We can then ensure that the local Pressman gets a good briefing on the overall situation and is given plenty of helpful material and IP lines. Here is a recent example from the Peterborough Standard.

We are planning to produce many more regional TV clips and local radio interviews on units and will be discussing those plans in detail with UPOs at a study day on 11 February.

The AIS will seize every opportunity to promote the Army's image through the national Press and TV. One example is a project now in hand to run a series of articles in a Sunday newspaper on the stories behind all the gallantry awards won in this campaign. As you know, because of personal security we are normally not able to give these awards the publicity they deserve, but we believe the stories can be told without using the names of the individuals concerned.

The four targets which CLF's Directive has outlined will obviously change if the pattern of hostilities alters. Please remember that successful attacks on these targets depend very much on the close cooperation by units on the ground and the following of correct procedures.

Let me remind you of the targets:
The denigration of extremist leadership depends on good intelligence (pause)

The separation of extremists from their grass roots support involves identifying divisive themes such as the damage that violence does to the community and cohesive themes such as the part played by the locally enlisted Security Forces.

The defeat of TOM and other subversive organisations requires unit cooperation to promote in Britain respect and understanding for the Army's role in Northern Ireland. (pause)

The exposure of extremist propaganda techniques demands quick reaction and quick reporting. (pause)

To summarise - At the beginning of the presentation we posed the question - Are we winning the propaganda war? I indicated that I believed the correct answer would lie somewhere between the extremes of outright defeat and overwhelming victory.

Success in the propaganda business is very difficult to quantify - the nearest one can get is to try and analyse events in terms of the impact of all the many media outlets right across the board from local newspapers to national TV. Few of us have the opportunity to read more than two papers let alone listen all
the radio and television news programmes. It is therefore all too easy to be riled by one or two unfavourable comments - unfavourable comments are more easily remembered than good. One must however recognise that we will never make a clean sweep in the news - propaganda is a percentage business and I believe that on the whole we are now far more often on the plus side than in the red.

To quote two very recent examples:

- During the spate of hijacking in which roads to the south were blocked the Army was criticised for not moving more quickly to open the main roads. However, when the extent of the booby-trapping of vehicles was publicised and it became apparent that the IRA themselves were unblocking some of the minor roads, the balance swung sharply in our favour. I estimate that we eventually came out with a 60 - 40 lead.

- And when 7-year-old Patrick Toner was killed last week outside Forkhill, we came very close to a 100% favourable Press and media. Accusations that a Security Force controlled explosion had killed him were quickly scotched - even the traditional line that "it is the Security Forces who attract violence" was muted.

There is clearly a great deal more that can be done. But at last, after 5 years, we have a firm information policy agreed by...
Government. We have got, or will soon be getting, the staff and equipment necessary to carry it through.

All we now have to do is to carry the Government along with us.
SECRET and PERSONAL

Secretary of State

Copy to:
CGS
DUS(Army)
DUS(CM)
CPR
D Sy(Army)
Mr J F Waterfield
Mr B Sheldon

Additional distribution:
GOC NI

1800 hrs.

THE CASE OF COLIN WALLACE

The purpose of this minute is to outline the action we propose to take in the case of Colin Wallace. You will remember that he is currently under suspension at North West District, during a police investigation of the circumstances in which a classified document was passed to Mr Robert Fisk of The Times.

The Attorney General's View

2. The police investigation has now been completed and the Northern Ireland Director of Public Prosecutions has reported to the Attorney General. The Attorney General's initial view is that, in view of the low classification of the document passed to Fisk (graded Restricted), legal action would be inappropriate (and in any case unlikely to succeed), and that the appropriate course would be for Departmental disciplinary action to be taken against Wallace. I am under a remit to report to the Attorney General on the action we should take if he decides not to prosecute, following which he will take his final decision.

Action to be Taken

3. I have discussed the action we should take with copy addresses of this minute in the light of the Attorney General’s views. We are clear that Wallace must be dismissed. The Department no longer has any confidence in him, and in any case his actions have been such as to make it necessary to deprive him of his NV clearance, which makes him virtually unemployable.

4. But, because the NV process is itself covert, because Wallace can argue about the degree of discretion afforded him in his job in Northern Ireland and because of the damaging revelations he can make about the Army’s information policy activities in Northern Ireland should he have a mind to do so, this will be by no means straightforward.
5. We must follow the formal procedures for disciplinary charges against civilian staff as set out in Civil Staff Regulations (MOD Manual 11) attached at Annex A. I would propose to present Wallace with the following charges:

a. Having been ordered to hand over his documents in HQNI on posting to NW District Wallace failed to comply with this order in that he retained one classified document.

b. He subsequently improperly passed this classified document, communicated to him in confidence, to a journalist.

c. When challenged, he lied to the police in saying that he had not passed over the document.

d. On his arrival at NW District, he was explicitly instructed by the Army Commander that he was not to deal with press enquiries about Northern Ireland affairs, since these were no longer his concern. Nevertheless he continued to do so.

6. We are agreed that the above constitute the basis of an adequate and defensible case.

7. We have considered whether, as an alternative to straight dismissal, we might offer Wallace the opportunity to resign. We are inclined to think that the advantages are likely to be minimal, while any such action might enable Wallace to claim publicly that we were trying to blackmail him into going quietly.

Possibility of Appeal

8. As Annex A indicates, Wallace has the right of appeal to the Civil Service Appeals Board. Nevertheless, either the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Civil Service Appeals Board always sit as Chairman of the panel hearing the case and is entitled to overrule his fellow assessors. It is therefore open to us to brief the Chairman in confidence on relevant aspects of the case. In any event the final decision rests with me and, even if the CSAB recommendation went the wrong way, I would be entitled to reject its recommendation. It is true that such a rejection might leave us open to an award of damages against the Department, but in our view this would be acceptable.

9. Wallace can also appeal to an Industrial Tribunal. The safeguards set out above are not open to us in this case, but at the end of the day the Industrial Tribunal cannot insist on reinstatement.
Damage Limitation

10. In parallel with the police investigation into this case, HQNI have now completed a full review of the Army Information Service’s ‘Psyops’ or ‘Information Policy’ activities which Wallace might reveal if he were so minded. The resulting report shows that the AIS was engaged in activities which, if publicised, would undoubtedly be damaging. These activities involved not only the dissemination of true, if discreditable, information about IRA members etc on an unattributable basis, but also the dissemination on an unattributable basis of information which was known to be false. Some examples are at Annex B. They include episodes which Wallace has already mentioned to the police. The view of all concerned, including the Army and MID, is that even if all this is publicised we can live with it.

11. I think this is right. At the same time, I believe that you would want to be assured that such activities have ceased and, to the best of our knowledge and belief, we can give you that assurance. We find it the easier to do so because of a forthcoming change in arrangements for information services in Northern Ireland. It has now been announced that Mr J H G Leach CSS will be appointed on secondment from the Diplomatic Service as an Under-Secretary in the Northern Ireland Office with responsibility for overall direction and control for Information Services. This change in organisation will give the Army the political direction for its information policy for which it has pressed for some time. In the context of Mr Leach’s appointment CSS is writing to the COG to direct him to ensure that the Army Information Services in Northern Ireland are not to carry out “disinformation” activities, and that if any such activities are undertaken, they are only to be carried out with the specific approval of the Northern Ireland Office through Mr Leach. In addition, we are making sure that within the Ministry of Defence, it is clearly understood that the PR organisation is in no way to be associated with the organisation and planning of “Psyops”, “Information Policy” or “dirty tricks”, call it what you will.

12. If you have your general approval for the action set out above, I will make arrangements to see the Attorney General as soon as possible and report to him the disciplinary action which we plan to take in this case.

30 April 1975

3 SECRET
PROCEDURE IN DISCIPLINARY CASES

1510. Whilst undue formality is undesirable, and no one standardized practice would be applicable in all cases, the procedure set out below is to be followed as closely as practicable when an officer is alleged to have committed a disciplinary offence.

a. He is to be given a written statement defining the charge made against him, and setting out particulars of the facts relied upon to support it.

b. He is to be told that he may consult a friend, a colleague or a representative of a recognized staff association before making his reply, and is to be given facilities for so doing. He is always to be required to submit a written reply to the charge, and is to be given at least seven clear working days in which to submit it.

c. If, in his written reply, he disputes any of the allegations made against him, or if he wishes to plead extenuating circumstances, he is to be given the opportunity of representing his case orally before the head of establishment, etc, or an officer (other than his immediate superior) deputed for the purpose. The officer so deputed is to be normally at least two grades senior to the person charged.

d. In representing his case orally he is to be allowed, if he so desires, to be assisted by a friend, a colleague or a representative of a recognized staff association. A statement of his oral representation is to be taken at the time of the hearing, and is to be seen and signed by the person charged.

1511. The head of establishment, etc, may dismiss a charge or dispose of it where the appropriate punishment lies within his delegated powers. If he is in any doubt as to whether the appropriate procedure for punishment, he should consult the next higher authority or MOD (CM(GC)1).

1512. When two or more members of the staff are jointly involved in irregularities which result in disciplinary action, the cases of all concerned are to be considered and disposed of together. For example, if two persons are jointly involved in a disciplinary matter but the head of establishment, etc, considers that the penalty to be awarded to one of them is outside his delegated powers, both cases are to be submitted to the next higher authority or the Ministry of Defence as appropriate. Similarly if an industrial and a non-industrial are jointly involved, both cases are to be dealt with together and if one lies outside delegated powers both are to be submitted to the next higher authority or the Ministry of Defence, and also to the appropriate industrial management authority.

