which I now have responsibility. The SIS record shows that the officer never served in Northern Ireland or in a role which had responsibility for matters connected to Northern Ireland. The officer retired in March 1991, and died in 2007.
5. The SIS record shows that the Minute was initiated in SIS London to record details of a meeting held at Gower Street (MI5's London base from 1976-95) on 11 October 1989 involving the author of the Minute, a second SIS officer (deceased April 1992) and an officer

from MI5. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a list of questions recorded by MI5 that had been formulated at a recent Cabinet Office meeting in relation to a review being conducted by senior MoD official, A G Rucker, into Colin Wallace. Some of the questions concerned allegations made by Wallace related to the Kincora Boys' Home. The meeting on 11 October was to discuss a response to the Cabinet Office questions that incorporated the results of consulting SIS and MI5 records, given that the two agencies had worked jointly in Northern Ireland during the key period in question.

6. As I made clear in my evidence of 30 June, in preparing material for the current Inquiry, SIS conducted extensive searches to identify any further material that may have led the author of this Minute to reach his conclusion. No such records have been identified, either from the period in the mid-1970s, or from 1989 when this minute was produced, beyond those already made available to the Inquiry. SIS records relating to Colin Wallace, which would have been reviewed by this officer in 1989 (and that were primarily focused on the national security implications of the material which he disclosed to the media), have already been made available to the Inquiry. The officer is likely to have had broad access to relevant Service files when conducting their work, subject to the limitations on our file management systems for that period, of which the Inquiry has already been made aware. On this basis, it is unclear why the officer reached this conclusion, which does not appear to be supported by other material identified in searches conducted by SIS, all of which has been disclosed to the HIA Inquiry.
7. I am aware that MI5 possess a corresponding Note for File, documenting their officer's account of the meeting on 11 October 1989, which they intend to disclose to the Inquiry. I understand that the document reveals the identity of the agent and that SIS officers were made aware of MI5 records that indicate that, in the mid-1970s, a handler had informed a particular agent of an allegation relating to McGrath's homosexuality. The allegation had originated from Roy Garland.
8. No reference is made in the MI5 document to "sexual malpractice at the Home [Kincora]" though I note that the MI5 officer expressed the view that some information on the agent's record could be "incorrectly interpreted". Given the apparently conflicting contemporaneous records from the 11 October meeting, and in the absence of any corroborating material for the SIS officer's account, I believe it is quite possible the SIS officer misinterpreted what was discussed at the meeting.
9. Research into the distribution of the SIS Minute shows that it was signed off without comment by two other London-based SIS officers. These officers had separate responsibilities for engagement with Whitehall Departments and regional affairs. Wider searches conducted by SIS for the HIA Inquiry has failed to identify any material on the SIS corporate record that could help to corroborate or dispute the assertion made by the author in paragraph 5 of the SIS Minute.

SIS Officer A

Signed

SIS Officer A

Date

14/7/16



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT – SUPPLEMENTARY #3

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. This is SIS's fourth Witness Statement and supplemental to the statement handed to the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) on 27 May 2016. The statement has been provided by SIS in response to a request received from the HIA Inquiry for the release of further documents. A summary of the documents annexed to this statement are listed below.

Reference	Date	Summary
Document 1	08/04/1974	Telegram from IJS HQNI addressed to SIS London and DCI staff in Northern Ireland entitled " <i>Bill Fuller</i> ".
Document 2	07/06/1974	Telegram from IJS HQNI addressed to DCI staff in Northern Ireland, rpt SIS London entitled " <i>Bill Fuller</i> ".

Reference	Date	Summary
Document 3	02/09/1974	SIS internal note entitled <i>"Bill Fuller - PIRA banker"</i> .
Document 4	21/10/1974	Telegram from IJS HQNI addressed to SIS London, repeated DCI staff in Northern Ireland entitled <i>"Bill Fuller"</i> .
Document 5	12/12/1974	Telegram from IJS HQNI addressed to SIS London, rpt DCI staff in Northern Ireland entitled <i>"Bill Fuller"</i> .
Document 6	24/03/1975	MIS Letter to MI6 (SIS) entitled <i>"John Colin Wallace"</i> .
Document 7	08/04/1975	Letter from IJS HQNI addressed to SIS London, repeated DCI staff in Northern Ireland to confirm information passed to Wallace to brief the press.
Document 8	14/02/1976	Telegram from IJS HQNI addressed to SIS London and MI5 concerning the security of SIS personnel in HQNI.
Document 9	02/01/1987	SIS Minute relating to Colin Wallace and Fred Holroyd.
Document 10	16/08/1989	One page profile of John Colin Wallace.
Document 11	18/12/1989	MI5 letter to SIS London entitled <i>"Colin Wallace"</i> .
Document 12	28/12/1989	SIS Minute entitled Colin Wallace.
Document 13	12/03/1990	SIS note of conversation with MI5 Officer 1 on Colin Wallace.
Document 14	12/06/1990	SIS note of conversation with MI5 relating to file research on possible contact with Colin Wallace.
Document 15	28/06/1990	MI5 Letter entitled <i>"Wallace: The Rucker Report"</i> .
Document 16	03/07/1990	SIS Minute on research conducted to ascertain what contact Colin Wallace may have had with SIS staff in NI.
Document 17	04/07/1990	SIS Minute entitled <i>"Colin Wallace"</i> relating to a "Public Eye" TV programmed broadcast on BBC2.
Document 18	21/07/1990	SIS note recording an internal discussion on Colin Wallace on 1 February 1990.
Document 19	25/03/1975	Article from The Times Newspaper entitled <i>"Britain ends black propaganda campaign by Army in Ulster"</i> .
Document 20	09/03/1990	Article from The Times Newspaper entitled <i>"Wallace complaint against The Independent upheld"</i> .
Document 21	18/03/1990	Article from The Sunday Correspondent entitled <i>"MI5 investigated Wallace before sacking"</i> .

Reference	Date	Summary
Document 22	24/03/1990	Article from The Spectator entitled " <i>The Secret Life of Walter Mitty</i> ".
Document 23	29/08/1992	Article from The Scotsman entitled " <i>Ulster's Intelligence Test</i> ".

SIS Officer A

Signed

SIS Officer A

Date

21 NOVEMBER 2016

ANNEXED DOCUMENT

Document 1 - 8 April 1972

TELEGRAM IN

FROM [REDACTED] — US HQNI	ORIGINATED DATE TIME 8 Apr 74 1630Z	ADDRESSED [REDACTED] — DCI STAFF [REDACTED] — SIS LONDON
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[BIEL FULLER]

DCI STAFF

[REDACTED] OF 27 MARCH 1974.

1. WE AGREE THIS STORY IS WELL-WORTH FOLLOWING UP WITH A VIEW TO A PRESS STORY APPEARING. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, [REDACTED] (GOOD INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST THAT HE IS) IS WELL INTO THIS STORY, AND WOULD SEEM TO BE THE SIMPLEST (AND MOST RESPECTABLE) CHANNEL FOR ENSURING THAT THE STORY SEES THE LIGHT OF DAY.

DCI STAFF

2. HE DISCUSSES THE CASE WITH COLIN WALLACE OF PR HQNI, WHO PASSES WHATEVER INFORMATION HE GATHERS TO G/INT. PLEASE WOULD [REDACTED] CONSIDER IF THERE ARE ANY FACTS OF THE STORY SO FAR, OR ANY PARTICULAR LINES, WHICH COULD BE PASSED BY WALLACE TO [REDACTED], WHO WILL NOT ASK ANY QUESTIONS AS TO THE ORIGIN OF THE INFORMATION (HE WILL KNOW IT COMES FROM QUOTE INT UNQUOTE), THE IDEA BEING TO

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

/GIVE

PAGE TWO

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

GIVE [REDACTED] AS MANY LEADS AND NAMES TO FOLLOW UP AS POSSIBLE. A NOTE FOR PASSING TO WALLACE, BUT NOT [REDACTED], WOULD BE IDEAL.

3. WE CONSIDER THE TIME HAS ABOUT COME TO PASS INFORMATION TO [REDACTED], BUT IF YOU CONSIDER THIS ACTION PREMATURE, PLEASE BEAR [REDACTED] IN MIND AS YOU GATHER FURTHER INFORMATION. WE COULD, OF COURSE, GO ON FOR MONTHS PICKING UP ODD SNIPPETS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE STORY OURSELVES SEMI COLON THE FACT IS, THE MORE WE PASS DOWN TO [REDACTED], AN INDUSTRIOUS JOURNALIST, THE MORE LIKELY IS IT THAT HE WILL HAVE ENOUGH TO GO AHEAD AND PUBLISH SEMI COLON ALSO THE MORE PASSED, THE MORE WE ARE LIKELY TO GET IN RETURN FOR TRACING ACTION.

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

Document 2 (Page 1) - 7 June 1974

FROM [REDACTED] — US HQNI	ORIGINATED DATE 7 June 74 1445Z	ADDRESSED [REDACTED] — DCI STAFF
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[BILL FULLER.]

DOCUMENT REFERENCE

[REDACTED] OF 10 MAY 1974.

MOD OFFICER J

1. MAJOR [REDACTED] HAS NOW SHOWN THE SANITISED WRITE-UP TO COLIN WALLACE WHO IS AT PRESENT CONSIDERING THE BEST MEANS OF EXPLOITING THE INFORMATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, THERE ARE ONE OR TWO FACTORS CONCERNING [REDACTED]'S CURRENT DIMINISHED INTEREST IN THE STORY AND HIS PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH HQNI, UPON WHICH, ACCORDING TO G/INT, WALLACE CAN BE RELIED TO GIVE SOUND ADVICE. FOR THE RECORD WALLACE UNDERSTANDS THE DOCUMENT WAS COMPILED BY G INT HQNI.

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

2. WE ARE CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE SITUATION THROUGH MAJOR [REDACTED], AND ARE ADVISING PRIOR TO ANY ACTION.

MOD
OFFICER J

3. WALLACE HAS PRODUCED THE FOLLOWING FROM HIS QUOTE PRESS SOURCES UNQUOTE WHICH, IF HE FINALLY DECIDED THAT THE PAPER SHOULD BE PASSED TO [REDACTED] WILL FEED IN ORALLY:

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

/QUOTE.

PAGE TWO

QUOTE

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

██████████ (POSS UVF) ██████████, HAS HAD SEVERAL
MEETINGS WITH ██████████ (COUSIN OF ██████████) IN THE
ARDOYNE. HE HAS ALSO VISITED DUNDALK. ██████████ IS CO-DIRECTOR
WITH ██████████ OF THE ██████████ CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. ██████████
FORMERLY OF ██████████, NOW LIVES AT ██████████.

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITYPROTECTION
OF IDENTITYPROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

FINANCE TO ESTABLISH THE ██████████ CONSTRUCTION CAME FROM THE UNITED
STATES. ██████████ IS CHAIRMAN OF THE ██████████ ASSOCIATION AND
IS INVOLVED IN THE ██████████. HE IS RETAINED BY AMERICAN
BUSINESS INTERESTS TO ADVISE ON LOCATING ██████████ PROJECTS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND.

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

THE FOLLOWING VISITED DUBLIN ON 5TH APRIL 1974.

A. ✓ ██████████, ██████████ (██████████ CONSTRUCTION COMPANY)

B. ✓ ██████████, ██████████ (UVF AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY)

C. ✓ ██████████, ? (COUSIN OF ██████████)

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITIES

D. ██████████, ██████████ (██████████ CONSTRUCTION COMPANY)

E. ✓ ██████████ ██████████

F. ✓ ██████████ ██████████ (UVF) UNQUOTE.

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATION

Document 3 - 7 June 1974

SIS LONDON [REDACTED]

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

Major [REDACTED]

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

Bill FULLER "PIMA BANKER"

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

This is a ploy which I used to deal with Colonel [REDACTED], who in turn spoke to Colin WALLACE who in turn spoke to [REDACTED], correspondent of the [REDACTED]. You may like to read the original report passed to [REDACTED] (copy attached) and a follow-up snippet. Can we then discuss the present state of play and what action might be taken to get [REDACTED] into print?

2 Sept 74

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

Document 4 - 21 October 1974

FROM [REDACTED] — US HQNI	ORIGINATED DATE 21 Oct 74 TIME 1650Z	ADDRESSED [REDACTED] — SIS LONDON
------------------------------	-----------------------------------------	--------------------------------------

FOLLOWING ALSO FOR [REDACTED] — US LONDON

[BILL FULLER]

US / HQNI ✓

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

YOUR TELEGRAM ADDRESSED [REDACTED] OF 31 JULY 74.

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

1. [REDACTED] HAS NOW INFORMED WALLACE THAT THE STORY IS NOW ALL SET TO GO (YET AGAIN) BUT [REDACTED] WOULD LIKE A PHOTOGRAPH OF FULLER ATTENDING THE FUNERAL OF PIRA MURDERER [REDACTED] (WHICH HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE DONE BY ARMY SOURCE [REDACTED])

2. THE ARMY HAVE EXTENSIVE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE FUNERAL CONCERNED AND ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] HAVE NOW OBTAINED AN ORDINARY PHOTOGRAPH OF FULLER, IT IS DIFFICULT FROM IT TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY FULLER AMONGST THE MANY ARMY PHOTOGRAPHS. DOES [REDACTED] HAVE A SOURCE WHO KNOWS FULLER BY SIGHT AND, IF SO, ARE WE SO SURE OF THAT SOURCE AS NOT TO WORRY ABOUT THE FACT THAT A PHOTOGRAPH HE IDENTIFIES AS BEING OF FULLER APPEARS SHORTLY THEREAFTER [REDACTED]? IF THERE IS SUCH A SOURCE WE WILL SEND YOU THE PHOTOGRAPH CONCERNED.

CODEWORD

US LONDON

3. MEANWHILE, WE ARE MAKING EFFORTS HERE, THROUGH IP, HQNI, TO HAVE FULLER IDENTIFIED. OBVIOUSLY THERE IS CONSIDERABLE VALUE IN PUBLISHING A PHOTOGRAPH WHICH STRESSES HIS LINKS WITH PIRA TERRORISTS.

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

Document 5 - 12 December 1974

TELEGRAM IN

FROM [REDACTED] — US HQNI	ORIGINATED DATE 21 Oct 74 TIME 1650Z	ADDRESSED [REDACTED] — SIS LONDON
------------------------------	--------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------

BILL FULLER SIS LONDON US / HQNI

[REDACTED] TEL ADDSD [REDACTED] OF 10 DECEMBER.

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

1. [REDACTED] APPROACHED COLIN WALLACE THIS MORNING. THEY HAVE RESEARCHED THE STORY AND THE MANAGING EDITOR IS PREPARED TO GIVE THE ARTICLE WIDE COVERAGE, HE MENTIONED A FOUR PAGE SPREAD. FURTHERMORE THEIR LAWYERS ARE PREPARED TO LET THEM NAME FULLER. AT THE SAME TIME THEY WILL BLOW THE US FINANCIAL SUPPORT BUSINESS.

2. THEY HAVE ASKED WALLACE WHETHER HE CAN SUPPLY ANY MORE DETAILS OF PROPERTY, PUBS, HOTELS, FIRMS ETC OWNED BY FULLER, OR CLOSE ASSOCIATES IN EIRE. (OBVIOUSLY EXCLUDING [REDACTED]). THEY ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN ANMMY FIRMS OF KNOWN INVOLVEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

3. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ON THESE POINTS, PARTICULARLY THE EIRE PROPERTY. CAPT [REDACTED] CAN SUPPLY SOME DETAILS OF ULSTER FIRMS KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED BUT ANY COLLATERAL YOU MIGHT HAVE WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER [REDACTED] HAVE GIVEN CLEARANCE TO PASS ANY OF THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN YOUR [REDACTED] OF 21 NOVEMBER.

ENDS

SIS DESIGNATOR

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

Document 6 (Page 1) - 24 March 1975

DOCUMENT ADMIN

SECURITY MARKINGS



Box No. 600

ADDRESS & PHONE
NUMBERS

Telephone

SIS OFFICER

MI6

Your reference

Our reference

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

(in duplicate)

Date 24 March 1975

JOHN COLLIN WALLACE

1. We spoke on the telephone on 21 March about the above case and as promised I enclose a copy of a paper which gives an indication of the sort of operations upon which WALLACE claims to have been employed. This paper was prepared by me from the preliminary report made by the RUC to the DPP Northern Ireland. This report has not yet been seen by the Attorney General and difficulties could arise if it became known that some of the contents of it had been made available to people not connected with the conduct of the investigation or the discussion upon prosecution. Likewise the DPP Northern Ireland would be embarrassed in his relations with the RUC if disclosure should take place.