Punishments

1513. Disciplinary offences may be punished by one or more of the penalties set out in Annex 15A. When a reprimand or a more severe punishment is awarded, the offender is to be notified in writing of it, and required to acknowledge the letter by signing and returning a copy of it. Copies of letters issued by heads of establishments, etc, awarding a formal punishment are to be sent to the appropriate civilian management division for insertion in the record of the individual concerned.

1514. Dismissal. Where dismissal has been the punishment, the officer may have the right of appeal to the Civil Service Appeals Board (see Chapter 8), usually within 21 days, and he must be informed of this right in the letter notifying him of his dismissal. The decision to dismiss must not therefore be implemented until:

a. The expiry of the 21-day period, or

b. Any earlier date on which the officer indicates in writing that he does not intend to appeal, or

c. If he appeals, the date on which the outcome is known;

but the officer is to be suspended from duty without pay from the date of the letter informing him of his dismissal.

Appeals

1515. An officer may appeal against a punishment, other than dismissal, under the grievance procedures laid down in Chapter 10. He may therefore make representations to the permanent Under Secretary through normal official channels or through his staff association.
EXAMPLES OF INFORMATION POLICY ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMY INFORMATION SERVICE KNOWN TO COLIN WALLACE

William Craig - Niedermeyer

1. In an article in The Times on the 25th March this year Fisk alleged that an officer attached to 39 Infantry Brigade had at the time toured newspaper offices in Belfast suggesting that a Protestant politician was in some way involved in the disappearance of Niedermeyer in December 1973. This is clearly a reference to the rumour then prevalent that Niedermeyer had had a liaison with Craig’s wife. Although there are no records to that effect it seems highly probable that the rumour was in fact put about by the PRO of 39 Bde.

The Shooting of Jim Bryson

2. Bryson was shot by the SF at a time when feelings between the IRA and the UIRA were running particularly high. At the time there was some doubt in the public mind as to where responsibility for the shooting lay. It is true, as Wallace has alleged, that Faura Drum, Vice President Provisional Sinn Fein, in a speech implied that the UIRA were responsible but none of the Press cuttings available indicates that the Army attempted to implicate the UIRA or made any reference to letters being found by Army units.

Soviet Involvement in Irish Troubles

3. The report in the Daily Express in January 1972 about the sighting of a Soviet submarine off the Londonderry coast was almost certainly originated by the Army (in consultation with MI6 and SGO). Wallace’s allegation that the Army contributed photographs of a submarine in the area are incorrect.

The Price Sisters Handkerchiefs

4. Wallace was instrumental in the production of a "memorial" handkerchief to commemorate the death of the Price sisters. The handkerchief was photographed and a copy was passed to the Daily Telegraph to support a story that it had been found in the Maze and was connected with a callous premeditated propaganda plot by the IRA to exploit their martyrdom. The Daily Telegraph published the story on the 12th January 1974. There is no record of the terms in which Wallace briefed the Daily Telegraph.

The Ulster Citizens Army

5. The UCA is a shadowy virtually unidentified group which broke away from the UDA in October 1972. Since that date its title has
been used by the AIS on a number of occasions as a vehicle for launching IP projects. For the most part these operations were conducted successfully and securely. However, in the latter stages the Press came very close to exposing Army involvement. This came about as a result of Wallace's hitherto undisclosed personal connection; he appears in some way or other to have enjoined the husband of his former mistress in the plot and consequently placed both himself and the project at risk – to say nothing of the unfortunate victim.

The Clockwork Orange

6. This was the title of a project involving the "planting" of an account of the organisation and activities of the PIRA purporting to have been written by a PIRA deserter. It was not in fact issued but it is of interest in at least two respects. It is a fair measure of Wallace's competence in the IP field and his encyclopaedic knowledge of the subversive scene in Northern Ireland. It also demonstrates Wallace's determination – with whatever intention – to take an independent line even to the point of disobeying instructions. Although, in this instance, he had been instructed not to proceed he nevertheless addressed a catchment letter in the form of a forgery to Gerald Kemp of the Daily Telegraph whose response entailed the CIO attending a meeting with Kemp in the Europa Hotel. Despite the embargo on premature action Wallace nevertheless – in advance of clearance – again acted independently by offering the story to another correspondent and in doing so enlisted the services of an NCO in the AIS. For a variety of reasons the project has not been cleared.
THE CASE OF COLIN WALLACE

You will have seen the Secretary of State's minute to PUS of the 9th May agreeing with the course of action proposed in PUS's minute of 30th April. PUS saw the Attorney General this morning and was told that the Attorney General has decided not to prosecute. Arrangements are being made to inform the Northern Ireland Director of Public Prosecutions of the Attorney General's decision and, through him, to call off the RUC investigation. Mr Sheldon will let me know as soon as this process has been carried out and we shall then be in a position to proceed with disciplinary action against Wallace. I have suggested to Mr Sheldon that the GOC North West District should inform Wallace that he is not to be prosecuted at the same time as the written charge sheet is handed to him; he will confirm as soon as possible that he and his colleagues are content with this arrangement, which has both presentational and practical advantages.

2. PUS would now be grateful, therefore, if:

a. DUS(CH) would stand ready to arrange for the GOC North West District to see Wallace in order to inform him that he is not to be prosecuted but that Departmental disciplinary action on the lines proposed in DCH/8/10 of 2nd May (not to all will now be taken.

b. DUS(Army) would consider and advise him on what procedures might be appropriate to satisfy the Secretary of State on the points made in para 3 of his minute.

13 May 1975

M J V BELL
FS/PUS
14th May, 1975

Dear Sirs,

The Attorney General has now considered the papers relating to the alleged unauthorised disclosure of an official document by John Colin Wallace, formerly a senior Information Officer at Army Headquarters at Lisburn. In particular, the Attorney has read the interim police report dated 19th March, 1975.

The Attorney General is of the opinion that the interim report discloses clear evidence of an offence under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, 1911. Both the Attorney General and his predecessors have felt it proper, in exercising their discretion on the granting of a consent to a prosecution under section 2, to take account of the circumstances of the offence, the nature of the document or information which has been disclosed, and the balance of public interest. Further, the Attorney General has in mind the recommendation of the Franks Committee in this regard. Having considered these factors, including the probability that the public interest might better be served by disciplinary proceedings than by a prosecution, the Attorney General has decided that he would not consent to a prosecution in the present case.

I would be grateful if you could inform the R.U.C. of this decision, and of the reasons for it.

Yours sincerely,

C. B. Shaw, Esq., Q.C.,
Director of Public Prosecutions,
Royal Courts of Justice (Ulster),
Belfast, BT1 2NX,
Northern Ireland.
MR J C WALLACE, BIO HQ NORTH WEST DISTRICT

1 I have been asked by Sir Michael Cary, the Permanent Under Secretary of State, to refer to your minute of 30 April addressed to Director of Security (Army) and to inform you that the Attorney General has decided against prosecuting Mr J C Wallace in the matter which led to the police enquiries to which you referred in that minute.

2 It does however appear that Mr Wallace has been in breach of discipline as a Civil Servant. You are therefore requested to see Mr Wallace and to inform him that

   (i) you have been informed that no prosecution against him is intended as a result of the recent police enquiries into his conduct;

   (ii) you have reason to believe that he may have been guilty of breaches of discipline, as set out in the attached sheet, which should be handed to him (in final form).

3 You are also requested to arrange for this office to be informed by telephone when the above interview has taken place, and for Mr Wallace's reply to the charges, when received, to be forwarded to me, with any comments you may care to make.

4 The guidance in MOD Manual 11 paragraph 1510 should be followed. Any enquiries about procedure should be directed to me.

W. GERAGHTY
General Officer Commanding
North West District

1. I have read the charges made against me alleging breaches of discipline amounting to serious misconduct.

2. I wish to strongly contest these charges on the grounds that they are inaccurate and that considering the background circumstances prevailing at the time when these offences are alleged to have taken place, I did not act in a manner which amounts to serious misconduct.

3. May I respectfully request that I be given an opportunity at the earliest possible convenience of presenting my case orally to someone fully conversant with Army information activities in Northern Ireland.

[Signature]
J C Wallace
Senior Information Officer

20th May 1975

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE
SUMMARY NOTE OF ORAL REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO MR J D GROVES, CPR, ON FRIDAY 10th MAY BY MR J C WALLACE, SIC, IN REPLY TO THE CHARGES PREPARED AGAINST HIM

PREAMBLE

1. Mr Groves advised Mr Wallace that, Police enquiries having resulted in a decision not to prosecute, the Department had now to consider what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken in respect of the matters with which he had been charged. The fact that the appropriate authorities had decided not to prosecute did not dispose of the question of discipline, nor did it imply that nothing serious was involved. The Department took a serious view of breaches of security by responsible officials especially if it appeared that these were not simply the result of misadventure. The Department had to have confidence that its officials would adhere strictly to instructions in matters where security was involved. Hence the reference in the charges to "serious misconduct".

2. Mr Wallace, having confirmed that he understood these points, was invited to present his answer. He was told that a note would be taken and that where necessary he might be asked to elucidate points or to resolve any apparent inconsistencies.

STATEMENT BY MR WALLACE

Background

3. Mr Wallace explained that he had elected to make oral representations because of the complex nature of the background to his actions. He began by referring to the Ulster Workers Council strike in May 1974 which had been supported by certain MPs from both Stormont and Westminster and had led eventually to the collapse of the Ulster Executive. He stated that at that time, apart from his normal PR duties which included the production section, he was also acting as "unattributable briefing officer" on behalf of the Information Policy Branch, and in this last role he had been directed to launch a series of actions to coincide with an Army arrest operation. The Police had not been informed and had subsequently protested about some of the arrests made.

4. Continuing, Mr Wallace said that when Mr Cudlipp, previously of The Times, was appointed Information Adviser to the Secretary of State antagonism developed between Cudlipp and Mr Fisk, a Times correspondent, who thereupon waged a campaign against Cudlipp from information provided by the Loyalists. Towards the end of the summer of 1974 the Loyalists had told the Press that Mr Wallace was himself a participant in operations against them. The Press, however, had taken no action on this allegation.

5. Mr Wallace said that later, when an Army unit had started an operation against the IRA, Fisk had been invited to an interview by the IRA leadership and handed a copy of a document alleged to be black propaganda prepared by the Army unit concerned. Friction had continued to develop between Fisk on the one hand and Cudlipp and the Northern Ireland Office on the other and Fisk had prepared a report based on a Northern Ireland Office confidential document. Fisk's report had been seen by Mr Wallace who reported back to the Army.
6. When Mr Wallace was told of his appointment to N.W. District he had spoken to Mr McBride and to the Chief of Staff because of the inferences which might be drawn and the possibility of allegations by the Press. Mr Wallace said that, as a result, the Chief of Staff had agreed to look into the possibility of a delay in the appointment but in the event the Press had learned of his departure only after he had left on leave. He had, however, returned to Lisburn later and visited journalists to explain his departure as a normal career move. He had then learned that the Guardian, Sunday Times and Daily Telegraph had begun to investigate rumours of black propaganda by the Army and himself but that these investigations had been dropped. He stated that the Sunday Times had also advised him that they had heard from the Ministry of Defence, and in Ireland, that he had been removed from his post.

7. Mr Wallace referred to a farewell party which he had given on 30 January 1975 to introduce his successor. A few journalists, including Pisk, had been unable to attend, but Pisk had invited Mr Wallace to have a drink with him on 1 February. Mr Wallace explained that Pisk was writing a book and was the journalist whom he most feared. The book had been discussed on 1 February when it became clear to Mr Wallace that Pisk had knowledge of the workings of the Information Policy Committee and probably of its operations. An forged IRA document had also been discussed and Mr Wallace asserted that he had told Pisk that the use of such documents was frowned upon by HQNI. Having explained to Pisk that on the previous day a conference had been held to discuss Information Policy he had then told him the basis of the policy laid down by HQNI.

8. Mr Wallace then went on to say that on 2 February he had lunched with Mr David Blundy of the Sunday Times who had confirmed that he had received information from the Ministry of Defence and Northern Ireland that Wallace's posting was not voluntary. Having received this information from two sources Mr Wallace had now become worried and had reported it to Mr McBride. His main worry was about Pisk who he believed had accepted instructions he had told him about instructions issued by HQNI. However on 4 February, to try to convince him, he had picked up some PR photographs and a copy of the script for the study day and called on Pisk. Pisk was out and Mr Wallace said that as he was due to sail from Ireland that evening he had decided to leave the document and to telephone from the office later. He made this call, one from the ferry and a third the following morning, all without success. He had learned later that Pisk was in Dublin.

CHARGE (a) After being ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel J D Railton, HQ Northern Ireland, on 31 January 1975 to give up documents in your care before your posting to N.W. District, you nevertheless intentionally retained an official document classified RESTRICTED, namely a draft of the Army Information Services presentation for the Commander, Land Forces' study of 31 January 1975.

9. In reply to a question from Mr Groves, whether the facts stated in this charge were correct, Mr Wallace said that the date of the interview with Colonel Railton should read 1 or 2 February.
He explained that he had handed over his job in two parts. The PR aspects he had handed to Mr Winterford on 30 January but the Information Policy matters, including all accountable documents, were transferred to Colonel Railton progressively from 1 February. He had understood Colonel Railton’s instructions to relate to IP documents, not to PR documents which he considered the study day paper to be. He had in fact prepared part of it himself.

He said that during part of the IP turnover to Colonel Railton other people had been present but not for the whole time. He explained that the turnover consisted mainly of selecting from three filing cabinets those briefing documents which Colonel Railton decided that he wanted. They included only three accountable documents. The keys of the office had not been formally handed over as office accommodation was to be re-organised on his departure. He did not know who occupied his office subsequently. Mr Groves advised Mr Wallace that the account of the handover received from N. Ireland differed from that which he had just given. Having noted this, Mr Wallace went on to say that he considered the document referred to in the charge to be not an IP document but one intended to illustrate policy to units. Any confusion arose because there were two meanings to the words “Information Policy”.

10. He also agreed that he had handed over his duties to Mr Winterford and Colonel Railton but he did not consider that he had completed his duties in N. Ireland since he still had six feature articles about N. Ireland to complete for the Press and it had been agreed that he would return at weekends to discuss IP matters with Colonel Railton. Replying to Mr Groves he said that he could not say for certain that it was understood by Colonel Railton and Mr McDine that he would continue to deal with the Press. He thought, however, that Colonel Railton had been present when he had discussions with a member of the Press. He was not sure about Mr McDine but Mr Winterford had not known as he was not taking over IP duties.

CHARGE (b) You subsequently improperly passed this classified document to a person not authorised to have access to it.

11. Mr Wallace confirmed that he did not challenge the classification of the document nor the fact that he had left it for Fisk.

12. Mr Wallace continued by saying that over five years he had briefed from both Restricted and Confidential documents. On occasions the only method of proving facts was to show the actual document. He considered this to be covered by Section 2 paragraph 1a of the Official Secrets Act. He believed that his IP handover had not been completed and since the threat of exposure of IP operations was the most serious to have faced him he considered his actions in handing over the document to Mr Fisk to be within the requirement to safeguard this information. He believed there to be nothing in the document which was unhelpful to the Army provided that the Press understood the meaning of IP which he was sure they did. He said that giving the document to Fisk would effectively prevent him from releasing the information about IP operations.
SECRET

CHARGE (c) You falsely stated to the investigating Police that you had not so retained and improperly disposed of the aforementioned document.

13. Mr Wallace explained that when he was questioned on 5 February there were two Policemen present; one from the Lancashire Constabulary and one from the RUC. He stated that certain IP operations with which he had been associated had not been released to the RUC and had been denied at senior level. He could not therefore discuss them in the presence of a member of the RUC. On the departure of the Police he had tried to contact HQNI for advice and eventually on 7 February he had spoken to Colonel Railton and offered to return to N. Ireland. Possibly because the facts could not be fully explained by telephone Colonel Railton had advised against his return. Mr Wallace had then sought and obtained an interview with CFR on 11 February and later the same day had made a full statement to the Lancashire Police. About two weeks later he had also discussed the matter with the RUC. Mr Wallace explained that he had not in fact denied leaving the document for Pisk. He had stated to the Police only that the last time he had seen the document it had been in his in-tray. He accepted that this was untrue.

CHARGE (d) After posting to the N.W. District, you continued to answer Press enquiries about Northern Ireland affairs after 6 February 1975 although you have been explicitly instructed by me on that date not to do so.

14. Mr Wallace said that he had been seen by the GOC on 7 February and had been asked by him to avoid commenting on matters going on in N. Ireland. He had subsequently had several contacts with the Press but only in relation to outstanding points and historical matters. Following his suspension on 11 February he had been seen again by the GOC on the 13th when he was told that he might stay in the Mess but should remain out of sight to avoid contact with the Press. He had then made arrangements to accept calls only from journalists having a legitimate reason to speak to him on matters outstanding. He had explained to these that he was on leave and would contact them later. In about mid-March he had again been contacted by two journalists. On both occasions the calls had come through between 6 and 7 in the evening and it was not known that they were from the Press until they had been accepted. Mr Wallace stated that he had told each caller that he was on leave and had given the names of the official PR contacts for N. Ireland.

15. In March the Daily Telegraph had complained to MOD that they could not contact Mr Wallace and in the week before Easter the GOC had told him of this and again warned him not to talk to journalists. Mr Wallace said that since his suspension the only other journalists to whom he had spoken were two whom he met on the journey when he returned to Northern Ireland.
SUMMARY

16. Mr Wallace summarised the reasons for his actions as:—
Fisk with his good sources in Stormont and the RUC was a threat.
If he, Wallace, had resigned or remained in N. Ireland he would
have been at risk of being shot because his position with the
Services had been compromised.

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY MR GROVES

17. Having received confirmation from Mr Wallace that he had
completed his representations Mr Groves reminded him that a record
of what he had said had been made. He must not assume that the
explanations given had necessarily been accepted as valid. He
would be given an opportunity to see and comment on the record
of these discussions and to make additional points in writing if
he so wished.

.............

Record seen and agreed, subject to the following observations:—

(J C Wallace)
June 1975
SUMMARY

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Fisk with his good sources in Stormont and the RUC was a threat.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS BY MR GROVES

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of what he had said had been made. He must not assume that the
explanations given had necessarily been accepted as valid. He
would be given an opportunity to see and comment on the record
of these discussions and to make additional points in writing if
he so wished.

Record seen and agreed, subject to the following observations:—
Para 4. Line 5. Delete " provided by the Loyalists " and substitute " leaked

to him from the Northern Ireland Office."

Para 4. Line 7. After "in " insert " black propaganda."

Para 5. Line 1. After " an " insert " in "

Para 5. Line 6. Delete " provided a paper " and substitute " written a story."