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOATIONS

2. I attended a meeting at the MOD on 21 March under the Chairmanship of Sir Michael Cary, which was attended by the VSGS and the GOC Northern Ireland among others. The GOC will now order an internal enquiry to establish the true facts about the nature of WALLACE's duties and the operations upon which he was engaged. This enquiry will, I think, be co-ordinated by Ian Cameron and I expect to be informed of the results. You kindly agreed to let me know whether your Service was involved in any of the operations mentioned by WALLACE. At the same time you might like to consider if he is likely to be aware of any other operation in which you were concerned.

MIS OFFICER

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

Enc

SECURITY MARKINGS

Br Bernard Sheldon

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

SECURITY MARKINGS

PSYOPS were approved by the Ministry of Defence. Peter Broderick, former CIO HQNI, prepared a brief on its workings for the Inspector of Establishment in July 1974. This brief is now contained in a file marked 'SECRET' - Job justification brief for SIO post at HQNI.

2. Amongst hundreds of possible examples are the following:-

- i. IRA embezzlement story. A letter found in Long Kesh was planted with Chris Rider of the Sunday Times whose investigations led to the unearthing of IRA funds. The IRA suspected HORNER, one of their intelligence agents and a former Irish Ranger, of speaking to Rider. He was murdered.
- ii. Doctored versions of Republican papers and leaflets were produced and distributed in Republican areas and overseas - especially Communist countries and America.
- iii. Stories were planted about UDA, IRA, UVF leaders etc, to discredit them or to make their organisations believe there was an informer within their ranks. After the arrest of Ivor BELL, Brendan HUGHES and five others, a planted story about an informer within the IRA resulted in an increased number of knee-cappings.
- iv. Close contact was maintained with Rider of the Sunday Times, Fisk of the Times, and other reporters with good sources. Their stories were killed by leaking similar stories to other newspapers.
- v. The nitro-benzene story. In connexion with the production of home-made explosives by the Provisional IRA, a rumour was circulated to the press that nitro-benzene caused leukaemia, and a member of the Provisional IRA who had been admitted to hospital was cited as an example. A file exists on this case.
- vi. The black magic story. To separate the IRA from the Catholic community and the Catholic Church, a story was circulated that young members of the Provisional IRA were dabbling in black magic. Under cover agents planted black candles in various areas in support of this story.

/vii.

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

SECURITY MARKINGS

- 2 -

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

vii. The Sean McSTIOPHAN story. A very detailed study was made of his background which was then planted - mostly with the press. This eventually led to his dismissal as Chief of Staff.

viii. Countless arms and smuggling stories were placed with the Sunday Telegraph.

ix. The Bill FULLER story. FULLER is an American millionaire who provides bail and funds for the IRA. He has Mafia connexions. Stories about him and his associates were leaked to selected journalists, including Fisk of the Times. The paper on him was originally a classified document. The file, which still exists, was provided by Lt Colonel B, G2 Liaison Int at HQNI, with the request that it be got into as many papers as possible.

x. The shooting of Jim BRYSON. BRYSON was shot from an Army OP. Letters alleged to have come from eye witnesses or people in the immediate vicinity identifying members of the Official IRA at the scene were deliberately lost prior to being found by Army Units and handed over to the Intelligence Unit and the CIO. They were then shown to the press. The operation was successful as Mario DRUMM spoke at BRYSON's funeral and confirmed that the Official IRA were responsible for his death. The exposé appeared in the News of the World. This operation was directed by the Deputy Commander of 39 Brigade and Colonel Cubbis. Colonel Pack gave authority for it to go ahead.

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

xi. Soviet involvement in Irish troubles. A Soviet submarine was observed off Portrush. For political reasons Government could not get involved and the story was leaked to the News of the World which carried a series of articles. Photographs of a submarine and a tanker off Portrush were used. The operation was authorised by Colonel Pack with the consent of the Foreign Office.

xii. BBC documentary on internment and detention. Measures were taken to counter the influence of the Association for Legal Justice and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association which had been briefing the BBC. Details are contained in a file headed "David Mills, BBC Background Brief on Internment".

/xiii.

SECURITY MARKINGS - 3 -

The operation was cleared by the Secretary of State, the Chief Constable of the RUC and the Chief Information Officer agreed to it. David McDine directed the operation. Colonel Railton prepared the background.

xiii. Many letters and counter letters were written to the press about the conduct of the Official IRA in a particular area, for example, a letter from "Worried Ballymurphy". Letters were also written in support of other major themes, for example, after the Soviet involvement story, several letters were written asking the Church to do something about it.

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

xiv. The news-sheet "Slaughter". This news-sheet purported to have been printed and published by the Clonard/Colin Sinn Fein, but was in fact published by the L. Glosters and distributed by them in Republican areas.

3. Just about every newspaper was used in support of these operations, including foreign newspapers which were subsequently used as a basis for briefing local journalists. Colonel Railton was usually consulted about major projects or something involving another agency, eg RUC or Intelligence. The planting of a good story would lead to compliments from the CIO, the Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Defence.

21 March 1975

Document 7 - 8 April 1975

From	[REDACTED] — US / HQNI	Date 8 April 75	DOCUMENT REFERENCE
------	------------------------	-----------------	--------------------

DCI STAFF	Addressed to [REDACTED]	Copied to [REDACTED]	US / HQNI	[REDACTED]
	SIS LONDON	References	tel [REDACTED]	
			of 7 April 75	
	No. of enclosures	2		
	Subject	WILLIAM FULLER		

1. Our records show that the following has been passed to [REDACTED] WALLACE via G INT for briefing the Press, in particular [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]. We know that the dossier at (a) below was passed by WALLACE at least to [REDACTED]. We are not sure (and nor are IP, HQNI) if WALLACE passed that at (b) below.

DOCUMENT HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

X

PROTECTION OF IDENTITIES

a. The sanitised write-up on Bill FULLER (copy attached). In handing this to [REDACTED], WALLACE photocopied on to the last page some of his own information, i.e. that contained in para 3 of our tel [REDACTED] of 7 June 74.

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

DCI STAFF

b. A note about [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (copy attached - the version passed to WALLACE had no "Gol GS" on it). This was passed on the basis of [REDACTED] of 10 June 74, para 2.

SIS LONDON

2. We did not repeat/not pass any of the information contained in [REDACTED] letter [REDACTED] of 4 November 74, as the story was quiescent at that time.

DOCUMENT REFERENCES

3. A minute on [REDACTED] and William FULLER was, on the basis of [REDACTED] of 21 November 74 and the authority granted in your tel addressed [REDACTED] of 13 March 75, [REDACTED] to [REDACTED].

US / HQNI

[REDACTED] of 8 April 75

DOCUMENT ADMIN

US / HQNI

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

handed to Jeremy RAILTON (WALLACE having left) on 17 March 75. He has not yet passed it to [REDACTED] and in our view it is up to him as to whether the time is now right for an oral briefing on this paper to be given to [REDACTED] (understandably and, in our view, correctly, IP have become chary of passing "unattributable" papers to the Press).

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

4. Various Press cuttings have also been passed down to IP, but we take it that these are not of interest to you.

Document 8 - 14 February 1976

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

US / HQNI

FROM

DATE AND TIME

13 FEB 76 0900Z

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

IN SNUFFBOX FOR

MIS DESIGNATION

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

SECURITY OF SIS PERSONNEL IN HQNI

DCI STAFF

YOUR TEL ADDSD 641 OF 13 FEB 76

1. WE SHOWED THE A/Q TELEGRAM TO IAN CAMERON AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH HIM. FROM THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US (THE TIMING OF PAISLEY'S LATEST TRIPS TO LONDON AND A REPORT FROM [REDACTED]), IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT SOME AT LEAST OF PAISLEY'S ACCUSATIONS ABOUT A BLACK PROPAGANDA TEAM AND ITS AIMS

CODEWORD

/HAVE. . . .

OF 14 FEB

HANDLING
INSTRUCTIONS

US / HQNI

HAVE BEEN PRODUCED AS A RESULT OF HIS MEETING COLIN WALLACE, THE FORMER MEMBER OF ARMY INFORMATION POLICY IN THE AIS TEAM IN HQNI WHO LEAKED INFORMATION AT LEAST TO ROBERT FISK. IF THIS IS SO, THERE MAY BE ANOTHER DIMENSION TO PAISLEY'S SUSPICIONS OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

MOD OFFICER

2. WALLACE HAD VERY CLOSE CONTACT WITH G INT AT HQNI AND RECEIVED BRIEFINGS FROM THEM (INCLUDING FROM [REDACTED] WHOM YOU MIGHT LIKE TO CONTACT). CAMERON STOPPED THIS INTIMATE DEGREE OF CONTACT ON HIS ARRIVAL HERE, BUT CONSIDERS IT PROBABLE THAT WALLACE KNEW OF A CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE EFFORT (IF ONLY OF CAMERON'S GROUP) AT HQNI AND EVEN OF THE IDENTITY AND SOMETHING OF THE FUNCTION OF

SECRETARY 2

[REDACTED] WE UNDERSTAND THAT WALLACE WAS VERY CLOSE TO [REDACTED] AND SUBSEQUENTLY MARRIED HER. IF THESE SPECULATIONS ARE TRUE, AND IF PAISLEY HAS BEEN CONTACTING WALLACE, THE LATTER COULD REVEAL A CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE AT HQNI (PARA 2.3 OF THE A/Q TEL REFERS). EVEN IF THIS IS NOT [REDACTED] IT IS GETTING PERILOUSLY CLOSE TO HOME AND COULD PROMPT PAISLEY TO CONTINUE TO PROBE TO OUR DETRIMENT.

ENDS

US / HQNI

INFORMATION KNOWN TO HIA
INQUIRY AND CONSIDERED NOT
RELEVANT

MINUTES

and date 2 January 1987

COLIN WALLACE
FRED HOLROYD

SIS OFFICER K

DOCUMENT
ADMIN

1. [REDACTED] telephoned on 30 December 1986.
2. Humphrey BERKELEY (according to [REDACTED] a friend of Maurice OLDFIELD) is SDP candidate for Southend East (Teddy TAYLOR's seat) and a co-trustee of [REDACTED]'s in a hospital trust. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are co-trustees.

SIS OFFICER K

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

3. BERKELEY has told [REDACTED] that WALLACE and HOLROYD are ex-MI5 officers. WALLACE has just emerged from a prison sentence for manslaughter, a charge on which he was framed by MI5 and both "want justice".

4. WALLACE and HOLROYD had been in touch with Teddy TAYLOR who offered them £50,000 "to forget". They were unwilling to do so and therefore approached BERKELEY and gave him 40 files to read. BERKELEY was reading these files and found them pretty sensational; he obviously, says [REDACTED], scents the possibility of a book (written by him) and, being perennially hard up, this idea appeals. BERKELEY asked [REDACTED]'s advice and was told that his duty, as an SDP candidate, was to write a synopsis of the material and send it to [REDACTED], a "sensible fellow".

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

SIS OFFICER K

5. [REDACTED] asked if we were interested in seeing the 40 files. I said I would take advice and revert.

SIS OFFICER K

DOCUMENT
ADMIN

SIS OFFICER K

6. [REDACTED] asked for my comments : I said that WALLACE and HOLROYD had been amply publicised in the Irish Republican press and I would advise [REDACTED], as a friend, not to get involved. [REDACTED] said he would pass the advice on to BERKELEY. I said I did not want to be accused of trying to suppress WALLACE and HOLROYD and was advising only [REDACTED] himself. I suspect he will still pass the word to BERKELEY.

SIS

- DESIGNATOR 7. I am copying this minute to [REDACTED].

LEGAL ADVISER

SIS OFFICER K


2 Jan 87

ANNOTATED COMMENTS REVIEWED BY HIA
INQUIRY AND CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT

Please continue overleaf

CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]


SIGNATURE [REDACTED]

 CLASSIFICATION

ANNOTATED COMMENTS REVIEWED BY HIA
INQUIRY AND CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT

 SIS DESIGNATOR

2/1.




ANNOTATED COMMENTS REVIEWED BY HIA
INQUIRY AND CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT

 SIS DESIGNATOR

12 Jan 86

-4-



ANNOTATED COMMENTS REVIEWED BY HIA
INQUIRY AND CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT

 SIGNATURE

Document 10 - 16 August 1989

[REDACTED] SECURITY MARKINGS

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE [REDACTED]JOHN COLIN WALLACE

1. Born c. 1944, Ballymena, Co. Antrim.
2. Grammar school educated. Trained at Queen's University in Belfast as a manufacturing chemist.
3. Family chemist shop in Ballymena.
4. Captain in UDR, (TA). Employed by MOD as civilian Information Officer - mixing socially with the press, and issuing press releases. Also worked as disinformation officer releasing reports on sources of money and arms at home and abroad of selected terrorists.

INFORMATION
KNOWN TO THE
HIA INQUIRY

SECRETARY 2

4. Married [REDACTED] in August 1975.
5. First adverse reference to Wallace was from [REDACTED] in December 1974. Wallace was suspended by MOD. According to a statement by J P Waterfield NIO - Wallace consistently and without authorisation gave highly classified material over a long period to Fisk (The Times) including material originating from NIO and never consulted with or reported this to his seniors.
6. Robert Fisk used an article based on an HQNI document passed by Wallace in August 1974.
7. According to [REDACTED] Wallace is on Paisley's payroll (25 February 1976).
8. He resigned in December 1975.
9. Wallace accused of murder of Jonathan Lewis and convicted of manslaughter on 20 March 1981. He was released from prison on parole in December 1986.

MIS

PROTECTION OF
IDENTITY[REDACTED]
16 Aug 89

SIS DESIGNATOR

SECURITY MARKINGS [REDACTED]

SECURITY MARKINGS — [REDACTED]

DOCUMENT ADMIN



PO Box 500

Telephone [REDACTED]

ADDRESS & PHONE
NUMBERS

SIS OFFICER O [REDACTED]

Our Ref [REDACTED]

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

SIS

Your Ref [REDACTED]

cc [REDACTED]

MIS OFFICER

Date 18 December 1989

LEGAL ADVISER

Jean [REDACTED]

Colin WALLACE

MIS OFFICER 1 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], you and I have at various times discussed the answers we [REDACTED] were to give to A G Rucker of MOD who was coordinating and writing a paper for his PUS and the Cabinet Office, ultimately as a basis for briefing the PM, about WALLACE and (particularly concerning you and us) his dealings if any with either of our Services. You kindly searched for any record of these affecting the late [REDACTED], or your Service, without success; likewise ourselves.

SIS OFFICER B

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATION

SIS OFFICER B [REDACTED]

2. There was no need for us to offer anything in our answers for Rucker that might have compromised [REDACTED]

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

3. I must tell you that at a late stage we discovered a note of May 1987, interestingly by [REDACTED] himself, of an informal conversation he had with Ian Cameron ([REDACTED]'s successor as ASP at HQNI) in which Cameron had said that on arrival at HQNI in June 1974 he had found that [REDACTED] had had dealings of some sort with WALLACE. Being the cautious man he was, Cameron had then issued instructions to his staff not to speak to WALLACE. We discussed this with [REDACTED], who felt he was bound to make a low key mention of it in our answers, with the result that Rucker's report now contains the following passage: "Mr Cameron informally surmised that his predecessor ([REDACTED] - SIS) had had dealings with Mr. Wallace, but both the Security Service & the SIS files reveal no dealings [with Mr Wallace by any of their officers (including [REDACTED])". I attach copies of the relevant pages from the final report which relate the point and refer to WALLACE's alleged "Officer 'A'" of the Security Service, whom we have always been unable to identify.