Para 5. Line 8. Delete " paper " and substitute " copy of the NIO document."


Para 7. Line 6. After " feared " insert " regarding the possible exposure of

Army and NIO in operations."

Para 7. Line 12. Delete " conference " and insert " study period for units."

Para 7. Line 12. Delete " information policy " and insert NQMI policy on

press information."

Para 9. Line 5. Delete " on " and substitute " by."

Para 10. Line 3. After " had " insert " briefings for."

Para 10. Line 5. After " awk discuss ? insert " outstanding."


Para 10. Line 8. After " press insert " on these feature articles."


Para 10. Line 10. Delete " he was not sure about Mr McIlvane but."

Para 12. Line 7. Delete " him " and insert " his department."

Para 12. Line 11. Delete " understood " and insert " believed."

Para 12. Line 11. After "the " insert " cover."


Para 13. Line 15. After " that " insert " in his statement to the police."


Para 16. Line 3. Delete " or " and substitute " and."

MOD Docs - annotation added by the HIA Inquiry
May the following representations please be taken into consideration, in addition to those made by me to Mr J D Groves, CPR, on Friday 30th May 1975.

1. During my IP handover, Lieutenant Colonel Railton had access to all documents, both classified and unclassified, in my possession. Those not selected by him for retention within the IP Branch were destroyed or left in my filing cabinet for use by my successor or as the CI0 directed.

2. Owing to a shortage of time on the day of my departure, I was unable to call on Colonel Railton before leaving HQN. I did however, telephone him from the ferry and confirm that I would be returning to N Ireland as agreed on 14th February 1975 and would call on him to discuss any outstanding IP matters. There was therefore no question of my IP handover being complete when I left the Province.

3. All information was given to Railton on the basis that it would be treated "off the record" or in specific parts, "unattributable".

J C Wallace
5 June 1975

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE
FROM: MAJOR GENERAL K. J. Mc QUEEN

W Geraghty Esq, CB
Deputy Under-Secretary of State
(Civilian Management)
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2HB

HEADQUARTERS, NORTH WEST DISTRICT
CUERDEN HALL, BAMBER BRIDGE
PRESTON PR5 6AY
PRESTON 35436 ext.2

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE
COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Received by
DUS (CM)

Re No. 810

9 JUN 1975

6d June 1975

Dear DUS,

MR J C WALLACE

Thank you for your letter dated 3 June.

On 5 June in the presence of Mr Pomret, District Secretary, I showed
Mr Wallace the top copy of the record of the interview with Mr Groves.

Mr Wallace has today handed in his observations (which he has recorded on
the top copy) together with an additional statement. These two documents are
forwarded with this letter as requested.

With regard to paragraphs 14 and 15 of the record of interview, I have nothing
to add to the statement made in my minute dated 30 May addressed to the Director
of Security (Army).

Mr Wallace knows that a copy of the record of interview is available for his
use and that it is retained in this Headquarters under classified protection.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

[Signature]

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
DUS (CM)

Copy to:
- FS/PUS
- MA/CGS
- DUS(Army)
- AUS(CM)(A)
- D Sy Army
- CM(A)3 (Mr Fairbairn)

MR J C WALLACE

I have read Mr Wallace's amendments with care. Most of them are clarifications of his case. In some cases he has changed what he actually said, but none of these changes basically alter the point he was making. I think I can accept them all.

John G

10 June 1975
MB Ext 7900

J D GROVES
CPR/8
May the following representations please be taken into consideration, in addition to those made by me to Mr J D Groves, OPR, on Friday 30th May 1975.

1. During my IP handover, Lieutenant Colonel Railton had access to all documents, both classified and unclassified, in my possession. Those not selected by him for retention within the IP Branch were destroyed or left in my filing cabinet for use by my successor or as the CIO directed.

2. Owing to a shortage of time on the day of my departure, I was unable to call on Colonel Railton before leaving HQNI. I did however, telephone him from the ferry and confirm that I would be returning to N Ireland as agreed on 14th February 1975 and would call on him to discuss any outstanding IP matters. There was therefore no question of my IP handover being complete when I left the Province.

3. All information was given to Fisk on the basis that it would be treated "off the record" or in specific parts, "unattributable".

(Sgd) J C Wallace
5th June 1975
Mr J G Wallace

1. I refer to the disciplinary charges presented to you by GOC North West District on 19 May 1975, your minute to the GOC dated 20 May, your interview with Mr J D Groves on 30 May and your further written representations dated 5 June. The amendments you proposed to the record of the 30 May interview have been adopted and your statements have been most carefully considered.

2. I regret that I have to inform you that the first two charges against you - namely the unauthorised retention of a classified document and the improper passing of it to a person not authorised to have access to it - have been held to be proved. A most serious view is taken of these breaches of trust by an officer in the position which you held. It has accordingly been decided that you should be dismissed from your employment in the Civil Service.

3. It has been decided to take no further action on the third and fourth charges.

4. You are reminded that you have the right of appeal against dismissal. If you wish to exercise it, you should, within 21 days of receiving this letter, notify the Secretary of the Civil Service Appeal Board, Standard House, 27 Northumberland Avenue, London, WC2M 5BE, of your intention to do so, and inform him of the broad grounds on which your appeal is based. Because of your right of appeal, dismissal will not be implemented before (a) the expiry of the 21 day period referred to above;

(b) any earlier date on which you may indicate in writing that you do not intend to appeal;

or (c) if you appeal, the date on which the outcome is known.

Meanwhile you will be suspended without pay from 1 July 1975 inclusive.
5 Any enquiries you may wish to make about your superannuation rights should be sent to Ministry of Defence CH(A)3.

6 A duplicate copy of this letter is enclosed with an acknowledgement of receipt which you should sign, date and hand back to the officer who has passed it to you.

W. GERAGHTY
SECRET AND PERSONAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone, 01-218 .......... (Direct Dialing)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

4th July 1975

Hidden copies to:
Sir P Cooper MIO
Mr D T Sol
Mr B Sheldon

Internal:
MA/GGS
DUS(CM)
CPR
D Sy(Army)

Sir Michael Hanley KCB

Dear Michael,

COLIN WALLACE

As you know, Colin Wallace has now been informed that he is to be dismissed and has told us that he intends to appeal. The next stage is that Wallace must present his case in writing to the Civil Service Appeals Board, who will forward it to the Department for comment and reply. (Our reply will be shown to him). There will probably then be an oral hearing. Wallace appears for the moment to have abandoned his idea of briefing a solicitor and has gone instead to the TPCS, who have I understand agreed to help him even though he is not a member.

In anticipation of this, I had a strictly private and personal word yesterday with Jock Shaw, the Chairman of the Civil Service Appeals Board. I started out by:

a. Rehearsing the charges against Wallace.

b. Outlining in the most general terms Wallace’s connection with "information policy" in Northern Ireland.

c. Explaining that both the circumstances and the nature of the man made it possible that the hearing would be attended by damaging publicity.

I went on to say that I had asked Jock for this meeting for two reasons. First, while we had no wish to embarrass him by pressing on him information which did not relate strictly to the charges and would not be used in "open court", the fact was that, as he no doubt realised, the formal charge was merely the tip of the iceberg and, if he would find it useful, I would be prepared to consider arranging for
him to have a briefing on the general background to the case. I added that the decision was not up to me since other Departments, such as the NIO, were involved but that if he were interested I would see what could be done.

Secondly, I said that I wanted to ask his advice about how the hearings should be handled in order to minimise the risk of publicity.

Jock Shaw, whose background in personnel security work enabled him without difficulty to read between the lines, reacted very helpfully indeed. On the first point, he said that it would undoubtedly be of assistance to him if he were able to be fully briefed on the background. As to the second point:

a. he said it was open to him to choose his two fellow Assessors. He had it in mind to pick those whom he had used for the hearing. Not only in his opinion were they absolutely reliable, but also, and from our point of view even more important, he felt that if he, having been briefed on the background, asked them to take his word on its significance and relevance, they would do so.

b. He said that there was no formal understanding about hearings 'in camera', the problem never having arisen so far, but remarked that the Press had been excluded from the hearing in which they had shown some interest. He offered to discuss this point further with the GDS at the GSD. (I said that this would be very helpful).

c. He pointed out that because [Protection of Identity] had threatened to use the documents produced at the hearing in a book he was writing, legal arrangements had been made to limit the use of the documents to the appeal only. I doubt if this will be of much help to us, since our main worry is unattributable stories, but it may be worth bearing in mind.

The purpose of this letter then is to seek your agreement, and Frank Cooper's, to briefing Jock Shaw on the background to the case. What I have in mind - and he agreed - was that we should put together a dossier of the key documents and allow him to sit in a corner of my office and read it. He would not take the documents away, nor would he wish to (though it would also be most helpful if you could make available your Case Officer to answer any supplementaries).

The dossier should, I suggest, consist principally of the following items:

2.
SECRET AND PERSONAL

a. Frank Cooper's letter to Douglas Allen of 25 September 1974, setting the investigation in train.

b. Frank Cooper's letter to me of 11 December 1974, together with the associated Security Service report and the reports from A-Protection of Method.

c. The sensitive report of the exchange between Fisk and Wallace on 4 February 1974.

d. The HQNI report prepared for Bernard Sheldon and forwarded to me by the GOC on 15 April.

This approach may appear somewhat unorthodox but nonetheless there does seem to me to be a strong case for giving Jock Shaw access to the background in order to satisfy him that the Department's actions were not, as might be concluded from the overt facts of the case, an over-reaction to what could at its most serious be described as an individual error of judgment, but rather that it was the final step in a series of events which convinced us that, whatever Wallace's motives, we could no longer continue to employ him in public service. Conversely, I think there are virtually no risks involved. Certainly, insofar as the documents lie within my discretion, I am completely happy to act in this way. Jock Shaw is absolutely trustworthy and the information would not go beyond him. (I should say here that I hope everyone concerned will respect Jock Shaw's confidence in a meeting which, to use his own words, 'did not of course take place').

After Jock had returned to his office, he rang my Private Secretary to let us know that Wallace's letter to the CSAB stating his intention to appeal had now arrived and that, in his view, there would be merit in acting as quickly as possible.

I should be glad to discuss with you and Frank Cooper should you wish.

Yours ever,
Michael
WALLACE - LINE TO TAKE WITH BILL MCCALL.

1. In our view, the charges for which Wallace was dismissed will stand up by themselves.

2. Nevertheless, as I am sure you will realise, there is more in this than meets the eye. To judge by what Wallace has told us, his case will hinge on the extent of his discretion. And there is no doubt that Wallace was permitted a wide degree of discretion. For one thing, as you will no doubt now know, Wallace was a key man in the Army's black propaganda or "disinformation" activities in Northern Ireland, and partly because he had an encyclopaedic knowledge of the Irish Sea.

3. Wallace's use of his discretion was, however, beginning to give the management serious doubts about his judgment and/or his loyalty. Indeed on at least one occasion his actions directly endangered the lives of innocent people [the mistress' husband episode].

4. We had therefore decided that it was essential to do something about Wallace but precisely because of the fuzziness of such questions as discretion, we thought it would be wrong to take disciplinary action and decided to move him.

5. We took action finally because in the case where he was dismissed the management were in no doubt that Wallace had no discretion and because, secondly, in our view the nature of the document# was especially damaging despite their relatively low classification. (Quot paras # and # of OGS's minute at annex).
D-MI5 Officer

K. R. B. (and Security Service) briefed Jock Stone, Chairman of the CSAB, yesterday again the background to the decision to dismiss Ms. Wallace. The briefing was well received and Stone was apparently satisfied that the Department's decision was justified. When he had left, the Department's statement in response to Wallace's appeal, he will seek a word with you with a view to deciding what he needs to say to the two other Ministers.

Michael B. has meanwhile suggested that you might care to bring Frank Cooper up to date, by writing to him along the lines of the attached.

[Handwritten note]

22.7
SECRET
SECRET AND PERSONAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 8000 (Switchboard)

23rd July 1975

Sir Frank Cooper KCB CMB
Northern Ireland Office
London SW1

Hidden copies to:
DUS(CM)
GPR
Mr Sheldon

WALLACE

The purpose of this letter is to bring you up-to-date on two developments in the Wallace case.

First, I had a visit last Friday from Bill McCall of the IPCS (Wallace's staff association from whom he has asked for assistance in his appeal). I suspected that he might have it in mind to press me on the severity of the sentence, and I was ready to go as far as I possibly could without compromising Wallace. I told him to explain that, although we thought the charges would stand up by themselves, they were merely the tip of the iceberg. But this was not the case at all. Bill brought with him a letter from Peter Broderick (formerly CIO at HQNI and now in DOE) to the IPCS which made two main points:

(a) he not only offered his support for Wallace at the Civil Service Appeal Board but also inferred that he would be willing to take him on in the Department of the Environment;

(b) there was a most serious risk to Wallace's life if the activities in which he had been engaged came out.

Bill said that, had he been me, he would have taken the action we did (though the IPCS would still give us a run for our money at the CSAB); but he feared that we might not be fully aware of the extreme damaging revelations which Wallace might make, and asked us whether we had considered transferring him to another Department.
I told Bill that so far as damaging revelations were concerned, it was true that we could not be absolutely certain that we knew everything that Wallace had done (let alone what he might invent) but I thought we had a pretty good idea of the dimensions of the problem. I added that we had taken all reasonable steps to ensure that the fac did not come out publicly and that Wallace's security and safety rested in his own hands. As to the question of a transfer, I said that we had considered it very carefully at various stages of the game. The problem was that we could not possibly give him the kind of chit which would make him saleable to any Department one could think of. I said that Broderick's letter did however add a new element to the situation and I would look at it again.

I subsequently consulted John Groves and Bill Geraghty. Their advice, with which I fully agree, is that the situation is not materially altered by Broderick's intervention. It is not up to Broderick alone to take Wallace on in DOE, and leaving aside the desirability of having these two together again, we should still be faced with the problem of selling Wallace to DOE management. In any event, it is not possible at this point to revise our decision to dismiss. If, however, Wallace were successful in his appeal, and our decision to dismiss were reversed, this would be a new situation and we could look at the possibilities again in that light. I have written to Bill on those lines.

Secondly, Jock Shaw, the Chairman of the CSAB, came in for the briefing which you and Michael Hanley kindly agreed. I was not able to see him myself, but Michael Bell and [redacted] of the Security Service briefed him on the lines proposed in my letter to Michael Hanley. Michael Bell tells me that the briefing went very well. Shaw departed saying that he had been convinced, particularly by the [redacted] that the Department's decision was fully justified. He proposes to await the official Departmental statement in response to Wallace's appeal (which is in the course of preparation) and will then consider what he needs to say to his two fellow Assessors. He has promised to come and talk to me again before he speaks to them. Michael Bell and [redacted] both stressed that he must not mention and the report based on them, and this he fully accepts. But it will be a matter of judgement, which we can discuss at the time, how far he need go into the murky waters of "information policy".

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Hanley.

Yours, etc.

Michael,
MR J O WALLACE

1. I attach the final draft of the Department’s memorandum on Wallace’s appeal. The amendments to the previous version have in the main been agreed by all concerned, but there has been some rewriting. If any copy addressed has further comments, perhaps they would telephone them to you — or to me if they raise points of substance — before close of play on Thursday 31st.

2. You will then I hope be in a position to send the final version with annexeures to the Board on Friday 1 August.

3. PS/TUS will note, ref para 4a of his minute of 29 July, that I have left in the job description as contained in the trawl and added an explanation which covers the point that some unattributable briefing was involved. To leave out any reference to the duties of the post would I think look odd to the Board.

29 July 1975

W GERAGHELY
DUS(OM)
MB 7217
Ertn 6833
CONFIDENTIAL

MR J C WALLACE, SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICER, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
APPEAL TO THE CIVIL SERVICE APPEAL BOARD AGAINST DISMISSAL ON
DISCIPLINARY GROUNDS

STATEMENT BY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Introduction

1. This statement is in reply to a notice of intention to
appeal to the CSAB by Mr John Colin Wallace, aged 32, who is
currently suspended without pay from his post as Senior
Information Officer at Headquarters, Northwest District,
Preston, and who has been informed that he is to be dismissed
on disciplinary grounds.

Civil Service Career

2. Mr Wallace joined the Ministry of Defence (Army Department)
as an unestablished Assistant Information Officer on 1 May 1968
for duty in HQ Northern Ireland. He was selected for an
Information Officer post in that Headquarters and took up post
as an acting unestablished Information Officer on 2 March 1970.
Following success at a Civil Service Commission Open Competition
he was established on 14 December 1971.

3. On 8 July 1974 Mr Wallace was granted temporary and
geographical promotion to Senior Information Officer to fill a
new post in HQ Northern Ireland pending the outcome of a trawl
to fill it permanently. He subsequently applied under the trawl
and on the recommendation of a Departmental interview board he
was confirmed in the appointment as a substantive Senior
Information Officer on 27 September 1974. The job specification
was:

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"As Head of Production section the successful candidate will be the manager of Photographic Printing and Editorial PR Units, which produce amongst a wide variety of items a weekly troops publication "Visor". The successful candidate will also be required to do a full share of in-depth briefing of visiting journalists on both background to, and the current situation in, Northern Ireland."

The briefing activities referred to came in practice to include unattributable briefing of the type mentioned by Mr Wallace in his interview with Mr Groves on 30 May 1975 (paragraph 3 of Annex B refers).

4 Throughout his service in the Ministry of Defence Mr Wallace has earned favourable reports from his superiors in Northern Ireland.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

5 Towards the end of 1974 it was decided, both for management reasons and in the interests of Mr Wallace's career, that he should leave Northern Ireland, where he had then served for over six years, to take up a vacant Senior Information Officer post in Headquarters, North West District, Preston. He was informed of this decision by the Deputy Chief of Public Relations, MOD, at an interview on 24 December 1974. At a further interview with Mr McDine the Command Public Relations Officer, HQU, on 7 January 1975, it was arranged that Mr Wallace should travel to
England on 4 February to take up his new appointment. Meanwhile he was to take leave, returning on Monday, 27 January. He was instructed to hand over a part of his duties to his successor, Mr D A Winterford, and the remaining part to a military officer on the HQ staff.

Lt Colonel J D Railton. The handover to Mr Winterford was completed on Thursday 30 January and to Colonel Railton on Friday 31 January, on which day the Colonel instructed Mr Wallace to hand over all classified documents in his possession.

6. On Tuesday 4 February, Mr Wallace delivered a copy of a draft of an Army information services presentation for the Commander, Land Forces, which was classified "Restricted", to the home of a newspaper correspondent. This action, which Mr Wallace has admitted, led to police inquiries but no charges were preferred.