MIS OFFICER
1LEGAL
ADVISER

SIS OFFICER B

5. The Cameron Report mentioned was an HQNI damage assessment prepared for the GOC in 1975, after WALLACE's departure from Northern Ireland, entitled "Damage Assessment [REDACTED]"

SECURITY MARKING

Document 11 (Page 2) - 18 December 1989



██████████ — SECURITY MARKING

Page No.:

BOX No. 500 Reference:

MIS OFFICER 1

on Disclosures of Information Policy made by Mr Colin Wallace following his suspension from duty in December 1974. It included a description of WALLACE's duties overt & covert (none of which of course made any reference to either of our Services).

SIS OFFICER E

6. I drafted a letter to you on these lines some time ago, but it was inadvertently destroyed - hence the delay. I am myself leaving my part-time employment here, and ██████████ is away until mid-January, so if you have queries I recommend you to address them in the first instance to ██████████.

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

LEGAL ADVISER

7. I have spoken separately to ██████████ about ██████████ on ██████████ of Rucker's report, who might conceivably be ██████████. ██████████ feels he may need to make some comment about this to the Cabinet Office.

SECRETARY 3

MIS OFFICER 2

Yours ever,
██████████

SECURITY MARKINGS

ORIGINATOR

MINUTES

and date 28 December 1989

COLIN WALLACE
Security Services etc etc

MIS OFFICER 2

1. You may like to see this letter from [redacted] concerning Colin WALLACE. I do not think that I have any further points that I wish to make, particularly as I am not enthusiastic about SIS becoming involved in a long saga on this odd man. He was an MOD employee and it is basically an MOD problem.

SIS OFFICER B

2. As you are aware (and is reflected in the attached letter), I have looked through all the likely files and have found no references whatsoever to suggest that the late [redacted] or indeed any other member of SIS, had a professional relationship with WALLACE and had briefed him in any way. I accept, however, that there could have been social relationships which would have gone unrecorded. Arguably I should now plough through the unlikely files but I do not feel that time devoted to going through several hundred files against the possibility that I might pick up one sentence in one letter is really justified, especially as the Security Service have found nothing.

DOCUMENT
ADMIN

SIS OFFICER O

28 December 1989

- 2 -

1. I entirely agree that it would be unproductive to plough through unlikely files. What we are seeking would not have been recorded that way, anyway. I also agree with paragraph 1 of Minute 1.

SIS OFFICER B

2. I am, however, concerned at the likelihood that this comprehensive MIS report will now go to the MOD and perhaps to No 10 stating that [redacted] "had dealings" with WALLACE. This could start a number of hares running, and ultimately lead to questions in Parliament, with attendant publicity.

INFORMATION
KNOWN TO
THE HIA
INQUIRY

3. [redacted] it is not impossible that he and [redacted] had some social contact. And as [redacted] was a very high profile officer and

/occupied ...

SIS OFFICER B

Please continue overleaf

SECURITY MARKING

[REDACTED] SECURITY MARKING

Minute 2 continued.

occupied, I believe, an office not far from WALLACE's, it is quite possible that the two passed the occasional word during the working day. But, as WALLACE wasn't PV'd and as he was never traced with us nor appears in any relevant files, even the low key reference to [REDACTED] in para 25(c) of the Report seems unnecessarily pregnant. It is significant that Ian CAMERON did not find it necessary to comment in writing on [REDACTED]'s 'dealings' with WALLACE at the time, which he would doubtless have done if they had been serious or relevant. If, however, a mention has to appear (but see my suggestion in para 4 below). I would prefer something along the lines of:

SIS OFFICER B

"It is understood that in 1987, a Security Service Officer (Mr CAMERON) recalled that he had believed his predecessor ([REDACTED] - SIS) to have had dealings with WALLACE at some point, but could not recall their nature. Mr WALLACE was, at that time, engaged [REDACTED]

IRRELEVANT
DETAIL

Neither the Security Service nor the SIS files reveal any dealings with Mr WALLACE by any of their officers, including [REDACTED]."

SIS OFFICER B

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

SIS OFFICER P

4. I am concerned that speculation about [REDACTED] and about [REDACTED] may now be passed on to the Cabinet Office without any serious attempt having been made to interview [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Ian CAMERON or indeed others who were in Northern Ireland at the time, and who are still serving in [REDACTED]. Questions which suggest themselves are:

SIS OFFICER P

MOD OFFICER I

SIS LONDON

What were [REDACTED]'s duties in NI - was he in the Information Policy Unit? Who was [REDACTED]'s PA, and if he did not have an SIS PA what was his means of communication with [REDACTED]? Who attended engagement parties or social events organised by WALLACE [REDACTED] (if any), and did these include [REDACTED]? My feeling is that a short investigation (perhaps by an [REDACTED] officer, who would have ready access to the files of former members of staff) could throw light on some of the grey areas, and perhaps enable SIS to pre-empt a further and perhaps deeper investigation should the report as it stands reach No 10. If we fail to uncover anything useful, we at least will have done our best.

SIS OFFICER B

SIS LONDON

5. [REDACTED] should see these papers before a reply goes to the Security Service.

5 January 1990

SIS DESIGNATORS

- 3 -

I agree with minute 2. I think we shall be even to have done even best.

15/1/90

SECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN

Document 13 - 19 March 1990

[REDACTED] SECURITY MARKING

COLIN WALLACE - Note of conversation with [REDACTED] MIS OFFICER 1

MIS OFFICER 1

1. On 8 March I spoke to [REDACTED] who has been looking into the WALLACE affair for MIS. As [REDACTED] is a retired officer he has now handed over the bulk of his research to [REDACTED], though he is still involved occasionally.

MIS OFFICER 2

SIS OFFICER B

2. [REDACTED] told me that he had been to see Ian CAMERON recently. They discussed CAMERON's recollection of possible WALLACE contact in the light of CAMERON's earlier conjecture ([REDACTED] letter of 18 December to [REDACTED]) that [REDACTED] had had 'some dealings' with WALLACE.

MIS OFFICER 2

SIS OFFICER O

3. CAMERON took over from [REDACTED] in July 1974 and had a handover lasting only three days, at the end of which he was not much the wiser. It was only after [REDACTED]'s departure that CAMERON discovered some files which [REDACTED] had kept and which contained details of a few journalists. There wasn't very much in the files but as CAMERON also heard that [REDACTED] had been in the habit of meeting journalists he suspected that [REDACTED] had been studying journalists for some undisclosed purpose.

SIS OFFICER B

4. It was because everybody at Lisburn regarded WALLACE as the local guru on every subject, and because whenever anything cropped up the immediate reaction was to 'ask WALLACE', that CAMERON told his staff to keep well away from the Army Information Services and from WALLACE in particular. This of course was well before WALLACE had fallen under any sort of suspicion.

SIS OFFICER B

SIS OFFICER B

5. Comment. To some extent the above is reassuring. CAMERON has no direct evidence that [REDACTED] had dealings with WALLACE. It may be that it was only after the case against WALLACE hardened that CAMERON drew the conclusion that WALLACE had provided [REDACTED] with information about journalists and had assisted with introductions. On the other hand it would be helpful to know why [REDACTED] was gathering details of journalists. I will therefore examine our records to see whether he had a brief to do so, and whether he supplied SIS with any journalist leads. Incidentally, there is no particular mystery as to what [REDACTED] was supposed to be doing in NI. In March 1974 [REDACTED] forwarded to the DCDS(I), General WILLISON, a comprehensive 5-page report by [REDACTED] covering his first 13 months in NI and setting out guidelines for the year ahead.

MIS OFFICER 3

SIS OFFICER B

[REDACTED] SIS OFFICER E

12 March 90

[REDACTED] SECURITY MARKING & DOCUMENT ADMIN

[REDACTED] SECURITY MARKING

(C)

SIS

COLIN WALLACE - FILE RESEARCH ON POSSIBLE [REDACTED] CONTACT

SIS OFFICER B

MIS OFFICER 1

1. Prompted by Ian CAMERON's remark to [REDACTED] that he thought that [REDACTED] had had 'dealings' with WALLACE, I have trawled through the likely files to see if there is any evidence of this. There is no doubt that WALLACE and [REDACTED] were acquainted socially, but almost everybody who spent any time at HQNI during the period that WALLACE was there knew him socially. Professional contact, whether direct or indirect, would have been another matter.

2. According to [REDACTED] (file note dated 12 March), CAMERON discovered that [REDACTED] had been keeping rudimentary files on some journalists, to whom he had given code names. CAMERON surmised that [REDACTED] had obtained the names and the background details of these journalists from WALLACE.

SIS OFFICER B

SIS LONDON

IRRELEVANT DETAIL

US HQNI

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

3. [REDACTED] had a [REDACTED] brief [REDACTED] for superb contacts among the local, UK and international press, and as WALLACE was not at that time under any kind of suspicion, there would have been no reason why [REDACTED] should not have turned to him. However there is no indication that he did. I have examined the relevant volumes [REDACTED] and there are only three mentions there of WALLACE, in the correspondence quoted in para 4 below. I have also examined the files [REDACTED]

SIS OFFICER B

DOCUMENT
REFERENCESINFORMATION
KNOWN TO
THE HIA
INQUIRY BUT
CONSIDERED
IRRELEVANT

[REDACTED]. With the exception of [REDACTED] file there are no mentions of WALLACE. In [REDACTED]'s case the references are related to those in file [REDACTED] (William FULLER), which contains, as one would expect, the most numerous mentions of WALLACE in connection with an operation with which the Service was involved (see para 6 below).

SIS REFERENCES

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

4. Late in 1974, possibly prompted by the then current inquiry into leaks from HQNI, [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] for details of HQNI Press sources being run on an unconscious basis by PR HQNI (principally Colin WALLACE). [REDACTED] replied

US HQNI

DCI STAFF

/2

[REDACTED] SECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN [REDACTED]

SECURITY MARKING

-2-

DOCUMENT REFERENCES

US HQNI

([redacted] Telegram [redacted] of 18 Nov [redacted] attached) that there were [redacted] such sources, but did not indicate how they knew this. In all probability the information came indirectly from WALLACE via G/INT because in April 1975 ([redacted] of 4 April, also attached) [redacted] says that 'since WALLACE left IP HQNI the system whereby information from these sources had been passed to G/INT had been suspended'. [redacted] suggested looking up [redacted] records in case this threw up a clear lead.

US HQNI

SIS LONDON

HIA CONSIDERS
INFORMATION
IS COVERED IN
THE NEXT
PARAGRAPH

SIS OFFICER B

US HQNI

SIS OFFICER B

5. The significance of the above is that it suggests that [redacted] had not been feeding the names of journalists to [redacted] for operational purposes. If he had, the correspondence would have referred or cross-referred to this in some way. If [redacted] did have contact with journalists, and had begun to keep private files on them, this must have been for his own cover or private purposes.

INFORMATION KNOWN
TO HIA INQUIRY -
CONSIDERED NOT
RELEVANT

SIS OFFICER B

SIS LONDON

PLACE

6. While we can therefore regard Ian CAMERON's suspicions about professional contact between the two as unproven and probably groundless, it is nevertheless disturbing that [redacted] may, if CAMERON's recollection is correct, have been active for whatever reason in a field in which WALLACE was the then acknowledged expert. It would be wise to get to the bottom of this if possible. One possible explanation is that stung by [redacted]'s criticism, on 27 March 74, that he was not in fact delivering the goods in Northern Ireland he began to assemble details of possible sources [redacted] but then simply did not follow-through. It is unlikely that [redacted] would have confided in his MI5 PA on matters such as [redacted] tasking. However we do have the opportunity of finding out something more of what [redacted] was up to with journalists, and possibly with WALLACE by consulting this PA, [redacted]. She lives in [redacted] and is well known to [redacted], who will see her on 12 June.

SIS DESIGNATOR
INFORMATION
KNOWN TO HIA
INQUIRY - NOT
RELEVANT

SIS OFFICER B

SECRETARY 1

MIS OFFICER 1

SIS OFFICER B

7. However, if there was no official contact between [redacted] and WALLACE it is clear that in one specific area at least there was considerable indirect contact between WALLACE and SIS. This was over the William FULLER case. Here SIS, using G/INT as a cut-out, provided information for WALLACE to pass on to the journalist [redacted]


PROTECTION OF
IDENTITY

/3

SECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN

 SECURITY MARKING

- 3 -

It is unclear whether WALLACE was aware that SIS was one of the original providers of this information. Strictly speaking WALLACE should not have known, and the files indicate the care that was taken by  to ensure that he did not find out. However, WALLACE must have known that the detailed information he was given could not have come from Army sources alone. We are therefore dependent to a considerable extent on the Army's own security in this case, and must hope that knowing winks and glances were not exchanged. Otherwise WALLACE could claim that he was part of an SIS/MIS dirty tricks operation, and provide sufficient details to be believed.

US HQNI

 SIS OFFICER E

12 June 90

 SECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN 

SECURITY MARKINGS
& DOCUMENT ADMIN



DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

PO Box 500
London

ADDRESS & PHONE
NUMBERS

Telephone

28 June 1990

Yours truly,

WALLACE: THE RUCKER REPORT

1. Please refer to the Rucker Report, paragraph [redacted], and my letters referred to therein. Paragraph [redacted] refers to Cameron's surmise that [redacted] might have had dealings with WALLACE.

SIS OFFICER B

INFORMATION
KNOWN TO THE
HIA INQUIRY
AND
CONSIDERED
NOT RELEVANT

2. Cameron based his surmise on recollections that after taking over in HQNI in 1974, he had found a few files for journalists who had been given codenames with some reference to WALLACE but little else in the files. These aroused his suspicion at the time and it lodged in his mind. I felt it proper to let you know of this doubt at the time but we have continued extensive researches to ascertain the facts. We have now done so. Far from establishing any professional operational relationship between [redacted] and WALLACE, our research has produced strong circumstantial evidence that there was none. I think we have found the explanation of the files Cameron recalled. [redacted] journalists had been given codenames by the Army as they were contacts run by PR/HQNI, principally by Colin WALLACE. Information obtained from these contacts was passed by PR/HQNI to G3 Int HQNI and drawn on for G Int's intelligence summaries. After WALLACE had moved, the system whereby information from these sources went to G Int, was suspended. At that time there was clear indication that the journalists had not been approached by the agencies. Moreover, WALLACE produced a list of all his journalist contacts, the terms of which established that none of these contacts was in contact with the agencies. It is clear from these exchanges that the journalist files were not the subject of professional co-operation between [redacted] and WALLACE.

A G Rucker Esq
AUS (SCS)
Metropole Building
Northumberland Avenue

SIS OFFICER B

SECURITY MARKING



██████████ — SECURITY MARKING

Page No 2

██████████ — DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

**INFORMATION KNOWN
TO THE HIA INQUIRY**

3. On this basis I will be grateful if you will remove the reference in paragraph ██████████ to Cameron's suspicions about S ██████████ which are now found to have no foundation.

SIS OFFICER B

██████████
██████████
██████████ } NAME &
SIGNATURE OF
MIS LEGAL
ADVISER

Copied to: ██████████, NIO London
██████████, Home Office
██████████, Cabinet Office

Blind copy to ██████████, SIS

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

██████████ — SECURITY MARKING

SECURITY MARKING [REDACTED]

outlined in para. 6 - but I do not think
there is any need under 6 ii to go beyond
the files.

[REDACTED] — SIS DESIGNATOR

- 4 -

SIS OFFICER C

MIS OFFICER 1

1. I have now interviewed [REDACTED] (Flag A), talked again with [REDACTED] (Flag B), and done further file research (Flag C). [REDACTED] has paid a follow-up visit to Ian CAMERON and has interviewed [REDACTED]'s PA [REDACTED]. As a result, I am quite satisfied that there are no official skeletons in the SIS cupboard as far as [REDACTED] is concerned. The residual danger, about which we can do nothing, is that WALLACE will impute to [REDACTED] some unwholesome or illegal activity allegedly carried out independently or on behalf of SIS. Sadly almost anything may be believed by a credulous public in view of [REDACTED]'s larger than life image and his firm identification as SIS. So far WALLACE has been reticent about revealing SIS identities and activities (even if he knows anything of the latter, which is doubtful) [REDACTED].

SECRETARY 1

SIS OFFICER B

SIS OFFICER B

Unfortunately, as [REDACTED]'s job was to advise the Army on operations this involved him with Fred HOLROYD, who has also made claims about [REDACTED]. HOLROYD and WALLACE are now co-operating to some extent.