7. On receiving advice that no prosecution was intended, the Ministry of Defence commenced disciplinary action under normal Civil Service procedures. Mr Wallace was seen on 19 May by Major General K J McQueen, GOO North West District, in the presence of Mr F Pemfret, the District Secretary, and charged with four offences. A copy of the charges is attached as Annex A. Mr Wallace elected to make oral representations in his defence and he was interviewed for this purpose by Mr J D Groves, Chief of Public Relations, in the presence of Mr R T Fairbairn of the Civilian Management division on 30 May.
A written record of the representations was made and, with certain amendments, was agreed by Mr Wallace. Copies of the statement with the amendments incorporated, and of an additional written statement dated 5 June, are attached as Annexes B and C.

Mr Wallace was informed on 25 June that his representations had been considered. The first two charges had been held to be proved but it had been decided to take no further action on the third and fourth charges. He was told that he would be dismissed. A copy of this memorandum is at Annex D.

Department's Reply to the Appeal

Mr Wallace does not dispute the fact that, without authority, he retained a Restricted document after 31 January and later passed it to a journalist; but he claims that this was done with the intention of safeguarding the interests of the Department, and that it was in accordance with "his terms of reference" and the nature of his duties.

10. The Department cannot accept such an explanation. The MOD Civilian Staff Regulations require all staff to make themselves fully aware of the requirements of the security regulations which apply to them (MOD Manual 11 para 1103). MOD Security Regulations define the Restricted category as information the unauthorised disclosure of which would be undesirable in the interests of the nation. Quite apart from this, Mr Wallace committed his offences after he had relinquished his post in Northern Ireland when, whatever his interpretation of the
duties of that post, he must have known that they were no longer his to discharge. It is a normal part of a handover of duties to leave an account of any unfinished or pending business. If Mr Wallace had believed that the disclosure to a selected individual of certain classified material, relating to the post he had left, would have been of benefit to the public service, his right course would have been to have put a suggestion in those terms to his successors or to his late superiors. He could easily have done so, since he remained in touch with them until 4 February, when he left for England. He did not do so, nor did he indicate to them his intended activity even when, as he said in his statement to Mr Groves (paragraph 8 of Annex B) he reported his concern about the situation to Mr Mcine between 2 and 4 February. He did not even, before his departure on 4 February, report to them what he had done. Had he in fact sought permission for his proposed action he would certainly not have received it.

In concluding that Mr Wallace should be dismissed the Department took full account of what he had said in his defence, but considered that it only confirmed that the offence was a premeditated and wilful misuse of the access to special knowledge and material which he had gained from his late appointment.
FILE DCM 8/10/1
PT 2

Security Mr JC Wallace - Risks
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

The Institution of Professional Civil Servants

NORTHUMBERLAND STREET - LONDON - WC2N 5BS - Telephone: 01-930 0755

STATEMENT by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants on behalf of Mr. J.C. Wallace.

INTRODUCTION

1. This statement is in reply to a statement made by the Ministry of Defence to a notice of intention to appeal to the CSAR by Mr. John Colin Wallace, who is currently suspended without pay from his post as Senior Information Officer at HQ, Northwest District, Preston, and who has been informed that his is to be dismissed on disciplinary grounds. Because of the peculiarities of this case it was decided that the normal order to submission of cases would be reversed.

CIVIL SERVICE CAREER

2. The details of Mr. Wallace's career record contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Ministry's statement are correct. We do however wish to amplify the section dealing with the Job Specification, in order to establish that Mr. Wallace was engaged on special work for the Department which has been called by a number of names, psychological operations, information policy, but to the layman is perhaps best described by the term 'Black Propaganda'. Since our case is based on the premise that within the context of this kind of activity Mr. Wallace's actions are understandable.

3. The job specification quoted deals only with the straightforward IR duties, which were subsequently handed over to Mr. Waterford. The psychological operation duties, and unattributable briefing duties, were handed over to Ealling. The job specification dealing with the latter duties is "E-Transmission Method" and the Department ought at least to have referred to its existence.

4. The Ministry state in their document that Mr. Wallace earned favourable reports from his superiors in Northern Ireland, we have reason to believe that this is an understatement.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

5. The activities of Mr. Wallace as an Information Officer in Northern Ireland involved him in work which required decisions and action relating to the Department's relationship with the Press, in a situation which was unique for a civilian Civil Servant to find himself in. He was in short engaged in the black propaganda war which accompanied terrorist activities such as we see in Northern Ireland. For a number of reasons we do not wish to give a detailed account of specific instances, not the least of which are the security aspects of such activities, and the danger such revelations might engender for Mr. Wallace and other Civil Servants working in Northern Ireland. We would therefore hope that the Department would accept that Mr. Wallace's duties included the following activities:

- Unattributable briefing of journalists which included the revelation of privileged and sensitive information.
- Operations to discredit individuals and cause disaffection within organisations which very often had serious consequences for the

/PEOPLE
people so acted against.

Operations designed to result in a 'favourable press' for the Department and Government, by countering hostile propaganda.

(If was an operation of this type, countering hostile propaganda, from which the incidents in this case arose).

6. We would submit that these kind of activities carried out with varying degrees of supervision called for decisions to be taken based Mr Wallace's 6 years' experience of the Northern Ireland situation. In other words he was expected in the normal course of his duties, to give information to the press which was of a classified nature, and in so doing often had to exercise his judgement as to how much of such information he could reveal. We also submit that Mr Wallace was expected to make authoritative judgments about the effect any information he conveyed would have on the interests of the Department.

7. We agree with the contents of para 5 of the MOD Statement up to and including the penultimate sentence, but the events described therein are worthy of further explanation. Between the interviews of 29 December and 7 Jan, Mr Wallace saw McBlay, and pointed out the construction which might be placed upon his sudden departure from Northern Ireland. Since he had been accused of engaging in 'black propaganda operations' by a terrorist group some two weeks earlier. Representations were subsequently made by HQ Northern Ireland to MOD, with a view to delay the posting. At the 7 January meeting he was informed that the transfer would be delayed by a month and that there was no reason why he should not take his previously arranged leave during that period.

8. Coming to the last sentence, the events of the nine days prior to Mr Wallace's departure, did not go according to plan. The contents of that sentence describes the proposed programme for the handover, in actual practice Colonel Rainiot was not available on 31 January, since he was fully committed to the Commander of Land Forces Study Period (note the presentation to which the document in question refers), and Mr Wallace took leave that day in order to complete his domestic arrangements prior to departure. The actual handover was more hurried than chaotic operation, and occurred during the course of the next few days, whilst the normal operations of the office continued. Indeed the events of 1 February prevented the handover being completed, and Wallace arranged to see Rainiot about outstanding points on 1 February. With regard to the document in question its classification was low, and it was not accountable, it fell in the PR side of the job, but required no further action by Wallace's successor.

9. Mr Wallace agreed that he delivered the document in question to the home of a Newspaper correspondent, but maintains that this action was taken in connection with the duties of the post he had occupied, and was in effect a last attempt to clear up an operation which he had been carrying out since his return from leave on 27 January, and was part of the measures employed by the Department to convince the press that his transfer had no connection with the accusation of Black propaganda activities. Rainiot and McBlay were involved in this operation.

10. During the last few days of Mr Wallace's duties, it became obvious to him that one journalist did not accept the innocence of his departure, and was determined to pin the Black propaganda story on the Army Information Service, and
Mr Wallace in particular. Mr Wallace thought that following his verbal claims, by showing him the document in question, he would convince him that the Army did not indulge in such activities, and that the proof lay in the revelation of the policy as described in the document.

11. Although it might not be immediately obvious to a reader of the document how it could prove the Army’s innocence, what is abundantly clear is that it does not contain any evidence, which could be used against the interests of the Department. The idea was to show what the current official policy was, as presented to the Senior Staff concerned on the Government side as recently as 4 days earlier.

12. These actions can be justified by the policy laid down in the AIS handbook annex B, 'Countering Hostile Propaganda':

Para 7
"The prime objective of all Commanders shall be to pre-empt hostile propaganda by:

(a) explaining policies, operations and techniques to be used in advance, to those affected, so that motives cannot be misinterpreted...

Para 7
"Among the means which can be used to pre-empt or counter hostile propaganda are...

(b) operations to demonstrate that accusations are obviously not true."

13. In claiming that his actions were in accordance with the above instructions we would draw the Board’s attention to the contents of the document in question and the following points it makes:

1) It calls for a more effective PR campaign,

2) It stresses that 'truth' is a constraint on any PR operation as are also legal, and political considerations;

3) It contrasts these constraints, with the comparative freedom from them enjoyed by the IRA;

4) It then goes on to suggest practical ways a more effective campaign can be carried out, with illustrations, etc.;

5) It also calls for the use of 'white propaganda' in a more positive way;

If Mr Wallace had been concerned to show that the journalist's suspicions were true, we would submit that this document would not have been used.

14. As stated previously the handover period was a 'ragged' operation, and Mr Wallace took the view that he was still concerned and responsible to see that an operation, which was designed to clear his name of an accusation by a terrorist group, was successfully completed.

15. In practice the operation went wrong, but the ensuing article (annex A)
was not as damaging as it might have been, but still contained some embarrassing material.

CONCLUSIONS

16. We have attempted above to explain the actions of Mr Wallace, against the background of a situation which is unique to the experience of the vast majority of Civil Servants in peacetime. The details are a mesh of clandestine activities, by which people attempted to use the news media in order to either 'get across their message', or counter the enemy's propaganda.

17. The question to be answered is whether Mr Wallace's actions were those of a loyal servant of the Department, taking action in a situation in which he saw great danger to the interests of the State, or those of a traitor deliberately betraying his employer by passing on information which would be helpful to those who sought to oppose the interests of the State.