SIS OFFICER B

INFORMATION
KNOWN TO THE
HIA INQUIRY AND
CONSIDERED NOT
RELEVANT

2. A report has already gone from the Security Service to the MOD, for the Cabinet Office, mentioning [REDACTED] as possibly having had 'dealings' with WALLACE. Extracts relevant to SIS were sent under cover of [REDACTED]'s letter to [REDACTED] dated 18 December 1989. However, as a result of further researches here and in the Security Service [REDACTED] has now written again to Arthur RUCKER of the MOD (letter dated 28 June 1990) withdrawing his earlier suppositions about [REDACTED] and WALLACE. This letter, and a covering minute ([REDACTED] dated 28 December 1989 is also attached.

SIS OFFICER O

SIS OFFICER B

MIS OFFICER 2

LEGAL
ADVISER

SIS OFFICER B

3. We can therefore be confident that SIS had no conscious operational involvement with WALLACE of any kind. It appears that we used WALLACE only once, on an unconscious basis, and using G/INT as a cut-out. This was in the FULLER case, a straight information operation. Our role was to provide true facts through G/INT for PR HQNI to pass on without attribution to suitable journalists, principally [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]'s Insight team (and an RUC

DOCUMENT REFERENCE

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

/SB ...

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] — SECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN

SECURITY MARKING [REDACTED]

DOCUMENT ADMIN [REDACTED]

MINUTES
(continuation sheet)

and date 8 February 1990

SB source). WALLACE's intuition may suggest that SIS provided input but he certainly cannot prove it. In any case, what he was being asked to do was normal information work, the only difference being that he was not given details as to the origins of the facts. It is possible, of course, that WALLACE thought he was engaged in disinformation, but he wasn't. I have reassured [REDACTED] that there was no SIS involvement with WALLACE, even indirectly, over psyops or any other clandestine activity which could lay us open to criticism were WALLACE to publicise it.

LEGAL
ADVISOR

5. I attach a revised chronology and have removed the earlier, less complete chronology attached to minute 1.

[REDACTED]
3 Jul 90

SIS OFFICER E

- 5 -

[REDACTED] seems to have covered all the remaining angles. The only weak spot seems to me to be an use of G/INT as a cut out. As [REDACTED]; earlier file note (Flag C) acknowledges we cannot be certain that the Army's security was unbreachable. Experience has shown of us that we have had no less an on the scene

[REDACTED] 3/

SIGNATURE

Document 17 - 4 July 1990

SECURITY MARKINGS

DOCUMENT ADMIN

MINUTES

and date, 4 July 1990

COLIN WALLACE

1. On 1 June 1990, the BBC2 TV programme 'Public Eye' broadcast a claim by the former Army Intelligence Officer, Brian GEMMELL, that he knew MI5 sometimes made operational use of the homosexual orientation of contacts. As an example he cited the meeting he had in London on 7 September 1976 with two officers of the Security Service. They discussed using homosexuality as a lever to recruit the Deputy Chairman of the ULCCC John McKEAGUE.

MI5 OFFICER 2

SISLONDON

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

2. [redacted] visited [redacted] on 27 June to see whether [redacted] contained a record of this meeting, which was between GEMMELL and [redacted].

US LONDON

US PERSONNEL
KNOWN TO THE
INQUIRY

US HQNI

[redacted]. So far we have found no record of the actual meeting, but the papers indicate that [redacted] did put forward a proposal along the lines claimed by GEMMELL later in 1976. It was not pursued because [redacted] did not think it would work, a view with which [redacted] agreed.

SISLONDON

MATERIAL THE HIA
INQUIRY CONSIDERS
IRRELEVANT ABOUT
THE OFFICERS
INVOLVED IN THE
MEETING.

3. [redacted]

[redacted] will let us have the results of his inquiry in due course.

MI5 OFFICER 2

4 Jul 90

SIS OFFICER E

SECURITY MARKING & DOCUMENT ADMIN

SECURITY MARKING

21 7 90

NOTE FOR [REDACTED] — SIS OFFICER E

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONSCOLIN WALLACE: RECORD OF A CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] ON 1
FEBRUARY 1990

SIS OFFICER L

SIS
DESIGNATORS

1. Hearing that I had been charged with the task of investigating the SIS involvement with Colin WALLACE, [REDACTED] asked me to call, saying that he wished to contribute to my investigation, if that is the right word. On arrival I learned that he had also invited [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to attend. I show below a digest of what [REDACTED] told the meeting.

SIS OFFICER B

US

2. [REDACTED] was not on the staff of [REDACTED] in Ulster but was appointed as the Intelligence Advisor to DCI. His role was declared to the RUC and involved giving tradecraft and other advice to Army intelligence personnel. By contrast, [REDACTED], of which [REDACTED] was one [REDACTED] SIS commander [REDACTED] and his staff kept as he put it "a million miles from [REDACTED]", not only because he had nothing to do with the objectives of [REDACTED] but because of his very high profile, macho image in Northern Ireland. [REDACTED] has for instance revealed that [REDACTED] would interview people in his office with a loaded pistol on his desk and [REDACTED] confirmed that he sometimes came into the Officers Mess for lunch with this weapon. There was therefore a strong need not to "contaminate" [REDACTED] or the SIS presence in NI, with WALLACE, whom [REDACTED] knew to hold extreme right-wing pro-Protestant views. [REDACTED] was however in no doubt that Colin WALLACE knew the identities of the staff [REDACTED]

SIS OFFICER L

US HQNI

SIS OFFICER L

INFORMATION
KNOWN TO THE
HIA INQUIRY

SIS OFFICER B

US HQNI

SIS OFFICER M

SIS OFFICER L

US HQNI

INFORMATION
KNOWN TO THE
HIA INQUIRY AND
CONSIDERED NOT
RELEVANTSECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN

SECURITY MARKING [REDACTED]

INFORMATION
KNOWN TO THE HIA
INQUIRY AND
CONSIDERED NOT
RELEVANT

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

SIS
OFFICER L

US HQNI

SIS OFFICER L

US HQNI

PROTECTION OF
IDENTITY

PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY

US HQNI

3. WALLACE was a locally engaged civilian and worked for the overt wing of the Army Information Unit. When [REDACTED] arrived in NI the covert wing was headed by Lt Col [REDACTED] an expert in psychological warfare. By the nature of the game it was impossible to withhold much of the black propaganda side of things from WALLACE's normal, overt information office. Inevitably therefore, WALLACE took part in some discussions of black propaganda plans. [REDACTED] emphasised once more that the [REDACTED] consciously had nothing officially to do with WALLACE although [REDACTED] was very much involved in its early stages with formulating "dirty tricks" aimed at the IRA, in conjunction with [REDACTED] Army covert propaganda unit. Others in the Army set-up were a Lt Col [REDACTED] and a Col [REDACTED]. Hugh MOONEY of the FCO (IRD) was also very much involved and his picture appears in a book on the WALLACE affair (held by you). The [REDACTED] was tasked to organise para military operations designed to disrupt the IRA. In conjunction with [REDACTED] et al [REDACTED] conceived and submitted formal applications for clearance on a number of dirty trick operations eg as follows, none of which was approved:

INFORMATION KNOWN TO
THE HIA INQUIRY AND
CONSIDERED NOT
RELEVANT

4. One operation, which might have come to the ears of WALLACE indirectly (although there was no evidence that it did), evolved from a discovery by the Army Bomb Disposal Unit (headed by one [REDACTED]).

MATERIAL RELATING
TO THE SPECIFIC
OPERATION
CONSIDERED NOT
RELEVANT BY THE
HIA INQUIRY

PROTECTION OF
IDENTITY

SECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN

SECURITY MARKING

Even this ploy
never came to fruition.

5.

6.

INFORMATION
KNOWN TO THE
HIA INQUIRY AND
CONSIDERED NOT
RELEVANT

SIS OFFICER L

7. Speaking about WALLACE [REDACTED] said that they had met frequently on social occasions.

US LOCATIONS
KNOWN TO
HIA INQUIRY

it seemed to [REDACTED]
inconceivable that WALLACE did not know of the presence of [REDACTED] in NI and the staff who manned them.

It is [REDACTED]'s main concern
that WALLACE might one day show his hand and blow [REDACTED] and
others to the press and Parliament.

SIS OFFICER L

8. Other facts we discussed were:

SIS OFFICER B

a. The MI5 officer who was teamed with [REDACTED] was
someone called [REDACTED] (ph). He is
an officer who might reveal more about [REDACTED]

MI5 OFFICER 4

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATION

SECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN

SECURITY MARKING — [REDACTED]

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

(as would be [REDACTED] if we were
allowed to talk to them);

b. [REDACTED] was seconded to the Army and if he had
secretarial help it would have come from that
source. Note: Amongst the papers I am giving you
is a note I asked for from [REDACTED] which shows
the way [REDACTED] might have communicated with [REDACTED];

SIS OFFICER B

SIS DESIGNATOR

SIS OFFICER L

SIS LONDON

US HQNI

c. With [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] at the time were:

DETAILS OF US
PERSONNEL
KNOWN TO HIA
INQUIRY

[REDACTED]

Document 19 - 25 March 1975

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

Britain ends 'black propaganda' campaign by Army in Ulster

From Robert Plak
Belfast

The British Government has effectively prevented army officers in Northern Ireland from continuing a "black propaganda" campaign against suspected extremists and their supporters by taking over control of the department that decides the army and police information policy in the province.

During the past year several soldiers, with permission from their superiors, have been "leaking" information.

They have also been involved in forging Provisional IRA posters, have tried to persuade journalists that a prominent Protestant politician was involved in the murder of the former West German honorary consul in Belfast, and have had at their disposal extensive classified files on British and Irish reporters working in Belfast.

The Government's decision to coordinate its information policy "does not necessarily mean that officials will no longer be empowered to leak information, scurrilous or otherwise, about the lives of extremist suspects, but at least a six-page Army dossier on American businessmen and their contacts, which was handed out to certain journalists, has been withdrawn. Some of the information in that document, together with names, addresses and home telephone numbers, was apparently gathered in the United States from a passage actually refers to an American suspect's "alleged 40 adulteries during a three-month period") but a senior official in the State Department last weekend categorically denied any official American involvement in the gathering of the information.

The files on journalists contain names of staff on London and Dublin daily and Sunday papers. They contain information, some of it almost certainly gathered from tapped telephone calls, on Mr Kevin Myers, former correspondent in Belfast for *The Observer*, *The Times* correspondent, Mr Vincent Brown, of the Dublin-based *Irish Independent*, and a reporter on *The Daily Telegraph*.

The file on myself contains a report submitted last year to the military Special Investigation

Branch by a former member of the Special Air Service, the Army's counter-insurgency unit, naming every possible contact and friend I may have made in the previous 12 months. The information, virtually all of which is false since I became suspicious of the officer concerned, was gleaned during a dinner table conversation and even includes the description of a picture in the cottage where I live.

The dossier on Irish businessmen includes the name of a Dublin public house owned by a man who also owns restaurants in Manhattan, Boston, Chicago and San Francisco; and those of the son of a leading United States paper manufacturer who is alleged to have tried to send rifles by air from America to Shannon airport, and of a wealthy estate agent in Dublin.

Other names include those of a businessman who is a leading supporter of the Fianna Fail political party in the Irish Republic (the Army file says that he is "certainly well received in IRA circles"), a man employed by GEC in the Irish Republic, a wealthy Dublin quarry owner and a farmer in co Monaghan.

The document suggests the involvement in IRA activities but occasionally adds that there is no evidence to substantiate some of the allegations.

Attached to the back of the document is a photocopy of a letter apparently sent by a Belfast businessman to a New York supporter of Sinn Féin, asking for funds which could be deposited in a branch of the Allied Irish Bank in Belfast. No mention is made of whether the letter was legally acquired by the Army (it is dated November 27, 1972) but it was sent to an address in East 45th Street in Manhattan, which is just off Second Avenue. Neither the State Department nor the American Consulate in Belfast could suggest how the letter was acquired.

The Army has never admitted possessing files on newspapermen in Belfast, although several journalists have been aware that their movements and telephone conversations have been subject to surveillance. On one occasion, for example, an appointment I made with a reporter on a local Belfast newspaper, to talk

about alleged police corruption in Belfast, was discussed at a military conference at Lisburn within 12 hours.

The file on my own contacts is expanded by the inclusion of the report by the former SAS officer, who was specifically instructed to ask me if I would have dinner with him.

He was at the time the second in command of 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, based at Tenement Street police station in Belfast. On the way to dinner he said that our conversation would be "off the record" (an expression generally taken to mean that the contents of a conversation would not be passed to a third party), but over the meal he asked about the sources of several reports I had written for *The Times* about the Army, the police and the IRA.

Suspicious of his motives, I invented several names and fictitious contacts—one of them a non-existent Lieutenant in a unit that had previously served in the Roman Catholic Ardara area of Belfast—and he made a detailed note of all those in his report to the SIB, which was written the following day. All the names I mentioned complete with inaccuracies, are in it.

Other attempts have been made to use journalists. An officer attached to 29 Infantry Brigade at Lisburn last year toured newspaper offices in Belfast, suggesting that a Protestant politician in Ulster had been involved in the disappearance of Mr Thomas Niedermaier, the West German honorary consul in Belfast, who was kidnapped from his home in Belfast just after Christmas 1973.

The Army has also been responsible for forgeries in the past 12 months. One was a Sinn Féin poster in Newry, and another a cleverly designed copy of a Provisional IRA poster which originally carried the silhouette of a gunman and the words "Victory '74". The Army's version, which was plastered round streets in the Lower Falls area had the additional words "but not through the barrel of a gun".

Reporters who tried to follow up the story in the republic, where British soldiers should not operate, could find no truth in the allegations.

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

The Times

25 March 1975

Publication

THE JIMES

Date 9 MAR 1990

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

Wallace complaint against 'The Inde

MR COLIN WALLACE had been, until the beginning of 1973, a senior information officer at British Army Headquarters in Ulster, Co Down, Northern Ireland. Ever since he has waged a ceaseless and volatile campaign, alleging that the security forces in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s carried out undercover assassinations as well as a smear campaign against prominent politicians.

Mr David McKinnick has been a highly respected commentator on the North Irish political scene during the whole of the relevant period. He was a correspondent on the Irish Times until 1953, when he became *The Independent's* Ireland correspondent. It is a collection of articles of which he was the principal author in *The Independent* on 2 September 1987, that has given rise to this complaint to the Press Council.

The complaint is in two parts. First, Mr Wallace alleges, in essence, that the pages contained unsupported assertions and inaccuracies; and second, he maintains that the editor of *The Independent* thereafter declined to acknowledge that there was anything that the paper was required to remedy, and wrongly failed to accord Mr Wallace an opportunity to refute the assertions and correct the factual inaccuracies.

The front page introduction of 2 September 1987, "Doubts over Ulster murder claims", represented the product of an investigation by Mr McKinnick of a number of matters per-

The Press Council has upheld a complaint against *The Independent* by Colin Wallace, of Dailoway Road, Arundel, West Sussex, a former information officer with the Army in Northern Ireland. The Council decided to issue its adjudication in the form of the following reasoned decision.

sonal to Mr Wallace. Mr McKinnick concluded that Mr Wallace's allegations were unreliable, because no veracity could be placed on claims made by Mr Wallace about himself and his activities. Describing Mr Wallace and a named army officer as two intelligence personnel, the article stated: "Our inquiries have revealed major discrepancies, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in their stories which cast serious doubt on the reliability of their version of events." Mr McKinnick was thus applying a familiar and well tried technique of testing the general credibility of a person by putting that person's statements under the microscope.

Could the various statements made by or attributed to Mr Wallace, whether they were relevant, peripheral or irrelevant to the specific allegations, be shown to be untrue? If the answer to that question was in the affirmative, there was a reasonable basis for disbelieving him. Mr Wallace was either romancing or fantasising, or he was a mischievous purveyor of contrivance.

Mr McKinnick chose four topics for testing Mr Wallace's credibility. They were: (a) graduation from Queen's University, Belfast; (b) membership of

the Widgery tribunal in Londonderry, 1972; (c) recommendations for decorations; and (d) parachuting experience.