18. Throughout this case it has never been suggested by the Department that Mr Wallace's actions were of a criminal nature. Indeed, it can be supposed that since these actions were the subject of policy investigations from which criminal proceedings did not ensue, that such proceedings were unjustified. At worst he can be criticised for an error of judgement either in deciding to reveal the document or in keeping it in a place where other people might find it. The board will hear from Mr Wallace's former superior officer a testimony as to his character and loyalty, and we would submit that in all the circumstances of this case, and given the admitted previous outstanding reports on his performance as an Information Officer, the Department are being unduly harsh in dismissing him.
NOTE FOR FILE

Mr Fairbairn rang to say that a new Chairman has been appointed - Sir Leslie Williams - who would like a similar briefing to that given to his predecessor. Would Mr Broadbent be willing to provide this, or would he prefer that someone else should do it? Sir Leslie would like to come at 3.30 on Wednesday 8 October.

4.10.75
I attach my notes for Friday as revised by our discussions this morning.

15 October 1975
J D GROVES
MB Ext 7900
CPR
Mr Wallace has admitted the offence for which he has been dismissed. He has pleaded justification. The basis of this plea is that in the years he worked in the Army PR at Lisburn his undercover job was one of considerable sensitivity dealing with counter-propaganda.

Mr Wallace entered the Service as an Assistant Information Officer in 1968 and was promoted to Information Officer and later to Senior Information Officer. His reports were very good.

There is no dispute that during his tour in Northern Ireland Mr Wallace was involved in counter-propaganda work. But I must make it clear that Mr Wallace was at no time authorised to pass classified documents to unauthorised people. Any proposal to do so would have required the approval of the Chief Information Officer at the HC, and he would not have taken a decision to do so without reference to higher authority. We cannot therefore agree that Mr Wallace's action was covered in any way by the degree of discretion given to him in his former duties.

Moreover the offence was carried out after he had completed his tour and handed over. It was committed after he had formally been instructed to hand over all classified documents and after he had said that he had done so. It is evident that in spite of that instruction and his answer, Mr Wallace deliberately deceived his employers by retaining
the document and passing it to Mr Fisk. He says that this was done as a last act of helpfulness - to combat a story he believed was about to be written. He had discussed his concern about such a story with Mr McDine, the CIO. Even in normal circumstances he would surely have consulted the CIO on how he intended to deal with it as this would surely be an important issue involving a national newspaper, and moreover the paper dealt with IP/PR - the subjects for which Mr McDine was entirely responsible. Yet even though he proposed to pass the document after he had handed over his duties, he did not tell Mr McDine of his intention. He did not tell Colonel Railton. He did not tell his successor, Mr Winterford. There was ample opportunity to do so. Yet by handing over the document he was clearly creating a situation they would have to deal with after his departure. It was placing Fisk in a position of initiative and knowledge of which the PR staff remaining at Lisburn would be totally unaware.

Not only did Mr Wallace intend to pass the document to an unauthorised person; when he found Mr Fisk was out, he put it through the letterbox, thus widening the possibilities of those who might see it. This in itself was surely a highly irresponsible action.

Mr Wallace has challenged the date of the handover. We are quite clear that it was completed at about 2100 hours on Friday 31 January. Colonel Railton was accompanied by a Mr Puttock. If the Board wishes to hear first hand evidence on this point, Colonel Railton is here today. Mr Wallace has suggested that it was agreed that he would carry on
dealing with Northern Ireland matters. Colonel Railton will tell you that this was not so. The only outstanding point was the completion by Mr Wallace of certain biographical notes on journalists serving in the province. It was agreed that Mr Wallace would let Colonel Railton have these when he came back on 14 February to collect the remainder of his kit.

It has been suggested that this document was not harmful and therefore this was no more than a technical breach of the rules. This has been most carefully considered. In the first place the document was a policy document for limited consideration within the security forces at a senior level. Secondly, the Ministry of Defence and the Northern Ireland Office take a different view of the effect of handing this particular document to a journalist who was working with a greater freedom of action for different objectives. They consider it was unhelpful, indeed potentially damaging.

As head of the MOD PR organisation I take the view that a Press Officer is in a very special position. His daily duties give him access to people eager to obtain information of all sorts. He has greater opportunities to harm the Government than many civil servants and therefore carries a considerable responsibility. In turn the Government must have complete confidence in his judgement and loyalty. Of course he sometimes has to exercise judgement in how far he goes orally. But classified documents which can be quoted or even reproduced in the Press are a different matter altogether. If a Press Officer breaches the trust placed in him by the Department by passing - either deceitfully or through lack of judgement - a classified document to a journalist, I do not believe that trust can be restored.
but quite apart from my own view as Chief of Public Relations, I have to say that the Department consider that Mr Wallace's actions even if well intentioned were sufficiently ill judged to result in forfeiture of trust.

Mr Wallace's offence was a premeditated and wilful misuse of special knowledge and material for which he had no authority and which he did not report despite the opportunity to do so. The Department concluded that in the circumstances, despite his previous good record, they could no longer employ him in a position of trust or responsibility and that he should therefore be dismissed.

Finally Mr Wallace has referred to and quoted from memory from a document he calls the Army Information Service Handbook. Mr Wallace is wrong. His reference is plainly to a classified draft of an annex to the Information Reference which was under consideration at the time he left Northern Ireland. It was never cleared and never published. It therefore has no status.
1. Mr Wallace appealed to us against the Department’s decision to terminate his appointment on disciplinary grounds. He was charged with:

   a. retaining a document classified "RESTRICTED" and passing it to a person not authorised to receive it; and
   b. carrying out the duties of the post after he had relinquished it.

   Speaking on the appellant's behalf Mr Crook (IPCS) said that because of Mr Wallace's excellent record and loyalty to the Crown he did not deserve dismissal. His action was understandable at the time.

3. It was put to us that the activities of Mr Wallace as a Senior Information Officer in Northern Ireland involved him in work which required decisions and action relating to the Department's relationship with the Press, in a situation unique for a civilian Civil Servant. Mr Wallace was considered an expert in his job.

4. Mr Crook went on to say that Mr Wallace did not dispute the fact that without authority he retained a Restricted document and later passed it to a journalist, but he claimed that this was done with the intention of safeguarding the interests of the Department and that it was in accordance with his terms of reference and the nature of his duties. It was hoped the Department would accept that Mr Wallace’s duties included unattributable briefing of journalists which sometimes included the revelation of privileged and sensitive information. He often had to exercise his judgement as to how much information he could reveal.
5. Between the interviews of 24 December and 7 January Mr Wallace pointed out that a false construction might be placed upon his sudden departure from Northern Ireland since he had been accused of engaging in 'Black Propaganda operations' by a terrorist group some two weeks earlier. Mr Wallace was informed that the transfer would be delayed by a month and that there was no reason why he should not take his previously arranged leave during that period.

6. Mr Crook went on to say that one journalist in particular was disposed to pin the Black Propaganda story on the Army Information Service (AIS) and on Mr Wallace personally. Mr Wallace thought that by showing him the document he (Mr Wallace) could convince the journalist that the Army did not engage in such activities. Mr Wallace took the restricted document to the home of the journalist, and, getting no reply, pushed it through the letter box.

7. Mr Crook said that Mr Wallace had had excellent reports and a good record, and because of this error of judgement the Department's decision to dismiss him was to brand him as disloyal by implication.

8. Mr Broderick said that an essential part of Mr Wallace's job was to gain the total confidence of the Press and to convince the journalists that he was a reliable source of information. In this job he was second to none - his long term and intimate knowledge of the Irish scene made him an invaluable contact for the Press.

9. Mr Broderick went on to say that Mr Wallace was capable of an error of judgement, particularly against the background of six years under constant strain and pressure, but he could not conceive of any situation in which Mr Wallace would act maliciously against the interests of the Crown and the Army.

10. Mr Wallace said that he was required to exercise his discretion in giving information to the Press. He added that there was nothing in the document which was not common knowledge, and he knew of documents of a higher classification which were shown to the Press and which are still classified. He agreed he had made an error of judgement in leaving the document at the home of the journalist but said that he believed his decision was right at the time.

11. Replying for the Department Mr Groves said that Mr Wallace's previous good record was not in dispute. There was a general rule that no classified document should be passed to unauthorised persons. Mr Wallace had left a copy of a classified document at the home of a newspaper correspondent without telling the Chief Information Officer what he had done.

12. Mr Groves went on to say that it was directly contrary to regulations to hand over a document and any decision to show a document would have to be made at senior level. Mr Wallace who was well aware of the rules handed over the entire document. The Department considered this action a serious error of judgement and one which could
not overlooked. Furthermore this offence was committed after Mr Wallace had relinquished his post in Northern Ireland when whatever his interpretation of the duties of that post, he must have known they were no longer his to discharge.

13. It was put to us that if Mr Wallace had believed that the disclosure to a selected individual of certain classified material relating to the post he had left, would have been of benefit to the public service his right course of action would have been to put a suggestion in these terms to his successors or to his former superiors. He could easily have done so since he remained in touch with them until 4 February when he left for England. He did not even report what he had done. Had he in fact sought permission for his proposed action he would certainly not have received it. In summing up the Department considered that the offence was a premeditated and wilful misuse of the access to special knowledge and material which he gained from his previous appointment.