Before dealing with each of these items, it is necessary to make it clear that the Press Council is in no position to determine whether Mr Wallace's allegations against the security forces in Northern Ireland and the denials by the governmental authorities are substantiated or not. Even if it were an appropriate function for the Press Council to inquire into such matters touching directly on national security, it is not equipped to undertake in such a case as this such a mammoth task which would require remedies and facilities not available to a self-regulatory body. (A few days after the oral hearing before the Complaints Committee on 26 January, the Secretary of State for Defence ordered an inquiry, with limited terms of reference, to consider whether Mr Wallace had been unjustly treated by the civil service appeal board in confirming his dismissal from the service). The Council's task is simply to decide whether the complaint (as formulated) against Mr McKinnick and *The Independent* is made out or not.

If a journalist and his (or her) editor

seek out to convey to readers that someone is not worthy of belief in what he says or claims, the journalist must verify all the facts which he selects for the purpose of raising doubt on the credibility of the named person, either by reference to documentary material or to oral answers to questions asked by the journalist.

Mr McKinnick wrote that "some of Mr Wallace's statements are clearly untrue...". He went on to chronicle, *inter alia*, the four issues selected to substantiate the assertion that Mr Wallace's statements were untrue.

The article stated: "He [Mr Wallace] once claimed to have been a member of the Widgery tribunal, which reported on the 'Bloody Sunday' killings in 1972, but he demonstrably was not." This statement was derived from a manuscript note in Mr Wallace's own handwriting on prison note-paper, while he was serving a prison sentence in the early 1980s. The statement that Mr Wallace was describing himself as a "member" of what was undoubtedly an inquiry conducted solely by the Lord Chief Justice of England could properly be relied upon as an untrue state-

ment. But it was so transparently incorrect that anyone might reasonably have inquired of the maker of the statement whether it meant what he said, rather than refuse it on its face value. If Mr McKinnick had asked Mr Wallace if he would no doubt have been told that Mr Wallace had been detained by his superior officer from his normal duties to assist in the Army team taking part in Lord Widgery's inquiry. While it could not say he was a member of the inquiry, he did have some direct involvement in it. The Council concluded that, although by itself this item in the article does not call for reprehension, Mr McKinnick was too quick to seize the opportunity to rebut the statement. Queen's University, Belfast.

The article stated: "A profile of [Mr Wallace] in a South of England newspaper described him as a graduate of Queen's University, Belfast, but the university says he does not hold one of its degrees." The "profile" was written by a journalist who did not purport to quote Mr Wallace at any stage as having been "a graduate of Queen's University". The reference to Queen's University derived from Mr Wallace's curriculum vitae in his successful application for the job with Arundel District Council as information liaison officer. In that CV Mr Wallace did say that he had helped to train cadets there as part of his military duties in Northern Ireland. Nowhere was there any evidence of a claim by Mr Wallace to graduation from Queen's University, Belfast.

Wallace ruling

The Press Council has upheld a complaint against *The Independent* by Colin Wallace, a former Army information officer in Northern Ireland. Page 1.

'Independent' upheld

There was no basis for saying that this was a "clearly untrue" statement made by Mr Wallace.

The decorations

The article stated that "he [Mr Wallace] has said that he was three times recommended for decorations, but there is no record of this". Mr Wallace's statement appears to be correct. Two superior officers of his who were successively head of the Ministry of Defence Information Office had made such recommendations. They were mentioned in a letter to the Arun District Council. Mr McKittrick's checks, as he admitted, did not include the relevant section of the Ministry of Defence. Again, this was a failure to check hard data before branding the statement as false.

Parachuting

This item appeared in the same edition of *The Independent*, but was written by Mr McKittrick's co-investigator, Mr John Ware. The article was headed "Parachutist who was all waffle and no action", the gist of which was that Mr Wallace was bragging when he claimed to be an experienced parachutist. It turned out that in 1974 Mr Wallace had been issued with a D licence. This would signify that the holder of the licence had made 300 jumps.

Mr Ware's article pooh-poohed this fact, on the ground that the D licence system was notoriously open to abuse. The innuendo was that Mr Wallace had been one of the abusers and had ac-

quired his D licence by falsely claiming the requisite number of jumps. There was in this item clearly room for rival versions, depending on the reliability of the D licence. Given the two sides to the issue, however, it was quite irresponsible to conclude preference for one rather than the other, to the point of disbelieving Mr Wallace's statement that he was an experienced parachutist.

For the reasons set out in the four aggregated items the Council finds that *The Independent* published articles on 2 September 1987 containing unsupported assertion that the complainant was not worthy of belief in making his allegations about the security forces in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.

Right of reply

Where someone has been the subject of attack as in this case on the grounds that what he has said is not to be believed, he is entitled to defend himself. It was no answer for the editor of *The Independent* to say that the newspaper's reports had been meticulously researched, that the details had been checked before publication, and that the aggrieved complainant "was given early opportunity to meet us [the editorial staff] afterwards". Even if the editor considered that Mr Wallace's complaint was unjustified, this was a case in which it was unreasonable not to give him space to reply.

The complaint against *The Independent* is upheld.

■ *The Independent* has invited Colin Wallace to reply to our article.

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

NATIONAL NEWS

Telephones tapped to trace press department 'nutter' who issued bogus

MI5 'investigated Wallace

By Kevin Tools.

COLIN Wallace, dismissed from the Ministry of Defence press relations unit in Northern Ireland for leaking sensitive material, was the subject of an MI5 investigation months before he was sacked, it was claimed last night.

Mr Wallace and his superior Peter Broderick, head of Army Information in Northern Ireland, have always maintained Mr Wallace was secretly authorised to leak information to journalists as part of his work for the Information Policy Unit. The claims are to be investigated by David Calcutt QC in a government inquiry into the exact circumstances of Mr Wallace's dismissal.

In an exclusive interview with *The Sunday Correspondent*, Hugh Mooney, a former Foreign Office "black propaganda" expert who worked in the same unit in Northern Ireland as Wallace, said the MI5 investigation began months before Wallace was transferred out of the unit in January 1975.

"Wallace was exceeding his authority. He was giving briefings that were in conflict with what was required of him. He

was leaking stuff to journalists that he had no right to do," said Mr Mooney.


"His telephone calls were monitored weeks before the first transfer and it was on that basis it was decided he had to be moved out of Northern Ireland."

The Intelligence agencies and the Foreign Office had been particularly concerned about stories about the deployment of SAS and a bogus one, complete with a false picture, about Russian submarines landing IRA terrorists near Londonderry.

"Because there were so many agencies involved - the Ministry of Defence, Headquarters Northern Ireland, Army Press Relations, Central Military Intelligence and MI5 - in Information Policy it was only when there was a concerted effort to bring the department heads together that the problem was easily isolated to this 'nutter' in press relations," Mr Mooney added.

The man who supervised the investigation was Lt-Col Jeremy Rallton, head of the Information Policy Unit.

In September 1975 Lt-Col Rallton was due to appear at Mr Wallace's final disciplinary



hearing to be cross-examined about the real nature of Wallace's work for the Information Policy "psychological operations" Unit.

But on the morning of the enquiry Mr Wallace was told that Lt-Col Rallton had missed his flight from Belfast and that he would be unable to attend.

Lt-Col Rallton's absence at the inquiry turned the whole disciplinary procedure into a

farce, Mr Wallace said. "The Army did not want him to be cross-examined as that would have let the cat out of the bag. The safe way was for him not to be there."

"As the man normally responsible for 'psy-ops' he was the only person that could have answered the questions about my real work. His evidence was crucial to the inquiry."

Lt-Col Rallton last night

HANDWRITTEN
ANNOTATIONS

THE SUNDAY CORRESPONDENT MARCH 18 1990

ies, claims expert who worked for Foreign Office e before sacking'

admitted that his non-appearance at the hearing was "strange".

"One has to deduce from that that a reason like the plane being late would not be sufficient to explain my absence," he said.

"There would have to be some other factors involved but I cannot really tell you more."

"If, for some reason, a witness considered to be fairly critical is not available, the people in charge of the inquiry are going to find some other way of taking evidence. The fact that this was not done in this case is obviously indicative of some other factors."

Mr Mooney also admitted that Mr Wallace had told him about the sex scandal at Kincora boys home in Belfast - casting further doubt on Government claims that the security forces had no knowledge of the long-running rape and buggery of children in care.

"I do know he mentioned it. He was dropping it in and feeling his way. He kept pushing it. But I could never understand why I thought it was totally irrelevant to our concerns. I did get the feeling he was pushing this. But how the hell did he

know? He certainly did not know by anything he was doing officially."

Mr Mooney, from the Foreign Office's department's cold-war psychological warfare unit, the Information Research Department, along with Collin Wallace ran the black propaganda campaign to smear the IRA and other opponents of the Government.

Mr Mooney also attended high-level security briefings at the Northern Ireland Office to co-ordinate overall information policy in Northern Ireland in the mid-seventies and acted as a liaison officer between MI5 and the Foreign Office.

His role was confirmed by Col Maurice Tugwell, founder of the Information Policy Unit.

"Mooney had his own agenda. He reported to this extraordinary Foreign Office set-up that was run by Howard Smith, who later became head of MI5 in Belfast," said Col Tugwell.

"It was the liaison office between the Foreign Office and the Northern Ireland situation. And whilst he kept the General Officer Commanding briefed he really reported to that office."

Mr Smith was the security co-

ordinator for Northern Ireland and later Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1976-78. He was Director General of MI5 from 1979-81.

Mr Mooney's role was to plant stories in the foreign media, particularly the influential American papers. He cultivated foreign journalists on assignment to Northern Ireland.

A Foreign Office official confirmed that Mr Mooney had been seconded from the Foreign Office to the Northern Ireland Office for that period.

The Information Research Department was founded in 1947 to conduct secret propaganda operations against communist governments and run "hearts and minds" operations in Britain's restless post-war colonies. Special training courses in psychological operations for army personnel and senior civil servants were held at the Ministry of Defence's Joint Warfare Establishment near Salisbury.

The department was closed by David Owen in 1977 when he was Foreign Secretary. In a row over its right-wing bias, its function was transferred to a new Overseas Information Department.

THE SECRET LIFE OF WALTER MITTY

*John Ware questions
the credibility of
Colin Wallace*

COLIN Wallace, the former army information officer who the Government now admits was engaged in disinformation in Northern Ireland in the early Seventies, is having a very good run. Many of those that knew him then believe he is a 'Walter Mitty' — a kind of military groupie. But since the Government's admission, he has begun to acquire an aura of serious mystery, and the status of a martyr and a saint.

Mr Wallace says the Government has still not conceded his real role which he says went far beyond spreading black propaganda about paramilitaries and local politicians. Mr Wallace claims he was invited to become part of an MI5 attempt to sabotage Harold Wilson's 1974 Labour government; that since 1972 he had been pressing the authorities to expose a homosexual ring at the Kincora Boys Home in Belfast; that in the first six months of 1975 the security forces assassinated 35 Catholics either directly or in league with loyalist terrorists; and that his conviction for manslaughter in 1981 was a set-up by the intelligence services because he knew too much.

Mr Wallace's most vociferous and uncritical supporters have been Ken Livingstone MP, and former *Private Eye* colleagues, Paul Foot and Richard Ingrams. They are confident they have got to grips with Mr Wallace's subterranean mind even though they have never worked in Northern Ireland. Colleagues who have expressed more scepticism (mostly those who have worked in Northern Ireland) have been accused of either working for or being duped by the intelligence services. Even the BBC seems now to have accepted him. A recent edition of BBC 2's *Fifth Column* gave him

ten minutes of unchallenged time to repeat his claims.

The question of Mr Wallace's credibility has also earned the partial support of the Press Council under Mr Louis Blom-Cooper QC. Recently the Council upheld a complaint by him against a collection of articles in the *Independent* mostly written by their respected Ireland correspondent David McKittrick, who confirmed that Mr Wallace had been a black propagandist but cast doubt on his claims to have tried to expose Kincora, or that he had known of so many covert assassinations by the security forces.

Here I should declare an interest. One of the articles was written by me. Since it is almost impossible to get to the bottom of Mr Wallace's allegations because they relate to the world of intelligence in Ulster where hard fact is submerged in an Irish bog, I chose one of his non-intelligence claims as a general test of his ability — his parachuting exploits.

Mr Wallace claims to have been a display parachutist at public events with two army teams called the Phantoms, whom he says he commanded, and the Black Knights. Now that may seem a trivial point, but it is central to the allegation that he's a Walter Mitty.

On the face of it Mr Wallace's parachuting claims are plausible because he was indeed issued with a 'D' or display licence by the British Parachute Association in June 1974. However, because the licence system was open to abuse in the early Seventies whereby the requisite number of parachuting manoeuvres entered in a log-book were not always properly checked, we asked Mr Wallace to produce his log-book so we could check it. He said he couldn't find it. So we asked him to provide dates and places where he had display-jumped. Two, he said, 'stand in my mind': the Phantoms at a children's party in Millisle in Co. Down in August 1973; and the Black Knights at a rugby club fête in Lisburn, Co. Antrim, in 1972. He also recalled jumping with the Black Knights in Banbridge, Co. Down.

The *Belfast Telegraph* does indeed have a picture for the Millisle event captioned:



THE SPECTATOR 24 March 1990 1

The Parachutists under Captain Colin Wallace arrive with birthday cards for all the children at the service'. Mr Wallace called himself 'captain' because he was an acting part-time captain in the locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment.

Nevertheless we were suspicious because the Millisle, Lisburn and Banbridge events all took place before 1974 when Mr Wallace got his display licence. So I traced one of the soldiers who jumped that day, a young lieutenant called Arthur Gibson, who found his log-book recording the jump. He said that he, not Wallace, led the display and added, 'I am quite certain Wallace did not jump with us on that day. He may have been commentating on the ground. Wallace used to organise the displays, for example liaising with the local landowners. While I was in Ulster I did about 60 jumps and I never saw Wallace jump once.'

In support of his claim to have jumped with the Black Knights at Lisburn, Mr Wallace pointed to a picture in a local paper, the *Ulster Star*, of a parachutist whose face was obscured by goggles and helmet jumping out of an aircraft to advertise the team's forthcoming display. It was impossible to tell whether this was Mr Wallace, who again was described as the team leader. The caption said, 'The point of no return for team leader Colin Wallace as he walks on air thousands of feet above the countryside.'

Mr Wallace told us a photographer from the *Ulster Star* had taken the picture over Long Kesh. The paper's photographer at the time was Mervyn Dowling, who recalls taking a picture of Mr Wallace in jumping gear at Long Kesh — but on the ground, not over it.

We also traced the soldier who led the display at Lisburn, then a captain, now a colonel. He said, 'I am quite certain Wallace did not jump with us on that day. I recall him on the ground being there to meet us. I also remember jumping at Banbridge and Wallace did not jump with us then either.'

None of the members of the Black Knights that we found remembered Mr Wallace jumping with them. No one doubts that Mr Wallace performed some parachute jumps. The question is whether he embroidered that fact with his claims of army display-jumping at public events.

Most of the evidence challenging this was laid before Mr Louis Blom-Cooper and his Press Council colleagues. They did not give it any weight and the Council censured the *Independent* for disbelieving Mr Wallace's statement that he was an experienced parachutist.

There is all the difference in the world between being a parachute jumper — even an experienced one — and the derring-do of free-fall display with professional soldiers. There is no comparison between the black propaganda campaign Mr Wallace ran for local Ulster consumption and the

authorised MIS programme he now claims to have been drawn into to destabilise Harold Wilson's government in London. The same goes for Mr Wallace's claim to have alerted the authorities and five journalists to the Kincora scandal. None of the journalists says he did. All they recall is Mr Wallace mentioning a homosexual called McGrath who was close to a politician called Paisley. In other words, Mr Wallace was just doing his job — smearing the locals.

Perhaps some of Mr Wallace's claims will turn out to be true. My guess is that he

is having the time of his life playing the field, just as he did 16 years ago in Northern Ireland. For Colin Wallace's parachuting exploits may just offer a clue to his real modus operandi drawn from his days as a government disinformation agent: that the best propaganda must contain at least a grain of truth. If that is so, will the Wallace inquiries by David Calcutt QC and the Defence Committee pick it up? The point has already been lost on a growing number of uncritical and un sceptical MPs and journalists, and even the Press Council itself.

Ulster's intelligence test

FOR FOUR of the years that I worked in the intelligence world, I was in the army and wore the insignia of most ranks up to and including major, but I have never thought it relevant to any piece of writing I have produced to emphasise I was "an ex-army officer". So when I read the press release about this book and found this description of its author, it stuck in my mind, and when I read in his preface that he had "been a member of the regular army for nine months", I thought it worth clarifying.

Like many young men going to university, Mark Urban had a short-term limited commission and served in the Royal Tank Regiment, after short training courses, from January to August 1979, with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. After that he served in the Territorial Army.

However, he did not serve in Northern Ireland, although he states that as a journalist he did make two visits to the province. I would not have looked at this book with such a critical eye had I not formed the opinion, because of this, that the author was rather a self-opinionated young man, although a letter from him to me, explaining his military career and a couple of other points, was courtesy itself.

The book sets out to cover the secret struggle against the IRA between 1976 and 1987. I am writing the biography of Sir

BIG BOYS' RULES

MARK URBAN

£14.99. FABER & FABER

Maurice Oldfield, the former Chief of M16, who was called out of retirement by Mrs Thatcher to co-ordinate intelligence in Ulster in 1979, and I was interested to see how he was treated in this book. The author gives a factual account of Oldfield's appointment and appears sympathetic to him, so it is surprising that he quotes the old smear that Oldfield propositioned a man in the lavatory of a pub, when that allegation was extensively investigated by Channel 4, who found it to be a complete fabrication.

Oldfield was sent to Northern Ireland because the police and the army needed to have their heads knocked together. Unfortunately, the best policeman Ulster ever saw, Sir Kenneth Newman, had as his army opposite number

Lieutenant-General Timothy Creasey, who wanted "to hit the IRA for six" and questioned that the police was the supreme security authority. These two men were transferred out of Ulster, and Oldfield's influence began to be felt.

This, the most important of the intelligence scenarios in the province during the period of the book, is dismissed in half a dozen pages.

On the subject of Colin Wallace

and Fred Holroyd, the author is fair and takes no position. These two were former army intelligence officers, who exposed various "dirty tricks" which were used by the security forces against politicians outside the Irish problem.

I was surprised Urban does not go into the question of persuading the Catholic clergy to help the security forces. He told me: "I have found no example of a priest providing intelligence on the IRA during 1976-1987" — a naive statement, since no priest who had been helpful would advertise the fact. However, a very profitable group to penetrate would be those who sympathised with the IRA; that is the Roman Catholic church and those close to it, and it was Oldfield's understanding of the depth of Catholic thought that triggered this new approach to intelligence-gathering in Ulster.

This is not a deep book which examines the philosophy of the intelligence specialist. It is not easy to read, is reminiscent of a regimental diary and stays at the tactical level.

The strategy of the struggle against the IRA is not covered; for example, "black" propaganda, financing of politicians and political movements and, of course, the church. But, hopefully, these are matters where security is tight and it is in nobody's interest to publicise them.

Anthony Cavendish



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT – SUPPLEMENTARY #5

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. This is SIS's sixth Witness Statement and supplemental to the statement handed to the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) on 27 May 2016. The statement is to provide information to the HIA Inquiry in relation to Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) reports issued by Intelligence staff in Northern Ireland from 1972 onwards.
4. During a relevance review of SIS records the HIA Inquiry identified a handwritten annotation against the name *McGrath*, in a document originated by IJS HQNI on 16 January 1976 (Document 1). The annotation stated that further details on McGrath (first name unknown) could be found on DIS 725A. No information was provided to indicate what the letters DIS stood for or where the additional details on McGrath could be found. It should be noted that the relevant intelligence information in the document has already been seen in other files reviewed by the HIA Inquiry.
5. At the request of the HIA Inquiry SIS was asked to conduct research to establish the meaning of the letters DIS and to conduct additional searches to identify whether SIS held a copy of the DIS 725A report. This piece of work resulted in SIS ascertaining the meaning of the letters DIS to be Daily Intelligence Summary and that a copy of the DIS 725A report was retrievable from SIS records.

6. A review of DIS 725A indicates that it was originated by intelligence staff based at the Director and Co-Ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) offices in Northern Ireland on 17 January 1976. The report includes a section entitled "*UVF/TARA cooperation in arms buying*" in which a reference is made to a *William McGrath (reported to be head of TARA)*. The material content of this section has already been seen by the HIA Inquiry on other files.
7. A field comment added by intelligence staff in Northern Ireland indicated that in March 1975 McGrath was reported to be homosexual and employed as a House Master at the Kincora Boys Home. The report was circulated to addresses that included the FCO, SIS, MI5, GCHQ, MoD, Cabinet Office, Home Office, NIO and Metropolitan Police Special Branch.
8. DIS725A was identified on a set of records held by SIS, under the title "*Report File*" and as a consequence, no Inquiry search terms would have led to them being identified. A review conducted by SIS indicates that DIS reports were first issued on 29 November 1972 and disseminated by telex for information to the Intelligence Agencies, MoD and Whitehall Departments. The SIS record also indicates that, where appropriate, a copy of the report was also made available to the Head of the Royal Ulster Constabulary's Special Branch.
9. An assessment of DIS reports held on the "*Report file*" indicates that they comprise a summary of information obtained through intelligence sources, on subjects such as the activities of Loyalist and Republican terrorist and paramilitary organisations and the security and political situation in Northern Ireland. As a general principle DIS reports would summarise the intelligence recorded elsewhere on other records held by SIS and/or MI5 or other intelligence sources. In most cases, we would expect the intelligence to have been recorded on records associated with the original source of the reporting.
10. To assist the HIA Inquiry and at its request, SIS has conducted a full review of the set of records in which the DIS725A report was retrieved and made available to the Inquiry team all reports where a reference has occurred to either KINCORA, TARA or William McGRATH. No references to child sexual abuse were identified in any of the DIS reports reviewed by SIS. At the request of the HIA Inquiry, I have exhibited the relevant extracts from DIS reports containing relevant information in the attached Annex.
11. The extracts are provided to avoid the production of intelligence information in each report which the Inquiry has seen and considers irrelevant. Where not otherwise marked, the redactions made to the annexed documents are for the protection of identities or on which the HIA Inquiry has judged to be irrelevant information. A summary of the annexed documents is as follows:

Reference	Date	Report No.
Document 1	16/01/1976	Telegram from IJS HQNI - UVF/TARA co-operation
Document 2	08/02/1973	DIS 45A
Document 3	18/04/1973	DIS 89
Document 4	13/06/1973	DIS 122A
Document 5	11/07/1973	DIS 140
Document 6	13/12/1975	DIS 707
Document 7	17/01/1976	DIS 725A
Document 8	13/03/1976	DIS 761A
Document 9	07/12/1976	DIS 933A
Document 10	25/01/1977	DIS 961A
Document 11	14/02/1977	DIS 974A
Document 12	18/02/1982	NIIR 180282

SIS Officer A

Signed

SIS Officer A

Date

21 November 2016

ANNEXED DOCUMENT

Document 1 (Page 1) - 16 January 1976

US HQNI

FROM

DATE AND TIME

16 Jan 76 1235Z

SIS LONDON

SECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN

UVF/TARA CO-OPERATION

1. ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO THE ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE (UVF) HANDED [REDACTED] TO TARA FOR A CONSIGNMENT OF SMALL ARMS. THIS WAS TO BE PART OF A LARGE PURCHASE OF ARMS BY TARA [REDACTED] WHEN THE NEW UVF BRIGADE STAFF TOOK OVER THEY COULD FIND NO TRACE OF THE ARMS AND DECIDED TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER. AS A RESULT THE PRESENT COMMANDER OF THE UVF, [REDACTED], AND [REDACTED] RECENTLY WENT TO THE HOUSE OF THE HEAD OF TARA, (FNU) MCGRATH, WHO LIVES AT 188 UPPER NEWTONARDS ROAD. *See 215 7254 for further details.*

HANDWRITTEN
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2. PRESENT AT THIS MEETING WAS [REDACTED] DEPUTY HEAD OF TARA, [REDACTED] CONFIRMED THAT TARA HAD RECEIVED THE MONEY FROM [REDACTED] OF THE UVF. [REDACTED] HAD GIVEN IT TO [REDACTED] HEAD OF THE TARA GROUP IN [REDACTED], WHO HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANISING THE ARMS PURCHASE. [REDACTED]

SOURCE COMMENT

1. PARA 1. (FNU) MCGRATH IS SAID TO BE A SENIOR NORTHERN IRELAND CIVIL SERVANT.

2. PARA 2. [REDACTED]

/3.

Document 1 (Page 2) - 16 January 1976


 } SECURITY MARKING &
DOCUMENT ADMIN


FIELD COMMENT

1. PARA 1. THE NORTHERN IRELAND TELEPHONE DIRECTORY LISTS A WILLIAM McGRATH AT 188 UPPER NEWTOWNARDS ROAD.
2. HQNI HAVE A CARD ON WILLIAM McGRATH CONFIRMING HIS CONNECTION WITH TARA AND RECORDING THAT HE IS A HOMOSEXUAL.

Document 2 - DIS 45A - 08 February 1973

TO: FCO for PUSD [REDACTED]

IRD [REDACTED]

Republic of Ireland Dept [REDACTED]

GCHQ [REDACTED]

MOD [REDACTED]

Cabinet Office [REDACTED]

Northern Ireland Office [REDACTED]

Security Service [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED] Northern Ireland Office in Belfast.

Daily Intelligence Summary No. 45A (8 February 1973)

1. Security

A. Extremist Protestant arms holding.

According to a delicate and reliable source, [REDACTED], Leader

of an extreme militant organisation in the Finaghy area of S.W. Belfast which [REDACTED] describes as the 'Tara group of the U.V.F.', stated that the following weapons had recently been acquired by the group:

Comment: In spite of paragraph 2 above, we are inclined to regard this report with some caution. [REDACTED]

Document 3 (Page 1) - DIS 89 - 18 April 1973

TO: PRO for PUSD [REDACTED]

IRP [REDACTED]

Republic of Ireland Dept [REDACTED]

GCHQ [REDACTED]

MOD [REDACTED]

Cabinet Office [REDACTED]

Northern Ireland Office [REDACTED]

Security Service [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED] Northern Ireland Office in Belfast.

Daily Intelligence Summary No 89 18 April 1973

1. Security

Document 3 (Page 2) - DIS 89 - 18 April 1973

11. Political

B. New Protestant Organisation: TARA

(CF Daily Intelligence Summary No 83

(10 April), para 11A.)

A delicate and reliable source has provided further information on TARA, the new Protestant Organisation about which there have been recent press reports. According to source, quoting [REDACTED] of the UDA, TARA originated in 1968 from within the Orange Debating Society. In its refurbished form, the leader is WILLIAM MCGRATH, a Paisleyite, and his son WORTHINGTON is secretary. Another prominent member is CLIFFORD SMYTH (a leading member of PAISLEY's Democratic Unionist Party).

Comment: It seems likely from this later information that our guess about [REDACTED]'s involvement was probably wrong. Although we think it unlikely that TARA has, or will develop, much influence, it seems clear from indications we have had of fears in UDA circles about its posing a possible threat to UDA

that its existence will add further to the divisions and tensions among extremist Protestants.

Document 4 - DIS 122A - 11 July 1973

TO: FCO for PUSD [REDACTED]
IRF [REDACTED]
Republic of Ireland Dept [REDACTED]


GCHQ [REDACTED]
MOD [REDACTED]
Cabinet Office [REDACTED]
Northern Ireland Office [REDACTED]
Security Service [REDACTED]
Metropolitan Special Branch [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] Northern Ireland Office in Belfast.
Daily Intelligence Summary No 122A (13 June 1973)

1. Security

a. Militant Protestant Activities (UVF and UDA)

According to a report (11 June) from a secret and reliable source with good access at local level, [REDACTED], the leader of a group of militant Protestants in the Finaghy area of Belfast known as the Tara group of the UVF, has stated that a number of young members of the group have been trained in the use of arms and explosives at their Headquarters in Wilton Street in the Shankill district. [REDACTED]



Document 5 - DIS 140 - 11 July 1973

TO: FCO for PUSD [REDACTED]
 IRD [REDACTED]
 Republic of Ireland Dept [REDACTED]

GCHQ [REDACTED]

MOD [REDACTED]

Cabinet Office [REDACTED]

Northern Ireland Office [REDACTED]

Security Service [REDACTED]

Metropolitan Special Branch [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] Northern Ireland Office in Belfast.
 Daily Intelligence summary No 140(11 July 1973).

1. Security.

a. Tara Activity (cf item 2B of Daily Intelligence Summary No 89 of 18 April 1973).

A regular and reliable source reports that WILLIAM MOGRATH, leader of Tara, has approached MARTIN SMYTH, Grand Master of the Orange Order, with a request for a meeting to consider Tara's position and discuss "the whole defence". He is understood to have reminded SMYTH that the organisation was set up in 1969 with support from the County Grand Lodge of Belfast and the Grand Orange Loyal Institution and subsequently seconded a number of its members to the Orange Volunteers(OV). According to source, SMYTH's reaction to the request was non-committal, and he took the view that "MOGRATH's crowd are away on a cloud of their own".
 Comment: Although there has been one report, in May 1973, of the Tara Brigade being resuscitated in the [REDACTED], we see the present report as confirmation of our earlier view that it is unlikely to develop into an influential body.

Document 6 - DIS 707 - 13 December 1975

TO: FCO FOR PUSD [REDACTED]
 IRD [REDACTED]
 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND DEPT [REDACTED]
 GCHQ [REDACTED]
 MOD [REDACTED]
 CABINET OFFICE [REDACTED]
 NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE [REDACTED]
 SECURITY SERVICE [REDACTED]
 METROPOLITAN SPECIAL BRANCH [REDACTED]
 HOME OFFICE [REDACTED]
 FROM: [REDACTED] NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, 11, BELFAST.

DIS 707 [REDACTED]

F. UDA ACTIVITIES IN BELFAST

ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE MOST OF THE MEMBERS WHO JOINED THE UDA AT ITS INCEPTION HAVE BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THE ORGANISATION AND ARE TAKING NO ACTIVE PART IN IT OTHER THAN PAYING THEIR WEEKLY DUES.

[REDACTED]

2. MANY OF THE OLDER MEMBERS ARE CONSIDERING JOINING THE TARA ORGANISATION AS THEY CONSIDER IT TO BE MORE RESPECTABLE. IT HAS A STRICTER VETTING PROCEDURE AND THE MOST IMPORTANT QUALIFICATION FOR JOINING IS THAT A MEMBER MUST BELONG TO THE ORANGE ORDER. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE TARA IS A WELL-ARMED, CLOSE-KNIT ORGANISATION.

[REDACTED]

COMMENT: TARA IS A SECRETIVE "DOOMSDAY" ORGANISATION. WE DO NOT KNOW ITS EXACT STRENGTH BUT WHEN IT WAS FORMED IT CONSISTED OF ABOUT 100/150 MEMBERS.

Document 7 - DIS 725A - 17 January 1976

TO: FOD FOR PUGD [REDACTED]
 ID [REDACTED]
 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND DEPT [REDACTED]

CCNO [REDACTED]
 MOD [REDACTED]
 CABINET OFFICE [REDACTED]
 NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE [REDACTED]
 SECURITY SERVICE [REDACTED]
 METROPOLITAN SPECIAL BRANCH [REDACTED]
 HOME OFFICE [REDACTED]

FROM [REDACTED] NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE IN RECEIPT

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 725A (17 JANUARY 1976)

I SECURITY

B. UVF/TARA COOPERATION IN ARMS-BUYING

ACCORDING TO A REGULAR AND RELIABLE SOURCE THE ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE (UVF), ABOUT 2 YEARS AGO, HANDED [REDACTED] TO TARA FOR A CONSIGNMENT OF SMALL ARMS [REDACTED]. WHEN THE NEW UVF BRIGADE STAFF TOOK OVER THEY COULD FIND NO TRACE OF THE ARMS AND DECIDED TO INVESTIGATE. RECENTLY [REDACTED] (THE PRESENT UVF COMMANDER) AND [REDACTED] VISITED 188 UPPER NEWTONARDS ROAD, THE HOUSE OF WILLIAM MCGRATH (REPORTED TO BE HEAD OF TARA).