14. The Board have considered very carefully the statements submitted and the submissions put to us at the hearing. We conclude that there is justification for the Department's decision that Mr Wallace's services cannot be retained. However, having regard to his previous good record of service, if Mr Wallace wishes to offer his resignation we recommend that the Department should accept this as an alternative to dismissal.

SIR LESLIE WILLIAMS CBE
MR A F J GRANT CB FICE
MR T J HIGGS JP

Civil Service Appeal Board
Standard House
27, Northumberland Avenue
London WC2N 5BE

October 1975
5 Arne Walk,
Blackheath,
London SE3

27th November 1975

Dear Mr,

I write to inform you that I wish to resign from my post as Senior Information Officer with the Ministry of Defence.

Please accept the effective date of my end of employment as 31st December 1975.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

J. C. Wallace

Ministry of Defence
M (A) 3
Jacon House
London WC1X 0HW
13th December 70

Dear Mr. Groves,

My very sincere thanks for all your kindness and understanding during my recent problems. My apologies for all the embarrassment caused to you and your staff. I hope the matter now dies.

Naturally I feel very bitter at the whole episode but I realise that to contest the outcome any further would not be in anyone's interest.

Please give my regards and belated congratulations to
David, I hope he has now recovered from his illness and has taken over the 'hot seat'.

I hope to meet you again at some date in the future, but in the meantime, may I wish you a very happy Christmas and a less hectic 1976!

John Rawlinson

CPO Walla O
I had lunch today with Mr Roland Moyle who told me that Mr Colin Wallace had been to see him as he was now one of his constituents. Mr Moyle knows very little about the background to the whole case.

2. Briefly, what Mr Moyle told me was that Mr Wallace had been to see him; had argued that he had been unfairly treated; and was asking that he should put his case to the Secretary of State for Defence.

3. Mr Moyle said that Mr Wallace had told him that both he and his wife were under threat. Mr Wallace was still unemployed.

4. Mr Moyle indicated that what had struck him about why Mr Wallace had put his points forward was first that he had been given a very strong character reference by Mr Broderick (I borrowed the text of this from Mr Moyle, and a copy is attached - I imagine it was in relation to the Appeal Board procedure, though it is somewhat odd in many ways); but it appeared to be admitted that his life was apparently at risk. Was it perhaps the case that he had been treated rather harshly; was there not perhaps a case for finding him another job in the Civil Service?

5. I explained to Mr Moyle that the case had been gone into very thoroughly; and Mr Wallace’s posting to Preston was purely temporary while the necessary investigations and consideration was given to his case; and that Mr Wallace had appealed, but had been turned down. Moreover, there is a great deal more to it than meets the eye and, if my memory serves me correctly, there was a clear and continuing evidence of disloyalty over a very considerable period of time.

6. Mr Moyle asked that he should be given advice on how to deal with the case, and perhaps you would consider, in conjunction with John Westfield, how we could best deal with it. So far as I am aware, Mr Moyle has not mentioned the matter to the Foreign Office.

6th May 1976
IN CONFIDENCE

CIVIL SERVICE APPEALS BOARD

Statement

I am Peter Broderick, employed in the Civil Service for 16 years and now a Chief Information Officer (A). From July '73 until September '74 I was Head of Army Information Services, Headquarters, Northern Ireland, in the rank of Chief Information Officer (B). Colin Wallace was on my staff as an Information Officer and later as Senior Information Officer.

My statement concerns the work and character of Colin Wallace, but to do this I must set the scene. It is an important factor in this case and I believe that it has been much misunderstood and resented by some in Whitehall.

At the start of the present troubles in Northern Ireland, Army Public Relations consisted of two civilians - one senior and one Assistant Information Officer (Colin Wallace). It was geared for peacetime tasks largely slanted towards recruiting. At that time, the Army did not have a clear appreciation of the operational necessity of press and public relations because they had never operated against insurgents within the borders of the United Kingdom before under the close scrutiny of over 200 resident press-men. The two civilians found themselves operating a 24 hour press service, 365 days a year. This situation continued for three years. When the lessons had been learned the hard way, mixed military and civilian public relations reinforcements were drafted in over 30 of them to do the work that the two incumbents had managed. Even so, the Army recognised that the personal strain was such that military personnel usually did 6 month tours in Northern Ireland; one did more than 2 years without relief. Citizen Management made no alteration to their peace-time procedures whereby staff were expected to remain indefinitely. (They now have - but only since this case arose.)

Under the strain, the Senior Information Officer became ill and largely ineffective. The Army by this time had become keen converts to the need for active public relations as an integral part of their operational capability, and became impatient with the Senior Information Officer who was neither well enough nor personally trained for an operational role. Consequently, and with the full agreement of the Army in Whitehall, a separate military staffed unit was set up in Northern Ireland, literally on the other side of the corridor from Public Relations. Under the title of Information Policy, its brief was to use psychological means to assist operations strategically and tactically. It is a skill that requires sensitivity, political finesse, and a thorough knowledge of the situation.....

The military approach - with officers who had a minimum of theoretical training and no practical experience - would have been doomed to embarrassing failure. They had even forgotten the one basic essential - a channel of communication to enable them to transfer their thoughts and ideas into effective coverage by the press.
Colin Wallace, at first, became the pawn in this game. Though on the staff of public relations, he was used by Information Policy as their outlet to the press. He also had 'knowledge of the Irish situation', which was totally unique in the Headquarters and surpassed that of most of the Intelligence Branch. As time progressed, he was not only the main briefer of the press, but also the advisor on Irish matters to the whole Headquarters and - because of his personal talents - contributed much creative thought to the Information Policy Unit. In order to do his job he had constant and free access to information of high classification and extreme sensitivity.

The attitude of the MODPR organisation in Whitehall to the activities of Information Policy Unit was one of extreme suspicion. Wallace's dual role was particularly resented by Whitehall, while highly valued by the operation commander in Northern Ireland. The Senior Information Officer had by now become very ill and was retired.

I was posted to Northern Ireland in a high rank deliberately to take over both Public Relations and Information Policy and mould them into one unit. This I did - but I confess that it took only a few weeks on the ground to realise that the Whitehall 'defensive' approach to Army Information work was totally inappropriate to the Northern Ireland situation. I was instructed by my Generals there to use public relations and information policy techniques in direct support of their military objectives, and this I willingly did in direct liaison with the Northern Ireland Office and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

In reorganising, one of my first actions was to legitimise the role of Colin Wallace and to allocate him firmly to Information Policy. As it involved an upgrading, we were put in the difficult position of having to trawl the post publicly to comply with civil service rules and we could scarcely mention psychological warfare. A device was therefore agreed for a cover title as 'Head of Production Services' - but the trawl did not mention briefing of the press as an important function.

Wallace's primary job was to win friends among the press and to gain their total confidence as a reliable source of information. By agreement with Intelligence in each case; he was supplied with selected information about terrorists, their activities, their sources of money and arms at home and overseas, of the allegiances of so-called innocents and such matters. This - together with his long-term and intimate knowledge of the Irish scene - made him an invaluable contact for the press. Almost all of his background briefings he gave non-attributably - and it is a measure of his skill and the regard for him by the press - that I cannot recall a single occasion when any reporter, even from the hostile papers, disclosed the source of the briefings.

To my knowledge, he worked at least 80 hours a week - coming to his dorm every day. He lived in the Officers' Mess and regarded himself as always on duty. He has never claimed long-hours gratuity nor overtime as a matter of principle. During my 15 months' duty, I doubt whether he ever left the camp area (except on accompanied duty) more than a dozen
times - until the last few weeks when he found himself a girlfriend who is now his wife. Upon my arrival I found that he had taken virtually no leave for 6 years except to attend his Territorial Army Camp. For about two nights each week, he served with the Ulster Defence Regiment which meant going on armed patrol from 8pm until dawn and getting no sleep.

Colin Wallace - though very sociable - is basically a self-contained and private individual with, I understand, a strong religious upbringing. He has very little in the way of human safety-valves. Upon my arrival, it was obvious that not only he, but the rest of the civilian staff, had been under strain for some time - and in Wallace's case for six years.

Though inevitably much of the strain is imaginary and anticipatory, there is a very real physical threat: Not only from random bombs and shootings, but particular threats to members of the Army Information Service's staff who are - in all senses - targets for the terrorists. Wallace was licensed by the Chief Constable to carry a personal protection firearm: Such licences were not issued lightly.

He was not always the easiest person to manage: His enthusiasm and dedication sometimes outran his judgement. His personal pride made it difficult for him always to acknowledge mistakes. His self-contained personality meant that I personally could never guess just how deep the communication between us really was. But these are all human factors which, once a manager has recognised them, can be taken into account; and they pale into insignificance compared to the plus points.

I do not hesitate to say that Colin Wallace is the best thing that ever happened to Army Public Relations in Northern Ireland; that if it had not been for his talents, knowledge and efforts the Army could well have lost the propaganda war; and I could not wish to meet anyone more dedicated to the Army than he was and, so obviously, still is. He acted resolutely and to effect against anyone - republican or loyalist - who was destroying his country. His name is well known in Ulster in terrorist circles. Under no circumstances could he ever return. His successes there for the Army means that he is now banished for ever.

The particular incident which this Board is now considering happened after my departure from the scene. Some facts have been made available to me. Knowing Wallace and how deeply he feels about his work, knowing Robert Fisk and his particular style, knowing my successor, and above all knowing the atmosphere and pressures of Northern Ireland, I venture to say that Colin Wallace is capable of an error of judgement; particularly against the background of six years under constant strain and pressure; but I just cannot conceive of any situation in which he would act maliciously against the interests of the Crown and the Army.