THE SOURCE COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

/ COMMENT

COMMENT: WILLIAM MCGRATH WAS REPORTED IN MARCH 1975 TO BE WARDEN OF THE KINCORA BOYS HOSTEL. HE HAS PREVIOUS TARA TRACES AND IS SAID, LIKE CLIFFORD SMYTH, TO BE A HOMOSEXUAL. ANOTHER REGULAR AND RELIABLE SOURCE HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT THE UDA, AND ALSO [REDACTED], MAY BE AWARE OF THIS TARA/UVF ACTIVITY IN THE ARMS FIELD. SEE ALSO ITEM 1(C) OF DIS NO 636 OF 26 AUGUST 1975 WHICH MAY BE RELEVANT.

REPORT REVIEWED BY HIA
 INQUIRY AND CONSIDERED
 IRRELEVANT.

Document 8 - DIS 761A - 13 March 1976

TO: FCO FOR PUSD [REDACTED]
 IRD [REDACTED]
 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND DEPT [REDACTED]
 GCHQ (Z88)
 MOD [REDACTED]
 CABINET OFFICE [REDACTED]
 NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE [REDACTED]
 SECURITY SERVICE [REDACTED]
 METROPOLITAN SPECIAL BRANCH [REDACTED]
 HOME OFFICE [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED] NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, IN BELFAST.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 761A (13 MARCH 1976)

1 SECURITY

C. UVF/TARA/UDA ARMS DEALINGS

A REGULAR AND RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTS THAT [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] (UVF) ARRANGED TO VISIT TARA REPRESENTATIVES IN THE BALLYMENA AREA ON 11 MARCH 1976. THE VISIT WAS IN CONNECTION WITH THE [REDACTED] OF ARMS WHICH TARA CLAIMED TO HAVE BOUGHT FOR THE UVF [REDACTED] SOME 2 YEARS AGO.

2. [REDACTED] ARRANGED THE VISIT AFTER LEARNING FROM THE FORMER UVF BRIGADIER, [REDACTED], THAT TARA HAD BEEN OFFERING FOR SALE SOME ARMS FROM A CONSIGNMENT [REDACTED]

THE UVF BELIEVE THAT THE ARMS COULD IN FACT BE THEIR OWN CON-SIGNMENT NOW AT LAST ARRIVING [REDACTED] THIS WAS WHY THEY DECIDED TO VISIT THE TARA REPRESENTATIVES.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COMMENT: THE UVF/TARA ARMS DEAL WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN ITEM 1B OF DIS NO 752A OF 17 JANUARY 1976.

DIS REPORT No.
 SHOULD READ
 725A)

Document 9 - DIS 933A - 07 December 1976

TO: FCO FOR PUSD [REDACTED]
 IRD [REDACTED]
 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND DEPT [REDACTED]
 GCHQ [REDACTED]
 MOD [REDACTED]
 CABINET OFFICE [REDACTED]
 NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE [REDACTED]
 SECURITY SERVICE [REDACTED]
 METROPOLITAN SPECIAL BRANCH [REDACTED]
 HOME OFFICE [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED], NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, IN BELFAST.
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 933A (7 DECEMBER 1976)

1 SECURITY

A. DUP AND TARA

[REDACTED] SOURCE REPORTS THAT AT A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) HELD AT BALLYHENNA ON 3 DECEMBER, IT WAS DECIDED THAT MEMBERS OF THE PARAMILITARY ORGANISATION, TARA, WHO ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE DUP SHOULD BE FORCED TO RESIGN FROM THE PARTY. THE EXECUTIVE AGREED THAT CLIFFORD SMYTH (EX ASSEMBLY AND CONVENTION MEMBER FOR NORTH / ANTRIM

ANTRIM) SHOULD BE DISMISSED FORTHWITH FROM THE DUP BECAUSE OF HIS ASSOCIATION WITH TARA, AND THAT PETER ROBINSON (SECRETARY OF THE DUP) WOULD PRODUCE A LIST OF OTHER MEMBERS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF TARA. THESE PERSONS WILL BE DISMISSED IN DUE COURSE.

2. DR IAN PAISLEY, THE LEADER OF THE DUP, BELIEVES THAT TARA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRODUCTION OF AN ANONYMOUS LETTER WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE DUP WAS PLANNING TO FORM A NEW PARAMILITARY PARTY AND STAGE A COUP D'ETAT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. PAISLEY CLAIMS TO KNOW THAT COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE RUC SPECIAL BRANCH AND BELIEVES THAT TARA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SENDING COPIES TO THEM.

COMMENT: TARA IS A SMALL PARAMILITARY GROUP OF WHICH VERY LITTLE IS KNOWN, OTHER THAN IT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE HAD LONG-STANDING CONNECTION WITH PAISLEY AND OTHER DUP MEMBERS. IT IS TRUE THAT AN ANONYMOUS LETTER MAKING THE ALLEGATIONS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE HAS COME TO NOTICE. THE ALLEGATIONS WERE VERY SIMILAR TO DETAILS GIVEN IN A REPORT WHICH WAS CONTAINED IN ITEM I-H OF DIS NO 838A OF 23 SEPTEMBER 1976. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PAISLEY IS CORRECT IN BELIEVING THAT TARA, OR INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH IT, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING THE ALLEGATIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF VERY SIMILAR REPORTS FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES: THEIR SIMILARITY IS SO VERY MARKED THAT WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ALL EMANATE FROM THE SAME ORIGIN, AND ARE THUS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS COLLATERAL FOR EACH OTHER.

Document 10 - DIS 961A - 25 January 1977

TO: FCO FOR PUSD [REDACTED]
 IRD [REDACTED]
 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND DEPT [REDACTED]

GCHQ [REDACTED]
 MOD [REDACTED]
 CABINET OFFICE [REDACTED]
 NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE [REDACTED]
 SECURITY SERVICE [REDACTED]
 METROPOLITAN SPECIAL BRANCH [REDACTED]
 HOME OFFICE [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED] NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, IN BELFAST.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 961A (25 JANUARY 1977)

I SECURITY

A. TARA RECRUITING NEW MEMBERS

1. A REGULAR AND RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTS THAT THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARY GROUP, TARA, HAS RECENTLY LAUNCHED A 'HEAVY RECRUITING CAMPAIGN'. CLIFFORD SMYTH IS THE MAIN INSTIGATOR OF THIS DRIVE.

THE SOURCE COMMENTS: THE REASONS FOR TARA'S SEARCH FOR THE NEW MEMBERS ARE PROBABLY TWO-FOLD. FIRST, THE GROUP HAS NOW

AMASSED SUFFICIENT MONEY AND ARMS TO WARRANT AN INCREASED MEMBERSHIP: AND SECOND, TARA LEADERS NOW FEAR A RETURN TO VIOLENCE ON THE 1969 PATTERN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THEY BELIEVE THAT HMG IS EITHER UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO MAKE SERIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE CRISIS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE DEEP SENSE OF FRUSTRATION WHICH EXISTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE SECTARIAN DIVIDE WILL ONLY BE ALLEVIATED BY VIOLENCE - FOR WHICH TARA INTENDS TO BE READY. 327

COMMENT: TARA IS A SHADOWY ORGANISATION ABOUT WHICH VERY LITTLE IS KNOWN. THERE HAVE HOWEVER, BEEN PREVIOUS REPORTS THAT IT WAS ATTEMPTING TO PROCURE ARMS. CLIFFORD SMYTH IS A FORMER HENCHMAN OF IAN PAISLEY: HE HAS RECENTLY BEEN DISMISSED FROM THE LATTER'S DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP). TARA'S RECRUITING CAMPAIGN WAS MENTIONED IN AN 'IRISH TIMES' ARTICLE ON 13 JANUARY 1977, BUT WAS DESCRIBED AS 'SELECTIVE' RATHER THAN 'HEAVY'. WE HAVE NO COLLATERAL FOR THIS REPORT AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT MAY REFLECT TALK IN LOYALIST PARAMILITARY CIRCLES SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH MAY HAVE INSPIRED THE 'IRISH TIMES' ARTICLE.

Document 11 (Page 1) - DIS 974A - 14 February 1977

TO: FCO FOR PUSD [REDACTED]
 IRD [REDACTED]
 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND DEPT [REDACTED]

444

GCHQ (289)

MOD [REDACTED]

CABINET OFFICE [REDACTED]

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE [REDACTED]

SECURITY SERVICE [REDACTED]

METROPOLITAN SPECIAL BRANCH [REDACTED]

HOME OFFICE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, IN BELFAST.
 [REDACTED]

DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 974/A (14 FEBRUARY 1977)

1. SECURITY.

A. TARA ACTIVITIES.

A R [REDACTED] SOURCE REPORTS THAT [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] THE TARA COMMANDER FOR EAST BELFAST SAID THAT
 TARA WAS NOW PERFECTLY HAPPY TO HAVE [REDACTED] AS A
 PROMINENT MEMBER OF THE ORGANISATION. [REDACTED]

2. THE COMMANDER SAID THAT THERE WAS A CAMPAIGN UNDERWAY TO RECRUIT
 /NEW MEMBERS

Document 11 (Page 2) - DIS 974A - 14 February 1977

NEW MEMBERS TO TARA, AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME SUCCESS IN
ATTRACTING PEOPLE "FROM OTHER ORGANISATIONS", HE SAID THAT THE
AMOUNT OF RECRUITING IN BELFAST WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT. [REDACTED] 446

[REDACTED]

3. THE COMMANDER ALSO MENTIONED THAT WILLIAM MCGRATH, ANOTHER
PROMINENT MEMBER IN TARA, HAD PROMISED THE EAST BELFAST GROUP A
CONSIGNMENT OF THOMSON MACHINE GUNS AS LONG AGO AS 1969, WHICH
HAD NEVER MATERIALISED. HE ADDED THAT HE KNEW THAT MCGRATH STILL
OWED [REDACTED] FOR THE PURCHASE OF WEAPONS NOW IN THE POSSESSION OF
THE COMMANDER.

COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FROM THE DUP. IN ITEM 1A OF DIS NO. 961/A
OF 25 JANUARY 1977, WE REPORTED THAT TARA HAD EMBARKED ON A
RECRUITING CAMPAIGN: THIS APPEARS TO BE MEETING WITH LIMITED
SUCCESS.

THERE HAVE BEEN PREVIOUS REPORTS ABOUT TARA ARMS DEALS. IN ITEM
1B OF DIS NO. 725/A OF 17 JANUARY 1976, WE REPORTED THAT TARA
WAS ATTEMPTING TO PURCHASE A CONSIGNMENT OF SMALL ARMS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Document 12 (Page 2) - NIIR 180282 - 18 February 1982

NIIR 180282/M

IMMEDIATE FOR

SECURITY SERVICE

MOB

CABINET OFFICE

NIO(L)

TUSD

GCHQ

HQMI

HOME OFFICE

MPSB

CHANCERY DUBLIN

THIS REPORT IS BEING CIRCULATED UNDER SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS IN
MUC, HQMI, AND NIO(B).

POLITICAL

10. PAISLEY'S THIRD FORCE, WITH NOTHING TO DO AND NO DIRECTION, HAS SUBSIDED WHENCE IT CAME. PAISLEY HIMSELF HAS BEEN TRYING TO COPE WITH ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIMSELF IN CONNEXION WITH THE KINCORA STORY BUT OTHERWISE (PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THIS) HAS KEPT A LOW PROFILE.

11. JOHN MCMICHAEL (UDA AND ULDP) HAS ANNOUNCED HIS CANDIDATURE IN THE SOUTH BELFAST ELECTION. HE MAY DECIDE TO MAKE "KINCORA" A FEATURE OF HIS CAMPAIGN PARTICULARLY SINCE THE UDA ASSERT THAT TWO OTHER CANDIDATES (MARTIN SMYTH (OUP) AND WILLIAM MCCREA (DUP)) ARE IMPLICATED.



INQUIRY INTO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE 1922 TO 1995

WITNESS STATEMENT – SUPPLEMENTARY #6

I, SIS Officer A, will say as follows:

1. I have been employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since August 1989 in a range of roles in the UK and overseas. I became a Deputy Director in 2012 and, since October 2015, have been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters. It is the longstanding policy of SIS that the identities of its officers, other than the Chief of the Service, are not publicly disclosed, for operational reasons and in order to ensure the safety of them and their families.
2. In my current role, I oversee the compliance of SIS operations with the law and other relevant guidance and directives. This role includes overseeing the Service's response to legal cases and disclosure requests related to a range of issues, including legacy matters in Northern Ireland. In this capacity, I provide assurance to C, the Service's Accounting Officer, that we are effectively meeting our legal obligations.
3. This is SIS's seventh Witness Statement and supplemental to the statement handed to the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) on 27 May 2016. The statement has been made to support a request of the HIA Inquiry to provide information on matters associated with Sir Maurice Oldfield (Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service 1973-78).

OLDFIELD NOTES (2011 & 2014)

4. During a review of sensitive papers relating to Sir Maurice Oldfield the HIA Inquiry identified two notes drafted by an SIS officer (Officer G) in 2011 and 2014. The sensitive papers in which the notes were identified form part of a wider collection of hard copy material on Oldfield, held in four ring binders in a part of the Service inaccessible to the majority of SIS staff. All four binders have been made available to the HIA Inquiry in full, to conduct a review for relevance.

October 2011

5. In 2011, Officer G held a post equivalent in 2016 to Deputy Director with responsibility for matters relating to operational security. In his first note, dated 25 October 2011, Officer G begins by providing summary of the main points covered (Article 1):

The **CODEWORD** papers include full details of the investigation into allegations that he was an homosexual and possibly a KGB agent – the first was true, the second not.

The relationship **CODEWORD** had with the Kincora Boys Home (KBH) in Belfast and subsequent 'rentaboy sex scandal' is, in my view the only remaining potential sensitivity in the papers.

The sensitivity being that **CODEWORD** may have a link to (by association through his friendship of the KBH head) of the alleged crimes at the boys home - given the current climate surrounding similar cases, it may at some point emerge as an issue.

Article 1

6. The investigation referred to by Officer G's in the first paragraph of the summary was conducted by MI5 in 1980 to determine whether Oldfield's homosexuality may have been used to compromise him in a way which damaged national security at any point during his career. The investigation concluded in February 1981 that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that national security had been compromised, and indeed that Oldfield had contributed notably to a number of security and intelligence successes which would not have been achieved had there been a breach of security.
7. Officer G describes the papers as (Article 2):

paper holding has four ring binders containing the investigation papers and correspondence between the Service and the then Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert ARMSTRONG. There is a separate manila folder containing copies of private correspondence to and from **CODEWORD**. It is not clear that the file is complete.

Article 2

8. After providing a description of the papers located in the four ring binders (and the separate manila folder), Officer G confirms that *"I have read all the papers in these files."*
9. In the same note Officer G explains in more detail the references he made in the document summary in relation to Oldfield and the Kincora Boys Home (Article 3).

CODEWORD

More worryingly is the small collection of papers in File 3 which relate to the relationship [REDACTED] had with the head of the Kincora Boys Home (KBH) in Belfast. This institution became the focus of press allegations of an homosexual vice ring – [REDACTED] was never implicated. No action was, or has been since, taken on this aspect of the matter. Given the current climate surrounding the issue of mistreatment, especially sexual, of children in children homes (sometimes a long time ago), it is possibly that KBH might be the subject of a media and subsequent legal enquiry. If so [REDACTED]'s relationship to the KBH might emerge especially as his last job was a security/intelligence co-ordinator in NI which is when his PV certificate was withdrawn.

CODEWORD**Article 3**

10. The final version of the note was passed to Officer J who at the time was Director with responsibility for matters relating to security and compliance, and Officer G's senior officer. After reviewing the document, Officer J annotated the note agreeing with Officer G's proposals for the four binders of sensitive material to be retained in the secure area and that the issue should feature on a schedule of possible future risks. Officer G's note was added the sensitive papers and returned to the secure area for storage.

August 2014

11. In 2014, the underlying papers and Officer G's 2011 note were reviewed by SIS Officer H who had recently taken over from Officer J as the acting Director with responsibility for security and compliance. Officer H noted the conclusions made by Officer G and that they did not appear to accurately reflect the information contained in the papers themselves. Officer G (now retired) was therefore contacted and invited to conduct a second review of the papers in order to clarify the conclusions he reached in his 2011 note and what they were based on.
12. On 14 August 2014, Officer G visited SIS London to review his 2011 note and the underlying material. He subsequently drafted a second note (Article 4) in which he begins:

CODEWORD

I have this morning (14 August 2014) been given the opportunity by [REDACTED] to examine the 4 volumes of the [REDACTED] case and my review dated 25 October 2011. This collection of papers is the only set of documents I have ever seen on the [REDACTED] case and served as the basis for my original (25 October 2011) review.

CODEWORD**OFFICER I****OFFICER I****Article 4**

13. Officer G goes on to explain that he has been asked in particular to clarify the statement he made in paragraph 5 of his note dated 25 October 2011. After reviewing all the papers Officer G wrote (Article 5):

Having been given full access to the papers, though my focus was on volumes 1-3, I conclude that my original statement was imperfectly drafted. As it stands this particular sentence is at odds with that which immediately follows it: "This institution became the focus of press allegations of an homosexual vice ring – [REDACTED] was never implicated."

CODEWORD [REDACTED]

Article 5

14. In concluding his second note, Officer G adds a short explanation as to the reasons why he had recorded his review of the papers.

I do recall vividly reviewing the papers. My overall impression was and is – based on the papers – that there were a lot of unsubstantiated rumours – largely in the Irish press, which hinted at or directly linked [REDACTED] to the Kincora Boys Home.

CODEWORD

Article 6

Interviews with SIS officers

15. At the request of the HIA Inquiry, SIS conducted an interview with Officer G and other officers with knowledge of the notes and the papers relating to Oldfield. Background information on the officers interviewed by SIS is as follows:

- **Officer G** - responsible for drafting the 2011 and 2014 notes. In 2011, Officer G held a post equivalent to the present Deputy Director with responsibility for matters relating to operational security. Officer G's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland. Officer G retired from SIS in March 2013.
- **Officer H** - in 2014 Officer H was acting Director with responsibility for matters relating to security and compliance. Officer H's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland. Officer H retired from SIS in June 2016.
- **Officer I** - in 2011 and 2014 Officer I was managed by Officer G and was responsible for ensuring the secure storage and access to sensitive records, including the collection of papers relating to Oldfield. Officer I's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland. Officer I retired from SIS in September 2015.
- **Officer J** - in 2011 Officer J was Director with responsibility for matters relating to security and compliance. At the time, Officer J was Officer G's line manager. Officer J's employment record indicates no postings or roles associated with Northern Ireland.

16. On 30 September 2016, Officer I was interviewed in SIS London about her recollection of the Oldfield papers and the circumstances of Officer G's review and his 2011 note. Officer I explained how in October 2011, she was in the process of reviewing and rationalising paper holdings in her office at a time of office moves. Among the paper holdings, she came across four 'sensitive investigative files' associated with Sir Maurice Oldfield in one of their four-

drawer filing cabinets. She recalls drawing the Oldfield files to Officer G's attention and that he decided to review them personally.

17. On the same day (30 September 2016), Officer G was also interviewed by SIS London, during which he explained the circumstances which led to his decision to review the Oldfield papers in 2011 and to draft the notes in 2011 and 2014. Officer G began by explaining that in 2011 he was aware that there were numerous sensitive paper holdings which had accumulated over a period of decades that were held variously by himself, Officer I and Officer J.
18. His recollection is that he wished to understand the scope of materials held, and to determine what, if any, action should be taken in relation to those holdings. He was not asked to carry out a review of the sensitive paper holdings, nor to start with the Oldfield file. Rather, he decided on this course of action as the senior officer most directly responsible for sensitive security issues (and thus one of the very few officers who would be authorised to review such sensitive Service files).
19. In reviewing the Oldfield files, Officer G explained that he had access only to the four files in the group, and to no other SIS documentation on Oldfield. He added that there was nothing on the files to explain when and why they were compiled or the nature of any Service investigative activities in relation to Oldfield at the time. His views, as recorded in the two notes, therefore drew solely on the content (including media pieces) of those four files.
20. Officer G's recollection is that he was struck by some documents in the files that related to MIS's investigation into Oldfield in 1980, at least in part due to allegations appearing in the media in 2011 concerning the activities of Jimmy Saville.
21. Having reviewed the four files, Officer G typed up his first note, which was produced on a stand-alone computer used exclusively for sensitive security related issues. Officer G went on to explain that the note was the only copy produced, and this and other files produced on the stand-alone by Officer G were properly deleted on his departure from the post (and the Service). Officer G then handed a hard copy version of the note to his superior officer (Officer J) who added a brief comment. No further action was taken and the note was appended to the collection of papers.
22. On 3 October 2016, Officer H was interviewed on his involvement in this matter. Officer H explained that in 2014 he had taken over, on a temporary basis, the role of Director for security and compliance issues. His previous post had been Deputy Director responsible for compliance and disclosure matters.
23. Officer H went on to say that on taking over the role of Director he received a briefing by Officer I which included details on the Oldfield papers and the production of Officer G's 2011 note. Officer H explained that on reviewing the note, it did not seem to him that Officer G's conclusions accurately reflected the underlying material in the files themselves. He therefore asked that Officer G be invited back to SIS to review the papers and his original note in order to clarify his earlier conclusions and to explain on what they were based on. Office G did on 14 August 2014 when he drafted a second note entitled "*Supplementary Comment*".

MIS emails

24. Searches conducted by MIS at the request of the HIA Inquiry in relation to Sir Maurice Oldfield identified a chain of internal emails dated 11 August 2014 that refer to the papers held by SIS and the 2011 note written by SIS Officer G. The final email, initiated at 13:37, (Article 7) indicates that MIS had been in contact with SIS Officer I with regard to the SIS papers on Oldfield. The author of the MIS email commented:

It sounds like the [Oldfield] file is similar to ours, but less complete. Our conclusions were the same, except that on the [SIS Designator] file there's reference in a recent file summary to OLDFIELD knowing the head of Kincora Boys Home at the time. [Officer I] is not sure where this has come from as she can't find a source for this. She has arranged to speak to the person who wrote the summary on Thursday to find out."

25. The full MIS email chain is set out below:

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 11 August 2014 13:37
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Child Abuse Enquiries - [REDACTED] Review
Importance: Low

Great - thank you!

MIS DESIGNATORS

CODEWORD

-----Original Message-----
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 11 August 2014 13:30
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Child Abuse Enquiries - [REDACTED] Review
Importance: Low

Hi [REDACTED] **NAME** **SIS OFFICER I**

I've discussed what we've found with [REDACTED] - as it's an ex-SIS officer we would normally share everything with the [REDACTED] unless there's a reason not to.

It sounds like the [REDACTED] file is similar to ours, but less complete. Our conclusions were the same, except that on the [REDACTED] file there's reference in a recent file summary to OLDFIELD knowing the head of Kincora Boys Home at the time. [REDACTED] is not sure where this has come from as she can't find a source for this. She has arranged to speak to the person who wrote that summary on Thursday to find out. [REDACTED]'s also waiting for access to OLDFIELD's personnel file.

SIS OFFICER I

We agreed we'd speak again after our meeting on Wednesday when it's clearer what we (MIS) are being asked for. We can then decide whether we need to combine our results with SIS or feed back separately. I guess we will need to coordinate in either case.

[REDACTED] the OLDFIELD work was at [REDACTED]'s own initiative as she was aware of the allegations. So it may be that we need to include [REDACTED]'s findings with ours.

SIS OFFICER I

SIS DESIGNATOR

INFORMATION KNOWN TO THE HIA INQUIRY AND CONSIDERED NOT RELEVANT

Article 7 (Page 1)

MIS DESIGNATORS **SECURITY MARKING**

From: [REDACTED]
 Sent: 11 August 2014 12:37
 To: [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: RE: Child Abuse Enquiries - [REDACTED] Review
 Importance: Low

CODEWORD

Thanks [REDACTED] **NAMES OF MIS OFFICERS**

A very good comprehensive review. As discussed, I'll talk to [REDACTED] on Wednesday morning and clarify whether she is completely clear on what the [REDACTED] task was. I'm working on the basis she is, but I'll also need to clarify whether the other participants are aware. And finally what, if anything, we need to communicate externally, particularly bearing in mind there is no clear link between OLDFIELD and Kincora. Given the historic media allegations, I don't know whether the intended recipients of the [REDACTED] product (something I will need to understand from [REDACTED]) are expecting something to be said about OLDFIELD. I'll let you know what I learn from [REDACTED] before the meeting **NAME OF MIS OFFICER**

MIS DESIGNATORS

Just one other thing, when I was seeing [REDACTED] last week with [REDACTED] at SIS she was looking at some OLDFIELD-related files. Has she fed the results of that into your work? Is this something we would normally share in the [REDACTED]s? I wasn't sure whether [REDACTED] would be seeing additional stuff to us.

SIS OFFICER I **SIS OFFICER G** **MIS DESIGNATOR**

NAME OF MIS OFFICER

-----Original Message-----
 From: [REDACTED] **MIS DESIGNATORS**
 Sent: 11 August 2014 11:13
 To: [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: Child Abuse Enquiries - [REDACTED] Review
 Importance: Low

CODEWORD

Hi [REDACTED] **MIS NAME & DESIGNATOR**

My write-up of possibly relevant material on the OLDFIELD [REDACTED] file is attached (in some detail in the interests of full disclosure and so hopefully we won't have to review the file again at a later date).

As discussed, we need to decide how much of this needs to be passed to [REDACTED] at this stage.

Thanks,

MIS DESIGNATOR

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26. SIS has made available to the HIA Inquiry all Service records associated with Sir Maurice Oldfield including the 4 ring binders of sensitive papers. Searches carried out by SIS at the request of the HIA Inquiry has identified no material to show that Oldfield visited Northern Ireland during his employment in SIS, or to indicate any visits to the Kincora Boys Home or contact with William McGrath.

OLDFIELD PRIVATE PAPERS (1981)

27. In the course of the HIA Inquiry's review of SIS records relating to Oldfield the Inquiry team identified a note entitled "*Contents of suitcase received on 12 March 1981*" (Article 8). There is no information to indicate who in SIS drafted the note (or when) but it provides a list of the material belonging to Oldfield that was received by SIS following his death on 11 March 1981. The list includes including personal diaries, address books and private papers The note indicates that action was taken in SIS to sort papers into particular categories of information.

28. One of the categories listed on the note is a set of papers referred to as "Private papers with positive or possible [Codeword] implications". The HIA Inquiry has been able to account for all of the categories listed on the note with the exception of this set of private papers. SIS was asked by the HIA Inquiry to conduct searches for the purpose of identifying any information relating to the papers and their present whereabouts (if still held by SIS).

CONTENTS OF SUITCASE RECEIVED ON 12 MARCH 1981		NAME OF LOCATION
HANDWRITTEN ANNOTATIONS	5 plain folders -	
	1 containing copies (in some cases the 'originals') of detailed minuting, briefing by desk officers, lists of questions senior officers wished to raise, etc etc, for the Senior Officers' Seminar [redacted] 30 Sept - 2 Oct 1966.	
	[redacted] containing personal correspondence March 1964-July 1966.	
	" " " Oct 1974-Dec 1975.	
	" " " Jan 1976-Oct 1976.	
	" " " Jan 1977-Jan 1978.	
	[redacted] 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976	
	[redacted] Office diaries for 1977, 1978 and 1980.	
	[redacted] Private diaries for [1963, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968(2), 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979]	
	[redacted] 3 Address books. (one 12/3/79)	
	Red folder containing an exchange of correspondence with [redacted] on literary matters.	
	Bundle of copies of "Foreign Report" published by The Economist Newspaper Ltd, dating from early 1978.	
	"Life" membership card and correspondence connected with the Intelligence Corps Association.	
	Bundle of miscellaneous papers.	
	HANDWRITTEN ANNOTATIONS	CODEWORD
	The papers have been sorted, as follows:-	
	SIS papers;	
	Private papers with positive or possible [redacted] implications;	
	Correspondence from persons connected with publicity (Press, books);	
	Correspondence dating from the "Stormont" period;	
	Overt material relating to intelligence/security matters;	
	The material connected with the Intelligence Corps Association;	
	Miscellaneous.	
PROTECTION OF IDENTITY		

Article 8

29. The note provides no additional information to describe what the papers consist of (i.e. letters, press cuttings) or the quantity of papers referred to. Searches conducted by SIS have failed to identify any further documents in relation to the contents of the suitcase or information on Sir Maurice Oldfield that has not already made available to the HIA Inquiry

team. SIS has made enquiries with both MI5 and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on the possibility that SIS may have passed papers relating to Oldfield to these organisations on or after the 12 March 1981. Searches conducted by both organisations failed to identify anything on their corporate record to indicate that material had being received from SIS in relation to this matter.

30. The codeword used to describe the Private papers is that used for the investigation conducted by MI5 in 1980 to determine to whether Oldfield's homosexuality may have been used to compromise him in a way which damaged national security at any point during his career.

OLDFIELD SIS PAPERS

31. Whilst reviewing sensitive papers relating to Sir Maurice Oldfield the HIA Inquiry identified a note originated by an SIS officer on 2 May 2001 in relation to papers on Colin Wallace, Oldfield and Northern Ireland (Article 9). The author of the note, at that time, was in a role that handled personal and staff related matters.

1. I attach the papers relating to Maurice OLDFIELD. They seem to fall into two categories.

a) Tracing on [REDACTED]: the papers appear to have been taken from OLDFIELD's file on a loan slip in 1984.

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

b) Papers relating to Colin WALLACE, OLDFIELD and Northern Ireland. I do not know the background to this. The [REDACTED] papers mentioned in the pink memo is a reference to a large collection of papers found in [REDACTED] waste bag after he left the service (all torn in half - hence the sellotape). I assume that they are not the originals, but have no idea where the originals might be filed.

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

2. Sorry to dump these horrors on you.

SIS DESIGNATOR

2 May 2001

SIS DESIGNATORS

1. [REDACTED] These originated by [REDACTED]
So possibly derived from an [REDACTED] interview -
Maurice Oldfield's PV top-up? Manchester
University 1935-37 might have made him
a contemporary of M.O.

INFORMATION KNOWN
TO THE HIA INQUIRY
AND CONSIDERED NOT
RELEVANT

2. [REDACTED] Colin WALLACE the
Army officer engaged in Pops in N. Ireland
in the '70s. He went to prison on a ^{manslaughter} ~~murder~~
conviction. On release he attempted to clear
his name. It was a cause celebre.

3. M.O. was in N. Ireland at the time.

4. All on M.O.'s file I guess.

Article 9

32. The note contains annotated comments made by an unknown SIS officer, in which the individual writes in paragraph 3 "MO. was in N. Ireland at the time". SIS has been asked by the HIA Inquiry to conduct research in order to identify any material in SIS records that could assist the Inquiry to understand the meaning of the unknown SIS officer's comment in paragraph 3 or what it refers to.
33. The author of the note left the Service in July 2001 and SIS has been unable to find any information to help ascertain the identity of the unknown SIS officer who made the annotated comments. Efforts to date, to contact the author of the note has proved unsuccessful.
34. Research conducted by SIS for information associated with the note that could help ascertain what the annotated comment is in reference to, has identified no relevant

material. Searches have also identified no information in SIS records to indicate that Oldfield made any visits or operational deployments to Northern Ireland during his service with SIS. His appointment in 1979 as Security Co-ordinator appears to be the first occasion that Oldfield visited Northern Ireland.

SIS SEARCHES

35. With regard to searches carried out by SIS at the request of the HIA Inquiry for material relating to Sir Maurice Oldfield. SIS has identified no information to support any of the allegations published in the media, or the suggestions found in Officer G's 2011 note, associating Oldfield with the Kincora Boys Home or William McGrath. Of particular note is that SIS records give no indication that Oldfield ever served in or visited Northern Ireland whilst a member of the Secret Intelligence Service (1947-1978). His appointment in 1979 as Security Co-ordinate appears to be the first occasion that he visited the Province.
36. All material relating to Oldfield has been made available to HIA Inquiry, in full, to enable the Inquiry team to conduct a comprehensive review of information held on the SIS corporate record. SIS has also ensured that all requests received from the HIA Inquiry for access to additional records or answers to questions that have arisen during the review process are handled to the full satisfaction of the Inquiry team.

Signed

SIS Officer A

SIS Officer A

Date

8 DECEMBER 2016